

NAQSHBANDIS

IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL ASIA



Edited by Elisabeth Özdalg

SWEDISH RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN ISTANBUL 1999

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NAQSHBANDIS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL ASIA CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

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Edited by Elisabeth Özdalga



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Front cover: Calligraphy in the form of a dervish headgear saying: "Oh, His Excellency Sultan Muhammad Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband al-Bukhari" (Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6, p. 38, Istanbul 1994).

Back cover: Calligraphy from the beginning of the nineteenth century saying: "Seyyid Sultan Muhammad Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband" (Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6, p. 34, Istanbul 1994).

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Preface

One of the significant characteristics of modern society is the development of mass movements. It is especially during the twentieth century that the momentum of the grass-roots has influenced the course of political developments. In this, as in so many other respects concerning the development of modern society, Western countries have been in the lead. The prototypes of modern mass movements and the variety of ideologies that have rendered them identity, are characteristically European.

The Muslim world was drawn into the process of modernization at a later stage than the West. As a matter of fact, one of the agonizing issues of today's world politics is that of Islam having been drawn into this process under the domination of the West, allegedly against the will of the Muslims themselves. Whether agreed to or not, as a result of this process, many Muslim countries now show all the marks characteristic of a modern mass society. It may seem paradoxical, but an important rationale behind a large number of Islamic oppositionist mass movements, constitutive parts of modern society, is exactly the bitterness against the undesired influence from the West.

A hasty glance at the rapid proliferation of different social movements in the Muslim world would have it that these are relatively new phenomena caused by confrontation between Islam and the West and/or traditional Muslim societies and modernity. This is evidently true, but admittedly only partly true, for a closer look at the forces behind political activism in the modern Muslim world reveals that the "new" social and political movements often are deeply rooted in very old cultural and political traditions of these societies.

In this respect, there is a striking difference between the Muslim world and the West. Whether they were based on liberalism, socialism, even conservatism, or their hybrids such as Christian Socialism, National Socialism or Fascism, the modern social and political movements of the West broke off more sharply against their past traditions than the Islamic movements apparently have. Closer allegiance to the symbols, values and meaning structures of the old Islamic heritage seems to play a significant role in many Islamists' orientation towards the modern world. Their recognition, utilization, and celebration of the values and practices of the past seems to constitute an important part of what may prove to be a specifically Muslim way "to and through modernity."

The importance of old religious and cultural traditions in the formation of life in modern society is focused upon in this book on the Naqshbandī. The Naqshbandī order constitutes one of the leading Sufi (mystical) orders (*tariqa*) in the Muslim world. Its history dates back to fourteenth-century Bukhara in Khorasan, where Bahā'al-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1389), the eponym of this branch of Islamic mysticism, lived as a leading Sufi sheikh. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Naqshbandī order developed into a world-wide organization, spreading to areas culturally and geographically as distant from each other as Central Asia, Eastern Turkestan, India, China, Afghanistan, and the then Ottoman Empire (including the Balkans). Especially important for the diffusion of the order was Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) from India, who, at the turn of the first millenium, became one of its great innovators. This granted him and his followers the epithet *mujaddid* (renew-

er). He is not only well-known for his great wisdom, but also for his powerful personal involvement in social and political affairs. Ahmad Sirhindi was deeply influenced by Khoja 'Ubayd Allah Ahrār (d. 1490) from Samarqand, another socially and politically powerful Naqshbandī sheikh, who has gone down to posterity as an outstanding personality.

Yet another prominent Naqshbandī sheikh and renewer was Mawlānā Khālid (d. 1827), who belonged to a Kurdish tribe in what is today northern Iraq. Since he spent his most influential years in Baghdad, he has gotten the epithet "Baghdadī". Like Ahmad Sirhindi he was influential enough to initiate a new Naqshbandī sub-branch, called Khālidiyya. It was to a great extent under the influence of the Khālidī branch that the Naqshbandī order markedly increased its influence over nineteenth century Ottoman society. The legacy of Mawlānā Khālid is still strong in both present-day Turkey and Syria.

Generally speaking, the influence of the Naqshbandī order, as a religious as well as a social institution, has not abated. Its authority over ruling elites as well as common people has naturally shifted over time and developed differently in different parts of the world, but through widely shifting historical and geographical conditions, and against the challenge coming from modern society and secularism, the Naqshbandī have preserved a core of beliefs and rituals which still provides this *tariqa* with a strong identity of its own.

It would be too much to contend that the Naqshbandī have proved to be immuned to secularization. No religious institution with as close ties to state and society as the Naqshbandī could be expected to remain untouched. But in spite of all the strong forces of contemporary society working in the direction of rationalization, critical self-reflection, and scientific thinking, it is striking how much of confident and honest religiosity is preserved among its adherents while maintaining a strong involvement in the running of worldly affairs.

Outsiders trying to understand the role of the Naqshbandī in today's society often mistake their involvement in worldly affairs (as economic entrepreneurs, state officials, or political activists) for simple worldliness. It is indeed easy to judge the political and economic networks established by the Naqshbandī as if they constituted their primary aim, with religious involvement being nothing but a pretext, an ill-disguised cover for crude economic and political interests. However, this picture is too simplistic to really make sense. While it is true that the religious experience itself is inaccessible to anyone but the initiated, this does not prevent the outside observer from recognizing its influence over people's deeds. A feature of the Naqshbandī tradition, as it has taken shape through history is the idea of a double responsibility: towards this world and the other world. This position seems to be as valid now as it was hundreds of years ago and constitutes an important key to the remarkable persistency and integrity of this movement.

As a sociologist, I cannot help reflecting over the specific features of the Naqshbandī *tariqa* as an organization. It seems that we are faced with two different principles of organization. On the one hand, the Naqshbandī order contains the characteristics of a formal institution, where individuals are subjected to long training and inviolable rules. On the other hand, it consists of a conglomerate of loosely associated groups, to which sympathizers can attach themselves freely and casually. The organization is formal and non-formal, institutionalized and non-institutionalized at one and the same time. The relationship between a sheikh and his disciple (*murshid-murid*) is an example of a compelling, imperative kind of relationship, while the fact that there is a lack of strong restrictions against the setting up of new *tekkes* (dervish lodges) illustrates a looser kind of relationship between lodges. So, while the structure

within a *tekke* may be hierarchical and authoritarian, the relations between *tekkes* are often less restricted. This combination of a rigid, authoritarian structure with an open, tolerant one seems to have turned the *tariqa* into a powerful form of organization, and may help us understand the secret behind the fact that the order has been able to live on until our own days.

The articles on which this book is based are papers read at a conference entitled "Patterns of Transformation among the Naqshbandīs in Middle East and Central Asia" held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 9-11 June, 1997. The conference was part of a two-year program of activities at the Institute focusing on the wider topic, "Islamic culture." The aim of the Naqshbandī conference was to address problems of recent change among the Naqshbandī in the Near East and Central Asia. Keeping in mind the long history of this religious institution, the aim was to encourage analyses along a *longue durée* perspective. In light of that objective studies focusing on Central Asia gained special significance, since these areas are the original homeland of the Naqshbandī. But it was crucial to focus on Central Asia for yet another reason; this concerns the fact that its peoples have only very recently come out from a seventy-year long communist dictatorship, where religion was severely suppressed. From this fact stems many questions related to what will happen to Islam in general and the Naqshbandī in particular as conditions in this part of the world get a chance to normalize.

At a time when the term "globalization" has become such a prestigious word, it is worth recalling how "international" people living many generations before us really were. The Naqshbandī have played an important role in building and maintaining international networks for many centuries. This book opens with a chapter by Hamid Algar, where attention is drawn to this fact. Hamid Algar presents an analysis of how Sheikh Nidāī of Kashghar (d. 1760), in the capacity of a wandering mendicant, for more than forty years travels to a large number of holy sites in Turkestan, later on turns south to Kirkuk, Mosul, Aleppo, Jerusalem and the Hijaz and how he finally settles in Istanbul, where he is appointed the first sheikh for a newly opened *tekke* in Eyüp. This example illustrates how the Naqshbandī order for many centuries bound together the three main regions of the Sunni Muslim world: the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.

Dhikr (*zikr*) - the repetitive invocation of the name of Allah - is an often practiced ritual among all Sufis. Many Sufi orders practice the *dhikr* collectively, with intensive and emotion-laden expressions, where the partakers move their bodies rhythmically as they loudly pronounce the names of Allah. The Naqshbandīs are traditionally known for greater self-restraint. Making the respect for the Islamic law - *shari'a* - a high priority, the members of the Naqshbandī order have generally been regarded as more sober and orderly in their religious practices than other Sufis, who have developed more ecstatic forms of worship. *Dhikr* is practiced also by the Naqshbandī, but usually not as the so called "vocal (loud) *dhikr*," but as "silent *dhikr*." Even though silent *dhikr* generally has been referred to as one of the most characteristic distinguishing marks between the Naqshbandī and other Sufi orders such as Qadiriyya ("whispering" versus "jumping" dervishes) historical records show that both forms of *dhikr* in fact have been practiced by Naqshbandī dervishes themselves. This intriguing problematic is addressed by Isenbike Togan in the second chapter. Professor Togan shows that the question of which form of *dhikr* to practice could even stir up controversy between different Naqshbandī groups. She refers to the *Khafi* (those practicing silent *dhikr*) *Jahri* (those practicing loud *dhikr*) conflict in Eastern Turkestan and China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Put into a wider frame of analysis including areas stretching from Central

Asia and China to the Ottoman Empire, and with a time frame extending over a period from Yusuf Hamedani (d. 1139) to Mawlānā Khālid (d. 1827) and Mehmed Zahid Kotku (d. 1980), professor Togan shows that these kinds of controversies in fact were exceptional. Generally, the history of the Naqshbandī on the practice of *dhikr* has been marked by tolerance and non-interference. The author also considers the methodological problems involved and suggests possible ways of explaining and understanding the different attitudes to *dhikr*, by linking them to the shifting political and social contexts.

The subject of the third chapter, written by Jo-Ann Gross, is the well-known *waqf* (foundation) of Khoja Aḥrār (d.1490) in Samarqand and its reorganization after the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1860s. Khoja Aḥrār was an influential and venerated Naqshbandī sheikh, whose *khānaqāh* or tomb complex has been a place of pilgrimage for over 500 years. The fact that the Russian colonial administration initiated a special investigation of the *waqf* in order to put it under control of the colonial administration bears witness to the social and economic importance of the *waqf* holdings. The author argues that the fact that the *waqf* was subject to such an extensive collection of documents reflects the durability and continued influence of the followers of the Aḥrār family in the nineteenth century. The effect of Russian colonialism was, however, that the Naqshbandī communities for the first time in their long history were seriously threatened.

In the following chapter, Butros Abu-Manneh approaches Khoja Aḥrār from a different point of view, namely through a hagiography, called *Rashahāt 'Ain al-Hayat* (Trickles from the Fountain of Life) written by Kashifi, one of Khoja Aḥrār's disciples. The chapter contains an analysis of the hagiography and how it was translated into Ottoman Turkish at the end of the sixteenth century and later, also into Arabic. The book was printed for the first time in Istanbul in 1821 and reprinted several times thereafter. Based on this information Butros Abu-Manneh suggests different ways to interpret this interest in Khoja Aḥrār's life and ideas by people living several hundreds of years after his death.

While the Naqshbandī, due to Russian colonization, suffered several set-backs in Central Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century, they experienced a marked revival in the Ottoman Empire. When Sultan Mahmut II abolished the Janissaries in 1826 and the Bektashi *tekkes* together with them, Naqshbandī groups ended up having a more favorable position than any other Sufi order. In some cases members of the Naqshbandī order were even given responsibility over the dervish lodges formerly belonging to the Bektashi. The question of the relationship between different Sufi orders and the Ottoman state administration is discussed by Ilber Ortaylı, who describes how official Tanzimat policy vis-à-vis the Sufi *tariqa* was characterized by a will to increase state control and create new hierarchical, and modern, forms of organization. It is also shown how, in this process, Naqshbandī lodges and leaders often were granted special privileges.

Vernon Schubel discusses the role of hagiographies in Uzbekistan after the independence from the former Soviet Union. Even if Russian colonization had meant interference in the affairs of the Sufi orders and their *waqfs*, it did not mean a threat to the very existence of these religious institutions. This is, however, what happened during the Soviet era, when most institutions were brought to ruin. Today, when the people in the different republics of Central Asia try to recreate their old religious traditions, they discover that the destruction has lasted for such a long period and been so far-reaching that they have difficulties in finding any living mediators of the old traditions. Based on his own recent research, Vernon Schubel discusses how written sources, in the form of popularized hagiographies play an important role in

the process of reconstructing the Naqshbandī tradition in Uzbekistan. He also discusses a dilemma facing today's Uzbekian authorities, who in their newly started nation-building project, are anxious to support the new interest in Islam (and Naqshbandiyya), without therefore leaving the fields open to religious radicalism and fanaticism.

The three following chapters (Chapters 7-9) concern the Naqshbandī in three areas outside of Central Asia, namely in the Kurdish areas of Iraq and south-east Turkey, Syria and Afghanistan. Ferhad Shakely discusses the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān in northern Iraq, who have been the most influential representatives of the Khālidi branch in the Kurdish areas and elsewhere in the Middle East since the beginning of the last century. Uthman Siraj ad-Din I (d. 1867) from Hawrāmān, was initiated into the Naqshbandī order by Mawlānā Khālīd (d. 1827) in 1811. Ferhad Shakely gives a detailed description of the relation between the sheikhs of Hawrāmān and other Sufi orders like the Qadiriyya and their cultural and political influence in the Kurdish areas up to our own day. One of the most influential successors of Uthman Siraj ad-Din I, Uthman Siraj al-Din II (in Turkish Şeyh Osman, died in Istanbul in 1997, at the age of 101. Since he did not appoint a successor, the future influence of this family on the Khālidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya is uncertain. Parenthetically it can be added that during the Istanbul conference the participants had the opportunity to visit the tomb of Sheikh Uthman II at his *khānaqāh* on the outskirts of the city. We are very grateful to his relatives who generously invited us there for the evening gatherings.

Leif Stenberg takes us to a Syrian branch of the Naqshbandī order, centered at the Abu an-Nur Foundation in the northern part of Damascus and headed by Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, also the Grand Mufti of Syria. The Naqshbandī order came to Syria at the end of the seventeenth century, but the most important personality in the history of the Naqshbandiyya in Damascus was the Kurdish sheikh Mawlānā Khālīd, who moved there from Baghdad in 1822, five years before he died. Sheikh Khālīd's tomb is situated relatively close to the Abu an-Nur Complex, which in turn is close to the tomb of the Islamic philosopher and mystic Ibn al-Arabi (d. 1240). The legacy of the Khālidi branch is strong in Damascus, where all contemporary branches of the Naqshbandiyya have sheikhs with *silsila* (patrilineal genealogy) going back to Sheikh Khālīd. This chapter focuses on the Naqshbandī in present day Syria, and the question of how they adjust themselves to the changing conditions of a rapidly modernizing society. How do the Naqshbandiyya brethren tackle piety and religious traditions as they encounter the imperatives of a modern market economy and the ideals of modern science? Today's Naqshbandis in Damascus are driven by an urge to increase their influence in Syrian society and Stenberg discusses the effects on beliefs and ideology of this concern to reach out to the masses.

Bo Utas' account of the Naqshbandī order in Afghanistan is unique. Spending some time in Afghanistan for research in 1977 and 1978, he happened to be in the country at the very day of the coup d'état, the 27th of April 1978. Between April and June of that year he traveled around to twelve functioning *khānaqāhs*, seven of which Naqshbandī. Keeping in mind that most of the old structures of traditional Afghan society were destroyed in the political events and the civil wars that followed, Professor Utas' observations were done at a very critical point of time and contain information about groups and social networks that are now lost for ever.

The next three chapters (Chapters 10-12) are about modern Turkey. Hakan Yavuz problematizes the role of different Naqshbandī groups on economic, political and intellectual life in post-war Turkey against the background of an historical exposé of the Naqshbandī order. The following two chapters deal with two promi-

nant Naqshbandī sheikhs in contemporary Turkey. The first one is a portrait of Osman Hulusi Ateş (1914-1990), who was born in Darende, a small town in the province of Malatya. The author, Fulya Atacan, describes how Osman Hulusi Ateş, or simply Hulusi Efendi, became a recognized sheikh. His father had belonged to the Naqshbandī order, but it was not clear whether he had been a sheikh or just a *murid* (disciple). What, after many years of religious leadership, enables Hulusi Efendi to acquire the status of sheikh is the fact that he is able to claim that his family descended from the Prophet, i.e. that Hulusi Efendi in fact could be regarded as a *seyyid*. Fulya Atacan has given a well-informed account of other steps in Hulusi Efendi's road to becoming a recognized sheikh, and describes his alliances with local politicians and bureaucrats, which turned him into a personality having not only religious, but economic power and political authority as well.

The second portrait of a contemporary Naqshbandī sheikh is presented by Professor Korkut Özal, former MP for the National Salvation Party (1973-80), who served as Minister of Internal Affairs in one of the coalition governments of the 1970s. It was a great honor for the organizers of the conference to be able to invite Professor Özal. First, because it was valuable to bring along a participant with such deep experience of active Turkish political life, second, because Professor Özal himself has received Naqshbandī training. Professor Özal's account of the well-known contemporary Naqshbandī sheikh Mehmed Zahid Kotku (1897-1980) therefore offers more than just a portrait of a prominent Sufi leader, it also offers an account of Professor Özal's own experience of being his *murid* (disciple) for a period of twenty years. We are grateful for the generous sincerity offered by Professor Özal, to conference participants as well as readers, on a truly personal issue.

As organizer of this conference, I want to convey my deep-felt gratitude to all participants of the conference and to the hosts at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, especially to the director of the Institute Professor Bengt Knutsson, and the assistant Kari Çağatay. I also want to express my thanks to the board of trustees of the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul for their generous financial and moral support. I also owe the copy-editors, especially Çağatay Anadol, Sylvia Zeybekoğlu, Hamdi Can Tuncer, Veli Uğur, and Saliha Bilginer at The History Foundation in Istanbul many thanks for their insightful and patient work. Finally, I also want to thank the HSFR, the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm, for providing the funding necessary for the publication of this volume.

Istanbul in July, 1999.

Elisabeth Özdalga

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From Kashghar to Eyüp: The Lineages and Legacy of Sheikh Abdullah Nidāi

HAMID ALGAR

It is well-known that the earliest presence of the Naqshbandiyya in Istanbul was the result of direct transmission from the Central Asian homeland of the order. This was undertaken by Mollā Abdullah Ilāhī of Simav (d. 896/1491), whose prolonged sojourn in Samarqand and Bukhara culminated in his initiation by the great Naqshbandī master, Khoja ‘Ubaydullāh Ahrār (d. 895/1490), and Emir Ahmed Buhārī (d. 922/1516), a fellow disciple of Ilāhī who accompanied him back to Simav; first Buhārī and then Ilāhī himself moved to Istanbul in order to establish the first Naqshbandī circle in the Ottoman capital.¹ This was but the beginning of a fairly constant flow of Naqshbandīs from various parts of Central Asia to Istanbul, significant enough to result in the foundation of *tekkes* to accommodate them during their stays of varying duration, *tekkes* typically bearing designations such as Buhara tekkesi or Özbekler tekkesi.² The great majority of these Central Asian visitors remained anonymous, having little or no impact on the established Naqshbandī circles of Istanbul, a city which apart from its great cultural and political prestige was for them primarily a staging post en route to the hajj. It was generally from India and the Hijaz, not from Central Asia, that new branches of Naqshbandī tradition were transplanted to Istanbul. There were, however, a number of Central Asian migrants who settled permanently in Istanbul and left something of a mark on the spiritual life of the city.

Particularly interesting is the case of Sheikh Abdullah Nidāi of Kashghar, who had two distinct affiliations to the Kāsānī branch of the Naqshbandiyya, a lineage otherwise little known outside of Central Asia.³ After his arrival in Istanbul, he found favor with Mujaddidī Naqshbandīs, while retaining his own Kāsānī loyalties, and the *tekke* one of these Mujaddidīs founded on his behalf came after several generations to serve — however briefly — as a center of the Khālidi branch of the order. His life and legacy thus serve to illustrate the interrelatedness of the various branches of the Naqshbandī tree, as well as the function of the Ottoman capital as a locus of cultural and spiritual interchange.

1 Kasım Kufrahi, "Molla İlahi ve Kendisinden Sonraki Nakşibendiye Muhiti," *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi*, III/ 1-2 (October 1948), 129-151.

2 Thierry Zarcone, "Histoire et Croyances des Derviches Turkestanais et Indiens à Istanbul," *Anatolia Moderna/Yeni Anadolu, II: Derviches et Cimetières Ottomans*, Paris, 1991, pp. 137-200.

3 Another spiritual descendant of Makhdūm-i A‘zam who migrated westwards was Abū Sā‘id Balkhī, initiator into the Naqshbandiyya of the celebrated Syrian Sufi, ‘Abd al-Ghānī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1771); see Barbara von Schlegell, *Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ghānī al-Nābulusī*, PhD. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1997, p. 141. There was also a Kāsānī sheikh in 11th/12th century Mecca, Muhammad Husayn al-Kāfī; see Ibn al-‘Ujaymī, *Khabayā al-Zawāyā*, ms. Dār al-Kutub al-Misriyya, tārikh 2410, f. 23b.

The only source for the life of Nidāi before his arrival in Istanbul is the untitled treatise in Persian that he finished writing in Rebiülahir 1165/February-March 1752, and the poetry — all in Persian, with the exception of a few verses in Chaghatay — appended to the manuscript copies of this treatise.⁴ A loosely structured work that has as its stated purpose the exposition of the Naqshbandī path, it is replete with quotations, definitions and classifications dealing with such matters as the main principles of the order, known as the *kalimāt-i qudsiyya* (ff. 4b-7b), its claim to initiatic descent from the Prophet through Abū Bakr (ff. 8b-9a), and the primacy of silent over vocal *dhikr* (ff. 4b, 13b). Most, if not all, of this material is to be found in earlier, more authoritative works on the order. Of much greater interest is the account Nidāi provides of his own life and wanderings, his twofold affiliation with the Kāsānī branch of the order, and the distinctive characteristics of this variant of the Naqshbandiyya.

Nidāi does not record the date of his birth, although it may be presumed to have been 1100/1688-9, given the fact that he is said to have been seventy-four years of age when he died in Istanbul in 1174/1760.⁵ Nor is it known precisely where he was born, whether in the city of Kashghar or a village in its environs. He tells us only that at the age of seventeen, when he was “one of the nightingales of Kashghar,” he was captured by a *pir* who was “a nimble hunter on the Path,” and persuaded by him to abandon all possessions and family ties. He then accompanied this unnamed *pir* on a series of extended travels to places in the immediate region left unspecified, until he conceived the desire of travelling independently to more distant climes. Thereupon the *pir* advised him to remain steadfast in journeying “for twenty or thirty years” and to observe the *sharī‘a* in his outer life and the *tariqa* in his inner life; listed for him the principal places he should visit, beginning with the city of Kashghar itself; and presented him with “a book full of intuitively attained knowledge” (*yak juz’ kitāb-i ‘ilm-i ladun*) (ff. 25a-26b).

It is unclear whether or not this *pir* was Naqshbandī, and if so whether he may be identified with either of the persons from whom Nidāi received his formal affiliation, Khoja Hidāyatullah Kāshgharī (d. 1106/1694) and Bābā Mollā Amān Balkhī. For Nidāi does not tell us clearly when, where, or in what order he was initiated by these two. All that is certain is that for him the Kāsānī branch of the Naqshbandiyya to which both were affiliated represented its most advanced stage of development. Its eponym was Khoja Ahmad Khojagī Kāsānī (d. 949/1542), more commonly known as Makhdūm-i A‘zām, separated from the great Ahrār by only one link in the initiatic chain, Mawlānā Muhammad Qāzī.⁶ Nidāi lays great stress on the role of Makhdūm-i A‘zam as elaborator, perfecter and transmitter of the Naqshbandī path, describing him as the “chief link,” *sar-halqa*, in the chain of the Naqshbandī masters, a title more commonly reserved for a much earlier master, Khoja ‘Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī (d. 617/1220); he remarks of him that “he developed this path of the silent *dhikr*, *tariq-i khufya*, to the highest degree” (f. 12b). The high status of this master is also evident from the fact that he had “four honourable wives, twelve accomplished sons, and seventy-two perfected *khalīfas*,” and that he trained this perfect progeny, both the biological and the spiritual, in “poverty and indigence, *faqr-u-fāqa*, according to the path of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamā‘a” (f. 13b).⁷

4 All references in the text are to ms. Aşir Efendi (Süleymaniye) 411, a copy of the treatise and the poetry prepared in 1174/1760-61 by Mustafa Aşir.

5 Hafız Hüseyin Ayyânsarayî, *Hadikatü'l-Cevâmi'*, Istanbul, 1281/1864-65, I, p. 261.

6 On Makhdūm-i A‘zam, see Shāh Mahmūd Churas, *Jāmi' al-Maqāmāt*, O.F. Akimushkin (ed.), Moscow, 1976, and Arif Usman, *Makhdumi A‘zam, Sīratī va Meroşī*, Tashkent, 1996.

7 This description of Makhdūm-i A‘zam must have been standard, for an identical wording is to be found in Kemalettin Haririzade’s *Tibyān Vesâilī'l-Haqâiq ve Selâsili't-Tarâiq*, ms. İbrahim Efendi 430, II, f. 77a.

Distinctive in Nidāi's account of the Naqshbandī line, both before and after Makhdūm-i A'zām, is this emphasis on poverty, *faqr*, as pre-eminent among the spiritual virtues, a feature absent from most Naqshbandī literature, particularly that produced by Mujaddidī authors. Indeed, the only passages in the doctrinal portion of Nidāi's work that are cogently and forcefully argued are those that deal with poverty. It is, he says, "the crucible in which the appetitive soul, *nafs*, must be burnt," or alternatively "the alchemy that turns the dross of human nature, *bashariyat*, into pure gold" (f. 14a). Further, it is the innermost meaning of the affirmation of divine unity, *sirr-i tauhīd*, the quintessence of all gnosis, and the form assumed in the heart of the dervish by the love of Allah. This exalted state of poverty is attainable only through prolonged ascetic self-denial, *riyāzat*, and the abandonment, *tark*, both of this world and of one's self, the latter being infinitely more difficult (ff. 9b, 14a). Ultimately, however, Nidāi cites the Prophet as saying, "poverty is one of the treasures of Allah," "a gift bestowed by Him only on a prophet, a veracious devotee, *siddiq*, or a believer honored by Him" (f. 13b).

Going together with this stress on *faqr* is a concern, equally atypical for the Naqshbandīyya, with two outer accoutrements of the path symbolizing poverty, the distinctive headgear, *kulāh*, and cloak, *khirqā*, of the dervish. Both served initiatic purposes, for when a Kāsānī dervish donned the *kulāh* for the first time, he and all present would intone *lā ilāha illā'llāh*, and when the *khirqā* was draped over his shoulders, they would recite "succor from Allah, and a victory close at hand; give glad tidings to the believers" (Qur'ān, 61:13; f. 16a). Hats of poverty had been divinely bestowed first on Adam, then on Noah, next on Abraham, and finally on the Prophet Muhammad (f. 14a). Although the hat was in each case a token of *faqr*, it additionally symbolised another virtue or attribute present in each of its wearers: command, *amr*, in Adam, vision, *ru'yat*, in Noah, generosity, *sakhāvat*, in Abraham, and munificence, *'atā*, in the Prophet Muhammad. The hat of Adam went first to Seth and then to Idrīs, who took it with him to Paradise; Noah's hat was lost in the Flood; that of Abraham passed in turn to Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Jethro, Moses, and Jesus, the last of whom bore it off with him when he ascended to the fourth heaven; while that of the Prophet Muhammad was given to Abū Bakr, "when his clothes were distributed after his death" (ff. 16a-b). The removal from the world of the first three hats may be taken to symbolize the abrogation of previous religions, while the preservation of the hat of the Prophet signifies the permanence of Islam. As for the transmission of the Prophet's *kulāh* to Abū Bakr, this indicates, no doubt, not only the Sunni



A sixteenth century Naqshbandi sheikh from Istanbul (Türkische Gewänder und Osmanische Gesellschaft im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, Graz 1966)

belief in the legitimacy of his caliphate but also the Naqshbandī claim to spiritual descent from him. Each of the hats worn by the prophets had four *tark*, slashes or folds, a word fortuitously ambiguous, for it also has the meaning of abandonment.⁸ Thus the four folds in the Muhammadan “hat of poverty and munificence” bequeathed to Abū Bakr betokened abandonment of the world, *dunyā*, the self, *nafs*, Paradise, and existence, *wujūd*, itself (f. 16a).

The *khirqa* receives even greater emphasis. The primordial cloak (also termed “the garment of poverty,” *libās-i faqr*, by Nidāi) was first bestowed on the Prophet in pre-eternity when the spirits of men were created, and then given him anew by the archangel Gabriel during the *mi'rāj*, prompting him to exclaim, “poverty is my pride,” *al-faqrū fakhrī* (f. 14a). Traditions to much the same effect are by no means exceptional in Sufism, although it is certain that the wearing of a cloak was a custom introduced by the Sufis themselves and retrospectively attributed to the Prophet.⁹ Problematic, however, is Nidāi's division of the *khirqa* into two types, material, *sūrī*, and non-material, *ma'navī*, for even the material cloak — like the hat — would seem to have symbolic meaning, and it is difficult to see what could be signified by a non-material cloak other than the meaning symbolised by its material counterpart.¹⁰ Nidāi compounds the obscurity of the matter by reporting that a *khirqa* of unspecified type was transmitted from the Prophet to the following succession of figures: Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, Hasan al-Basrī, Ma'rūf Karkhī, Junayd Baghdādī, 'Abd al-Qādir Gilāni, Bāyazīd Bistāmī, Abū'l-Hasan Kharāqānī, Yūsuf Hamadānī, 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī, Bahā'al-Dīn Naqshband, and Mawlānā Ya'qūb Charkhī (f. 15a). This list, the last six names in which are to be found in the Naqshbandī *sil-sila*, with several intermediate links, is open to a number of chronological objections, unless the *khirqa* is supposed to have been transmitted in the atemporal, suprasensory realm, in which case it was presumably of the non-material type. The next recipient of the *khirqa*, Khoja 'Ubaydullāh Ahrār, is proclaimed by Nidāi to have had, however, “both the material and the non-material *khirqa* manifest in his noble being” (f. 15a). Given the great esteem enjoyed by Ahrār, it seems that whatever may be meant by the two types of *khirqa*, the simultaneous possession of both counts as a mark of special distinction. The immediate heir of Ahrār was Muhammad Qāzī, succeeded in turn by Makhdūm-i A'zam, for whose “stature the material and non-material *khirqas* were perfectly fitted” (f. 15a). From him the *khirqa(s)* passed to Muhammad Amīn Dahbīdī, also known as Ishān Kalān, progenitor of the Dahbīdī sheikhs who for generations were custodians of Makhdūm-i A'zam's shrine in the village of Dahbīd near Samarqand;¹¹ next to Muhammad Amīn's son, Khoja Muham-

8 For a similar correlation between the twelve slashes of the Ni'matullāhī headgear and twelve forms of abandonment, see Shāh Ni'matullāh Valī, *Risāla-hā*, ed. Muhammad Javād Nūrbakhsh, Tehran, 1352/1977, I, pp. 160-165.

9 See Sayyid 'Alī Muhammad Sajjādī, *Jāma-yi Zuhd: Khirqa va Khirqa-pūshī*, Tehran, 1369 Sh./1990, pp. 65-69. Despite the widespread popularity of these legends, Shihāb al-Dīn 'Umar al-Suhrawardī (d. 631/1234) had no hesitation in remarking “there is no doubt the wearing of a *khirqa* in the form now conventional among our sheikhs did not exist in the time of the Messenger of God” (*Awārif al-Ma'ārif*, in supplementary volume to Ghazālī's *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Beirut, n.d., p. 78).

10 It is true that the Prophet is reputed to have said, “I have two *khirqas*, poverty and jihad,” in a *hadith* of dubious standing alluded to by Iqbāl when he made pilgrimage to the allegedly prophetic *khirqa* preserved in Qandahār (see *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl*, ed. Ahmad Surūsh, Tehran, 1343 Sh./1964, pp. 426-427), but it seems difficult to correlate these with the two *khirqas* discussed by Nidāi.

11 Concerning this line of Naqshbandī sheikhs, see Hamid Algar, “Dahbīdiya,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, VI, pp. 585-586. Their interest in *khirqas* is apparent from the fact that in the late seventeenth century three of them were transporting a cloak that had allegedly belonged to the Prophet from Samarqand to India when they were intercepted along the Badakhshān-Chitral border and forced to take up residence, together with the cloak, at Jawzān, which was then renamed Fayzābād in recognition of the sacred relic. There the cloak remained until it was moved to Qandahār in 1182/1768. See Robert McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, Princeton, 1991, pp. 224-226.

mad Hāshim (d. 1046/ 1636); then to Khoja Muhammad Hāshim's nephew, Hidāyatullāh Kāshgharī (d. 1106/ 1694), better known as Khoja Afāq; and finally from him to Nidāi (ff. 15a-b).

In 1089/1678, Khoja Afāq seized control of Yārkaṇd from a debilitated branch of the Chaghatayid dynasty, and his descendants, known as the White Mountain (Aqtağlıq) Khojas, continued to exercise rule in Eastern Turkestan until the mid 12th/18th century; he was thus a figure of considerable historical importance.¹² Nidāi, however, does not mention him with any particular reverence, nor does he attribute to him the same qualities by which he describes Ahrār and Makhdūm-i A'zam; it seems probable, therefore, that he did not regard him as his principal connection to the Naqshbandī-Kāsānī line. Indeed, the *khirqā*

he received from him must have been a non-material one, posthumously donated, for when Nidāi parted company with his unnamed *pir* and came to Kashghar, he recounts having resided for a time at the "effulgent shrine," *mazār-i fayz-āsār*, of Khoja Hidāyatullāh, in alternating states of sobriety and distraction (f. 26b). Apart from this autobiographical detail, it should also be remembered that Nidāi can have been only eight years old when Khoja Hidāyatullāh died, making it improbable that the master should have given him an initiatic cloak while still in the flesh.

It is another line of Kāsānī transmission that had greater significance for Nidāi, although it is one entirely lacking in celebrated names and seems to have transmitted only the material *khirqā*. From Makhdūm-i A'zam this other line passes first to Mawlānā Khurd Tāshkandī, then in turn to Molla Akka Shabirghānī, Khoja Payanda Aqsī, Sūfī Juvayn Ghijduvānī, and Bābā Qul-Mazīd, who in addition to his Naqshbandī lineage had a Qādirī *khirqā*, bestowed on him by a certain Marjān Muhammad Khwārazmī (f.15b). Nidāi tells us nothing of these individuals beyond their names; it is known, however, from other sources that Mawlānā Khurd settled in Balkh, dying there in 975/1567,¹³ and it is possible that his initiatic descendants also



Naqshbandi murshid (from the manuscript of Nidāi, f. 15a-b)

A sixteenth century Naqshbandi murshid of from Istanbul. (Türkische Gewänder und Osmanische Gesellshaft im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, Graz 1966)

¹² Concerning the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan, see M. Hartmann, "Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien," in Hartmann, *Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 195-346; R. B. Shaw, *The History of the Khojas of Eastern-Turkistan*, Calcutta, 1897; and İsenbike Togan, "Chinese Turkestan: V. Under the Khojas," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, V, pp. 474-6.

¹³ Muhammad b. Husayn Qazvinī, *Silsila-nāma-yi Khwājagān-i Naqshband*, ms. Bibliothèque Nationale, supplément persan 1418, f. 20b.

resided there for several generations, for apart from Khoja Pāyanda, Shabirghānī had a disciple named Mawlānā Muhammad ‘Arab Balkhī, who was succeeded in turn by Mir Kalān b. Sayyid Mahmūd Balkhī. As for Baba Qul-Mazīd, one of his two principal disciples was also a Balkhī, Bābājī Hājī ‘Abd al-Rahīm ‘Āqibat-ba-khayr, author of a treatise cited by Nidāi as his source for traditions concerning the headgear of the prophets (f. 16b). ‘Āqibat-ba-khayr had five *khalīfas*: Shāh Nāzir, Shāh Manzūr, Bābājī Mazārī (i.e., from Mazār-i Sharīf), Bābājī Safāi Samarqandī, and Bābā Mollā Amān Balkhī (f. 15b). None of these can be presumed to have lived in Balkh, not even the last-named, for it was in Kashghar that Nidāi encountered him and received from him the essence of the Path, soon after bidding farewell to his nameless preliminary *pir*. Nidāi lavished much praise on Bābā Mollā Amān, describing him as one who had been “clothed by God in the cloak of honor, *khil’at*, of attaining His presence and given to drink of the wine of His beauty” (f. 16a). He not only helped Nidāi gain tranquillity amidst the tempestuous and unstable spiritual states to which he was then subject (f. 26b), but also bestowed on him such bounty, “both outer and inner,” that a hundred years would not suffice to give adequate thanks (f. 16a). What precisely Nidāi meant by the “outer bounty” is uncertain, but presumably it included the hat and cloak Mollā Amān gave him while still alive, and the staff, ‘*asā*, and begging bowl, *kachkūl*, he bequeathed to him (f. 15b).

The mention of a staff and a begging bowl — the meagre equipment of the wandering mendicant — as part of Bābā Mollā Amān’s legacy, is significant. Taken together with Nidāi’s rule that all the dervish may legitimately possess is a jug, *ibrīq*, for making ablutions, a kerchief, *rūymāl*, and a prayer mat, *musallā*, (f. 17b), it shows clearly that for the line of Kāsānī descent to which Nidāi belonged, *faqr* meant not simply an inward detachment from the things of this world, but a deliberately chosen indigence that demanded the renunciation of a settled life. He does not explicitly mandate mendicancy, but he is clear and emphatic in his condemnation of *kash* (regular exertion for the sake of earning a living), denouncing it as “the deed of the weak” and liable, moreover, to cause the neglect of prayers, and in his complementary exaltation of *tavakkul* (reliance on God, hyperbolically interpreted to mean the abandonment of all such exertion) as “the deed of the strong” (f. 22b); the practical result of such attitudes must clearly have been at least passive mendicancy.¹⁴ It was thus as a wandering Naqshbandī mendicant that Nidāi set out from Kashghar on the long journey that was to take him to Istanbul.

The very notion of an itinerant Naqshbandī dervish seems at first sight contradictory, even grotesque, given the strict adherence to the norms of Sunni propriety and the insistence on maintaining a presence within society that are normatively associated with Naqshbandīs. Even apart from the case of Nidāi, however, there is evidence that the typology of the order, especially in Central Asia, was more complex than is often realized. A much travelled and highly observant Iranian Sufi belonging to the Ni‘matullāhī order, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn Shīrvānī (d. 1253/1838), remarks that in the course of his journeys he had encountered three classes of Naqshbandīs: *sharī‘a*-observant Sunnis, who did indeed constitute the great majority; Shi‘is, of whom he had never met more than two or three; and *qalandars*, “ignorant of the *sharī‘a* and regarding it as a mere series of fetters.” These *qalandars* neither prayed nor fasted; regarded marriage as forbidden; consumed large quantities of bhang and hemp juice; travelled ceaselessly; recited poetry whenever the mood took them; considered it incumbent to beg every Thursday; and cheerfully desig-

¹⁴ Concerning the general problem of begging in Sufism, see Hamid Algar, “Begging in Sufi Literature and Practice,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, IV, pp. 81-82.

nated themselves as “God’s fools.” Their relation to Islam was purely nominal, and their sole claim to the true *faqir* of the Sufis consisted of the clothes they wore.¹⁵ Other evidence from the early nineteenth century suggests that Bukhara, the very homeland of the Naqshbandī order, was by no means free of this *qalandar* pestilence. Throughout the khanate there were hospices established to accommodate *qalandars* when they wished to rest from their travels, and in the city of Bukhara itself they had official permission to beg freely every Thursday and Sunday, using whatever means they saw fit. “On those days,” reports the Russian traveller Khanykov, “they are seen strolling in crowds through the streets, stopping the passers by, and with loud wild cries asking alms, singing hymns, and exhibiting the holy towns of Mekka and Medina, illuminated on wood, or pictures of the damned in hell.” So fully institutionalized were the *qalandars* of Bukhara that the emir would appoint “the wisest of them” to act as their leader and representative with the authorities.¹⁶ It was presumably *qalandars* such as these that Zayn al-‘Abidin Shīrvānī regarded as one class of Naqshbandī.

Nidāī must not, however, be confused with them. It is significant that in the terminology of his native Eastern Turkistan, as reflected in the texts published and translated by Gunnar Jarring, the terms dervish and *qalandar* convey different although sometimes overlapping meanings. There, *qalandar* stands uniformly for a religious charlatan, aggressive and shameless in his begging; whereas “dervish” means generally one who is either content with “whatever God places in front of him,” or begs only passively, accepting unsolicited donations.¹⁷ It is true that Nidāī’s first place of residence in Istanbul was the *kalenderhane* at Eyüp, and that annexed to his poetry we find some verses of Sheikh Ahmad-i Jām (d. 536/1141) in praise of the *qalandar*,¹⁸ but none of this justifies his classification as a *qalandar* in the Eastern Turkistani sense of the word. Nidāī is in fact vehement in his condemnation of the antinomian pretendants to Sufism for all the faults Shīrvānī detected in them, and several more besides: their complete disregard for the categories of *halal* and *harām*; a straightforwardly pantheistic claim to absolute identity with God; mistaking visions of Iblīs for true illumination; and regarding the saints, *awliya*, as superior to the prophets (ff. 20a-23a). He stresses the necessity of studying the sciences of the *sharī‘a* as well as observing its commands, and the absolute incumbence of performing not only the five mandatory prayers but also the superogatory acts of worship, *navāfil*, and recitations, *awrād*, that are the hallmark of the especially pious (ff. 19b-20a). It is three elements alone that set apart Nidāī’s understanding and practice of the Naqshbandī path from more familiar concepts and tend to create a misleading impression of identity with the *qalandars*: abstention from marriage, passive mendicancy, and — most important of all — itinerancy.

Nidāī’s independent travels took him first to Yārkand, “capital of the lands of Turkistan”, where he visited a complex of Sufi tombs known as the “Seven Muhammads”, *haft Muhammadān* (ff. 26a-b). In general, it seems that his primary purpose in visiting the cities that lay along his route, as well as his most abiding memory of them, was pilgrimage to the shrines of various Sufis, for this is virtually all

15 Shīrvānī, *Riyāz al-Siyāha*, ed. Asghar Hāmid Rabbānī, Tehran, 1339 Sh./1960, pp. 482-483.

16 Khanykov (Khanikoff), *Bokhara: its Amir and its People*, tr. Baron Clement A. de Bode, London, 1845, pp. 261-262. For depictions of the Naqshbandī *qalandars* of Bukhara, see the frontispiece to the 1865 New York edition of Arminius Vambéry, *Travels In Central Asia*; and O. A. Sukhareva, *Bukhara XIX - Nachalo XX vekov*, Moscow, 1966, p. 307.

17 Jarring, “Dervish and Qalandar: Texts from Kashghar edited and translated with notes and glossary,” *Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis*, (1985-1986) 2, 18-27.

18 Ff. 58 a-b.

that he records of his journey before arriving in Istanbul.¹⁹ From Yārkaṅd he went northwest to Kashghar, where, as previously recounted, he spent some time at the shrine of Khoja Hidāyatullāh Kāshghārī before making his evidently decisive encounter with Mollā Amān Balkhī. He does not tell us how long he spent in Kashghar with this master, but however great his devotion to him, it was not sufficient to deflect him from continuing on his way, first to Khujand, where he visited the tombs of Bābā Kamāl Khujandī (d. 803/1400-01) and Muslih al-Dīn Khujandī. Next, in Samarqand and its environs, he paid homage at the tombs of the theologian Abū Mansūr Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and two of his great ancestors in the Naqshbandī line, Khoja Ahrār and Makhdūm-i A'zam. Once arrived in the district of Bukhara, he hastened to the shrine of 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī, a key figure in the immediate prehistory of the order, and then to that of its eponym, Khoja Bahā'al-Dīn Naqshband. The latter site appears to have left an unusually strong impression on him: "At that blessed shrine, I witnessed scholars and gnostics, lovers and sheikhs, coming in great crowds, multitudes, and droves, to visit the *pir*. Some were busy with their supplications, others were engaged in reciting the Qur'ān, and others again were sunk in introspective meditation. All, in short, were engaged in some form of devotion" (f. 27b). These brief but evocative sentences serve to confirm the well-known appeal exerted by the shrine as a goal of pilgrimage for devotees from all over Central Asia and beyond. From Bukhara he proceeded to Balkh, where he recounts visiting the saints' tombs, without mentioning any of their names.²⁰ Next he traversed Khorasan, visiting in Herat the tombs of Khoja 'Abdullāh Ansārī (d. 481/1088) and two Naqshbandīs, Sa'd al-Dīn Kashgharī (d. 866/1462) and Kāshgharī's disciple, the celebrated poet and polymath 'Abd al-Rahmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492); in Turbat-i Jām, that of the Sufī Sheikh Ahmad-i Jām (d. 536/1141), commonly known as Zhanda-Pīl; in Mashhad, that of Imām Rizā; in Khārjird — somewhat curiously — that of Qāsim-i Anvār (847/1433-4), a Sufī suspected of Hurūfī leanings and condemned by Jāmī as a heretic; in Nishapur, that of Farīd al-Dīn 'Attār (d. 617/1220); and in Bistām, that of Bāyazīd Bistāmī (d. 260/874), who is the sixth link in the Naqshbandī initiatic chain. From Khorasan he struck out southwest to Isfahan, where he visited the tomb of the poet Sā'ib (d. 1087/1676), again a curious choice, given Sā'ib's lack of renown for religiosity, and then continued on to Shiraz, visiting there the tombs of two poets with a more credible claim to spiritual eminence — Sā'dī and Hāfiz (f. 27a).²¹ From Shiraz he moved on to Baghdad, presumably overland through western Iran, although a journey through Fars to the Persian Gulf coast followed by a sea voyage to Basra would also have been a possibility. Baghdad was rich in sites for pious visitation; among the tombs Nidāi visited there were those of Abū Hanīfa, Imam Mūsā al-Kāzīm, and early Sufīs such as Junayd Baghdādī (d. 297/910), Shibli (d. 333/945), Hallāj (d. 310/922), Ma'rūf Karkhī (d. 199/815), 'Abd al-Qādir Gilānī (d. 561/1166), and Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 631/1234). The possibilities of Baghdad exhaust-

19 The prompt paying of homage at the tombs of the saintly in whatever city one alighted had for long been part of established etiquette for the Sufī traveller. See Suhrawardī, *'Awārif al-Ma'ārif*, p. 96; Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, *Mirsād al-'Ibād*, Muhammad Amīn Riyāhī (ed.), Tehran, 1365 Sh./1986, p. 526; and Abū 'I-Mafākhīr Yahyā Bākhārī, *Awrād al-Ahbāb wa Fusūs al-Ādāb*, Īraj Afshār (ed.), Tehran, 1358 Sh./1979, p. 163.

20 This silence is curious, given the abundance of Balkhīs in Nidāi's own lineage and the fairly prominent place occupied in Balkh — even in fairly recent times — by the tomb of Abū Nasr Pārsā (d. 865/1459), the son and *murīd* of Khoja Muhammad Pārsā (d. 822/1419 in Medina), one of the chief *khalīfas* of Bahā'al-Dīn Naqshband.


21 It is worth noting that Nidāi makes no mention of encountering sectarian hostility during his travels in Iran. This furnishes one indication among many others that the notion of Iran forming a "sectarian barrier," denying transit to Central Asians *en route* to the hajj even in peacetime, must be discarded.

ed, Nidāi moved on in turn to Kirkuk, Mosul, Aleppo (where he mentions having stayed with a certain Hājji Muhammad Balkhī, possibly a member of his own initiatic line), Jerusalem, and finally the Hijaz. All that he relates of his sojourn in the Hijaz is that during each of the three years he spent there he performed the hajj and visited the Prophet's Mosque in Medina (f. 27b).

Having, as he puts it, spent "forty-five years seeking out the People of God, *dar talab-i ahlullāh*," Nidāi finally reached Istanbul and decided to settle there. Why he decided to go to the Ottoman capital and why he chose to end his journeys there are two more of the questions left unanswered by his narrative. It is true that he himself offers several explanations. "The spring-time of life was," he says, "drawing to a close," in addition to which his protracted wanderings seemed to have induced in him weariness and confusion: "Where was I? Where had I been? Where was I now? In this state of bewilderment madness was hard on my heels" (ff. 50b-51b). Apart from these entirely comprehensible human sentiments, it may be that Nidāi felt he had exhausted the spiritual benefits to be gained from ceaseless travel: he had, after all, defined the seventh and final degree, *daraja*, of poverty as *sukūnat*, (tranquillity, coming to rest; f. 16a).

Moreover, the impressive spectacle of the great city, located at the junction of three waterways, did not fail to arouse the admiration of Nidāi, who until then had seen only the landlocked cities of Central Asia and the arid terrains of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Hijaz. Here was "a city the like of which I had never seen ... in the midst of it great waterways beyond the mind's ability to conceive, plied by fine ships of all types" (ff. 50b-51b, 56a-b). Istanbul was adorned not only by its natural setting, but also by "the supremacy of the *shari'a* and the path of the *tariqa*," ensured by its ruler, Commander of the Faithful Sultan Mahmūd, who was of such splendor that Jamshīd and Faridūn would have immersed him in praise if they had lived to see his auspicious age (ff. 50b-51b).

Possibly decisive, however, for Nidāi's abandonment of the itinerant life was the favor extended him by La'lizāde Abdūlbakī Efendī (d. 1159/1746). A retired kadi who had been initiated to the Mujaddidī branch of the Naqshbandiyya by Sheikh Muhammad Murād (d. 1166/1752 in Damascus) during one of his sojourns in the Ottoman capital, La'lizāde also had ties of sympathy if not formal affiliation to the Melāmiye-Bayrāmiye, and it may have been this breadth of spiritual interests that



Ruins of the Buharali tekkesi, built in 1692, restored in 1887, in Kadirga (vicinity of the Hippodrome), Istanbul (Cengiz Kahraman, 1994).

inspired him either to build or to restore the *kalenderhane* in Eyüp in 1156/1743.²² He appointed Nidāi as its first sheikh, which might lead to the supposition that it was an explicitly Naqshbandī establishment; indeed it is designated as such in a list of the *tekkes* of Istanbul drawn up some forty years after its foundation.²³ No doubt Naqshbandī practices predominated at the *kalenderhane*, which would have been comprehensible given the overwhelmingly if not exclusively Central Asian identity of its clientele, but they were mingled with Yesevī elements such as the “*dhikr* of the saw,” *zīkr-i arra*, and the recitation of the poetry of Ahmad Yasawī.²⁴ It is unlikely that this compound should have been elaborated in Istanbul; more probably, it represented a transplantation there of the fusion between the two cognate orders, Naqshbandiyya and Yasawiyya, that is occasionally encountered in Central Asia, despite their marked differences with respect to the methods of *dhikr*.

Having abandoned itinerancy, one pillar of the life of the wandering dervish, Nidāi decided to marry, thereby discarding another of its pillars. This choice compelled him to vacate the *kalenderhane*, since its direction was reserved for a celibate sheikh. Fortunately for Nidāi, a certain Yekçeşm Murtaza Efendi (d. 1160/1747), a financial official who had been initiated into the Mujaddidī branch of the Naqshbandiyya by Sheikh Ahmad Yekdast Jūryānī (d. 1119/1707) while on the hajj, had shortly before received instructions in a dream to construct a Naqshbandī *tekke* at Eyüp. He complied with this command from the unseen, and construction began in 1157/1744, in the quarter of Eyüp known as Idris Köşkü after the mansion built there in the sixteenth century by the Kurdish statesman and historian, Idris Bitlisī (d. 926/1520). Once the *tekke* was finished, about a year later, the newly married Nidāi was appointed its first sheikh, and it became known after him as the Kaşgārī tekkesi.²⁵

In the space of about two years, Nidāi had thus benefited successively from the favor and patronage of two Mujaddidīs, La‘līzāde and Yekçeşm Murtaza Efendi. There is, however, no reason to assume that he replaced or even supplemented his Kāsānī affiliation with an adherence to the Mujaddidiyya, despite his abandonment of the itinerancy and celibacy that characterized the line of Bābā Mollā Amān Balkhī. The assertion that the Kaşgārī tekkesi founded on his behalf was or became “one of the principal centers in Istanbul for the diffusion of this branch of the Naqshbandiyya” (i.e. the Mujaddidiyya) seems entirely unwarranted.²⁶ Nidāi’s move from the *kalenderhane* to the *tekke*, far from involving the adoption of “a new, energetic and rigorist form of the Naqshbandiyya,”²⁷ seems to have been dictated exclusively by his wish to marry, not by any desire or need to acquire new spiritual loyalties.

In 1158/1746, Sheikh Mehmed Emin Tokadī, a *khalifa* of Sheikh Ahmad Yekdast Jūryānī, died in Istanbul; he had been the principal representative of the Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman capital. The succession was uncertain until a certain Yahya Efendi, a longtime devotee, dreamed that Tokadī had risen from the grave to converse with him. Informed of the dream, Nidāi interpreted it as a posthumous appointment of

22 Ayvānsarayī, *Hadikatü'l-Cevāmi'*, I, p. 260. Concerning La‘līzāde, see Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, Istanbul, 1333/1914, I, p. 159; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmânî*, Istanbul, 1308/1890, III, pp. 298-299; and Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, *Melâmîlik ve Melâmîler*, Istanbul, 1931, pp.153-155.

23 Cited by Zarcone, “Derviches turkestanais et indiens à Istanbul,” p. 155.

24 Osman Ergin, *Türk Şehirlerinde İmarat Sistemi*, Istanbul, 1939, p. 31.

25 Ayvānsarayī, *Hadikatü'l-Cevāmi'*, I, pp. 261-2. Occasionally, however, the *tekke* is designated after its founder as Murtaza Efendi Tekkesi; see Günay Kut and Turgut Kut, “İstanbul Tekkelerine Ait Bir Kaynak: Dergāh Nāme,” *Türkische Miscellen: Festschrift für Robert Anhegger*, Istanbul, 1987, p. 233. Concerning Yekçeşm Murtaza Efendi, see Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmânî*, IV, p. 361, and concerning Jūryānī, see Muhammad Khalil al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar*, reprint, Damascus, 1408/1988, I, pp. 107-108.

26 Zarcone, “Derviches turkestanais et indiens à Istanbul,” p. 164.

27 *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

Yahya Efendi as Tokadî's *khalifa*, and his view was accepted as that of a respected friend of the Mujaddidîs, not as one of them.²⁸ The significance of the contacts between Nidâi and the Mujaddidîs of Istanbul lies precisely in such mutual acceptance and the intertwining of different branches of the Naqshbandiyya that it reflects.

Nothing is recorded of the remainder of Nidâi's life, which ended on Safar 7, 1174/ November 18, 1760. He was buried next to his *tekke* and succeeded as sheikh by his son, Ubeydullah Efendi, who died almost exactly ten years later at the age of forty-five. Next came Gilânî Isa Efendi, who had formerly been imam at the *tekke*; his designation as Gilânî probably indicates a claim to descent from 'Abd al-Qâdir Gilânî, not an origin in the Iranian province of Gilân as has been suggested.²⁹ Isa

Efendi appears to have been highly regarded by the Ottoman royal house: Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1171-87/ 1757-74) would come to visit him incognito at the *tekke*,³⁰ and when he died a nonagenarian on Safar 26, 1206/ October 28, 1791, a *türbe* was constructed for him by Sultan Selim III (r. 1203-22/ 1789-1807). The following sheikh was Çelebi Seyyid Ubeydullâh (or, according to one source, Mehmed) Efendi, Nidâi's son-in-law; he died less than three years into his tenure, on Şevval 16, 1208/ July 17, 1794. He was succeeded by Hacı İsmail Efendi, who had been Nidâi's slave and served him as his coffee maker, *kahveci*; he too died some three years after his appointment to the office, on Rebiülevvel 24, 1212/ September 16, 1797. Next came Hâce Nidâi Abdullah, son of Çelebi Seyyid Ubeydullah Efendi, named, obviously enough, after his grandfather; he died on Rebiülevvel 7, 1213/ August 19, 1798, at the exceptionally early age of twenty-two, a mere fourteen months into his tenure. Stability of direction again proved unattainable with the next sheikh, Hâce Lutfullah Efendi, former custodian of the shrine of Ebu Eyüp Ensârî. Three years after his appointment to the *tekke*, he was accused of improper relations with his daughter-in-law and compelled to resign. Burdened with debts as well as disgrace, he spent the rest of his life in poverty in Üsküdar, but he appears ultimately to have been forgiven, for he was buried next to the *tekké* when he passed away in 1220/1805-6. This



Ruins of the Buharalı tekkesi in Kadırga, Istanbul (Cengiz Kahraman, 1994).

28 Seyyid Hasib Üsküdarî, *Menâkıb-i Şeyh Emin Tokadî*, ms. Ali Emiri (Şeriye) 103, ff. 27b-28a.

29 Klaus Kreiser, "Kaşgarî Tekyesi - ein Istanbuler Naqşbandi-Konvent und sein Stifter," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman*, Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic, and Thierry Zarcone (eds.), Istanbul-Paris, 1990, p. 333.

30 Mustafa Özdamar, *Dersâdet Dergâhları*, Istanbul, 1994, p. 22.

scandal seems to have created an unexpected vacuum, for no one could be found to replace Hâce Lutfullah Efendi other than Hâce Mehmed Eşref Efendi, second son of Çelebi Seyyid Ubeydullah Efendi and a minor at the time; the office of sheikh had initially to be exercised on his behalf by a *vekil*, Hüdaverdi Efendi. In the long run, however, the appointment proved beneficial, for Mehmed Eşref Efendi lived until Rebiülevvel 15, 1257/ May 7, 1841, permitting him a tenure of forty years. The *tekke* evidently gained in esteem under his direction, for it was one of the two Naqshbandî hospices represented at the gathering of sheikhs, *ulemâ* and government officials convened on Zilhicce 2, 1241/ July 8, 1826 to decide on the disposition of the Bektashî *tekkes* then being sequestered.³¹ Mehmed Eşref Efendi was succeeded by his son, Sheikh Mehmed 'Âşir Efendi. Born in 1248/1832-3, he also assumed formal leadership of the *tekke* as a minor. However, in the fullness of time he, too, became well regarded in the Sufî circles of Istanbul, and he was appointed in 1385/1894 to the Meclis-i Meşayih, a regulatory body for the Sufi orders attached to the office of the Sheikh al-Islam that had been created in 1295/ 1868.³² He died on Zilka'de 20, 1320/ February 28, 1903, to be succeeded by the last sheikh to preside over the *tekke* before the collapse of the Ottoman State, Sheikh Bahaettin Efendi (d. 1918); it is unknown whether he belonged to the lineage, biological or spiritual, of Nidâi.³³

The successor to Bahaettin Efendi and the last sheikh appointed to the Kaşgarî tekkesi before the forced closing of all the Sufî hospices and meeting places in November 1925 was Seyyid Abdülhakim Arvâsi. A Kurd, he was born in Şevval 1281/ November-December 1865 in Başkale, a town in the province of Hakkari (but later attached to that of Van). His father, Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, was one of the numerous Qâdiri sheikhs who had transferred their principal allegiance to the Naqshbandiyya after the rise to prominence — particularly marked in Kurdistan — of the Khâliidiyya, a new and truly energetic branch of the order founded by Mawlânâ Khâlid Baghdâdî (d. 1242/1826). Arvâsi was thus immersed in the world of the Naqshbandiyya from childhood. He received his formal initiation into the order at the age of fourteen from Seyyid Fehim (d. 1313/1895), a disciple of Taha Hakkârî (d. 1269/1852-3), who had been one of Mawlânâ Khâlid's principal *khalifa* among the Kurds. After a lengthy period of study in the *medreses* of both Kurdistan and Iraq, he settled in Van to teach what he had learned, together with the principles of the Naqshbandî path. In April 1915, after Armenians armed by the Russians invading Eastern Anatolia had launched a campaign of killing and plundering in Van and its environs, Arvâsi found himself compelled to leave his homeland. After a lengthy journey in search of refuge that first took him across the mountains to Irbil and Mosul, and then to Adana, Eskişehir, and Bursa,

31 The *tekke* was represented on this occasion by a certain Balmumcu Mustafa Efendi; see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, Istanbul, 1309/1891, XII, p. 182.

32 Mustafa Kara, *Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler*, Istanbul, 1980, p. 308.

33 This account of Nidâi's successors is drawn from Ayyânsarayî, *Hadikatü'l-Cevâmi'*, I, pp. 261-2; Zâkir Şükrü Efendi, *Die Istanbul Derwisch-Konvente und ihre Scheiche*, Mehmet Serhan Tayşî and Klaus Kreiser (eds.), Freiburg im Breisgau, 1980, pp. 50-51; and Hüseyin Vassâf, *Sefîne-i Evliyâ*, ms. Süleymaniye, yazma bağışlar 2300, II, ff. 58a-59b. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı speaks additionally of another sheikh at the *tekke*, Hâce Husâm (d. 1281/1864), who had a supplementary affiliation to the Mawlawiyya (*Türkiye'de Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar*, Istanbul, 1969, p. 223); he is, however, absent from all the lists of Nidâi's successors. The sum of the admittedly somewhat sparse information concerning the sheikhs who presided over the Kaşgarî tekkesi suggests that the institution played a role of some importance throughout the nineteenth century. Against this it might be argued that the number of people resident there was not particularly impressive (eight men and four women in 1885, for example, as opposed to twenty four men and seventeen women at the Yenikapı Mevlevihanesi; see Necdât İşli and Thierry Zarcone, "La population des couvents de derviches d'Istanbul à la fin du XIXe siècle," *Anatolia Moderna/Yeni Anadolu*, II, pp. 214-215). Such figures are not, however, particularly significant; it would be more important to know how many people would typically attend the sessions of *dhikr* that were held at the *tekke* every Friday.



Özbekler tekkesi, Üsküdar, İstanbul (Yavuz Çelenk, 1997).

he finally arrived in İstanbul in April 1919. Together with his family, he was lodged initially in the Yazılı medresesi at Eyüp, moving six months later to the Kaşgari tekkesi. Apart from Bahaettin Efendi's aged and infirm mother, no one else was living there at the time and the life of the *tekke* was at a low ebb. Arvâsî's arrival served to reinvigorate it, for it now became a meeting place for all those who were drawn to him by the sermons he preached at various mosques and by the lessons on Sufism he gave at the Süleymaniye. It continued to function as such after the cessation of *tarikât*-related devotional practices in accordance with the law of November 1925 which, while prohibiting the *tarikats*, permitted certain sheikhs to continue residing in their *tekkes*. Arvâsî is said to have accepted the proscription of organized Sufi activity, as well as the other anti-Islamic measures of the period, with quiet resignation and a determination to avoid political entanglements. Thus he told Hüseyin Vassâf (d. 1929), who was then gathering material for his history of the Sufi orders, *Sefîne-i Evliyâ*: "I know nothing of politics; I have never had any connections to any political group; I have no duty other than providing religious guidance, *irşad*."³⁴ This emphatic quietism did not satisfy the Kemalist authorities. After the Menemen incident of December 1930, Arvâsî was among the Sufi sheikhs who were arrested and accused of participation in a vast reactionary plot. After his acquittal, he returned to the Kaşgari tekkesi. However, in 1943, he was arrested again and forced to live under surveillance at a hotel in İzmir before being permitted to move to Ankara. It was there, in a modest house near the Hacı Bayram mosque, that he died in the midst of these final travails. His followers and relatives were denied permission to take the body to İstanbul for burial, so a group of them interred him in the nearby village of Bağlum.³⁵ People still visit his tomb, and the local inhabitants attribute to him the posthumous miracle of bestowing exceptional fertility on their land.³⁶

Thus ended the life of the last sheikh of the Kaşgari tekkesi. All that had remained

³⁴ Vassâf, *Sefîne-i Evliyâ*, ff. 59a-60b.

³⁵ On the life of Arvâsî, see Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Son Devrin Din Mazlumlari*, İstanbul, 1969, pp. 249-280; Sadık Albayrak, *Şeriat Yolunda Yürüyenler ve Sürünenler*, İstanbul, pp. 159-164; and Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Tam İlmihal: Seâdet-i Ebediye*, 33rd. ed., İstanbul, 1984, p. 972.

³⁶ Remarks made to the author during a visit to Bağlum in May 1977.

of its devotional life after Arvāsī's forced departure from Istanbul was the performance of public prayer in the mosque attached to the *tekke*, which indeed continues down to the present.³⁷ Arvāsī's spiritual legacy did not, however, remain entirely unclaimed. The celebrated poet and litterateur, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (d. 1983), credited him with his own deliverance from an infatuation with Western, especially French, culture and concomitant rediscovery of the Islamic heritage, and in gratitude he wrote copiously on his teachings and life.³⁸ Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, by laying claim to being Arvāsī's *khalifa*, has secured some transmission of this particular branch of Khalidī-Naqshbandī tradition, albeit with certain distinctive emphases of his own that have caused his followers to become popularly known as Işıkçı.³⁹

Istanbul was not the only terminus for wandering Naqshbandī dervishes. India, viewed by many Central Asians as a land of opportunity, was in fact a destination far more frequently chosen by itinerant Sufis, including dervishes known to Nidāi and belonging to his initiatic line. Principal among them was a certain Bābā Shāh Sa'īd Palang-pūsh, meaning "man in the leopard skin," a disciple of Bābā Qūl-Mazīd. Born in Ghijduvān near Bukhara, he travelled to Tashkent, Mashhad, the Hijaz, Balkh, Kabul and Kashmir, before arriving in India in 1086/1785. There he encountered Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān, a Moghul general engaged in the conquest of the Deccan. He joined his retinue as a kind of spiritual auxiliary, entrusted not so much with moral uplift of the soldiery as with the deployment of his miraculous powers against the enemy. He was reputed to have derived his martial prowess from Khizr, who had equipped him with arrows he used to fell a leopard with minimal effort; it was to memorialize this triumph that he took to wearing the skin of his prey (hence also his sobriquet).⁴⁰ Closely associated with Palang-pūsh was Bābā Shāh Musāfir, also a native of Ghijduvān. He first met Palang-pūsh as a child, when studying at a *maktab* in Bukhara, but it was not until he too had migrated to³India that Palang-pūsh bestowed on him an initiatic *khirqā*. Unlike Palang-pūsh, and despite the meaning of his own sobriquet, "the traveller," Bābā Shāh Musāfir chose the settled life and took up residence in a *tekke* established for him at Awrangābād in the Deccan by Nizām al-Mulk Āsaf Jāh, founder of the dynasty that was to rule the Deccan until the mid-twentieth century. Bābā Shāh Musāfir did not, however, follow the example of Nidāi by marrying after ending his travels, thus excluding the possibility of hereditary succession, and when he died in 1126/1714, it was to Bābā Shāh Mahmūd Jī, an orphan who had been reared in the *tekke*, that its direction was passed. His assumption of leadership did not, in the long run, suffice to ensure the vitality of the *tekke*, for it attracted only unassimilated immigrants from Central Asia. Among these wanderers were Bābā Shāh Nāzīr of Samarqand and Shāh Qalandar of Qunduz, mentioned by Nidāi without further detail as disciples of Bābā Hājji 'Abd al-Rahīm 'Āqibat-ba-Khayr (f.16a); after their migration to the Deccan, they joined the following of Bābā Shāh Sa'īd Palang-pūsh. When the flow of fortune seekers from the north dwindled to a trickle in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, Sufi activity at the *tekke*

37 For photographs of the present state of the *tekke*, see Kreiser, "Kaşgarī Tekyesi," p. 336; and Zarcone, "Derviches turkestanais et indiens," p. 171.

38 See especially Kısakürek, *Büyük Kapı*, Istanbul, 1965; idem., *O ve Ben*, 4th. ed., Istanbul, 1984.

39 See Hamid Algar, "Der Nakşibendi-Orden in der republikanischen Türkei," *Islam und Politik in der Türkei*, Jochen Blaschke and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), Berlin, 1984, pp. 184-185.

40 Virtually the only source for the history of the *tekke* at Awrangābād and its occupants is Bābā Shāh Mahmūd Jī, *Malfūzāt-i Naqshbandiya*, Hyderabad, Deccan, 1358/1939. This work is unavailable to me, and I have therefore depended on the exhaustive account of it given by Simon Digby in "The Naqshbandīs in the Deccan in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century A.D.: Bābā Palangposh, Bābā Musāfir and Their Adherents," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman*, pp. 168-207.

effectively ceased, although the male descendants of Bābā Shāh Mahmūd Jī continued to inhabit it as their private property until 1916.⁴¹

The fortunes of the two transplanted Kāsānī lineages — one in Istanbul and the other in the Deccan — thus differed widely from each other. Without renouncing his own spiritual loyalties, Nidāi demonstrated a certain flexibility by marrying and thus begetting a lineage, simultaneously biological and spiritual, that helped to ensure longterm continuity at the Kaşgarī tekkesi. Although the origin of Nidāi's wife is unknown — it need not be assumed that she was born and bred in Istanbul — the mere fact of his marriage can be taken as an indication of assimilation into the environment where he had chosen to settle. Perhaps more importantly, he developed a reciprocal collegial sympathy with the Mujaddidīs who were fast eclipsing all other Naqshbandī lineages in the Ottoman capital, and this permitted him and his descendants to enjoy respect and acceptance in its Sufī circles. By contrast, the Kāsānīs of Awrangābād neither modified their practices nor showed any inclination to acquire a local clientele, depending almost exclusively on migrants and wanderers from Central Asia; many of the dervishes were in fact recruited as boys in Central Asia on the understanding that they would remain permanently celibate, and the only locals recruited were orphans.⁴² A particularly telling sign of their unwillingness or inability to assimilate into the Indian environment was their complete lack of contact with the Mujaddidīs, who by the late eighteenth century were present in Awrangābād and engaged in a determined and organized effort to disseminate their branch of the Naqshbandiyya throughout the subcontinent.⁴³

It may finally be noted, however, that for all his contented assimilation into the Ottoman environment, Nidāi remained sympathetically aware of his brethren in the Deccan, remarking of Bābā Shāh Mahmūd Jī that “he is at present occupying the seat of guidance, *sajjāda-nishīn*, in India, where he is the guide of the age, *murshid-i vaqt*” (f. 16a). The channels of communication whereby such awareness was preserved are unclear; correspondence, the exchange of visits, or encounters at the hajj may have been involved, although there is no record to this effect.⁴⁴ What is important to note, and may fittingly serve as conclusion to this paper, is the function of the Naqshbandiyya as a farflung network of human, spiritual and intellectual sympathy, that for several centuries linked together the three principal zones of the Sunni Muslim world — the Ottoman State, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.⁴⁵

41 Digby, “The Naqshbandis in the Deccan,” p. 204.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 206.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

44 A possibly significant detail is that Bābā Shāh Musāfir once received a box of dates prepared with honey, “sent by a *murīd* with an Ottoman name” (Digby, “The Naqshbandis in the Deccan,” p. 187).

45 Even more clearly illustrative of this function than the career of Nidāi is that of a certain Shāh Haydar of Tashkent, a *murīd* of Palang-pūsh who left India and after prolonged wanderings in Europe, Ethiopia and the Hijaz established a Naqshbandi *tekke* at Būlbūl Deresi in Üsküdar; see Zarcone, “Derviches turkestanais et indiens,” pp. 157-159, and Digby, “The Naqshbandis in the Deccan,” p. 199.

The *Khafī*, *Jahrī* Controversy in Central Asia Revisited

ISENBIKE TOGAN

This paper is less a presentation of the results of an investigation than an exploration of an issue that had previously seemed to me more or less settled. The question is whether it is appropriate to associate the silent *dhikr* with the Naqshbandiyya. Although I myself come from a family in which affiliation with Naqshbandiyya played an important role,¹ I was exposed to these issues by working with the late Joseph F. Fletcher in the late 1960s and early 1970s. What I had learned about the issue was that the Naqshbandiyya perform the silent *dhikr*,² where there is an emphasis on silence and control of emotions and thoughts, something which is a reflection of Naqshbandī principles.³ Jürgen Paul, writing in the early 1990s, says “Die *Ḥwāḡagān* üben vor allem den stillen *ḏikr*.”⁴ Against such a backdrop, the late Joseph F. Fletcher drew attention to a controversy between the adherents of the silent *dhikr* and those of the vocal *dhikr* in Eastern Turkestan and northwest China.⁵ At a time when there were not many previous studies on Islam in Eastern Turkestan and China, one of Joseph Fletcher’s major tasks was to describe the situation, define the

1 Hamid Algar, 1992, pp. 127-128.

2 Hamid Algar states that other aspects “never became a distinctive feature of the Naqshbandī order—even of its Mujaddidī branch—comparable to its insistence on the silent *dhikr* and concern for the ascendancy of the *sharī‘a*” (1990, p. 21). For aspects of Naqshbandī *dhikr* see Algar 1976A. A discussion of *dhikr* among sufis placed into a larger context of mysticism in general and religious practice can be found also in Gilsenan, 1973, pp. 156-161.

3 The principles of the Naqshbandiyya are referred to as *kalimāt-i qudsiyya* (the Sacred Words). According to tradition eight of these were transmitted by ‘Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwān as the following: 1. *hūsh dar dam* (“awareness while breathing”) 2. *nazar bar qadam* (“watching the steps”) 3. *safar dar vatan* (“journeying in the homeland”) 4. *khalvat dar anjuman* (“solitude in the assembly”) 5. *yād-kard* (“remembrance”) 6. *bāz-gasht* (“restraint”) 7. *nigah-dasht* (“watchfulness”) 8. *yād-dasht* (“recollection”). Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband, on the other hand, added three more principles: 9. *wuqūf-i zamān* (“temporal pause”) 10. *wuqūf-i ‘adadī* (“numerated pause”) 11. *wuqūf-i qalbi* (“heart pause”). The translations into English are by Bo Utas, from a handout that he distributed at his talk at Harvard University in late 1980s.

As Hamid Algar says, these were formulated originally in Persian and are to be found in all the books on the Naqshbandiyya (1976, p. 133). For instance, in Turkish they are to be found in Mehmed Zahid Kotku, [n.d.] I, pp. 95-99, also Rashahāt, Cawnpore: 20 and Istanbul: 25. Algar elaborates on *nazar bar qadam* and *safar dar vatan* in 1976a, pp. 43-44; *khalvat dar anjuman* in 1976b, p. 133. A most detailed description of these principles, based on the most important Naqshbandī sources is given by Ahmad Tahīrī ‘Iraqī in his introduction to Muḥammad Parsa’s work *Qudsiyya: Kalāmāt-i Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband*, Tehran, 1354h.sh/1975, pp. 50-64.

4 Jürgen Paul, 1991, p. 22, n. 5.

5 In a posthumously published article, Joseph F. Fletcher (1995, XI, p. 33), states (paraphrasing the original to avoid mentioning names): Meditation at saints’ tombs may have been one of the points at issue, but the quarrel itself centered on the performance of the *dhikr*. Ma Ming-hsin insisted on the permissibility of *jahr*, and the Old teaching masters (the Chinese Āfāqiyya) insisted with equal vehemence on the traditional Naqshbandī silent *dhikr*.

problem, and try to understand whether they belonged to the Naqshbandiyya, the Yasawiyya or to the Yasawī groups, who more and more came to be associated with the Naqshbandiyya. He found that both practices were present in all groups. He also studied the social context of these controversies. His unpublished work and papers⁶ show how sensitive he had been to shades of different interpretations, since he had prepared many translations of many different passages concerning similar issues. In some cases, he prepared translations of the same passage in both its Persian original and its translation into Arabic. Looking at the manuscripts and the translated passages, one realizes that he wanted to bring all these interpretations together. Unfortunately, an early death left this tremendously important task incomplete. The passages that he chose are important not only in a historical sense but also in the way they serve to guide analyses of current developments in both the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds of today.

I have also examined the social and economic background of the two disputing groups of Naqshbandis in Eastern Turkestan in earlier papers.⁷ These groups were known as the Black and White Mountain or Ishāqiyya and Āfāqiyya, respectively.⁸ Previous studies carried out include those of Joseph F. Fletcher, Saguchi Toru from Japan⁹ and Jonathan Lipman from the United States,¹⁰ who studied these groups from an historical perspective, and Dru Gladney,¹¹ who did so from an anthropological one. It was, in fact, Saguchi Toru's study in Japanese that had opened the way for Joseph Fletcher's studies. Jonathan Lipman and I were students of Fletcher. During the late sixties and early seventies, I was more interested in finding the truth than in dealing with perceptions. This was especially so in regard to the neglected and misrepresented people of Inner Asia who always had been seen from the vantage point of the surrounding sedentary civilizations. Since then a lot has been written on the different Inner Asian peoples, whether nomadic or sedentary; and their history is now better known in its own right. However, there is still the important question as to how certain issues were perceived at different times. Today it seems that news on T.V. from different sources and channels is one of the ways through which we are exposed to different kinds of perceptions of the same issue on a daily basis. It was Lev Gumilev who first drew my attention to the "perception of realities and expression of feelings" as a way of interpreting the meaning of history for the nomads.¹² My reaction was to question why this applied only to the nomads. Just at that juncture, in relation to conversion to Islam, Devin DeWeese stated in his book that he was not so much interested in what had happened, but in how it was perceived when it happened.¹³ Similarly, since 1995, I have been doing micro-stud-

6 Information on these can be found in Beatrice Forbes Manz, "Preface," in Joseph F. Fletcher, 1995. His unpublished papers are located at the Harvard University Archives. Here in this paper some of them have been consulted. In some cases I have quoted J. F. Fletcher's translations (courtesy of Harvard University Archives). See notes 8, 31, 39, 56, 73, 79, 80, 84 below.

7 Isenbike Togan, 1989, 1992.

8 They have entered the literature as Qara Taghliq that is "Black Mountain" and Aq Taghliq that is "White Mountain" (Fletcher, 1995, XI, pp. 10-11. See further I. Togan, 1992, pp. 140 and 14. See also Ch'en, 1971). But there is also indication that in some manuscripts they were referred to as Aq Tughliq that is "those with a white standard" and Qara Tughliq "those with a black standard" (personal communication by the late Abdülkadir İnan in the year 1970). In Chinese sources, on the other hand, they are referred to as Black and White Cap Muslims. A similar explanation is found among the papers of the late Zeki Velidi Togan who says that the begs of Eastern Turkestan explain Qara Taghliq and Aq Taghliq as derived from Qara Taqyaliq [i.e. black capped] and Aq Taqyaliq [i.e. white capped].

9 Toru Saguchi, 1963.

10 Jonathan Lipman, 1995, 1998.

11 Dru Gladney, 1991.

12 Lev Gumilev, 1987, p. 31.

13 Devin De Weese, 1994, p. 12.

ies, demonstrating how the same problem is perceived differently in different historical contexts.¹⁴

The emphasis in this paper, too, will be more on perception. The issue is one of determining how the silent and vokal *dhikr* were perceived at different times. Within such an endeavor, I would like to raise certain questions, especially in terms of how we historians of the twentieth century perceived certain issues in the past. It seems that in the late sixties and seventies, and even well into the eighties we were more concerned with strict documentation. In the days of the Cold War, with definite lines drawn between the two ways of looking at and perceiving the world, we wanted more to see on which side certain issues belonged. Many of us were trying to understand by pinning down, defining, determining or by categorizing. At present we are using more or less the same source material perhaps with some additions. Looking at the same material from a different vantage point, it is amazing to see how selective we have been for the sake of clarity.

The Problem

Because I had initially studied the Naqshbandī in terms of their relation to seventeenth-century Eastern Turkestan and had evaluated extant literature as unique and incomparable,¹⁵ I had not put the Eastern Turkestanī Naqshbandiyya into an historical context of Naqshbandī studies in general. The emphasis had been on difference. For Joseph Fletcher, himself coming from the China studies tradition, it was important to put the Muslims, whether Turkish or Chinese speaking back into history. In the book that he started but unfortunately could not complete, he laments the fact that Muslims in present China have remained beyond the pale of history.¹⁶ His later work, including the posthumous article, shows relations between Central Asia, Middle East and especially Yemen and the Muslims in the Chinese orbit.

Nevertheless, as my socialization had been in Republican Turkey, I did not have a monolithic view of Islam; but apparently I had a monolithic view of the *tariqa*, and especially, of the Naqshbandiyya, until I met Joseph Fletcher. In Republican Turkey the confrontation had been between the Naqshbandiyya and members of the new republic, and not within the Naqshbandiyya. Consequently, this difference that had brought the Eastern Turkestanī and the Chinese Naqshbandiyya into confrontation was interesting. First, they were different from the Naqshbandiyya in general; second, the controversy between the two opposing groups of the Black Mountain and White Mountain had been significant for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Eastern Turkestanī history. Moreover, the controversy between the New and Old Teaching in eighteenth-century China showed parallelisms to Eastern Turkestan.¹⁷ In

14 In 1995, I worked on a single episode seen in the the different versions of the epic *Mamas*; recently, I have studied how the siege of Khwarezm in the thirteenth century has been told in different ways in a diachronic study of the sources.

15 Hamid Algar's studies were not yet available at that time, e.g., the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In those days of area studies and fragmented view of the world, even if his study on the Bosnian Naqshbandis (1972) had been available to me at that time, looking from an East Turkestanī perspective, both in place and time, such a reference would have looked remote.

16 This book in typewritten manuscript, as well as his other papers are to be found in Harvard University Archives (HUG FP 100) "Altishahr under the Khojas," Box: 2; "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," Box: 3.

17 Fletcher, 1995, XI; The developments in northwest China first began among the Turkish speaking Salar communities. The Salars, who are the descendants of the historical Salur, a branch of the Oghuz, had earlier been in East Asia; then in the eleventh century, they moved to Central Asia and later, in the twelfth century they again returned to the East (I. Togan, 1998, p. 189). On their manners and customs see Trippner, 1961 and 1964.

both cases the basis of the disagreement had been the nature of the *dhikr*. While both the White Mountain and the adherents of the New Teaching - a century later- performed the vocal *dhikr*,¹⁸ the new ways of the newcomers were not well received by the adherents of the Black Mountain and Old Teaching, respectively. In both cases, a confrontation emerged. In 1679, the White Mountain Naqshbandiyya, under Appaq Khoja, were able to obtain popular support in this regard and succeeded in getting the upper hand in Kashghari politics. They were reading the Maṣnawī, performing *samā'*, and it is most probable that they were performing the *dhikr* in both its forms - vocal and silent. In fact, vocal *dhikr* does not exclude the silent one, but silent *dhikr* does exclude the vocal one. Therefore, the emphasis in available sources written by their adversaries is on its vocality. In these sources, they sometimes emphasize the chain of transmission, *silsila*, rather than the manner and the style of the remembrance; but sometimes there are also descriptions of vocal *dhikr*.¹⁹ But they do mention the Maṣnavī and the *samā'*. Later, however, sources speak of the path of Appaq Khoja as well as of the Old Teaching as Khufiyya.²⁰

At first glance, the information contained in our sources was difficult to reconcile and appeared contradictory. The adherents of Appaq Khoja, also called Āfāqiyya, who were criticized because of their uncivilized manners (being too loud, e.g., vocal) were later called the Khufiyya, those who were supposed to perform the silent *dhikr*. They were in fact known as such in Northwest China in contrast to those who performed the vocal *dhikr* (the Jahriyya).²¹ We also see that the nineteenth century "rebel" leader Ma Chan-ao²² and others are sometimes referred as Jahriyya (vocal *dhikr*) and sometimes as Old Teaching, supposedly silent *dhikr*.²³ Moreover, we learn from Dru Gladney that the present Khufiyya in People's Republic of China perform the vocal *dhikr*. He says:²⁴

Although the Na villagers are members of a Khufiyya Sufi order, they do not practice the silent *dhikr* traditionally associated with the Khufiyya. As described above, when the Khufiyya order was first introduced to China it was known for promoting the silent *dhikr*, as opposed to the later Jahriyya order, known for the vocal use of the *jahr* in remembrance. However, like many Khufiyya members in north and central Ningxia, the Na villagers now practice the oral *dhikr*. Local historians suggest that the interesting combination of Jahriyya and Khufiyya ritual practices among the Na may result from their participation in Ma Hualong's Jahriyya-led uprising (1862-1876) after they had been Khufiyya for many generations [n.66]. As a result, when they pray in unison at certain rituals, the *dhikr* is expressed aloud.

If what local historians say is correct, we have here a case of a group of people who have changed their way of performing the *dhikr*, from the silent to the vocal, but who still carry the name Khufiyya (the secretive or the silent ones). This contradiction does not seem to disturb anyone in their environment. In Turkey as well there

18 The fact that the adherents of the New Teaching performed the vocal *dhikr* is well attested. But the ways of the White Mountain were perceived differently by different scholars. As will be evident in the course of this paper, we can confidently say that the White Mountain leader Appaq Khoja performed the vocal *dhikr*.

19 Here I am speaking of course of a limited number that I have seen. Below I have rendered a translation of a passage on vocal *dhikr* described in the *Tadhkīra-i 'Azīzān*. There is a longer description of vocal *dhikr* in *Majmū'at al-Muhaqqiqīn* by Muhammed Sadiq Yarkandī as it will be mentioned below.

20 Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 31 and Trippner, 1961, p. 148.

21 The terms Khafīyya, Khufiyya and their use is being discussed further below.

22 On Ma Chan-ao, see Jonathan Lipman, 1997, pp. 126-127.

23 Fletcher, 1995, XI, pp. 45, 32.

24 Gladney, 1991, pp. 142-143.

seems to have been a lax approach towards these issues. In one of the leading works on the present Naqshbandiyya in Turkey we read:²⁵

According to *Neticetül-fikir* by Celâleddin Suyûtî, there are about 25 *hadis* [i.e. ḥadîs] which state that in the *dhikr*, e.g., *jahrî* which can be performed both in a group in a mosque and also individually, there is nothing detestable. One should only be careful not to disturb others who read [the Qur'an], who perform the prayers or who are asleep. In such cases, out of fear for dissemination, it has been stated that the silent *dhikr* is superior. Acting in the following manner is also permitted: although you may start with *jahrî*, because of feeling exhausted, for example, you may change to *khafî*, or, just the opposite, you may start with *khafî*, but then change to *jahrî*. This is all permissible. Both in the reading of the Qur'an and in the performance of the *dhikr*, it has been stated there are benefits from following both ways, and one may sometimes perform in the *jahrî*, and sometimes in the *khafî* way. Especially, the *dhikr-i jahrî* is beneficial and effective in getting rid of worries and unpleasant memories.

It seems then in the twentieth century, within both major groups of the Naqshbandiyya, different ways of performance of the *dhikr* is permissible. In a more recent study²⁶ Hamid Algar says:

As for the related insistence of the Naqshbandiya on the practice of silent *dhikr*, this has by contrast been widely abandoned. In Turkey, for example, it is possible that even a majority of Naqshbandis now practice vocal *dhikr*, being either unaware of the silent *dhikr* or regarding it as a higher stage of spiritual practice indefinitely beyond their reach.

What then has been the problem historically? If the nature of the performance of the *dhikr* was not crucial and one could change or shift from one to the other, how are we going to understand what happened in Eastern Turkestan and northwest China in the 17th and 18th centuries? Françoise Aubin, approaching similar issues from a different perspective, says that what happened in China was neither because it was "islam dégénéré"²⁷ nor because the Naqshbandis in China were the ignorant Naqshbandis.²⁸ She especially takes issue with Raphael Israeli's views who in trying "to pin down the differences between various sects and to determine the exact nature of the of the 'Old Sect' and the 'New Sect' both in absolute terms and their relative positions to the 'normative' Islam"²⁹ comes to the conclusion that the followers of the New Teaching in northwest China were not Naqshbandis but Qadiris. As Aubin's objective is to demonstrate the relationship between the *shari'a* and local customs of the specific environment, she dwells especially on the terminology that has been used; citing the classics in Chinese Islam, she shows how the terminology of Islam in China has been inspired by the terminologies used in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Attributing the New Teaching (Israeli's Qadiriyya) to Yemen, she says that it has been established by Joseph Fletcher "définitivement," that the New Teaching was not something autochthonous or a branch of the Yasawiyya nor something different, but a branch of the Naqshbandiyya.³⁰ Later she briefly deals with the

25 Kotku [n.d.], II, p. 53; Mehmed Zahid Kotku was one of the leading Naqshbandis in Turkey. His views have been published under the title *Tasavvufî Ahlak* in 5 volumes. Mehmet Şevket Eygi, another Naqshbandi leader who has written about the life of Bahâ' al-Dîn Naqshband by making excerpts from *Anîs al-talibîn wa 'uddat al-sâlikîn* written in the fifteenth century, incorporates the views of Kotku in his discussion of the *dhikr* (1978, pp. 19-20).

26 Algar, 1990, p. 42.

27 Aubin, 1990, pp. 492-493.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 515.

29 Aubin, 1990, p. 491, n.1; Raphael Israeli has a paper in the same volume (1990, pp. 576-587). The quotation is from 1990, p. 576. But he had earlier published also a book (1980) on these issues.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 518.

Khufiyya while going into more detail with the Jahriyya. However, she does not deal with the specific question of the *dhikr*.

The Methodological Issue

While I was still trying to understand and to clarify the situation for myself, just by chance I came across another reference from another time (and also place) of the Islamic world. This reference concerned the father of Emir Sultan, the saint of Bursa, the early Ottoman capital. According to tradition, Emir Sultan, who married Sultan Yıldırım Beyazıt's daughter, was the son of Emir Seyyid Kulāl of Bukhara.³¹ Emir Seyyid Kulāl was also the mentor of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband. What led me to further explore this question was the fact that Emir Seyyid Kulāl was combining both kinds of *dhikr* in his teaching and that Bahā' al-Dīn would leave that place whenever they were performing the vocal *dhikr*.³²

On the basis of this information, I started to reexamine the issue. It looked as if the issue was never as clear cut as I had assumed. Just about the same time, I happened to visit the tombs of the three Naqshbandī leaders in Samarkand and Bukhara. The group I was travelling with started from Dahbid, a small town about 30 km away from Samarkand, where Makhdūm-i A'zām (d. 1542) is buried.³³ It was February 1996 and a most beautiful site under the snow. We also saw a group of Uzbek men of different ages coming to visit. They were walking in a row, forming a darkish line under the snow flakes. Some of them also had overcoats, *chapan*, with flower designs. On the same day we also visited Khoja Ahrār (d.1490) in Samarkand,³⁴ this time under a heavy snow and there was no one else there but us.³⁵ The next day we were in Bukhara and we had a late afternoon visit at the tomb of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband³⁶ as it was approaching sunset. Without any previous plan, we had started our visit in the sixteenth century and ended it in the fourteenth, with the person from whom the Naqshbandiyya take their inspiration. It was during this visit, which was like a pilgrimage, that I developed an awareness that instead of categorizing we should try to feel the texture of the fabric of history. The first notions of the fabric I also owe to Joseph Fletcher who in the posthumously published article on "Horizontal Continuities," speaks of the weft and warp of history.³⁷ But there was an added dimension here. We had seen each site under a different light. The contrast of the white snow covering the ground, the sight of the snow flakes under a dim daylight and the sunset without the snow made me also aware of the importance of light as reflected on the texture. As if to illustrate this situation, my

31 Şinasi Çoruh, 1973, p. 27; and Senayi Çelebi, *Menâqib-ı Emir Sultan*, Istanbul, 1289H/1872M.

32 For a translation of this passage see below.

33 On Makhdum-i A'zam see Algar, 1990, p. 16; and Zahidi, 1996, pp. 3-12. This site is mentioned by R. D. McChesney, 1996, p. 83.

34 The site is being described in Golombek and Wilbur, 1988, pp. 270-271 (no. 37). An account of the history of the shrine complex and its administration is to be found in McChesney, 1996, pp. 98-109. For a short account of Khoja Ahrār's life see Algar, 1990, pp. 13-15. See also Jo-Ann Gross, 1990 and 1992; Algar, 1990, p. 48 mentions further studies. A more comprehensible list of references can be found in Paul, 1991.

35 I was accompanied on this trip by Dr. Abdelqadir Zahidi, a participant at this conference and Dr. Nurten Kılıç from Uludağ University (Bursa, Turkey) who is working on Shaybani Khan and his Naqshbandi affiliations.


36 The history and administration of the shrine complex is to be found in R. D. McChesney, 1996, pp. 92-98. A brief account of his life in English is to be found in Algar, 1990, pp. 10-12.

37 Fletcher, 1985, p. 33.

photographs of the snowy scenes had come out with a bluish tinge. Without looking at the label, I had used a film which was intended for use indoors. The bluish looking snow, on the other hand, somehow was perfect in conveying the sentiment of that specific day. And in this way I became aware of the fact of how different the same texture can look if it is exposed to different lights. It was also at about the same time that I read Joan Schott's article "Experience,"³⁸ where again the light factor was introduced. In her approach, light symbolizes the theory. In my approach,³⁹ light symbolizes perception differing in time. The relationship between the master, *murshīd*, and his pupil, *murīd*, and the *dhikr* that both brings them together and ties them to God, is a *leitmotif* that I have used in this study. The different sources give me a feeling of texture. Within the context of varying

dimensions of time and space, I trace how the views of the *dhikr* have changed. I try to understand how perceptions have changed in Eastern Turkestan and China, not unlike the alteration of beams of light as they strike the snowy landscape. In other words, a sense of perception and feeling of the fabric of history emerged through a synchronic and diachronic examination of the sources and societies related to the issue under focus. In my interpretation of the texture of history, I hope that external factors such as the state, will be balanced by the intense relationship between the master, the *murshīd* and the pupil, the *murīd*, as it represents an inner dynamic of the Nashbandiyya. A closer look at different sources has shown that there have been differences in emphasis; following them chronologically, I could sense the development of a trend. I associated this trend as a development from a level of tolerance and non-interference, with more or less fluidity, towards emerging lines of division. We see later that under the Ottomans in the Middle East these lines become blurred, leading to coexistence. Yet the development of such lines of division in Eastern Turkestan and China led to conflict.

The problem in Eastern Turkestan and later in northwest China had been that there was no tolerance. However, the level of tolerance changed over time; what also changed was the place of emphasis within Naqshbandī principles, as well as the structure of the Naqshbandiyya organization in Central Asia, where it had come into



The *madrasah* and minaret belonging to the tomb-complex of Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwani (d. 1220) in the town Ghijduvan outside of Bukhara (E. Özdalga, 1999)

³⁸ Here I would like to express my gratitude to Deniz Kandiyoti who suggested this article as "an artwork in terms of present historiography."

³⁹ In general I have utilized different theories for different social phenomena, without subscribing to any one of them; in that sense theory has been for me as changeable as light, and I think that is why Joan Scott's article was so meaningful.

being. During periods of tolerance, the leaders were succeeded by many sons - many *khalīfas*, each representing a different approach; on the other hand, when there was one approach, there was only one line of transmission in the *silsila*. Elsewhere⁴⁰ I have compared the emergence of the *ṭarīqa* organization in the fourteenth century with retribalization, tribal re-grouping and referred to the *ṭarīqa* as "urban tribes." In such a process we see first the different opinion-holders functioning, as is the case in lateral succession,⁴¹ with each representative depending on the supporters for their existence. Later, however, there is branching off from the coexistence of the different opinions and a resulting outmigration.⁴² In this case, the representatives no longer depend on their supporters for their existence; it is their place in the unilinear *silsila* that determines not only their existence but even more importantly, their authority.

In fact, when the four successors called the *chāryār*, "the beloved four," evolved into one and only successor, *khalīfa*,⁴³ the greatest visible change was the authority of the *murshīd*. This development, having more authoritarian and didactic overtones, happened at a time in Central Asian history when on the social and political scene peaceful policies were being propagated. As we know, peace was also one of the most important axioms of Khoja Aḥrār, who lived in the second half of the fifteenth century.⁴⁴ But these times were also unsettled, both socially and politically. The authority and the responsibility that the *murshīd* attained, on the other hand, relieved the *murīd*, even if temporarily, from the burdens of life.

The prevalence of and insistence on the silent *dhikr* is also a product of this period. One could say that it was the *murshīd*'s authority that impelled the *murīd* to carry out peaceful activities and perform the silent *dhikr*. The Naqshbandiyya, with their emphasis on silence and the control of emotions and thoughts is reminiscent of other "civilizing processes" elsewhere in the world.⁴⁵ The *murshīd* attained over his *murīd* an authority that made it possible for the followers to put volition aside and become willing followers of their respective *murshīd*. Within this relationship obedience to the *murshīd* increasingly gained currency. One should take into consideration the fact that centuries influenced by the mobility of incoming populations had left Transoxiana with a degree of volition, which was a heritage coming from the habit of tribal populations' voting with their feet and making shifting alliances. Tribal populations had made it their habit since the sixth century to settle and become sedentary in the regions of Transoxiana. In contrast, the new trend, in which the Naqshbandī leaders such as Muḥammad Pārsā, Khoja Aḥrār played a decisive role, emphasized not volition but rather subordination and obedience to the

40 Togan, 1998, p. 7.

41 For a discussion of lateral succession, see Thomas J. Barfield, 1989, pp. 133-138.

42 Implications of outmigration will be discussed further below.

43 Apparently this evolution from the four *khalīfas* (*chāryār*) to one representative, is one of the issues that Bakhtiyar Babadjanov has dealt with in his doctoral dissertation. According to what he told me in Tashkent (October, 1997), he is going to publish an article in French on this subject. Devin DeWeese (1996, p. 191) points out the fact that the four successors is a later systematized presentation following the Prophetic paradigm. He rightly states that in earlier periods different sheikhs had successors whose number varied, sometimes they were five, in other cases, three.

44 Jürgen Paul, 1991, pp. 232-235; Jo-Ann Gross, 1992, p. 164.

45 For instance, Norbert Elias speaking of European culture, emphasizes the court culture as ensuring the control of aggressive instincts. In his view, this transition entailed the increase in the socio-political control of the state in the direct discharge of impulses and individual violence (Elias, 1982, pp. 229-295 as mentioned by Esenbel, 1996, p. 105). What is interesting is the notion that the Central Asian case does not entail an increase in the control of the state but an intensity in the relationship between the *murīd* and the *murshīd*.

murshīd.⁴⁶ The period during which we observe all these developments signals also the end of mass migrations by tribal people and also the end of the conquests. The arrival of the Uzbeks under Shaybani Khan at the beginning of the sixteenth century will be the last great advance of new populations before the Russian conquest at the end of the nineteenth century. In other words, we could say that the insistence on silent *dhikr* and peace had a lasting impact on the populations of Central Asia. These trends towards a peaceful coexistence were also supported by the political structure of power-sharing among the khans; lesser khans would fight among themselves but the moment one of them became the Great Khan, he would abandon arms.⁴⁷

In the Light of the Early Sources

In view of these developments, I will now present in a chronological order the changing views on the perception of the *dhikr*,⁴⁸ not so much on the basis of the authority of certain sheikhs, but in terms of how certain sources reflect these developments on the whole. By that token we will be aware of this trend toward authority and subordination and obedience that becomes more visible in different sources. It seems that⁴⁹

the “*Risāla-i šāhibiyya*” (written in 1204), attributed to Abū Yūsuf’s own disciple ‘Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī, [n.18]⁵⁰ says that Abū Yūsuf traced his *dhikr* to Abū Bakr, that Abū Yūsuf

46 Fritz Meier’s work (1994) deals with the evolution of this special tie between the *murīd* and the *murshīd*. Although *rābiṭa* as the specific term that describes this relationship became institutionalized later, especially in the nineteenth century, Fritz Meier shows that from earlier times this specific bond had been used by mystics. However, it had always been in the manner of the submission and subordination of the *murīd*. It seems that the relationship starts to evolve in that direction with Khoja Ahrār (Meier, 1994, pp. 50-51). A brief assessment of *rābiṭa* and its implications for the Naqshbandiyya is to be found in Algar, 1990, p. 31. The development leading to the rise of the authority of the *murshīd* has also been shown by ter Haar (1992, pp. 320-321). He shows how this aspect was not of great significance at the beginning during the formative years of the mystical path of the Naqshbandiyya. Although there were proponents of it, such as Khoja ‘Ala al-Dīn Aṭṭār, they warned that a special relationship could not be developed without efforts on the part of the novice. Yet by the 19th century, the talents of the novice were seen as insignificant (ter Haar, 1992, p. 321).

What is of interest is the fact that not the manner of the *dhikr*, but the intense relationship between the *murīd* and the *murshīd*, and the rise of the latter’s authority in guidance was going to remain as the lasting trend among the Naqshbandiyya in later centuries. We can also say that in China also the issue was not so much the nature of the *dhikr* but rise of the authority of the *murshīd*. Jonathan Lipman quotes the following judgement rendered by a Chinese scholar saying that the people showed “fanatical loyalty to the leaders” (1997, p. 150; see also further below note 89). It is significant that in northwest China such leaders were for vocal *dhikr*, whereas in Central Asia they were emphasizing the silent *dhikr*.

47 McChesney, 1991, pp. 84-85.


48 This is by all means not an exhaustive list of all sources dealing with the early period. Some sources were remotely located and not immediately available. Others remained beyond my reach although they are located nearby. One such manuscript is a treatise by Muḥammad Pārsā as listed in the Iranian catalogue of manuscripts in the Bursa Library. This treatise is called *risala dar bayān-i dhikr-i jahr*. I am indebted to Evrim Binbaş for drawing my attention to this manuscript.

49 This quotation is from Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Old and the New Teachings in Chinese Islam,” (p. 14) to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). In actual fact the above passage starts with the following words:

It is not entirely certain what kind of *dhikr* Abū Yūsuf advocated. According to *Rashahāt ‘ayn al-ḥayāt* of ‘Alī Kāshifī (written in 1503/4), Abū Yūsuf and his school practiced the “remembrance of the public way” (*dhikr-i ‘alāniyya*) — in other words, a spoken (*jahrī*) litany [n.17].

As I am presenting the sources in a chronological way, I have quoted above only from *Risala-i Sahibiyya*; yet, I did not want to quote the passage out of context, so I have included it here.

50 Note 18 in Joseph Fletcher’s study gives as the source of this information the following: ‘Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī, “*Risāla-i Šāhibiyya*,” Sa’id Nafīsī (ed.), *Farhang-i Iran-zamīn*, vol. 1 (1953-54), pp. 70-101. Then the note continues with other recensions of the work, which I have not incorporated here.



Dervishes from the Qadiriyya order known for practicing vocal *dhikr*. Engraving from the 19th century.

did not perform the remembrance of the public way, that in his time “the remembrance of the public way, *dhikr-i ‘alāniyya*, did not exist,” and that he performed a “remembrance of the heart”, *dhikr-i dil*, while holding his breath, which caused him to sweat profusely. The same work also says that Abū Yūsuf specifically urged his followers to perform the remembrance of the heart and not to perform the “loud remembrance,” *dhikr-i buland*. [n.19]⁵¹

It is noteworthy that in the twelfth century the specific terminology of *dhikr-i khafī* and *dhikr-i jahrī* was not yet in use.

The second work under consideration, is *Maqāmāt-i Emir Kulāl*, which was written around 1440.⁵² In this work, the nature of the *dhikr* is not so much the issue. The work consists of many anecdotes, stories related to Emir Kulāl. One among these anecdotes in particular has become widely known, as it mentions that Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband in his earlier years an executioner,⁵³ thus the exaltation of him in other works does not appear here. But there is no exaltation of Emir Kulāl either. In these stories it is more important that Emir Kulāl recognizes the good in the person. A passage on *dhikr*⁵⁴ speaks more of how one should be prepared for the *dhikr*,⁵⁵ rather than emphasizing which form is better.

51 Note 19 in Joseph Fletcher’s study is “Appendix IV” which consists of a five-page translation of the relevant passages from *Risāla-i Şahībiyya*.

52 For a description of the work see Paul, 1991, p. 9 and 1990, p. 286, n. 2 and for a brief discussion of it, see Algar, 1990, p. 11.

53 This episode is mentioned by Algar (1990, p. 10) and Zeki Velidi Togan (1968, p. 783). It seems that it is better to regard being an executioner in terms of a symbolic significance as “an executioner who by his faith in God is turned into a *wali*.” This assumption is confirmed in an narration related to the saint of Ankara, Hacı Bayram Veli. It is told that at the beginning Hacı Bayram Veli was a head executioner, *bostancıbaşı*. What is of significance is the fact that the person who told the story did not know of the meaning of *bostancıbaşı* as head executioner; she only knew the other meaning, that is “head keeper of orchards,” thereby confirming the fact that she was telling something transmitted to her within the oral tradition (Akşit, 1998, p. 190).

54 *Maqāmāt-i Emir Kulāl*, MS in Akademii Nauk Leningradski Filial No. 1562 Folio 35a, b. See also Storey, p. 1058.

55 This passage reminds one of the passage by Najm al-Dīn Rāzī to be found in Hamid Algar’s translation (1982, p. 271).

Anīs al-ṭalibīn wa ‘uddat al-sālikīn, which supposedly was written in 1427 in the longer version, and in 1452 in the shorter version,⁵⁶ contains an important episode related to Bahā’ al-Dīn and Emir Kulāl. The whole episode is a personal experience by Bahā’ al-Dīn himself, who after this “vision,” abandons the *‘alau* (visible, public), that is, the vocal *dhikr*. In this episode, we hear from Bahā’ al-Dīn himself that whenever he felt overwhelmed by rupture, *jaḥba*, he would go and visit the graveyard in Bukhara. One night, while he was on a visit in the graveyard, he saw that a small light was visible on the tombs of saints. In the meantime, he was taken by two persons to a very respected person’s grave and there he sat, facing the *qibla*, and experienced a vision where Khoja Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī appeared to him surrounded by all the important Khojagan like ‘Ārif Rīwgārī, Khoja Maḥmūd Injir Faghawī, Khoja ‘Azīzan ‘Alī Ramitanī and his mentor Khoja Muḥammad al-Baba Sammāsī. The latter told him that he had been given the *kulāh* of saints (*‘azīzān*). Khoja ‘Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī then gave him certain instructions, telling him especially to remain on the path of *sharī‘a* and avoid any *bid‘a*, that is, innovations in the religion. This episode⁵⁷ was also incorporated into Jāmī’s work and the remainder has been translated by Joseph Fletcher into English:⁵⁸

I went to Nasaf and came to Emir Kulāl (his secret be sanctified), the Emir showed me kindness and did me many favours and taught me the *dhikr* and had me practice it by way of the negation [*La ilāha*] and the affirmation [*ill-Allah*] after the manner of the *khafīyya*.⁵⁹ And because I was under specific orders, I have not undertaken to perform the *dhikr-i ‘alāniyya*.

According to Jürgen Paul, *Anīs al-ṭalibīn wa ‘uddat al-sālikīn*⁶⁰ was written earlier than the *Maqāmāt-i Emir Kulāl*. Yet the tone of this work is completely different than the former. This work, which on the whole is a compilation of anecdotes related to Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband, does not portray him as a person who only wants to see the good in persons he comes into contact with. Here Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband appears as a *murshīd* who requires complete obedience from his followers.⁶¹ There are instances where he requires from one of his followers that he break his fast

56 Paul, 1991, p. 9, n. 22.

57 From the Turkish translation *Maqāmāt-i Naqshbandiyya* done by Süleyman ‘Izzi Teşrifāti. Istanbul 1328/1910, pp. 26-27; the whole episode spans pages 22-26. The Turkish translation gives the author’s name as Şalāh al-Dīn ibn Mubarek al-Bukhārī, whereas Jürgen Paul thinks that this authorship is not quite certain (1991, p. 9 and n. 22). The Turkish translation appeared, as well, in modern Turkish, in 1983. Selahüddin B. Mübarek, *Makāmāt-i Muhammed Bahāüddin Nakşibend: Enisü’t-talibīn ve Uddetü’s Sālikīn*, Istanbul, 1982. There is also a popular edition of anecdotes from this work in Mehmet Şevket Eygi; this specific episode is to be found in 1978, pp. 116-118. A somewhat shortened version of this episode is to be found in Jāmī, *Nafahat*, Lucknow, 1915, pp. 345-46 and Istanbul 1971, p. 427 and 1995, p. 532. This episode has been translated by M. Molé in his ‘Autour du Daré Mansour.’ pp. 38-40.

58 From Joseph Fletcher, “The Old and the New Teachings in Chinese Islam,” note 38 to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). Joseph Fletcher gives as his reference “Jāmī, *Nafahat*, pp. 385-386.” He has used the Tehran edition of 1958 edited by Mahdī Tawhīdī Pir.

59 This phrase that is rendered by “negation and affirmation (*naḥī va iṣbat*) in the above quoted text is being commented on by Mehmet Zahid Kotku [n.d.], II, p. 248 under the title “Nefy ü İsbāt.” He says that this can be only brought to completion by fulfilling nine conditions. In *Anīs al-ṭalibīn* it is stated that by *lā ilāha* everything except God is negated and by the word *illa’allah* God is affirmed. *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, Istanbul, 1338/1919-20, p. 77; 1983, p. 109.

60 For a discussion of the information available on this work see Paul, 1991, p. 9. In this study, I have used only the Turkish translations (1338H and 1983); I did not have a chance to compare the translations with the Persian originals.

61 *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, 1338: 87; and 1983, p. 125.

because Bahā' al-Dīn expects him to comply with the state of the other guests who were present. Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband is also portrayed as a holy person who has the power to read the minds of his followers. Within this frame of mind (of the work), the more he does this, the more adherents he gains; except for the important passage mentioned above, issues about the *dhikr* do not come into the forefront⁶² but faith in and obedience to the *murshīd* does. There are many instances in which Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband is portrayed as making people ashamed because of their attachment to material life, greed or unpleasant thoughts. He is also shown as displaying his power either by his authority on one of his closest *murīds*, Emir Husain, or making Khoja Shādī of Ghijduwan bashful, because of his selfishness or wordly concerns. Yet many of the anecdotes on aspects of belief, ritual and explanation of spiritual matters are told by Khoja 'Alā al-Dīn Aṭṭār, who, according to another source,⁶³ happened to be his son-in-law. But this relationship is never mentioned in this specific work.

In this work, which is an account of the life of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband, we see in the account of that special experience, before which he had been performing *dhikr-i 'alānī* and after which he decided to abandon it, a strong conviction and will.⁶⁴ Yet he does not ask his followers for submission to *dhikr-i khafī*; he only says that his chosen way is *khafī* and that it is superior to the *jahrī*.⁶⁵ These two works, *Maqāmāt-i Emir Kulāl* and *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, were written at about the same time; the difference in their perception of realities conveys us the message that there was neither one opinion nor a linear evolution in relation to the ideas on *dhikr*, but that different perceptions coexisted during the first half of fifteenth-century Central Asia. We will also see that the same trend continues well into the beginning of the sixteenth century.

In Molla Jāmi's work *Nafaḥāt al-uns*,⁶⁶ which was written in 1476, we see that people are described with respect to their preferences for the vocal or the silent *dhikr*. There seems to be no pressure to follow one or the other way; people are presented in a neutral way. In Jāmi's work, people like Khoja 'Alā al-Dīn Aṭṭār, who continued to prefer the *dhikr-i 'alāniyya*, are mentioned in detail. 'Alā al-Dīn Aṭṭār expresses views favoring vocal *dhikr* and seclusion, *khalwa*, which is again not easily reconcilable with the Naqshbandī principle of "solitude in the assembly."⁶⁷ We know when Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband met the Kartid ruler Malik Husain of Herat⁶⁸

this sovereign's first question to the sheikh was whether his 'dervish-hood' was hereditary; this was followed by a query about whether he engaged in the vocal *dhikr*, *samā'* (musical performance), and *khalvat* (seclusional retirement).

Bahā' al-Dīn replied in the negative to the questions of heredity, vocal *dhikr* and *samā'* and answered the last query with "solitude in the assembly (*khalwat dar anju-*

62 *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, 1338, p. 76; and 1983, p. 108.

63 This work is *Rashaḥāt 'ain al-ḥayat* which will be discussed below.

64 This strong will is portrayed in the work as stemming from his representing God's will. *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, 1338, p. 87; and 1983, p. 125. But interestingly enough in *Rashaḥāt* this aspect is shown as a reflection of his submission to God's will.

65 *Anīs al-ṭalibīn*, 1338, p. 43; and 1983, p. 108.

66 For a short account on Jāmi's work editions, see Farhadi, 1990, p. 65; and for a detailed study on his life Zeki Velidi Togan, "Cāmi," *IA*, vol. 3, pp. 15-18; and on his works Helmuth Ritter "Cāmi; Eserleri," *IA*, vol. 3, pp. 18-20.

67 Solitude in the assembly is apparently not an exclusive principle, as the Naqshbandiyya in Turkey also use seclusion for the solitary *dhikr*. (Kotku [n.d.] I, pp. 58-62; and II, pp. 57-59.)

68 Devin DeWeese, 1996, p. 198.

man).”⁶⁹ Yet according to Jāmī’s *Nafahāt* ‘Alā al-Dīn, who died in 802 H/1399, that is, ten years later than Bahā’ al-Dīn, is reported as having said:⁷⁰

those who perform the *dhikr-i khafī* in our times, are doing this not from their heart but from their stomach (belly). The aim is not to tell too much. It is [sufficient] to say three times *la ilaha illallah* in one breath, moving it⁷¹ from right down on the heart and completing it on the left by saying *Muhammadan rasūl Allāh*. This can not be achieved without effort; it is appropriate to do this in the early morning or after the evening prayer in *khalwa* and in solitude from people.

Later, when he was asked about the *dhikr-i ‘alāniyya*, he said:⁷²

by the consensus of the ‘*ulamā*, it is permissible to say [the remembrance] loudly and to convey it orally in the last breath. For the dervish, each singular breath is like the last breath [as they die before dying.-I.T.].

In ‘Alā al-Dīn Aṭṭār’s episode, as recorded by Jāmī in 1476, we see one of the leading personalities of the Naqshbandiyya. It is noteworthy that one does not encounter his biography as frequently as others, nor is his name to be found in all the *silsila*.⁷³ In Jāmī’s work, his affiliation with vocal remembrance and seclusion are mentioned in a neutral way.

‘Alī Shīr Nevāī, who was a close friend of Molla Jāmī, had participated in the compilation of Jāmī’s work. In view of the fact that this work was in Persian and many of the Turkish people were going to remain ignorant of it, ‘Alī Shīr had been contemplating whether he should translate it into the Turkish language, or into what we call today Chaghatai literary language. Twenty years later, in 901 H/1495-96, he began this task and wrote *Nesāyim al-maḥabbe min shemāyim al-futuvve*. While he translated Jāmī’s work, he also added translations from Farid al-Dīn Aṭṭār’s *Tezkīrat al-awliyā*. He also amended sections on the Turkish and Indian saints.⁷⁴ What is interesting from our vantage point, is the fact that for the most part he omitted sections on issues of *dhikr* when he was translating Jāmī’s work. For instance his account of ‘Alā al-Dīn Aṭṭār is very short and does not include the passages translated above. He briefly mentions the “*dhikr* of the heart” or *könül zikri* in relation to Khoja ‘Abd al-Khālīq Ghijduwānī.⁷⁵ He also omitted the passage on *dhikr* in the account on Khoja Aḥrār. These omissions seem not to

69 This episode is to be found in *Anīs al-talibīn*, 1338, p. 49; and 1983, p. 73. The passage has also been incorporated into Jāmī’s work, where however, the name of the ruler is not given (Persian original: Lucknow, p. 346; Istanbul, 1971, p. 427; and 1995, p. 532). In the same work there is another episode where a woman does not recognize Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband as sheikh and says “Why are you calling him a sheikh? He does not know about *dhikr*, *sema*’ and *khalwa*.” *Anīs al-talibīn*, 1338, p. 110; and 1983, p. 155.

70 Jāmī, Lucknow, p. 351; Istanbul, 1971, p. 437; and 1995, p. 542.

71 In the Persian original of the text, there is no apparent object of the verb. I have translated the phrase with “it” which can be understood as “breath” if one thinks of *dhikr-i khafī* (Eygi, 1978, p. 33) or “head” if one thinks in terms of *dhikr-i jahri* (Köprülü, 1991, pp. 106, 107; and Kotku [n.d.] I, p. 58).

72 Jāmī, Lucknow, 1915, p. 351; Turkish translations: 1971, p. 438.

73 According to *Rashaḥat* he was from Khwarazm and had married the daughter of Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband (Cawnpore, p. 80 on the margin of the page, and Istanbul, p. 88). In *Anīs al-talibīn* he is credited with having told many of the anecdotes related to Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband. Among the modern publications related to Khalidī *silsila*, mentioning or not mentioning his name seems to make a difference, see Hacı Muharrem Hilmi Efendi, 1976, pp. 68 and 66. He also does not appear in Hamid Algar’s passage on the Naqshbandī *silsila* (1990, p. 9). In Babadjanov’s catalogue (1993) of Naqshbandī manuscripts we find two hagiographical accounts dealing with him. One is authored by Muhammad Pārsā (p. 13, no. 2520/II) and the other is by Abu al-Qāsim bin Mas’ūd al-Bukhārī (p. 16, no. 11399/III).

74 Eraslan, 1996, pp. 1-2.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 232.

be related to his own preferences but to the Turkish reading audience. In this context he says:⁷⁶

Out of fear of verbose prolixity I took out statements about Saints that were irrelevant to the contemporary people.

A closer examination shows that 'Alī Shīr took out the introductory treatise on Sufism by Jāmī';⁷⁷ in its place, he inserted a discussion of the "five pillars of Islam."⁷⁸ He also replaced the passages on Naqshbandī concepts—which are in fact excerpts from Khoja Aḥrār's work interpolated into Khoja Aḥrār's biography⁷⁹—with information on Khoja Aḥrār's life.⁸⁰ All of this shows that he was very much aware of the receptibility of his audience. It seems then that he was instrumental in expanding the range of Naqshbandī ideas among the Turkish reading public.⁸¹

When we come to the sixteenth century, and deal with *Rashaḥat 'ayn al-ḥayāt* which was written in 1504, we see that the dominant theme is the display of tolerance. However, in this work there is a tendency to dwell on the nature of the *dhikr*. Therefore, we could say that by 1500 the distinction between the two forms of *dhikr* had become apparent; this is also the time when "distinguishing lines" began to appear in the social fabric.⁸² In the *Rashaḥat* there are long passages on the *dhikr*, a description of how *dhikr-i khafī* was introduced, how *dhikr-i jahrī* was performed by Injir Faghawī (d.1315/16) and by Ramitānī (d.1321), who was known as Khoja 'Azīzan. Of Injir Faghawī we read in Joseph Fletcher's translation:⁸³

Because of the exigency of the time and the requirement of the circumstance of the sufi community (*ṭalibān*), he [Khoja Maḥmūd] inaugurated the *dhikr-i 'alāniyya*. The first time that he performed it was when Khoja 'Ārif was dying, at about the time that he gave up the ghost on the top of a hill in Rawygar. The Khoja 'Ārif, in that place, said, 'Now is the time when they have beckoned us' and after his transmission [to the other world] Khoja Maḥmūd busied himself with the *dhikr-i 'alāniyya* in a mosque by a gate of Wabkan.

And Mawlānā Ḥāfiẓ al-Dīn, [one] of the most eminent of the ulema of the time, who was the great ancestor of his eminence Khoja Muḥammad Pārsā [d.1420], at the instigation of the chief of the ulema, Shams al-A'imma al-Halwā'i (God have mercy on both of them), asked Khoja

76 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

77 *Nafahāt*, 1995, pp. 59-149; Lucknow, pp. 2-31)

78 Eraslan, 1996, pp. 3-12.

79 *Nafahāt* 1995, pp. 556-571.

80 Eraslan, 1996, pp. 256-258.

81 Zeki Velidi Togan, "Cami," *İA*, vol. 3, p. 16.

82 These distinguishing lines were those between nomads and the sedentary, as in the case of the Özbegs and the Kazakhs; or between Muslims and non-Muslims as in the case of the Zunghars and Kazakhs; or between the Shi'a and the Sunna as in the case of Safavi Iran and Sunni Özbegs and Ottomans.

83 The translation of the passage is from Joseph Fletcher, "The Old and the Teachings in Chinese Islam," Appendix VI related to note 36 on page 21 of the typewritten manuscript to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). He used the Tashkent edition of Kashifī's *Rashaḥāt* (p.34). He also compared it with the following manuscripts of the work: India Office Library, MS I.0 705, fol. 28a-b, and MS I.0 2225, fols. 25a-26b; British Museum, MS Oriental 212, fol. 20b. All of the manuscripts that Joseph Fletcher utilized are available at the Widener Library (Harvard University) in bound volumes made from microfilms.

Joseph Fletcher had filed under the title "Supporting Texts (Arabic)" (pp. 3-5) a translation of the same passage as incorporated into Muhammad al-Rakhawī's work. This work seems to be *al-Anwār al-qudsiya fī manāqib al-naqshbandiyya* (Cairo, 1344, pp. 119-120) mentioned by Hourani, 1972, p. 101 n. 4 as a collection of biographies connected to the Naqshbandiyya order.

In my turn, I have compared the translation with the Cawnpore: 33 and Istanbul: 39 editions.

Maḥmūd in Bukhara, in the presence of a great multitude of the imams of the ulema of the time, 'for what purpose does your worship speak the *dhikr-i 'alāniyya*?' The khoja answered, 'So that the sleeping may be awakened and the inattentive may be made aware, and that by the *dhikr* he may come into the path, and that he may come to preserve in the Koranic law (*shari'a*) and the sufi way (*tariqat*), and that he may show a liking for the truth of contrition and repentance which are the key to all good deeds and the root of all good fortunest.'

His eminence Mawlānā Hāfiz al-Dīn said, 'Your intention is right, and for you this position is lawful.' Then he begged Khoja Maḥmūd to set a limit for the *dhikr-i 'alāniyya* so that by that limit the real might be distinguished from the counterfeit and the stranger be separated from the familiar [i.e., those who are making a false show from those who were performing the spoken *dhikr* legitimately], and the khoja replied, 'The *dhikr-i 'alāniyya* is granted to anyone whose tongue is free from falsehood and slander, and whose throat is free from hypocrisy and listening to slander, and whose head is free from paying heed to anything other than His Divine Majesty.'

Another passage in the *Rashaḥāt* which defines the difference in the nature of the *dhikr* in a humorous way is attributed to Khoja 'Alī Ramitānī, who was a successor to Khoja Maḥmūd Injir Faghnaẓwī. In this episode we hear that Khoja 'Alī Ramitānī gave a witty answer to a question he was asked:⁸⁴

The third problem is that we hear that you say the remembrance publicly (*dhikr-i jahr*). Why is this? His answer was 'We also heard that you say the remembrance secretly (*dhikr-i khafī*). In that case your remembrance is also public. [As by *dhikr-i khafī* the intention is that it should not be known by the public. If one is known by the performance of *dhikr* there is no difference between being known by *jahr* or by *khafī*. One could even say that being known by the performance of *khafī* is close to hypocrisy --an addition to this passage in the Turkish translation of the text, I.T.]⁸⁵

In the *Rashaḥāt*, completed in 1504, there is too much emphasis on who performed what kind of *dhikr*; yet great attention is given to non-interference. In other words, there is a conscious display of a tolerance. There are three passages where this attitude is clearly seen. The first one concerns Yusuf Hamādānī; the second, Emir Kulāl, while the third, concerns Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband. Thus we read first:⁸⁶

The way of Khoja Yūsuf and his shaykhs [.....] was *dhikr-i 'alāniyya*, but because Hadrat-i Khoja 'Abd al-Khāliq [may God sanctify his secret] had been communicated to orally⁸⁷ the *dhikr-i khafīyya* by Hadrat-i Khidr [may God's mercy be upon him] and was commanded with the [use of] it, Khoja Yūsuf did not comment to alter⁸⁸ his [way] and said 'do it in the form as you have been commanded by him [i.e. Hadrat-i Khidr].

Concerning Emir Kulāl 's tolerant attitude we read:⁸⁹

Starting from the time of Khoja Injir Faghnaẓwī to the time of Emir Kulāl (may God's mercy be upon him) one would combine *dhikr-i khafīyya* with *dhikr-i 'alāniyya*. Within this honorable *silsila* they have been called '*alāniyya khānān* [that is] those who say it publicly.

84 *Rashaḥāt*, Cawnpore: 35 and Istanbul: 41. Joseph Fletcher's translation of a similar passage from al-Rakhawī (pp. 120-123) is to be found among his "Supporting Texts (Arabic)" pp. 6-16.

85 *Rashaḥāt*, Cawnpore: 35 and Istanbul: 41.

86 *Rashaḥāt*, Cawnpore: 19 and Istanbul: 24. I made use of both texts; a somewhat different translation is to be found also in Joseph Fletcher "The Old and the Teachings in Chinese Islam," Appendix III in relation to note 17 on page 14.

87 This rendered by *talqīn* in the Persian, it has been omitted from the Turkish translation.

88 While the Persian original (p. 19) has here only *taghayyir nadada* i.e. did not convey a change, the Turkish translation (p. 24) uses the phrase with *tefsīr eylemedi* "did not comment" (reading the *nefsir* of the text as *tefsir*).

89 *Rashaḥāt*, Cawnpore: 54 and Istanbul: 60.

When the time came for the appearance of Khoja Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (may God sanctify his secret), since he had been ordered by the power of the spirit of [Khoja 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī], he preferred the *dhikr-i khafiyya* and abstained from *dhikr-i alāniyya*. And each time companions of Emir Kulāl would begin with *dhikr-i 'alāniyya* Hadrat-i Khoja would get up and go out from that spot.⁹⁰

Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband's attitude, on the other hand, can be understood from the following anecdote as told by Khoja Misāfir Khwarezmī:⁹¹

We were many times in attendance to Khoja Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (may God sanctify his secret) and in his service; but we had a strong inclination towards music (*samā'*). One day, we decided among us, his companions that we would have singers (*qawwāl*)⁹² tambourine and reed-flute players⁹³ ready and would occupy ourselves [with them] when he was holding a session. [That way we wanted] to see what he would say. We did as agreed and brought singers and musicians. Hadrat-i Khoja was sitting in that assembly and he did not say any words of prohibition; afterwards he said:

We do not do this [yet] we do not do that [i.e. forbidding] either.

The then prevalent non-interference has been epitomized with the famous utterance of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband quoted above.⁹⁴ Yet, at the same time, *Rashaḥāt* tells us openly how the silent *dhikr* is more virtuous. In *Rashaḥāt* we also see that after Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband, the work concentrates more on those who performed the *khafī*, like Khoja Aḥrār, who however was not known by his tolerance but by the endurance he showed to rulers.⁹⁵

A gradual shift towards sanctioning the silent *dhikr*, but also giving a place to the vocal one appears by 1550. The famous sixteenth-century Naqshbandī Khoja Aḥmad Kāsānī, known as the Makhdum-i A'zām says in a much quoted passage from *Risāla-i Bāburiyya*:⁹⁶

The lords of the Naqshbandiyya have preferred the silent (*khufī*) remembrance, but some of them, if necessary, also perform the vocal (*jahrī*) remembrance, just as when Khoja Aḥmad Yasawī was appointed to set out for Turkestan, he saw that the inhabitants of that place did not take to the silent remembrance; so he immediately took up the way of the vocal remembrance, and thus the *dhikr-i arra* was created."

Here we see an adaptation to the local circumstances, and the vocal *dhikr* is per-

90 In the abridged Turkish translation made by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, himself a leading Naqshbandī intellectual of his time, the word for "spot" which in the original is *khawza* "region, place, spot", has been rendered by the phrase "leaving the circle" with the words: *Emir Külâl' in meclisinde açık zikir başlayınca Hoca Hazretleri halkadan ayrılıp dışarıya çıkarlar*, Kısakürek [n.d.], p. 76. This interpretative translation is significant as coming from Turkey where the public remembrance has been prevalent.

91 *Rashaḥāt*, Cawnpore: 65 and Istanbul: 71.

92 Here the word *qawwāl* has been rendered as "singers" on the basis of the entry in Jamshīd Sāle pur, *Farhang-i Jāmī' Farsī ba Turkī-i Istanbulī*. Tabrīz, 1370h.sh./1991 (p. 929a) which reads: 1. pek söyleyen, çok konuşkan, 2. şarkıcı, türkücü, 3. sufiler arasında sema meclisinde hüznü şiiir okuyan kimse. *Rashaḥāt*, Istanbul: 71 has not translated the term *qawwāl* into Turkish. Dictionaries such as Steingass (993a) and Redhouse (1478b) explain the word as "eloquent, glib, loquacious"; Steingass also speaks of "a professional story-teller and an improvisator."

In view of the rest of the continuation of the text above where the author speaks of the singers (*güyanda*) and musicians (*navīzanda*) who later were brought in, *qawwāl* has been rendered as "singers."

93 The word in question has been rendered as Diya in the Cawnpore: 54. However, there is no attested meaning to this word. It seems to be a copyist's error for *Nai'ī* C. In fact in the new edition of *Rashaḥāt* by 'Alī Aḥgar Mo'iniyyan (vol. II, p. 115) we find *Nai'ī*. The Turkish translation has also *neyzen* "reed-flute player" (*Rashaḥāt*, Istanbul: 71).

94 This phrase has been also widely known in the Naqshbandī literature in Turkish with the following phrase: *Biz bu işi işlemezüz, inkâr dahi eylemezüz* (*Rashaḥāt*, Istanbul: 71) or *Biz bu işi yapmayız ama inkâr da etmeyiz* (Kısakürek [n.d.], p. 93).

95 Gross, 1992, pp. 159-171.

96 Fletcher, 1977, pp. 115-116.

formed to appease the community of the new followers.⁹⁷ Joseph Fletcher who cites the above passage, also mentions another occasion where the *dhikr-i arra* lay hidden, so to speak, in silent form under that Naqshbandi's hat:⁹⁸

At the time when I came to pay my respects to the Hadrat, I had the honor of kissing his threshold. I was always ready and watchful of my conduct lest any act displeasing to the Hadrat come from me. And at the same time I was afraid and trembling, concerned about how I, with this weak aptitude, could be in attendance upon such royalty, when suddenly, from kindness, he bestowed [his] blessing, *tāqī*, [n. 12] upon me and made [me] his confidant of secrets. Every time I put the *tāqī* upon my head, from within [the *taqī*] came the sound of *dhikr-i arra*. For one week the situation continued in this way. Thereafter, out of respect for the Hadrat, I put the *taqī* away in a corner. He showed favor and said, "We have not given [you] that *taqī* to put away at home." And after that I put on that *tāqī*, peace and tranquility appeared within me.

This passage is interesting as it shows to us that while the *dhikr-i arra* was hidden under the "hat", acceptance of both forms had given peace and tranquility to the person concerned; perhaps this is worth keeping in mind when we encounter both forms of *dhikr* performed with no incompatibility.

Coming to Eastern Turkestan and Northwest China

Following the descendants of Makhdum-i A'zām towards Eastern Turkestan we find ourselves within a controversy between the two branches, descending from Khoja Ishāq Walī, who died in 1599, and Muḥammad Emin's son, Muḥammad Yusuf (d. 1653), and the grandson, Hidayetullah, known as Appaq Khoja.⁹⁹ The controversy and the bitter disputes between the followers of these two lines have been described in different ways.¹⁰⁰ The controversy between the two groups was so high that a Black Mountain source speaks of the other group, who presumably were performing vocal *dhikr*, as "roaring"¹⁰¹ or as "*dīwāna*."¹⁰² The escalation of the disagreement partially ended in 1679 with the enthronement of Appaq Khoja in Kashghar. To achieve this end, he had sought the help of the Zunghars. The Zunghars, who occupied Kashgharia and extorted high taxes, did not show a preference for Appaq Khoja's branch only, as can be seen in a document dating from 1742, where we find, the Black Mountain leader Khoja Ya'qūb ibn Khoja Daniyal in power under Zunghar protection. Eventually the Black Mountain were going to rebel against the Zunghars and continue their existence later under Ch'ing rule, which came to Eastern Turkestan in 1759. The document that I have been referring to is preserved at Houghton Library of Harvard University.¹⁰³ In this document, we do not see the old controversy, but a new one with the words "newly emerging sect."

97 During the discussions at this conference, Hamid Algar mentioned the prevalence of the use of vocal *dhikr* in our own times, when a new community is initiated to the *tariqa*.

98 Joseph Fletcher, 1977, p. 118.

99 His name is sometimes written Appaq meaning "superwhite" or Āfāq meaning "the horizon." I have used the "Appaq" version. That the name applies to saintly figures can be seen from an example in Turkey where the saintly person's name is *akpak* meaning purely white (Akşit, 1998, p. 116).

100 The controversy had the effect that the Chinggisids were pushed out from Kashghari politics. These are to be found in Toru, 1963; and İ. Togan, 1989, where also extensive references are given to Joseph Fletcher's unpublished studies.

101 Hartmann, 1905, p. 270.

102 See Hartmann, 1905, p. 219; and Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," p. 198, to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). Here the use of the term *dīwāna* implies *dīwāna-i khudâ* "in ecstasy of admiration of God."

103 They are referred to as "Turkestan Documents," MS Storage 110.

The document dated 1742 precedes the return of Ma Ming-hsin, the leader of the New Teaching to China.¹⁰⁴ As Joseph Fletcher studied and traced the chain of education and transmission in the case of Ma Ming-hsin, the leader of the "New Teaching" in China,¹⁰⁵ I will not go into detail here. Suffice it to say that the controversy between the Old and the New Teachings is regarded as one of the factors that led to the Muslim Rebellions towards the end of the nineteenth century. In the context of 18th-century China, the term "Old Teaching" was a name for the Khufiyya, the Naqshbandis who presumably performed their rituals in a low voice. In fact, Joseph Trippner says that only one part of the adherents of Old Teaching were called "Hu-fei-yeh" that is Khufiyya and these were the so-called "Leisebeter" (*an-nien*), i.e. those who would pray in a low voice.¹⁰⁶ Here we see the term Khufiyya used in such a way it does not exclusively denote the silent *dhikr*. Joseph Fletcher alludes to this fact by saying that the term Khafiyya frequently referred in a general way to the Naqshbandis in Central Asia.¹⁰⁷ We also hear from Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush that the Naqshbandis in Central Asia are referred to as "whisperers," while the Qadiris were referred to as "jumpers."¹⁰⁸ A passage from an official report in a Chinese local history in Joseph Fletcher's translation reads:¹⁰⁹

The New Teaching is a heresy, but we have made inquiries and obtained information from the rebel clique. They say that ever since he returned home from abroad in the 26th year [of Ch'ien-lung] Ma Ming-hsin was propagating and establishing the New Teaching and ordering people to recite scripture loudly. It seems that (.....) this is because (.....) of the fact that, among the Muslims who live in the various cities of Sinkiang, recitation of scripture is a loud recitation in a raised voice. [This is something of] which your majesty's servant A-kuei has been aware for a long time. As for the quiet recitation in a low voice [practiced by] the Muslims of the interior (....) [i.e. China proper], perhaps when [Islam] first entered China in the T'ang dynasty, it was ridiculed by people, so the (Muslims) changed (their loud) recitation to the silent one. On the strength of Ma Ming-hsin's return home from abroad it was assumed that he had acquired the correct [Islamic] tradition in the Western regions: so people transmitted [Ma's New Teaching] from one to another and put it into practice. In fact, the [two] scriptures are virtually the same, but the foolish people tired of the old and delighted in the new...

Another investigation by the Chinese government gives us further detail in the testimony of a "rebel":¹¹⁰

104 The return of Ma Ming-hsin is given by Dru Gladney as 1744 (1991, p. 50). But Raphael Israeli speaks of 1761 as "his return from a period of study in Kashgar" (1990, p. 582). But his source is not quite clear, and his book of 1980 is not available to me. In the passage rendered from Joseph Fletcher's translation the translation is given as Ch'ien-lung 26, which is 1761.

105 History of these groups was studied by Joseph Fletcher. See his "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," edited by Jonathan N. Lipman in Fletcher, 1995. The present state of the affairs are to be found in Dru Gladney, 1991, pp. 46-52.

106 Trippner, 1961, p. 148.

107 See Fletcher, 1986, p. 21 and also 1995, XI, p. 31. Apparently this usage of the term Khafiyya to denote the Naqshbandiyya in general was also prevalent in the Middle East. In a Khalidī treatise translated into Turkish (Kotku, 1993, p. 93), it is stated that "In the Naqshbandi order, in many case, it is superior (*afdāl*) to be secretive and they call this *tariqa* "Tariq-i Khafiyya" (*Esasen Tarikat-i Nakshbandiyye' de her halde gizli olmak efdaldır ve bu Tarikatın adına Tarik-i Hafiyye derler*).

108 Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985, p. 7.

109 Joseph Fletcher made extensive translations (about 40 typewritten pages) from the Ch'ing work *Kan Ning Ch'ing shih-lüeh cheng-pien*, dealing with the history of Kan-su and Ning-hsia regions and to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). The specific quotation is from vol. 2, pp. 500-504 of the original and p. 28 of the translations.

110 Joseph Fletcher's translation (pp. 12-13) is from the above work *Kan Ning Ch'ing shih-lüeh cheng-pien*, vol. 1, pp. 339-344 to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives).

I am a [member, resident] of ... of ... of Ho-chou, and I was also previously a Chiu-chiao [adherent]. In Ch'ien-lung 36, I became a follower of Ma Ming-hsin of the New Teaching and read scripture in the Salar country. The source of this scripture is the same [as that of the Old Teaching]; the only difference is in the [method of] reading. The Old Teaching reads it silently in a low voice. The New Teaching reads it aloud in a loud voice, sometimes shaking their heads and dancing. Since the 36th year Ma Ming-hsin has been bringing together the akhund of various places and preaching the scriptures (to them). There was a Ma Lai-ch'ih, an akhund of the Old Teaching in Ho-chou, who said that this was heresy and refused to practice [it]. Therefore [Ma Ming-hsin's adherents] frequently clashed with those Old Teaching [adherents], killing each other.

As we can see clearly from the above, the New Teaching stood for vocal *dhikr* which is explicitly stated with the phrase "shaking their heads and dancing." But the conflict between the two groups did not only entail the performance of the *dhikr*. There were also other points of disagreement. The adherents of the Old Teaching preferred to break their fast after the prayers in Ramadan; they also venerated saints, which made "tomb worship" an issue. Ma Ming-hsin, on the other hand, was against veneration of saints,¹¹¹ advocated vocal *dhikr* and sided with those who broke their fast first and then went to prayers.¹¹² But it seems as in the Black Mountain and White Mountain case¹¹³ here also, there was a socio-political aspect underlying these ritualistic problems. Ma Ming-hsin took a stand against saintly lineages and also saintly tombs, because he thought that leadership in the path (*tariqa*) should be open to all.¹¹⁴ This is why families were divided in terms of their preference for the Old and New Teachings.¹¹⁵ On the surface it looked as if only ritualistic differences had brought about the controversy; in other words it was an atmosphere of intolerance in which the state, the Ch'ing government, played a role by its categorization of political movements that were under surveillance.¹¹⁶ In this case the Confucian tradition of the Chinese state played an important role. As Dru Gladney says:¹¹⁷

In between, one finds various attempts at changing Chinese society to "fit" a Muslim world, through transformationist or militant Islam, as illustrated by the largely Naqshbandiyya-led nineteenth-century Hui uprising. The Jahriyya sought to implement an alternative vision of

111 Later his descendants will be accused of tomb worship (Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 44).

112 Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 32.

113 I. Togan, 1989.

114 Joseph Fletcher's translation (p. 6) from *Kan-Ning Ch'ing shih-lüeh cheng pien* 18 37v-38v to be found in the Harvard University Archives, HUG FP 100, Box 3 (Courtesy of the Harvard University Archives). In fact in Turkey, this issue is one of the dividing factors among the Alevi *baba* (hereditary) and the Bektashi *dede*, an evolution which came into being without a clash.

115 See Joseph Fletcher's translation (p. 22) from *Kan-Ning Ch'ing shih-lüeh cheng pien*, vol. 1, pp. 344 f.

116 Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 45. Differences in ritual can exist or different views might be in conflict with one another. However, they do not necessarily lead to social confrontation. The observations of the Buddhist monk Hsüan Tsang who in the seventh century are an example of this latter case:

The different schools are constantly at variance, and their contending utterances rise like the angry waves at sea. The different sects have their separate masters, and in various directions aim at one end.

There are Eighteen Schools, each claiming pre-eminence. The partisans of the Great and Little Vehicle are content to dwell apart. There are some who give themselves up to *quiet contemplation* and devote themselves, whether walking, standing still or sitting down, to the acquirement of wisdom and insight; others, on the contrary, differ from these in raising *noisy contentions* about their fate. According to their fraternity, they are governed by distinctive rules and regulations which we need not name (Beal, 1968, p. 80— Italics are mine, I.T.).

117 Dru C. Gladney, 1991, p. 61.

the world in their society, and this posed a threat to the Qing, as well as other Hui Muslims, earning them the label of "heterodox" (*xie jiao*) and persecution by the Chinese state.¹¹⁸

Jonathan Lipman, on the other hand, sees the threat to the Chinese state in the nature of the relationship between the leaders and their followers:¹¹⁹

An essential part of this Sufi faith lay in obedience to the leader of the order, in whose hands lay the power of initiation in to the order and whose tomb provided individual and communal inspiration to his descendants and followers... The extraordinary loyalty they inspired in their followers constituted their potential threat to Chinese state interests.

The document of 1742 seems to have been written from a similar atmosphere of intolerance in Eastern Turkestan, where it seems newcomers were not welcome. The document, which is an appointment deed for a sheikh in Artuch, the place where the saintly ruler Satuq Bughra Khan is buried, was issued by Khoja Ya'qub, known in general as Khoja-i Jihān. After appointing this said sheikh, Khoja-i Jihan says that the appointment had been made with the following conditions:¹²⁰

the said person [i.e. Mir Khoja] should not associate himself with the newly emerging sects (*madhhab*) and with innovations in religion. He should also not establish close relationship with soldiers on horseback, tax collectors and the people who impose taxes; he should also not regard these people as his protectors or as his "educators." He should always act in accordance with the religion of Muhammad and the shari'a of Muṣṭafa....

The document then continues by saying that the appointed sheikh should pay full attendance to the services to be rendered to the saintly, meaning Satuq Bughra Khan's shrine.

What is interesting, however, is that this time the³ adversaries of the Black Mountain Khojas represented by Khoja-i Jihān, were not adherents of Appaq Khoja, but a new group that was seen as "a newly emerging sect." We do not quite know who they were. The date (1742) raises the question of whether we are dealing with Ma Ming-hsin who returned to China in the 26th year of emperor Ch'ien-lung's reign, that is in 1751.¹²¹ If he spent some time in Kashgar as Israeli maintains -see above- then this would be more than a coincidence. In that case, it would be quite possible that we are dealing with the same person and that he started to propagate his ideas in Eastern Turkestan. The document was issued by Khoja Ya'qub ibn Khoja Daniyāl, a descendant of Ishāq Waln, that is the Black Mountain group which was associated with silent *dhikr*. On the other hand, Mir Khāl al-Dīn Yarkendī, who, according to Joseph Fletcher, was a *murīd* of the Āfāqī path, refers to his affiliation as "Khufiyya," which appears again as an appellation referring to the Naqshbandiya in general rather than to the nature of the *dhikr* itself, as mentioned

118 Dru Gladney goes on to say the following, which is also relevant elsewhere as an important issue (1991, p. 61):

By contrast, other Hui reformers have attempted throughout history to make Islam "fit" Chinese society, such as Liu Zhi's monumental effort to demonstrate the Confucian morality of Islam...

These various approaches in China's Islam represent sociohistorical attempts to deal with the problem of relating the world religion of Islam to the local Chinese realm.

119 Jonathan Lipman, 1997, p. 136.

120 These documents, all 14 of them are carefully made copies of mostly appointment deeds from Eastern Turkestan. The time range spans the period 1008H/1599 to 1297H/1879. Some have been issued by rulers some by others. The quotation above is from Rabi 'al-awwal 5 1155H which is 19 July 1742. These documents are preserved at the Houghton Library of Harvard University under the title "Turkestan Documents," with the call number MS Storage 110.

121 For this return date see the quotation above.

above.¹²² We see a similar attitude in the early nineteenth-century source, *Majmū'at al-muhaqqiqīn*, where there is a long description given of a *dhikr* session. Here both silent and vocal aspects are being emphasized. However, remembrance of God is described in a vocal fashion.¹²³

In northwest China, the Turkish-speaking Salar, who became adherents of Appaq Khoja, were referred to as followers of the Khufiyya; this was also Old Teaching as propagated later by Ma Lai-chih.¹²⁴ In other words, towards the middle of the 18th century, both in Eastern Turkestan and in northwest China, the followers of the Āfāqī path were referred to as Khufiyya.¹²⁵ But, as mentioned above, in northwest China, Old Teaching (Khufiyya) denoted reading of the scriptures in a low voice. The above-quoted report written by a Chinese official in which it was stated that from the first inception of Islam under the T'ang Dynasty, the tradition in China had been the reading of the scriptures in a low voice - perhaps because of the fear of being ridiculed by others. Here we see how important environmental factors are, as Confucian tradition is silent. This statement can be seen also as one of the ways of trying to reconcile the ideal with local customs. It seems that Appaq Khoja, whom we will see below as performing the vocal *dhikr*¹²⁶ in Eastern Turkestan in opposition to the Black Mountain group, introduced "Khufiyya" among the Salars presumably performing the rituals in a low voice.

When the situation is reexamined, it can be said that contemporary sources originating with the Black Mountain (*khafī*) group state clearly that Appaq Khoja and his adherents were regarded either too loud or un-Islamic.¹²⁷ They, as well as the White Mountain sources, on the other hand, speak of his reciting the Maṣnawī and per-

122 Joseph Fletcher's remarks (1995, p. 31) that the terms Khufiyya and Jahriyya denoted differences between the different branches of the Naqshbandiyya in China, whereas in Central Asia the same terms distinguished the Nashbandiyya and the Yasawiyya are pertinent for an understanding of this complex issue. These aspects of Central Asia are also being discussed by DeWeese (1996, pp. 181 and 203).

Mīr Khāl al-Dīn Yarkendī also speaks of a group called the Jahriyya. For this reference see Joseph Fletcher "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," unpublished manuscript pp. 168-170. According to Joseph Fletcher this work by Mīr Khāl al-Dīn Yarkendī (Br. Museum Or. 8162) contains two works by the same author. These are "*Hidāyat-nāme*" and "*Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat*." The reference mentioned by Joseph Fletcher is on fol. 1a and reads as follows:

In the lands of Turan there are four *silsila* well known. These are Khafiyya, Jahriyya, Kubraviyya and the 'Ishqiyya...

Another Āfāqī source, the *Majmū'at al-Muhaqqiqīn* by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Yarkendī speaks of four ways of attaining sainthood: Jahriyya, Khafiyya, Kubraviyya and Ishqiyya (Berlin Staatsbibliothek, MS. Orient 1680 p. 18 line 11 and the Tashkent edition of 1996, p. 67). See also Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 28, n. 40.

123 The second part of *Majmū'at al-Muhaqqiqīn* is devoted to *dhikr*. In the Tashkent edition this section spans pages 78-101. In the Berlin manuscript the section starts with page 54. As my copy of the Berlin manuscript is incomplete I could not compare the two versions. There are other problems related to this manuscript, and I would like to address them later. For these problems see Hofman, 1969, II, pp.10-11, Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, 1993, pp. 59-60; and Zahidi, 1996, p. 65, n. 14.

124 Ma Lai-chih's activities are described in detail by Trippner, 1961, pp. 152-156.

125 It seems that Joseph Fletcher's following remarks (1977, pp. 118-119) shed further light on this issue. He says:

Makhdūm-i A'zam, who was the spiritual ancestor of the Naqshbandiyya in China, might have transmitted the *dhikr-i arra*, silent or vocal, through his grandson Muḥammad Yūsūf and his great-grandson Khoja Appaq, to the Chinese Naqshbandiyya, making them all the more susceptible later on, in the eighteenth century, to Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching of the vocal *dhikr* of the *Jahriyya*.

It is important to note that he speaks of *dhikr-i arra*, as silent or vocal. Normally when *dhikr-i arra* is mentioned we think of the vocal *dhikr*, Fletcher, however, draws the attention to the complexity of the matter.

126 On this issue, see Fletcher, 1977, pp. 118-119.

127 As mentioned above Black Mountain sources speak of "roaring" (Hartmann, 1905, p. 270) "ways of infidels," (Hartmann, 1905, p. 259).

forming the *samā'*. In the *Tadhkīra-i 'Azīzān* or *Khojagān* by Muḥammed Ṣādiq Kashgharī (a Black Mountain adherent) we find the following description of Appaq Khoja:¹²⁸

Residing on the royal throne of Yarkend and employing the *sharī'a* of [Muḥammad] Muṣṭafa, Appaq Khoja ruled over those who were seeking justice as a *pādshāh*. Also sitting on the cushion of sheikhdom he would teach his loyal disciples the rites of the *ṭarīqa*. He also would preside over the *khalqa-i dhikr* (circle of remembrance) and sometimes he would lecture about the Maṣnawī and make expositions about *haqāyiq* (divine truth) and *ma'ārif* (divine knowledge); displaying manifestations of the lover and the beloved [i.e. God],¹²⁹ he would become intoxicated with and immersed in [divine] love. One or two thousand disciples would look up to his saying (literally: would hang from his mouth).

In this description, written by his adversaries, we see Appaq Khoja presiding over vocal *dhikr* ceremonies, but at the same time the whole ritual is also put into the appropriate Sufi framework by mentioning artfully the four gates of *sharī'a*, *ṭarīqa*, *haqāyiq* and *ma'ārif*.¹³⁰

In northwest China, Appaq Khoja and later Ma Lai-chih are reported to have regarded the Maṣnawī¹³¹ and the Mawlūd:¹³² as symbols of investiture. Both the Maṣnawī¹³³ and the Mawlūd are recited; in other words, they are symbols of vocal expression. All of these indications of vocal *dhikr* do not, of course, exclude the silent one. Appaq Khoja's adherents in China and Eastern Turkestan were called the Khufiyya - a general term for the Naqshbandiyya that did not make distinctions between the two opposing groups. In Eastern Turkestan, the Black Mountain group, by this time, did not see the White Mountain group as their adversaries; that is why Khoja Ya'qūb, known also as Khoja-i Jihān, proposed joint rule to the White Mountain Khojas.¹³⁴ By 1742 it was not Appaq Khoja's adherents but a newly emerging sect and innovations to the religion that was a social and political issue. It seems that the lines between the two earlier opposing groups had become blurred; the Black Mountain group, who performed the silent *dhikr*, and the White Mountain people, who most probably performed both, seemed to have come to accept each other. As we have seen, it was the earlier adamant Black Mountain group who made a proposal for joint rule. Appaq's descendant who established a *zawiya* in Istanbul, had been performing the silent *dhikr*.¹³⁵ Therefore, in both cases the lasting issue seems not to have been the nature of the *dhikr*, but the atmosphere of intolerance dividing newcomers from the old establishment, both socially and spiritually.¹³⁶

128 *Tadhkīra-i 'Azīzān* or *Khojagān*, Berlin Staatsbibliothek, MS Orient fol. 3292 page 51. This passage has been paraphrased by Hartmann with the following words (Hartmann, 1905, p. 217):

Āfaq Choğa regierte in Jarkend nach dem Gesetze Muhammed's; bisweilen nahm er den ... Sechstuhl ein, unterwies die Murids in de Tariqat-regeln, präsierte Dhikr-Andachten, dozierte das Mesnevi und hatte Verzückungen; tausend bis zweitausend Studenten hingen an seinem Munde.

129 A description of manifestations of the lover and the beloved can be found in a passage from *Risālā-i Sipahsālar* as translated by Evrim Binbaş (forthcoming).

130 For the Four Gates, see Hācī Bektaş-ı Velī, *Maḳālat*, 1986 (pp. 3-34).

131 Fletcher, 1995, XI, p. 13.

132 *Ibid.*, p. 16; and Trippner, 1961, p. 154.

133 A similar attitude is seen among the Naqshbandiya in Turkey where also Masnawī was recited among those with a preference for vocal *dhikr*. *Istanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, "Nakşibendilik," pp. 33 and 38.

134 Hartmann, 1905, pp. 258-260.

135 On the basis of the statement made by Hamid Algar, who studied the treatise written by this descendant of Appaq Khoja.

136 It is also probable that the new comers were called *jahrī* by the mainstream, while the mainstream referred to itself as *khafīyya* in a general sense. This needs to be looked into more carefully. Later the outsider's appellation becomes the name that the "insiders" adopt, as is the case with so many ethnic terms.

On the basis of a quotation from *Risāla-i Bāburiyya*, I have already interpreted the performance of the vocal *dhikr* by Aḥmed Yasawī as an adaptation to local circumstances; Hamid Algar has also supported this interpretation with examples from our present times.¹³⁷ Perhaps it also helps not to see the changes as a shift from vocal to silent *dhikr*, but as a stage in accomplishment, as the famous quotation from ʿAlī Rāmitānī shows:¹³⁸

Sheikh Badr al-Dīn al-Maydānī who was one of the esteemed companions of Sheikh Bulghari, happened to associate with Haḍrat-i ʿAzizān and asked him: *dhikr-i kethir*, that is, mentioning the name of Allah many times, is something with which we have been ordered by Allah with the verse 'mention Allah very much.'¹³⁹ Is it a remembrance of the tongue or is it a remembrance of the heart? Haḍrat-i ʿAzizān said: for the beginners it is a remembrance of the tongue, for the accomplished it is a remembrance of the heart.

Conclusion

To recap the whole issue, I would like to state that - as our early sources reveal - there were two forms of reading the Qur'an and performing the *dhikr*. Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband himself preferred the silent one but did not interfere with others. After his death, the two ways continued side-by-side; by the middle of the sixteenth century we see a shift of emphasis, though at this time what was hidden under the cap of Makhdūm-i Azām was not the silent one, but the vocal one. Later, in Eastern Turkestan and in northwest China, the difference between the two became crucial and led to social strife. Yet in the Middle East, the two forms continued to exist side-by-side as in earlier times. It seems that for marginal and newly emerging communities, vocal *dhikr* was the distinguishing mark at the beginning. However, with the passage of time, when the novice acquired the properly required education (spiritually) and the marginal entered the mainstream (socially), the nature of the *dhikr*¹⁴⁰ seems to have lost its importance as a distinguishing mark for the communities concerned,¹⁴¹ being taken up by other newly emerging groups as their distinguishing symbol. This is what we see in the document of 1742 in Eastern Turkestan and among Ma Ming-hsin's adherents in China.

If *dhikr* was not the issue but rather tolerance, then we can see that non-tolerance or intolerance becomes visible in the 17th century. Joseph Fletcher speaks of a *jahri* being driven out of Transoxiana to Afghanistan.¹⁴² This expulsion gives us a clue about the different ways of coping with differences of opinion. Apparently in Central

137 Conference discussions mentioned above. See also the quotation from ʿAlī Rāmitānī.

138 *Rashahāt*, Cawnpore: 35-36, Istanbul: 42.

139 Sura XXXIII/41. See also [n. d.] I, p. 26.

140 There is also an explanation of the difference between the *khafī* and *jahri* in terms of the difference of the *silsila* that we see in the article "zīkr" in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. There it is stated that those who see themselves under a Bakrī *silsila*, perform the *khafī*, and those who are attached to Ali, perform the *jahri*. On the other hand, the Eastern Turkestan genealogy of the saints goes back to Fatima. The White Mountain Khojas, whose *silsila* also goes back to Abu Bakr in terms of their spiritual lineage (*nishah-i ma'navi*) used to perform vocal *dhikr* (See İ. Togan, 1992, p. 141 *Majmū'at al-Muhaqqiqin*, Berlin MS. Orient 1680, p. 24, line 10; pp. 43-48 and Tashkent edition 1996, pp. 69, 76-77). Because of all these reasons, the Eastern Turkestan and the Chinese Naqshbandiyya were seen as local peculiarities outside the mainstream Naqshbandiyya and mainstream Islam. For Bakrī origin, see Algar, 1990, pp. 4-11.

141 Hamid Algar's paper presented at this conference speaks of Sheikh ʿAbdullāh (Kreiser, 1990), a descendant of Appaq Khoja who came to Istanbul in the first half of the eighteenth century. According to Algar he was performing the silent *dhikr*. Yet as we know, the Āfaqi source *Majmū'at al-Muhaqqiqin* written early in the nineteenth century speaks of vocal *dhikr* as we have seen above.

142 Fletcher, 1977, p. 113.

Asia, they were trying to retain a certain homogeneity. This they could achieve by outmigration.¹⁴³ In Eastern Turkestan and northwest China, on the other hand, differences of opinion could not be handled and thus led to social clash.¹⁴⁴ Yet at about the same time, under the Ottomans, al-Qurānī (1616-1690), his son al-Kurdī (d. 1733), az-Zayn b. Muḥammed b. ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Mizjājī (1643-1725) all performed the vocal *dhikr* without any controversy. By the time az-Zayn’s son, ‘Abd al-Khāliq (ca. 1705-1740), who was an intervening link between az-Zayn and Ma Ming-hsin, became the teacher:¹⁴⁵

the use of *jahr* in the Naqshbandī *dhikr* seems no longer to have been a burning issue among the Yemen Naqshbandīs. ‘Abd al-Khāliq taught the *dhikr* to his disciples both “by secrecy and by exclamation” (*sirran wa jahran*), and one of his disciplines has explained that there was no “incompatibility” (*munāfāh*) between the two.

In fact under the Ottomans, there was also coexistence even within Istanbul between different Naqshbandī *tekkes*. Here the Islamic state played a different role than the Confucianist state in China. The Ottoman state played the role of referee between the competing groups and gave each one a place within the system, encouraging coexistence rather than trying to categorize rival social and political groups.

On the other hand, we should also note that the statement that there was no incompatibility between the two forms of *dhikr* coincides with the time period when *rābiṭa*, the special relationship between the *murshīd* and the *murīd* had become prevalent among the Naqshbandī principles and, as a consequence, in the Naqshbandī literature. As the Khalidī texts from the beginning of the nineteenth century show, *rābiṭa* takes precedence over the *dhikr*. In a treatise on *dhikr* it is stated that:¹⁴⁶

Although *dhikr* itself is honorable and eminent, the way of *rābiṭa* is more beneficial to the novice. Because the novice is addicted to the mundane world, he does not have a relationship to the spiritual world. He can not attain favor and blessing without an intermediary. Therefore, he needs an intermediary and an occasion.

The ascendancy of *rābiṭa* and its implications for the Naqshbandiyya have been analyzed at length by Fritz Meier¹⁴⁷ so I do not need to go into detail. Yet one can not help but think about the process of change that occurred within the Naqshbandiyya. Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband, to whom the preference of the silent *dhikr* is ascribed, was not for interfering as his famous utterance demonstrates: *mā in kār namikonīm va ān kār namikonīm* - “we do not do this [yet] we do not do that [i.e. forbidding] either”. Yet later by the 19th century in a Khālidī text it was stated that¹⁴⁸

The special relationship (*rābiṭa*) which encapsulates the image of the sheikh is more beneficial for the *murīd* than the *dhikr*.

143 A similar case of outmigration is described by R. D. McChesney in relation to the Juybārī sheikh (1996, pp. 113-114). All of these patterns of outmigration remind one of the Barth model (1961) applied to the Basseri, who were trying to retain a homogeneous population by outmigration

144 This reminds one of the segmentary opposition. In fact, Joseph Fletcher speaks of rivalry among these groups when he says (1975, p. 80):

The fact that the New Teaching provoked a violent reaction from the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya and did not provoke a similar reaction from the other brotherhoods, which suggests that Ma Ming-hsin and the leadership of the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya were competing for the loyalties of the same religious constituency, namely those Muslims of northwest China who had Naqshbandī affiliations.

I think that the controversy about fast breaking is a very illustrative example of the non-tolerance among competing groups.

145 Fletcher, 1995, p. 30.

146 Kotku, 1993, p. 109.

147 Meier, 1994.

148 “*Nisbet-i rabita ki, hifz-i suret-i şeyhtir, müride zikirden ziyade nafidir*” (Kotku, 1993, p. 11).

By the same token, the position of the *murīd* was described in the same source in the following way:¹⁴⁹

Therefore it is necessary for the *murīd* to place his will under that of the sheikh and to submit himself to him completely, so that he can act like a corpse in the hands of *ghasal* [i.e. one who washes the dead] while being present in his discourse.

Earlier it was Emir Kulāl who let Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband exist and behave in his own way. The later Sufi masters in the fifteenth century continued to make their own preferences and choices. But with the ascendancy of the *rābiṭa*, there was not much decision-making power left to the *murīd* and apparently neither was it required by the *murīd*. More research is needed on the basis of local manuscripts and hagiographies to see whether the Naqshbandīs in Eastern Turkestan and in northwest China experienced the rise of the authority of the *murshīd* and its contextualization in a hierarchical world view to a similar degree.¹⁵⁰ If not, how different was the relationship between the *murīd* and the *murshīd* in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Eastern Turkestan and northwest China?

In revisiting the *khafī/jahrī* controversy, all of these questions can also be tied to the relationship between the mosque and *dargāh*, which under Islam is a relationship of duality. In other words, the saints are not incorporated into the mainstream space of worship - the mosque,¹⁵¹ a situation which perpetuates the debates over mainstream Islam and popular Islam. The mosque can be organized and institutionalized by higher authorities, like the state, as under the Ottomans; in contrast, while the *zāwiya*, the *ṭarīqa* and the saints are also coordinated by the state, they are not incorporated into the mainstream institution. It was not the state or a higher religious authority but people who would in the end determine who was a *murshīd* and a *murīd*. There was no institution like the church in Europe which would determine sainthood. The Ottomans, played an intermediary role also for the *ṭarīqa* by furthering some and discouraging others. In this respect the institutionalization of the *ṭarīqa* played an important role; most of the *menāqibnāmes* were written during this period of institutionalization in the fifteenth century.

In terms of *jahrī/khafī* remembrance, on the other hand, that the decision maker was not the state, or a religious institution like a religious order or church is evident. In the abode of Islam in general and among the Naqshbandiyya in particular, it was the relationship between the *murīds* and their *murshīd*, and the consensus within the community of followers that was decisive. Therefore we should not expect one specific or unchanging way of remembrance of God that is followed by all the Naqshbandiyya within the Islamic world.

Postscript:

Just as I was handing in this present paper to the editor, thanks to Evrim Binbaş I happened to see the recent monograph by Jürgen Paul, *Doctrine and Organization. The Khwājagān/Naqshbandiyya in the first generation after Bahā' al-Dīn*, where

149 "Bu sebeple müride lazımdır ki, kendi iradesini şeyhinin iradesine tâbi kılıp, kendisini tamamiyle ona ismarlayıp, onun sohbetinde, gassâlm elindeki ölü gibi ola" (Kotku, 1993, p. 110).

150 There is a passage in *Tadhkīra-i 'Azīzān* which gives the impression that similar questions were also the issue in Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth century. However, the passage in question does not express the prevailing opinion but quotes a *fatwa* by Khoja Muḥammad Pārsā from the fifteenth century (Hartmann, 1905, p. 229; and Berlin MS, p. 78). When these problems were hot issues everywhere and new leadership emerged in relation to them, why were they quoting from the fifteenth century work? This is why this issue needs to be studied in detail in the context of Eastern Turkestan.

151 Where as catholic and orthodox churches are full of saints.

diversity of the views on the silent and vocal *dhikr* are presented on a wide range of sources related to the 14th and 15th centuries.

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The *Waqf* of Khoja ‘Ubayd Allah Ahrār in Nineteenth Century Central Asia: A Preliminary Study of the Tsarist Record

JO-ANN GROSS

The renowned Naqshbandī *pir*, Khoja ‘Ubayd Allah Ahrār (1404-1490), is buried at his *khānaqāh*-shrine complex in the village of Khoja Kafshir on the outskirts of Samarqand, and his burial place has been the object of pilgrimage for over five hundred years since his death in 1490. The Arabic inscription on his gravestone likens his grave to the garden of paradise and a cultivated field.¹

This is a meadow that is made joyous by glorious flowing rivers
and a garden that is ornamented with divine holiness.
Allah was pleased by its proprietor after He gave him [Ahrār] rest
and sought Allah’s perfumes of nature in the morning and the evening.
And the Sovereign, All Knowing, comforted his soul.
[There is for him] rest and satisfaction and a Garden of Delight.²
It is He who created the field of the world as a means to increase
the cultivation of the hereafter,
And He gave him [Ahrār] his outward and inward blessings.

These words paint a metaphorical image of an abundant nature, one blessed by Allah with prosperity. Subsequent verses also speak to the great esteem and respect in which Khoja Ahrār was held by his contemporaries. Indeed, by the late fifteenth century, the Naqshbandī order was deeply integrated into the socioeconomic, political, and religious fabric of rural and urban life in both Khorasan and Transoxiana.³ The eminent state of the order at that time marked a turning point in the history of Sufi communities in the Eastern Islamic world. Sufis acquired great status, enjoyed remarkable benefits, and established networks of philanthropy and economic activity that continued up to the Soviet period. The history of the Naqshbandiyya during the Timurid period not only attests to its power and significance, but also provides a

1 My English translation is based on N. Veselovsky’s transcription of the Arabic and Persiancriptions, “Pamyatnik Khoji Akhrara v Samarkande,” *Vostochnye zametki* (1895), 321-335.

2 Qur’an, 65: 89.

3 The Naqshbandiyya was particularly active in the urban centers of Herat and Samarqand during the Timurid period. For studies of the Naqshbandiyya in the Timurid period, see O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie Dokumenty XV-XVI vv.*, Moscow, 1974; Jo-Ann Gross, “Khoja Ahrar: A Study of the Perceptions of Religious Power and Prestige in the Late Timurid period,” Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1982; idem., “The Economic Status of a Timurid Shaykh: A Matter of Conflict or Perception?” *Iranian Studies*, 21 (1988), 84-104; idem., “Khoja Ahrar: An Interpretative Approach to Understanding the Roles and Perceptions of a Sufi Shaykh in Timurid Society,” in Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic, and Thierry Zarcone (eds.), *Naqshbandis*, Editions ISIS, Istanbul/Paris, 1990, 109-122; Jürgen Paul, *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der Naqshbandiyya in Mittelasien im 15. Jahrhundert*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1991; idem., “Forming a Faction: The *Himayat* System of Khwaja Ahrar,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23 (1991), 533-548.

paradigm for the expansion and institutionalization of a religious community. Although the active political and economic role of the Naqshbandī Sufi community in Timurid society is not unique to the history of Sufism, the example of Khoja ‘Ubayd Allah Aḥrār and the Naqshbandiyya offers a compelling model of the efficacy of sheikhly authority and the strength of an organizational structure that was based upon the religious authority of individual sheikhs; the endowment of shrines, mosques, and *madrasahs*; genealogical ties; and the personal charisma exerted by influential sheikhs.⁴ The current restoration of Sufi shrines and the revival of lines of descent in present-day post-Soviet Uzbekistan is a conspicuous example of the continued relevance of the Naqshbandiyya’s cultural legacy in modern Central Asian society.⁵

In contrast to the remarkable period of growth during the Timurid period, little research has been done on the social and economic history of the Naqshbandiyya in the nineteenth-century, following the Russian conquest of Central Asia. What work has been done has been produced mainly by Central Asian scholars, most notably the work of Zakir Abdurakhman Kutbaev, and more recently, that of Bakhtiyar Babadjanov.⁶ One of the most promising avenues of research for the study of the persistence of Aḥrār’s trust and his descendants in Central Asia is a collection of tsarist documents housed in the Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning the *waqf* properties of Khoja Aḥrār.⁷ These documents attest to the continued claim to and management of extensive *waqf* properties as originally founded and stipulated by Aḥrār himself in the late fifteenth-century. Three trust deeds drawn up between 1470 and 1490 (the year of his death) enumerate Khoja Aḥrār’s endowments and their beneficiaries, which were Aḥrār’s male heirs; a mosque and *madrasah* in Tashkent; a *madrasah* in Samarqand in the Suzangaran quarter; and the *khanaqāh*-shrine complex on the outskirts of Samarqand where Aḥrār is buried.⁸ Twelve docu-


4 For comparative examples of sheikhly authority and Sufi communal organization, see Sarah Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992; Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994; Richard Maxwell Eaton, *Sufis of Bijapur 1300-1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978; Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973; Robert D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991.

5 Along with the restoration of shrines and the ideological rehabilitation of prominent Sufis, a number of pamphlets and books have been published in Uzbek on Sufism and Sufi pirs. Among those concerning Khoja Aḥrār are: Boturkhon Valikhudjaev, *Khojda Akhrori Vali*, Samarqand, 1993; Boturkhon Valikhudjaev, *Khodja Akhror Tarikhi*, Samarqand, 1994; Zokir Kutboev, *Khodja Akhror Valii*, Tashkent, 1996.

6 O. D. Chekhovich’s pioneering work on *waqf* influenced a whole generation of scholarship on the socio-economic history of Sufism in Central Asia. Her student, Zakir Abdurakhman Kutbaev, wrote a dissertation on the *waqf* of Aḥrār’s descendants, “K istorii vakufnykh vladeniya Khoji Akhrara i yevo potomkov,” *Akademiia Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, Institut Vostokovedniia*, no. 579, Avtoreferat, 1970. I am grateful to Z. A. Kutbaev for making his avtoreferat available to me. The current ideological climate in post-Soviet Uzbekistan has led to a more open scholarly inquiry into the history of Sufism in Central Asia that includes questions of politics, culture, Sufi polemic, and social organization. See, for example, Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, “On the History of the Naqshbandiyya Mugaddidiya in Central Māwāra’annahr in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries,” in Michail Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen, and Dmitriy Yermakov (eds.), *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, Berlin, 1996. Devin Dewese is one of the few scholars in the west working on nineteenth century material, for example, “Shrine, Waqf, and Holy Families: Descent Groups Linked to Khoja Ahmad Yasavi in the 19th Century,” unpublished paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association Conference, November 1997.

7 Fond 18, opis’ 1, nos. 10476 and Fond 18, opis’ 1, no. 10477, Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekiston Respublikasi Markaziy Davlat Arkhivi).

8 See documents 5, 10, 11, and 12 in Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*. The Samarqand mosque is usually referred to in the Russian protocol as the Safid *madrasah*.



At the graveyard of Khoja 'Ubayd Allah Aḥrār in the village of Khoja Kafshir on the outskirts of Samarqand (Jo-Ann Gross, 1997).

ments were drafted during Aḥrār's lifetime, which include eight purchase deeds (three of which have *waqf*-conversion codicils) and four *waqf* charters. Often, land that was donated to or bought by Aḥrār remained in the use of the former owners, thus initiating new forms of economic relationships between the sheikhs and those working the land. All of the original deeds stipulated that Aḥrār was to be the *waqf* administrator, *mutawalli*, and that after his death, his sons, Khoja Muhammad 'Abd Allah and Khoja Muhammad Yahyā and their heirs, would become the beneficiaries and administrators of the *waqf*.

Based upon these documents, it is apparent that during the late fifteenth century, Aḥrār converted a large number of small parcels of land into *waqf* for the use of *madrāsahs*, mosques, and *khānaqāhs*. He also established the future control of the administration and collection of revenues of these endowments for himself and for his heirs in the line of his son, Muhammad Yahyā. Although it is beyond the confines of this paper to trace the history of the Aḥrārī family after Khoja Aḥrār's death in 1490, later historical sources reveal that the Aḥrārī family continued to exert its influence on the local economy of Samarqand through the perpetuation of the endowment and the authority of the Aḥrārīs as managers, *mutawallis*, of the *waqf*, as *qādīs*, and as elders of the community.⁹ An article in *Turkestankie Vedomosti*, published in 1884, for example, reports that in the city of Tashkent, 800 tenants inhabited houses valued at 300,000 rubles belonging to the Aḥrārī trust.¹⁰ In her fieldwork in the village of Khoja Aḥrār in the 1920s, Olga Sukhareva reports that several hundred people claimed descent from Khoja Aḥrār; this in a period during which the family trust had already been liquidated by the Soviet administration, and, as a result, their roles as administrators had been discontinued.¹¹

9 For a discussion of the shrine and its administration, see Robert D. McChesney, *Central Asia Foundations of Change*, The Darwin Press, Princeton, 1996, pp. 98-109.

10 "Vakufy v Turkestane," *Turkestanskie Vedomosti*, 1884. Cited in McChesney, *ibid.*, p. 108.

11 O. A. Sukhareva, "Potomki Kodzha Akhrara," in G. F. Kim, G. F. Girs, and E. A. Davidovich (eds.), *Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma*, Bartol'dskoe chtenie, 1982, Nauka, Moscow 1985, p. 161. Cited in McChesney, *ibid.*, p. 108.




Figure 1: Kazakh Steppe and Central Asia. Early Twentieth Century.

Source: Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917* (Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 136.

Along with the Russian conquest of Central Asia in the 1860s came a reorganization of the conquered territories and the extension of the imperial administration.¹² On July 11, 1867, by decree of Tsar Alexander II, the Governor Generalship of Turkestan was established. Initially three Governor-Generalships were established in Central Asia in Orenburg, Semipalatinsk, and Turkestan (see figure 1). General Konstantin von Kaufman was appointed Turkestan's first Governor-General on July 14, 1867; General M. G. Cherniaev succeeded him after his death in 1882.¹³ In accordance with Russian administrative organization, territory was partitioned into a hierarchy of divisions, the largest of which were five *oblasts*, including Samarqand and Syr Darya (the latter of which encompassed Tashkent). Tashkent served as the

¹² Each of the Governor-Generalships was headed by a Governor-General who was responsible to and appointed by the tsar; subordinate to him was a hierarchy of officials and regional administrators who operated the affairs of the districts and dealt with taxation, economic issues, communications, and law.

¹³ For a discussion of von Kaufman's administration, see David MacKenzie, "Kaufman of Turkestan: an Assessment of His Administration 1867-1881," *Slavic Review*, XXVI (June 1967), 265-285.


administrative center of the Syr Darya *oblast* and as the Governor-Generalship of all of Turkestan. The functions of the *oblast* government were coordinated through an administrative board, and general meetings were held to deal with specific problems.

The *oblast* was, in turn, subdivided into several *uezds*, each of which was headed by an *uezd* commandant along with an administrative staff.¹⁴ The *uezds* were divided into smaller districts called *uchastok*, each of which was headed by an officer in charge of an administrative force. All of the administrative divisions were based on the provincial administration of European Russia, with one significant distinguishing feature: in Turkestan, the military and civil administration were combined.¹⁵

On the village level, the authority of the local elites was more apparent, and was, by necessity, recognized by the Russian administrators. Here local governance was effected through a village council which was headed by an elected elder, *aksakal*. Several villages comprised a *volost*, which in turn was administered by a *volost* council with an elected elder serving as the chief official; the *volost* council was organized with the participation of one representative from every fifty households.¹⁶ It is through this administrative structure and those local officials that the investigations into the *waqf* lands of Khoja Ahrār were carried out.

It is commonly acknowledged that the institution of *waqf* is of prime importance for the establishment of social services in Islamic society, among them the financing of education through the construction of building and support of teachers, prayer leaders, Qur'ān reciters, and the like, and the funding of specific institutional budgets, particularly the *madrasah*. In the case of the Naqshbandi community in Central Asia, Khoja Ahrār, and after his death, his progeny, managed and directed the shrine, public buildings, and trusts while preserving stipulated revenues for the use of education, commerce, agricultural production, and philanthropic purposes. A whole network of socio-economic relationships, therefore, emanated from the Ahrārī trust.¹⁷

Given the colonial impetus of the tsarist administration to regulate the Central Asian economy and to ensure its authority in those territories, and given the extensive economic role played by the endowed properties in the local economy, a kin-based regional organization such as the Ahrārī family naturally was perceived as a challenge to tsarist authority and control. Obtaining knowledge of the exact extent of the Ahrārī trust and its revenues was therefore of great interest to the Governor-General. Between 1893-99 the tsarist government carried out investigations into the



The tombstone of Khoja 'Ubayd Allāh Ahrār. (Jo-Ann Gross, 1997).

14 Richard Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917*, University of California, Berkeley, 1960, p. 96.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76. The Tashkent *uezd* was part of the Syr Darya *oblast*, while the Samarqand *uezd* was part of the Samarqand *oblast*.

17 See Jo-Ann Gross, "The Economic Status of a Timurid Sufi Shaykh: A Matter of Conflict or Perception?" *Iranian Studies*, 21 (1988), 84-104; Jürgen Paul, "Wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und Organisation," in *Die politische und soziale Bedeutung der Naqshbandiyya in Mittelasien im 15. Jahrhundert*, pp. 89-112.

waqf properties located in the Samarqand and Tashkent *vilayat*. One component of this project was a series of inquiries into the *waqf* properties of Khoja Aḥrār that were carried out by the Land-Tax Commission (Pozemel'no-Podatnaya Kommisiya) of the Tashkent Governor-Generalship. The record of their reports sheds light on tsarist administrative policy with respect to land tenure, taxation, and settlement issues.

For the remainder of the paper, I will examine a small portion of the extensive paper trail of over three hundred pages included in the two document collections under investigation.¹⁸ Included in the two collections are records of meetings of the Land-Tax Commission, Russian translations of *waqf* documents, records of on-site visits by commissioners to villagers, testimony of *mutawallis* and villagers, measurements of properties and descriptions of property boundaries, decisions of the commissioners, inquiries into taxation, *iqrārs* (affidavits of property sold) presented to the commissioners by villagers, and letters written by *mutawallis* to the commission.¹⁹ This study necessarily is a preliminary one that focuses on the tsarist government's investigation of the *waqf* properties of Khoja Aḥrār in Samarqand, and only briefly with Tashkent.²⁰ I hope to demonstrate that the Aḥrārī trust indeed persisted into the late nineteenth century in the Samarqand and Tashkent regions; that the *mutawallis* of the a *waqf* were both central to the investigations and prominent members of their communities; that the high level priority given to the investigation of the Aḥrārī *waqf* properties is indicative of their importance and magnitude; and that the ultimate goals of the Land-Tax Commission were to weaken the social-economic hold of the Aḥrārīs, and to increase control as well as the tsarist tax base by privatizing some of the *waqf* properties.

Judicial and political reviews of *waqfs* and their administrations was a matter of course in Central Asia. However, in contrast to those reviews of Muslim administrations which were, in theory, based upon Hanafī law and the concept of the "general good", *maslahah*, of the *waqf*, the reviews of the tsarist administration were based upon a concept of "imperial good" and the secular concerns of statecraft.²¹ Indeed, one intriguing aspect of the investigative process of the tsarist administrative officers is their predicament of relying heavily on the *mutawallis* of the Aḥrārī trust as well as the local population for their information (including native village elders), while often mistrusting their motivations.²² This was indicative of the profound effect that the imposition of a non-Muslim, Christian government would have on the formerly close relationship between Sufis and the state in Central Asia. In former times, the ruling elite supported the Sufis, often patronized them, and looked to them for spiritual, moral, and even political advice. The tsarist conquest ushered in a period of mutual mistrust between Sufis and the state, although not to the extent so pervasive in the Soviet period, when Sufis were considered threats to the Soviet state and forced underground, endowments were confiscated, and shrines and mosques closed down.²³ Inherent in the Russian protocol is a palpable, although not surprising, sus-

18 Apart from documents submitted to the investigators by *mutawallis* and villagers, which are written in Persian and/or Uzbek, all of the records are written in Russian.

19 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476 and Fond 18, opis' 1, no 10477, Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, are the basis of this study, as stated above.

20 The enormity of the two fonds and the detailed information contained in them requires further research, and is the subject of a much broader study of the nineteenth century materials on the Aḥrārī trust by this author.

21 See McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 10-11. It should be noted that during the 1880s and 1890s, the religious class and the Shari'ā remained in place, although their authority began to be contested by secular authority and law.

22 There are indications that many of the local native officials participated willingly in the investigations since it was in their best interest to do so.

23 See Jo-Ann Gross, "The Polemic of 'Official' and 'Unofficial Islam': Sufism in Soviet Central Asia," in Frederick De Jong (ed.), *Islamic Mysticism Contested*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, forthcoming.

piciousness on both sides. The Russian inspectors suspect that the *mutawallis* are hiding information from them and even committing fraud, especially concerning revenues, while the *mutawallis* suspect that the inspectors are out to confiscate the trusts as well as undermine their authority.

In order to investigate the *waqf* properties of Khoja Aḥrār, a special commission composed of influential officials of the Land Tax Commission of the Tashkent Governor-Generalship was organized in Samarqand under the chairmanship of A.N. Chernevsky.²⁴ The protocol dated September, 1883 records that the commission requested the *mutawallis* to submit existing *waqf* documents concerning the Aḥrārī trust, which they did on May 4, 1887.²⁵ At the beginning of the protocol, two *mutawallis* of the *waqf* of the *khanāqah*-shrine complex of Khoja Aḥrār are named, Ishan Bakir-Khoja, son of Muhammad Yusuf-Khoja, and Sultan-Khoja, son of Inayat-Khoja.²⁶ The *mutawalli* of the "Safid" *madrasah* in Samarqand, Awliyā-Khoja, son of Buzuruk Khoja, is also named.²⁷ The *waqf* documents that the *mutawallis* submitted to the Land-Tax Commission were organized by the Russian administrators into three categories, labeled letters "A," "B," and "V."²⁸

On July 16, 1893 a special meeting was convened concerning the *waqf* economy of Khoja Aḥrār that marked the beginning of the investigation of the properties in the Samarqand *oblast*. At the meeting it was decided that an investigation be carried out to determine the exact location and boundaries of those properties. In the course of the investigation, the *waqf* properties were divided, for convenience, into separate parcels, sometimes as settlements, other times as an entire *volost* or administrative division. It followed that the various commissioners were assigned to establish the locations and borders of these properties, and it is clear from the protocol and the mentioned documents, that they relied heavily on the testimony of the *mutawallis*, who were often unable to provide the documentation and precise information that

24 Kutbaev, *ibid.*, 96-97.

25 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 1a; 43a.

26 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 1a; 5a. Although the Russian protocol refers to Ishan Bakir Khoja and Sultan Khoja as *mutawallis* of the *madrasah* of Khoja Aḥrār, they may have been the *mutawallis* of the shrine complex rather than the *madrasah*, since only two *madrasahs* are included in the endowments of Aḥrār, one in Samarqand (in the Suzangaran quarter, which is always referred to as "Safid" *madrasah* in the Russian protocol) and the other in Tashkent. There are also other *mutawallis* named in the document. For example, later on fol. 68b is a letter (in Uzbek) addressed to the Commission written by the *mutawalli* of Khoja Aḥrār, Hajjī Muḥammad Rahim, and the *mutawalli* of the Safid *madrasah*, Awliyā' Khoja. Elsewhere Hajjī Muḥammad Khoja signs his name simply as "the custodian of [the *waqf*] of Khoja Aḥrār, fol. 57b.

27 Although it cannot be certain, it is likely that the *mutawallis* were descendants of Khoja Aḥrār, as stipulated by him. See Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, 35, for a discussion of the *mutawallis* as stipulated in documents 5, 10, 11, 12, and 17.

28 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 1a. Letter "A" was apparently a copy of the original *waqf* document 323, opis' 1, 1202 presently housed in the Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, but then kept in Bukhara. See document nos. 10, 11 and 12 in Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, 107-299. The Russian translation of document "A" which was made by S. Lenin and O. Dmitrievsky is composed of 72 pages, but begins only with line 25 of the Persian *waqf*, since the first 24 lines were unreadable. Kutbaev notes that the Russian translation of document "A" "fully conforms to the original *waqf* document no 323, opis' 1, no. 1202," Kutbaev, 98-99. A closer examination of the correspondence of the Russian translation with document no. 323 is needed to fully examine their relationship. Kutbaev also notes that many of the place names are transliterated incorrectly in the Russian. Document letter "B" was based on the original *waqf* document, and conforms to *waqf* document no. 9 in the Institute of Oriental Studies of Uzbekistan. On the reverse side of the Persian document the following words are written in Russian, "Document letter B is included in file (dela) no. 54 of the Land-Tax Office (Otdelenie), 1893." See document no. 17 in Chekhovich, 316-372. Document letter "V" is not a *waqf*, but rather a *yarliq* of the Bukharan Amir Haidar dated 1825 concerning the *waqf* property of Khoja Aḥrār in Kamangan, which corresponds to document no. 9a in the Institute of Oriental Studies of Uzbekistan. See document 18 in Chekhovich, 373-319. On the reverse side of document 9a there is an inscription indicating that it was presented to the Commission on March 4, 1887.

they were seeking, and secondarily, on the testimony of local inhabitants and the various documents they presented. For example, Protocol no. 70 describes Commissar P. Aprelev's meeting with the *mutawallis* in November, 1893. This meeting concerned the *waqf* documents of Khoja Ahrār and their correspondence with actual lands presently in use in the villages of Kamangaran, Shirbut, and Mirganch.²⁹ The *mutawallis* claimed that the land was being utilized by people who came from different places and had acquired hereditary rights to the property. They claimed that they did not know why the lands were occupied contrary to the will of the testator.

Concerning Aprelev's interrogation of the village elders of Khishraw in November, 1893, Protocol no. 72, he makes note of conversations with the *mutawallis* about document "A" and appeals to those elders to establish the current locations of the properties described in the *waqf*; included also is the testimony of the village elders of Khishraw.³⁰ Three of the villagers stated that, "Several old men know from their father's and grandfather's properties, that those who occupy the agricultural land of the village of Khishraw have done so for more than 400 years, passing it from generation to generation."³¹ This statement suggests that lands occupied by tenants during the lifetime of Ahrār had been passed on through families long after the death of Ahrār. According to one village elder, "the inhabitants of the village are not all descendants of Khoja Ahrār 'Ubaydullah Sheikh Zahid, known as Khoja Ahrar, but are people who have arrived from different places, and occupied it as vacant land on an ordinary basis..."³² Another individual reports that, "At the present time, the *waqf* lands are the legal property in the use of 266 households of the village of Khishraw, and include Arabs, Turks, newcomers from Bukhara, Uzbeks from the Urgench and Naiman clan, and also eleven Persians."³³ Although these statements may reflect the desire of some individuals to prove their legal rights to occupy these lands, they also illustrate a fluidity in settlement patterns as well as the ethnic diversity of the population occupying the Ahrārī *waqf* lands.

Included in the records are also numerous documents brought to the investigators by villagers, many of which record the sale of rights to the use of lands of the Ahrārī *waqf*.³⁴ Two *iqrār*s were presented in the village of Khishraw, one of which is an *iqrār* (see figure 2) recording the sale in 1289/1872 "by Bābājān Bey to Bāzar Bey of the uncultivated assets, *sukniyāt*, of 24 tanābs of *waqf* land [belonging to] the revenues of a *waqf* which are intended for the specified purpose."³⁵ In Miyankhaw, villagers presented three documents to the inspector in order to demonstrate that some small parcels of lands in this village, which were considered as *waqf*, had been sold.³⁶

29 Kamangaran is located approximately two kilometers from Samarqand. I have thus far been unable to locate Shirbut and Mirganch.

30 Fond 18, opis' 1, 10476, fol. 10b, 11a. All of the elders' names are listed here. At this time Aprelev also discussed with the *mutawallis* the absence of a seal on document "B," which the *mutawallis* claimed was a result of the copying of the document every 10 years, as stipulated by the *waqf* testator. *Ibid.*, fol. 11a.

31 *Ibid.*, fol. 15b.

32 *Ibid.*, fol. 16a

33 The Russian term used is "Persian," but hand written next to the Russian word, in Arabic script, is *Irāni*. *Ibid.*

34 Kutbaev notes that such testimony doesn't always conform to fact, since the primary motivation of such individuals was to prove their legal rights to the use of these lands. Thus they would sign any forged document in order to support their testimony. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, pp. 108.

35 *Sukniyat* is the rights to use the land or property, or things on that land or property that may already exist. Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, ff. 19b-20a. This document has the seal of the *qaḍī*, Damullah Zaman Muhammad Ziyayev, along with a list of six witnesses. Note that the Persian text on the left side of the page is accompanied by a Russian translation on the right side. See fol. 25a for a survey of the *waqf* properties in the Samarqand region made by the Land-Tax Commission.

36 *Ibid.*, fol. 24a-24b.

Although the commission found the small number of documents submitted as insufficient to consider the entire village as private property, Aprelev used the existence of such documents to cast doubt on the validity of the *waqf* lands of Ahrār as described in document "A" and "B," and he used them as a basis for rejecting the position of the *mutawallis*.³⁷

Another villager testified that whereas Kamangaran was a settlement from time immemorial, the villages of Shirbut and Mirganch were founded only sixty-three years before by emigrants from the village of Urgut. Although they had no legal right nor did they ask permission for it, they continued to live on it for several generations, knowing that one-third of the property belonged to the Ahrārī *waqf*, and 2/3 made up the *amlaka* (land previously unirrigated and unoccupied reclaimed land).³⁸ It appears from this example, and others, that lands of the Ahrārī trust that had been left fallow were settled, and that local knowledge and the actions of the *mutawallis* assured its recognition as part of the *waqf*, thus those revenues were given over to the *mutawallis* for the benefit of the *waqf*. Clearly, these kinds of arrangements frustrated the Russian administrators, and only fueled their suspicions of wrongdoing.

After nine months of investigation, a meeting of the Land-Tax Commission was convened by Aprelev on August 10, 1894 to explain his conclusions regarding his findings concerning the *waqf* properties of the Ahrārī trust that were located in the second land parcel of the Samarqand *uezd*.³⁹ He concluded that document letter "A" could not be considered as authentic since there were signs of forgery, gaps in the text, inconsistencies, and the lack of an official copy corresponding to this document.⁴⁰ Document letter "B", it was concluded, was also problematic since it lacked any official seal, and, despite the stipulations of the *waqf* document to preserve a copy of the document by the *qādī*, no copies were found.⁴¹ Based upon the on-site visits, the testimony of the villagers and the *mutawallis*, and the documents submitted by the *mutawallis* and the villagers, the commission concluded that a portion of the lands located in the villages of Kamangaran, Miyankhaw, Khishraw, Shirbut, and Mirganch did not belong to the *waqf* of Khoja Ahrār because they did not coincide with parcels bequeathed by Ahrār for the use of the *waqf* as established by him in the fifteenth century (as detailed in the questionable documents "A" and "B"). The *mutawallis* of the *waqf* of Khoja Ahrār, moreover, did not clarify these questions with any reliable information about the legality of the *waqf*. This conclusion interestingly views the estate of Khoja Ahrār as frozen and based solely on the fifteenth-century record, in effect denying the validity of changes that would most likely have taken place over time. Property transactions affecting the original endowment would have been recorded, but not all of those documents may have survived, thus the predicament of the *mutawallis*.⁴² As Kutbaev notes, the *mutawallis* asserted that, despite the absence of the emir's seal in the document named letter "B," this docu-

37 Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 111.

38 Protocol no. 38, 1894, fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 25b, 26a.

39 *Ibid.*, 36a-38b. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

40 *Ibid.*, fol. 36a; Kutbaev, *ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

41 *Ibid.*, The original, the *mutawallis* argued, was in Bukhara.

42 In a later investigation into the properties named in document "A" conducted by the tax inspector, Voronets, which included the Safid *madrāsah* in the Suzangaran quarter of Samarqand, he reports that the *mutawallis* did not know how much income was received for each *waqf*, nor did they keep receipts or have any account books. It is not surprising that the *mutawallis* did not want to submit their record books to the tsarist administrators, although, as Kutbaev notes, this led the administrators to conclude that the *mutawallis* were holding on to revenues. Following interviews with villagers in Vang, Laish, and Chaukh, measurement of the borders of the *waqf* properties, and reports of the *mutawallis*, Voronets concluded that those *waqf* lands had always been settled and "freely passed on as inheritance, and were alienated. And the borders of the present time do not conform to the borders mentioned in the *waqf* document." Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 119; fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 144a-b.

ment was copied every ten years in accordance with the stipulation that it be done so by the *waqf* testator.⁴³ But routinely, when portions of documents were unclear or lacked legible seals, they were considered by the commission to be invalid. The inspectors also used many of the documents presented by various villagers to conclude that they were privately owned and therefore not *waqf* properties, despite the fact in many cases it was the *suknīyat* of the *waqf*, not the land itself, that was being sold.⁴⁴ Aprevel and the commission did not appear to accept the testimony of the *mutawallis* of the *waqf* as valid; however, he did appear to accept the *iqrārs* as authentic. Kutbaev notes that it is possible to suppose that these people were hereditary tenants of the *waqf* properties of Khoja Aḥrār.⁴⁵ But, as he also notes, it is also possible that some of these reports were simply not factual.⁴⁶ The documentary record for administrative decisions such as those described above highlight the complexity of issues concerning the historical transformation of endowments through time and space. It also makes a strong argument for the need to consider not only the documents themselves, but the socio-political and economic dimensions of them.

The preservation of the Aḥrārī trust, as stipulated by Aḥrār himself, was naturally of great concern to the *mutawallis* whose prestige, status, and subsistence rested largely upon their positions as administrators of the trust. Under the tsarist administration, it was customary for the Russian officials to distribute the *waqf* revenues on an annual basis to the *mutawallis*. As part of his contribution to the investigation, Voronets examined the incomes from the *waqf* properties described in document letter "A."⁴⁷ After meeting with the *mutawallis* of the *khanaqāh* complex of Hazrat-i Khoja Aḥrār and the *mutawallis* of the Safid *madrasah*, the properties in the villages of the Shakhabski (Shahabski) Volost were accepted by Voronets as *waqf*.⁴⁸ The protocol dated November 29, 1894, which lists the expenditures, attests to the persistence of the Aḥrārī family as well as the organization of its communal activities.

For the Safid *madrasah* in Samarqand in the Suzangaran district, it is recorded that the *mutawallis* distributed 1774 rubles and 30 kopeks in the following manner: 1/10 for himself (the *mutawalli*), 255 rubles 50 kopeks for the *mudarris*, 37 rubles 7 kopeks for the upkeep of each of the 28 rooms of the *madrasah*, 30 rubles for the *mullah*, plus one ruble 15 kopeks for entertainment and the upkeep of the Provincial Administrative Office (Uznaya Upravleniya).⁴⁹

The remaining revenues were distributed for the use of the *khānaqāh* complex (called Hazrat-i Khoja Aḥrār in the protocol) and for the maintenance of Khoja Aḥrār's descendants in the following manner:

43 Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 104. See fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 11a. At another meeting of the Land Tax Commission convened by Aprelev on November 23, 1893, the *mutawallis* were questioned about document "A," mainly regarding the places names and the size of the land parcels. These discussions were to establish the next phase of the on-site investigations. In doing so, as Kutbaev notes, the commissars of the Land-Tax Commission were granted "unlimited rights," and were provided with administrative officials and services to help the investigation process. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 106.

44 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 19a, b. See also "Tsenii dokument o vakufnikh vladeniya Khoji Akhrara," *Akademiya Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan Institut Vostokovedeniia, Sobornik statei: Molodikh uchenikh i samnurani instituta vostokovedeniia*, Tashkent, 1970.

45 Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 115.

46 It should be noted that within one month of the meeting, the investigative materials were translated into Uzbek, including the testimony of the *mutawallis*. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 116; fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 37a.

47 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 39a. Voronets was looking into the properties listed as no. 54 in the *dela* of the *oblast* government.

48 The villages were Vang, Laish, and Chauk. The protocol states that the *mutawallis* did not know how much income was generated from each of the *waqf* properties. It does state that they received about 10,000 rubles from the uezd government annually from the properties in the Samarqand *oblast*. *Ibid.*, fol. 39b.

49 Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476, fol. 39b-40a.

1000 rubles for the two above-mentioned *mutawallis*, 400 rubles for the mosque and food to be served at fast time, 80 rubles for the *imam*, 20 rubles for the *muezzin*, 40 rubles for two *mustarahan*. In addition, what remained after the expenditures is to be distributed to the 500 descendants of Khoja Ahrār, to be divided into 317 portions, one portion for each male, and 1/2 portion for each female, thus averaging to 27 rubles for each portion.⁵⁰

Some two years later, in response to the Commission's conclusions regarding the validity of the *waqfs*, the *mutawallis* were firm in their disagreement with the tsarist decision that put their revenues in peril. Awliyā' Khoja and Muhammad Rahim Khoja lodged a formal written protest to the Commission in which they stated (in Uzbek), unequivocally, that the revenues of the *waqf* properties were used to support the Safīd *madrasah* in Samarqand, four *mullahs*, and 500 of the descendants of Khoja Ahrār as stipulated in the original *waqf* deed of the fifteenth century (see figure 2) and they requested that this be maintained (see figure 3).

We the *mutawallis* of [the *waqf*] of His Eminence Khoja Ahrār, Hajjī Muhammad Rahim son of Khoja Subhānqūlī and the *mutawallī* of the Safīd *madrasah*, Awliyā Khoja, son of Buzurg Khoja, with all due respect to the respectable Governor, beg you to note that the aforementioned late Eminence (meaning Ahrār), may God bless him, had given... [lacunae] for the daily maintenance and...[lacunae] equal to approximately 500 persons to include adults, minors, women and surviving descendants. They have no... [lacunae] they cannot even maintain the hired workers specified by His Eminence for his progeny. The said *madrasah* has four *mullahs* whose studying and support is due to that *waqf*. We hope that Your Highness will reactivate (*jori bulub*) that old *waqf* (of long years). This will take care of the aforementioned inheritors (*tirikchilik*) and the *mullāhs* of the *madrasah*. Respectfully, we place our mark and give our words herein, I the *mutawallī* of the Safīd *madrasah* Awliyā Khoja, son of Buzurg Khoja: Muhammad Rahim Khoja, I give my word.⁵¹

The *mutawallis* also argued that those inhabitants who, over the course of more than 400 years, occupied and/or claimed the usufruct of properties within the legal *waqf*, and continued to divert a portion of the revenues as stipulated for the use of the *waqf*, confirmed the status of these properties as legally part of the *waqf*.⁵²

Detailed investigations into the *waqf* properties of Khoja Ahrār such as those described above also provide evidence concerning the resettlement of Russians in the Tashkent *vilayat*, and the possible vulnerability of the *waqf* lands of Khoja Ahrār to tsarist settlement policy. The Resettlement Administration was formed in 1896, mainly in response to the Siberian Railroad Project that brought many Russian immigrants into the region. The main centers of Russian peasant colonization in Central Asia were in the steppe *oblasts* and Semirichie, outside the confines of Tashkent and Samarqand, although the influx of colonists did have some affect on the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan.⁵³

50 *Ibid.*, fol. 40a, 40b. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 117-118. The protocol also notes that the *mutawallis* had no account book and did not keep receipts.

51 *Ibid.*, fol. 68a, 68b. Note that several words were unclear in the Uzbek text. The Russian protocol above the letter only generally describes the dissatisfaction of the *mutawallis*. Following the Uzbek text is a Russian translation of it, which incorrectly states that there were 300 persons for whom maintenance was to be provided. Fond 18, opis' 1, 10465, fol. 68b.

52 Another aspect of the investigations concerned the taxation of *waqf* properties. For example, while P. Gorskii carried out a broad topological survey in a number of villages, he also collected information about the taxes paid for the use of *waqf* properties of Khoja Ahrar. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 22-23. Fond 18, opis' 1, no. 10476. The conclusion that *waqf* letter "A" was fraudulent was partially based on P. Gorskii's investigation.

53 In 1911, according to Pierce, only 6 percent of the population in the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was Russian, most of which was located in the urban areas, or 407,000 Russians out of the total population of 6,493,000 in 1911. Pierce, *ibid.*, p. 137.

Протоколъ

1876. Ноябрь 18 дня Поселенно-податный Комиссаръ Комиссарию Савиннухъ Назаровичъ на основании 13 ст. Правилъ о владении наемн. казенн. земл. в. Мухом. края объявилъ свое замечаніе о купавшихся какъ въ Мухом. уезде Мухом. уезд. ма Францу Суджанкувъ Морчинову и Франц. Кудина Бурыкувъ Кудинаву, которое составившея подаломъ ны мною Савиннухъ Назаровичъ. Заключилъ въ настоящемъ протоколѣ, что они предвѣтъ на Комиссаро составили въ какъ орамы то права которыми они всегда пользовались, такъ какъ въ отнѣшеніи поучаствоватъ въ какъ орамы то права дехандовъ мисдреевъ и наслѣдствъ Назарова ма Ахмедова мшаматъ ордентъ къ едному му-меево-каши.

Комиссаръ г. М. Назаровичъ

Handwritten text in Cyrillic script, likely a signature or official stamp, partially obscured by a large, dense block of handwritten text in Arabic script (likely Tajik or Uzbek). The Arabic text is written in a cursive style and occupies the lower half of the page, overlapping the signature area.

Figure 3: Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Fond 18, op. 1, no. 10476, fol. 68a.

these lands who will resell their rights to the use of this land to the Russians.”⁵⁴ It is not clear to what extent such transactions actually took place or whether the land itself may have been sold, but it is likely that, over time, not only was the authority of the *mutawallis* undermined, but the actual endowment itself may have been violated.

Despite these transformations, much of the Ahrārī patrimony survived through the nineteenth century, and most probably until its final liquidation under Soviet rule. Evidence of this is found in a copy of a map of the Tashkent *waqf* of the descendents of Khoja Ahrār that was compiled by tsarist officials in 1890.⁵⁵ The map, measuring 8 feet by 4 1/2 feet, is currently housed in the Central State Archives in Tashkent, and dramatically illustrates the extensive agricultural land in the region, which included a proliferation of canals that ran through the territory. According to a table

54 Fond 17, opis' 1, no. 18103, fol. 111, 112. Kutbaev, *ibid.*, p. 152.

55 Fond 277, opis' 1, no. 4020, Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Z. A. Kutbaev, “Tsennii dokument o vakufnikh vladeniya Khoji Akhrara,” *Akademiya Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan Institut Vostokovedniia. Sbornik statei: Molodikh uchenikh i sammurani instituta vostokovedniia*, Tashkent, 1970.

recorded on the map, the total land area of the properties of the *waqf* comprised more than 55,116 *tanābs* of land, and included large fruit orchards and vineyards. This alone is proof of the extraordinary role of the descendants of Khoja Aḥrār in the agricultural economy of the Tashkent region.

In conclusion, the abundance of information generated by tsarist administrative policy provides the historian with valuable insight into the relationship between the tsarist administration and the Aḥrārī communities of late nineteenth-century Central Asia, and attests to the persistence of the patrimony of Khoja Aḥrār through the agricultural economy, through the community network that was involved in this agricultural economy, and through the administrators of the *waqf*, many of whom are likely to have been Aḥrārīs themselves. The visibly high priority given to the investigation of these properties by the Turkestan Governor-General further reflects the survival, prominence, and influence of the Aḥrārī family in the nineteenth century.

The Russian protocol, and the Persian and Uzbek documents that are included in it, support three conclusions. First, that the *waqf* of Khoja Aḥrār was remarkably durable, and survived over five hundred years after its original foundation. The embrace of the garden of paradise on earth, so eloquently described in the words carved on Aḥrār's gravestone, persisted through his progeny despite the challenges posed by the vestiges of conquest and change, including the tsarist conquest. Second, the Naqshbandi community, due to its extensive endowment, as well as the prestige and status of its leadership, played a central role in the local economy and social organization of nineteenth-century Central Asia. And third, colonial rule in Central Asia introduced a previously unknown threat to the existence of the Naqshbandi communities: that of a non-Muslim state authority that recognized neither the sanctity of the community nor the spiritual authority of its leadership. The colonial policy of reclamation of land and resettlement threatened the endowment of Khoja Aḥrār as founded by him. The supervision of the *waqf* properties, particularly in the distribution of revenues, was further undermined as it was taken over by Russian administrators. The history of Sufism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Central Asia remains understudied, as does the utilization of the wealth of documentary sources contained in the state and local archival collections of Central Asia such as those examined here. It is hoped that the preliminary findings of this study illustrate the value of such documents not only for the local history of Sufism, but for the comparative history of *waqf* as well as Sufi-state relations.

A Note on “Rashahāt-ı ‘Ain al -Hayat” in the Nineteenth Century

BUTROS ABU MANNEH

Rashahāt-ı ‘Ain al-Hayat (Eng.: Trickle from the Fountain of Life), is a hagiography of Khoja Nāsir al-Dīn ‘Ubaid Allah ibn Mahmud al-Shashi, better known as Khoja ‘Ubaid Allah Ahrār, the great Naqshbandī sheikh of Transoxania in the fifteenth century (806/1404-895/1490). Khoja Nāsir al-Dīn was born in the village of Baghistan near Tashkent,¹ but he lived most of his life in Samarqand, the capital of the Timurid dynasty, thus becoming known also as ‘Ubaid Allah al-Samarqandi. The author of the hagiography was Fakhr al-Din ‘Ali ibn Husein al-Wā‘iz al-Kāshifī of Harat (Herat in north-west Afghanistan), known also by his nom de plume: al-Ṣafī.³ Kāshifī wrote the book in Persian, the literary language of the later Islamic centuries in the eastern Islamic lands, during the first years of the sixteenth century, the tenth hijra century.

‘Ubaid Allah Ahrār was initiated into the Naqshbandī order by Sheikh Ya‘qūb al-Charkhi in Chaganian and became his deputy (*khalifa*), in which capacity he was active for over sixty years. It was under ‘Ubaid Allah Ahrār’s guidance that the Naqshbandī order became the predominant order in central Asia.⁴ Kāshifī became a disciple of Ahrār in the last years of the Khoja’s life. Twice he travelled from Herat to Samarqand to attend his presence, first in 889/1484 and again in 893/1488, two years before the death of the sheikh. Throughout the book he calls him “shaikhuna,” our master,⁵ indicating discipleship, but it does not seem that Kāshifī was trained to be a *khalifa* of Ahrār since the time he spent in the company of Khoja was too short. He stated that he served him “four months the first time and eight months the second”⁶ but usually took several years for someone to be trained as a *khalifa* by Ahrār.

Much of the material Kāshifī includes about the Khoja was what he himself had heard directly (*bi-lā wāsiṭa*) from him. After every session (with Ahrār) (*b’ad-a inqīdā’-i kull-i ṣuḥba*), he tells us, he recorded what he heard from him,⁷ a matter which lends the book a high degree of authenticity. In addition, he recorded things he himself observed or heard from other disciples.⁸ Thus the book is largely based on Kāshifī’s personal experience. But he also used what two *khalifas* of the Khoja

1 H. Algar, “A Brief History of the Naqshbandī Order,” in M. Gaborieau et al. (eds.), *Naqshbandis*, Editions ISIS Istanbul-Paris, 1990, pp. 3-44; see p. 13 (hereafter Algar, “A Brief History”).

2 Abdulmajid al-Khani, *al Hada’iq al-Wardiyya fi Haqā’iq Ajilla’ al-Naqshbandiyya*, Cairo, 1308/ [1890-1891], p. 156.

3 On Ali ibn Husein ... al-Kashifi, see Tahsin Yazıcı, “Ṣafī,” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 10, p. 61 and bibliography (Hereafter *İA*). See also *EL*², vol. 8, pp. 800-801. Kashifi’s father Husein was a well-known poet and preacher in Harat, see *EL*², vol. 4, pp. 704-705

4 Algar, “A Brief History,” pp. 13f.

5 See M. Murad al-Qazani al-Manzilawi (trans.), *Rashahāt ‘Ain al-Hayat*, Mecca, 1890, p. 4.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 5

had written about their master, namely Mir Abd al-Awwal (who was also the Khoja's son-in-law) and Qadī Muḥammad al-Zāhid, his favourite disciple during the last twelve years of his life.⁹

Kāshifī divides his book into a *maqala* (discourse) which serves as an introduction to the book, followed by three *maqṣads* (chapters) and a *khātima* (end), to use his own terminology. He gives at the beginning of the *maqala* the Naqshbandī chain of succession, starting with Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first Caliph, whom the Naqshbandīs regard as the head of their chain, and then lists the Khojagān, the predecessors of the Naqshbandīs. Most of the introduction, however, is dedicated to Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband al-Bukharī, the founder of the order in the fourteenth century, and to successive *khalifas* up to Khoja Aḥrār.

Thus, roughly speaking, the first half of the book forms a history of the early phase of the Naqshbandī order. The following three chapters (*maqṣads*), nearly making up the other half, are all about 'Ubaid Allah Aḥrār. The first chapter tells us about his parentage, childhood, travels and companionship (*suḥba*) with Naqshbandī sheikhs i.e., his training and initiation into the order. The second records his sayings or traditions and the teachings he conveyed in his sessions (*majlis*). In the third *maqṣad*, which is by far the most important, Kāshifī describes the relations Aḥrār maintained with the Timurid rulers of Samarqand, the influence he had upon them, and the struggle he led to secure the supremacy of the sharī'a in the state instead of Timurid practices of government derived from Mongol norms. In this respect, Aḥrār became a model for many Naqshbandī sheikhs after him. This part concludes with a brief discussion about each of Aḥrār's *khalifas*. At the end there is a short description of Aḥrār's death.

The *Rashaḥāt* was completed in 909/1503-4, fourteen years after the death of Aḥrār. It soon acquired a place of prominence among Muslim hagiographical literature. Thus, it was not strange that it soon reached the Ottoman lands and about the mid-1580s was translated into Ottoman Turkish.

Indeed, throughout the sixteenth century, due to certain political developments, there seemed to have been a growing tendency towards Sunni-orthodox beliefs among the Ottoman elite. The first of these developments was the conflict with the Shi'a Safawids, which was to prove a bitter and longstanding one. Among other things, the Ottoman expansion into the Arab lands brought the Muslim Holy places in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem within the sultan's domains. "The Empire was no longer a frontier state but an Islamic Caliphate" wrote Inalcık,¹⁰ who observed, moreover, that the growing consciousness of the Ottoman leading classes of the new status of the state led to the strengthening of Orthodox Islamic feeling among them.¹¹ And we cannot fail to observe how during this century the Sunni-orthodox legal and cultural character of the state was emphasized. An aspect of this development was that the Sultan "entrusted the Şeyh ül-Islam Ebussuud with the task of bringing the secular laws of the state into conformity with the *şeriat*."¹² Another aspect was a growing movement of translating religious texts from Arabic and Persian into Ottoman-Turkish. The *Ihyā' Ulūm al-Din* of Ghazālī, and al-Qushairi's *Risala* are but two clear examples of this movement.¹³ The translation of the *Rashaḥāt* should be seen within

9 *Ibid.*, p. 5, *Masmu'at and Silsilat al-'Arifin wa Tadhkirat al-Siddiqin*, respectively. See *Encyclopedia Iranica*, vol. I, London, 1985.

10 H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1973, p. 34.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 34 and 182.

12 *Ibid.*

13 The translation of Qushairi's *Risala* was undertaken by Hoca Sa'deddin Efendi who was the tutor of Sultan Murad III and of his son Mehmed III and served as sheikh al-Islam (*Devhat-ül Meşayih*, pp. 36-38); and the translator of *Ihyā' Ulum al-Din* of Gazzali was Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi, to which he


the context of this trend.

The one to undertake the translation was Muhammad Ma'rūf ibn Muhammad Sherif-el-Abbasi of Trabzon, sometimes called Ma'rūf 'Ārifī¹⁴ or Muhammad Sherif al-Trabzonī, which he completed in Zilhicce 993/ [December, 1585] when he was serving as the *qaḍī* of İzmir (Smyrna). It does not seem that he had been commissioned by anybody or that he was rewarded for his efforts, and we assume he acted on his own initiative.

Whether or not Muhammad Ma'rūf was a follower of the Naqshbandī order, is not known. Bursali, in a short reference to him in his *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, says that "he was affiliated ... with the sufi path,"¹⁵ but nowhere is it explicitly stated that he was a Naqshbandi or who his sufi master was. But we may find

an indication in the introduction to the book of what motivated him to undertake the translation. Since his youth, he writes, he had always preferred the sheikhs of this order, *ṭaife*, i.e., the Naqshbandiyya, and he spent most of his time learning about them and their manners and character (*şemayıl ve etvār*). Moreover, he added, he became fond of the book and found it to be "like a physician for the soul" (*tabibi cān gibi*) and a therapy for the heart. Consequently, it was this that made him decide to translate it and thus spread its benefits.¹⁶

Muhammad Ma'rūf' worked on his translation during the days of Sultan Murad III (1574-1595), who was known for his pious disposition and his strong tendency towards sufism.¹⁷ During his reign, many mosques and *tekkes* were built or restored. First among these was the Kā'be in Mecca.¹⁸ Two sufi sheikhs were especially close to Sultan Murad. The first, Sheikh Şuja' (d. 996/1587-8), was a Khalwatī and the



Calligraphy in the form of a Naqshbandi headgear, *ku'ah*, saying: Hazret-i (the revered) Shah Sultan Muhammad Bahā' al-Din Naqshband (Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, vol. 6, p. 38, Istanbul 1994).

gave the title: *Yenābiu'l-Yakin fi Ihyā'ī 'ulumi'd-din*. Bostanzade Mehmed served twice as sheikh al-Islam during the reigns of Murad III and Mehmed III (*Devhat-ül Meşayih*, pp. 34-35). See M. İpşirli, "Bostanzade Mehmed Efendi," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 6, p. 311. See also M. T. Brussalt, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (hereafter *OM*), I, p. 256. For the translation of other books see H. Z. Ülken, *İslam Düşüncesi*, Istanbul, 1946, pp. 202-204; see also idem., *Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi*, vol. II, Istanbul, 1933, pp. 217ff; see also *OM*, I, pp. 347-348, 400 and II, 19, 24, 43, 49.

¹⁴ As in *Sicill-i Osmani* (hereafter *SO*), vol. 4, p. 502.

¹⁵ *OM*, vol. 2, p. 22.

¹⁶ See p. 5 and p. 6 of the Cairo edition of A. H. 1269/1853 and p. 6 and p. 7 of the Istanbul edition of A. H. 1291/1874.

¹⁷ See Nev'izade Atâi, *Zeyl-i Şekâik*, Istanbul, 1268/1853, p. 382; *IA*, "Murad III", vol. 8, pp. 624ff. Cf. also C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton, 1986, p. 75 and n. 15 and pp. 111-113.

¹⁸ *Nuhbat-ul Tevârih ve'l Ahbâr*, Istanbul, A. H. 1276/1859-60, pp. 132-3; *IA*, vol. 8, p. 625.

second, Sheikh Sha'ban (d. 1002/1593), a Naqshbandī.¹⁹ Murad III's attitude towards the Naqshbandī order was demonstrated moreover by his patronage of Sheikh Ahmad Ṣādik, the prominent Naqshbandī sheikh from Tashkent who had immigrated to Istanbul and settled there.²⁰ No doubt keenly aware of the attitude of Sultan Murad III towards the Naqshbandī order, Muhammad Ma'rūf not surprisingly praises the Sultan lavishly in his introduction and enumerates his praiseworthy qualities in terms that may be seen as a dedication.

Muhammed Ma'rūf's translation of the *Rashaḥāt* was, it seems, widely used - no major library in Istanbul was without a copy of it.²¹ The expansion of the Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī order in Istanbul since the last decades of the 17th century undoubtedly contributed to the rising popularity of the book. But it seems that it reached its widest circulation in the 19th century, with the advent of printing, when it saw many editions not only in Ottoman Turkish but in the original Persian as well as in Arabic in different lands of the Muslim world.

The first time the Ottoman Turkish translation of Muhammad Ma'rūf came out in print was in 1236/1821, in Istanbul. In the following decades it saw five more editions. Two of these were printed in Cairo, the first at the Bulāq press in Muharram 1256/March 1840, and the second at al-'Āmira press in 1269/1853. It is interesting to note that the first of these two prints was ordered by al-Hajj 'Uthman Nuri Efendi al-Istanbuli, and the second by Colonel (*Binbaşı*) Izmirli Emin Efendi. Both names suggest that they were Turks though they may have been residing in Cairo.

The publication of the text that appeared in Istanbul in 1279/1862-3 was printed in Ṭabī'hane 'Āmire. Another one came out twelve years later in 1291/1874, also in Istanbul, this time in lithograph. In the margins of this edition were printed thirteen sufi tracts, most of which are Naqshbandī-Khalidī literature, suggesting that this edition was printed by Khalidīs. The text of all these editions is identical. As far as it is known, no further editions were printed in Istanbul, not even during the reign of Sultan Abduhamid II, during which hundreds of sufi books and tracts were published, sometimes with the encouragement of the authorities.

A sixth Ottoman-Turkish print in the 19th century, again of the same translation, was printed in Qazān on the Volga basin in 1306/1888-9 "with the permission and license of the Russian [authority of] Education in ... Peterburg [sic] issued on 28 Dekaber [sic] 1888 of the Christian *hijra* [sic]." That it was printed there suggests the existence of a reading public and of a following of the Naqshbandī order in those regions even before the spreading of the Khalidiyya-Ziyā'iyya there by sheikh Zayn Allah.²²

Indeed, the fact that *Rashaḥāt 'Ain al-Hayat* saw six editions in Ottoman-Turkish during the 19th century may be seen as an indication of the popularity of the book among Turkish readers and the wide following the Naqshbandī order enjoyed among them. Though a latecomer to Istanbul, the Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī, the leading branch of the Naqshbandī order in the later centuries, acquired the largest number of lodges,

19 On sheikh Shujā', see *SO*, vol. 3, p. 137; and on sheikh Sha'ban 'Ata'i, p. 371; and *SO*, vol. 3, p. 148.

20 Mustafa Selaniki, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, Istanbul, A. H. 1281/1864-65, p. 211; D. Le Gall, *The Ottoman Naqshbandis in the Pre-Mujaddidī Phase*, Dissertation, Princeton University, 1992, pp. 73f.

21 C. A. Story, *Persian Literature. A Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, vol. 1, pt. 2, London, 1972, pp. 964ff. *İstanbul Kitaplıkları Tarih-Coğrafya Yazmaları Kataloğu*, pp. 496-504.

22 al-Qazāni, Muhammad ibn Abdullah, *Dhail al-Rashahat*, pp. 182-183 on sheikh M. Zakir al-Jistawī, a *Khalifa* in the Khalidiyya who was active in Qazān before the end of the nineteenth century. See also H. Algar "Sheikh Zaynullah Rasulev, the Last Great Naqshbandī sheikh of the Volga-Urals Region," in Jo Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia, Expressions of Identity and Change*, Durham and London, 1992, pp. 112-133.

tekkes, in the city in the 19th century.²³ It is doubtful whether any other Islamic religious text saw as many editions in less than seventy years.

However, the *Rashaḥāt* seems to have been equally popular in other parts of the Muslim world, for instance in Muslim India, among the readers of Persian or in Central Asia. It is known that within less than a decade, the book was twice printed in the original Persian, in Lucknow (India) in 1308/1890 and in 1315/1897 in lithograph.²⁴ According to C. A. Story, it was also printed in Cawnpore, in 1911/12, a printing which is "described as a seventh edition."²⁵ If he is right, this brings the Persian editions in India to nine. Moreover, another Persian edition appeared in 1911 in Tashkent.²⁶

In addition, the *Rashaḥāt* was also translated into Arabic and published in Mecca, in 1890. In fact, it had already been translated into Arabic once in the early seventeenth century, by Sheikh Taj al-Din Zakariyya al-'Abshami, an Indian Naqshbandi and a disciple of Sheikh Baqi Billah, who after the death of his master in Delhi (1603) immigrated to Mecca where he died in 1640.²⁷

The new Arabic translation, however, was undertaken about mid-1880s by Muhammad Murad b. Abdullah al-Qazāni al-Manzilawi, who came originally from the vicinity of Qazān and settled in Mecca; hence his nickname Qazāni.

Sheikh Murad seems to have been well versed in Arabic, Persian and, of course, in Turkish. In Mecca he was initiated into the Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī order. His other main contribution there was the translation from Persian into Arabic of the collection of letters of Sheikh Ahmad al-Sirhindi (*The Maktūbāt*) in three volumes²⁸ (printed in Mecca in 1317/1899-1900).

In his introduction to the translation of *Rashaḥāt*, Qazāni claims that neither was he familiar with nor had he seen an earlier Arabic translation. "I have not found anybody until this very day who has undertaken its translation [into Arabic]," he wrote in his introduction.²⁹ But a close examination of the two translations leaves us in doubt whether he was speaking the truth. At any rate, he seems to have been helped by the Ottoman-Turkish translation.³⁰ Qazāni appended his translation with a short review of the famous Naqshbandī sheikhs from Qāḍī Muhammad al-Zahid, the prominent disciple of Khoja Aḥrār, through Sirhindi and his chain down to Sheikh Muhammad Mazhar, and Mazhar's *khalifa* in Mecca, Muhammad Salih al-Zawāwi, who was Qazāni's master in the order and who funded the edition of his translation.³¹ This treatise, which he printed in the margin of his *Rashaḥāt* (pp. 2-189), he called *al-Nafā'is al-Sāniḥāt*, generally known as *Tadhyīl al-Rashaḥāt* or *Dhayīl al-Rashaḥāt*.³² In this manner the *Rashaḥāt* became available to the Arabic-speaking public in the

23 For the names and the number of Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī *tekkes* in Istanbul see Klaus Kreiser, "Medresen und Derwischkonvente in Istanbul: Quantitative Aspekte," in J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, et P. Dumont, (eds.), *Economie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1983, pp. 109-119. The findings of Prof. Kreiser are corroborated one generation later by the findings of Üsküdarı Ahmed Münib in his *Mecmu'a-i Tekāyā*, Istanbul, A. H. 1307/1889-90.

24 For the ed. of 1890 see Story, *ibid.*, the edition of 1897 is not mentioned by him but a copy is found in the library of the University of Tübingen in Germany.

25 C. A. Story, *ibid.*, p. 965.

26 *Ibid.*

27 On Taj al-Din Zakariyya, see Le Gal, pp. 210 ff. A manuscript copy of this translation is found in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, no.: de Slane 2044.

28 On Qazāni, see his short autobiography fixed as appendix to vol. 3 of his translation of Sirhindi's *Maktubat*, pp. 188-192.

29 See *Rashahat 'Ain al-Hayat*, Mecca, 1890, p. 3.

30 *Ibid.*

31 See Qazāni's autobiography (n. 28 above), p. 191.

32 See *Rashahat* (n. 29 above), p. 2 of the Table of Contents; Story, *ibid.*, p. 965; and Brocklemann, *GAL*, S. II, pp. 287-8.

Arab countries and in other Muslim lands where Arabic was more familiar than Turkish or Persian.

To conclude, *Rashaḥāt 'Ain al-Ḥayāt* was printed in many editions in the three main oriental languages during the nineteenth century. No doubt, the advent of printing had something to do with that. But the large number of editions is a clear evidence of a growing demand for the book, which in itself may point to the wide expansion of the Naqshbandī order throughout the Muslim lands, especially in Asia. It is also a sign that in the nineteenth century the Muslim world still enjoyed a strong cultural unity and that, despite European penetration into Muslim lands, it was Islamic themes that continued to sway the interest of the Muslim public.

The popularity of the book in the nineteenth century may also have been due to its major theme, i.e., the struggle of Sheikh 'Ubaid Allah Aḥrār for the supremacy of the *sharī'a* in the state as against the tendency of the Timurids in Samarqand for an arbitrary and tyrannical rule of governments.³³ The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of many such governments throughout the Muslim world. Above all, modernization and military reform provided rulers and states with much coercive power for which at the same time no checks and balances were instituted. Moreover, under pressure to introduce intensive modernizing measures, many Muslim rulers paid little attention to Islamic traditions or to the *sharī'a* and tended to neglect Muslim institutions. Such developments gave the book, whose hero worked in the defense of Islamic ideals, a special importance in the eyes of the Muslim public. It was a demonstration of their attachment to Islam and their unfailing trust in its heritage.

³³ Mansura Haider, "The Mongol Traditions and their Survival in Central Asia (XIV-XV Centuries)," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 28 (1984), 57-79.

The Policy of the Sublime-Porte towards Naqshbandīs and Other *Tarīqas* during the Tanzimat Period

İLBER ORTAYLI

The Naqshbandīs are faithful to the state, and they are the representatives of state policies in the area of *tarīqas*. Can this be considered a general rule? In Islamic history there are those among famous Naqshbandī sheikhs that don't occupy this position. However, in the nineteenth-century Ottoman period, Naqshbandīs came to represent the state within other *tarīqas* and were even appointed by the state to caretaker positions within mosques. It was even possible for a Naqshbandī *tarīqa* member to become a *mürīd*, disciple, of other *tarīqas*. As a matter of fact, in this century, Naqshī sheikhs went along with this permission and possibility; thus it was frequently possible to come across a Naqshī sheikh occupying a position among the Rūfaiyah or Mawlāwī dervish orders or a Bektashī dervish dressing like a Naqshbandī or Mawlāwī.

The Ottoman administration kept a vigilant watch on what is called village Alevism and some Bektashī groups. This is witnessed beginning with the sixteenth century. The fifteenth-century Sheikh Bedrettin movement (the last example of its kind) especially drove the state to be vigilant in this area. Moreover, in a decree sent by the imperial divan, *divan-ı hümayun* in the sixteenth century, it was ordered that "Simawnalu (intriguers) who were involved in affairs contrary to the holy law and who were determined to be thieves and robbers were to be sent to ships to be worked as oarsmen" (BOA, *Mühimme* [Imperial Records] 12, decree: 784, 18 Ramazan 978/13, February, 1571, p. 398). The decree continues: "those in your jurisdiction who are like the Simawnalu and are opposed to the sacred law ..." Despite 150 years having passed since the Simawnalu Sheikh Bedrettin revolt, the government still recoils from the remains of this religious movement.

Moreover, the dervishes of heterodox *tarīqas* were being violently pursued. For example, it was ordered that dervishes who planted grape vines around dervish lodges and made alcohol be sent to Istanbul. It was requested that dervishes of non-Sunni lodges be outlawed (BOA, *Mühimme* 3, decree: 172, 29 Muharrem, p. 73; *ibid*, 2 Rebiyülevvel 965/10 November 1561).

In 1826 the Janissaries were abolished with great tumult, bloody slaughter, betrayals and murders. These events that were described with great horror by Adolphus Slade Pasha (the British Naval Adviser) make it necessary to view with suspicion the title, "the just", *adlī*, given to Sultan Mahmud II.¹ The effect of these events were to be long-lasting. Moreover, the historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, compares the abolition of the Janissaries with the destruction of the Strelitsy by Peter the Great, a similar event in Russia, and says that "Even the dissolution of the Janissaries resembles the dissolution of the Strelitsy, with the exception that whereas the

¹ Adolphus Slade, *Records of Travels in Turkey and Greece*, vol. I, London, 1832, pp. 258-61.

Janissaries had been a cancer in the very heart of our state, the Strelitsy had been a tumor on Russia's back. Here, once the Janissaries were dispersed, continuous reforms in every administrative department became inevitable..."² Together with the Janissaries, another group that needed to be gotten rid of was the Bektashīs. This decision resulted in the denunciation, slander and punishment of many innocent people. Many Bektashī dervish lodges were confiscated. Even the *pirevi* in Hacıbektaş (Nevşehir) was confiscated and turned over to the Naqshbandī administration. The Naqshbandīs assumed an active role in this process. In this way, the state sometimes chose to prop up *tariqas* and their lodges, and sometimes to close them down. In fact, this method - the control of religious life by the state - prevented certain developments from occurring, with the reform that it would give birth to in 1925 being inevitable. For example, writers and annalists of official chronicles openly speaking ill of Bektashīs advocated the closing of their lodges. Another example is the historian (*Sahhaflar Şeyhizade*) Mehmed Esad Efendi, who in his work *Üss-i Zafer* (a book about the abolition of the Janissaries), describes the Bektashīs as members of a heretical and immoral *tariqa* which provoked the Janissaries.³

Mahmud II, in order to restore central authority, or perhaps more accurately, in order to re-structure it according to the needs of the nineteenth century, had to take certain measures and implement firm practices. From this perspective, in order to defame the Janissaries and the Bektashīs and to lessen public support and sympathy towards them, the new regime was seen to take advantage of new propaganda techniques. In one of the copies of the *Takvim-i Vekayi* (the name of the first Ottoman official newspaper) dated August 1833, it was reported as a purported case of witchcraft (or vampirism) - that upon opening the graves of two Janissaries (Abdi Alemdar and Ali Alemdar) it was seen that their hair and nails had gotten long. This was interpreted as evidence that they had come to life during the night and had become vampires.⁴ Undoubtedly, *Üss-i Zafer*, the work of Mehmed Esad Efendi (*Sahhaflar Şeyhizade*), the aforementioned historian, is a history written within this genre.

It was said that the reason for going after the Bektashīs was the spiritual influence of their *tariqa* and the religious education they provided for the Janissaries. This relationship - that of the Bektashī rites and Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī being the *pir* (master) of the Janissary Corps, and without following the conventional wisdom - the extent to which the Janissaries held the Bektashī perspective and followed its rites has still not been analyzed in a detailed and convincing way. It is true that in the late period, it was seen that some of the Bektashī dervishes and their elders had close daily relations with the Janissaries; however, this is insufficient to answer the basic questions concerning the extent to which the Janissary soldiers and officers were interested in or actually belonged to the *tariqa*. Most probably the state must have been hesitant because of the words of the Bektashīs and the possibility that they might provoke the Janissaries politically. Actually, the situation can be seen more as an attempt of some *ulamā* and other members of the *tariqa* to help bring into disfavor those *ulamā* that they didn't like. That the Bektashī provoked the Janissaries and caused mischief is one of the claims made, but among other things, it is seen that the same prejudice of the Naqshbandīs, which the new regime protected, was directed against the Bektashīs as well as the Melāmīs. Undoubtedly, the roots of this tension reach further back in history. In fact, the eighteenth-century writer, Vassaf Hüseyin, in his *Sefinetü'l Evliya*, tries to prove the heresy of the Bektashīs, through some incidences and in-

2 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. 12, Dersaadet (Istanbul), 1309 (1891-92), p. 180.

3 Mehmed Esad Efendi, *Üss-i Zafer*, Dersaadet, 1243 (1827-28), pp. 140-41.

4 *Takvim-i Vekayi*, no. 68, 19 *Rabi al-awwal* 1249 / 6 August 1833.

terpretations. There is a tendency for non-Bektashī criticism and *madrasah* members to see and show the Bektashī as a group of those who have veered from the path of Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī and who abuse his name and ideas.⁵

Thus in the orders and decrees of the government, while making no mention of foundations of the rites and compact of the Bektashī *tariqa*, a respectful language towards Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī was used; however, the Bektashī group was being slandered. Even in Cevdet Pasha's history, there are references to Mehmed Esad Efendi. According to Cevdet Pasha,

Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī, one of the famous sheikhs of the age of his excellency Orhan Ghazi, was a person by the name of Seyyid Mehmet Efendi, and was on the correct path: following him appeared a few irreligious heretics who passed themselves off as his followers and supporters; and in order to have the same master as the Ottoman military, infiltrated the Janissaries.⁶

Even Cevdet Pasha's stereotypical description of the Janissary-Bektashī relationship in the history that he wrote much after 1826 in order to slander the Janissaries and the Bektashīs is meaningful.⁷ Cevdet Pasha points out the sheikh al-Islam giving a speech in the name of the committee consisting of himself, and Naqshbandi, Khalwatī, Mawlawī and Celvetī sheikhs gathered at the Topkapı Palace that year as saying "Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī and other saints are acceptable and are our leaders, but we oppose the heretics, and those who like some Bektashīs distort our worship." Some of the decisions stemming from this include the giving of Bektashī lodges and tombs older than sixty years to Sunni *tariqas*; closing and destroying others and banishing their sheikhs and disciples (bastards having the name of disciple) to *ulamā*-centered (e.g., fanatical Muslim) districts such as Hadim, Birgi and Kayseriyye in order to bring about a correction of their religious conviction. As a matter of fact, during those days an imperial order (*ferman*) was sent to Kayseri; and in that order it was explained that

some heretics have polytheistic practices, and defame the four caliphs because of their membership in Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī's order, and that their numbers have been increasing, their lodges were being torn down, some killed, some exiled, and that their property had to be returned to them.⁸

On June/July 1827 an order was issued to the effect that

they pray five times a day in mosques and *meşjids*, along with their congregations.⁹

The Bektashī lodges in Yedikule, Sütluçe, Eyyüb, Merdivenköy and Rumelihisari were torn down and their members imprisoned (4 Zilhicce, which means three days after the meeting). From the point of view of belief, these lodge members were being examined before the sheikh al-Islam; preferring the deceitful methods of the shi'as, "*Usul-ı Şīa'yan*", to use the words of Cevdet Pasha, they appeared as if they had adopted Orthodox Islam - concealing their true beliefs and rituals. Being accused of Bektashīism, Melekpaşazāde Abdülkadir Bey, Shanizade Mahmud Atullah Efendi, physician and historian, İsmail Ferruh Efendi, financial administrator, were exiled. In this way, the members of what is informally called the

5 Vassaf, *Sefīnetü'l-Evliya*, vol. I, p. 210; İrfan Gündüz, *Osmanlılarda Devlet Tekke Münasebetleri*, Ankara, 1983, pp. 143, 147.

6 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *ibid.*, vol. 12.

7 Let me point out here that modern historiography has brought different critiques concerning the profile of Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī. For example, Ahmed Yaşar Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı* (The Revolt of the Babais), Istanbul, 1996, Part II, pp. 178-80; idem., *Kalenderiler* (wandering mendicant dervishes), Ankara, 1992, last chapter.

8 *Kayseri Şer'iyye Sicili*, no. 194, year 1242, pp. 66-68 (Ankara Milli Kütüphane, Ankara National Library).

9 Mehmed Esad Efendi, *ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

“Beşiktaş Society of Science,” *Beşiktaş Cemiyet-i İlmiyyesi*, were dispersed with jealousy.¹⁰

According to the decisions made at the meeting held by the *ulamā* and sheikhs, for a long time members of the Bektashī lodges coming from Naqshbandī, Qādirī and Saadiyye *tariqas* were appointed as some sort of trustee-caretaker, *kayyum*. Besides many being assassinated, many were exiled - being sent to cities in Anatolia dominated by a strict Sunni mentality. Along with the Janissaries, Bektashīs and those suspected as being so, those who had relations with the latter were also investigated and severely punished.¹¹

Naturally, a Mawlawi sheikh was assigned to the Janissary Corps in place of a sheikh who was a Bektashī elder. Naqshbandīs were appointed to the Hacı Bektaş dervish convent and Bektashī lodges in Istanbul. (Sheikh Mehmed Said Efendi, a Naqshī sheikh, was appointed to the Hacıbektaş Center). According to information provided by Mustafa Kara, the Naqshī sheikh, Ahmed Hikmet Efendi, was assigned to the Ramazan Baba dervish convent in Bursa. Some Bektashīs passing for Naqshbandīs remained in these lodges. However, the possibility in Islamic mysticism and *tariqas* to belong to two, perhaps even three *tariqas* made situations like these easier. On the other hand, the people of the Ottoman Palace were Mawlawī; Naqshbandīyya was not a popular *tariqa* at the palace. Members of the dynasty who belonged to this *tariqa* were numbered.

Bureaucrats of the *Tanzimat* period, in contrast to the Mahmud period, stopped such a cruel struggle with Bektashilik and Malamiyya. In time, rehabilitation of these lodges was obtained. However, in general a mechanism that restricted, supervised and controlled all *tariqas* was developed. The lodge stood up against the state; the state became the supervisor and protector of the lodge. Moreover, in 1863, through the establishment of the Assembly of Sheikhs, *Meclis-i Meşayih*, a mechanism designed to control the *tariqas* was created.

Sects such as the Vahhabi and Ismailiyye were not recognized or tolerated by the state; on the other hand, despite falling outside Islamic faith, beliefs of such sects as the Dürzī and Yezidī were shown tolerance by the administration and it is known that the state followed a path of dissolution and appeasement. In the same way, a similar attitude existed within the *tariqas*. In the Ottoman Empire, the Hurufi sect was not tolerated; in the fifteenth century, its members had been pursued, chastised and executed. (Even Mahmud Pasha had them burned the Christian style). The Ticanī *tariqa* was not seen to be opposed to Islamic dogma, but nonetheless was not officially recognized and protected.¹² The convents and lodges of *tariqas* that were not recognized or approved or whose members were forbidden to set up lodges, would be closed. For example, in 1851 a sheikh of an unrecognized *tariqa* in Anadoluhisar was accused of charlatanism and exiled. The neighborhood *muhtar* (local elected official), along with some local residents, presented an official petition to the *Meclis-i Vâlâ* court in which the faithful people of Anadoluhisar complained about the aforementioned Sheikh Mustafa and asked that he be investigated. It was decided, following an investigation by the sheikh al-Islam, to exile the person by the name of Mustafa, who in the

10 Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *ibid.*, vol. 12, p. 180; Mehmet Esat Efendi, *ibid.*, pp. 205-209; Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, “Arif Efendi,” vol. 2, p. 996.

11 Mehmed Esad Efendi, *ibid.*, pp. 205-210; *Kayseri Şer’iyye Sicili*, no: 194, year 1242 (1826-27), pp. 54, 66-68; Mustafa Kara, *Bursa’da Tarikatlar ve Tekkeler*, vol. 2, Bursa, 1993, pp. 62-63.

12 For beliefs such as *Ahmedî*, or *Baha*, see B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton, 1984, p. 20; John S. Guest, *The Yezidis*, London, 1987. For the *Yezidis* and the Ottoman administration, see *BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 11312, 3 March 1270 (15 March 1854). For the *Yezidis* who moved to the province of Muş, see *BOA, Meclis-i Mahsus*, no: 895, ca 1277. *The Yezidis* and conscription.

vicinily of Göksu had misled people by saying he was a sheikh, thereby being a heretic in the eyes of Islam.”¹³

Throughout the whole *Tanzimat* period, the *Meclis-i Vâlâ*, was the organ that decided to provide financial assistance as well as food and other necessities to dervish lodges. For example, Valide Sultan's donation to the Cerrahî dervish convent having passed through the *Meclis-i Vâlâ* indicates the policy of central control in this area.¹⁴ Another example is the way in which some people came to occupy leadership positions within lodges. For instance, in 1854, with the death of sheikh of the Üsküdar Bandırmalızâde lodge, Abdürrahim Selâmet Efendi, in order to ensure a reliable successor, his son, Fahreddin Bey, was retired early from public service with the Sublime Porte, with a full pension, so that he could take his father's place as sheikh of the lodge.¹⁵ That same year, in Rumelia, Albania, Ioannina and Crete, cooks and ney players in different lodges were given food assistance and put on salary.¹⁶ During those same years, 1217-1268/1852-1853, it is seen that many lodges in Istanbul and its environs were given this type of assistance. The intention of this financial assistance was to tie the lodges to a hierarchy, to obtain control and to render them powerless.¹⁷ It ought to be pointed out that this type of supervision and control was extended to the *madrasahs* as much as it was to the lodges. A decree based upon a decision of the *Meclis-i Vâlâ* dated 19 Receb 1276/February 12 1860, demands the exile and rounding up of vagabonds who try passing for students and dervishes of *madrasahs*, lodges and inns.¹⁸ From both our observations and those of Mustafa Kara, it is clear that, especially in Istanbul, most lodges had been drawn into a hierarchical system of supervision and control by the state through the tactics of sheikhs and financial support.¹⁹ As a result, the state came to direct every movement of the members of lodges and *tariqas* - so much so that some of them could perform traditional duties and play their political roles, including social leadership, only with government permission; otherwise, intervention would be made. For example, during the Crimean War, when Abdülkadir, a *Rufai* sheikh, unfurled a flag and started gathering volunteers, the Ministry of War issued a decree forbidding this action.²⁰

With the arrival of the *Tanzimat* period, what position did Bektashî come to occupy? Of the many claims that abound, the most prominent is the one that asserts Sultan Abdülmecid's sympathy towards the Bektashî. However, apart from this exaggeration, in contrast to Mahmud II period, the *Tanzimat* Decree demonstrates a tolerance and permissiveness towards every religion, religious doctrine, and especially the *tariqa*. Through a decree dated 1852, it is seen that the *postnişin* (office as head of *tariqa*) position of the Hacı Bektaş convent was restored and it was returned to the Bektashîs.²¹ The large numbers of Bektashîs and lodges in Rumelia, especially Albania, Ionnia and Crete, were already in a freer and more permissive environment. Among the Danube principalities and Crimean Muslims left outside Ottoman administration, it is a fact that this *tariqa* existed comfortably and innocently. According to

13 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 5733, 16 Muharrem 1267 / 21 November 1850.

14 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 11131, 18 Za 1287 / 14 September 1851.

15 BOA, *İrade, Dahiliyye*, no: 18623.

16 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 18201, 29 Şaban 1270 / 27 May 1854.

17 Mustafa Kara, "Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar," *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, pp. 983-86.

18 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 18789, 19 Receb 1276 / 11 February 1860.

19 Mustafa Kara, *ibid.*, pp. 983-86; İrfan Gündüz, *ibid.*, pp. 203-17.

20 BOA, *İrade, Dahiliyye*, no: 17634, 15 Muharrem 1270 / 18 October 1853.

21 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ* no: 15932, no: 15825.

Friedrick De Jong's research, in places like Egypt²² and Albania, the social and administrative integration of these *tariqas* was more cohesive and they experience more of an atmosphere of support. Still, later on there was a greater intimacy between the Young Turks and these types of *tariqas*. Even if the ties of sheikh al-Islam Musa Kāzım Efendi to freemasonry and Bektashiism have been exaggerated, they are still to some extent a reality. Irene Melikoff proposes a connection between the Young Turks and freemasonry and Bektashism. The historian T. Zafer Tunaya indicates that it was usual for an "İttihadcı" ("Unionist," member of the organization Union and Progress) to establish a connection between the *tariqa* and freemasonry is normal. Prof. Kreiser has pointed out the links between the Unionists and such *tariqas* as the Melāmī and Bektashī.²³

After Mahmud II, the Bektashīs adopted a new lifestyle and ritual and started down the path of a new type of secrecy. They infiltrated other *tariqas*, including even Naqshbandiyya. They assumed some new forms of behavior. For example, spitting on the coins carrying the imperial seal of Mahmud II or on his tomb while going down Divanyolu...²⁴ Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, they wrote countless treatises publicising their articles of faith, ceremonies and rituals. They published their hymns. They popularized Bektashī poetry and of course a Bektashī literature of humor, both oral and written, spread. Moreover, those with laic views continuously spread this literature; Bektashī jokes are still part of our daily lives - both oral and written.²⁵ This has brought about a sympathy in a variety of circles. Today, the Bektashī order, as is the case with the Malamiyya, does not exist as a regular on-going *tariqa*. Outside of Turkey, in Albania and the former Yugoslavia, it continues in a more organized hierarchy.

The closing of lodges, is much more than being a radicalism invented by the Republic; its origins are based on suspicion and an official control that goes all the way back to the *Tanzimat*. A modernizing administration could not put up with groups gathering and institutionalizing around the lodge.

Translated from Turkish by Sylvia Zeybekoğlu.

22 BOA, *İrade, Meclis-i Vâlâ*, no: 11750; no: 11749; no: 12810; no: 6039; no: 5983; no: 6086; no: 5980. F. De Jong, "The Sufi Orders in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Palestine," *Studia Islamica*, 58 (Paris 1983), 143-181; idem., "Materials Relative to the History of Darqamiyya Order and Its Branches," *Arabica*, 22 (1979), 126-143.

23 T. Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler III (İttihad ve Terakki)*, Istanbul, 1989, p. 321; Klaus Kreiser, "Dervischscheiche als Publizisten-Ein Blick in die Türkische religiöse Presse zwischen 1890 und 1925," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlaendischen Gesellschaft*, Supplement 6 (1985), 333-341.

24 J. K. Birge, *The Bektashī Order of Dervishes*, London [1937], 1965, p. 79.

25 Süleyman Hakkı, *Bektaşî Hikâyeleri*, Istanbul, 1338 (1919-20), p. 94; Derviş Ruhullah, *Bektaşî Nefesleri*; A. Rıfki, *Bektaşî Sırrı*, Istanbul, 1325-29 (1907-11), vols. I, IV.

Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of the Naqshbandī Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan¹

VERNON JAMES SCHUBEL

Since its independence from the former Soviet Union in 1992, there has been a tremendous resurgence of interest in Sufism among the people of Uzbekistan. One element of this renewed interest has been the appearance of numerous books, pamphlets, newspaper articles and television and radio broadcasts on the lives and teachings of the great *awliyā* of Central Asia. These “post-Soviet hagiographies,” presented almost entirely in the Uzbek language, rather than in Russian, are playing a crucial role in the process of the reconstruction of the Sufi tradition—especially the Naqshbandiyya—in Uzbekistan.

In pre-Soviet Central Asia, belief in the *awliyā-i Allah* as the spiritual successors to the Prophet was an essential element of Islamic piety. Central Asians, like Muslims elsewhere, believed that the *awliyā* were privy to secret knowledge and possessed miraculous powers. Several of the great transnational *tariqas*, including the Naqshbandiyya, Kubrawiyya and Yasawiyya, originated in the region.

The Naqshbandiyya *tariqa*, in particular, was a crucial religious and cultural institution, and living sheikhs of this tradition played important roles in their society. Tombs of the most famous Naqshbandī *awliyā* were important sites of pilgrimage not only for Central Asians, but for Muslims from throughout the Islamic world; similarly, numerous less well-known local shrines served as regional centers of pilgrimage *ziyarāt*.

Along with *ziyarāt*, oral and written narratives about the lives of the *awliyā* played a crucial role in Central Asian piety. Through stories of the *awliyā*, ordinary Muslims become aware of their moral and spiritual teachings, as well as the general worldview of Sufism. Through these narratives, belief in the *awliyā* became part of the culture at a basic level, providing individuals with what Victor Turner has called the “root paradigms” of Islam, instilling beliefs and attitudes in an existential rather than purely cognitive and didactic manner.² In Central Asia, this was true both at the level of “high culture”—through the Chagatay poetry of Navai’i and Mashrab and the highly sophisticated Persian *tazkirah* (hagiography) tradition—and at the “popular level” through countless oral narratives about the *awliyā*.

During the Soviet period, much of the continuity of Central Asian Islam with its past, including the Sufi tradition, was irreparably disrupted. Under the official state doctrine of “scientific atheism,” Islamic institutions were destroyed or deformed by the Soviet governments. Under Stalin, *‘ulamā* and *pirs* were killed and *madrasahs*

¹ The research for this paper was conducted in Uzbekistan from September 1995 through April 1996 under the auspices of an IREX Advanced Research Fellowship. I wish to thank IREX for the generous support.

² Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1974, p. 64.

were closed.³ Contrary to the theories of cold war sovietologists like Alexandre Benningsen, it seems that the once thriving Naqshbandiyya tariqa system was nearly completely rooted out. On a recent research sabbatical in Tashkent, I was told on more than one occasion that for all intents and purposes the classical institution of *pir-murid* (the relationship between Sufi master and disciple) has been utterly destroyed. Thus, perhaps the most authentic and significant element of the Sufi tradition, has been eradicated from Central Asia, and in the opinion of many Uzbeks, sympathetic to the Sufi tradition, there is little chance that it can be revived in a meaningful way.

The tradition of hagiography also suffered during the Soviet period. Not only was the Russian language given precedence over Uzbek to the extent that many educated Uzbeks know it better than their mother tongue, but under Stalin the scripts of the Central Asian languages, including Uzbek, were changed to the slavic Cyrillic, which among other things rendered most Uzbeks illiterate in relation to books written in the Arabic script.⁴ While the works of important medieval writers like Navai'i continued to be published in the new script during the Soviet period, they were greatly censored. Thus, literature which was steeped in the Islamic mystical tradition of Sufism had all references to God or the Prophet Muhammad or the four Caliphs expunged. Uzbeks lost touch with their past and, as is the case with colonized peoples everywhere, many people began to accept their colonizers' belief that their indigenous culture was parochial, backwards and inferior.

Even at the oral level there was a disruption in the hagiographical tradition. Many parents purposely avoided teaching their children too much about Islam for fear of the repercussions it would have on their futures, if they were identified as believers.

However, since independence there has been a resurgence of Sufi literature, including hagiographical materials. The period around independence saw the publication for the first time of unexpurgated versions of classical Chagatay literature in Cyrillic script. Similarly, there has been a veritable flood of modern Sufi literature published in Uzbek. Bookstores throughout the country are well-stocked with books on Sufis and Sufism. For a variety of reasons the government has been supportive of the literary reconstruction of the Sufi tradition as a fundamental aspect of the "*altin meros*" or "golden heritage" of the nation, and it has made the celebration of the lives of medieval Sufi *awliyā* a centerpiece of its nation-building agenda.⁵

The Re-creation of History in Uzbekistan

The reconstruction of the Sufi tradition is part of a larger reconstruction of medieval history. For a variety of reasons, the Uzbek government has especially encouraged the examination of the "*altin meros*" and the great medieval cultural florescence of Central Asia, while simultaneously discouraging scholarly inquiry into the Soviet period. While the Soviet period is often briefly described in the introduction to books dealing with the "*altin meros*" as a period of oppression in which culture and religion were destroyed, there is little systematic historical study of the Soviet period. Instead, the officially encouraged history focuses on the glories of the

3 Nazif Shahrani, "Central Asia and the Challenge of the Soviet Legacy," *Central Asia Survey*, 12/2 (1993), 123-135.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 131.

5 For a general overview of this process, see Thierry Zarcone, "Sufi Movements: Search for Identity and Islamic Resurgence," in K. Warikoo (ed.), *Central Asia: Emerging New Order*, Haranand, 1995, pp. 63-75.



The mosque belonging to the tomb complex of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband in Bukhara (E. Özdalga, 1999).

medieval past, particularly the Timurid period.⁶ This reconstruction of medieval history, of course, involves the reconstruction of the Sufi Islamic tradition and more particularly the Naqshbandiyya.⁷

The Sufi Islamic Past

Perhaps no other aspect of Uzbekistan's past was so maligned under the Soviet system as Islam. Islam and Islamic institutions—including Sufism—were constantly blamed for the “backwardness” of the Uzbeks, which, in turn, justified their colonization by the Russians and Soviets. With independence, Uzbeks were probably more interested in gaining access to information about Islam than any other facet of their past. Despite its apparent support for the return of Islam as a religion, the current regime is in many ways fearful of religious resurgence. Current government officials and academics were themselves schooled in the former system which made antipathy to religion a cornerstone of its policy. Many officials fear the rise of religious political movements—like those in Algeria or Iran—which would challenge their authority. Nonetheless, it seems that the government sees the rehabilitation of Sufism as a way to feed its people's yearning for a connection with Islam in a way that does not threaten the state.

⁶ For a detailed discussion of the new emphasis on Amir Timur and the Timurids, see Stephen Hegarty, “The Rehabilitation of Temur: Reconstructing National History in Contemporary Uzbekistan,” *Central Asia Monitor*, 1 (1995), 28-33.

⁷ The Naqshbandiyya is so intimately a part of the “*altin meros*” that it is impossible to present the history of Timurid Turkestan without reference to it. Of course the government also emphasizes the more obviously Turkic tradition of the Yasawiyya *tariqa*. But the Naqshbandi tradition is honored as a truly Turkic *tariqa*, even though Bahauddin wrote in Persian. Many writers, including Arif Usman spend a great deal of time defending the Naqshbandiyya as a Turkic Sufi order—pointing out that Navai'i was a Naqshbandi *murid* and he certainly was a crucial creator of Uzbek Turkic identity. Because the Naqshbandi are an important phenomenon on the world stage there is a great deal of national pride involved in maintaining its legacy. The Yasawi tradition on the other hand largely died out even in Turkestan. It is more localized, politically more relevant to Pan-Turkism than to global Islam.

The absence of actual Sufi orders allows the state to sponsor Sufism as a complex of ideas and practices divorced from institutions that might challenge its authority. Although the Sufi *tariqas* as institutions were largely destroyed under Stalin, a variety of manifestations of Sufism, including the patronage of mystical healers and pilgrimage to shrines, have become once more popular with the people and form a basis for a kind of Islamic practice which shows a continuity with pre-Communist Islamic piety.

The practice of *ziyarat* (pilgrimage or visit to the tomb of a saint) is a particularly visible continuity with the past. Although *ziyarat* was discouraged in the Soviet period and many tombs fell into disrepair, it never completely ceased. Some of the more important shrines were, in fact, well maintained as museums. Currently, pilgrimage to the tombs of important *awliyā* has re-emerged as a popular manifestation of Islamic piety. The tomb of Bahā'al-Din Naqshband near Bukhara is once more thriving as a place of *ziyarat* not only for Uzbeks and other Central Asians but also for Muslims from around the world. The tombs of other Khojagān *awliyā*, such as Mir Kulāl and Abdulkhalīq Ghijduwanī, have also re-emerged as centers of *ziyarat*. In fact, the tomb of Bahā'al-Din Naqshband's *pir* Mir Kulāl, which had fallen into ruin under the Soviets, has recently been completely rebuilt with the help of Pakistani *murids*.⁸

Similarly, classical Sufi poetry survives in a variety of forms, for example, in the lyrics of popular songs. The republication of the mystical poetry of Mashrab, Navai'i and Yasawī in a complete and uncensored form not only provides new access to the Islamic heritage of the pre-Soviet past but also provides evidence that despite the political continuities with the Soviet past, society has, from the standpoint of religious freedom, indeed transformed for the better since the end of the Soviet Union.

Post-Soviet Hagiography

The post-Independence period has seen the rise of a form of literary and scholarly writing which is sometimes referred to as "post-Soviet hagiography," a kind of writing which now fills the bookstores and scholarly journals.⁹ Not surprisingly much of these materials concerns the Naqshbandī tradition and its role in the history and culture of Uzbekistan and Central Asia. The year 1993 was officially recognized as the 675th birth anniversary of Bahā'al-Din Naqshband (and the 900th anniversary of Ahmad Yasawi); and that year saw a remarkable flurry of writings about Naqshbandī tradition.

There are three major types of Naqshbandī literature being published in contemporary Uzbekistan. The first is the publication of medieval Chagatay literature transliterated into Cyrillic. This category includes the republication of Alisher Navai'i's poetry, including his clearly mystical Sufi works such as *Lisan at-Tair*, his retelling of Attar's *Mantiq ut-Tair* (The Conference of the Birds) in Chagatay Turki, and a variety of other Chagatay works connected to the Naqshbandī tradition. Often

8 This resurgence of *ziyarat* is not limited to Naqshbandī sites. Just across the border from Uzbekistan in the city of Turkestan in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the tomb of Ahmad Yasawi—currently under a major reconstruction effort by the Turkish government—is a center of pilgrimage for the entire region. Even in Tashkent, sometimes referred to as "the capital of atheism," the tomb of the Yasawi saint, Zangi Ota, is under renovation and has become a thriving center of *ziyarat*. Lesser known sites such as the tomb of sheikh Antaur located in downtown Tashkent have also been revived as local centers of *ziyarat*. *Ziyarat* activities, including the ritual slaughter of animals and the communal distribution of food, which had been discouraged during the Soviet period, now have the tacit approval of the government.

9 I was first made aware of this term by Iliyar Karimov a scholar at the Oriental Institute, who has also studied at Indiana University.



At the graveyard of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1389) in Kasr-i 'Arifan in the vicinity of Bukhara (E. Özdalga, 1999)

these works include introductions which not only describe the circumstances of the author's life but juxtapose the suppression of Islam in the Soviet period, when such works could not be published, with the situation since independence.

A second category includes translations of works from Persian and Arabic. A variety of classical biographies of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband are available including a translation of Abul Muhsin Muhammad Bakir ibn Muhammad Ali's *Maqamat-i Khoja Bahauddin Naqshband*¹⁰ as *Bahauddin Balogardan*. Surprisingly, Ali Safi's *Rashahāt-i 'Ain al-Hayat*—probably the most important and frequently cited hagiographical source for the Naqshbandiyya in Central Asia—has not been republished in a complete translation, although portions of it have appeared in a variety of journals, including *Muloqot*, the official journal of the ruling party.¹¹

Another category of this literature consists of contemporary hagiographies of medieval *awliyā* based on primary sources. These include books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles written both by journalists and academics. One such work is Sadriddin Salim Bukhari's *Dilda Yar*, a popular work on Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband.¹² Professor Bukhari is a professor of literature at the University in Bukhara and was perhaps most famous in the Soviet period for translating Goethe into Uzbek. He has also translated medieval hagiographical literature from Persian into Uzbek.

Dilda Yar is a curious and diverse work. Published in 1993, its contents include: a brief biography of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband,¹³ a chapter devoted to the nature of *tariqa*,¹⁴ a discussion of Naqshbandi doctrine as presented in the *Rashahāt*,¹⁵ a description of the rules and *adab* of the Naqshbandiyya *tariqa* as presented in a speech by a visiting Khalidi sheikh from Turkey in 1991,¹⁶ and selections of relevant

10 Abu Muhsin Muhammad Bakr b. Muhammad Ali, *Bahauddin Balogardan*, Muhammadkhan Makhdum Hasankhan Makhdumoghli (trans.), Yazuvchi, Tashkent, 1993.

11 See for example *Muloqot*, 7-8, 1995. pp. 57-61.

12 Sadriddin Salim Bukhari, *Dilda Yar: Hazrat Bahauddin Naqshband*, Ghafur Ghulam Nomidagi Adabiyat va San'at, Tashkent, 1993.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-20.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 20-33.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 64-70.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 71-75.

poetry by Mashrab, Alisher Navai'i, Sufi Allahyar, and Babur.¹⁷ This book, which was readily available in bookstores throughout the country, was one of the sources that people would frequently recommend when I told them I was interested in Sufism.

The book is clearly intended as an introduction to the Naqshbandiyya tradition. The author carefully explains concepts such as *ilm la-dunni* (knowledge directly from God) and phenomena like the Uwaysiyyah *tarikah* to an audience that is largely ignorant of the basic elements of the Sufi worldview.¹⁸ He also presents a variety of sources stressing the importance of the fact that Bahā' al-Din Naqshband received training not only from living sheikhs but also from the *ghayb*—particularly from Abdulkhaliq Ghijduvani. Like most writers on the Naqshbandiyya, he emphasizes Bahā' al-Din Naqshband's teaching of silent *zikr*.¹⁹ A significant element of this book is the way in which it stresses the ancestry of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband on his father's side back from Ja'far As-Sadiq through Husayn b. Ali to Ali b. Abu Talib, drawing on a work entitled *Tuhfatul Ansab*. While he also mentions that Bahā' al-Din is a descendant of Abu Bakr Siddiq on his mother's side, he seems to emphasize the 'Alid *silsila* over the Bakrī one.²⁰

Dilda Yar contains a variety of stories about Bahā' al-Din Naqshband that emphasize his solidarity with the poor and the downtrodden. In one such story he refuses the food of a king explaining that kingship is not legitimate labor and thus the food offered by a king is not *halal*.²¹ This not only emphasizes Bahā' al-Din's preference for ordinary working people over rulers, but also gives evidence of the importance the Naqshbandī sheikhs gave to the necessity of honest labor—an important theme in all of this literature. Another anecdote notes that the saint's hands always smelled of earth because in the dark of night when no one was looking he would crawl along the roads and clear away thorns and stones so that blind or infirm persons would not step on them. He did this at night so that no one would see him performing his good deed.²² Throughout, Bahā' al-Din is presented as a perfect exponent of devotion and humility. In one story he is even shown kissing the footprints of a dog and crying, saying that Sufis should learn purity of love for God from dogs, who are symbols of obedience and humility.²³

In an obvious rejection of "scientific atheism" the author of *Dilda Yar* accepts the authenticity of miracles and presents several examples of them. In one such story Bahā' al-Din, while still under the tutelage of his *pir*, Mir Kulāl, burned his winter cloak by throwing it into the flames of an oven. Upon learning of this his *pir* responded by telling him that he still had need of it and he should retrieve it. Bahā' al-Din noted that this was impossible, as the cloak had surely already burned away. But Mir Kulāl responded that the cloak had been upon his shoulders all these years while he was burning in the fire of love and it had not been harmed. Thus, if it had not been harmed by spiritual fire, how could it be harmed by earthly flames? Bahā' al-Din then miraculously removed the cloak undamaged from the fire.²⁴

This story resonates with a number of stories told in Central Asian hagiographical literature about *awliyā* who are able to enter into fire and not be burned.²⁵ It also

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 53-64.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-19.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

25 For a fascinating discussion of this metaphor in Yasawiyan hagiography see Devon DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tukles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition*, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, 1994, pp. 243-289.

provides a striking example of the necessity of obedience in the *pir-murid* relationship and the ability of *pirs* to perform *karāmat* or miracles—all constant themes within the larger Naqshbandī tradition and the Sufi tradition in general.

Like other authors, Sadriddin Salim Bukhari stresses the important role played by Bahā' al-Din Naqshband and the Naqshbandiyya tradition on Uzbek literature and history—in particular his influence on Navai'i.²⁶ To this end he presents examples of poetry by important figures dealing with Bahā' al-Din Naqshband. Thus, *Dilda Yar* not only functions to reconstruct the Sufi tradition, it also helps in the construction of a national Uzbek identity.

Another major writer of Naqshbandī hagiographical literature is Arif Usman, formerly Arif Utmanov, a professor of history at the Al-Biruni Oriental Institute in Tashkent. Among his works is a short booklet on the life and teachings of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband, *Bahauddin Naqshband va Uning Ta'limati Haqida*²⁷ (On Bahā' al-Din Naqshband and his Teaching) and a similar booklet on the Yasawiyyan *pir*, Zangi Ota.²⁸ He has also published numerous newspaper and journal articles and appears regularly on television and radio discussing the lives of the *awliya*. One of the key themes of Arif Usman's works is the reconciliation of the apparent historical contradictions between the various *tariqas* of Central Asia. He stresses the common source of the Naqshbandiyya and Yasawiyya *tariqas* in the person of Yusuf Hamdani, whose tomb lies not far from the Uzbek border near the city of Merv in neighboring Turkmenistan. As he frequently argues, Yusuf Hamdani's *khalifas* included Ahmed Yasawi, the founder of the Yassawiyya *tariqa*—and a spiritual ancestor of the Bektashis—and Khoja Abdulkhalīq Ghijduvani, who is part of the *sil-sila* of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband.²⁹ Not only has he made this argument in print on more than one occasion, but I have seen him on television presenting pictures of his trip to the tomb of Yusuf Hamdani, explaining this connection to the Uzbek-speaking television audience. This argument not only reconciles apparently contradictory elements in Central Asian religious history but also presents to Uzbeks—who have long been taught that their culture was inferior to that of the Russians—a vision of their culture as one that played a central role in Islamic and, thus, world history.

Despite his training in the Soviet academy, Prof. Usman has made a clear break with some of the most important themes of Soviet-era scholarship by thoroughly and explicitly rejecting the doctrine of “scientific atheism.” For example, Prof. Usman's writings like those of Sadriddin Salim Bukhari, accept the authenticity of the miracles of the Central Asian *awliyā*, ignoring the Soviet rejection of miracles as superstition.

Like *Dilda Yar*, Arif Usman's *Bahauddin Naqshband va Uning Ta'limati Haqida* is designed as an introductory text on Sufism for persons with little or no previous knowledge. He presents a brief biography of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband,³⁰ a brief description of the eleven rules of the Naqshbandiyya,³¹ a lengthy discussion of the political and social activism of the Naqshbandīs with a detailed discussion of the slogan *Dil ba Yar, Dast ba Kar*,³² (“the heart with the Friend, the hand at work”) a discussion of the role of Naqshbandī sheikhs in rebellions against the Russians and other colonial powers,³³ and the importance of “humanism” in the thought of Sufis (including a

26 Bukhari, *ibid.*, pp. 53-63.

27 Arif Usman, *Bahauddin Naqshband va Uning Ta'limati Haqida*, Universitet, Tashkent, 1993.

28 Turghun Faiziev and Arif Usmanov, *Zangi Ota*, Uzbekistan Respublikasi Khalq Ta'limi Vazirligi T. H. Qari-Niyazi Uzbekistan Pedagogika Fanlar Ilmi-Tadqiqat Instituti, Tashkent, 1993.

29 Usman, *ibid.*, pp. 9-10, 25-27.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 9-14.

31 *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 17-21.

33 *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

fascinating discussion of *wahdat ul-wujud*).³⁴ He devotes a significant portion of the book to showing the connections between the Yassawiyya and the Naqshbandiyya and the importance of the Naqshbandī *tariqa* as an order that united Turki and Tajik speakers—an significant point to make in a country where ethnic and linguistic conflict is a real possibility.³⁵ Thus, he covers a lot of ground in 32 brief pages. He closes his book with a call to the people to remember in a proper manner the life and works of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband in the upcoming anniversary year of his birth (1993) and with a quotation from President Karimov about the need of the people to honor the great persons of their past including Ahmad Yasawi and Bahā' al-Din Naqshband.³⁶

Other important sources of hagiography are newspaper and journal articles. In 1994, a paperback was published collecting representative newspaper and journal accounts of Sufism which had been published since independence. Entitled *Ghaiblar Khailidan Yangan Chiragh* (The Lamp that Burns from the Hidden Ones), it was readily available in an inexpensive edition throughout the country.³⁷ It collected a wide variety of materials, including scholarly articles and journalistic accounts of the Sufi tradition. Arif Usman provided materials for this work,³⁸ as did Najmuddin Kamilov—a talented scholar who has himself written a remarkable hagiography of Najmuddin Kubra³⁹—who wrote an excellent chapter on the basic ideas of *tasawwuf*, Islamic mysticism, and a historical outline of the Sufi tradition.⁴⁰ An important theme present in many of the articles was the people's tragic lack of knowledge about religion as a result of the Soviet experience and the need to correct the slanders against Islam that were a central part of the previous system.

This is an important objective of post-Soviet writing on Sufism—to counter the ideas about the *awliyā* that were taught as part of the Soviet educational system. It should be remembered that there was very little actually taught, even in the Uzbek language-medium schools, about the *awliyā*. What was taught was generally negative—although certain aspects of Naqshbandī teaching were seen as superior to other forms of Sufism. The slogan *Dil ba Yar, Dast ba Kar* (see above) was a notion which could be reconciled with a kind of proto-socialism as the Naqshbandīs demanded that their *murids* work for a living rather than beg or receive public remuneration for religious practices. This was a Sufism that valued the labor of the working class.⁴¹ Similarly, Arif Usman sees the early Naqshbandīs as practicing *hurfiylik* (free thought) and *gumanizm* (humanism).⁴²

Still, in the Soviet period the Naqshbandiyya—and Sufism in general—were presented as tools of the state used to control the lives of working people. For example, the fifteenth-century Naqshbandī saint, Khoja Ahrār, was commonly portrayed as: (1) a large feudal land owner who used his religious status to oppress the peasantry, (2) a rival and enemy of the poet Navai'i, and (3) a signatory to the unjust death warrant against Ulugh Beg.⁴³ Despite his important role in Central Asian history there was little discussion of his life in school beyond this. Thus, one of the first tasks

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

35 *Ibid.*, pp. 26-31.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

37 Shamuiddin Mansurov (ed.), *Ghaiblar Khailidan Yangan Chiragh*, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1994.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. 134-147.

39 Najmiddin Kamilov, *Najmiddin Kubra*, Abdullah Qadiri Nomidagi Khalq Merosi, Tashkent, 1995.

40 Mansurov, *ibid.*, pp. 13-58.

41 M. A. Usmanov (ed.), *Islam: Spravochnik*, Uzbek Sovet Encyclopedias Bosh Redaksia, Tashkent, 1989, p. 67.

42 Usman, *ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

43 Arif Usman, "Hitoyo Hindgacha Mashur Edi," *Tashkent Okshomi*, November 23, 1994, p. 3. See also, Usmanov, *ibid.*, p. 275.

of this new hagiographical tradition is to make available new versions of the history, which tend to reconstruct the lives of the *awliyā* in a more favorable light.

An article written on the life of Khoja Aḥrār by Arif Usman in the journal *Tashkent Okshomi*, published on November 23, 1994 entitled, "Hitoyo Hindgacha Mashhur Edi" (He was Famous as Far Away as China and India) provides a good example of this. In the beginning of his article Professor Usman argues that Sufism is a part of the culture and values of the region which has influenced the whole world—a fact which is affirmed by the number of European and American orientologists interested in the tradition. He quotes the famed academic, Professor Wahid Zahidov, who told him in the 1970s that the people were looking forward to the time when they would have access to the "golden manuscripts" that have been stored in the institutes "as the mother's milk of the culture." Now that "blessed day" has come, he argues, and it is the task of scholars to bring out the true nature of that culture. In the rest of his article Arif Usman takes on the Soviet version of Khoja Aḥrār as a feudal landlord—a charge which he dismisses as slanderous and baseless. Usman stresses several themes. One is Khoja Aḥrār's unbroken *silsila* to the Prophet, which is the source of the saint's authority. He also notes Khoja Aḥrār's familial connections on his mother's and father's sides with great *awliya*. Professor Uthman also addresses the issue of miracles by narrating how during a childhood illness Khoja Aḥrār slept in the tomb of his ancestor Hazrati Kaffal al-Shashi in Tashkent. That night he was visited both by the aforementioned *wali* and Hazrat Isa in a dream. Not only was he healed of his illness, but Khoja Aḥrār was also given the power to start the "dead hearts of corpses"—interpreted metaphorically by Prof. Usman as the ability to turn worldly selfish people into *murids* merely by casting his glance upon them.⁴⁴ This is a common theme in Central Asian hagiography. Najmuddin Kamilov presents a similar story in his remarkable book on the life of Najmiddin Kubra where a merchant is turned into a *murid* by a mere glance during a *sohbat* (conversation).⁴⁵

Prof. Usman also counters the story of animosity between Khoja Aḥrār and Navai'i by quoting the poet on the greatness of the saint, whose *murids* and *firman*s (edicts) stretched throughout the Muslim world and were famous as faraway as China and India. The article ends with a call to scholars to serve the country by recovering for the youth the real history of the *awliyā*.⁴⁶ This is certainly the case in Uzbekistan. People trained as orientologists in the last regime are now functioning as the cultural transmitters of a forgotten past. To this end, numerous newspaper articles of this kind have been written by scholars from the academic institutes pointing out what they see as the calumny of Soviet writing about the *awliyā* and presenting their own responses to it.

The Reconstruction of the Naqshbandī Tradition in Uzbekistan

There are a variety of writings on the Naqshbandī tradition available in modern Uzbek. Everything from the translation of classical materials to tri-lingual abridgements of the writings of Idries Shah in English, Russian and Uzbek.⁴⁷ Some empha-

44 Usman, "Hitoyo Hindgacha," p. 3.

45 Kamilov, *ibid.*, p. 25.

46 Usman, "Hitoyo Hindgacha," p. 3.

47 Idries Shah, *Order of Nakshbandi*, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1993.

size the *sharī'a*-mindedness of the Naqshbandī path and some the *hurfikrlik* and humanism of the *awliyā*. Most emphasize the importance of obedience to one's *pir*, the existence of the *ghayb* and the efficacy of belief in the *awliyā* for obtaining spiritual and material ends—all common themes within the Sufi tradition throughout the Islamic world.

At first glance, there is little different in these post-Soviet writings from what one might encounter, for example, in modern South Asian hagiographies. But the intellectual and religious context of post-Soviet Uzbekistan means that readers are using these materials in a very different way from their co-religionists in South Asia. While British colonialism in South Asia attempted to control religion within limits, it never attempted to destroy it at its roots. South Asian hagiographies are written for an audience that has maintained connections with its religious past. It is unlikely that a person reading a spiritual biography in Urdu in Karachi or Delhi would have no familiarity with the basic concepts of the Sufi tradition. On the other hand, the Soviet system attempted to destroy religion as part of its official position of "scientific atheism." In many ways it was extremely successful.⁴⁸ Many people in Uzbekistan have only a cursory idea about the nature of the Sufi tradition. The work of a writer like Arif Usman is based on classical sources. Thus, it emphasizes major themes common throughout the tradition—the authority of the *awliyā*, the necessity of obedience to one's *pir*, the ability of *awliyā* to work miracles, the danger involved in showing disrespect to the *awliyā*, the need to seek humility and not judge people by outward station or state. But Professor Usman is not reminding his audience of something they have known since childhood; he is teaching persons who have been raised with an ignorance of and antipathy to the basic ideas of the Sufi tradition.

The themes in these works have in many ways been forgotten by the current generation, which has been cut off from the Sufi tradition for decades. Clearly Arif Usman is trying to re-educate a new generation. And as the government has no objection to this emerging literary Sufism, he and others like him are more than free to publish such works. There is very little here that challenges the state's nation-building agenda. In fact, these works aid in that agenda.

Despite its resonance with the larger Sufi tradition, the literary reconstruction of the Naqshbandī tradition in Uzbekistan does, however, distinguish itself from Naqshbandī Sufism in other places in several significant ways. The first and most obvious is the lack of a thriving *pir-murid* tradition. Thus, perhaps the most important theme in Sufi hagiography is the one that is hardest to articulate in the current Uzbek environment.

The *awliyā* are both objects of devotion and paradigms of devotional allegiance—achieving *fana fi-sheikh* (spiritual annihilation in one's sheikh) through their devotion to their *pirs*, a devotion which the rest of us should imitate. This is a major theme in the hagiography being published in contemporary Uzbekistan. Devotion to one's *pir* is a major virtue, the highest evidence of one's sainthood. Contemporary hagiographical writings emphasize this virtue, and yet in Uzbekistan, this is in many ways an impossible virtue to articulate, as living *pirs* are few and far between.

One of the most interesting characteristics of writing about the Naqshbandī tradition in Uzbekistan is the lack of attention given to Ahmad Sirhindi and the Mujaddidī tradition and its offshoots. Given the fact that the Mujaddidī tradition has become so dominant within the Naqshbandī *tariqa* that it is treated by some scholars

48 I am grateful to Prof. Nazif Shahrani of Indiana University for his insight into this fundamental difference between Soviet and British colonialism.

as synonymous with the larger Naqshbandī tradition,⁴⁹ it is unusual that among all of the books and pamphlets written in modern Uzbek about the Naqshbandī tradition there is almost nothing written about Ahmad Sirhindi and the Mujaddidīs. The emphasis is clearly on the Khojagān tradition and, to a lesser extent, the later *silsila* running through Khoja Aḥrār to Makhdum-i A'zam. Arif Uthman mentions Ahmad Sirhindi briefly in *Bahauddin Naqshband va Uning Ta'limati Haqida*, but gives no details about him except that he played a major role in spreading Naqshbandi teaching in India.⁵⁰ In *Dilda Yar* Sadriddin Salim Bukhari presents the discussion of proper *adab* (rules of good manners) by a Turkish Khalidī *pir*, but does not discuss the specific beliefs or practices of the Khalidīs as a branch of the Mujaddidīs.⁵¹ The discussion of miracle stories in hagiography in general is focused on the Khojagān tradition and draws heavily on the *Rashahāt* for its material. The Mujaddidīs are conspicuous by their absence. When I asked an imam in Bukhara about Ahmad Sirhindi, he responded that the Mujaddidī was not a popular figure in the region and instead argued that people in Bukhara tended to follow the teachings of Makhdum-i A'zām.

There are several possible reasons for the absence of the Mujaddidī in published works about the Naqshbandiyya. One is largely nationalistic. The Khojagān *awliya* spent most of their lives in Central Asia and their tombs are all located in or near Uzbekistan. As the literary reconstruction of the Naqshbandiyya tradition is linked to an agenda of nation-building, it is not surprising that the hagiographical tradition focuses on those *awliyā* who can be presented as national heroes in ways that the South Asian Ahmad Sirhindi cannot. Secondly, there is the possibility that the government fears the kind of political resurgence sometimes associated with the Mujaddidīs.

A crucial idea associated with Ahmad Sirhindi is the attack on *wahdat ul-wujud* (the unity of being)—a concept dominant in much of Shi'a and Sunni esotericism. *Wahdat ul-wujud* is an important theme in much of the poetry of Mashrab, who saw no contradiction between venerating Bahā' al-Din Naqshband in his poetry and holding to a radical notion of mystical *tawhid* (unity).⁵² I have not found this attack on *wahdat ul-wujud* to be a common feature of contemporary Uzbek writing about the Naqshbandiyya. In fact, Arif Usman presents a remarkable story concerning *wahdat ul-wujud* in *Bahauddin Naqshband va Uning Ta'limati Haqida*.

One day a court official came upon a dervish sitting in the middle of the road. The dervish refused to get up or even acknowledge the presence of the courtier. The courtier asked him, "Who are you and why haven't you stood up upon seeing me?" The dervish asked the courtier who he was and he replied proudly that he was a person of high stature. The dervish asked him if there was anyone higher than he and the courtier replied that certainly the king was higher. The dervish then asked if there was anyone higher than the king and the courtier replied that of course God was higher than the king. The dervish then asked if anyone was higher than God and the courtier replied that no one was higher than God. At this point the dervish replied, "That 'No one' that you say—that's me! Leave and don't remain on this road!" Arif Usman uses this story to demonstrate the meaning of *wahdat ul-wujud*, which he sees as a source of the humanism in the Sufi tradition.⁵³

49 See for example, Hamid Algar, "Naqshbandiyah," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 226.

50 Usman, *Bahuddin*, p. 12.

51 Bukhari, *ibid.*, pp. 71-74.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

53 Usman, *Bahauddin*, pp. 23-25.

perspective it is perhaps useful to begin with the opposite question why have the Mujaddidīs become so dominant in the larger Sunni world that they have become synonymous with the term “Naqshbandī”? There was a time when Sufism seemed to treat the borders between the *ummah* (community of Muslim believers) and potential converts in the non-Muslim world as fluidly as possible in order to facilitate conversion to Islam. To this end many *tariqas* emphasized vernacular poetry and the Islamization of indigenous practice. The Mujaddidīs, born in India where the *ummah* was surrounded by Hindus and where Shi’a minorities were playing a major role within Islamic culture, attempted to draw the boundaries of Sunni Islam more rigidly, treating the border between the *ummah* and the non-Muslim world as a wall to protect the “true Islam” from external and internal pollution. The Mujaddidiyya presented a form of Sufism which can easily exclude Shi’a Muslims by emphasizing Bahā’ al-Din Naqshband’s *silsila* through Abu Bakr, rather than through Ali. Its primary goal was not the spread of Islam to non-Muslims but the protection of Islam from “heretical” influences. Thus it is not surprising that with the rise of the Shi’a Saffawid empire the explicitly pro-Sunni Mujaddidi *tariqa* would grow in popularity, particularly with rulers who sought to prevent Shi’a influences from destabilizing their rule. Similarly in the contemporary world, the Mujaddidīs remain popular with those persons interested in protecting Islam from the polluting *bid’a*, innovation, of modernity and westernization. This tendency of the modern Mujaddidī-Naqshbandiyya to divide the world into “Us” and “Them” is likely seen by the government of Uzbekistan as potentially de-stabilizing. Perhaps even more importantly, the fact that the majority position of the Naqshbandī tradition is Mujaddidi raises the possibility that a living Naqshbandī tradition could once again emerge focused around *murids* trained by Pakistani and Turkish sheikhs. As I have already stated the government is supportive of Sufism as a worldview—not as an alternative political institution capable of civil disobedience.

Conclusion

Post-Soviet hagiography is playing an important role in the reconstruction of Islam in Central Asia. There were occasions where I would be sharing food with people at a shrine or in a home and I would ask someone if they knew any *rivayat*, narratives, about the *awliyā*, and when they told me one I would ask where they had learned it. I expected to hear that they had learned these things from their parents or grandparents, until they would mention the recent issue of some journal which they had read.

In many other parts of the Muslim world people know their Islamic identity in hundreds of subtle and organic ways. They may see themselves as “secular Muslims,” they may not pray or fast with any regularity. But they know the poetry of Hafiz or Rumi or Yunus Emre or Ghalib or the stories and songs of their grandparents. These living cultural artifacts—steeped in the language and worldview of Islam and *tassawuf*—are the places they look to when their lives are in crisis, their hearts are broken, or the anomie of modern existence stands threatening like a wolf at the door. In Uzbekistan, this organic quality has been largely disrupted. The recreation of Islam is in some ways like the reconstruction of the memory of an amnesiac who has been told he was a Muslim and tries to regain his Islam through reading books about Islam or questioning other Muslims. If this sounds harsh it is not far off from the metaphor of the *mankurt* used in Chingiz Aitmatov’s remarkable novel, *The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years*. *Mankurts* were unfortunate souls, kidnapped and tortured by having a leather band placed around their heads until they forgot who

they were and became the willing slaves of their captors.⁵⁴ (One wonders how Aitmatov ever got this metaphor past the Soviet censors.)

The Uzbeks are trying to recreate their religious past out of the murky amnesia of the Soviet period. It floods back in fits and starts from numerous directions producing a weird jumbling effect. Islam is mixed-in with *The Weekly World News*, flying saucers, aliens, ninjas and a variety of supernatural phenomena generally referred to as “extra-sense.”⁵⁵ Faith healers who channel Islamic spirits, including famous *awliyā* have become commonplace—in fact they are forced to register with the government. People are in the process of sorting it all out.

Of course the government has its own reason for making sense out of all this jumble. The state is trying to construct a univocal Islam—one voice, one interpretation of history. To my mind there is an insoluble dilemma inherent in the top down version of Sufism being currently constructed by the government. It is akin to creating a religious Esperanto, a Sufi tradition stripped of its organic wholeness, and thus, to my mind, doomed to artificiality. The Sufi tradition as it grew naturally in the region is deeply multivocal. It is both the sober (at least in some accounts) Sufism of Bahā' al-Din Naqshband and his companions and the drunken spiritual madness of the liminal poet saint of the Fargana Valley, Mashrab—the 17th-century advocate of *wahdat ul-wujud* who was executed by the king of Balkh after defecating on his throne, one of history's ultimate anti-authoritarian gestures. The government clearly prefers the former to the latter.

Of course, some people want to avoid the Turko-Iranian past entirely. These are voices that say that we don't need any “little books,” only Qur'an and *hadith*; voices like that of the young man in Tashkent who told me that the Naqshbandis are wrong because they are Shi'a and gave as evidence of this assertion that his local imam told him that this was the case and he should know because he knows Arabic. When I asked the young man if Bahā' al-Din Naqshband knew Arabic, he backtracked and said that Bahā' al-Din was still a proper Muslim but the problem emerged later in the tradition. He gave the same answer when I asked about Khoja Ahrār and Makhdum-i Azam. In any event, for some the solution is to avoid “the poison of Sufism” entirely.

This attitude is certainly not unique to Uzbekistan. It can be argued that criticism of devotional allegiance to holy persons is one of the major characteristics of religion in modernity. The centrality of devotion to living saints—once a crucial feature of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam—has been one of the first targets of modernizing reformers in all of these traditions. Even in traditions where it still thrives, many people educated in the culture of the modern world system view devotion to saints as a relic, a superstitious anachronism. This is especially true of many of the groups that are often labelled as “fundamentalists” or “Islamists.”

There is an ironic situation in Uzbekistan. In other parts of Muslim Asia the Sufi tradition is largely oral, relying on the direct transmission of knowledge from master to disciple. On the other hand so-called “fundamentalism” accomplishes much of its *dawa* through pamphlets and books. In Uzbekistan—where Wahabism is illegal (and any Islam the government disagrees with is labeled “Wahabism”)—the situation is reversed. “Fundamentalism” has gone underground where it is passed orally from teacher to student, whereas Sufism—divorced from the institution of *pir-murid* has taken on a new life as a largely literary, intellectual tradition. Of course from the

54 Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than a Thousand Years*, John French (trans.), Indiana University, Bloomington, 1988.

55 One need only look at the range of articles in the journal *Sirli Alam*, which covers a variety of mystical and supernatural themes—including Sufism.

standpoint of the government's security interests a Sufi tradition free of the pesky problem of actual charismatic religious leaders is much preferred to the alternative.

It is against this backdrop that the current phenomenon of "post-Soviet hagiography" should be understood. On the one hand it serves the needs of the state which is reconstructing a particular vision of history and Islam. And yet the people who participate in the production of these hagiographies have their own agendas, which, although they sometimes coincide with the state's agenda, are less cynically attempting to the best of their ability to recreate an authentic Sufi tradition. Intellectuals in the former Soviet Union are quite used to writing within the narrow limits of state sanctioned opinion. From my conversations with some of these authors it is clear to me that they believe in and value the Sufi tradition. While some of their writings may seem at times like cynical attempts to create a new "politically correct" Islam—writers like Kamilov and Usman strike me as people who believe in the Sufi tradition and wish to see it revived. The fact that the state has reasons of its own for reconstructing it is no mere coincidence, but it is co-incidental.

There is a Naqshbandī saying that a live cat is greater than a 1,000 dead lions—meaning one live sheikh is greater than 1000 dead ones.⁵⁶ From the standpoint of the state, however, it is quite clear that they would much prefer a dead lion to a live cat. And in some sense the point is moot. There are few live cats to be found. Prof. Usman told me once that the old *pir-murid* system may no longer be possible anywhere in the modern world, let alone Uzbekistan. Only time will tell if the living tradition will re-emerge in Uzbekistan as Turkish and Pakistani *murids* and *pirs* re-establish connections with the land of their spiritual origins and what remains of the indigenous tradition slowly re-emerges. Perhaps this new hagiographical tradition will pave the way for its rebirth.

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⁵⁶ Harzulla Yoldoshev, "Hazrat Haqida Ibratli Rivoyatlar," *Bukhara Hakikati*, 9 September, 1993, p. 3.

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The Naqshbandī Sheikhs of Hawrāmān and the Heritage of Khāliddiyya-Mujaddidiyya in Kurdistan

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The history of the Naqshbandī order has been extensively recorded and studied not only by Western scholars, but by leaders of the order and their followers as well. However, such studies, understandably, do not parallel the various historical periods or geographical extent of the order. As far as Kurdistan and the Kurdish Naqshbandīs are concerned, almost all the studies have tended to focus on Mawlānā Khālid Shahrāzūrī (1193/1779-1242/1827), the eponym and founder of the Khāliddiyya suborder, and the early years in the development of Khāliddiyya. In contrast, this paper is confined to studying the post-Mawlānā periods of the Khāliddiyya suborder, and more especially the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān, the Sirāj al-Dīnī family, who have been the most influential and prominent representatives of the Khāliddiyya branch in Kurdistan and in the whole Middle-East. A great emphasis will be put on the family's role in spreading the Naqshbandī order from the time of Sirāj al-Dīn I. The main features of the order, which have been shaped in the span of more than one and a half centuries, are studied in the light of, and in comparison with, the situation of the order at the time of Mawlānā Khālid at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Mawlānā Khālid and Khāliddiyya

The Naqshbandī order, as it was introduced in Kurdistan at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Mawlānā Khālid, had special features that, no doubt, contributed to its development and the spread of its teachings. Those features were identical, for the most part, with the mainstream Sufi views established and/or reestablished by sheikh Ahmad Sirhīndī (d. 1624) and his successors. It is, therefore, quite natural that Mawlānā Khālid would represent the ideas and teachings of his masters in the subcontinent, by whom he was initiated to the path. But it is also true that Mawlānā Khālid was not just one of those hundreds or perhaps thousands of deputies who were initiated, trained and instructed by sheikh 'Abdullāh Dihlavī, also known as Shāh Ghulām 'Alī, (d. 1240/1824). He was, due to several reasons, exceptional in his position, qualities and abilities.

Shāh Ghulām 'Alī conferred upon Mawlānā Khālid "full and absolute successorship," *khilāfa tāmma muṭlaqa*, a rank which he seems to have denied other deputies. There are statements by Shāh Ghulām 'Alī in which he expressed his awareness of

the unique position of Mawlānā Khālid.¹ After staying one year in the *khānaqāh* in Delhi, Shāh Ghulām ‘Alī, tells Mawlānā to go back to Kurdistan. While he and his master were bidding one another farewell, they had an interesting conversation, at the end of which Shāh Ghulām asked, “what else do you want?” Mawlānā replied, “I want religion (*dīn*) and I want the world (*dunyā*) to strengthen the religion.” The Sheikh tells him, “Go, I gave (bestowed upon) you the whole of it.”²

Mawlānā Khālid returned to Kurdistan in 1811 but left it for good and went to Damascus in 1822. Even during those eleven years, he spent more than five years of his life in Baghdad.³ This period, although relatively short, was quite important and decisive for the order since it was during these years that the order was firmly established and most of the great and prominent deputies initiated. It was also during this time that he had heated discussions concerning different religious questions with Iranian scholars he encountered on his journeys to and from India through Iran. He survived an assassination attempt as well.

The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya was recognized as an anti-Shi‘a order. This was due partly to the fact that there was a great Shi‘a population in the original regions of the order in the Indian subcontinent, as well as the daily confrontations strengthening that tendency. There were certainly also historical reasons for the tension in the relations between the Naqshbandīs and the Shi‘a. But when Mawlānā Khālid returned to Kurdistan this aspect had been minimized. There was no need to emphasize anti-Shi‘ism because there was no direct confrontation with the Shi‘a. On the other hand, the Indian Mujaddidis were on good terms with the leaders and followers of the Qādiriyya order; Mawlānā even received a *Khilāfa* even for the Qādiriyya order. But once Mawlānā was back in Sulaimani, he was confronted with great rivalry by the leader of the Qādiri order, sheikh Ma‘rūf Nodē (Nūdahī) (1175/1761-1254/1838). The Qādiri order was well established in Kurdistan at that time and had great influence upon the people and even the rulers of the Kurdish Baban principality. The return of Mawlānā Khālid and the rapid spread of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya as a new and energetic order disturbed the Qādiri leaders, who strongly resisted Mawlānā Khālid. The rivalry was escalated to such a degree that even Mawlānā’s trustworthiness as a Muslim was questioned by sheikh Ma‘rūf who also accused him of being a liar and a heretic. The presence and influence of the political factor in this conflict should be emphasized. The Baban Maḥmūd Pāshā harbored ill will against Mawlānā Khālid and feared his influence upon his brothers and cousins. It is not unlikely that the Pāshā played a role in deepening the dispute between the two orders for the benefit of his political ends.⁴

Although Mawlānā Khālid was deeply touched by the circumstances, he showed, nevertheless, great restraint and never allowed himself to be pulled into polemics. He expressed his willingness to have discussions and dialogue with his opponents. In letters to one of the Baban princes, ‘Uthmān Pasha, he suggests that sheikh Ma‘rūf and “great scholars” should come to meet him and he would debate and converse

1 ‘Abd al-Karīm (Malf) Mudarris, *Yād-i mardān* (Remembering the Great Men), vol. 1, pp. 326-327. A letter of Shāh Ghulam Alī to Mawlana Khālid. See also, Butros Abu-Manneh, “The Naqshbandiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century,” *Die Welt des Islām*, 1-4/XXII (1984), 5.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 32

3 This is probably the main reason why a number of historians and scholars call Mawlānā, Baghdadi Mawlānā. Of the nearly 300 letters and treatises to which we have access, he signed them using a variety of titles including al-Kurdī, al-Jāfī and al-Shahrazī; in no instance did he use al-Baghdādī. The insistence on calling him Baghdādī is apparently a political stance aiming at denying his Kurdishness.

4 Mudarris, *ibid.*, p. 47.



The shrine of Mawlānā Khālid al-Kurdi al-Shahrazūri in Damascus.
(Ferhad Shakeley, 1993)

with them (in faqīr ba 'Uhā mubāḥatha va guftgū mīkunam). He suggests further that 'Uthmān Pasha himself would be present in the meeting.⁵

Mawlānā Khālid's attempts to achieve a peaceful solution did not appear to be successful. Thus, he chose to leave Sulaimani and to reside in Baghdad, where he stayed about three years. When Maḥmūd Pasha succeeded his father, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Pasha (d. 1228/1813), as the ruler of the Baban principality, he visited Baghdad and invited Mawlānā to return to Kurdistan, which he did in 1231/1816 or 1232/1817. Apparently the situation was such that it was not proper for Mawlānā to stay a long time, therefore he left Sulaimani for good on the 25th of October, 1820.⁶ Apart from the summer months of 1821 and 1822 which Mawlānā spent in Hawrāmān, he stayed in Baghdad. After spending the summer of 1822 in Kurdistan, he left via Urfa and Dayr az-Zūr to Damascus where he arrived most probably late in November 1822.⁷ It is often indicated that Mawlānā left Kurdistan, and Baghdad, for Damascus to escape the Qādiris' hostility. Considering the situation from an historical perspective, it should be kept in mind that it was necessary for the Order to expand and not be limited to Sulaimani or Baghdad. A sort of settlement was, however, reached with the Qādiri leaders while Mawlānā was still alive; sheikh Ma'rūf Nodē declared his repentance in his letters to Mawlānā and by sending his envoys to him, asked for a meeting and reconciliation, as well as forgiveness for his shortcomings.⁸

The time between Mawlānā's return to Kurdistan as a sufi guide and his death was relatively short, but he succeeded in establishing the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya as the most powerful and influential sufi order in the Middle-East. He is compared in this respect to Shāh Ghulām 'Alī.⁹ In 1820, when he was still living

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

⁶ Claudius James Rich, *Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan*, vol. I, 2nd ed., England, 1972, p. 320.

⁷ Reading Mawlānā's letter from Damascus, dated 17th of Rabi' al-Awwal 1238 (2 December, 1822), to two of his deputies in Baghdad, one can easily infer that he had arrived there quite recently. See Mudarris, *ibid.*, pp. 416-417.

⁸ Mudarris, *ibid.*, pp. 396-397.

⁹ Abu-Manneh, *ibid.*.

in Kurdistan, the number of his disciples was estimated at 12,000,¹⁰ which is not easy to verify or disprove. One thing is certain in this context; no other Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi sheikh before him succeeded like him in initiating so many great and distinguished scholars to the order.¹¹

The Sirāj al-Dīnī Sheikhs

The Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikhs have been the most prominent representatives of the Khālidi suborder in Kurdistan since the time Mawlānā Khālid left Kurdistan for Damascus at the end of 1237 A. H./autumn, 1822. Indeed, sheikh ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I (1195/1781-1283/1867) was the most important figure among Mawlānā Khālid’s disciples even while Mawlānā was still living in either Kurdistan or Baghdad. The two men knew each other as students of Islamic sciences (*faqē* in Kurdish), and they met once again in Baghdad in 1226/1811 during Mawlānā’s five-month stay in the mosque of sheikh ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Gaylāni, shortly after his return from India to Sulaimani.¹² It was then that Faqē ‘Uthmān, who afterwards was known as Sirāj al-Dīn I, was initiated into the path by Mawlānā. After two years of spiritual training, he was the first person to become a full-fledged *khalīfa*, deputy, of Mawlānā.¹³ He was then thirty three years old. Sheikh ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn was born in Tawēla, in the region of Hawrāmān, near Halabja. According to many sources, his parents were descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad. The family, thus, is a sayyid family. But the Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikhs never claimed being sayyids. Sheikh ‘Uthmān signed his letters with his own name followed by al-Khālidi al-Mujaddidi an-Naqshbandi.

Sheikh ‘Uthmān accompanied his preceptor during the years in which Mawlānā was twice obliged to leave Sulaimani for Baghdad. In Sulaimani, sheikh ‘Uthmān usually substituted for Mawlānā in the *khatm* assemblies. The disciples were instructed by Mawlana to attend ‘Uthmān’s *khatm* circles. Among these were outstanding names such as Sayyid Ismā’il Daghistanī, Mullā ‘Abd al-Hakīm Kūshgharī and sheikh Muhammad of Halabja.¹⁴ Apparently, Mawlānā Khālid, who had much organisational ability, was preparing his disciple to succeed him and to take the difficult and crucial responsibility of spreading the order in Kurdistan. When Mawlānā left Sulaimani for Baghdad for the last time in 1820, sheikh ‘Uthmān did not follow him. He moved, instead, to his home region, Hawrāmān, and began to establish a strong base for the order, which became one of the most important centres for the Khālidi suborder in the whole Middle East, continuing to be such until the 1950s. This centre not only contributed greatly in spreading the sufi teachings of the Naqshbandi order, but also produced a number of poets whose poems are the most marvellous and significant examples of sufi poetry.

This indispensable position of Sirāj al-Dīn for Mawlānā and for the order, becomes more clear when we learn that during the summer months of 1236/1821 and 1237/1822 Mawlānā left the heat of Baghdad for the summer resorts of Hawrāmān, where he met Sirāj al-Dīn and supervised the Naqshbandi networks in Kurdistan. Sheikh ‘Uthmān also visited Mawlana in Baghdad, at least once, during this period.

10 Rich, *ibid.*, p. 141.

11 Mudarris, *ibid.*, p. 40.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

It was from Kurdistan, not from Baghdad, as it is commonly, but wrongly, accepted in the sources about the Khālidi suborder, that Mawlānā Khālīd went to Damascus.

After leaving Sulaimani in 1236/1822, Mawlānā was represented in his Sulaimani *khānaqāh* by sheikh ‘Abdullāh Hirātī (d. 1245/1839-40), who was assisted by sheikh Muḥammad Ṣaḥīb (d.1283/1866), the brother of Mawlānā. When Mawlānā died in 1242/1827 Hirātī, and a short time later also Ṣaḥīb, left for Damascus. A few years later, in 1254/1838 the Baban Aḥmad Pasha invited sheikh ‘Uthmān to be in charge of the Khālidi *khānaqāh* in Sulaimani. The sheikh accepted the task and supervised the *khānaqāh*, but he did not abandon Hawrāmān, returning there often.



Sheikh Muḥammad ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn II (1896-1997) at middle age.

With the exception of those two years, sheikh ‘Uthmān lived in Tawēla and Biyāra, in Hawrāmān, from 1236/1820, the year Mawlānā left Sulaimani for Baghdad, until his death in 1283/1867. In nearly half a century he had become the most prominent *khalīfa* of Mawlānā Khālīd in Hawrāmān and Baban regions.¹⁵ The sheikh had a great number of *khalīfas* and *mansūbs* /deputies and affiliates, from different regions in Kurdistan and the Middle East. In his hagiography about Mawlānā Khālīd and the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān, Malf ‘Abd al-Karīm-i Mudarris enumerates 96 *khalīfas* and 33 *mansūbs* of sheikh ‘Uthmān. Among them we find many great ulema and poets in addition to two powerful rulers - Aḥmad Pāshā of Baban and Rizāqulī Khān of Sina (Sanadaj) in Ardalān. This is contrary to what many researchers suggested - that the Naqshbandiyya was only an assembly for opposition sects in Kurdish society.

In addition to his letters, there are a few lines of poetry and ten advisory articles by sheikh ‘Uthmān, in which he instructs his disciples in the ways of the order. In one of these articles, dated 1272/1856, he appoints his sons Muḥammad Bahā’ al-Dīn and ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān as his deputies and successors and advises his followers to obey them. Sheikh ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I was succeeded in turn by five sheikhs in his family. However, it should also be indicated that other members of the family have been in charge of the path in different periods, each with his own disciples and *khānaqāhs*. Sheikh ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn was succeeded directly by his son sheikh Muḥammad Bahā ad-Dīn (1252/1837-1298/1881). Although in his testament, Sirāj al-Dīn had appointed two of his sons - Bahā al-Dīn and ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Abu al-Wafā (1253/1837-1285/1868) - to be his successors, except for a very short time, sheikh ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān declined the position and resided in Baghdad. He was a creative poet. The small

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

number of poems to which we have access today, some 70 poems in Persian, mostly *ghazals*, indicates his talent as a sufi poet. Bahā al-Dīn was also a poet, although only a few of his poems are extant.

The third sheikh in the Sirāj al-Dīn *silsila*, initiating chain, was sheikh ‘Umar Dhiā’ al-Dīn (1255/1839-1318/1901). He was distinguished from his predecessors in some respects. It was during his time as a sheikh that *dhikr-i jahr*, vocal remembrance, was practiced in addition to *dhikr-i khafi*, silent remembrance. He was known for his enthusiasm for science and education, and for culture as a whole. He built several new *khānaqāhs* in Khānaqīn, Kifrī, Qizrābāt, Biyacra, Tawēla and Sardasht. He was a brilliant poet in Kurdish, Persian and Arabic. In his poems he used “Fawzī” as his *takhalluṣ*, pen name. We have access to some fifty letters written by him to his deputies or to the great men of his time, among whom we find the Qājāri Shāh Muẓaffar al-Dīn (reigned 1896-1907) and the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Ḥamīd II (reigned 1876-1909). There are, moreover, three treatises on sufi teachings. A remarkable feature in the life of sheikh ‘Umar Diyā’ al-Dīn was the good relations he had with the Qādīri sheikhs and their disciples and followers, which will be dealt with later.

The immediate successor in the chain was his son sheikh Najm al-Dīn (1280/1863-1337/1918), who was known for his *zuhd*, renunciation. The Ottomans wanted to give him a monthly salary to use for the *khānaqāh* and its visitors, but the sheikh rejected the offer. He had great interest in intellectual conversations with the scholars who so often visited the *khānaqāh* in Biyfra. He was a poet, but the number of the poems available to us is very small. Sheikh Najm al-Dīn was succeeded by his brother sheikh Muḥammad ‘Alā al-Dīn (1280/1863-1373/1954). He wrote a treatise in Arabic entitled *Ṭibb al-Qulūb* (Healing the Hearts) which contains advice and recommendations. He was a well-known physician who helped thousands of people in the region and he prescribed herbal medicine to them.

When sheikh ‘Alā al-Dīn died in 1954, he was succeeded by his son sheikh Muḥammad ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn II (1314/1896-1417/1997), who was already a well-known and established sufi leader. Sheikh ‘Uthmān II was deeply learned in Islamic theology as well as in Kurdish and Persian poetry. He was, moreover, a skillful physician with wide knowledge of herbal medicine. When the monarchy in Iraq was overthrown by General ‘Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, sheikh ‘Uthmān left Iraqī Kurdistan in 1959 and resided in Iranian Kurdistan for about two decades. After the Iranian revolution he came back to Hawrāmān, Iraqī Kurdistan, but he soon left it for Baghdad. He spent the last seven or eight years of his life in Istanbul, where he died on 30 January, 1997. He was buried inside his residence, close to the *khānaqāh* in Istanbul. Sheikh ‘Uthmān was also a poet; two volumes of his poems, in Kurdish and Persian, are published,¹⁶ as well as a volume of his treatises and letters entitled *Sirāj al-Qulūb* “Lantern of Hearts”¹⁷ of which an English translation is also published.¹⁸

Sheikh ‘Uthmān’s brother, sheikh Mawlānā Khālid, also a sufi leader, died almost simultaneously in Sanadaj Iranian Kurdistan. It seems that neither one of them knew about the death of the other, thus fulfilling a great wish of their lives. Both had wished that he may never experience (the literal Kurdish expression here is “not to see”) the death of his brother. In tens of poems and hundreds of letters exchanged between them in the span of the last 70-80 years, they expressed that wish time and

16 *Chapkaḡulē la ḡulzār-ī ‘Uthmānī* (A Bouquet from the ‘Uthmānī Rose Garden), (first volume) compiled and edited by ‘Abdullāh Mustafā Sālih (Fanāyī), 1st ed., Baghdad, 1989, 2nd ed., 1992 (although no place is given, it is certainly printed in Istanbul); vol. 2, Istanbul, 1995.

17 *Kitāb Sirāj al-Qulūb*, li al-Sheikh Muhammad ‘Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn an-Naqshbandī [n. d., n. p.].

18 *Sirāj al-Qulūb* (“Lantern of Hearts”), by Hadrat Shaikh Muhammad Uthman Sirag Ad-Deen An-Naqshbandī, Khankah Canada, Canada, 1992.

again. This was one of the last wondrous deeds, *karāmāt*, so often attributed to them throughout their lives. When they died, sheikh 'Uthmān was 101 years old and sheikh Khālid 99. Sheikh 'Uthmān was named after his great-grandfather, 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I, while sheikh Khālid was named after Mawlānā Khālid.

The role of the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān in spreading and establishing the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khāliidiyya in Kurdistan and in parts of the Middle-East is of central importance. It was under their guidance, as well as that of their deputies, that the order reached most of the regions in Iraqī and Iranian Kurdistan, Turkman Şahrā in Iran, Northern Syria, Lebanon and Bosnia. Nevertheless, they still identified themselves as Khālidīs and Mujaddidīs, and never invented, or claimed to have invented, a new sub-order.

The Post-Mawlānā Naqshbandī-Mujaddidī in Kurdistan: Development and Evolution.

The characteristics of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya that Mawlānā Khālid introduced in Kurdistan were not everlasting; they were, to some extent, the products of the Central Asian and Indian circumstances. The new Kurdish environment obviously had its impact on the development of the Khāliidiyya sub-order and shaped it to adjust to the Kurdish reality. It should be emphasized here that the adjustment did not involve the principal conceptions or teachings of sufism, but mostly concerned the practical aspects: silent or vocal *dhikr*, the attitude towards other sects and communities, the Shī'a and the Qādiris, or the stance that should be adapted on politics and political authorities. The only exception, may be the opinion of Ibn 'Arabī and his theory of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, which is not properly relevant in this case.

The first great problem to face Mawlānā Khālid and his newly established sub-order was the hostile attitude taken by the leader of the Qādiri order in Kurdistan, sheikh Ma'rūf Nodē, with all the complicated consequences the conflict implied, as was mentioned previously. Sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I had to deal with this conflict and with the new situation as a whole when Mawlānā Khālid left for Damascus and died thereafter in 1242/1827. The reconciliation reached at between Mawlānā Khālid and sheikh Ma'rūf put an end to any further open dispute between the two men and their followers. The position of Sirāj al-Dīn as the main representative of the order in Kurdistan necessitated starting new and friendly relations with the Qādiri order. This new attitude marks the two orders' relations in the coming decades and among the succeeding generations. Among the letters sent by Sirāj al-Dīn to different people we find a letter to Hājī sheikh Kāk Aḥmad (1207-1305), son of sheikh Ma'rūf Nodē which contains many friendly and sincere expressions.¹⁹

Sheikh 'Abd al-Raḥmān Tālabānī (d. ca 1275/1858) of Karkūk (Kirkuk) was one of the prominent leaders of the Qādiri order, with whom Sirāj al-Dīn was on good terms. This relation was developed further when Sirāj al-Dīn sent his son 'Umar to study at the Tālabānī *tekke* in Karkūk, where he lived within sheikh 'Abd al-Raḥmān's family and studied in the company of his son, 'Alī, who afterwards succeeded his father and became the leader of the Qādiri order. Sheikh 'Umar Ḍiyā al-Dīn later married a niece of sheikh Ḥasan Qarachēwār of Qādir Karam, Karkūk, who also was a leader of the Qādiri order.

In a letter to the Naqshbandī deputies and novices in the Juwānro region, sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn reminds them that their order is a combination of five orders,

¹⁹ Mudarris, *ibid.*, pp. 44-45.



Sheikh Muhammad 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn (1896-1997) and his son, Zahir Shakeri (1993)

including the Qādirī, and that sheikh Sirhindī regarded Hadrat-i Ghawth, i. e. sheikh 'Abd al-Qādir Gilānī (d. 561/1166), the all-embracing means without whom nobody would be favoured on the path.²¹ Apparently, some people had behaved rudely with the disciples of sheikh 'Abd al-Rahmān (probably sheikh 'Abd al-Rahman Tilabānī). The sheikh orders his followers "to treat them as a beggar treats a king." He further tells them that he regards himself as the ground under the feet of the lowest of the sheikh disciples (*khāk-i qaḍam-i 'adnā darvīshī ... dānesta va mīdānam*). Sheikh 'Uthmān Dīyā al-Dīn, in a letter to one of his deputies, emphasizes that there is no difference between the Qādirī and the Naqshbandī orders, and whoever makes such a difference, bears the signs of misfortune.²² In another letter, addressed to sheikh Hasan Qarāchevī, a leader of the Qādirī order, he begs him for attention, *sharh* and describes himself as a servant, *khāḍir*.²³

This genuine and friendly relation between the Qādirīs and the Naqshbandīs was not limited to the leaders of the two orders. The Kurdish sufi poet Mawlawī (1211/1800-1300/1882) was a deputy of sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I and his son sheikh Muhammad Bahā al-Dīn, but at the same time, he was a good friend of sheikh 'Abd al-Rahmān Tilabānī and sheikh Kāḳ Ahmad, both great leaders of the Qādirī order. He had met them and sent letters to them. He wrote poems in praising sheikh 'Abd al-Rahmān and wrote two elegies when the sheikh died.²⁴ His friendship with the family continued even after the death of the Sheikh. Mawlawī visited sheikh 'Alī Tilabānī and on the occasion he stayed several months in the Qādirī *tekke* in Karkūk.

The third and fourth generations of Qādirī and Naqshbandī sheikhs kept all the channels and bridges between them open and developed their relations further, cooperating even on the political level when the circumstances of the Kurdish liberation movement demanded such cooperation. Sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn II, praises sheikh Muḥammad Ḥafīz (1881-1956), king of Southern Kurdistan (October 1922-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-51.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 238.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

²⁴ *Diwan-i Mawlawī*, compiled and edited by Maḥmūd 'Abd al-Karīm Mutarris, Baghdad, 1959.

7-27-2011. See also Mutarris, *ibid.*, pp. 486-47.

August 1923) in one of his poems and wishes to sacrifice his head, fortune, heart and soul for him.²⁴ These were not merely words of courtesy or politeness since we know that the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān supported sheikh Maḥmūd politically and militarily. In May 1919 Maḥmūd Khān Dizlī, a chief from Hawrāmān, encouraged directly by the Naqshbandī sheikhs, came with 300 of his men to Sulaimani. After clashes with the British troops, he occupied the city and took the British officers as prisoners. This operation enabled sheikh Maḥmūd to strengthen his authority as the governor of Southern Kurdistan.²⁵ It was during the same period that another Naqshbandī sheikh, sheikh Aḥmad of Barzān, the elder brother of the legendary Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, started a campaign among the tribes in his region to support sheikh Maḥmūd and his uprising against the British colonialists.²⁶

The relations between the Qādiri and Naqshbandī orders assumed a political and organizational form in the middle of the 1940s when there was a need to build a new party to lead the Kurdish struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan. Malā Mustafā Barzānī, a general in the army of the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad in 1945-46, sent his representatives to Iraqi Kurdistan to build such a party. In his absence - since he was outlawed by the Iraqi and British authorities - he appointed sheikh Latā Ḥafīd (1917-1972), son of sheikh Maḥmūd, as the first vice chairman of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) that was founded on August 16, 1946.²⁷ This decision had both historical and political significance. Barzani evidently wanted to mark the new party as a continuation of the Kurdish aspirations, of which sheikh Maḥmūd was a great symbol. Moreover, it was of great importance to include sheikh Laṭīf in the leadership of the party to ensure support from different regions of Iraqi Kurdistan, but also because he was an outstanding figure among the Qādiri sheikh, including the Ḥafīd sheikhs in Sulaimani, whose influence, socially and politically, should be taken into consideration. This symbolic significance was reassured a half century later when the remains of Muṣṭafā Barzānī were brought to the Great Mosque in Sulaimani and put beside the graves of sheikh Kāk Aḥmad and sheikh Maḥmūd one night, before he was moved to Barzān to be buried in his native village, in 1992. Even in our days we find that one of the three political advisors of Mas'ūd Barzānī, chairman of KDP, is a professor of law from Karkūk who belongs to the Qādiri sheikhs.

Sheikh 'Umar Diyā' al-Dīn, as was mentioned above, was sent by his father to study at the Qādiri *tekke* in Karkūk, where he was treated as a member of the family and established a friendship with sheikh 'Alī Tālabānī that lasted throughout their lives. This intimate acquaintance with the Qādiri order had its impact on the practical aspects of the Naqshbandī order. When sheikh 'Umar succeeded his father as the leader of the Naqshbandiyya-Khālidiyya, he introduced the vocal remembrance *dhikr-i jahri*, into the order besides the silent remembrance *dhikr-i khafi*, that has been, and still is, characteristic for the Naqshbandiyya.

The Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikhs who were always identified as Naqshbandīs began to initiate their disciples even to the Qādiri order and to consider themselves as leaders for both orders. Sheikh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Dīn was the first to use the title *Khūdim at-Ta-rīqa an-Naqshbandiyya wa' l-Qādiriyya* (servant of the Naqshbandī and Qādiri orders).

24 Sālih *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

25 M. R. Hawar, *Sheikh Mahmūd-i Qāramān u dawlatāka-y khwarū-y Kurdistan* (Sheikh Mahmud the Hero and the State of Southern Kurdistan), vol. I, Jaf Press, London, 1990, p. 489. See also, Hilmī, Rafīq, *Yāddāsh* (memoirs), vol. 2, Baghdad, 1956, p. 115.

26 Mas'ūd Barzani, *Al-Barzani wa l-Haraka al-taharruriyya al-kurdiyya 1945-1958* (Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement 1945-1958), n.d.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 24. See also, Sharif, 'Abd as-Sattār Tāhir, *al-Jam'iyyat wa l-munattamāt wa l-ahzab al-Kurdiyya fi nisī qarn 1908-1958* (Kurdish Societies and Organizations during Half a Century, 1908-1958), Sharikat al-Ma'rifa, Baghdad, 1989, p. 154.

The Attitude towards Ibn 'Arabī and His Doctrine of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd*

The earlier leaders of the Naqshbandiyya were apparently acquainted with and interested in the teachings of Ibn 'Arabī (560/1165-638/1240), especially his doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, the unity of being, in as early as the eighth/fourteenth century. This familiarity with Ibn 'Arabī and his teachings can be traced in the numerous treatises written by the prominent Naqshbandī sheikhs in Transoxiana, as well as their disciples and deputies.²⁸

Mullā 'Abdullāh Ilāhī (d. 896/1490), a deputy of Khoja 'Ubaydullāh Aḥrār (d. 895/1490), was the first to introduce the Naqshbandī order in the Ottoman lands. Ilāhī, who was trained by Aḥrār and had had contact with 'Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 898/1492), was greatly influenced by the teachings of sheikh al-Akbar, which had an impact on his writings.²⁹ The Naqshbandis in Kurdistan were not far removed from that influence. Evidently, the works of Ibn 'Arabī were read and studied in the sufi, and intellectual, circles in Kurdistan and there was a serious interest in them among the educated Kurds.³⁰ A literary and poetic expression of Ibn 'Arabī's ideas, especially the doctrine of *waḥdat al wujūd*, is found in the poems of the Kurdish sufi poet Malā-ye Jazirī (1570-1640). These teachings are also artistically interwoven with the events of the Kurdish national epic *Mam u Zīn* by Aḥmad-i Khānī (1651-1707).³¹

The first Naqshbandī leader who took a critical attitude towards Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* was sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī, the Mujaddid. This attitude marked to some extent the order in the Indian subcontinent after Sirhindī, the post-Sirhindī period, that was called henceforth Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya. As far as the Khālidiyya branch of the order is concerned, it is obvious that Mawlānā Khālid Shahrāzūrī was an initiatic descendant of sheikh Aḥmad Sirhindī by five generations, and an enthusiastic Mujaddidi. It is, therefore, presumed that he was influenced by the teachings of Sirhindī. We do not find in the letters of Mawlānā Khālid, of which nearly three hundreds are extant, or in his treatises, any reference to sheikh al-Akbar and his teachings. Nonetheless, he wrote several times to his deputies and disciples advising them to read works written by leaders of the *tariqa* and scholars who were known for their enthusiasm for Ibn 'Arabī and his teachings, such as 'Ubaydullāh Aḥrār, 'Abd al-Rahman Jami, 'Abd al-Ghafur Lari and 'Abd al-Ghanī an-Nabulusī.³² It is only in later hagiographies that a critical attitude concerning Ibn 'Arabī's *waḥdat al-wujūd*, is ascribed to Mawlānā Khālid. Mala 'Abd al-Karim Mudarris in his *Yād-ī Mardān* quotes sheikh Shahab ad-Din Alusi as stating that he had heard that Mawlānā Khālid forbade his disciples to read Ibn 'Arabī's *Futuḥāt al-Makkiyya* and *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*.³³ Alusi was himself a *mansūb*, member, of Mawlānā Khālid and studied Islamic law under him. Nevertheless, when relating Mawlānā's attitude towards Ibn 'Arabī's works, he states that he had heard about it.

The Iraqi historian 'Abbas al-'Azzawī indicates in an article that he had seen a list of the books belonging to Mawlānā Khālid, in which he did not find anything of the

28 Hamid Algar, "Reflections of Ibn 'Arabī in Early Naqshbandi Tradition," *Journal of Islamic Research*, 1 (1991), 3.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

30 Martin van Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi Order in 17th century Kurdistan," in Marc Gaboriau, et al. (eds.), *Naqshbandis. Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order*, Editions ISIS, Istanbul-Paris, 1990, p. 346.

31 'Izz al-Din Mustafa Rasul (ed.), *Aḥmad-i Khani*, Baghdad, 1979, pp. 455-464.

32 Mudarris, *ibid.*, pp. 321, 338-344.

33 Mudarris, *ibid.*, p. 67.

books by the extremist Sufis. Then, praising Mawlānā Khālid, he adds "far be it from him that he inclines to such books."³⁴ The sentence here is not clear since 'Azzawī does not specify what "such books" means. But in the preceding pages in the same article, he quotes the above-mentioned sheikh Ālūsī, stating that Mawlānā Khālid had a pure faith, and "he did not believe in unity, unification and incarnation," which explains 'Azzawī's doubts. This is, undeniably, contradictory to the assertion found within other sources that there were several of Ibn 'Arabī's works in Mawlānā Khālid's library.³⁵

Although most of the leading Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikhs have been good poets and active letter writers, there is not a single comprehensive work on the philosophical and theoretical aspects of the Naqshbandī order amongst their writings. Most of the letters and treatises were written to reply to deputies, followers and friends. In many cases they are devoted to explaining questions related to *shari'a*, or simply contain instructions about everyday matters. A number of these letters were written to the rulers of the time (including the Ottoman Sultan and the Qajar Shah) to ask them a favour or just to send them a few words of courtesy. The letters and treatises of sheikh 'Umar Diya' al-Din are, probably, the most comprehensive among the writings of the Sirāj al-Dinī sheikhs. In a few of them, he discusses briefly the questions of *fanā'* and *laṭā'if* and other related topics, but the question of *wahdat al-wujūd* is not dealt with anywhere.

The Cultural Heritage

In addition to hundreds of letters and a great number of treatises, Mawlānā Khālid also wrote tens of poems in Kurdish, Arabic and Persian. These were collected and printed in Istanbul in 1260/1844, only eighteen years after his death. Even in his letters, Mawlānā Khālid usually quotes lines of poetry. Often these are lines by known poets like Hafiz, Mawlānā Jalal al-Dīn Rūmī, Shah-i Naqshband, Shabustarī, Jāmī, Bīdel-i Bukhārī and others. But he enriches many of his letters with lines of his own poetry. The addition of these lines of poetry clearly shows Mawlānā's sophisticated taste and appreciation of poetry, as well as and the impact of words as a whole. This tradition was developed further by the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān, the Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikh family. In the 1830s, sheikh 'Uthman Sirāj al-Dīn I, had already turned his home region to an important centre of sufism and culture, which attracted a great number of the poets and scholars. Other sheikhs in the family, who succeeded him during the last one and a half century, continued to promote Kurdish culture. Among their disciples, there have always been great scholars and poets who not only contributed to the spreading of the order, but also created great works that constitute the grounds of Kurdish sufi literature, which is an important feature of Kurdish culture as a whole. Many of these poets and scholars dwelled permanently in the Naqshbandī *khānaqāhs* or visited frequently and stayed there long periods.

Malā Hāmid-i Kātib (1225/1810-1310/1892) was initiated into the path by sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I in 1250/1834 and remained with the family until his death. He served as *kātib* to the sheikh and his sons Muḥammad Bahā al-Dīn and 'Umar Ḍiyā al-Dīn. Malā Hāmid was writer and poet, but his poems are mainly devoted to record social events, including the births and the deaths of the prominent members

³⁴ Al-Muhami, "Abbas al-'Azzawī: Mawlānā Khālid an-Naqshbandī," *The Journal of the Kurdish Academy*, 1 (1973), p. 709.

³⁵ Algar, *ibid.*, p. 20, n. 75.

of the Sirāj al-Dīn family or of the order in general. His works include six books, the most important of which probably are the interpretation of the *Mathnawī-ye Ma'nawī* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī in three volumes, his commentary on *Gulshan-i Rāz* by Maḥmud Shabustarī and *Riāḍ al-mushtaḳīn*, a hagiography about the lives of Mawlānā Khālid and sheikh 'Uthman Sirāj al-Dīn I. Even though none of these works are printed, manuscripts are extant.

Another two great Kurdish sufi poets are Sayyid 'Abd ar-Raḥīm Mawlawī, also known as Ma'dūmī, and sheikh Muḥammad Maḥwī (1830-1906) who undoubtedly merit being studied thoroughly as examples of excellent and significant sufi literature. Other important poets and scholars affiliated with the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān are Hājji Sayyid Ḥasan Chorri (d.1323/1905), Malā 'Abdullāh Jalī Koyī (1250-1326), sheikh Salīm Takhtayī, also known as Sālim-ī Sina (1845-1909), sheikh Muḥammad Amin Hawleri (Al-Kurdī al-Arbillī), sheikh 'Umar Ibn al-Qaradaghī (1303-1353), sheikh Bābā Rasīl Becdanī (1303-1363), sheikh 'Abd al-Karīm Aḥmadbirinda (d. 1361), Malā Maḥmūd Beckhud (1878-1955), sheikh Aḥmad Shākālī (1903-1982) and Malā 'Abd al-Karīm Mudarris (born 1901).

Conclusion

The return of Mawlānā Khālid in 1811 from India marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Naqshbandī order in the Middle East. Although a representative of the Mujaddidi branch of the order, the charismatic character of Mawlānā Khālid made him the eponym of a branch called Khālidiyya, which spread rapidly throughout the whole Middle East. Many of the leaders of the Khālidiyya played an important role in the political history of Kurdistan in different periods. Sheikh 'Ubaydullāh Nahrī (in 1881), sheikh Sa'id Pīrān (in 1925) and Malā Muṣṭafā Barzānī (1945 until 1975), leaders of the Kurdish liberation movement, belonged to the Mujaddidi-Khāliidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya. The role of the order in the development of Kurdish culture was even greater, since many significant scholars and poets were among the deputies and disciples of the Khālidiyya.

The first deputy of Mawlānā Khālid was sheikh 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn I, who was the founder of the Sirāj al-Dīnī sheikh family, also known as the Naqshbandī sheikhs of Hawrāmān. The Naqshbandī centre started in Hawrāmān in the 1830 has continued to be the most important sufi and cultural centre in Kurdistan during the last one and a half centuries.

In 1997 one of the most influential sufi sheikhs of Hawrāmān, sheikh Muḥammad 'Uthmān Sirāj al-Dīn II, died in Istanbul, without appointing any one of his sons or deputies to succeed him. This was an unprecedented event in the history of the family. There are now speculations that the leading role of the family has come to an end. It is not obvious, however, to what extent this will affect the development or the survival of the Khālidiyya-Mujaddidiyya in Kurdistan.

Naqshbandiyya in Damascus: Strategies to Establish and Strengthen the Order in a Changing Society

LEIF STENBERG

On a warm evening at the end of April 1995, I found myself in a beautiful house in the old quarter of Damascus. I was in the home of one of the younger members of the Naqshbandi order, sitting on the floor of one of the rooms in the house. The light was dim. Around me sat some twenty young men, all of them members of the order. They were performing a religious ritual within the mystical tradition of Islam called *mawlid*. They were listening to a recitation, singing in honor of God and were meditating silently. After the ritual, we sat together around a table, discussing the relationship between Christianity and Islam, as well as between the Muslim world and the so-called West. During the discussion, it turned out that one of the young men spoke Swedish. He worked as a civil engineer and had studied at Chalmers Polytechnic in Gothenburg. The others were also professionals: dentists, doctors and pharmacists. During our conversation, they told me that most of them had grown up in modest circumstances, and their parents had all been affiliated with the Naqshbandiyya order. The order had promised to take care of the children's education and would in exchange give them religious instruction in the tradition of the order, making pious members out of them. As a consequence of this conversation, I undertook to study the social reproduction of this religious order - the strategies the order has adopted in order to respond to the development of modern society and thereby establish its position in Syria. Since that meeting in 1995, I have been collecting information about the Naqshbandiyya, primarily on the present state and status of the order in Damascus. I have also maintained contact with the order and recently, in May 1997, I was the guest of the Abu al-Nur Islamic Foundation (*majma' Abi al-Nur al-Islamiya*) in the Rukn al-Din-area, a northern part of the city.¹ The Abu al-Nur Islamic Foundation is a trust that has its headquarters in the Abu an-Nur mosque, and at this mosque the elderly sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, head of one branch of the Naqshbandiyya in Damascus and the Grand mufti of Syria, performs once a week. He presents his *dars* (an informal sermon explaining the significance of a Qur'anic text) every Friday morning in front of about 7000 people.

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to outline how a branch of the Naqshbandi order in Damascus confronts social change in the late 20th century. I want to focus in particu-

¹ The visit was supported by a generous grant from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

lar on how a Sūfī order acts to establish and strengthen its role by presenting an image of stability and traditionalism in a world of change. At the same time I want to highlight how Islam is interpreted to avoid marginalization. This includes additional attention to the social organization of the order and its relation to the political and economic life of Syria, as well as the everyday conduct of life by Syrians.

A second purpose of this paper is to elucidate the complex relationship between different forms of "Islam," especially the relation between Sufism and interpretations of "Islam" as generally seen by the traditionally educated Muslim scholars. The latter connection is particularly important, since the understanding of "Islam" and Sufism is often founded on simplistic stereotypes. In a place like Damascus it is obvious how different interpretations of Islam compete and a diversity of opinions exists among the traditionally educated Muslim scholars on the "true" meaning of Islam or the interpretation of Islamic terminology selected from a Quranic context. Accordingly, throughout this discussion "Islam" is viewed as an on-going discourse where different trends are engaged in struggle, and where the successful contender becomes, for the time being, the established tradition, until it is challenged by yet another trend.² This is a situation where many "Islams" fight to become the One Islamic Tradition.³ A presupposition for such a view is the idea that contemporary religious scholars in general, irrespective of their position in society and their standards as scholars, in most cases do not acknowledge the existence of contending positions, each striving for symbolic dominance. Instead, their interpretations of the Qur'ān and *sunna*, their work as Muslim scholars, are reflections of debates, discussions and developments in the society at large.⁴ Religion is in such an understanding intimately related to - and part of - society. Toward the end of this paper, I will offer some reflections on the ideas of modernity and globalization in relation to this branch of the Naqshbandiyya and the attempt to carve out a space for the order in contemporary Syria. One interesting question in this context is whether or not this particular branch is undergoing change from a religious organization to an economic, political and social organization with strong religious underpinnings.⁵ In a Turkish setting it has been noted that such a transformation can lead to the decline of branches or entire orders. For example, in a situation where the order becomes more of a commercial network than a spiritual fraternity, there is a risk that the bonds that tie the organization together are lost.⁶ Yet, the role of Sufism can be one of combining the

2 Daniel Brown expresses it in a similar way stating that in this process Muslims "are engaged in an ongoing process of *rethinking* the traditions in which they participate. Some, of course, deny any connection with the tradition, and others deny that their activity can be called 'rethinking,' preferring to see it as the revival or preservation of some ideal and unchanging model. Nonetheless, even the most radical opponents of tradition are not departing from the tradition, but molding it and seeking to lay claim to the authenticity it bestows. Likewise, even the most conservative defenders of tradition cannot help but reshape the very tradition that they seek to preserve unchanged." See Brown, 1996, p. 3f.

3 For a development and usage of this idea on a larger material, see Stenberg, 1996. From a believer's perspective one can always argue that this is an expression of the complexity of monotheism having to do with a unity and a plurality that always exists in a religion.

4 That the view of Sufism as strictly organized forms of mysticism is outdated has been pointed out by many, for example by Jo-Ann Gross (1988), and the need for studies of other roles of Sufism in society has been stressed by Annemarie Schimmel (1975). In the case of *Naqshbandiyya* Hamid Algar (1990) remarks that most earlier work on the order has been historically and philologically oriented. Therefore, the present article can be seen as an attempt to view Sufism and religion as a part of society in a sense that can be seen in Gilson, 1973; and Johansen, 1996.

5 For a similar process among Naqshbandiyya in Turkey, see the article by Hakan Yavuz in this book.

6 This possibility of decline has also been pointed out by Hakan Yavuz. It can also be noted that Peter Beyer in his *Religion and Globalization* (1994) views the transformation of religious organizations and movements in general into mainly commercial and/or political networks as a problem undermining their legitimacy, see Beyer 1994, pp. 97-109.



Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, Damascus (Jonas Otterbeck, 1997).

various opportunities at hand while prospering in the contemporary society. For example, the Naqshbandiyya stress both the importance of piety for the individual as well as the need for modern education.⁷ It should be noted by the reader that my presence among the Naqshbandis probably affected their responses, since I am a European outsider. This paper is also the result of preliminary research and it is primarily based on a reading of literature on the *Naqshbandiyya* and conversations with members of one particular branch of the order in Damascus. Consequently, the character of the piece is impressionistic.⁸ In addition my interaction was entirely with men. How female members of the order react to current trends is outside my purview.⁹

The Setting

During the 20th century, Syria has been ruled by various groups of elites such as landlords, a merchant class and a military establishment. Each of them has acted in consent with a hierarchical and patriarchal power structure based on belonging to a certain family and/or a religious organization. According to Volker Perthes, it was after the takeover of the former defense minister Hafiz al-Asad in 1970 (he assumed presidential powers in 1971) that political institutions developed and a stable political structure emerged.¹⁰ It was maintained, one could add, by an enormous security

7 Sufism, and mystics in the history of Sufism, can also play a role in which it reminds Muslims of the true path. In *A Woman and her Sūfīs* (1995) Fedwa Malti-Douglas analyses a book by the Egyptian television personality Kariman Hamza. In Hamza's personal religious revival a set of historical mystics play a distinctive role in guiding her.

8 The relationship between the researcher and the researched has been much discussed, particularly in the field of anthropology. I am aware of the fact that this relation may need more attention in this particular paper, but due to the limits of space I leave that discussion out here.

9 It is appropriate to express my gratitude to the people I have meet in Damascus for their help and hospitality, but also for the fruitful discussions we have had of which I hope there is more to come.

10 Perthes, 1995, p. 3. Another study of the politics of Syria is Nikolaos van Dam's *The Struggle for Power in Syria. Politics and Society under Asad and the Bath Party* (1996).

apparatus. Since al-Asad seized power, the country has been going through a set of economic as well as political changes. Economic success in the first part of the 1970s was followed by recession and a general dissatisfaction with corruption, economic disparities, repression, alienation from power, etc. This led to political unrest that culminated in the infamous Hama massacre of 1982. The period between the mid-1960s and 1982 is sometimes portrayed as a power struggle between the old Sunni establishment and the relatively new group of 'Alawī elite.¹¹ Throughout the 1980s, the country had severe economic problems. The downfall of important trading partners such as the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe forced the Syrian government to change its economic as well as political policy. Of course, changes of economic and political policies are also influenced by the concerns of the Syrian government regarding its relations with neighboring countries. Furthermore, it should be noted that although Syria is a parliamentary democracy, according to the constitution, the country has never carried out any form of free elections or allowed for an open public debate on political issues.¹² Yet, decision-making in general in Syria appears to be carried out relatively independently and is not influenced by foreign actors in the same way as in many other countries in the region.¹³ Hence, a critique of the statement of Perthes above on stable political structures concerns the absence of a political debate and the impossibility of establishing political parties. The value of stable political structures maintained by a strong security apparatus can, I think, be questioned, when politics in a wide sense is practiced by informal networks outside the formal structures. In this context, the Naqshbandiyya have an opportunity in Syrian society to act as a channel of political and/or economical action.

In today's Syria, societal change takes place on several planes. The country has during the last decade entered the "global village," as values and norms which previously were held to be self-evident in Syrian society came to be questioned. One example is the remodeling of family structures. Womens' ascribed roles are less clear-cut than they used to be. There is also a gap between generations in terms of values and aspirations in life. Changes have also taken place very concretely in the Syrian economy. The Soviet Union, previously Syria's main trading partner, no longer exists. The Syrian economic model, whereby the state exercised far-reaching control and directly owned major companies, is now undergoing a major restructuring. Syria is trying to establish ties with Europe, North America and some South East Asian countries. Likewise, transnational companies are playing an ever greater role. For example, the cars in Damascus have changed in recent years from old American cars to new and mostly Japanese cars, and companies like Benetton have established shops in the heart of the city. Advertising billboards for a mass of different products compete with posters of Hafiz al-Asad and his son Basil.¹⁴ A new entrepreneurial class is amassing considerable wealth and spending it on new Mercedes automobiles, at luxury hotels, or at the few night clubs in the center of Damascus. At the same time, a large number of people live in poverty, and are forced to have several jobs to make ends meet. In this process of massive change, traditionally educated religious

11 Throughout this paper, I will use the term 'Alawī to designate the group that seized power in the coup of 1970. The group is sometimes called *Nusayriya*, a term which places it outside the Muslim community. I have no intention here of taking part in the debate surrounding these two terms. For a short, general introduction to the history of the group, see Pipes, 1990, pp. 159-188.

12 For an amusing description of how Syrians far away from the power struggles in Damascus view the elections to the People's Assembly of the country, see Rugh, 1997, pp. 110f.

13 Perthes, 1995, p. 3.

14 Even the cult of Basil has been the subject of a recent governmental decree. The message of the decree is that the cult of Basil who died in a car accident in 1993 has gone to far and has to be, at least, limited.

leaders, such as sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro,¹⁵ who like to present himself as the highest representative of the Naqshbandī order in the Syrian-Lebanese region, attempt to establish their position and that of their order. Nevertheless, discussions of the effects of modern phenomena is not new in Syria. It has been going on for many years and the introduction of the telegraph, railway and telephone was discussed and seen by some as dangerous. Yet, I consider the recent technological and economic developments to be of a more radical character, changing the structure of the society deeply and involving a larger part of the population than was the case with the earlier technological innovations.

Naqshbandiyya - a Religious Order in Syrian Society

Many directions within Islam are, of course, represented in Syria. Approximately 75% of the population are Sunnī Muslims.¹⁶ From a historical point of view, Sunni Islam has for centuries been associated with political and economic power in Syrian society. Within the Syrian Sunni community the Naqshbandiyya - the order from the East - and Shadhiliya - the order from the West, have been the largest Sūfī orders throughout the 20th century. In the case of Naqshbandiyya, the presence of the order in Greater Syria, according to Frederick de Jong, goes back to the 17th century when a *zāwiya*, dervish lodge, was established in Jerusalem. De Jong also states that the order was introduced in Syria proper in the end of the 17th century.¹⁷ The most important historical figure in the history of the order in Damascus was sheikh Khālid (d. 1827), and all contemporary branches of the Naqshbandiyya in the city have sheikhs with a *silsila* going back to Khālid.¹⁸ His tomb is relatively close to the Abu an-Nur mosque in the Rukn al-Din area of Damascus. Much closer to the mosque is the tomb of Ibn 'Arabī and one supposes that sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro chose to stay at this less fashionable mosque in order to control the tombs, especially the latter one. Another reason is that the Rukn al-Din area has a Kurdish heritage.

In the recently published edition *Les Voies d'Allah* (1996) Pierre-Jean Luizard states that the Kaftāriyya branch was founded in the 1960s.¹⁹ This date is not supported by any reference, but presumably Luizard's understanding of the Kaftāriyya is built on de Jong's idea about when the branch was established.²⁰ In the historiography of the branch itself it seems to be important to highlight that the spiritual legacy is much older and in the biography of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro it is said that he took over the role of head of the Naqshbandī order after the death of his father in 1938.²¹ During my last visit in the Abu al-Nur mosque, I was shown the tomb of the father of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro. Sheikh Muhammad Amin Kuftaro, the father, was buried in one of the six burial-places in the tomb. Three places were empty, and in the other

15 I am here using the spelling of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro's name that to my knowledge is the one he uses in English and other European languages.

16 All figures of this kind are unreliable due to the political sensitiveness of the numbers and the fact that no reliable consensus exist. Different religious communities frequently adopt figures that are most positive to themselves.

17 de Jong, 1990, p. 592.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 594.

19 Luizard, 1996, p. 364.

20 See de Jong, 1990, p. 600.

21 The long history of the Kuftaro family in Damascus can be read in the bibliography on the life of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro of which the first edition was published in 1992. Unfortunately, it is not of my knowledge how sheikh Kuftaro received his permission to be a leader of the branch. This is to say that I don't know if he is both the highest representative and the spiritual leader.

two the son of sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro, sheikh Zahir, and the first wife of Ahmed Kuftaro are buried. The fact that sheikh Amin is the subject of a religious cult, especially when it occurs in the Abu al-Nur complex, appears to fit well with the historiographical ambitions of the order. Of course, it may be obvious that the specific branch, Naqshbandiyya-Kaftāriyya, was established as an independent sub-branch in the 1960s and that the Kuftaros earlier belonged to another branch. However, in the historiography of the order itself the order appears to be deliberately unclear on this point in order to give their branch legitimacy and status. In any event, it is clear from sheikh Kuftaro's biography that it was he who developed a small mosque in what was the outskirts of Damascus into a large mosque complex containing a library, reading rooms, classrooms and offices. This is to say that even though the father sheikh Amin is upgraded in terms of status, the Naqshbandiyya-Kaftāriyya is extremely focused on the person sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro.


As stated above, the grand mufti, sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro, is an influential Sunni Muslim in contemporary Syria.²² The grand mufti holds the highest official religious positions in the country, and it should be noted that he can be described both as a traditional religious authority and as the leader of a sufi order. This is certainly not unique and there are many examples in the history of Sufism where sheiks have been part of a formal religious hierarchy as well as taking an active part in public life in general.²³ Another contemporary and neighboring example within the Naqshbandiyya is sheikh Muhammad Nazim Adil al-Haqqani an-Naqshbandī. He is a Naqshbandī sheikh, but also a scholar in *shari'a* and he claims to be the mufti of Turkish Cyprus. Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani spent some time in Syria and both of them are very active in presenting themselves on the Internet and both have started institutes, or claim affiliation to institutes, in the U.S. During one of my visits to Damascus, during the spring of 1995, I had the opportunity to see how these roles could coexist without sharp boundaries. During a *dars* held by sheikh Kuftaro before the Friday prayer in his "own" mosque, many visitors from Lebanon were present. As Naqshbandī members, they had specifically come to hear sheikh Kuftaro speak. Many of them were moved to tears by hearing him expound on the meaning of Qur'anic verses. His speech concerned the relationship between religions, especially Christianity and Islam, and what attitude Muslims should take toward natural sciences. Sheikh Kuftaro's speech was marked by a rhetoric usually associated with Sufism, but was presented in a traditional mosque setting. When he had entered the mosque as well as when he left the room, many of the listeners tried to touch him and then pass their hand over their mouth and heart. That is a way of transferring sheikh Kuftaro's power, his *baraka*, to their own bodies. Later, after the prayer and the *khuṭba*, guests were gathered in a room to enjoy the company of the sheikh and a cup of tea. The young men from Lebanon looked very happy. They smiled and sometimes they seemed to be moved to tears again by the words of their sheikh. All this appeared to be commonplace and natural to the adherents. In this way, the boundaries between the official position of grand mufti and the function as the leader of a mystical fraternity were effaced. Apart from this more obvious role as a spiritual leader sheikh Ahmed Kuftaro and his foundation have other interests of social, political and economic character.

In general, the Naqshbandiyya order is described as having a great interest in poli-

22 In 1946, at the age of 31, sheikh Kuftaro was a founding member of the League of Muslim scholars. He was appointed Mufti of Damascus in 1951 and in 1958 he became the first mufti of Damascus and a member of the supreme council of *fatwā* (*majlis al-iftā*). Sheikh Kuftaro was elected grand mufti in 1964. He is also a member of the supreme council of *waqf* (*majlis al-awqāf*).

23 See, for example, Gross, 1988.

tics and in secular power. In the Syrian context, the interpretation of de Jong is that the support from the government of the Kaftāriyya branch has to do with the regime's interest in undermining the influence of local Naqshbandī leaders in various parts of the country.²⁴ In his double role as grand mufti and sheikh of a Sufi order, sheikh Kuftaro wields political influence. He can influence people and his support is important when the government wishes to impose a controversial decision. Sheikh Kuftaro may be allied with - or even controlled - by the Syrian regime, but he can also influence the political leadership through his position as the highest religious authority of a large religious movement. In the same way, his support of a Sunnī Muslim opposition would give that opposition considerable legitimacy. However, the latter is unlikely.



Cover of Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro's bestseller from 1997.

In general, the informal networks of Sufism is sometimes seen as a problem by various regimes. The support of one specific branch can be utilized in order to undermine other branches. It is a well known fact that a sheikh has vast influence among members of the order. Should this influence translate into political activity, it can become a direct threat. This has indeed occurred in the past, yet the orders usually confine their activities to an apolitical arena. Their political activities seem tied to economic issues. Sufi orders exchange goods and services and this Syrian Naqshbandī branch administrates a trust, the Abu al-Nur Islamic foundation, established in 1971. Yet, trusts have been set up under various names since the beginning of the 1950s. In all probability, the income seems to come primarily from private donations. The trust offers courses in Arabic for foreign students. Many of the foreign students are from Central Asia and presumably many of them are related to various Naqshbandiyya branches in their home countries. In such a way, an international network is maintained. However, one of the foremost ambitions of the foundation is to become an established and recognized center of Islamic learning in general, and Abu al-Nur is developing its educational connections with different universities in the Muslim world, such as universities in Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan, but also in North America.²⁵ In general, education at Abu al-Nur is free of charge. Another example of

²⁴ de Jong, 1990.

²⁵ The Abu al-Nur foundation hosts four branches of four foreign universities. They also have a four year education - *Kullīya Da'wa al-Islāmiyya* - was established in 1982. This was followed by the establishment of the *Kullīya Uṣūl al-Dīn* in 1992. Today the latter have more than 100 students for M.A. degree and recently the first students have started their education for a Ph.D. in Islamic law. In 1993 or 1994 sheikh Kuftaro opened the Abu al-Nur Institute for Islamic Studies and Arabic Languages in Baltimore, Maryland.

how the foundation is developing in areas not commonly related to Sufism is the travel agency operated by one prominent member. The foundation has developed a very effective organization in various fields such as economics, social activities and politics. In relation to politics, members of the Syrian parliament have been clearly linked to sheikh Kuftaro. He has managed to develop the Kaftāriyya branch into a powerful position in Syrian society, especially since he is the representative of official Islam in the country. This is a work impossible to carry out without a political talent. The policy of the regime, to favor one of the Naqshbandiyya branches in the country, has been effectively used by the Kaftāriyya, a situation emphasized by sheikh Kuftaro's role as mufti. Sheikh Kuftaro is also seen as constituting a balance towards a Wahhābī influence in Syria. Moreover, the interpretation of Islam made by sheikh Kuftaro fits very well with the political aims of the al-Asad government and it is possible that the "ecumenical" aspect of his interpretation has been emphasized since he was chosen as grand mufti.²⁶ The "ecumenical" aspect refers to the sheikh's perception that the three Abrahamic religions stem from a common ground, a view commonly found among contemporary liberal Christian theologians. In a larger context he appears to view all religions as just different traditions of the one universal religion, and he tries to avoid making value judgments on the different religions. Yet, his presentations of Islam in texts and in lectures reveal that his idea is that Islam is the final and most perfect tradition. One consequence of this understanding is that it legitimizes current Syrian rulership by an 'Alawī president, since it includes that specific tradition in the framework of Islam.²⁷ Seen from this perspective the generalizations by de Jong, but especially Luizard, on the position of sheikh Kuftaro in Syria seem simplistic. Accordingly, he is, in my opinion, more than a puppet in the hands of the government even if he enjoys little credibility among many Sunni Syrians.

Ritual and Islamic Terminology

In terms of religious rituals - mainly *dhikr* - the Kaftāriyya are arranged in a hierarchy of circles. The most prominent ones cannot be visited by non-Muslims. Every circle contains a sort of internal hierarchy and there is mobility upwards. Some people in the order, like some of the persons who are close to sheikh Kuftaro, move around and visit the different circles. Their task is to control, advise and inspire younger members of the order. On some occasions there have been conflicts between leaders of various circles and other leaders have to act as mediators.

In general, sheikh Kuftaro utilizes the Islamic terminology in a fashion common to religious leaders in many Muslim societies - among Sufis as well as Islamists. One example, taken from his lectures, is his conceptualization of *hidjra*. He states that the term has to do with the choice human beings have in the modern world. One has to make a choice between the good and the evil (on this point sheikh Kuftaro refers to

26 The ecumenical theme is stressed in the collection of speeches published in English, see Kuftaro, 1993, as well as in his Friday lectures. It is a possibility that the ecumenical theme was further emphasized after the takeover of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970.

27 The matter of whether or not the 'Alawīs are Muslims is, of course, important to Hafiz al-Asad and the 'Alawī elite. The ruling of the famous classical scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) saying that the 'Alawīs are heretics has caused the regime problems. In the beginnings of the 1970s the government tried to change the constitution to a text which allows Syria to have a non-Muslim as president. After massive protests this was withdrawn. In addition, in 1973 the regime asked the famous Lebanese *Shī'a* scholar Musa Sadr for a *fatwā* on the status of the 'Alawīs as Muslims or not. Not very surprisingly he ruled in favor of the 'Alawīs and declared them to be in the mainstream of *shī'ism*. The Syrian president also takes part in the sermons in the Umayyad mosque in the center of Damascus or in a mosque close to the presidential palace, particularly on religious holidays.

Cain and Abel). Humanity should do a *hidjra* to Allah and not between geographical places like Mecca or Medina. Therefore, *hidjra* means, according to sheikh Kufaro, to turn to Allah and follow the example of Muhammad. To conceptualize well known terms such as *hidjra* as a state of mind or principle instead of a specific historical event is a method used by Muslim scholars. In recent times the many different Islamist trends as well as others taking part in the present search for the "true" nature of Islam utilize this method in constructing interpretations.

The many references to Biblical stories seems to be part of a lifelong project of sheikh Kufaro to be part of the Muslim-Christian dialogue. A key element in his references to the Bible is the idea of the three monotheistic religions as derived of a common origin. On one occasion I, therefore, asked sheikh Kufaro somewhat naively if it was possible for me as a nominal Christian to study the spiritual guidance of Islam at the foundation and thereby receive the same education as the young men taken care of by the order. His answer, taken from a text by Ibn 'Arabi, contained two parts: The first was that Muhammad was only one brick, the last brick, in a large building; the second was that religion is like a large table and God serves a variety of dishes. The duty of sheikh Kufaro is to serve humanity the dishes. These answers contain somewhat cryptic messages. My interpretation is that it is possible for me to take part in the education, but only to a certain extent.

"Strategies" for Spreading the Message of Islam²⁸

The Abu al-Nur foundation also has its own security organization linked to certain branches of the Syrian security apparatus and the members are very careful with the information they hand out to people not involved in the order. This caution takes many forms. In a bookshop, I asked a member of the order who accompanied me about a song which was performed during a ritual and he quickly replied, that we (members of the branch) don't talk about such things in public. Another example, concerns the history of the order. We were in a house in the Rukn al-Din area and we were standing on a balcony of an apartment on the 8th floor. Our view was fantastic. We overlooked the Abu al-Nur mosque, but also the tombs of Ibn 'Arabi and sheikh Khālīd. I asked a young member of the order about the history of the Kufaro family and their relation to sheikh Khālīd. He answered that he did not know at what time the Kufaro family came to Damascus and he had nothing in particular to say about the relationship between the Kufaros and Khālīd. I continued on the subject and reflected on the meaning of history and asked him if he thinks it is possible that one can learn from history and/or specific persons in history. He answered that of course one can learn from history, but mostly in terms of ethics. He stressed, in the same manner as sheikh Kufaro usually does in his lectures at the mosque, the importance of interpreting Islam in relation to the present. For example, historical persons, such as sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, can give us guidance and inspiration in mostly ethical and moral matters and are not to be followed - so to speak - down to the last letter. The point, often repeated by sheikh Kufaro and his followers, is that Muslims should not be locked into a specific interpretation of Islam. Instead they should be guided by reason, and, my friend told me, sheikh Kufaro often says that religion is "mature reason."

²⁸ I am fully aware of the methodological questions that can be raised concerning many of the statements made in this part. It is, of course, difficult to make general statements on the basis of answers that may have been delivered with a certain intention. However, I refer to the idea of this article as impressionistic and reflecting my personal impressions.

The openness towards interpretation, the emphasis on ethics and morality and the idea of religion as mature reason was the most common theme in my discussions with young members of the order. This reflected their understanding of religion as partly "lost" in modern society. This was supplemented by statements that says that if we look at things scientifically we will understand that Islam is the true religion. Naturally, the themes reflect the teachings of sheikh Kuftaro. In discussions ranging from the moral decline of the so-called West to the relation between Islam and science, I was nearly always able to come up with a quotation or a slightly modified interpretation of sheikh Kuftaro. This caused amusement, but also some reflection and respect that I was able to express myself by the help of the words of sheikh Kuftaro.

The conversation on a balcony at the home of one of my hosts in Damascus, also revealed a part of the organization of the Abu al-Nur foundation. It is my impression that the foundation has a very active *da'wa* department. They have different strategies to receive various types of visitors and even assign a host to guide visitors. Persons that are judged as presumptive converts to Islam appear to be treated according to a certain scheme which encourages them to take the final step and convert.²⁹ The schemes appear to be tailor-made for the different individuals. I have been approached and put under some pressure to take part in *dhikr*. My host at one time told me that it is just a matter of meditation and I accepted. We gathered early one morning in the house of one of the spiritual guides close to sheikh Kuftaro. After the session, that went on for about half an hour, the person who led the *dhikr* asked me how I felt. I answered that I felt relaxed, but nothing more. He then asked if I experienced anything particular at the time during the *dhikr* when he laid his hand on my shoulder. I answered no and he explained to me, and to the others, that although I had not experienced anything a flower had been planted in my heart and now it was a matter of cultivation. He added, that I was now personally responsible for continuing the cultivation of the flower and he recommended half an hour of meditation everyday. His instructions to me were that I should practice a silent *dhikr* in which I should focus on silently repeating the name of Allah in my heart.³⁰ He invited me to contact him at any time in order to receive consultancy on personal experiences in relation to *dhikr*. Thereafter, he quickly served coffee and showed us his new TV and all the cable channels he could tune in. We watched a news program broadcasted by an Israeli channel. After this occasion I refused to take part in any form of ritual. That decision was clearly disappointing to some of my young friends in the order. Naturally, this is not stated publicly, but to me it is clear that the *da'wa* department of the foundation is very well aware of how to develop psychological strategies promoting the individual to convert.

On a larger scale the *da'wa* department works with the specific message of sheikh Kuftaro. The intent of this activity is to present the sheikh to a larger international audience. This is done by printing his lectures in English. A book was firstly printed in 1993, but was recently reprinted and enlarged.³¹ In general, the book is focused upon three interrelated themes; the first concerns the "ecumenical" character of sheikh Kuftaro's message mentioned above. He often refers to the Bible and Qur'an

29 The classical Sufi idea is that the spiritual path of a particular order is presented to the newcomer and it is up to him or her to accept the path. Hence, persons are not, at least ideally, encouraged to take the final step and become a member of the order.

30 Many symbolic meanings are attached to the heart. Within the Naqshbandi order in general, the heart of a disciple who reaches a higher knowledge of God as the only reality is united or linked to the heart of his or her sheikh. In the case of sheikh Kuftaro, his followers believe that he can grant them entrance to the Paradise.

31 I received some chapters of the new edition during my visit in Damascus in May 1997 and the finished book in November.

to point out the common history of Muslims, Christians and Jews. For instance, the shared history and historical figures are a foundation for cooperation between believers of the three monotheistic religions. Secondly, he stresses that the predicaments of the contemporary Muslim world are to be blamed, at least partly, on false interpretations of Islam.³² If people interpreted Islam in a correct manner - guided by reason - the problems of the world will be solved.³³ The latter is a classical statement in the history of Islam and emphasized among contemporary Islamists. Thirdly, the understanding of Islam in relation to the society must be understood, and this would enable us to understand it differently in different times. The latter interpretation appears as a way of using *ijtihād* (here in a general meaning of reinterpretation) in order to adapt to the changing realities of Syrian society. The fact that the book was first published in English can be seen as a part of a mission to establish sheikh Kuftaro as an authority on Islam on the global level. His followers are also active, for example, in Muslim student organizations in North America and try to propagate their understanding of Islam.³⁴ Since his first visit in 1966, sheikh Kuftaro has toured the United States on several occasions and recently lectured there. However, he recently took a decision not to travel any more due to his poor health.

Creating an Organization for the Future

One strategy, which has been mentioned above, is to financially support talented young men. The Kaftāriyya allows female membership and children to enter the order. However, I am not aware of any systematic effort to sponsor education of young women. On the male side, however, the branch will pay for education, but will also endeavor to inculcate its religious values, so that these young men will become new - or so to speak "better" and active - members of the order. This method of enrolling young men and paying for their education is designed to create a network of highly educated individuals who belong to the branch and who will "combat," or control, change in Syrian society.³⁵ It is at least a conscious strategy to create new members, who are able to handle the encounter with modernity. One symptom of this is the fact that the Kaftāriyya chooses to finance modern, professional education, for example, in medicine, dentistry, engineering and pharmacy - which lead to professions with high status in Syrian society and which in themselves imply an acceptance of modernity and its new ways of thinking. At the same time, this in some ways implies a change in the interpretation of what constitutes tradition and cultural heritage. An example is the fact that sheikh Kuftaro's sermons are filmed and that the Abu al-Nur complex contains recording facilities. Subsequently, the lectures can be purchased on videotape or on audio cassette. Another example is the position of some of the close relatives of sheikh Kuftaro. They are not traditional religious scholars, but, for example, are engineers who have received their education in Europe or North America. They are nevertheless active members of this Naqshbandī branch and are

32 Another theme in the lectures of sheikh Kuftaro is his discussion of environmental issues.

33 The term reason (*'aql*) has a wide range of meanings. In this context the term should be understood as the understanding of Islam presented by sheikh Kuftaro. Hence, two important elements in the teachings of sheikh Kuftaro related to the meaning of the term are his stress on the possibility of reinterpreting Islam and on non-violence. The latter can be seen as a critique of Islamists.

34 The Homepages on the Internet presenting sheikh Kuftaro are controlled by the order in Damascus, but it is monitored from Websites in the U.S.

35 Yet, it is not entirely new and, for example, the above mentioned sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani has an M.A. in chemical engineering from Istanbul University. At the same time as he was studying chemical engineering he was studying *sharī'a* and the Arabic language.

well versed in the teachings of it, holding high positions in the hierarchical system. My hypothesis is that they constitute a new generation of leaders, and that they are the driving force in the endeavor to send young men to Europe and North America. It should be noted that this is done at a time when foreign influence and so-called Western culture is condemned by many people in the Middle East in general, especially in the rhetoric of Islamist movements. As a parallel to the more worldly or secular education, the young men are also given a religious education at the Abu al-Nur foundation. The result is that most of the students have a double competence. They have degrees, on one hand in civil engineering and on the other an M.A. in *sharī'a* law or in the Arabic language. As noted above, the foundation has recently started a Ph.D. program in Islamic law. However, the courses given at Abu al-Nur foundation give the student a master's degree in either religious subjects or in the Arabic language. Once their education is completed, some of these men enter key positions, or they have the potential to do so in the future, especially in Syrian society where highly educated professionals are scarce. Yet, during my visit in 1997 some of the young men complained about the inadequate possibilities for working as civil engineers or pharmacists. One of them, a pharmacist by training, had instead set up a computer business. He was economically supported by the order. Talented young men can also be sent for further education abroad, either to specialize or receive a Ph.D. They are then, on their return to Syria, able to work for their order, and they can all be mobilized in a crisis situation.

Naqshbandiyya - Modernity and Globalization

In Syria, as in many other countries in the Middle East, processes of modernization are sometimes perceived as threats to Islam. The first steps towards a stage of modernity was related to the ideas of, for example, the national state, technical modernization, industrialization and a state based on stable values and norms. In a later phase, the process of modernization portrays a society undergoing rapid change, where no values remain constant - a mobile world with unclear norms, where the traditions and models to follow are diffuse. The possibilities of communication and the development of transnational companies also undermine earlier ideas of a stable and secure world.³⁶ Within the Naqshbandiyya-Kaftāriyya it is common to describe this fragmented mode of existence as devastating, as a situation where the social equilibrium is threatened. For the members of the order, the solution lies in a return to re-ligion and to the firm values and norms represented by religion. As has been stated above, a common statement is that Islam represents the natural order of things and this fact can be understood in a scientific manner. Despite members' perception of their order as stable and immutable, it is clear that the Naqshbandīs reinterpret Islam to confront change in society. The aim appears to create what Anthony Giddens has described as an ontological security.³⁷ Various events, local as well as international, affect the way the Naqshbandīs interpret the Islamic tradition in order to support its claim of representing stability. At the same time, modern technology - the Internet - is used to present sheikh Kuftaro's understanding of Islam. The modern communications systems make it possible for the head of a local Naqshbandiyya branch to be part of a global discourse on the function of Islam. The possibility of presenting Islam on a

³⁶ For a thorough discussion on the modes and levels of modernization, modernity and modernism, see Fornäs, 1995, pp. 38ff.

³⁷ Giddens, 1991, pp. 92ff.

global level has been noted by many as a new phenomenon, impossible a century ago, and this may have a unifying effect. Yet, the paradox is that Muslims are also exposed to a variety of local Muslim cultures and to the cultures of North America and Europe.³⁸ To a certain degree, it appears that several global Islamic messages are competing for influence in the contemporary world. Hence, the idea of a single normative Islam seems to be as unreachable as ever. It is not unimaginable, however, that the message of sheikh Kuftaro, trying to bridge a perceived gap between religions sharing a common ground, will have some success. One can argue that the Naqshbandiyya-Kaftāriyya represents a new trend in which traditionally educated scholars and their movements use the means of modern society to regain influence among those who interpret Islam, but also among Muslims in general. Their main target is, of course, the interpretations of Islam made by various Islamist groups.

On a local level, social and economic conditions in Syria can be frustrating. A high school teacher may have to have a second job, e.g., as a fruit juice vendor, to be able to support his family. Many educated people leave Syria in order to begin a new life in North America or Europe. There is a widespread dream of a better material life in Europe or the US, and the European visitor is often approached with requests to help Syrians emigrate. The chances of getting married are for many young men rather slim, especially for those who are not the eldest son in their family, the son for whom the family can afford to pay a dowry. Girls study at the university, not primarily to get an education or to find a suitable marriage partner, but to postpone marriage. Naqshbandī leaders are aware of these facts and they use all possible means to take an advantage of the situation. People also come to the branch of a combination of reasons and some of them has nothing to do with piety. One example of a strategy developed to strengthen the branch is that one of the relatively young leaders of the order is responsible for a project designed to develop an Internet in Syria and he is the producer of the Homepage on sheikh Kuftaro. Another example is sheikh Kuftaro's idea that he would like to start a satellite channel in order to compete with all the different channels available to Syrians. In a conversation with sheikh Kuftaro he expressed this as an interest of vital concern.³⁹ He considers the dissolution of traditional society to be the root cause behind much of this social frustration, and he claims that the reason for this dissolution is the loss of the influence of Islam. It appears that in the view of sheikh Kuftaro a TV channel can be an important instrument in getting society and individuals back on the straight path. Another way of increasing the role of Islam relates to the social organization of the branch. In my opinion, the picture of some orders as a body of men - a club - can be a way of trying to imagine how the Kaftāriyya establishes an environment for their young members,⁴⁰ a milieu with sometimes a highly boyish atmosphere. The latter was especially clear to me in my personal interaction with the young men of the order. In any circumstance the proposed solution to problems in society is to create a truly Islamic society - a different one, however, than called for by the Islamists. Yet, there are similarities in interpretation and usage between Islamists and Sufis. One example concerns the texts they read. Among the young men of the Kaftāriyya the ideas of, for example, Hasan al-Bannā or the Yemeni sheikh al-Zindhānī are very well known.⁴¹ In a Syrian context

38 This has been noted by, for example, Turner, 1991, p. 171. One interesting example is that the legal cultures of North America and Europe have influenced contemporary interpretations of *shari'a*.

39 In comparison Turkish Naqshbandis publish magazines, owns radio stations and have a TV-channel.

40 Hourani, 1981, p. 93.

41 Due to my interest in the relationship between Islam and modern science (see Stenberg, 1996), I was given videos containing speeches by al-Zindhānī.

one of the leaders of the local Muslim Brotherhood is often said to have a Naqshbandiyya background. Yet, his name, Said Hawwa, was never mentioned to me. One reason could have been the political sensitivity involved in discussing him. However, a general note is that many religiously motivated and justified movements among Muslims react to what is perceived as a problem, that is the marginalization of their religious tradition. Of course, the young men might have been attracted by the mystical elements in the writings of al-Bannā. Yet, their reading of his texts also suggests that the analysis of the problems within Muslim societies in movements forming a sort of political Sufism and moderate forms of Islamism is not that large. Both movements promote modernity in the form of a stable state and stable values and norms. In some sense the ideal seems not to be far from the models of a welfare state developed in many western European countries. However, the consequences of their analysis differ, that is they differ in how to put their religious interpretation into action.

Final Note

The young men I communicate with often return to the term *mujaddid* or renewer when they describe their idea of Islam. This is, of course, something they have been taught by sheikh Kuftaro, and he often refers to this term.⁴² As conceptualized by him and his disciples, the term means to return to Qur'an and *sunna* in order to renew or recreate Islam. However, in sheikh Kuftaro's understanding, the term relates not only to a renewer. It also means the person who reactivates and authenticates the truth in conformity with the contemporary world. Islam cannot be connected to a specific time or place in history, but must develop in accordance with the society. This can be seen as a critique of the opinion of many religious scholars - '*ulamā*' - that sheikh Kuftaro considers to be firmly riveted in a particular interpretation of Islam. The method of carrying out this interpretation of Islam - *ijtihād* - means to re-read the Qur'an and the *sunna*, that is, to go back to the authentic sources of Islam. The use of *ijtihād* also enables sheikh Kuftaro to exercise influence on his followers' understanding of Islam, and especially in his *dars*, he interprets Islam in a flexible manner that serves to show that Islam is the ultimate order for the human being. His critique is not only directed towards various brands of '*ulamā*' and Islamists. In, for example, relation to other Sufi orders he says that they sometimes go too far in various rituals. His general idea of Sufism is to go back to the term *tazkiya*, purification. In his translation the term means the purification of hearts and he states that this is the original term denoting the practices that are today described as Sufism. He also uses *zakāt*, usually understood as alms tax, in its meaning of purification. Both his understanding of *tazkiya* and *zakāt* are commonly held ideas by many other Sufis. In this manner he connects his form of Sufism with Qur'anic terms in order to create another form of legitimization besides the *silsila*.

The emphasis the Kaftāriyya put on social, economic and political activities strengthens the position of the branch in society. Yet, the organization is facing many threats. Sheikh Kuftaro and his followers are disliked by many Syrians, mostly because they have a strong relation to the Syrian regime. In a way they have also been copying methods used by the 'Alawīs to gain influence, primarily education as a tool for power. The argument that they are foreign, that is that they have a Kurdish descendency, is also used in the rhetoric of their opponents. But the greatest threat is

⁴² The earlier mentioned sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani is often referred to as the *mujaddid* of this century by his followers.

the fact that sheikh Kuftaro is 82 years old and after his death there is no clear successor. His leadership is charismatic in the Weberian sense, and he functions as a lens for his community, interpreting and explaining the outside world.⁴³ It is interesting to note that although the role of the Sufi sheikh and the role of the mufti is mixed in the mosque setting, the charisma of sheikh Kuftaro may have avoided institutionalization due to the possibility of keeping the charisma attached to his role as a sheikh. Yet, one effect of his charismatic status is that the institutionalization of his leadership has not been carried out, and one can easily imagine that after his death there will be a power struggle within the branch that may lead to a split among different less charismatic leaders. Of course, sheikh Kuftaro is well aware of the situation and the strategies needed to build up influence in many fields of society to keep his followers together. To my knowledge, sheikh Kuftaro has not written a will and he has not written any substantial text that can serve as an ideological guideline for the branch after his death. Yet, many people take notes on the *dars* every Friday and they are recorded both on video and audio cassette. His speeches from various conferences and public meetings are collected in a new and enlarged edition of *The Way of Truth* (1997). My interpretation is that the work to collect his sayings carried out primarily by some of the younger leaders is done in order to create a corpus of statements on Islam that can be used after the death of sheikh Kuftaro. The corpus of statements will have a unifying purpose. However, one can also interpret the uncertainty as something desired by sheikh Kuftaro. There are examples in the history of Sufism in which the sheikh supports a split. Usually, the reason is that the sheikh wishes to abolish the bad parts of the order and make a prosperous ground for the survivors.

Despite the belief that the order represents stability and traditional piety, the Kaftāriyya does in fact adapt to modernity, especially through its use of technology and modern forms of education. In the encounter with modernity, Islamic tradition is also reinterpreted. If we return to the conversation on the balcony, it is obvious that a young, but relatively prominent member of the branch knows the *silsila* and the history of his sheikh. The legitimization of the sheikh is usually maintained through the *silsila*, and the young man probably just kept this as a secret from me. The reason for this is difficult to understand, but one can easily imagine that the many years of living in a repressive state make people suspicious in general. In the end, one can also add that it would not be inconceivable to think that if the Kaftāriyya transform socially the branch will also transform its rituals and ideas. In the case of sheikh Kuftaro it is my impression that his authority is connected to his message, that is the ideas he expresses, especially in the *dars*. This is also manifested by the young men who in conversations with me are very focused on the words of sheikh Kuftaro and they quote him at length. Perhaps this is a sign of how authorization and ways to legitimate leadership change in a changing society. This change takes place when spiritual loyalty is justified by the help of "new" phenomena such as reason and modern education and, therefore, Sufism can serve as the vehicle for transformation in general, especially in a society in which there are few other vehicles of change.

43 The idea of the sheikh of an order functioning as a lens is taken from Gilsenan, 1982.

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The Naqshbandiyya of Afghanistan on the Eve of the 1978 Coup d'État

BO UTAS

In 1977 and 1978, I spent some time in Afghanistan collecting certain data on the *khānaqāhs* there. My investigation originally sprang out of an interest in the relation between oral and written traditions among Sufis. I had previously been occupied with studies in the manuscript transmission of Sufi texts, often stretching through more than five centuries. Now and then, in such manuscript traditions, it is possible to demonstrate the influence of oral sources, as e.g., in the early stages of the works ascribed to Khoja 'Abdu'llāh Anṣārī of Herat,¹ but on the whole, evidence of interaction between oral and written traditions is quite difficult to find. For various reasons my studies of oral traditions never got very far in the Afghanistan where I found myself at a time that soon proved to be the inception of a national catastrophe. The morning of the 27th of April 1978 I spent in the Ministry of Education in Kabul in order to secure a permit to travel to the provinces for my *khānaqāh* studies. Around 11 o'clock, I heard explosions. The coup d'état had started, and one of the most traditional of all Muslim countries of those days had begun to change precipitately and beyond restoration.²


Between the beginning of April and the middle of June of that year, I visited twelve functioning *khānaqāhs* in Afghanistan: seven of them Naqshbandī, three Qādirī and two Chishtī. This was part of a plan to make a more thorough description of *khānaqāhs* and *ṭarīqa* life in this country. In 1980, I published a preliminary report of those studies in an article entitled "Notes on Afghan Sufi orders and *Khānaqāhs*."³ There I tried to systematize the main socio-religious functions of those *khānaqāhs* as: (1) the seat of a *pīr* and his family, (2) shrines *ziyārat* of previous charismatic leaders ("saints"), generally the forefathers of the present *pīr*, (3) a local mosque (generally not a Friday mosque), (4) a *madrasah* or Qur'ān school, (5) a guest-house (which could be called the *khānaqāh* proper). The central characteristic of the *pīr* himself seemed to be his possession of so called *barakat* (divine power or blessing). In my article, I summarized his personal functions as: (1) instruction, *ta'lim* or *irshād*, (2) authorization, *ijāzah*, of disciples, *murīds*, (3) responsibility for spiritual exercises (*a.o. chillā*), (4) leading the *dhikr*, (5) healing, *du'ā-khwānī*, and making of amulets, *ta'vīz*, (6) arbitration of disputes, *iṣlāḥ-i ikhtilāfāt*. To this could be added, at least in some cases, tending to the welfare of the adherents (providing wells, bridges, etc.).

The situation of Sufi life and practices in pre-coup Afghanistan is, I think, of great interest also from a general point-of-view. The Afghanistan of those days was in

1 Cf. Bo Utas, "The *Munājāt* or *Ilāhī-nāmah* of 'Abdu'llāh Anṣārī", *Manuscripts of the Middle East*, 3 (1988), 83-87.

2 Cf. Bo Utas, "Recent events in Afghanistan", *Annual Newsletter of the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies*, 11/12 (1977-78, publ. 1979), pp. 3-21.

3 *Afghanistan Journal*, 7 (1980): 2, 60-67.



A map of Afghanistan showing the places visited by the author during his research in 1978.

many respects relatively untouched by modernisation. Of course, many things had already changed and others were rapidly changing, mainly because of the quick development of communications - roads and vehicles as well as radio and taped music, for example. Those were the days of the triumphal progress of the transistor radio and, in a basically non-electrified country. To this came the spread of a secular school system. But so much of the traditional structures was still intact that I think it was possible to get a reasonably good picture of the age-old centrality of the *ṭarīqas* in this part of Asia.

First of all, I observed that almost every grown-up man in the country seemed to have some kind of relation to a Sufi sheikh, *pīr*, *murshid*, *āqā*, *miyān*, *īshān*, *khalīfa*, or whatever they called him.⁴ This relation was quite multi-faceted and concerned either a few, or many, or all of the functions I mentioned before. This means that a *pīr* could at the same time be a spiritual guide on a high level of consciousness to the most well-educated people as well as a healer and practical instructor of people in the simplest circumstances. This also means that the distinction between an advanced (supposedly more spiritual) *taṣawwuf* and belief in healing powers and other phenomena that we often think of as superstitions and regard as part of “popular” or “folk” religion was, on the whole, non-existent. Some scholars have tended to detach the last-mentioned complex from “true” Sufism and call it “maraboutism” or the like.⁵ With regard to what I saw in Afghanistan in the 1970s, that is definitely wrong. When functioning properly, the traditional Afghan *ṭarīqa* showed a full integration of the various functions of the *pīr*. It is another matter that a part of the small, modern, westernized intelligentsia of Afghanistan took over the view that contemporary Sufi

4 For a Soviet view on the characteristics of Central Asian “ishāns”, see S. M. Demidov, *Sufizm v Turkmenii*, Ashkhabad (Ylym), 1978, pp. 105-113.

5 See esp. Olivier Roy in many works, e.g. “Sufism in Afghan resistance”, *Central Asian Survey*, 4 (1983): 2, 61-79; repeated in his “La naqshbandiyya en Afghanistan”, in M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic and Th. Zarcone (eds.), *Naqshbandis. Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman*, Editions ISIS, Paris, 1990, p. 480.

practices in their own country were somehow degenerated. This may be seen in books like the *Sair-i taṣavvuf dar Afghānistān* ('An overview of Sufism in Afghanistan') by a former Afghan ambassador to the UN,⁶ which bases its description of Afghan Sufism on stories about the great Classical Persian poets, partly recovered from Western sources, completely ignoring actual Sufi activities in his own country.⁷ There are, however, also excellent examples of the opposite: learned and knowledgeable Afghans who combine high education with a thorough knowledge of traditional culture, including Sufism (there is hardly a better example of this than Ravān Farhādī).

Before turning to the present Naqshbandi order and what I saw of its life and ways in the Afghanistan of the 1970s, it might be useful to take a look at some developments in the earlier history of the Naqshbandiyya, or rather the Khojagān as it was generally called in Central Asia. This early history has been summed up by Western scholars, notably Marijan Molé⁸ and Hamid Algar,⁹ and much of it can be gathered from Classical Persian sources like the *Rashaḥāt 'ain al-ḥayāt* by 'Alī b. Husain Vā'iz Kāshifī (Fakhr al-dīn Ṣafī)¹⁰ and the *Qudsīya* by Khoja Muḥammad Parsā.¹¹ The *sil-sila* or spiritual genealogy of the Naqshbandi order is well-known.¹² The founder of the Khojagan proper, i.e., 'Abd ul-Khāliq Ghujduvānī (d. c. 1220 A.D.), apart from being a disciple of the renowned Khoja Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf Hamadānī, is said to have experienced a spiritual initiation through the mysterious, immortal, "green" prophet, Khidr (Khezr). This took place when he was contemplating the 55th verse of the 7th Sura of the Qur'ān: *ad'ū rabba-kum taḍarru'an wa-xufyatan* 'call upon your Lord humbly and in concealment', and was taken as a call to introduce the silent *dhikr* or (Persian) *zīkr/zekr* (also called *khufya* or *dhikr-i khafī* or *dhikr-i qalb*). This is one of the foundations of the famous eight rules or holy utterances, *qalamat-i qudsīya*, that 'Abd ul-Khāliq instituted.¹³

The silent *dhikr* was thus made one of the fundamentals of the Khojagān, but according to the *Rashaḥāt 'ain al-ḥayāt* of 'Alī b. Vā'iz Kāshifī already the second successor of 'Abd ul-Khāliq, i.e. Maḥmūd Anjīr Faghnavī (d. 1272), took up the practice of *jahrī* or vocal *dhikr* again. This might suggest increased activities among broad layers of people, for which the sophisticated silent *dhikr* would seem less suitable. However, with the appearance of Muḥammad Bahā al-Dīn, also called Shāh-i Naqshband, who gave his name to the continuation of this order, it seems that the use of silent *dhikr* was reinstated (supposedly through a spiritual or *rūḥāniya* relation with 'Abd ul-Khāliq). The Shāh-i Naqshband died in 1389 and was buried in his native village Qaṣr-i Hinduvān (later Qaṣr-i 'Āshiqīn) near Bukhara, and with his successors the order began to spread widely in Central Asia and Khorasan, including northern present Afghanistan. With his second successor, the Īshān Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Ubaidu'llāh Shāshī, known as Khoja Aḥrār, and his family,¹⁴ an important principle

6 'Abd al-Ḥakīm Ṭabībī, *Sair-i taṣavvuf dar Afghānistān*, Kabul, 1357/1977.

7 Cf. also Bo Utas, "Scholars, Saints and Sufis in Modern Afghanistan", in Huldt and Jansson (eds.), *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, Croom Helm, London- New York- Sydney, 1988, p. 100.

8 Marijan Molé, "Autour de Daré Mansour: l'apprentissage mystique de Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband," *Revue des études islamiques*, (1959), 35-66.

9 Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandī Order: a Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica*, 42 (1976), 123-152; "A Brief History of the Naqshbandī Order", Gaborieau et al. (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp. 3-44.

10 Newal Kishor, Cawnpore, 1912 (and other Indian editions).

11 Ed. Ahmad Ṭāḥirī 'Irāqī, Tehran (Ṭahūrī), 1354.

12 See the just mentioned sources or J. S. Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Oxford 1971, p. 93.

13 Cf. A. A. Xismatulin, "Pragmaticheskii sufizm v bratstve Nakshbandiyya: teomnemiya (zīkr)," *Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie*, Vypusk 7, Sankt-Peterburg, 1995, pp. 245 ff.

14 Cf. Jo-Ann Gross in this volume.

was established that was to become central in the later Afghan Naqshbandiyya: the inherited leadership, that is that a son succeeds his father as *pīr* of the local order and khānaqāhs. This means that the divine blessing, the *barakat*, was supposed to be inherited rather than acquired through instruction, knowledge, spiritual exercises and divine grace. Furthermore, it probably often led to a gradual decline of the learning of the *pīrs*. Among the seven branches of the Naqshbandiyya that I visited in 1978 all affiliations were since long hereditary, and that was not only true for the family of the *pīr* but generally also for the families of the adherents. These virtual Sufi dynasties were often interrelated, but during my rather preliminary studies I did not succeed in collecting complete information on their affiliations.

There was, however, a definite line of separation between the *pīrs* of direct Central Asian affiliation and those who belonged to the Mujaddidiyya introduced from India.¹⁵ In spite of the fact that both Muḥammad Bāqī b'illāh Bīrang (d. 1603) and his disciple and successor Aḥmad Fārūqī Sirhindī, the renowned *mujaddid-i alf-i thānī* ('the renewer of the second millennium'), must have come to India through what is now Afghanistan, it seems as if the establishment of the explicitly Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandī order appeared rather late in Afghanistan. Thus a scion of the Mujaddidī family established himself in Kabul first in the beginning of this century, possibly with the active support of British interests (and parallel to the case of the Qādirīyya sheikh called Naqīb-Ṣāhib-i Chārbāgh of Jalālābād, born c. 1862 in Baghdad and died in Jalālābād in 1941). The name of this Mujaddidī in Kabul was Qayyūm Jān Āghā, of the 7th generation after Aḥmad Sirhindī. He became known in Kabul as the Ḥaẓrat-Ṣāhib-i Shōr-bāzār (after the location of the original khānaqāhs).¹⁶ He was succeeded as 'Ḥaẓrat' by his son Faẓl Muḥammad Shams ul-mashāyikh, also called Shāh Āghā,¹⁷ who died in 1924 and who, in his turn, was succeeded by his brother Faẓl 'Umar Nūr ul-mashāyikh, also called Shēr Āghā. The latter became an influential politician under Nādir Shāh: e.g., minister of justice 1929-1932. In 1936 he was given land in Qal'a Javād outside of Kabul and built a big khānaqāh there, which became the head-quarters of this branch of the Mujaddidis.

I visited Qal'a Javād a couple of times in April 1978 and met the Ḥaẓrat-Ṣāhib of those days, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Ziyā' ul-mashāyikh, according to Adamec also called Shēr Pāchā.¹⁸ He had succeeded his father, Faẓl 'Umar, in 1956. His son, Muḥammad Isma'il was also present. That was just before the coup d'état and the atmosphere was already rather tense. The place seemed to be under surveillance. Some preaching and agitation went on in the mosque, but the Ḥaẓrat-Ṣāhib was not very informative to a foreigner like me. He instructed me in general words about the preference of *shahūdiyya* to *vujūdiyya* etc., but on the whole I did not learn much from him about the Mujaddidiyya in Afghanistan. - According to later reports, the whole family was arrested and presumably executed in 1979.¹⁹

I had recommendations to the family from a second cousin of Muḥammad Isma'il, namely Sibghatu'llāh Mujaddidī,²⁰ a man who had an interesting carrier. He

15 For the later development of the Central Asian Naqshbandiyya, see Baxityor M. Babadzanov, "On the History of the Naqshbandiyya Muḡaddidiyya in Central Māwarā'annahr in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries," *Islamkundliche Untersuchungen*, ed. M. Kemper, Bd. 200: *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Century*, Berlin, 1996, pp. 385-413.


16 Cf. Ludvig W. Adamec, *Historical and Political Who's Who of Afghanistan*, Graz, 1975, p. 215, Table 86.

17 Cf. Ludvig W. Adamec, *A Biographical Dictionary of Contemporary Afghanistan*, Graz, 1987, pp. 122 f.

18 Adamec, *Biographical Dictionary*, p. 124.

19 See Olivier Roy, "La naqshbandiyya," p. 448.

20 Adamec, *Biographical Dictionary*, p. 125.



The somewhat dilapidated courtyard of the khānaqāh of Karukh. The pond is said to contain holy fish (B. Utas, 1978).

was born in 1925, became a theologian and teacher of Islamic law in Kabul, was kept in jail 1959-64 accused of being an *ikhvānī*, visited the United States in 1968-70, then came back home and was active in Islamicist religious politics. Finally, he became the head of the Islamic Center in Copenhagen 1974-78, where I met and interviewed him in the early spring of 1978. At that time, he definitely distanced himself from Sufi beliefs and practices, and when I referred to him at Qal'a Javād, his relatives seemed unwilling to talk about him. After the coup, he founded and led the resistance organisation *Jabha-i najāt-i millī-yi Afghānistān* (The Afghan National Liberation Front), obviously exploiting the Mujaddidī network. For a while he was an interim president of the post-Najīb republic.

Other branches of the Mujaddidī family were also active in Afghanistan in the 1970s. One of the more influential, apart from the Ḥaẓrat-Şāhib-i Shōr-Bāzār, was the Ḥaẓrat-Şāhib of Jaghartān, Herat. At the time of my stay in Herat in May of 1978, however, it proved impossible to get in touch with the then Ḥaẓrat-Şāhib, 'Abd al-Bāqī Jān, a son of the influential Ḥaẓrat Faẓl Aḥmad, who had also been a Minister of Justice under Nādir Shāh (in 1933).²¹ 'Abd ul-Bāqī Jān had himself been a member of parliament, and his great grandfather Şāhibzāda 'Umar Jān had led the *ghāzīs* at the battle of Maiwand (in 1880). In Afghanistan this family was originally known as the Sirhind Pīrs. Their activities show how deeply involved these branches of the Mujaddidī family were in the politics of Afghanistan. It is also well known that they were among the leaders of the revolt against Amānullāh in 1928-29. My difficulties in arranging a visit to the khānaqāh of the Ḥaẓrat-Şāhib of Jaghartān was, most likely, a result of political prudence.

Otherwise, Sufis were quite active in Herat in the 1970s. A Qādirī *dhikr* was regularly arranged in the great mosque right after the Friday prayer, in the winter in the courtyard and in the summer in the southern vault. I was present a couple of times and was allowed to make a recording. As for Naqshbandī khānaqāhs, I visited those in Ḥauz-i Karbāz and Navīn, both in the outskirts of the city. A special

²¹ Adamec, *Historical and Political Who's Who*, p. 139, Table 88.



The *madrasa* of the *khānaqāh* of Band-i Banafsh at Auba (B. Utas, 1978).

case was the *khānaqāh* of the *Āqā-Şāhib-i Kabarzān*, Sayyid ‘Abd al-‘Alī Shāh, also known as *Āqā Dīwāna*, ‘the mad master’ (a name inherited from his father, Mīr Shams al-Dīn *Āqā*). This family was related to the *Naqshbandī Khalīfa-Şāhib* of Navīn, but the *Āqā-Şāhib* rather followed *Qādirī* rites. His *jahrī dhikr* has been carefully described by the musico-ethnologist John Baily.²² I myself had more opportunities to follow the *Āqā*’s rather imposing practice as a healer.²³


The two proper *Naqshbandī khānaqāhs* of Herat looked less lively, however. I visited the *Khalīfa-Şāhib* of *Ḥauz-i Karbāz*, whose proper name was Mīr Farīd ud-dīn, son of Mīr ‘Imād al-Dīn, who died in 1973.²⁴ The young *Khalīfa-Şāhib* had an older *Mawlawī*, named *Abū Bakr*, at his side, but apart from their families the *khānaqāh* appeared completely deserted. It seemed as if the young *Khalīfa-Şāhib* had not been able to take up the mantle of his father and keep his influence over the adherents of his family. The situation would thus be symptomatic of a late stage of disintegration of a traditional local brotherhood. Today, I am told, this part of Herat is completely destroyed. The *khānaqāh* of Navīn seemed more active. I visited it both in 1977 and 1978. The *pīr* of that time, Mīr Muḥammad Şiddīq, had succeeded his father, Sayyid ‘Abd ur-Raḥmān, called *Khalīfa-Şāhib-i Navīn*, around 1970. They belonged to a *Sādāt* family originally from Ghur. Apart from the residence of the *pīr*, the *khānaqāh* complex included a Friday mosque, a *madrasah*, a number of *ziyārats*, shrines, and a guest-house. The *dhikr* was said to be silent, i.e., *khufya*.

The *khānaqāh* of Karukh, famous as the birth-place of one of *Anşārī*’s main disciples, is situated about 40 kilometres north-east of Herat. The proper name of the *pīr*, the *Ḥazrat-Şāhib-i Karukh*, was Sayyid Muḥammad Mukarram, a descendent of Sheikh al-Islām Sūfī Islām, an Uzbek from Maimanah and Bukhara, who established

22 It is not known to me whether this description has been published, but cf. John Baily, *Professional Musicians in the City of Herat*, (Cambridge Studies in Ethnomusicology), Cambridge, 1989, pp. 154-155.

23 On healing through *pīrs*, see also Harald Einzmann, *Religiöses Volksbrauchtum in Afghanistan*, Wiesbaden, 1977, pp. 105-106.

24 For *Ḥauz-i Karbāz* Roy, “La *Naqshbandiyya*,” p. 452, mentions a *pīr* named ‘Abdullāh.



The mosque of the khānaqāh of Band-i Banafsh at Auba, (B. Utas, 1978).

the family in Karukh at the end of the 18th century. He was killed in the war against the Qajars in 1807 and is buried in the khānaqāh.²⁵ Apart from residence and *ziyarat*, this khānaqāh, too, contained a mosque, a *madrasah* and a guest-house, all situated in a grove of stately cedars. A pond with holy fish belonged to the ensemble. A quite knowledgeable Mawlawī by name of Ghulām Muḥammad Najibī was in charge of the *madrasah*, which functioned as a normal Qurʾān school. After the morning prayer, however, there were recitations of poetry by Jalāl al-Dīn Balkhī/Rūmī. The *dhikr* was said to be both silent, *khufya*, and in *ḥalqa*, i.e., vocal or *jahr*. The *pīr* claimed to have deputies, *khalīfas*, in many places, especially in northern Afghanistan, e.g., Sheikh Tamar al-Dīn in Lab-i Nahr in Mazār-i Sharīf, and many of the followers seemed to belong to adjacent nomadic tribes. They used to come to the khānaqāh twice a year during their seasonal wanderings in order to show their allegiance, *baiʿat*, to the *pīr*. All in all, this seemed to be a fully functioning traditional khānaqāh, but there were signs of stagnation. Both in 1977 and 1978 the *pīr* was away when I first came to the khānaqāh, and some people said, maliciously, that he had to travel around much to collect revenues from his adherents, perhaps not the best sign as regards his authority.

The most lively Naqshbandī khānaqāh in the Herat region at the time of my visit was probably that of Band-i Banafsh ('The violet pond') in Auba in the mountains east of Herat. The Sheikh-i Aubaʿī, Ḥājji Muḥyiʿal-dīn Akhundzāda, generally referred to as Āqā-Şāhib, was an imposing man of around 60-65. His grandfather had moved in from Qandahar, and the *silsila* of the family was said to go back to Aḥmad Sirhindī (although separate from the affiliation of the family now known in Afghanistan as Mujaddidī). Like Karukh, this khānaqāh was also a complete complex of residence, mosque, shrines, *madrasah* and guest-house, situated in a beautiful grove of old pine-trees. The *madrasah* had about 15 pupils, starting from illiteracy and studying 4-5 years. In contrast to most of the earlier sheikhs I have described, Ḥājji Muḥyiʿal-dīn gave the impression of learning, and this khānaqāh was very live-


²⁵ Roy, "La naqshbandiyya", pp. 448 and 452, maintains that the "generic" name of the Hazrat of Karukh is Sharafatuddin (sic!).



Sayyid Dā'ūd Āqā, flanked by two young relatives, in front of his private mosque at Dihdādi (B. Utas, 1978).

ly, indeed. Lots of disciples came and went, including old, white-bearded khalīfas from other parts (conspicuously many were Pashtuns). Female family members were also among the guests: they disappeared quickly into the *andarūn*, the women's quarters. There was a library that also contained manuscripts, e.g., a treatise ascribed to Khoja Muḥammad Pārsā (copied in 16th century Bukhara), lithographs, e.g., a commentary of Ibn al-'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ ul-Ḥikam* etc. Incidentally, the sheikh mentioned an inclination towards *vujūdiyya*. *Dhikr* was individual and silent. According to the sheikh, the *jahr* performed in *ḥalqa* in Karukh was an innovation that Sufi Islām had brought in from Bukhara. *Chilla* was never used; at times, however, a ten days seclusion, *daha*.

One of the most well-known Naqshbandī khānaqāhs in northern Afghanistan was that of Dihdādi in the southern outskirts of Mazār-i Sharīf. The *pīr* at that time was Sayyid Muḥammad Dā'ūd Iqbālī, often referred to as Sayyid Dā'ūd Āqā. He was the son of Sayyid Iqbāl Khān, son of Sayyid Aḥmad Balkhī. He was a lively, pleasant man of about 70. The various functions of the khānaqāh were not concentrated around the residence in the ordinary way. There was a small mosque, which Sayyid Dā'ūd proudly maintained he had built with his own hands, but the *ziyārāt* of the family were situated around the Masjid-i jāmi' of Dihdādi at some distance from the residence. This was a nicely decorated mosque, in which also the *madrasa* was situated. The latter was said to have 5-10 pupils who were taught by a special Mawlawī, perhaps not directly belonging to the khānaqāh. I first met the sheikh in the book-sellers' bazaar of Mazār-i Sharīf and we had a very nice and interesting conversation, but when I came to visit the khānaqāh I had, unfortunately, to bring quite a delegation from the local office of the Ministry of Culture, and this made a trustful exchange of questions, answers and views difficult. This was already six weeks after the coup d'état and tension was mounting in the country. Obviously, the sheikh felt disturbed in this company, something I regret very much, because he seemed to be a very interesting man of broad views and accustomed to talk to foreigners. But as the situation was, the information I gleaned is uncertain. Among other things I was told that *dhikr* is performed both *as khufī* and *jahrī*, the latter even with musical *samā*, including the use of *nai*, supposedly through influence of the Mawlawiyya. (A




The Friday mosque of Dihdādi, housing also a *madrasah* and some *chilla-khānas* (B. Utas, 1978)

recording of a vocal *dhikr* in this khānaqāh was made a few years before my visit, at the time of the celebrations of Jalāl al-Dīn - in the presence of, among others, Annemarie Schimmel, Christoph Bürgel and Ravān Farhādī). Interestingly enough, the sheikh said that *chilla* was still practiced, and quite widely (I was shown a number of *chilla-khānas* in the Masjid-i jāmi'). There was also an interesting library in the residence, containing many manuscripts and old lithographs. Unfortunately I found no opportunity to study them more closely.

In the southeastern outskirts of Mazār-i Sharīf there was the Khānaqāh-i Lab-i nahr ('on the river bank'). The Sheikh Tamar al-Dīn, son of Sheikh Shihāb al-Dīn (said to have died in 1319 H. Sh.), was a tall man of 53, quite talkative but perhaps not so reassuring. As mentioned before, he was a khalīfa of the Ḥazrat-Ṣāhib of Karukh. This khānaqāh had also a mosque, shrines of the ancestors, and a crumbling *madrasa-yi ṣūfiya* that was not in use any longer. *Dhikr* was said to be performed exclusively as *jahr* (especially after night prayer the night before Friday), but with a declining number of participants (at the time, about 15). *Chilla* had been used among the Naqshbandis who practiced *ḥalqa-yi jahr* but not so any longer. Finally, the sheikh maintained that he was in great demand as a healer.

This has been a few gleanings from my field notes of 1977 and 1978. The khānaqāhs that I have described had, all of them, a similar structure. They were basically residences of dynasties of *pīrs* furnished with mosques, *madrasahs*, shrines and guest-houses. At the same time many signs of decline were noticeable: in various degrees, however, from the still quite dynamic Khānaqāh-i Band-i Banafsh of Auba to the, at least seemingly, dormant Khānaqāh-i Hauz-i Karbāz of Herat. The civil war was already looming on the horizon, and most, if not all, of these traditional centres of Sufi life were soon to be swept away. Some members of the sheikhly families joined or even led various resistance groups, drawing, of course, on their charismatic influence over their adherents. Some went into exile and probably had difficulties in adjusting to a life outside of the well-established khānaqāh. Whatever way they chose, the traditional networks were broken up and changed into new constellations.



The khanaqah of Lab-i nahr in the outskirts of Mazār-i Sharif (B. Utas 1978).

I dedicate this simple presentation to the memory of those *pīrs*, some of them remarkable men and probably all of them now gone.

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The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: the Naqshbandī Sufi Order

HAKAN YAVUZ

During the radical Republican reforms of Atatürk, the Naqshbandī Sufi order became an important target. The order was banned, and major lodges handed over to the Ministry of Culture. What the reformist Turkish state perceived as out-of-date institutions became a “womb” for fostering flexible and adaptive informal institutions and discourses. These networks have been the main intellectual and philosophical sources of the contemporary Islamic movements in Turkey.

The institutional setting of an order, *tariqa*, is in many cases more important than the religious doctrines to which it subscribes. In the course of this study the following functional aspects of the Naqshbandī order will be focused on: (1) a pattern for inner cultivation and religious salvation; (2) tool for upward mobility; (3) network for social and political services; and (4) a model for a community.

The Naqshbandī order, in its many different manifestations, has been a part of Turkish social and political life for several centuries. The Naqshbandī order, like other Sufi orders, has undergone an internal transformation and revival in recent decades despite state-imposed secularization and repression. Not surprisingly, this revival has developed parallel to the Turkish state’s gradual liberalization and integration into the global market. The Naqshbandī religious, social, and cultural networks have become closely integrated into other political and economic associations. In response to repression, most of these orders gradually transformed from strictly religious associations into competing educational and cultural informal associations with religious underpinnings. They gathered support from sections of traditional society, which regarded the Kemalist variant of secularization as too radical and destructive for Turkey’s social fabric.

To understand why the Naqshbandī order has become such a significant force in Turkish political culture, this chapter will address the following questions: What is the role of informal Sufi networks in the construction of an Islamic political identity and in the adaptation to market forces and political liberalism? Why is the Naqshbandī order significant for the study of Islamic political identity in Turkey? The most important reason for focusing on the Naqshbandīs is that the post-Republican elite, which shaped the opinion and identity of the leading Muslim movements, evolved among local Naqshbandī groups in Istanbul and Anatolia.

The Naqshbandīs operated as a repository of cultural and religious traditions and served as a bridge between the Ottoman period and the current Islamic political movements in Turkey. They offer a high degree of social mobility in terms of the horizontal (society-centric) and vertical (state-centric) Islamic movements. Finally, the Turkish Muslim understanding of Islam is very much filtered through Naqshbandī concepts and institutions. For example, both the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) and the powerful *Nurcu* groups are nurtured by the Naqshbandiyya. How do

the Naqshbandīs draw their internal and external boundaries? Do they primarily define themselves in opposition to other Islamist groups such as the *Süleymancı*, *Işıkçı*, *Erenköy*, and *Nurcu Cemaatleri*, communities, or mainly in opposition to the Kemalist secular tradition?

Naqshbandī social activism is both a cause and effect of change in the interplay between market, politics, and community. The Naqshbandī order also forms a social network in which the exchange of ideas and information plays a fundamental role in the reproduction of Islamic identity and in its reification within a living, evolving community. A full understanding of the Naqshbandī order can be achieved only if it is situated in its political, historical, and social context.¹ It is the main argument of this study that much of the recent change in Turkey's socio-political terrain can be rendered more intelligible to the outside analyst by examining the Naqshbandī order as an agent of social and political change.

The Transformation of the Naqshbandī Tradition

The Naqshbandī order is a carrier of the Sufi tradition of Islam. This tradition focuses on disciplining the self, *nefs*, by educating the believer about the nature and function of the different faculties of the personality, from the sensual to the spiritual.² The struggle to control the *nefs* is carried out in the realm of the heart, *kalp*. Sufis are distinguished from other Muslims, among other things, by their interpretation of the Qur'ān. In order to find the true meaning of the book, Sufis "read the Qur'ān with the 'eye of the heart,' not with the eyes of one's head."³ By the phrase "eye of the heart," Sufis refer to the ability to grasp the inner nature and meaning of the text. Sufis seek to create a balance between the inner and outer dimensions of the believer. The esoteric life is usually regulated by Sufi teachings. The exoteric life is represented by the ritual obligations of prayer and acting in accordance with Islamic norms.

Qur'ānic exegesis is dominated by explanation, *tefsir*, and interpretation, *ta'wil*. Explanation stresses the exoteric elements of the text—philology, history, grammar, and dogma. Interpretation, *ta'wil*, emphasizes the search for hidden meanings, or the esoteric dimension of the text. The Sufis focus on the *ta'wil* tradition in their efforts to reveal the inner dimensions of spiritual life and challenge the more formal, rigid orthodox interpretations of Islam.

1 Hamid Algar has developed the framework of the Naqshbandī studies in the following works: "Some Notes on the Naqshbandī tariqat in Bosnia," *Welt der Islams*, 13 (1971), 168-203; idem., "The Naqshbandī Order: A Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica*, 44 (1976), 123-152; idem., "Shaykh Zaynillah Rasulev: The Last Great Naqshbandī Shaykh of the Volga-Ural Region," in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*, University of Duke Press, Durham, 1992, pp. 112-133; idem., "Bibliographic Notes on the Naqshbandī Tariqat," in G. F. Hourani (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science* Albany, The State University of New York Press, 1975, pp. 254-259; "The Naqshbandī Order in Republican Turkey," *Islamic World Report*, 1/3 (1996), 51-67. See also Martin van Bruinessen "The Origins of the Naqshbandī Order in Indonesia," *Der Islam*, 67/1 (1990), 150-179; idem., "The Origins and Development of Sufi Orders (Tarekat) in Southeast Asia," *Studika Islamika*, 1/1 (April-June 1994), 1-23; idem., *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan*, Zed Books, London, 1992, on Naqshbandiyya order, see pp. 222-265.

2 Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975; J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971.

3 Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, *The Eye of the Heart: An Introduction to Sufism and the Tariqats of Anatolia and the Balkans*, Redhouse, Istanbul, 1988, p. 1.

Sufism is a discipline that aims to teach one how to live without confining oneself to the materialistic dimension of life. It argues that there is one true experience in existence and it is the encounter with the sacred, the numinous, which is beyond human reasoning and is grounded in a supra-conceptual instinct that immediately calls a believer's attention to his or her finiteness in the face of God. This sacred presence penetrates the deepest psyche of the believer and additionally provides a map of conceptual meaning. This complex map of meaning is marked by the cluster of concepts of *sabır* (patience), *tevekkül* (trust in God), *fedakarlık* (sacrifice), and *edep ve haya* (ethics and morals).⁴ While morality tends to organize relations between individuals, religion defines the relationship between God and the individual. Sufism organizes mental dispositions in respect both to human virtue and ritual activity. Sufism seeks to instill higher moral values, *ihsan*, through the disciplining of the passions.⁵ Sufism can be viewed as being a constant search for new inner discoveries and a struggle for human perfection. The sacred cannot be perceived rationally. It is rather experienced as a "feeling tone." In the face of the mystery and tremendous nature of God man is both awed and speechless, yet imbued with a commitment to struggle against a world order determined by one-dimensional life-worldliness.

Strangely, modern Sufism proved to be a dominant spiritual vehicle in urban areas of modern Turkey. This is contrary to the traditional image of the Sufi ascetic life. It has attached itself to the cities because it offers individuals a comprehensive source of normative principles by which to deal with the conditions of modern urban life. However, Sufism should not be mistaken for true numenal experience; instead it is an abridgement which allows the individual to chart new discoveries of inner life, thus transcending the one-dimensionality of material existence.

Nineteenth Century Ottoman Experience

Today's Naqshbandis in Turkey have to a large extent grown out of the Khālidi-Naqshbandi branch.⁶ Since Mawlānā Khālīd devoted himself to promoting the moral and spiritual rebirth of the Muslim community gathered around the Ottoman caliphate, thereby strengthening its resistance against outside attacks, he pursued a careful and deliberate policy to penetrate the state by recruiting ulema and some high ranking bureaucrats.⁷ However, since Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1837) was suspicious of charismatic popular leaders and competing loyalties within the state, he banned the Naqshbandiyya-Khālidiyya order in Istanbul and exiled the sheikh. Under Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-1861), the expulsion and persecution ceased, and some Naqshbandiyya disciples were appointed to higher positions. During the reigns of Abdülmecid, Abdülaziz, and Abdülhamid II, the Naqshbandi order expanded its influence and became one of the most important forces between ruled and ruler. According to Albert Hourani:

4 Mehmet Ali Aynı, *Tasavvuf Tarihi*, Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1992; Mahir İz, *Tasavvuf*, Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1990, 5th ed., p. 73; Mustafa Kara, *Tasavvuf ve Tarikatler*, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, 1985; Erol Güngör, *İslam Tasavvufunun Meseleleri*, Ötüken Yayınları, İstanbul 1992.

5 E. Abdülhakim Arvasi, *Tasavvuf Bahçeleri*, Büyük Doğu Yayınları, İstanbul, 1983, pp. 16-17.

6 Kasım Kufralı, *Nakşibendiliğin Kurulması*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi Türkiyat Enstitüsü, 1949, pp. 102-112.

7 Hamid Algar, "Devotional Practices," p. 210.

Throughout the nineteenth century most educated Muslims who took their religion seriously and interpreted it within the framework created by the great Naqshbandī masters of spiritual life.⁸

The factors which facilitated the expansion of the Naqshbandiyya-Khālidiyya orders included: close alliance between the state and the order; worsening economic conditions of the nineteenth century; and external political pressures and military defeats. Each of these factors requires close attention. The Naqshbandī order increasingly treated the state as a necessary instrument for the realization of Islamic ideals. According to the Khālidi tradition, implementation of Islamic law at the state and societal level is the *sine qua non* for a just society. The state-centrism of the Naqshbandī was promoted by Sheikh Khālīd. He asked his followers to "pray for the survival of the exalted Ottoman state upon which depends Islam and for its victory over the enemies of religion."⁹

With respect to Ottoman political and cultural life the nineteenth century has been called the "century of the Naqshbandī."¹⁰ During the nineteenth century, important societal forces comprising state bureaucrats, intellectuals and notables were exploring ways in which to revitalize Muslim society. They sought to carry out the mission of societal transformation through traditional institutions such as the Naqshbandī order. To fulfil this mission they brought the life of the Prophet into focus. Muhammad was one of the most successful social engineers who transformed an ignorance, *cehalet*, into a new civilized, *medeni*, society based on law. The Naqshbandī examined the Prophet Muhammad's conduct and political leadership with a view to revitalize their contemporary society. The direct engagement with politics and social life was stressed by Mawlana Khalid and handed over to his successor Ahmed Gümüshanevi.¹¹

Sheikh Khālīd, like Imam Rabbani, was worried about the effects of modernization which they perceived as bad innovation, *bid'at*, and the disintegration of the Ottoman-Muslim community. Khalid felt that the Muslim community was on the wrong path and tried to emphasize the significance of the *sunna* for social life, and that "if the *umma* had gone astray, it was because of its rulers." Thus, following Sirhindi, Sheikh Khalid seems to have thought that the most important duty of Naqshbandī-Mujaddidi sheikhs was to seek to influence rulers and bring them to follow *sharī'a* rules.¹² One of the major reasons why the Khalidi branch managed to penetrate the Ottoman state was the religiously orthodox and politically activist doctrine of the order. Both the state and the Naqshbandīs were critical of heterodoxy in society. The ulema of Istanbul favored the order, too, in their fight against the heterodox Bektashis.¹³

The social basis of Naqshbandī activism was located among the merchants, the literati, bureaucrats, and urban notables. The European "other" was brought into the cities and towns through the commercialization of agriculture and the penetration of

8 Albert Hourani, "Sufism and Modern Islam: Mawlana Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, Macmillan, Oxford, 1981, p. 76.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

10 Martin van Bruinessen, "The Origins and Development of the Naqshbandi Order in Indonesia," *Der Islam*, 67 (1990), 151; *idem.*, "The Origins and Development of Sufi Orders (Tarekat) in Southeast Asia," *Studika Islamika*, 1/1 (1994), 15, 16.

11 Butros Abu-Manneh, "Shaykh Ahmed Ziyauddin el-Gumushanevi and the Ziya'i Khalid sub-order," in Frederick de Jong (ed.), *Shi'a Islam, Sects and Sufism: Historical Dimensions, Religious Practice and Methodological Considerations*, M.Th. Houtsma Stichting, Utrecht, pp. 105-117.

12 Butros Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, 22 (1982-84), 14.

13 Albert Hourani, "Sufism and Modern Islam: Rashid Rida," in *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, Macmillan, Oxford, 1981, p. 80.

capitalism; the position of the middle class was thereby severely undermined by Western imperialist penetration. The middle class expressed its reaction to European penetration by seeking to redefine society in terms of Islamic concepts. For those concerned with the economic and political weakness of the Muslim population the Naqshbandis offered leadership and an organizational vehicle for political independence and the economic revival of a Muslim community. The Naqshbandiyya has managed to confront the penetration of capitalism and modern ideas by establishing its own competing network system. The Naqshbandi constantly protested against the Westernizing policies of Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. They even instigated the Kuleli Incident of 1859, an anti-reform protest which demanded the full restoration of Islamic law.¹⁴

The Naqshbandi order remained very critical of the Tanzimat Reform policies of the Ottoman bureaucrats and saw them as an attempt to disconnect Islam from the state.¹⁵ At the same time, the Naqshbandi order has also undergone change, thereby playing a key role in the formation of a society based on constitutionalism and human rights. In contrast to many of those engaged in the theoretical debates that surrounded the new idioms in Ottoman society, the Naqshbandi order, in interpreting the new idioms through the prism of the *shari'a* and the *sunna*, was a grassroots and activist movement. Although tribal in origin, it should be noted that the Naqshbandiyya has been more influential in cities than in rural areas. The Khālidī branch of the Naqshbandiyya has clear elitist qualities, finding its greatest adherents in learned individuals, merchants, bureaucrats, and notables.

The transformation of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century took place as a result of the penetration of Western capitalism which brought along the introduction of the railroad, universal education, and the rise of a public opinion. Capitalist penetration made small business groups, artisans, and farmers vulnerable to external pressures. In order to protect their interests, these groups resorted to Islamic symbols and rhetoric which, in turn, politicized Islamic identity. Studying the life of the Prophet Muhammad helped to make abstract precepts more concrete and created a shared moral understanding among Muslims.

The 1878 Russo-Ottoman War was a catalyst in the transformation of the order's strategies.¹⁶ Gümüşhanevi's direct involvement in the war as well as in *hadith* study, e.g., *Ramuz*, very important indicators for the formation of this new social and political Islam which stressed activism. The Naqshbandi order quickly adopted modern concepts such as the rise of nation, *vatan*, and freedom and moved to regulate and respond to the modern needs of the Muslim community. The order could be mobilized by systemic changes, but it, as a political agent, now sought to restructure social and political life in terms of Islamic principles. For example, Gümüşhanevi asked his disciples to participate in the 1878 war to protect the nation, *vatan*, religion, *din*, and the state, *devlet*.¹⁷ The destructive defeat of the Ottomans and loss of large territories forced the order to engage in social, cultural, and political activities. One result of the war was a mass exodus from the Balkans and the Caucasus and the destruction of historic Muslim villages and towns, which became a heavy trauma for the whole nation. One effect of this confrontation was that Islam was treated as an ideology of re-

14 Naqshbandi participation in the Kuleli Incident, see Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası Hakkında Bir Araştırma*, TTK, Ankara, 1937, pp. 30, 60-64.

15 A. Hourani, "Sufism," p. 95.

16 The *rabita* was also used by political authorities to develop close connections between the sultan and the population. In other words, the concept of *rabita* might have been the reason why the Ottomans remained very tolerant towards this branch.

17 H. Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary," p. 149.

sistance and restructuring. To conclude, the Naqshbandiyya of the nineteenth century became a vehicle for the preservation of Islam and a motivating force for mass mobilization against the penetration of capitalism and modern institutions that unsettled traditional society. The Naqshbandiyya, as a protest movement based on religious solidarity, became an instrument for articulating the interests of urban small business groups and farmers. Thus, in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, the Naqshbandiyya constituted most influential *tariqa*. In Istanbul alone, they had over 60 lodges, more than any other order.¹⁸

In the Ottoman Empire, the Naqshbandiyya was an institution that helped establish a sense of community among different Muslim groups.¹⁹ The Naqshbandis were reactivated by the expansion of capitalism along with new technologies of communication and transportation that came with European penetration. In this context the order stressed Islamic principles and Ahmed Gümüshanevi trained over 20 caliphs or deputies and asked them to initiate their own *tekkes*. The Naqshbandiyya of the nineteenth century became a vehicle for the preservation of Islamic teaching, and an institutional frame for mass mobilization against Western colonialism.

More recent trends of revivalism among the Naqshbandiyya is a search for an "authentic" identity and the control of resources on a broader basis. Whereas nineteenth century revivalism focused on political transformations, the Islamist movements of more recent decades primarily seek social and economic power which indirectly can be extended to shape the policies of the state. For example, during the War of Liberation, Naqshbandiyya played a critical role in the mobilization of the populace. The *Özbekler tekkesi* in Üsküdar, for instance, provided a shelter for high ranking officials against the occupying allied forces. İsmet İnönü, the deputy of Mustafa Kemal, stayed in this lodge, which offered logistical support to many other nationalist figures.²⁰ Some other prominent Naqshbandi leaders took active part in the War of Liberation. For example, Hasan Feyzi Efendi of Erzincan led the mobilization against occupation troops in Erzincan and Bayburt.²¹ In the examination of the history of the Naqshbandi order, we encounter several breaks and renewals, which have taken place during major socio-political upheavals. This ability to adjust to new situations and to develop new arguments neutralizes the hostile propaganda of opponents who seek to identify the movement as fundamentalist or an "enemy" of modernity. For example, the Naqshbandis fully supported the Turkish War of Independence but protested against the radical and authoritarian secular transformation of the system by Mustafa Kemal.²²

18 H. Algar, "Naqshbandi Order in Republican Turkey," *Islamic World Report*, 3 (1996), 54.

19 Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1983, 2nd ed., p. 70; idem., "The Nakshbendi Order of Turkey," in *Fundamentalism*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1990, p. 206.

20 Kadir Mısırlıoğlu, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Sarıklı Mücahitler*, Mizan, İstanbul, 1969, pp. 263-273.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 263-273; Cevat Dursunoğlu, *Milli Mücadele'de Erzurum*, T.C. Ziraat Bankası, Ankara, 1946.

22 The Kemalist historians presented the Nakshbandis "backward" and as an obstacle to change. See for example, İlhan Selçuk who argues that "The Naqshi Dervish Vahdeti was the hero of the incident of 31 March, which aimed at the Second Declaration of Meşrutiyet of 1909. Dervish was hanged by the "progressive" forces of the state. After the abolition of the Caliphate, Sheikh Said, a Naqshbandiyya leader, instigated a rebellion against the reforms of Mustafa Kemal in 1924. In the Menemen Rebellion against Atatürk's Reforms, the Naqshi leader Dervish Mehmet cut off the head of the officer Kubilay. Dervish Mehmet was later hanged by the state. Said Nursi took the Naqshi flag and carried it to Islamicize the country. Mehmed Zahid Kotku became the leader of the Naqshbandi in 1952. The Kotku's order developed under the protection of the state in the İskenderpaşa Mosque, which functioned as a garrison for the Naqshbandi activities. Kotku patronized and gave birth to Erbakan and the Özal brothers (Turgut and Korkut)." "Son Yüzyılda Nakşilerin Kilometre Taşları," *Cumhuriyet*, 3 August 1994.

The Naqshbandī leaders led a popular movement against the adoption of the new ideology of Westernization in 1925 and 1930. This resistance has in official historiography been merely treated as reactionary without examining the socio-political motives behind.²³ This was also the case with the 1909 demonstrations against the Young Turks, and also, the two anti-reform rebellions, namely the one of 1925 led by Sheikh Said and the one in 1930 in Menemen.²⁴ As a result of these two rebellions, the Parliament passed a series of draconian laws to implement their reforms, and suppress organized religious activity.

Kemalist Persecution

One of the most significant consequences of the birth of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal was a sustained campaign against traditional Islamic institutions, with Sufi orders being one of the chief targets. The Sufi orders were banned on 4 March 1924 under Legal Code 587, Halkevleri, or "People's Houses" were opened to promote officially recognized culture and strengthen popular forms of art and literature. Despite the state purges against religious figures and institutions, the Naqshbandī order managed to influence many rebellions against the reforms. According to Resat Halli, there were eighteen rebellions between 1924 to 1938 against the policies of the state, and most were led by Naqshbandi groups.²⁵ The most important ones were: the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), the Menemen Rebellion (1930), the Bursa Rebellion over the abolition of the Arabic call to prayer, *ezan* (1933), and the Iskilip Rebellion (1936). These incidents, and in particular the one in Menemen, are examined and presented by the official historiography as a clash between the forces of Darkness and Enlightenment. On 23 December 1930, a group of local Naqshbandī organized disturbances which were actually orchestrated by the state as a pretext to kill the most prominent sheikh Mehmet Esad (1847-1930). Even though there was no link between the incident and Mehmet Esad, the state arrested Esad and his elder son M. Ali Efendi. The latter was executed by hanging and, Esad while in jail, died or was poisoned to death on 4 March, 1931.²⁶

Under severe persecution by the state, the Sufi orders started to wither away. The policies of arrest, persecution, and execution continued, and the Naqshbandi order were identified as "a snake we have been unable to crush."²⁷ Despite these purges, the Khālidī Naqshbandīs were not as severely hit as other Sufi orders which were more dependent on the leadership of the sheikh and his lodge. Moreover, Mawlānā Khālid's particular interpretation of *dhikr* and *rabita* did not require any outward manifestation of religious rituals. Their recourse to inner spirituality made it easier to survive under the pressure from the secular authorities. The Naqshbandiyya-Khālidīyya was thus better suited than other *tariqas* to emerge as a

23 *Menemen İrtica Hadisesi*, Hariciye Vekaleti Matbuat Umumi Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 1931.

24 Mustafa Kara, *Din, Hayat, Sanat Açısından Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler*, Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul, 1980, pp. 327-335.

25 Reşat Halli, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Ayaklanmalar (1924-1938)*, Genel Kurmay Yayınları, Ankara, 1972.

26 Sadık Albayrak, *Şeriat Yolunda Yürüyenler ve Sürünenler*, Medrese Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1979, pp. 231-234; Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*, pp. 293-295. Mehmet Esad left a number of works: *Mektubat* (his letters to his followers which are regularly republished in monthly magazine *Altınoluk*); *Risale-i Nakşibendiye* (precepts and principles of Naqshbandi order); and *Kenzü'l-İrfan* (a collection of hadith with Turkish commentary). I would like to thank Ahmet Taşgetiren, the editor of *Altınoluk*, for bringing these works to my attention.

27 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Devrimler ve Tepkiler*, Goloğlu Yayınları, Ankara, 1972, p. 132.

matrix for the revival of organized Islamic movements in the more relaxed period of the 1950s.

The Naqshbandī tradition constituted the intellectual and historical groundwork for a new urban-Islamic discourse, led by figures such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Nurettin Topcu, and Sezai Karakoç. The formation of a new discourse indicates that Islamic acculturation goes hand-in-hand with accommodating different Islamist views and practices within conventional institutions. Kısakürek, Topcu, and Karakoç shaped the second generation of Islamist intellectuals active today, which includes Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel, İsmail Kara, Mustafa Kutlu, Rasim Özdenören, Erdem Beyazıt, and Ersin Gürdoğan. Most of these intellectuals, like the first generation, have close Naqshbandī connections. In a way, the long tradition of the Naqshbandī order has been transmitted to the new urban culture through these Islamist intellectuals. The fact of having been nourished and formed within a Sufi tradition distinguishes the Turkish Islamist intellectuals from Muslim intellectuals in other countries. Muhammed Abdu and Seyyid Qutub (1906-1966) of Egypt, for instance, treated Sufism as retrograde and suspect. Abu'l Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) of Pakistan called on his followers to denounce Sufism as a violation of the pristine Islam of the Prophet Muhammed. The Turkish Islamists appreciate the role of history and tradition and argue that the understanding of Islam is conditional upon a person's own experience. They are more liberal, open, and ready to reconcile differences within a democratic environment, rejecting slogans such as "Islamic revolution" and or "Islamic state."

In addition to being an incubator of the post-war generation of prominent Islamist intellectuals, the Naqshbandīs also helped to form the pro-Islamic National Order Party and the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. Mehmed Zahid Kotku, a sheikh of the Gümüşhanevi Naqshbandī order, mobilized his disciples, Necmettin Erbakan, Fehim Adak, Korkut Özal, Hasan Aksay, and Lütfü Doğan to form the Republic's first pro-Islamic party with the aim of healing the sharp rupture between traditional society and the Kemalist establishment. Kotku was to remain the spiritual guide of both parties while he was alive.²⁸

During the years of the NSP, Kotku favored an incremental approach to the political participation and "warned against premature attempts to establish an Islamic state in Turkey and stated a preference for the moral and cultural reorientation of Turkish society as a goal."²⁹ Furthermore, according to Halit İlhan, Kotku "was in favor of technology and did not hesitate to make use of any machine. He always encouraged people to establish firms and corporations, and stressed the significance of economic independence. His life was immersed in politics."³⁰

The Naqshbandīs, along with their complex web of institutions and practices, seek to expand their influence and create new social, cultural, and economic space outside of state control. The Sufi orders have turned out to be the major institutions for the aggregation of economic and political interests.


Identity Formation: The *İskenderpaşa Dergahı*

The case of the *İskenderpaşa Dergahı*, convent, indicates that many of those who are involved in contemporary Turkish Islamic social movements are not "deprived" people who suffer from anomie but are rather "enabled" people of Turkish society

28 Esad Coşan, "Thoughts on the Elections," *İslam*, (October 1991); Mehmet Sayoğlu, "Vefatının 15. Yılında Mehmet Zahid Kotku," *Yeni Şafak*, 12 November 1995.

29 Algar notes from his private conversation with Kotku in 1970 see "Political Aspects," p. 143.

30 Halit İlhan, "Bağımsızlığa Teşvik Etmiştir," *İslam*, (November 1992), 43.



Part of the Iskenderpaşa mosque complex in Fatih, Istanbul (Cengiz Kahraman, 1999).

who want to bring about change rather than passively react to socio-economic forces.³¹ In short, theories of relative deprivation, which treat social movements as growing out of membership in a group³² a disadvantaged position, relative to some other group do not apply in this case having. The revival of the Sufi orders is part of a broader process, since Islamic groups have become more involved through the general privatization of economic, educational and health services

In Istanbul there are four main Naqshbandī branches: the economically wealthiest and most influential one is the *Iskenderpaşa*, led by Professor Esad Coşan; the second most powerful branch is the *Erenköy Cemaati*,³³ with Musa Topbaş, a rich businessmen, as leader; the third, more conservative group is the *Ismail Ağa Cemaati*, led by Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu; and the largest fourth and one is the *Menzil Cemaati* of Adıyaman.³⁴ However, in this study I will focus only on the *Iskenderpaşa Dergahı* or *Cemaati*.

The Naqshbandī order is, and has been, an association of individuals who seek to reinforce and re-introduce the primacy of religion both in politics and ethnics. The *Iskenderpaşa Cemaati* had attempted to accomplish this by establishing their own economic, educational, and communicative networks. The individuals comprising the this *cemaat* are typically businessmen, ranging from wealthy executives in large national corporations to small merchants. The group is like a mixture of the Christian Coalition in the United States, with its political and religious agenda and strong media connections, on the one hand, and a large trade association, which seeks to protect its members from adverse political forces and economic instability, on the other.

Since the 1980 military coup, the Turkish state has receded from its heavy-hand-

31 Mary E. Hegland, "Introduction," in Richard T. Antoun and Mary E. Hegland (eds.), *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1987, pp. 2-3.

32 J. N. Gurney and K. J. Tierney, "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research," *Sociological Quarterly*, 23 (1982), 34.

33 Sadık Dana, *Mahmud Sami Ramazanoğlu*, Erkam Yayınları, Istanbul, 1991.

34 A. Selahattin Kınacı, *Şeyh Seyyid Muhammed Raşit Erol (K.S.A.)'nın Hayatı*, Menzil Yayınevi, Adıyaman, 1996.

ed social engineering and involvement in the subtelety of daily life. Although never having abdicated entirely their role in Turkish life, the Naqshbandīs, have now become much more overt and active in their goals and have filled the vacuum left by the state. For example, the Iskenderpaşa branch now utilizes and controls some national media outlets; its role in developing hospitals and other health care facilities is widespread; and its sponsorship of primary and secondary high schools has given many Turks the opportunity to turn away from state-sponsored institutions. Indeed, Turkey's late president, Turgut Özal, made public his connection with the İskenderpaşa branch of Naqshbandiyya.

The Iskenderpaşa offers both a case-study of a society-oriented Islamic movement and a model of horizontal Islamic identity building. Specifically, I argue that Iskenderpaşa's engagement in socio-economic segments of society that are not overtly religious in nature - such as the mass media, education, business- while continuing nonetheless with the primary religious purpose of promoting individual piety, constitutes an important model for Islam's future and peaceful co-existence with Western culture. The leader of the Iskenderpaşa order, Esad Coşan, argues that, unlike European culture, which, by its rationalistic overtones is in the process of destroying its moral fabric by marginalizing religion, Islam offers a more reliable path for the future. In terms of the order's relationship to the modern Turkish state and politics it emphasizes a gradualist and accomodationist program and concentrates its efforts on civil society. With an expanding private economy, the Naqshbandiyya has changed from being a state-oriented Islamic movement to become a society-oriented one.

However, I argue that the order's remarkable adaptive powers and pragmatism may lead to its decline, not so much because of state suppression or rivalry from other orders, but because of its smooth adaptation to capitalism and its integral involvement in Turkish politics, both of which may undermine the spiritual and cultural aspects of the order. The order may come to be characterized as a vacuous commercial enterprise rather than as a Sufi fraternity. Such a transformation, like that of Catholic orders in many Western states, may result in fragmentation of Islamic identity with different groups vying with each other for pre-eminence.

The Market Economy: Corporate Islamic Political Identity

In recent decades, the Naqshbandī order has been internally mobilized by more worldly needs. The order has, to a certain extent, become secularized, and in turn, religion has been modified by profane concerns. By focusing on the Iskenderpaşa, I will illustrate this transformation. The study of the Iskenderpaşa order is ultimately vital for four reasons: (i) the politically active character of the order constitutes a microcosm of the many changes taking place in Turkey at large; (ii) the Naqshbandīs are by far the most politically active of the existing *tariqas*; (iii) the order is also the most useful avenue for understanding the social interactions between politics and religion; (iv) it provides a substantial depository of documentary sources describing its development. In contrast to the Süleymancı, İsmail Ağa and Menzil communities, the Iskenderpaşa branch of Naqshbandiyya has adapted to the changing circumstances of Turkish politics in this century by assimilating the modern tools, something which other Islamic groups have been slow or skeptical to adopt.

The case of Iskenderpaşa illustrates that Islamic social movements do not function as a reaction to fundamental social and political disruption or massive deprivation. Instead, by opening private high schools, hospitals, radio stations, local TV

stations, commercial companies, printing houses, summer camps, and forming a reliable network among Naqshbandī businessmen, the order satisfies many needs of its followers. It also provides jobs in its own companies.³⁵ The Iskenderpaşa, like other Khālidī-Naqshbandī groups, is both cause and effect of the social transformations shaping state-society relations. The modern Islamic social movements in Turkey therefore are responsive to local as well as global aspects of social change.

Strategies chosen depend on the political context. For example, there is a close link between the degree of the state's autonomy and the cohesiveness of the order. If the political context is oppressive, the ties between followers are intensified and solidarity becomes a source of consensus. When the democratic environment flourishes, however, followers are inclined to emphasize other loyalties: club, union, or business association. Therefore as Turkey has been increasingly democratizing, the Iskenderpaşa has developed new means of communication such as periodicals and radio stations to keep its followers informed of current events. They have also opened new professional associations in medicine and law. All these activities compete with other loyalties by transforming Naqshbandī loyalty into a framework or a ground for accommodating professional loyalties. In this case, solidarity among the followers of the Iskenderpaşa order is built through creating a consensus on social and political issues.

One of the salient characteristics of the Iskenderpaşa order is that it is internally dynamic and externally defensive. By proclaiming superiority over other groups, such as, the Erenköy and Ismail Ağa Naqshbandī orders, the Nurcu, the Iskenderpaşa order is defining itself in relation to other Islamic groups. The internal borders are defined in relation to other Sufi orders. The internal borders are more important than the external ones which are automatically formed vis-à-vis the secular state.

Mehmed Zahid Kotku

The sheikh plays an important role in the transformation of the Sufi orders because it is around him that the order is structured. Mehmed Zahid Kotku, son of a Caucasian immigrant family, was born in Bursa in 1897. His father, Ibrahim Efendi, came from Daghestan when he was 16 years old and studied in Hamzabey Medresesi in Bursa. Ibrahim (Kotku) Efendi worked as imam and died in 1929 in the village of Izvat near Bursa. He studied in Oruçbey İbtidaisi, and subsequently at Maksem İdadisi. After his graduation, he went to Bursa Sanayi-i Nefisa school for technical training. During World War One, he was drafted into the army. While he was in Istanbul, the Empire was in the process of fragmentation, and he participated in public and private meetings to discuss the problems of the Empire and met with some Naqshbandī leaders.³⁶ He established a spiritual tie, *intisap*, to the Daghestani sheikh Ömer Ziya al-Dīn when he was 21 years old.³⁷

Kotku became the leader of the order after the death of Abdülaziz Bekkine of Kazan in 1952. He worked as an official imam in different mosques. In 1958, he was appointed to work as an imam at the İskenderpaşa mosque and worked there the rest of his life. He was never arrested by the police or questioned about his socio-re-

35 K. Yurteri, "Nakşiler Holdingleşiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 25 April 1994.

36 Mehmet Sayoğlu, "Mehmet Zahid Kotku: Kafkasya'dan Bursa'ya," *Yeni Şafak*, 12-14 November 1995.

37 Serdar Ömeroğlu, "Mehmet Zahid Kotku," *Milli Gazete*, 13-18 Kasım, 1988.

ligious activities. After one of his pilgrimages to Mecca in 1980, he became sick and died a week later. He was buried next to the other sheikh of the Naqshbandī order in the garden of Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul. The Turkish cabinet passed a special order for the burial of Kotku next to the Süleymaniye Mosque. The decision was taken by the Süleyman Demirel government before 1980 and implemented during the 1980 military intervention. This clearly demonstrates the power exercised by the order in government circles, leading the military commanders to implement this decision to demonstrate their partially different approach to religion and religious matters.

Many Sufi orders in modern Turkey, including different branches of the Naqshbandī order, claim Mehmed Zahid Kotku as the *qutb*, i.e., “pole” or “spiritual axis” of the 1960s and 1970s, in whom the perfect human being became fully manifest. One of the main reason why Kotku became the most powerful Sufi leader had to do with the quality of people around him: Turgut and Korkut Özal, Cevat Ayhan, Temel Karamolloğlu, Teoman Rıza Güner, Hilmi Güler, Nazif Gürdoğan, and many other public personalities. Many of Kotku’s followers became ministers (Korkut Özal, Lütfü Doğan, Fehim Adak), held office as prime minister (Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan), and president (Turgut Özal).³⁸

Kotku transformed the structure of the mosque-based community into a semi-political movement. The mosque, primarily the Iskenderpaşa, was no longer a place for elders to sit and pray. It became a center for shaping young people who later on came to occupy critical positions in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy³⁹ and in due course established the National Salvation Party. Kotku did not, however, see politics as the sole avenue to shape Turkey in accordance with his ideals. Instead he stressed economic progress and industrialization as a better means to develop society.⁴⁰ Kotku’s agenda modified the old Sufi saying: “*bir lokma, bir hurka*” (one piece of bread; one wollen cloak) and added “one Mazda.” By “one Mazda” Kotku meant an economically powerful Turkey.⁴¹ This meant a synthesis of tradition and modernity. In other words, he wanted his disciples to involve themselves in economic activity, not only in order to survive, but also to accumulate wealth and establish large firms. Kotku stressed both religious and worldly liberation. He wanted Muslims to control technology so that they could master their circumstances. His disciples were encouraged to become involved in trade and not in the civil service, since trade, for Kotku, freed individuals from pressures and created an economically and culturally powerful Turkey. He also emphasized education and human development as the engine of transformation. Kotku was a man of deep knowledge and was aware of the constraints of society. He treated the lack of ethics and concern for the inner self as the main impediment for the full realization of freedom.

Kotku wrote thirty books most of which have been published in third or fourth

38 For his Naqshbandiyya connection see his interview with Ruşen Çakır, *Cumhuriyet*, 27 Aralık 1991. Korkut Özal was born in 1929 and graduated from the Istanbul Technical University in 1951. In 1973, he entered the Parliament as a MP of the National Salvation Party from Erzurum. He became a Minister of Food and Agriculture and Minister of Interior. After the 1980 military coup, he worked in the private companies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

39 “Mehmet Zahid Kotku Hocaefendi Rahmetle Anıldı,” *Zaman*, 30 Kasım 1994.

40 Coşkun Yılmaz, “Mehmet Zahid Efendi (K.S.) ve İktisadi Hayat,” *İslam*, (Kasım 1994), p. 26.

41 In response to a question Lütfü Doğan, MP of the pro-Islamic Prosperity Party, at his office in the Grand National Assembly said “by ‘one Mazda’ they mean an economically up-to-date Turkey since Mazda was the best car in the market in the 1980s. Moreover, you should note that “Mazda” is a Japanese car and there is admiration of Japan for what they have achieved without giving up their tradition.”

editions.⁴² Since 1865, each sheikh has been writing his own books as a guide to deal with contemporary problems and in which the sheikh reinterprets *hadiths* to respond to challenges of his own period. An in-depth examination of Kotku's books reveals that the goal was to help Muslims to find their inner self through cultivating Islamic consciousness. By this method of digging within the self, Kotku sought to preserve the moral aspect of Islam by developing a code of conduct. Kotku's *Müminlere Vaazlar* (Sermons to the Faithful), seeks to consolidate Muslim faith through moral allegories from the period of the Prophet Muhammad. In the corpus of his writings, a struggle emerges over the question of how to close the gap between daily human issues and practices and Islamic morality.⁴³



Iskenderpaşa mosque in Fatih, Istanbul (Cengiz Kahraman 1999).

In his writings, Kotku brings diverse social, political, economic and other spheres of human life into an integrated Sufi ethic.

Islam, for Kotku, is a depository of moral arguments and the shared language of a community to mold the unformed future. One might sum up the writings of Kotku in the following way: peaceful community cannot exist without a shared language of Islam; communal justice and tranquility can only be realized by the internalization of Islamic mores; this internalization requires Sufi orders to cultivate the inner self of each believer. Kotku sought to articulate and consolidate shared mores to highlight questions of the sources of the self, community, social justice and the legitimacy of the state. Kotku's focal point was disciplining the soul and investing a cognitive map within each believer to form a well-ordered society. After Kotku's struggle to redefine the role of Islam in the community and economic spheres, Esad Coşan reinvented the Iskenderpaşa as a model for political associations and economic corporations. In this process, the image of God has been redefined and Coşan's presentation of the market implies that Muslims think about the "hidden hand" in the market as reflection of the hand of God.

42 Some of Mehmed Zahid Kotku's major works are: *Tasavvufi Ahlak*, 5 vols. *Nefsin Terbiyesi*; *Ana Baba Hakları*; *Cennet Yolları*; *Ehl-i Sünnet*; *Müminlere Vaazlar*, 2 vols.; *Hadislerle Nasihatler*, 2 vols.; *Alim*; *İlim*; *Müminlerin Vasıfları*; *Cihad*; *Namaz*; *Zikrullah'ın Faydaları*; *Tevhid*; *Tevbe*; *İman*; *Sabır*; *En Güzel Ameller*; *Oruç*; *Zekat*; *Hac*; *Cömertlik*; *Yemek Adabı*; *Zulüm*; *Faiz*; *Korku ve Ümit*; *İçki*; *Ölüm*; *Özel Sohbetler*.

43 Seyfi Say, "Mehmed Zahid Kotku'yu Anarken," *İslam*, (November 1991), 40-47.

Corporate Structure

According to some disciples, Mehmed Zahid Kotku, openly indicated his desire to see his son-in-law, Esad Coşan, leader of the *dergah*.⁴⁴ The Iskenderpaşa branch has two main centers in Istanbul. One of them is located around the Iskenderpaşa Mosque in Fatih in the European part of Istanbul. The Iskenderpaşa Mosque has a large open place where people meet before and after praying. The garden is surrounded by several small rooms. One of the rooms is used to prepare coffee and sandwiches. Outside the walls of the mosque there are many small shops and people also use these shops as a place to socialize. The mosque and the small shops around it, constitute a public space in which individuals meet and exchange ideas. Since the Iskenderpaşa Mosque is open to all Muslims, non-Naqshbandīs also attend the mosque and interact with Naqshbandīs. This interaction makes possible the comparison between different interpretations of the faith carried by individuals from different backgrounds.

The other location, which has been constructed by Coşan, is centered around the Mehmed Zahid Kotku Mosque in Küçükçamlıca, an exclusive area on the Asia Minor side of the city. This has become the center of publishing and radio broadcasting. Professor Esad Coşan himself lives near the Kotku mosque in Küçükçamlıca, within an exclusive complex. The furniture in his house is very modern and the room in which he receives his guests includes several works of original art on the walls and gifts from all over the world. (He also has a house in the village Ahmetce in Çanakkale province.) In comparison to Kotku's house and life style, Coşan represents a new mind-set and a determination to modernize the institutional aspects of the order. Moreover, in modern Turkey authority and respect has gradually become associated with consumption patterns, and Coşan's case indicates the degree of acculturation, that has taken place in this regard.

Most of the meetings and lectures take place in the Iskenderpaşa Mosque. But Coşan, unlike Kotku, does not live next to the mosque. By not doing this, he separates the public from the private.

Professor Coşan publicly discusses the course of international and domestic events in order to interpret them for his community. One can learn Coşan's opinions on numerous topics from his regular editorials published in Naqshbandiyya magazines like *Islam*, *Panzehir*, *Kadin ve Aile*, and *Ilm ve Sanat*. The editor of one of his magazines explains the process through which Esad Coşan keeps in touch with the media. One of his students summarizes the news and faxes it on to Professor Coşan. If Coşan requires more information, the whole newspaper is provided. I also learned that he follows the international media through the official Digest of Foreign News.⁴⁵ Moreover, followers outside Turkey send him news about Turkey and Muslim countries. In the office of the magazine, I saw the Digest of Foreign News which was marked by Professor Esad Coşan himself. The news items marked included those on the Cyprus question, the elections in South Africa, war in Bosnia, and economic growth in Malaysia. Coşan asked the people at the magazine to collect all the articles on Samuel Huntington's essay "The Clash of Civilizations." Huntington's controversial article is looked upon as being very authoritative in the West and along with the Bosnian genocide for Coşan served to form the contention that "the West" is ready to annihilate Muslims. Since 1993, Coşan has written several essays on this issue and argues:

44 Professor Esad Coşan was born in 1938 in Çanakkale and grew up in Istanbul. His grandfather and father were both Naqshbandi. He graduated from Vefa High School and studied Arabic-Persian Philology in Istanbul University. After his graduation in 1960, he was appointed as a teaching assistant to İlahiyat Faculty of the Ankara University and he became a professor at the same University. He retired in 1987. Coşan has three children: two girls who have studied in Turkey and a son who has studied business in the United States.

45 This is printed by the Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü.

"[the] present super powers see Islam as an enemy or target to be destroyed. This is very important and every Muslim must pay attention to this argument because Turkey is part of this target. The terror in the East and Southeast, clashes between Alevi and Sunni, conflict between secular and religious, veiled and unveiled, corruption, and moral degradation . . . are all manifestations of this treacherous plan to destroy us."⁴⁶

All these indicate that Coşan is not isolated or merely involved in religious issues, but very much engaged in a struggle to shape and interpret social and political events. The *Iskenderpaşa Dergahı*, has become a major interpreter of Muslim understanding of modernity.

Stretching the Borders of Modernity

If modernity is defined as not only rationalism and socio-economic development, but also as the creation of a new idiom of pluralist ethics involving the defense of social and civil rights and opposition to oppression, then modernity can be considered an indispensable part of contemporary Islamic movements.

The *Iskenderpaşa* is not only dealing with essentially spiritual issues. It is also a web for identity formation, creating informal organizations for mass mobilization against social dislocation and corruption. One of the major characteristics of the order is that it seeks to restructure society and the polity in terms of Islamic moral values. Whenever Turkish society perceives a threat to its unity and stability, one witnesses a revitalization of Islamic practices by the Naqshbandi order. The order uses its institutional and conceptual dynamics for the mobilization of an Islamic consciousness in Turkey. The confrontation with different cultures and close interaction with the symbols of the "other" have transformed the Naqshbandi order. This interaction has served gradually to bring some of its lofty goals down to earth. The order's transformation has led to a well-anchored "project" of mobilizing Muslims against perceived social decadence by using media, education, economic institutions (such as banking and trade) to bring about change.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Sufi orders often provided particular channels of upward mobility for individuals of lower socio-economic status, and thus created their own fragments of political power."⁴⁷ For example, in response to rapid economic growth in Turkey during the 1980s, Naqshbandi connections became useful in establishing businesses, obtaining credit and scholarships from Islamic banking sectors, and holding on to certain political positions. The reason why many politicians sought to make public their ties with the *Iskenderpaşa* has to do with the very real political and economic benefits which accrued from such a connection.

The *Iskenderpaşa* also promoted the circulation of ideas and the development of new intellectuals in society by publishing them through its magazines and radio stations and, by doing so, marketed its own intellectuals and representatives. Coşan calls upon his disciples to study foreign languages, use computers, establish connections with the outside world and to visit foreign countries.⁴⁸


Coşan views trade and commerce as a way of shaping society and the collective consciousness. He argues that you must take foreign trade seriously because "one road to success is success in trade."⁴⁹ In his later writings, trade and economic enter-

46 Esad Coşan, "Daha Ne Duruyor, Neyi Bekliyoruz," *İslam*, (Nisan 1995), 5.

47 F. Birtok and B. Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neoliberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazard of Rewriting Modernity," *Praxis International*, 13/2 (1993), 199.

48 Esad Coşan, *Yeni Dönemde Yeni Görevlerimiz*, SEHA, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 118-120.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 119.



Prof. Dr. Esad Coşan.

prising are emphasized more than politics. Indeed, some of his speeches and articles are very similar to the speeches of presidents of corporations informing shareholders about the economic condition of a company. Worship for God, for a follower of Coşan, can be realized in the market place. Coşan says:

“trade is real and permanent in an individual’s life. Other activities are utopic, hypothetical, imaginary; whereas, trade is the most realistic. As far as I am concerned, those who do not have trade experience do not turn out to be good humans. The most pragmatic and realistic people are businessmen and merchants. If a businessman is also a Muslim, he is the most in tune with his religious station in life.”⁵⁰

What took place in the second half of the 1980s was a struggle by the Iskenderpaşa to reconstitute the social and economic structure of Turkey in

terms of a shared language of fundamental symbols. This was also the beginning of the “business orders,” *tariqa ticariyyah*, which led to the rationalization of Islamic precepts. In other words, Qur’anic verses were turned into slogans as a project in social engineering. During this period, the mystical and heterodox features of Islam and of Sufism were significantly reduced. This was a process of de-localizing Islam and recreating a new, abstract, highly centralized and economically conscious Islam, which was embraced by the modern urban population.

The Iskenderpaşa helped foster the creation of a new code of conduct by examining the life of the Prophet Muhammad in terms of modern challenges. The Naqshbandi order stressed the role of the Prophet Muhammad over that of an abstract God, so as to provide a more concrete model for the public, which is characterized and identified with the period of the “*Tarikah Muhammadiyyah*” in which Muslims were called on to build their own economies and communities to meet modern challenges.⁵¹

This confrontation forced the Iskenderpaşa to use print as a “discursive space” to criticize what, from its perspective, were negative developments. The magnitude of the challenges presented by these external forces encouraged the order to stress the need for modern communications to mobilize the masses.

The Iskenderpaşa order has been very successful in changing the internal dynamics of cultural norms through redefining the role of culture and development. They do not differentiate culture from technology but rather treat culture as a base for economic development. The order has been through the social dynamics of this century: the fact that war-like competition is waged in the economic and technological fields.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁵¹ John Voll, “Hadith Scholars and Tariqah: An Ulema Group in the 18th century Haramayn and Their Impact in the Islamic World,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 15/3-4 (1980), 270; Anne Marie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, 1975, p. 277; idem, *Muhammad is His Messenger*, Chapel Hill, 1985, p. 226.



Adapting to modern times: The sign at the entrance door to the Iskenderpaşa mosque in Fatih says: "For a peaceful prayer, *namaz*, please keep your cellular telephones closed." (Cengiz Kahraman 1999).

This is clearly articulated by Gürdoğan when he states that the survival of Islam would be problematic without an economic base.⁵² After the liberalization of the economy and its own disengagement from the Welfare Party, the Iskenderpaşa discovered new spheres within which to pursue their vision of a coherent society, and to generate financial resources for its social and educational activities. To this end, it has established several firms and companies. With its own publication houses and radio stations, the Iskenderpaşa sees the accommodation of modernity as an inherent part of its tradition. In 1994, the order's companies had more than 1,500 employees: the Iskenderpaşa's Health Foundation has four hospitals:⁵³ Akşa Kliniği, Güneşli Akşa Kliniği, Sadiye Hatun Kliniği, and Sağlık Bilimleri Enstitüsü and Hospital; it owns SEHA Publishing and Printing and Trade Company (Matbaacılık Nesriyat ve Ticaret A.Ş.), VEFA Publishing (Yayıncılık), AKRA Ak Radio and TV Co., DEHA Printing Graphic and Reproduction Co. The order has one labour confederation, HAKYOL, and one cultural foundation, ILKSAV. Some scholars treat this participation in economic and social life as the "protestantation of Islam," an expression that does not provide a full or accurate picture. The Sufi orders are involved in overt economic activity, but this has not fully been articulated as an "idiom of individuality."⁵⁴

The Iskenderpaşa order argues that pressing social and economic problems cannot be solved by political means, but rather through the formation of a new consciousness or engaging in experience engendered by the latter. In this transformation, Islam can and should play a formative role by offering new alternatives and stressing the human factor. Gürdoğan argues that persons should affect their society in terms

⁵² Nazif Gürdoğan, "Tüketim Ekonomisine Başkaldırmanın En Etkin Yolu Tasavvuf," *Makaleler*, 8/92-95 (1984), 108-115.

⁵³ *İslam*, (Aralık 1993), 7.

⁵⁴ *İslam* has always encouraged Muslims to involve themselves in trade. While the desert was the birthplace of Islam, it was in cities that Islamic institutions and high culture developed. Moreover, the mosque was traditionally circled by a marketplace and this has been the case in many Anatolian towns. The *pazar* (market) is a defining characteristic of Ottoman city.

of their "spirit". The existence of the sacred is expressed by human action and norms. This also converts worldliness into sacredness. After a believer discovers this universal awareness of God's scheme, Gürdoğan states that such a person seeks to objectify this subjectivity through the personality of the Sufi leader. Moreover, this universal consciousness is also articulated in terms of a community. Through this objectification, God and religious norms enter practice in social life. Here one sees the externalization of belief, i.e., ideas are made concrete in terms of communal practices. Moreover, the main Naqshbandī goal is to restructure society, rather than the state. This shift in focus from the state to society is a new development, and it assists in the democratization of Turkey by increasing the range of social groups participating actively in the increasingly pluralistic socio-political environment.

Conclusion

The analytical study of the Naqshbandī order is very important in understanding that the Sufi orders' ability to adapt to new socio-political conditions also elucidates their power to shape society. Through the Naqshbandī order, it becomes apparent that Islam (as cultural and social signifier) should not be understood as a self-contained reality, but rather as a historically evolving belief system. Islam, as in the case of the *Iskenderpaşa Dergaht*, is an on-going discovery of the revealed knowledge in which different branches of the Naqshbandī order compete to assert their own hegemonic interpretation.

At the frontiers of the interplay between state and society, the Iskenderpaşa has several features of great importance. The order articulates rapid social and economic changes in terms of shared Islamic idioms, thus building a common cognitive map to situate social changes. The Naqshbandiyya in the Turkish context has managed to reconceptualize the processes of modernity by reimagining Islam. The Naqshbandī accommodated themselves to these social, economic, and political changes. Expanding trade created a new middle class which became the basis of Islamic activism during the tenure of Turgut Özal. The Islamic movements of the 1980s had a strong middle class dimension, and the revival of the Naqshbandī order was a response to the ideological and political needs of the middle class.

The Iskenderpaşa order has served as the matrix for the emergence of major post-war Islamic movements. It has also been subject to a far reaching transformation in religious discourse and associational life as a result of the economic development of the country. This has changed its character from being a *tekke*-based, small-sized community, to a "community" based on textual and therefore more anonymous relationships.

A Portrait of a Naqshbandī Sheikh in Modern Turkey

FULYA ATACAN

In the course of history, the Naqshbandī order spread throughout the Islamic world. Since the nineteenth century, the Khālidi branch of Naqshbandiyya has been the most influential branch not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in modern Turkey.¹

Osman Hulusi Ateş was a prominent Naqshbandī sheikh whose spiritual *silsila* (chain of initiation) goes back to Mawlānā Khālīd. In this article, the life of Osman Hulusi Ateş and his social position in the community will be discussed, based on data mainly collected from his disciples between 1990 and 1992.

The Life Story of Osman Hulusi Ateş

Osman Hulusi Ateş was born in Darende,² a district of Malatya, in the eastern part of Anatolia in 1914. His father, Hasan Feyzi was a preacher in the Hamid-i Veli mosque, until his death in 1945. The name of the mosque indicates the family's genealogical pedigree. It is claimed that Osman Hulusi Ateş's father and mother were descendants of the Prophet through Hamid-i Veli and Taceddin-i Veli.³

The first written source that supports this claim of being a *seyyid* (descendant of the prophet) was published by the *Şeyh Hamid-i Veli Camisi Onarma ve Koruma Derneği*⁴ in 1965. In this book, it is claimed that Hamid-i Veli, who is also known as Somuncu Baba,⁵ was buried in the tomb of the Hamid-i Veli mosque in Darende. In

1 About Mawlānā Khālīd and the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshbandī *tarikat* see: H. Algar, "A Brief History of the Naqshbandī Order," in M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic, T. Zarccone (eds.), *Naqshbandiyya: Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order*, Editions ISIS, Istanbul, 1990, pp. 28-39; D. W. Damrel, "The Spread of Naqshbandī Political Thought in the Islamic World," *ibid.*, pp. 275-286; H. Algar, "Political Aspects of Naqshbandī History," *ibid.*, pp. 136-149; B. Abu-Manneh, "Khalwa and Rabita in the Khālidi Suborder," *ibid.*, pp. 289-302; B. Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, 1984, N. V-XXII, 1-36; A. Hourani, "Sheik Halid and the Naqshbandi Order," in S. M. Stern, A. Hourani, V. Brown (eds.), *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, Cassirer, Oxford, 1972, pp. 94-100.

2 Darende is a fertile plain which is situated along the slopes of a mountain range (eastern Taurus Mountains) and watered by the Tohma suyu (a tributary of the Euphrates River). Principal economic activity is apricot production.

3 With respect to Hamid-i Veli, written sources did not approve this claim. The family claims that Taceddin-i Veli was from Medine and he worked as a judge (*kadı*) in Diyarbakır. He died in 650/1252. It is claimed that Osman Hulusi Ateş's mother Fatıma Hanım was from this family.

4 Hulusi Ateş established the *Şeyh Hanīd-i Veli Camiini Onarma ve Koruma Derneği* (Association for the Protection and Restoration of the Sheikh Hamid-i Veli Mosque) in 1961.

5 Hamid-i Veli was born in 1325 in Kayseri died in 1413. It is a disputed subject where he was buried. Some people claim that he was buried in Aksaray, Bursa while others claim that he was buried in Darende. He travelled Damascus, Tebriz, Erdebil and Bursa. He is also known as Somuncu Baba because of his work as a baker in Bursa. He had an *icazet* from Khalwati and Naqshbandī orders. There is no proof that he was a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. "Hamid-i Veli (Kayseri 1325-Darende 1413)," *Büyük Türk Klasikleri*, vol. 3, Ötüken-Söğüt Yayınları, Istanbul, 1986, p. 13-14; A. Akgündüz,

order to eliminate other claims, which insist that he was buried in Bursa, it is said that there are two tombs, one in Bursa and the other in Aksaray, which are also known by his name. However, these are places where he stayed for only a short period of time. The genealogical pedigree of Hulusi Efendi⁶ is summarised in the above mentioned book. In this summary, Hamid-i Veli is presented as a descendant of the Prophet and Hulusi Efendi is presented as a descendant of Hamid-i Veli. By implication, it is demonstrated that he is a descendant of the Prophet. At the beginning of the 1990s, other books concerning this subject were published. Based on historical documents, one of these books showed that Hulusi Ateş was the descendent of Somuncu Baba,⁷ but it is said that there was no evidence supporting the claim that Somuncu Baba was a *seyyid*. The author claims that since the family was related to Sheikh Abdurrahman Erzincani, who was a *seyyid*, it is possible that Hulusi Ateş was a *seyyid*.⁸ The family claims that Hulusi Efendi's mother was also from a *seyyid* family. As will be discussed later, being a descendent of the Prophet gave him a special place among the other sheikhs in contemporary Turkey.

Even though Hulusi Efendi and his disciples claim that his father was a Naqshbandi, it is not clear whether he was a Naqshbandi sheikh or just a *murid*, disciple. The local people know his father as *hatip*, preacher. It is said that the family was quite well off during the Ottoman Empire. However, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, their right to obtain revenues from the endowments was abolished and the family became quite poor.⁹

According to Hulusi Efendi's disciples, he was initiated into the Naqshbandi order when he was five. The story about his initiation is as follows: "One day, Ehrancizade İsmail Hakkı Toprak, who was a Naqshbandi sheikh in Sivas, came to Darende. While he was looking for the house of one of his disciples, he saw Hulusi playing on the street and asked him whether he knew him, whereupon he showed him where the house was. Ehrancizade İsmail Hakkı Efendi liked this boy very much and he wanted to give him some money. But Hulusi rejected the money and said "I do not want money but I want *himmət* (grace).¹⁰" The disciples of Hulusi Efendi interpret this story as his initiation into the Naqshbandi order and they emphasize Hulusi Efendi's difference from the other children by saying "You see, he was different from the others even when he was five. Can you show me a child who can refuse money? Nevertheless, he was a child. He could have taken the money and could have bought candy. But what did he do, he refused the money and what is more he asked for *himmət*."

Ehrancizade İsmail Hakkı Toprak was born in 1296/1880 in Sivas.¹¹ His family

Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Somuncu Baba ve Neseb-i Alisi, Es-Seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Vakfı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995.

6 Osman Hulusi Ateş is referred as Hulusi Efendi in the town and his disciples called him "my Efendi". I will use Osman Hulusi Ateş and Hulusi Efendi interchangeably.

7 Akgündüz wrote Hulusi Ateş's genealogical pedigree. A. Akgündüz, *ibid.*, pp. 148-153.

8 Abdurrahman Erzincani was the caliph of Safiyyüddin Erdebili. See A. Akgündüz, *ibid.* pp. 27-37, 147. It is claimed that Somuncu Baba married Abdurrahman Erzincani's daughter, Necmiye Sultan. N. Toprak, "Şeyh Abdurrahman Erzincani Camii," *Somuncu Baba*, 4 (1995), 29.

9 Interview with Muhittin Tütüncü in Sivas in 18.06.1991. Akgündüz published some documents concerning the endowments of Somuncu Baba in Darende. A. Akgündüz, *ibid.*, pp. 85-142.

10 The concept of *himmət* is widely used by Naqshbandis. Literally, it means the protection and help given by pious man. The indicator of having *himmət* in daily life is not only spiritual development of the person but also material improvement of his living conditions. There are only a few people who considered having *himmət* from Hulusi Efendi.

11 İ. H. Altuntaş, *Nakşibendi Şeyhi İsmail Hakkı Toprak'ın Hayatı ve Menkıbeleri*, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1992, unpublished graduation thesis, p. 6. Eraydın wrote his date of birth as 1306/1888. S. Eraydın, "İsmail Hakkı Toprak (K.S.)", *Somuncu Baba ve Es-seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Es-seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Vakfı Yayınları, no. 11, Ankara, 1997, p. 146.

was originally from Bukhara. Since his family dealt with the renewal of the cloth of Kaba and its upkeep, they were known as Ehamrcılar. His father, Hüseyin Hüsnü, was an army officer (*kolağası*) in Sivas. His mother, Ayşe, who was from Medina, was a descendant of the Prophet. İsmail Hakkı Toprak received his education in Şifaiyye Medresesi in Sivas. During the republican period, he first worked as a postman and then as a clerk at the Turkish State Liquor and Tobacco Monopoly, where he retired as director. He was fluent in Arabic and Persian. It is said that he had *icazets*, authorizations, from twelve different Sufi orders. He was initiated into the Naqshbandi order, along with Mustafa Haki (1856/57-1920) and received the title of caliphate from him.¹² He married three times.¹³ He died in 2 August 1969.¹⁴ His disciples are scattered through Sivas, Malatya, Adana, Amasya, Ankara and Istanbul.

Hulusi Efendi and his brother became disciples of Ehamrcızade İsmail Hakkı and obtained their religious education from him. I have been told that he used to pray to God saying "These are *evlad-ı resul* (descendants of the Prophet). God, help me to educate them without hurting them." In order to explain to me how much Ehamrcızade İsmail Hakkı liked them, the disciples told me that Ehamrcızade İsmail Hakkı addressed them as "my son."

Ehamrcızade İsmail Hakkı married Naciye Hanım in 1938. Even though it is claimed that she was a daughter of a famous family, nobody knows why or just how famous that family was.¹⁵ The following year, Hulusi Efendi went to Maraş to do his military service. *Keramets*, miracles, of Hulusi Efendi during his military service and anecdotes about that time emphasize that he performed his religious obligations even when he was a soldier and was respected by some of the officers.

The contents of the *keramets* constitute a very important source through which the sheikh's authority and the way it was legitimized in modern Turkey can be understood. Sufi orders have always been viewed by the *ulema* with a certain degree of suspicion, sometimes accused of being superstitious - something which is incompatible with Islam. In Republican Turkey, critics of the Sufi orders who regard them with suspicion and accuse them of being superstitious and backward are members of the secular elite. The army is considered to be the vanguard of Kemalist ideology, which was opposed to the existence of Sufi orders. The *keramets* of Hulusi Efendi in this period indicate that the criticism, which has always been made by members of this institution, is groundless. In these *keramets*, the authority of the sheikh over the officers was presented as an inevitable fact. Even though these officers had some prejudices towards the religious people, it was impossible for them to resist the power of a real sheikh. With his extraordinary manner, Hulusi Efendi made them more tolerant and the officers felt the need to pay respect to him.

After his military service, the question whether he should work became a bone of

12 İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, pp. 12-23. Eraydın wrote that after the death of Mustafa Haki in 1920, İsmail Hakkı Toprak became the disciples of Mustafa Taki Doğruyol (1873-1925) who took the office of sheikh after Mustafa Haki. So, he received the caliphate from Mustafa Taki Doğruyol. See, S. Eraydın, *ibid.*, pp. 146.

13 Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, polygamy was practised in the Ottoman Empire. His first wife died in 1949 and at the same date, he divorced his second wife. He married with Zeliha Toprak in 1950.

14 İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

15 Muhittin Tütüncü is the most sincere friend of Hulusi Ateş. They grew up together. Even though Muhiddin Tütüncü was older than Hulusi Efendi was, he always respected him. He is also one of the first people who took an oath of allegiance (*biat*) to Hulusi Efendi after the death of Ehamrcızade İsmail Hakkı Toprak. Only he said that she was from the family of Yenicehoğulları. But it is not clear whether this was just a name of the family or has some important connotations. Interview with M. Tütüncü in 18.06.1991 in Sivas.

contention between him and his father. He did not have a proper job. According to the anecdotes from this period, it is clear that his father was very annoyed with his son's unwillingness to work. His father beat him several times because he was just sitting with his closest friends and reading poems. He started to work as an apprentice in a carpenter's shop but he quit after a few days. In 1943, he opened a shop in a near village but he went bankrupt.¹⁶ Later he learned bookbinding and liked this job very much but his wife did not let him practice it. She said "Tell me who needs to have a book bound in this town. He was very good at this but I did not let him work. He bound his own books and I think that was all right, but as a job I rejected it." He worked as an imam and was paid by the community in surrounding villages for a short period.

This situation is not considered evidence of failure by his disciples. On the contrary, they emphasize this aspect of his personality showing that he had few worldly aspirations even though he was poor. In other words, with these stories, they emphasize that he lived as a dervish in the traditional sense of the word. In the context of a small town, being a sheikh is the job of these people. The sheikh must be attracted by divine love and must not pay any attention to this world. This way of understanding transforms Hulusi Efendi's failure into success and puts him in a special place in the community in the eyes of his disciples.

After his father's death, he worked as a voluntary imam at the Hamid-i Veli mosque until 1953. After this date, he worked at the same mosque as part of the permanent staff of the Directory of Religious Affairs until his retirement in 1987. It would be a mistake to consider this relation evidence of integration of the Sufi order into the official Islam in Turkey. As will be explained below, being an imam in the Hamid-i Veli mosque has a very important symbolic meaning for the family. They claim that they are the descendants of the Prophet through Hamid-i Veli, who was buried in this mosque. The family's genealogical pedigree is symbolised by these tombs. To be an imam at this mosque represents the continuation of this tradition. In 1925, *tekkes*, *zawias* and the titles related to these places were abolished. *Türbedarlık* (the office of *türbedar*, caretaker of a tomb) was also abolished and it became a crime to practice this task. Naturally, these prohibitions did not stop the activities of the Sufi orders but it removed their legitimacy in the new socio-political system of Turkey. In other words, the Sufi orders evaded the new legal system by maintaining their traditions rather than trying to get integrated into official Islam.

It is generally understood that being a member of a Sufi order or becoming initiated into it is not enough to become a sheikh in the future. The issue of who can become a sheikh and the way in which this is achieved needs to be addressed separately.

In the course of the long history of Sufi orders, the office of the sheikh would either be transmitted according to the hereditary pattern, or the sheikh would be chosen by the elite of the order, or an aging sheikh would determine his successor. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, it frequently was the case that the central authorities confirmed or appointed a sheikh to office. Examining how Hulusi Efendi became a sheikh may enable us to understand this process in modern Turkey, in the context of a small town.

As indicated above, being a descendant of the Prophet is considered by his disciples to be one of Hulusi Efendi's important characteristics. One of his disciples explained the importance of this sacred blood relation in the following way: "The *shari'a* will not disappear as long as a single *seyyid* remains in this world. This is

¹⁶ An interview with Mevlut Sarioğlu in Sivas in 18.06.1991. He is the disciple of Hulusi Efendi and he worked as a mufti in Sivas.

because no one but the *seyyids* have the power to fully support *shari'a*." It is clear that this sacred blood relation is considered to be a vital source for the continuation of Islam. *Seyyids* are the real protectors of Islam and they are able to maintain and preserve it under all conditions. How this sacred blood relation overlapped with the *murshid-murid*, teacher-pupil, relationship must be examined.

The primary virtue of Hulusi Efendi, which was emphasized by his disciples, was that he was a *seyyid*. In the case of Hulusi Efendi this sacred blood relation is intermingled with the *murshid-murid* relationship. If we examine the *keramets* of Hulusi Efendi and memories of disciples, it is clear that Hulusi Efendi had his own circle of disciples from the beginning of the 1950s when Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı was still alive. None of his disciples referred to Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı as "our old sheikh". The definition, which was used for Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı was that "He was the teacher of our *Efendi* (Sheikh Hulusi Efendi)". On the one hand, the family itself and the disciples openly say that Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı was the *murshid* of Hulusi Efendi, who initiated him into the Naqshbandi order. On the other hand, they emphasize the sacred blood relation to the Prophet in order to differentiate him from the other disciples of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı. This sacred blood relationship gave Hulusi Efendi a chance to form his own circle while Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı was still alive.

This independent circle of disciples created conflict and hostility between Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı and Hulusi Efendi. One of his disciples explained this event as follows: "Some jealous people told Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı that Hulusi Efendi did not recognize him as sheikh. Because of this, they did not see each other for seven years." The family also confirmed this fact. It seems that the circle of Hulusi Efendi's disciples was quite strong and was undermining the authority of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı. In this situation, Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı practiced a well-known sanction, which was not to let him have contact with the sheikh. The best protection, which Hulusi Efendi could uphold against this sanction, was to maintain his own circle, based on his blood relation to the Prophet, without openly rejecting the authority of the living sheikh.

The story about reconciliation also shows the superior position of Hulusi Efendi. This story is as follows: "One day Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı came to Gürün (the closest town to Darende). Hulusi Efendi appointed a dervish and gave him a poem, in which he praised Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı, and told him that he should not particularly call on his sheikh, but if the sheikh asked anything about Hulusi Efendi, the dervish should go to see him, and read this poem. That dervish went to Gürün and read the poem to the sheikh and Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı said that he should go to Darende. He came to Darende and the relationship between two became normal again."

What is interesting about this story is that it not only shows that Hulusi Efendi expressed his faithfulness to the older leader through his poem but also that the sheikh, Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı, came to Darende to visit his disciple, Hulusi Efendi. This means that he was completely innocent and even though the sheikh was Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı, he treated Hulusi, his disciple, like a sheikh.

It is also a well-known fact that after the death of a sheikh, the split inside the group is very common. After the death of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı in 1969, the group experienced a split which never developed into an open confrontation. According to Hulusi Efendi's disciples, during a pilgrimage to Mecca, Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı said, "My son, Hulusi, take care of my *ihvan* (brethren)," which means that he handed over the Naqshbandi order to Hulusi Efendi.¹⁷ Although Hulusi

¹⁷ Altuntaş also wrote that İsmail Hakkı Toprak handed over his order to Osman Hulusi Ateş. See, İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, p. 8.

Efendi did not have the *icazetname*, authorization, it is claimed that the son of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı wrote him a letter saying “Our hearts are together. If we were in a position to take an oath of allegiance, *biat*, to the sheikh after our beloved passed, you would be the leader.”¹⁸

It is claimed that Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı Toprak had 98 caliphs but he only appointed Hulusi Ateş for *irşad*, teaching. Altuntaş also points out that although this fact was not confirmed with an *icazetname*, authorization, Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı said that Hulusi Efendi would serve his *ihvan*, brethren, after his death in front of witnesses in Mecca. He also claims that Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı Toprak said that after his death, turmoil would occur among his disciples for 15 years.¹⁹

The other group, which was led by Hasan Akyol in Sivas, never recognized this claim. Hasan Akyol was born in 1895 in Darende. He was initiated into the Naqshbandī order with Mustafa Haki Efendi, continuing his education with Mustafa Taki Efendi and Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı, respectively. He died in Sivas in 1985.²⁰

Some people who belong to Hasan Akyol’s group in Darende say, “The real Naqshbandī sheikh was Hasan Efendi. Hulusi Efendi was a respected pious man. He worked for society.” The photographs of Hulusi Efendi and Hasan Efendi hang on the walls of many of the homes of Hasan Efendi’s disciples in Darende. I have not come across this practice in the houses of Hulusi Efendi’s disciples, even though they admit that these two men were friends. One of Hulusi Efendi’s disciples said that Hasan Akyol took an oath of allegiance to Hulusi Efendi in 1979.²¹

Altuntaş also confirms this, but he says that Hulusi Ateş never said that he was a sheikh until 1982, even though he had been appointed to this post. The reason for this was his respect for Hasan Akyol, who was older than he was and who had been initiated into the Naqshbandī order earlier than he was. He says that after the death of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı Toprak, about 15 people claimed their sheikhdom, which caused some of Ehramcızade İsmail Hakkı’s disciples to err. He insists that the turmoil has not yet settled down.²²

It is well-known that sheikhs appoint caliphs in order to spread their orders. This practice has enabled many caliphs to establish their own sheikhdom through different means. The loose organization of *tariqas* seems to have assisted them in this practice.

The example of Hulusi Efendi shows us one way of becoming sheikh. The sacred blood relationship to the Prophet gave him a possibility to form his own circle without openly declaring himself sheikh. As seen in the life story of Hulusi Efendi, being a *seyyid* is the main Islamic concept which justifies his authority. It must also be noted that this concept is coupled with the concept of “*el alma*” (literally “to get a hand from”), which is the basic Islamic concept for the continuation of the Sufi orders in Turkey. This concept indicates the spiritual *silsila* of the sheikh.²³

The population of Malatya is ethnically and religiously mixed. Ethnically, there

18 Es-seyyid Osman Hulusi Ateş, *Mektubat-ı Hulusi-i Darende*, M. Akkuş (ed.), Es-Seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Vakfı Yayınları, no. 2, Ankara, 1996, p. XI.

19 İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, p. 39.

20 [Anonymous author] “H. Hasan Efendi (1)”, *Beşbelde*, 3 (February-March 1991), 10.

21 Abdülmuttalip Azdemir wrote some of Hulusi Efendi’s poems and his experience with his sheikh for me. He also included a part which says that it is the copy of a card in which Hasan Akyol took an oath of alliance to Hulusi Efendi. I have not seen the original card. Interview with Abdülmuttalip Azdemir in Ankara in 08.07.1991.

22 İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

23 Osman Hulusi Ateş’s spiritual *silsila* is as follows: The Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, Salman al-Farisi, Qasim b. Muhammad, Ja’far as-Sadiq, Bayazid Bistami, Abu l-Hasan Kharaqani, Yusuf Hamadani, Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduvani, Mahmud Incir Fagnevi, Ali Ramiteni, Seyyid Amir Kulal, Baha al-Din Naqshibend, Ala al-Din ‘Attar, Maulana Yaqub Charkhi, Ubeydullah Ahrar, Muhammad Parsa,

are mainly Turks and Kurds, who are, in terms of religion, either Sunni or Alevi.²⁴ It seems that religion is more important as a source of conflict and differentiation than ethnicity. In this context, being a *seyyid* may enable an individual to overcome the difficulties and conflicts that are historically deep rooted and that emanate from different forms of Islam. This fact may be the main dynamic behind the emphasis on being a *seyyid*. It seems that being a *seyyid* is very important and the concept is widely used in Central and Eastern Anatolia, where the population always has been mixed.

Hulusi Efendi served as a Naqshbandi sheikh until his death in 1990. With an increase in his *ihvan*, he became one of the most important Naqshbandi sheikhs in the 1980s at the local level. By the end of 1980s his group had also begun to be influential at the national level.

Hulusi Efendi was one of the most important defenders of the doctrine of *vahdet-i vücud* (the unity of being). His *Divan*, which reflects this doctrine in the form of poems, was published in 1986, while his *Mektubat* was published after his death in 1996.²⁵

Power Relations in the Small Town

Until the end of the 1960s, Hulusi Efendi played the role as a traditional religious leaders in the town. At that time, Darende was a relatively closed, self-sufficient town. Within this framework, Hulusi Efendi, like any other religious leader in the rural structure, played an important role as a mediator and arbitrator in disputes in society. Being a *seyyid* made him free from ethnic, and particularly, religious conflicts and provided him with an autonomous position in the community.

In the 1970s, the town itself and the disciples of Hulusi Efendi experienced important changes due to general socio-political change in Turkey. At the end of the 1960s, migration to big cities began. Some of Hulusi Efendi's disciples, too, migrated to Istanbul, Ankara, and Adana. Meanwhile apricot production, which is characteristic for this region, gained importance and the town became integrated into the national market. The town began experiencing an increase of income at the beginning of the 1980s.

Throughout this process, Hulusi Efendi, who until then had played the role as a traditional religious leader further developed his powerful position and became a patron and a broker using clientalistic alliances manifesting themselves in the changing socio-political structure of Turkey.

In a society where resources are scarce and the state plays a fundamental role in the allocation of these resources, clientalistic networks become an important means through which social groups and classes get their share of these resources. Within this context, by improving his relations with the representatives of the secular state apparatus, namely the bureaucrats, Hulusi Efendi became important not only for his disciples but also for the local people in general. After the establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey in 1950, Hulusi Efendi established new ties with different

Derwish Muhammad, Muhammad Baqibillah, Ahmad Sirhindi, Muhammad Masum, Muhammad Seifeddin Faruki, Sayyid Muhammad Bedvani, Shah Abdullah Shemseddin Habibullah, Abdullah Dehlavi, Maulana Khalid Baghdadi, Yahya Dagistani, Chorumi Mustafa Rumi Faruk-i Shirani, Tokati Mustafa Haki, Mustafa Taki, Niksari Hacı Ahmet, İsmail Hakkı Toprak, Osman Hulusi Ateş. *Divan-ı Hulusi-i Darende*, Anadolu Matbaası, İstanbul, 1986, p. 319; İ. H. Altuntaş, *ibid.*, pp. 13-16.

24 N. Yalman, "Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie*, 10/1 (1969), 41-60.

25 *Divan-ı Hulusi-i Darende*, *ibid.*; M. Akkuş (ed.), *Mektubat-ı Hulusi-i Darende*, Es-seyyid Osman Hulusi Efendi Vakfı, Ankara, 1996.

political parties. These new networks, which included bureaucrats and political party members, helped him to consolidate his powerful position in society.

The people in the town define Hulusi Efendi as a very sociable and refined person. In other words, he was a person who knew how to treat people; he was a person who could easily communicate with outsiders; and he knew how the state apparatus functioned. Being accepted by bureaucrats and politicians enabled him to acquire disciples in influential places.

Most of the religious people, both members and non-members of Sufi orders in the town agree that Hulusi Efendi worked hard and sacrificed a lot for the development of the town. Non-members appreciated his ability to establish relations with bureaucrats, as well as his ability to gather strength from them, stating that in order to understand him, his relations with those bureaucrats has to be understood as well. What is most striking when visiting the home of Hulusi Efendi is the large number of town bureaucrats who come to visit the sheikh.

The nature of the relationship between the sheikh and the bureaucrats can be understood better if we consider the relative power of the sheikh and the district governor, *kaymakam*, in the context of a small town.

The highly centralized administrative structure of Turkey gives bureaucrats a powerful position. The highest bureaucrat in the town is the *kaymakam* (governor of a district, *ilçe*). The governor of the district, who is under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, is appointed by the central government. He directs the activities of the Census Bureau, Police, Land Registration, Agriculture, Forestry, Education, Religion, Health and Veterinary Services, Settlement, and Gendarmerie.²⁶ The duties of the governor of a district are to direct these departments, to see to it that the needs of town are met, to keep the central government informed of these needs, and to request that money be allocated for the meeting of these needs.²⁷

Some rather significant limitations are placed on the power of the governor of a district. Not only is he dependent upon the central government but he is also dependent on the aid of the people. Resources allocated by the central government are always limited. He needs the aid of people, such as free labour force, free use of certain machines, and financial donations. He needs to demonstrate progress in his town in order to promote his career. In theory, he is independent from politics but it must be remembered that political parties control the central government. In other words, while he is relatively independent from political changes in the central government, he is dependent on politicians for promotion or for keeping his position. It is possible to register a complaint about him with the Ministry of Interior through MPs, perhaps even resulting in his exile to another township.

In this relationship, the power of the sheikh is based on the resources — human and economic resources — which are controlled by him. The bureaucrats can use these resources to solve the problems of the town. This power is also very attractive to the politicians. These resources can be transformed into votes and political support. The sheikh is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the politicians and the bureaucrats because of the resources he controls. He can bargain not only with politicians but also with the bureaucrats. In the case of conflict with the bureaucrats, he can use political party channels in order to put some pressure on them or can even eliminate them. In the case of co-operation, both sides benefit. The character of this relationship also explains why both sides are willing to cooperate rather than to clash.

26 M. Sencer, *Türkiye'nin Yönetim Yapısı*, Alan Yayınları, İstanbul, 1986, p. 293; V. Versan, *Kamu Yönetimi*, 8th ed., Fakülteler Matbaası, İstanbul, 1984, pp. 198-200.

27 J. S. Szyliowicz, *Political Change in Rural Turkey*. Erdemli, Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1966, pp. 107-138.

In order to explain the nature of co-operation between the bureaucrats and the sheikh we can take the example of building a school in the town. Hulusi Efendi helped with the building of a Secondary School, Religious Vocational School, Industrial Vocational School, and a Faculty of Theology in the town. The district governor allocated state land upon which these schools could be built, while the sheikh collected money not only from his disciples but also from other people. Moreover, some of his disciples donated tables, chairs and other materials for the schools and provided scholarships to poor students. In the end, both the governor of the township and Hulusi Efendi benefited. The district governor helped the educational development of the town, thereby embellishing his career record. Similarly, Hulusi Efendi's status in the eyes of the people was enhanced by his assistance in getting schools built, thereby improving the quality of educational resources available to their children.

This does not necessarily mean that the bureaucrats were members of the order. Even though their recruitment was desired by the order, they were able to maintain their relationship at a level of co-operation.

As indicated above, another important component of this alliance was the political parties. Hulusi Efendi never identified himself with a particular party but the resources controlled by him and the worldview of the group made him and his group a centre of attraction for the political parties.

The virtues of Hulusi Efendi emphasized by his disciples and other townspeople include his lack of religious fanaticism as well as his patriotism, pointing to his participation in national commemoration ceremonies (e.g., the 29th of October/ Republic Day). Moreover, when he attended the opening of the town's first bank, he was criticized by some. However, his response (that it was a state bank whose activities had to be supported and pointing out that a relative of his was one of the bank employees) was characterized as reflecting open-mindedness. This open-mindedness reflected itself as well in the field of education, both religious and non-religious, supporting the education of girls as well as of boys.

It thus appears that Hulusi Efendi supported the state modernization project. In this respect, he played an important role as a local actor in the penetration of republican values into rural areas. Even though these people had difficulties during the one-party period (1923-46) under the Republican People's Party (RPP), they do not criticise it as severely as some Islamicist intellectuals do. Within this framework, he supported the RPP until the 1960s. Although the group was sympathetic to the Democratic Party and its practices, Hulusi Efendi was still considered a supporter of the RPP at that time.

After the transition to a competitive multi-party political system in 1950, political parties regularly tried to obtain Hulusi Efendi's support. While it was mainly centre-right and ultra-right parties which visited him during elections, until the beginning of 1970s, Hulusi Efendi had good relations with the representatives of the RPP in Malatya. Some of his disciples and his relatives were involved in party politics in the 1970s. These disciples were active in the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in the 1970s and in the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s.

When the worldview of Hulusi Efendi and his group is examined, it is clear that they interpret Islam in a holistic manner and this interpretation is juxtaposed with the conceptualisation of the society as an organic whole. Richard and Nancy Tapper claim that Turkish nationalism/republicanism and Turkish Islam today are both expressions of a single underlying ideology of social control.²⁸ This can also be said for the worldview of Hulusi Efendi and his disciples.

28 R. Tapper, N. Tapper, "'Thank God We're Secular!' Aspects of Fundamentalism in a Turkish Town," in L. Caplan (ed.), *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987, pp. 51-78.

In their view Islam is a belief system, which determines the ethical code of society and prevents social conflict. Even though many Muslims in the world share the same belief system, it does not mean that Turkish nationalist values will be lost. Hulusi Efendi and his disciples were and are very proud of being Turkish because Turks have played a very important role in the spread of Islam. The group's interpretation of nationalism and Islam based on the definition of a society as an organic whole naturally rejects existing ethnic and religious differences in society. If the differentiated ethnic and religious structure of the region is recalled, the importance of this approach, particularly for the centre-right and ultra-right parties, becomes clear.

The sheikh's powerful position in the town is limited in two important ways. The first concerns political pressures emanating from the national level. Regardless of the amount of resources at his disposal, political changes at the national level can have direct effects on the exercise of his power. The second has to do with the extent to which his disciples can be relied upon to follow him. Particularly with respect to his disciples who have higher socio-political status, it would not exactly be accurate to claim that they strictly adhere to the political and/or economic advice and/or preferences of the sheik. Thus it seems as though the sheik has to follow a policy of balancing one party off another, which at the same time having to deal with the disruptive influence of his disciples that results in his losing his bargaining position.

For instance, in the 1970s, some of his disciples were involved in the activities of the Nationalist Action Party, which was ultra-right and pan-Turkist. After the 1980 military coup, the political secret police questioned some people²⁹ in the town who were not his disciples; they also visited Hulusi Efendi's house and talked to him. Although he was not directly charged with having any political connections, he had to face a degree of questioning. In the 1980s, the group itself was very much identified with the Motherland Party (ANAP). It is claimed that in this period, the group generously benefited from the aid of ANAP. But when the Motherland Party lost its power, the group started to feel the negative effects of this connection. Nevertheless, the group has demonstrated the capacity and flexibility to change the system of alliances rapidly.

If we consider the patron-client relationship as an exclusive strategy adopted by different classes and groups in a society where resources are scarce, patron-client relationship become a system of alliances between classes and groups which has the capacity to change rapidly and be incorporated into new institutional arrangements. In a society where resources are scarce and the state is a crucial factor in resource allocation, clientalism is used as a strategy of participation by certain social classes and groups to manipulate an exclusionary system of allocation to benefit their own interests.³⁰

²⁹ The person who told me about this questioning is an old, small businessman. He is a member of the Qadiri order. The civil police questioned him: "A car stopped in front of my shop. Two people got out and came into my shop. At once, I understood that they were the police. They said some people from the town informed on Hulusi Efendi. They said if I did not tell the truth, they would take me to the car and then to the police station. They said they were from Ankara. They asked about Hulusi Efendi and the relations of his disciples with the National Action Party. I said he was a very respected and hard-working person and I did not know anything about the Party politics. Then they went to Hulusi Efendi's house. But I called the house of Hulusi Efendi and informed them about the civil police as soon as the police left the shop because I saw his disciples come with buses earlier that day. Tell me how could I talk against him? I saw him not only here but also in Mecca. Everybody respected him greatly. But these few disciples caused him a headache."

³⁰ A. Güneş-Ayata, "Class and Clientalism in the Republican People's Party," in A. Finkel, N. Sirman (eds.), *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, Routledge, London, 1990, pp. 159, 181.

Conclusion

Osman Hulusi Ateş was one of the important Naqshbandi sheikhs in modern Turkey. He became sheikh in 1969 and stayed in the office until 1990. He had thousands of disciples scattered throughout Malatya, Sivas, Konya, Maraş, Ankara, Adana, and Istanbul.

Hulusi Efendi's claim to being a *seyyid* enabled him to use this Islamic concept to justify his authority. His alleged sacred blood tie to the Prophet gave him an opportunity to establish his own circle. Hulusi Efendi's role as a *seyyid* overlapped with his role of being a Naqshbandi sheikh.

In the context of a small town, Hulusi Efendi was always the sheikh of his disciples but he was also an arbitrator in the disputes in the 1950s and 1960s. After the 1970s, he became a patron and a broker who tried to get for the town an equitable share of scarce resources in society, using a system of clientelistic alliances.

The alliance formed between the sheikh, the bureaucrats, and the politicians reinforced his powerful position in the small town. Not only was he the sheikh in the religious sense but he was also a secular patron and a broker within the new system of alliances.

Twenty Years with Mehmed Zahid Kotku: A Personal Story

KORKUT ÖZAL

It has been an exceptional privilege in my life and wonderful experience to know His Eminence Mehmed Zahid Kotku (*Hocaefendi*) (K. S.) and to be counted among his brothers in this transitory world for what has been a duration of twenty years. I can hardly express my profound gratitude to Allah for granting me such a distinct honor.

I must admit that writing an article on him is far beyond both my native and acquired talents and capacities. However, circumstances beyond my control have led me to undertake the challenge of contributing such a paper. Taking courage in the saying, "it is the ignorant who are really bold," I seek refuge in the forgiveness of the Almighty and in the ever-present tolerance of our beloved Hocaefendi.

This paper is not intended as scholarly research or as a comprehensive analysis. It is more a personal story designed to present some cross-sections from those twenty years of wonderful fraternity with His Eminence Mehmed Zahid Kotku (*Hocaefendi*) (K.S.).

However, in order to enable the reader to have some insight into the spiritual environment that prevailed during the earlier part of the author's life, a descriptive biography of him, before he met Hocaefendi, is presented. Following that, glimpses from the personal spiritual and social aspects of Hocaefendi and a short narration of some of his writings is presented with the purpose of illustrating his profound and magnificent personality and the way he, our beloved teacher, has handled the training and refining of the inner worlds of his students.

A Concise Biography of the Author

When the early and later stages of the author's life are compared, one cannot help but observe a rather striking change and transformation in his personality and attitudes. It would be difficult for the uninformed reader to have sufficient insight unless satisfactory coverage of the prevailing conditions that were responsible for the upbringing and education of the author, as well as the formation of his personality before he met Hocaefendi, is provided. This consists of a brief biography of the author in his own words.

I was born in Malatya in Eastern Turkey on May 29th, 1929 as the third child of my parents, Mehmed Siddik and Hafize Özal. Their first child was a girl, who died when she was 10 months old. Their second child was my elder brother Turgut Özal, whom I had the privilege of knowing for 64 years. Both my parents, who were employees of the government, received their education in the schools of the Ottoman Empire.

My mother started her education at the age of four and a half by attending the neighborhood Qur'an school. There she learned how to read and write and was also

given basic religious instruction. After receiving her primary school education, which lasted six years, she attended and graduated from a special course for primary school teachers - subsequently being appointed as a primary school teacher. She had a good understanding of the basics of Islam and was a devout Muslim.

My father, as the only surviving descendent of one of the oldest families of the town, received his education in one of the *madrasahs* (classical schools of advanced and applied theological teaching in the Ottoman Empire). After 16 years of intense schooling and after having mastered all the courses he was given, he was able to receive a certificate enabling him to teach, as well as to serve as an officer in religious institutions and services.

But the concept of secularism then adopted by the new republic eventually resulted in religion being distanced from the social and official spheres of the people. Attempts were made to minimize the state's involvement in religion and religious affairs. This was done through the closing and banning of many religious institutions and activities that had formerly been undertaken and/or supported by the Ottoman State.

Consequently, my father had to find a new profession. He subsequently agreed to be a primary school teacher. After some time, he successfully passed the entrance examination of the State Credit and Investment Bank for Agriculture. Being found to be a capable and promising candidate, he was sent to a one-year vocational training school for future officers of the bank. He completed the school with high honors and was appointed as branch head.

We were given by each of our parents as much basic instruction in Islam as the circumstances then permitted. It was really difficult during those times to provide instruction in Islam and to attempt to live according to its precepts. Our religious upbringing, education and training were, to a certain extent, adversely affected by the abrupt and fracturing social changes that took place during the early years of the Turkish Republic. According to the official state ideology of the period, the state was to take a "secular" position, which had atheistic overtones in interpretation and application.

Accordingly, we were taught that religion belonged to the past. Since religion, progress and development were not compatible, there was no place for religion in a modern society. Furthermore, the concept of a Divine Being and Authority, or the even mention of His name, were absent in our school books. There was an attempt to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance of the concept of religion from the public sphere with nationalism. However, in its early version, the concept of nationalism was based on the idea of a superior race rather than a unified identity based on shared values and common ideals.

Since both my parents were government employees, they were frequently assigned to various duties around the country. Because of that, our formal schooling and education had to be received in five different towns and cities.

My first acquaintance with Islam as a social institution took place when we, my elder brother Turgut and myself, made some occasional visits to the small *mescid* (a small building for worship) at İTÜ (Istanbul Technical University) during our early student years, where we became acquainted with some of the elder brothers. We also attended some gatherings Thursday evenings, where we would attend discussions and presentations given by learned scholars on Islam, Islamic values and Islamic life.

In June 1951, I graduated from the Civil Engineering Department of Istanbul Technical University with an advanced degree in civil engineering. After my graduation, I was appointed to the DSI (State Water Works Department), where I worked in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, handling the development of water and land



Mehmed Zahid Kotku, Hocaefendi.

resources. In the fall of 1955, I had the opportunity to take a language course in Ankara, which enabled me to go to the United States to specialize further in my profession. I went to the United States in the spring of 1956 and returned in the early fall of 1957. During my stay there, the last six months of which my wife joined me, I was able to acquire professional depth and insight into my fields of interest. Moreover, we were able to develop a somewhat deep and close understanding of the social, cultural and religious aspects of American life.

Our most significant observation was that religion was one of the most important and deeply rooted elements of American society. Most social values originated in religion. The observance of religious rituals was widespread. Neither the state nor government denied the existence of a Divine Being. On the one dollar bills it is written, "In God we trust." Article one of the first ten amendments to the American Constitution, clearly states that:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

On Sunday morning, seeing all the members of the family put on their best suits and dress, to attend church services as well as Sunday school classes in a serious manner was a very unique and instructive experience for me. My most interesting experience took place when I met some Mormons in Utah. I first visited the town of Spanish Fork during the summer of 1956 for a two-week stay. My second visit was during the spring of 1957. My wife and I stayed there for six weeks.

During those visits, so far as we are concerned, two important things took place. Through our limited knowledge and practices, the people of the town had the opportunity to gain some first-hand information about Muslims and Islam, a religion they used to think of as consisting of idol-worship before they met us. Moreover, we had an opportunity to learn quite a lot about various aspects of their life, including the very vital element of religion. The more we learned about the importance and comprehensive place religion had in both their private and communal life and conduct,

the wider and deeper was the change in our original concept of the role of religion in human life. The more details we accumulated, the more we came to the conclusion that the proposition that religion and progress were incompatible was founded on false premises.

While observing, studying and learning about their religion and its role in making and developing their society, and comparing it with our own religion, Islam, we observed two things: First, it became clear to us that the basic tenets and the creed of Islam were much more developed and refined. Second, after more detailed comparison and discussion, we discovered that we lacked the needed depth and understanding of our own religion and its institutions. It was then that my wife and I made a solemn vow to one another:

When we return home, God willing, we should not waste any time in starting to learn about our religion and living with it within our capacity.

At the beginning of September 1957, we were at home and I, as the director of DSI for Southeastern Turkey, was responsible for the water and land resources development of six provinces. At the same time, we were keeping our promise to learn about and live Islam. For that purpose, on the recommendation of a well-informed and observing colleague, I bought a recent Turkish translation of the Holy Book of Islam, the Qur'ān, and started reading it.

But almost from the beginning I was faced with a difficulty. What I was attempting to do was to learn how the concepts and tenets of Islam could be applied in my own life. And it was very difficult for me to extract this from the Holy Book by myself. Therefore, I consulted the same colleague again and explained my difficulty to him. He answered in the following way:

My respected brother, you are like the one who is in need of and wishes to get his room illuminated. You can do it by simply lighting a lamp. But in achieving that you do not need to start from the beginning and establish power-houses, transmission lines, and distribution networks. Those are already established and made available for your utilization in your room. The electricity has been brought up to your room and is made ready for you to light it up. What you need to do is to turn the switch on.

I asked him about the switch. He referred me to a well-known catechism book on Islam. I got it and started reading it. That was what I needed. I got the answers to almost all my questions and discovered many things that I was looking for. Although later on I was able to extend my horizon and depth of understanding by studying much more comprehensive works, I still appreciate the value and role of that first catechism book in my life.

At the same time, I started attending training courses to learn how to read and recite the holy Qur'ān in its original script. During those years, I also got acquainted with Imam Gazali, one of the most outstanding scholars of Islam, both in Islamic sciences and Sufism. I was reading whatever I could get ahold of, learning and practicing. The more I learned and applied Islamic sciences and values, the higher and more refined was the flow of life to me.

Whatever we learned, we immediately put into practice. It was a really marvelous change. As we implemented what we learned, doors opened for us to learn and implement more. We were not aware of the effect these developments were having in our daily life. In fact, the observance of the duties and practices of Islam day by day completely restructured and reshaped our physical and spiritual being and life. Without even being aware of it, the evolutionary change that had taken place during



Northeastern view of the Great Hall and mosque of Gümüşhanevi tekkesi.
(IAM Encümen Arşivi, 1936).

our two and a half years in Elazığ had fully transformed and reformed our entire way of living, including our social relations. Most of those habits and manners that were incompatible with Islam, as well as the majority of those aspects of our social relations that were not in harmony with Islamic values gradually disappeared.

We also noticed a remarkable change in the structure of our social acquaintances and composition of our friends. We never distanced ourselves from them, but we began to have less and less in common, both personally and socially, with some of our former associates. However, while the intimacy we once shared with many of our former friends waned, we developed close, real and lasting friendships with many new friends, based on broadly and deeply shared values. In short, those guidelines and values shaping, directing, and giving meaning to our personal actions and taste were transforming our lives. They were no longer based on adherence to secularism but rather on expressing the aspirations of the faithful.

Nonetheless, in spite of all those transformations, we felt as if something was missing and that feeling began to bother our consciences. Those transformations were all taking place in our so-called external world and relations. But they were not being reflected in our internal and spiritual world and being. Although we were trying to do our best to perform all the rituals that we were supposed to perform as Muslims, we were not able to achieve the full moral satisfaction and peace of mind so far as our inner dynamics and spiritual stability were concerned. It was as if we had a body but were missing a spirit. The more we contemplated, the more we were convinced that we needed something else. Our restlessness grew. We began looking for something that we did not know much about. Then I remember reading the book by the famous Sufi, Mawlānā Jalal al-Dīn Rūmī, during my years as a student at university. That book was *Masnawī*. It had been translated into Turkish into six volumes. It was a beautiful book. Full of wisdom. After reading it again, I drew the conclusion that if you wanted to achieve real and secured success in the difficult testing of this world, you had better look for a *murshid*, spiritual guide, and if you find one, hold tight. Then I remembered some lines from the poems of the famous Sufi, Yunus Emre:

Unless you approach the Truth
And reach the true Guide
And if not destined by God
You cannot be a seeker of the Truth
And you cannot arrive at the Truth

Yes, it was so simple. Find a teacher to guide you to the truth and bond yourself tightly and sincerely to him for your enlightenment and higher perfection of your *nefs*, inner self. I was sure about that but I did not have the insight that great men such as Mawlānā or Emre, who enlightened the world like great spiritual lighthouses in the glorious past of Islam, could exist and be found in our contemporary world.

The subject kept me busy for months. Then I decided to discuss it with one of my close associates who had a much deeper experience and insight into the subject. After learning about my problem and desire, he talked about Hocaefendi. The more I learned about him, the more I became convinced that he was the one I was looking for. Taking advantage of a business trip and the New Year's holiday, I went to the İskenderpaşa mosque in Istanbul. After performing the final prayer of the night in the mosque, we visited Hocaefendi at his home. Following a short introduction and talk, we sat on our knees; taking my right hand between his hands, he described my lesson to me.

We perform our *wudu* (ablution) and try to be on *wudu* all the time. In performing the lesson, we prefer to sit in a secluded place facing Qibla. We begin the lesson by submitting our *istigh-fars* (asking God's pardon) twenty-five times (Estaghfirullah El azeem). Then we recite Su'ra Al-Fatiha once, followed by Su'ra Al-Ihklas (Kulhüvellahu Ehad ...) three times;

After that, we say "I bestow God's pure reward for those as a gift, to the blessed and noble soul of our Prophet (May Allah's blessings and Peace be upon him), and to the glorious souls of all the other prophets (Peace be upon them and our Prophet), their sons, wives, households, companions and followers, as well as to the soul of Hazret Ebubekir (May Allah be pleased with him) and to the souls of our Eminent Great Sheiks, that came and passed till now, and to the souls of Muhammad Bahā al-Dīn Naqshband and Mawlānā Khalīd-i Baghdadi in particular (May Allah's mercy be upon them).

It was a set of instructions. (A translation of the full text of that lesson is given in Appendix A). He finished it with the following recommendation:

Don't interfere in other people's business. Keep away from places of gossip and backbiting. Do your best to make up for your undelivered prayers and fasts. Do your utmost to refrain from committing any sin. And do not forget us in your prayers. God bless you and may he keep you on the right path, the right order and the eternal truth. Amen.

After that, he prayed and completed his prayers with a verse from the holy book, the Qur'an:

Verily, those who give *bai'a* (pledge) to you (O Muhammed [p.b.u.h]), are giving it to Allah. The hand of Allah is over their hands. Then whosoever breaks his pledge, breaks it only to his own harm, and whosoever fulfills what he has covenanted with Allah, Allah will bestow a great reward." (Al Qur'an Sur'a Al-Feth a. 10)

Then all of us said 'Amen'. From then on, I was one of his pupils. The date was the first day of 1960.

A Short Biography of Hocaefendi

The following is an abridged translation of the biography of Hocaefendi, originally written in Turkish by his son-in-law, Professor Esad Coşan.

The Family

Hocaefendi's family was among the Muslims who migrated to Bursa from the



The tombstone of Mehmed Zahid Kotku at Süleymaniye Camii Haziresi (special graveyard), Istanbul (Cengiz Kahraman 1999).

Caucuses in 1883. His ancestors were from Nuha (one of the capitals of the old Khanate). That city is now called Şeki and is situated in northern Azerbaijan.

His mother, Sabire Hanım, passed away in 1900, in Bursa, and is buried in Pınarbaşı cemetery there; Hocaefendi was left an orphan at the age of three.

His father, Ibrahim Efendi, was a *seyyid* (a descendent of the Prophet [sav]). He came to Bursa at the age of 16. He completed his studies at the Hamza Bey Medresesi, and served as imam at various localities. He passed away in 1929 at the age of 76 and was buried in the village of İzvat in Bursa.

Short Life Story

Hocaefendi was born in 1897 in Bursa. He completed his primary school education at Oruç Bey primary school. He attended the junior high school at Maksem for one year. Then he continued his schooling at Bursa Trade School. While there, the First World War broke out. He joined the army on April 14th, 1916. He served on various fronts for three years and faced many dangerous situations. On July 10th, 1919 he was transferred to continue his military service in Istanbul as a military clerk.

Involvement in Sufism

While in Istanbul, he regularly attended various religious meetings, lectures, and sermons. Finally, on July 16th, 1920, after performing his Friday prayer at Hagia Sofia, he went to the *tekke* of Gümüşhaneli, next to Fatma Sultan mosque, across from the office of the governor of Istanbul. He joined the order there and took his duty lesson from sheikh Ömer Ziyaeddin Efendi. He made remarkable progress in his purification process. When his sheikh, Ömer Ziyaeddin Efendi, passed away on November 18th, 1921, he continued his lesson with the new teacher of the *tekke*, Mustafa Feyzi Efendi. He completed his *seyr-i süluk* (the spiritual process of achieving membership in a religious order).

In 1924, at the age of 27, he was given the Certificate of Deputation (permission to guide and teach). He also completed the conclusive memorization of the Holy Book. Moreover, he was given permission to teach certain important books used by

the *tekke* for training and education purposes (i.e., *Ramuzu'l-Ehadis*, *Delailu'l-Hayrat*, *Hizb-i Azam* and *Kaside-i Bürde*)

After the closure and banning of all Sufi institutions by the law enacted on November 30th, 1925, Hocaefendi returned to Bursa, where he married. When the post of imam at the village of İzvat in Bursa was vacated by the passing away of his father in 1929, he took over that post and lived there for about 16 years as the imam of that village. In 1945, he was transferred to Üftade mosque in the city of Bursa, where he served as its *imam-hatip* until 1952.

After the demise of Abülaziz Bekkine Efendi (the 38th member of the Noble Lineage) and upon the insistent requests of his followers, he accepted a transfer to Istanbul as the *imam-hatip* of the Çivi-Zade mosque. During that assignment, he also served as the *imam-hatip* of the Ümmü Gülsüm Mescid in Zeyrek-Istanbul. On October 1st 1958, he was transferred to the post of *imam-hatip* of İskenderpaşa mosque, where he served until his death on November 13th, 1980.

Noble Lineage (Spiritual Family Descent)

Hocaefendi is the 39th member of the Noble Lineage (Spiritual Family Descent) starting with the Holy Prophet (sav.). (The entire line of descent and some related information of the order as was made available to the author, is briefly presented in Appendix B).

His Personality

Our late Hocaefendi was of above medium height and weight. His appearance was both imposing and inspiring. His skin was white and his cheeks were rosy. He had a rather large head with a wide and alabaster forehead. His eyebrows were widely spaced. At first glance, his eyes appeared to be chestnut in color, but in reality his eyes were so profound in essence and so mysterious in appearance that a close look was almost impossible. There were some red specks in his eyes and a palm-size birthmark on his back and abdomen. His outer appearance was solemn, pleasant, and delightful. His face was always brightened by a rosy smile. Onlookers could not help but develop a deep sense of respect and a warm affection towards him. He greeted everybody by salutation and dealt with each of them cheerfully and in a pleasant manner.

He had an excellent memory, which enabled him to easily recall very fine details of past events and personalities. His conversations and talks were very pleasant and appealing. Most of the time, he used the dialect of the common people. He was an excellent and patient listener and never interrupted others while they spoke. When listening to others on subjects even very well known by him, he paid such close attention that it was possible to give the speaker the impression that Hocaefendi was hearing those things for the first time. His answers were full of meaning and niceties. When delivering the Friday *hutbe* (official sermon delivered to the congregation from the podium in a mosque), the style of his address to the audience was awe-inspiring. He raised his voice considerably and talked extemporaneously to the audience, assuming the conciseness of an army commander addressing his troops.

On all the issues he was interested in, he contemplated deeply and at length. It was impossible not to be filled with admiration for the resourcefulness and colorful comparisons he incorporated to his addresses and conversations. Sometimes he used to dwell on the interpretation of a single verse from the Qur'an for months.

He was extremely modest and was never pretentious. Many examples can be given of this attitude. He lived among his followers as if he was one of them and let

everybody have and maintain such an impression. He very carefully concealed his very high spiritual attainments. He was extremely respectful and bound to his teachers. His friends from the *tekke* used to tell how obedient and respectful he was in the presence of his masters.

As a spiritual guide and teacher, he exercised extreme patience and tolerance in training and educating his pupils. He could work on an individual for years and never get tired or let him down. He was able to probe and gain spiritual access to a person's heart. Most of the time, it was possible for one to get the answers to the questions in one's heart without raising them verbally. He used to bestow the needs of the needy without being asked. He had a certain control and dominance on the dreams and the hearts of people.

In family life, he was very affectionate and witty towards his household. He never ordered or asked for anything. In case of need, he preferred to express it through allusion, hint and allegory; and if not understood, he exercised patience.

He was extremely faithful to his friends. He frequently visited them as well as inquired about and looked after them. He also strictly observed his duties and obligations towards his relatives.

He was very generous, making unbelievably high donations. He was never afraid of being left without and always had guests and visitors for meals. He received them with a smiling face and pleasant manners and always left the door of his house open. He paid great attention to seeing to it that those serving him were fully content and happy. His attendance at evening and morning prayers and worships was extremely regular, urging his followers to do the same. The following recommendations are taken from his compiled *evrad* (recited portions of scripture) and illustrates his personality and style:

My most respected brother,

Try to wake up early in the morning. Proceed immediately to taking ablution and try to maintain your cleanliness all the time. Read out the morning prayer (*duaa*) with gratitude to Allah, the Glorified and the Exalted for waking you up from a death-like state for granting you a new life.

Do your best to perform all your prayers in the mosque with the congregation. As long as you have no important work to do, do not leave the mosque immediately after performing the morning prayer. Make use of the time by reading the Qur'an and glorifying Allah up to sunrise. Then perform prayers of two or four *raka'ats* of *Ishraq* (sunrise prayer). Before leaving the mosque, submit your supplications to Allah. Trust that you will get the complete reward of *hajj* and *umre* (minor pilgrimage to Mecca) in full. And let no shadow of doubt cross your heart that your sustenance, in abundance and ease, will be provided for you.

After you return to your house and before retiring to sleep, settle for some time in a quiet corner in the house and occupy yourself with reading the Qur'an, remembering Allah, the Glorified and the Exalted, and monitoring your own self even for an hour. Inspect yourself from time to time, better if you do that continuously and keep yourself under surveillance all the time. Try to find out how each and every breath of yours was inhaled and exhaled. Was it for the sake of satisfying Allah or otherwise? If you feel that you have breathed out the moments of your life for the satisfaction of Allah, the Exalted Almighty, then you have a reason and a duty to thank Him. If otherwise, which causes the Anger (*Gazab*) of the Almighty, then you have a duty to seek forgiveness from him; return back to Him forthright with repentance, with supplication for forgiveness, and with true resolve for non-recurrence.

After you have gotten a fair share of sleep and your body has rested, at which point of time the stillness of night would have prevailed and most people are taken by sound sleep, wake up and leave your bed to make a good *wudu*. How lucky you will be if you enjoy the unmatched bliss of standing humbly before Allah, the Exalted and Most High, our Lord and the Lord of all creations and making, at least four *raka'ats* of *Tahajjud* (deep night prayer), two by two, with your eyes flowing with tears of submission and love to Allah. Conclude your prayer with sup-

plication and Qur'ānic readings. Continue, if you can, up to the morning prayer (*fajr*) with the *dhikrullah*.

Nevertheless, great attention should be given to awakening one's heart by engaging it in "Dhikrullah" and supplication. Süleyman Çelebi, the poet renowned for his panegyric on the Prophet's birth, is quoted to have rightly said:

With deep heartfelt love for Allah given,
Even once to lingual utterance,
All wrongdoings are forgiven,
Indeed, no matter how numerous

Truly the heart is the center of all body organs. And uttering Allah with a heart wholly enveloped with ecstatic love for Allah means that each and every atom in the body is participating in the uttering. If you wonder how many cells there are in your body, then perhaps you should remember that your brain alone contains billions of cells. It would be more appropriate to say that only Allah knows how many atoms there are in the whole body. There, concentrate on engaging the heart in continued dhikr of Allah the Most Exalted and the Highest in Glory, while not forgetting Him for a single moment.

On Sufism and Sufi Orders¹

Islam consists of two aspects - an outer and an inner. The former is called *sharī'a* (outward law), and the latter *tariqa* (the spiritual purification). *Sharī'a* is divided into two categories: *ibadet* (acts of worship), which deal with fundamental belief and forms of worship, and *muamelat* (activities), which pertain to man's outer relations and cover social, economic and political fields of human activities and relations. *Tariqa* (the paths) deals with the purification of the inner self and keeps in view the spiritual emancipation of mankind. Since body and soul are intertwined, *tariqa* cannot remain independent of *sharī'a*; the two work in cooperation.

There is a third component, called *haqiqat* (the truth), which refers to the realities of this life as well as the life to come, including *marifet*, knowledge about the nature of God and the secrets of His Attributes and Essence. It is realization (i.e., actual vision and experience) of what you see, feel and realize in the light furnished to you by both *sharī'a* and *tariqa* combined.

The combination of *sharī'a*, *tariqa* and *haqiqat* is termed *tasawwuf* or Sufism. It is, in fact, the science and art of developing the spiritual faculties of mind and trying to understand, as far as possible, the Deity, Divine Attributes, Divine Works and Divine Mysteries. It is theory and practice combined.

The knowledge necessary for a beginner is supplied by *sharī'a*, and administered by the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.). Since the passing away of the Prophet, this duty has been carried on by his deputies, called sheiks, *pirs* or *murshids*, who are endowed with exoteric and esoteric knowledge, and enjoy the distinction of being recognized as heirs to the Holy Prophet.

This personal element is an important factor in the dissemination and purification process of Sufism. Mere book knowledge leads one nowhere. The Holy Qur'an without the Holy Prophet would not have brought about that miraculous and marvellous change of human history. The functions of the Holy Prophet have been described in the Holy Book as follows:

"It is He who hath been raised up amidst the unlettered, an Apostle from among

¹ This part is a summary of Wahid Bakhsh Rabbani: *Islamic Sufism*, Kuala Lumpur, 1992.

themselves who reads out to them passages of the Qur'an and purifies their souls and teaches them the Scripture and Wisdom." (LXII-2)

Accordingly, the duties of the Holy Prophet, so far as the believers are concerned, consist of the following:

1- To recite the Qur'an to his people (i.e., to communicate to them the message of God).

2- To purify their souls (which is quite a different thing from communicating to them the message of God).

3- To teach them the Holy Book (i.e., explaining to the people the meaning and the real significance of the passages of the Qur'an and training them in the proper method of observance of Qur'anic Ordinances. Such teaching can only be effective and useful when a man passes through the process of purification.

4- Finally, to bring them face-to-face with the wisdom (*hikmet*) which follows from the knowledge and action as stated above.

The personal element in the affairs relating to the amelioration of mankind has been handed down to us in the form of a spiritual teacher (*sheikh, pir, murshid*) and its vital importance can hardly be disputed.

Some Excerpts from Hocaefendi²

- *Tasawwuf*, from beginning to end, consists of nothing but two things: progress towards God the Almighty by *La Ilaha Illallah*, and descending to this world by *Muhammed-ur Resulallah*.

- The ultimate aim of *tasawwuf* is to bring mankind to spiritual perfection. Adherence to a *murshid* in order to save oneself from such evil habits and manners, keeps one from attaining bondage and serenity of divine audience, has been considered an obligation by the consensus of the scholars.

- Those desiring to follow the path to God should realize that the limited human intellect may not be enough solely to enable the seeker of the Truth to safely arrive at his or her objective and there is a necessity for a *mürşid-i kamil* (perfect guide) and *mürebbi-i hazık* (skilled teacher) as clearly indicated by the saying of the Holy Prophet: "Allah has educated me and he made my education completely perfect."

- There is no doubt that human beings must look for their treatment against the moral diseases originating from conceit, self-complacency, envy, hypocrisy and materialism. As witnessed by many sayings of the Prophet, non-adherence to a sheikh or a *murshid* as a pretext to emancipate oneself from those or similar bad attributes is a revolt against God and His Prophet. This is because one who is not following a true path cannot attain salvation unless he adheres to a perfect *murshid*. Regardless of how many books one may study or memorize, it does not help to refine one's hearth and to purify ones *nefs* (self).

- Those suffering from illnesses and not getting the proper medical treatment on time may end up dead. Similarly, those suffering from moral illnesses because of non-treatment due to excessive occupation of their hands, hearts and souls with never-ending worldly affairs may end up with moral deaths. However, such a moral death may be much more dangerous than the physical death because while some

² The excerpts that follow were all taken from Hocaefendi's five-volume book, *Tasawwuf Ahlak* (Sufi Morals).

deaths occurring after certain physical illnesses may be awarded martyrdom, there is no such reward for those who die of moral illnesses.

- Searching and finding a really perfect Spiritual Teacher is as important an obligation as performing prayers and fasting. When one finds such a teacher, it is of the utmost importance to maintain full obedience to him. This is because the real Teacher is an intermediary between the *murid* and his God. Turning aside from the real *murshid* is the same as turning aside from God the Almighty.

- A real *murshid* should be trained and educated by a perfect and perfecting teacher. He should approach Allah and achieve the attainment of Divine Gnosis by having full insight of the *shari'a* by fully learning and complying with the manners of *tariqa* and by discovering the secrets of *haqiqat*. He should be fully informed and aware of the dangerous passages of *tariqa*. He should be able to treat and educate his pupils in accordance with their abilities. He should train them to be patient and to endure heavy burdens. He should know very well the tricks of the Devil and persisting passions of the self. He should be able to protect any perversion of his pupils regardless of geographical proximity. He should be able to train and educate his pupils while absent and living in faraway places as if they were living in close proximity and getting their education and training face-to-face with him. The sayings, manners and all the deeds of the *murshid* should be fully in compliance with the *shari'a* and *tariqa*. He should avoid all heresy as he would wild lions. He should renounce all things that produce passion or personal taste. He should be able to bear difficulties, burdens, and misery. He should prefer and accept modesty and poverty. On matters of religion and *tasawwuf* he should demonstrate perfect exemplary conduct for his pupils. He should never transgress the border of the Book and Traditions because *tariqa* is strictly bound by the Book and the Traditions. The accomplishment of a rank in the seven attainments of the *nefs* is to be made under the guidance and in the presence of a perfect Teacher. This is done by performing *seyr-i süluk* (the process of proceeding in the Divine Path). The seven levels of attainment are as follows: 1 - *Emmare*, 2 - *Levame*, 3- *Mülhimme*, 4 - *Mutmainne*, 5 - *Radiye*, 6 - *Merdiyye*, and 7 - *Kamile*. (See Appendix C).

- Those false *murshids*, who claim to obtain permission to perform spiritual guidance through dreams, have by our great elders been called "Bandits of *Tariqa*."

- The son of Eshref (a famous Turkish Sufi) said: I have known eighteen sheikhs, and found only four of them to be perfect; and I have accomplished my perfection through one of them. The Perfects cannot give permission for guidance unless the *murid* attains perfection. The permission for guidance of the imitators cannot be honored. The genuine permission for guidance is given in the spiritual world by Allah Himself. The real Master is therefore the perfect teacher himself. Permission from those is the same as the permission from God. Spiritual guidance and education is not based on visible knowledge.

- O my brother! Just for the sake of saving you from the real calamity I earnestly recommend you to look for a perfect and perfecting *murshid* and fully submit yourself to him when you do so. Refrain from saying that "There is no implication in the Holy Book or in the Authentic Traditions about *tariqas* (the paths of Sufism)" since underlying such a statement lies disbelief. The totality of Sufism is based on the laudable moral qualities of the Prophet Muhammed (S.A.S.).

- All the good moral qualities such as asceticism, piety, being God-fearing, modesty, forbearance, patience and submission are, after all, the products of *tasawwuf*. It is therefore necessary for everybody, especially for those engaged in religious sciences and teachings, to be actively engaged in *tasawwuf*.

- After reading so many authentic Traditions of the Prophet, one must consid-

er the *dhikrullah* as the most important duty and should look for a true Spiritual Guide among the followers of the Holy Book and Traditions. If this may not become possible, this book³ may satisfy all his needs for a perfect teacher and skillful Guide.

- Mornings, evenings and before retiring for sleep, make sure that you are engaged in *dhikrullah*. But do not perform it at a minimum since Allah, the most Exalted and the most High asks and expects an abundance of it. Less *dhikr* cannot provide enough spiritual nourishment; it is at the same time considered as an indicator of hypocrisy. Just as too small a fire cannot heat our homes in winter, too small a loaf of bread cannot satisfy our hunger, nor can too little an amount of water quench our thirst.

- Attending to the daily duties of rosary is not enough. Those who are the travellers on the Sufi Path should emancipate themselves from all the bad and evil attitudes from sins. There are many of those who are intensely engaged in the performance of the rosary and who do not show any progress; they continue skidding and spend all their valuable life for nothing, leaving this world before attaining the perfection of themselves and of their faith.

- Many years ago, there were *dergahs* (dervish convents) called *tekke*, which provided spiritual training and education to the people. Since there were perfect and perfecting teachers available then, those attending these places could attain as good moral and spiritual progress as their destiny permitted. At the same time, *dergahs* were community schools of social and personal training. Many moral and spiritual practices, as well as teaching, to enlighten the inner world of people and to develop in them beautiful attitudes, manners and virtues, used to be carried out there. Through the grace of Allah, people attending those activities and taking part in the teaching and duty lessons in a serious and submissive manner may achieve enlightenment in their heart and purification of their *nefs* to gain and illustrate beautiful manners and high virtues. In time, some of those *tekkes* have lost their originality and have become degraded. Considering the defective ones as having undesirable social effects, they were all banned. The vacuum created by their physical disappearance has been filled by cafés, discos and tavernas.

On Divine Attributes of Allah⁴

- God is one without any equal in His Essence and Attributes.

- His unity is not a number that can be turned into two by the predication of another number. He is not finite so as to have six directions. He has no space. He is not in space so as to require the existence of space. He is neither contingent so as to need substance, nor a substance which cannot exist without another like itself, nor a natural constitution (*tabbi*) in which motion and rest originate. He is neither a spirit so as to need a frame, nor a body so as to be composed of limbs. He is free from all imperfections and exalted above all defects. He has no likeness so that He and His creatures should make two. He has no child whose begetting would necessarily cause Him to be of a family, or stock (*asil*). His essence and attributes are unchangeable. He is endowed with those attributes of perfection which Islam affirms, and which He had described Himself as possessing. He is exempt from those attributes which heretics impute to Him. He is Living, Knowing, Forgiving, Merciful, Willing, Powerful, Hearing, Seeing, Speaking, and Subsistent. He, together with His Attributes, exists from eternity and lasts to eternity. He does that which He has willed and wills that

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Syed Ali Hujwari-Kashf-ul.

which He has known. He is the sole predestinator of good and evil. He is the only worthy of hope and fear. He creates all benefits and injury. He alone gives judgement and His judgement is all wisdom. The inhabitants of Paradise shall behold Him. His saints may enjoy the *mushahadat* (visions) of Him in this world. Those who do not acknowledge Him to be so are guilty of impiety in Islam. (A complete list of the *Esma-ul Hüсна* in Arabic, Turkish and English is given in Appendix D).

Memoirs of Hocaefendi

Recounting the incidents and memoirs of deceased persons can sometimes provide a very clear and vivid description of their personality and spiritual portrait to interested readers. A few of the many interesting incidents and memoirs of my twenty years of fraternity with Hocaefendi are presented below.

Spiritual Bondage from a Plane

It was the year 1970. I was on my way home from an official business visit to the USA. Our plane had taken off from Kennedy Airport. After climbing to its normal cruising height and flying in an eastwardly direction, the plane suddenly started to tremble and shake. After a while, the shaking became so violent that even I, an experienced and frequent flier, became rather anxious. To have some relaxation and peace of mind, I performed in my heart the operation that is called "the bondage to the spiritual teacher." After a while, the shaking subsided and all became quiet. After transferring to another plane in Frankfurt, I flew to Ankara and arrived there late in the afternoon. A friend who met me at the airport informed me that Hocaefendi was in Ankara and there was going to be a dinner at another friend's home the same evening. We went there together. When we entered the guest-room, I saw Hocaefendi sitting in an easy-chair. I kneeled down and kissed his hand. The first thing he said to me in a voice so low that only I could hear was, "Was the shaking of the plane so violent?"

Good Manners for Family Conduct

This story was narrated to me by our late, and beloved brother Muammer Dolmaci. Sometime during the late sixties, our brothers were having a dinner party in a friend's home in Istanbul. After dinner, during the course of a conversation, one of the persons attending the party started talking about his family problems to Hocaefendi. He referred to many incidents where the bad manners of and mistreatment by his wife had become really unbearable. We came to the conclusion that he was having a real miserable life. The more he talked and told us about the incidents with his wife, the more we were convinced that he might get permission from Hocaefendi for a divorce. But Hocaefendi's recipe was short and clear: I wouldn't characterize a man as a real man if he cannot be successful in managing the conduct of his wife and family.

Losers in a Divorce

I remember on another occasion being told the following story: One of the real spiritual teachers was having difficulties with his wife and her bad manners. The situation had become so tense and hopeless that friends recommended him to divorce her. But his approach reflected another perspective. His answer was:

yes, sometimes I think of doing it. It may appear that I might get some peace of mind and relaxation if I were to divorce her. But when I look at the situation from a broader perspective, it doesn't appear to be the case. If I divorce her, three people may end up being losers: firstly, I may be a loser because of failing the Divine test of carrying out such a family life with her to the end; secondly, she may also be a loser because she may be left alone and become helpless; and thirdly, if someone happens to marry her and become her husband, he, too, may also become a loser by undertaking such an unbearable test. So by exercising patience and carrying the burden by myself without divorcing her, I may be able to save those three.

How My Mother Became One of His Students

It was the fall of 1963. In the company of Hocaefendi, we made a trip to Southeast Turkey, where there were many outstanding students of Hocaefendi. On our way from Diyarbakır to Malatya (my home town) we visited Hulusi Yahyagil in Elazığ. In the afternoon, we left Elazığ for Malatya by car. There were five of us in the car: Hocaefendi, three friends and myself. We were planning to be the guest of an old friend but a small car accident on the way kept us busy for several hours. Consequently, we reached Malatya at a very late hour. Since my mother, then a primary school teacher, was living with one of her relatives in a house on the way to the city, I invited all the company to be our guests for the night. My mother, seeing me at the door, was very happy and excited. When I told her that we had some guests, she became even happier and went to the kitchen to prepare dinner. While the guests were relaxing in our guest-room, I went to the kitchen to help her. She asked me who

our guests were, which was very unusual for her to do since we always used to have guests and she never had bothered about their identities. Until then I had not informed her about Hocaefendi and our relationship. She kept asking the question: "Korkut, who are your guests?" Then I asked her why she was so insistent. She replied, saying "Korkut, since you entered the house, a whisper in my heart has been telling me that "a treasure has just entered your house." Then I told her about our guests, including Hocaefendi, whom she wanted to see. We went to the door of our guest-room, and I gradually opened the door just to enable her to see the guests. First, she saw one of the guests, wearing a black beard, who was also a religious scholar. She whispered to me that he wasn't the one she was looking for. Then Hocaefendi



The tombstone of Hafize Özal, next by the graveyard of Mehmed Zahid Kotku (Cengiz Kahraman 1999).

became visible through the narrow opening of the door. She immediately told me, "This is him." Then she asked me whether he gave spiritual training. When I acknowledged that he did, she indicated that she wanted to be one of his students. After having dinner and performing evening prayers, she took her first lesson from Hocaefendi. That probably was one of the most important incidents of her life. A year later, she retired and moved to Istanbul, where she spent the remainder of her life in close proximity to Hocaefendi, until he died in 1980. She was a student who was active and serious in carrying out her spiritual duties and participating in all the related activities.

Visitors from Spanish Fork, Utah

My acquaintance with the Mormon community of Spanish Fork, Utah goes back to early fall of 1956 and late spring of 1957. Over the years, my wife and I had developed and maintained a good friendship with Parley R. Neeley and his wife, Josephine. They visited us in 1965 and became our guests, both in Ankara and Istanbul. While in Istanbul, I took Parley to Hocaefendi and they talked for about 45 minutes. Then the call for afternoon prayer was recited and we went to the mosque for prayer. Hocaefendi asked Parley to climb up to the balcony of the mosque and watch the congregation from there while we prayed. He recorded his observations on an 8-mm movie camera. Three years later, while I was on my way to San Francisco, I passed through Utah and was hosted by Parley and Josephine Neeley for the weekend. Parley, taking my presence as an opportunity to invite his folks and neighbors to talk about Turkey and what they remembered from their trip there, presented a slide show and showed us an 8-mm movie of what he filmed in Turkey. When Hocaefendi's face appeared on the screen, he froze the picture and remarked, "This is the holiest man I have ever seen."

How an Accident that Seemed Inevitable Was Avoided

It was the month of February 1967. Hocaefendi and some friends were about to start their pilgrimage. They were to fly from Ankara to Jeddah by a chartered plane. I invited him and our friends to a dinner party at my home before their departure. Late in the evening, there was a phone call from the airport asking us to bring the passengers to the airport immediately. The group, about forty altogether, formed a convoy consisting of a total of seven private automobiles to the airport. My car was second after that of Hocaefendi. After reaching the main road, about 30 km from the airport, I suddenly noticed that the fuel indicator of the car had lighted up, warning me that very little fuel was left. Since we were in a hurry and had no time to stop for gas, I decided to stop the engine on the downslopes to save some fuel. On the first long downslope, I did that by first increasing the speed of the car to 100 km/h and then turning the ignition off. It was a new model car with an anti-theft mechanism that was activated when the ignition key turned the engine off. The result was that the steering wheel was locked into place. We were travelling straight down an incline at a speed of 100 km/h. We then approached a part of the road that turned left, across a creek surrounded by earth ten meters high on both sides. The banks were covered with snow and ice. I turned the steering wheel to the left but the safety catch locked the system, which caused me to lose control of the car. I thought about attempting to unlock the wheel, but the curve was too short and the car too fast. The only thing I could do was to slam on the breaks, which I did instinctively. The curve came to an end but the car continued turning to the left, so we started to reach a position lateral to

the road, which closed it to traffic. We must have been driving at about 50-60 km/ h. and the situation seemed hopeless. We were either going to fall from a height of ten meters or, if by chance we could stop the car on the road, be hit by the on-coming cars in the convoy, thereby causing a big accident. The road could no longer be seen; there was nothing but a void in front of me. I felt the front wheels on the bank. All of a sudden, a miracle occurred. Ignoring the law of inertia, the car suddenly stopped. As if a hand was holding and moving our car like a toy it rotated and skidded towards the road banks and peacefully parked with its front facing Ankara. The road was fully cleared for on-coming traffic. Sitting in the driver's seat and facing the road, I saw the five cars that were following from behind safely pass by. A car accident that seemed inevitable had been avoided.

How I Got Involved in Party Politics

It was the end of the summer of 1973. We were celebrating the night feast of *Mi'raj* (the ascension of the Holy Prophet to the heavens for the Divine Audience). General elections for the Turkish Parliament were one and a half months away. Three prominent members of the National Salvation Party were there. They invited me to accept the candidacy of the Party to run for the membership of the Lower House of Parliament from the Erzurum electoral district. They told me that I had only 12 hours to make a decision. By neither accepting nor rejecting their offer, I told them that I would carefully consider their offer. After the festivities of *Mi'raj* were over, I invited some of my close friends for consultation. I solicited their views, whereupon we discussed the offer at length late into the night. None of them seemed to be in favor of the offer. They stated several reasons (about seven) why I shouldn't accept the offer. I noted them down. In the morning I went to the mosque for Morning Prayer. After finishing the prayer and other activities, Hocaefendi left the mosque to go to his home next to the mosque. I followed him. He invited me to his house for breakfast, at which we had the following conversation:

- What is the matter you want to consult me about?
 - I have just received an offer from NSP to run as a candidate for the lower house of parliament from Erzurum.
 - What is your personal opinion?
 - I've consulted my friends.
 - What do they say?
- Then I took my notes and started reading comments made by my friends.
- They think that since I am not a native of Erzurum, I may not be favored by the people in the elections.
- His answer was very brief and clear.
- Muslims will vote for you.
- Then I read the second comment.
- They think that Erzurum is a very large province with very rough terrain; so the time available for campaigning is too short to make myself understood and to create a positive impression on the people.
 - It is not propaganda, but rather Allah the Almighty, that governs and turns hearts.
 - My friends say that I do not like playing dirty politics.
 - Play politics by telling and spreading the truth and realities of the country.
- I didn't inquire about the remaining issues. In asking his permission, he gave me two more policy issues to be followed with the utmost care:
- Maintain a good and open dialog with all the people. And be open to their dialogs; be a uniting and unifying factor in politics.

That was all. The style and content of his answers were very clear. Hocaefendi wanted me to accept the offer. So I accepted the offer. The next day, I went to Erzurum to campaign and worked there until election day.

To many learned observers and friends, winning the elections looked really hopeless. In the last election, the majority party opposing us had won 8 out of 9 seats. They appeared to be the favored contenders. But as instructed by our beloved Hocaefendi, we did not pay attention to these claims. We carried out our campaign in a modest but enthusiastic fashion.

On October 14, 1973 the general elections were held. Our team and party were the favorites in Erzurum. We received 30 percent of the votes cast and became the leading party. We won three members in the Lower House and one in the Senate. The deep foresight of Hocaefendi had come true - the hearts of the people were governed and turned by God, the Almighty.

Appendix A

Lessons in the rules and methods used in performing the sacred duties

(Free translation by the author of advise given by Mehmed Zahid Kotku Hocaefendi)

We perform our *wudu* (ablution), and try to be on *wudu* all the time. In performing the exercise we prefer to sit in a lonely place facing Qibla.

We begin by submitting our *istighfars* (asking God's pardon) 25 times (Estaghfirullah El azeem).

Then we recite Su'ra *Al-Fatiha* once, followed by Su'ra *Al-Ikhlās* (*Kulhüvellahu Ehad...*) three times.

After that we say:

"I bestow God's pure reward for those as a gift, to the blessed and noble soul of our Prophet (May Allah's blessings and peace be upon him), and to the glorious souls of all the other prophets (Peace be upon them and our Prophet), their sons, wives, households, companions and followers, as well as to the soul of Hazret Ebubekir (May Allah be pleased with him) and to the souls of all our Eminent Great Masters that came and passed in succession till now, and explicitly to the souls of our Eminent Great Sheiks Muhammed Bahaeddin Nakshibend and Mevlana Halid-i Baghdadi in particular (May Allah's mercy be upon them)."

Then we reflect on the ending of our life and meditate on our death. This exercise is called "The bondage to death" and is carried out as follows:

We close our eyes. As if this were our last rest we envisage ourselves lying down in our bed facing Qibla. Being in full fear and anxiety we wonder and ask ourselves "what is going to happen to us?" Just at this moment the Divine Help arrives and enables us to utter the words of bearing witness to the Unity of the God and to the Prophethood of our Prophet Muhammed (May Allah's blessings and Peace be upon him): "*Eshedu en-la Ilahe Illallah ve Eshedu enne Muhammedun Rasuluhu.*" Right after that instant our soul has been taken away by the angel of death (Peace upon Him), the angel of death, and has been shown its eternal home in the other world hereafter. And then it has been returned back and set at the feet of the on-looker on-looking our dead body.

The soul says to the dead body: "Throughout all those years we have lived together. Now we are separated. Let us see what is going to happen." The soul waits there. Realizing that we have passed away, relatives and friends gather around our dead body. They cry, lament and moan with grief. They inform and send for washers. They prepare for ablution and wrapping in a shroud. They start to undress the body. Try to fully visualize and envision that very moment. Look.. and see...They undress you...Your body is put on the bench...Washers come...They first clean the body...Then wash it... *Ghusul* (full ablution) is performed... Then the body is wrapped in a shroud and placed in the coffin... The coffin is then taken to the mosque and put on the bier... The funeral prayer is performed by the *cemaat*... The coffin is then carried to the grave-yard ... and is lowered and laid to its resting place in the grave. Then the grave is filled and covered with the earth's soil...After finishing the burial ceremony, all the people go back to their homes leaving you there all alone... Allah, the Highest and most Exalted, meantime sends two of His angels for interrogations. They ask the questions: "Who is your Lord?" "What is your Religion?" "Who is your Prophet?" "Which is your Holy Book?" "Where is your Qibla?" Let Allah, the Compassionate enable all the followers of our Prophet, including us as His humble servants, to easily answer those questions in the

following: "Allah is my God, Islam is my Religion, Muhammed Mustafa (p.b.h) is my Prophet, the Glorious Qur'an is my Holy Book, and the Sacred Ka'ba is my Qibla." Upon receiving these answers the angels declare "May Allah give blessings to you and your place" and leave.

And your graves, God's willing, are converted into a garden of the Heaven by God the Almighty. Our Spiritual Teachers in the world hereafter are informed that this and that of their children have arrived. They come and take us to their place, where we engage in the *dhikrullah*. The corpses remain in the graves.

Before daily engaging yourself in the exercise "bondage to death," do your best to perform this duty most properly. The better the performance is, the higher is the divine reward and the more abundant becomes your spiritual enlightenment (10-15 minutes).

After that we perform the second bondage, "The bondage to the spiritual leader." Observe the following:

Our spiritual leader is Hazret-i Khalid. He was born in Baghdad and buried in Damascus. He had a large chest, broad shoulders, a straight and handsome nose, black beard (with some grey hairs), benevolent looks and a respectful personality. In this exercise we envisage him and our Spiritual Guide (Hocaefendi) as sitting next to each other in front of us. We contemplate that the divine spiritual enlightenment will be flowing from their hearts to ours and wait for the divine enlightenment and blessing to come. (By disassociating your imagination and perceptions from the world and the world hereafter as well as from any internal states, try hard to direct all your spiritual concentration to the spiritual master and to a point between his two eyebrows... After a while, try to encompass and transfer the spirituality of your spiritual master to the place between your own two eyebrows. And from there transpose it gradually to your heart and to the profound depths of your heart and maintain that mental picture all the time).

The third bondage is "The bondage to the Divine Audience." Think of and imagine the heart. The heart is two inches below the left nipple. It is a place to which the Divine looks and attention is directed and concentrated. Allah, the Highest and most Exalted, observes deep into the hearts of His servants and manifests Himself there. The heart is the place of spiritual illumination, and we join that place of bright glow. Our surroundings are all illuminated with that bright light... And we imagine that there, in front of us and written in brilliant letters, stands the name of ALLAH. May His glory be exalted. We then recollect the most beautiful attributes of Allah. He is the Almighty and the Omnipotent. He is the Omnipresent. He determines good and evil. He is free from all imperfections and exalted above all defects. He is not in need of, nor bound to the dimensions of time and space. He is endowed with all attributes of perfection. Then we turn to ourselves and think of our limitations, our incapacity and inability. By realizing that our Lord is fully aware of all our positions, hidden or open, we reduce ourselves to a mere nothing at His presence. After meditating for a while in such a mood we say: "O Allah...The earth belongs to you... The heavens belong to you...Whatever there is in heaven and on earth is yours... Whatever in existence is yours... I am your impotent, incapable and helpless servant... Please forgive me, o Allah...Please forgive me all my sins... Please accept me and place me among those servants of yours who always praise you and thank you for your bounties and are rewarded with your contentment."

After saying these from our inner selves, in a state of supplication and entreaty, we take our rosary, and give utterance to the following phrases, while deeply thinking over their meanings:

1-100 times *İstiğfar*: “*Estaghfirullah el-azim...*”

2-100 times *Kelime-i Tevhid*: “*La İlahe İllallah*”

3-100 times *Lafza-i Celal*: “*Allah*” (Allah, the word of Majesty, can, on the part of those having time available, be increased up to 5000 times. At the end of every hundred we say, while thinking of its meaning, “*İlahi ente maksudi ve rizake matlubı*”- O my God, you are my aim and it is your consent that I ask for).

4-100 times “*Salavat-ı Sherife*” (Prayers of God’s Blessings on our Prophet, p.b.u.h) and “*Allahumme Sally ...Allahumme Barik*” (The one we read during the sittings of our prayers is preferred. But in case of shortage of time saying “O God, bestow your prayers and blessings on our Master Muhammed (s.a.s) and his relatives, companions and followers” will suffice).

5-100 times *Su`ra Al-Ikhlâs*: (Starting in the name of Allah)

Other duties are:

1- Do your best to perform all your prayers together with others. Remain in the mosque after the morning prayers and be occupied with praising Allah and/or reading Qur’an and reciting your evrad until 45 minutes after sun-rise, and then perform two rik’ats as *ishrak* (after sun-rise) prayers.

2- Between *ishrak* and not later than 45 minutes before noon perform 4 (or 4+4+4) rik’ats of *doha* prayers.

3- After sun-set prayer perform 2 (better 2+2+2) rik’ats of *evvabim* prayers

4- Before retiring to your bed renew your ablution and perform at least 4 rik’ats of night prayer.

5- Do your best to perform *tahajjud* (2+2+2) (after mid-night) prayers.

6- Try to keep voluntary fasting of Monday-Thursday as well other voluntary fasts.

7- Don’t interfere with other peoples’ business and issues. Keep away from the places of gossip and backbiting. Do your best to make up for your undelivered prayers and fasts. Do your utmost to refrain from committing any sin. And do not forget us (Hocaefendi and other spiritual teachers) in your prayers. God bless you and may he keep you on the right path, for the right order and the eternal truth. Amen.

“Verily, those who give *bai’a* (pledge) to you (O Muhammed [p.b.u.h]), are giving it to Allah. The hand of Allah is over their hands. Then whosoever breaks his pledge, breaks only to his own harm, and to whosoever fulfils what he has covenanted with Allah, Allah will bestow a great reward.” (*Al Qur’an Sur’a Al-Feth a.10*).

Appendix B
The Noble Linage (Silsile-i Şerif)

Name	Birth				Death			Years (H)	
	Nesebi Ascend	Yeri Location	Mil. Georg.	Hic. Hegira	Yeri Location	Mil. Georg.	Hic. Hegira	Görev Duty	Ömür Life
1 Hz. Muhammed Mustafa (SAV)	Kureyş	Mekke-i Mükerrerme	571	-52	Medine-i Münevvere	632	11	23	63
2 Hz. Ebubekir Siddik (R.A.)	Kureyş	Mekke-i mükerrerme	573	-50	Medine-i Munevvere	634	13	2 63	
3 Hz. Selman Al-Farisi (R.A)	Farisi	İsfahan	461	-165	Medayin	655	35	22	200
4 Hz. Kasım ibn-i Muhammed (R.A.)	Kureyş	Medine-i Münevvere	640	19	Mekke-Medine arası	725	106	71	87
5 Hz. Cafer Sadık (R.A.)	Ehl-i Beyt	Medine-i Münevvere	703	85	Medine-i Münevvere	765	148	42	63
6 Hz. Bayezedi al-Bistami (K.S.)		Bistan-İran	753	136	Bistam-İran	845	231	83	95
7 Hz. Ebu'l-Haseni'l-Harkani (K.S.)		Harkan-ıran	959	348	Kars-Türkiye	1027	419	n.a.	71
8 Hz. Ebu Ali al-Faremedi (K.S.)		Farmez-Horasan	1018	409	Tavs	1084	477	58	68
9 Hz. Yusuf al-Hemedani (K.S)	İ. Malik	Hemedan-ıran	1049	441	Merv-Türkmenistan	1139	534	57	93
10 Hz. -Aldülhalik al-Gücdüvani (K.S.)		Gücdüvan-Bukhara	1106	500	Bukhâra-Turkestan	1179	575	41	75
11 Hz. Arif al-Rivgeri (K.S)	Türk	Rivger-Bukhara	1124	519	Safirkan-Turkestan	1251	649	74	130
12 Hz. Mahmud İncir al-Fağnevi (K.S)	Türk	Fağni-Bukhara	1190	587	Eyneki-Bukhara	1316	717	68	130
13 Hz. Ali Al-Ramiteni (K.S)		Ramiten-Bukhara	1194	591	Ramiten-Bukhara	1320	721	4	130
14 Hz. Muhammad Baba Semmasi (K.S.)		Semmas-Bukhara	1194	591	Semmas-Bukhara	1353	755	34	100
15 Hz. Emir Külal (K.S.)		Sühar	1245	643	Sühar	1370	722	17	129
16 Hz. Şahı Nakşibend Muhammad Bahaüddin Üveysi al-Buhari (K.S.)	Seyyid	Kasr-ı Arifan-Bukhara	1317	718	Kasr-ı Arifan-Bukhara	1389	792	20	74
17 Hz. Alaeddin Atar (K.S.)		Harezmi	1331	732	Ciganyan-Bukhara	1399	802	10	70
18 Hz. Yakubal-Çerhi al-Hisari (K.S.)		Çerh Gaznin Tacikistan	n.a.	n.a.	Düşenbe-Tacikistan	1446	851	49	n.a.
19 Hz. Ubeydullah Ahrar (K.S.)	Hz. Ömer	Dağıştan-Taşkent	1403	806	Semerikand-Turkestan	1489	895	44	89
20 Hz. Muhammad Zahid Parsa (K.S)		n.a.	1418	822	Medine-i Münevvere	1515	922	27	100
21 Hz. muhammad Derviş (K.S.)		n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Eseferad	1562	970	48	n.a.

22 Hz. Hâcegi al-Emkineki (K.S.)		Emkenek-Semerikand	1511	918	Emkenek	1599	1008	38	90
23 Hz. Muhammad Baki (K.S.)		Kabil-Afganistan	1565	973	Delhi	1604	1013	5	40
24 Hz. İmam Rabbani Müceddidi Elfi Sani Ahmed Faruk es-Serhedi (K.S.)		Serhend-Delhi	1563	971	Serhend	1624	1034	21	63
25 Hz. Muhammad Masum (K.S.)		Serhend-Delhi	1600	1009	Serhend	1669	1080	46	71
26 Hz. Şeyh Seyfüddin (K.S.)		Serhend-Delhi	1639	1049	Serhend	1686	1098	18	49
27 Hz. Seyyid Nur Muhammad el-Bedvani (K.S.)	Seyyid	Bedvan	1652	1063	Bedvan	1722	1135	37	72
28 Hz. şemsüddin Can-ı Canan Mazhar (K.S.)		n.a.	1701	1113	n.a.	1780	1195	60	82
29 Hz. Şeyh Abdullah al-Dehlevi (K.S.)		Pençap-Delhi	1744	1158	Delhi	1824	1240	45	81
30 Hz. Mevlana Ziyaüddin Halid al-Bağdadi (K.S.)	Seyyid	Şehrizor	1778	1193	Şam	1836	1253	13	60
31 Hz. Ahmed İbn-i Süleyman Halid Hasen al-Şami (K.S.)		Ervad-Trablusşam	1785	1200	Trablusşam	1858	1275	22	75
32 Hz. Ahmed Ziyaüddin İbn-i Mustafa al-Gümüştanevi (K.S.)	Türk	Gümüştane	1813	1228	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1893	1311	36	83
33 Hz. Hasan Hilmi İbn-i Abdullah al-Kastamoni (K.S.)	Türk	Daday Kastamonu	1825	1240	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1911	1329	18	89
34 Hz. İsmail Necati İbn-i Muhammad al-Zağferanboli (K.S.)	Türk	Safranbolu-Kastamonu	1839	1255	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1920	1339	10	84
35 Hz. Ömer Ziyaüddin ez-Zeki İbn-i Abdillan ed-Dağistani-(K.S.)	Türk	Muratlı-Dağistan	1849	1266	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1921	1340	1	74
36 Hz. Mustafa Feyzi İbn-i Emrullah et-Tekfurdağı (K.S.)	Türk	Kılıçlar-Tekirdağ	1851	1267	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1926	1345	5	78
37 Hz. Hasib Yardımcı İbn-i Ali al-Serezi (K.S.)	Türk	Serez-Mekadonya	1863	1280	Edirnekapi-Istanbul	1949	1368	23	88
38 Hz. Abdülaziz Bekkine İbn-i Halis al-Kazani (K.S.)	Türk	İstanbul	1895	1313	Edirnekapi-Istanbul	1952	1371	3	58
39 Hz. Muhammad Zahid Kotku İbn-i İbrahim al-Bursevi (K.S.)	Seyyid	Bursa	1879	1315	Süleymaniye-Istanbul	1980	1401	30	86

Appendix C
The Process of Educating and Perfecting the *Nafs*

EDUCATION

<p>A T T R I B U T E S o f N A F S</p>				<p>Endurance</p> <p>Contentment</p> <p>Generosity</p> <p>Gratitude</p> <p>Patience</p> <p>Repentance</p> <p>Humbleness</p> <p>Knowledge</p>
	<p>RANKS OF NAFS</p> <p>REFERENCE IN THE QUR'AN</p>	<p>1.-EMMARE (Inordinate appetite)</p> <p>Sure-i Yusuf a:52</p>	<p>2-LEVVAME (Self condemnation)</p> <p>Sure-i Kiyamet a:2</p>	<p>3-MÜLHİMME (Awakened)</p> <p>Sure-i Tems a:6-7</p>
<p>A T T R I B U T E S o f N A F S</p>	Incompatibility	Incompatibility		
	Addiction to finery and possession	Addiction to finery and possession		
	Addiction to eating and drinking	Addiction to eating drinking		
	Addiction to sleeping Lack of regret	Addiction to sleeping Lack of regret		
	Sinfulness	Sinfulness		
	Self-complacency	Self-complacency		
	Ignorance	Ignorance		
	Avarice	Avarice		
	Grudge			
	Envy			
	Wrath			
	Meanness			
	Conceit			
	Indulgence in sins			
	Heedlessness			
Disbelief				
Polytheism				

TOWARDS PERFECTION

		Attainment of Divine Gnosis		
		Contentment with the division of Allah		
		Deep reflection on Creation Nearness to Allah		
		Kind treatment of all the creatures of Allah		
		Renunciation of everything other than Allah		
	Miracles	Miracles		
	Asceticism and piety	Asceticism and piety		
	Dhikrullah (Continuous remembrance of Allah)	Dhikrullah (Continuous remembrance of Allah)		
	Renunciation of nonsense	Renunciation of nonsense		
	Sincerity and enlightenment	Sincerity and enlightenment		
Deep reflections	Deep reflections	Deep Reflections	Since these attributes pertain to the divine confidentiality nothing can be described or written down	
Enjoyment in worship	Enjoyment in worship	Enjoyment in worship		
Ascetic discipline	Ascetic discipline	Ascetic discipline		
Being accustomed to hunger	Being accustomed to hunger	Being accustomed to hunger		
Submission and resignation	Submission and resignation	Submission and resignation		
Good deeds	Good deeds	Good deeds		
Endurance	Endurance	Endurance		
Satisfaction, contentment	Satisfaction, contentment	Satisfaction, contentment		
Generosity	Generosity	Generosity		
Gratitude	Gratitude	Gratitude		
Patience	Patience	Patience		
Repentance	Repentance	Repentance		
Modesty and humbleness	Modesty and humbleness	Modesty and humbleness		
Knowledge	Knowledge	Knowledge		
4-MÜTMAİNNE (Pious and Tranquil) Sure-i Nahl a: 106, Sure-i Fecr a:27	5-RADIYE (Fully contended) Sure-i Maide a: 119 Seri-i Fecr a:26	6-MERDIYYE (Having been contended) Sure-i Fecr a: 28, Sure-i Beyyine a:8		7-KAMİLE (Perfection) Sure-i Tems a:9

Appendix D Esmâ-ül-Hüsna

Esmâ ü'l Hüsnâ	Allah'ın güzel isimleri	The Most Beautiful Names Of Allah
1 Allah	Allah	Allah
2 Ar-Rahman	Nimetlendirici	The All Merciful
3 Ar-Rahim	Merhametli	The All Beneficent
4 Al-Melik	Hükümdar	The Absolute Ruler
5 Al-Kuddus	Kutsal	The Holy
6 As-Selam	Selamet verici	The Savior
7 Al-Mü'min	Emin kılıcı	The Inspirer of Faith
8 Al-Muheymin	Kollayıcı	Thu Guardian
9 Al-Aziz	Galib	The Victorious
10 Al-Cebbar	Zorlayıcı	The Compeller
11 Al-Mutekebbir	Yüce	The Majestic
12 Al-Halik	Yaratıcı	The Creator
13 Al-Bari	Geliştirici	The Evolver
14 Al-Musavvir	Şekillendirici	The Fashioner
15 Al-Gaffar	Bağışlaması pek çok	The Great Forgiver
16 Al-Kahhar	Kahredici	The Crusher
17 Al-Vehhab	Bahşedici	The Giver of All
18 Ar-Rezzak	Rızıklandırıcı	The Sustainer
19 Al-Fettah	Kapı açıcı	The Opener
20 Al-Alim	Bilmesi pek çok	The Knower of All
21 Al-Kaabid	Darlandırıcı	The Constrictor
22 Al-Baasit	Genişletici	The Reliever
23 Al-Haafid	İndirici	The Abaser
24 Ar-Rafi	Yükseltici	The Exalter
25 Al-Muizz	Yüceltici	The Bestower of Honors
26 Al-Muzill	Aşağılatıcı	The Humiliator
27 As-Semi	İşitici	The Hearer of All
28 Al-Basir	Görücü	The Seer of All
29 Al-Hakem	Hükmedici	The Judge
30 Al-Adl	Adil	The Just
31 Al-Latif	Lutfedici	The Subtle One
32 Al-Halim	Hilmi pek çok	The Forebearing One
33 Al-Habir	Haberdar	The All-Aware
34 Al-Azim	Azametli	The Magnificent
35 Al-Gafur	Magfireti yüksek	The All-Forgiving
36 Aş-Şekur	Kulluğu kabul edici	The Appreciative
37 Al-Ali	Ulu	The Highest
38 Al-Kebir	En Büyük	The Greatest
39 Al-Hafız	Koruyucu	The Preserver
40 Al-Mukit	Destek ve Kuvvet Verici	The Maintainer
41 Al-Hasib	Hesab Görücü	The Reckoner
42 Al-Celil	Celalet Sahibi	The Sublime One
43 Al-Kerim	Kerem ve İhsan Sahibi	The Generous One
44 Ar-Rakib	Gözetleyici	The Watchful One
45 Al-Mucib	Dilekleri Kabul Eden	The Responder to Prayers
46 Al-Vasi	Sınırsız Geniş	The All-Embracing
47 Al-Hakim	Hikmet Sahibi	The Perfectly Wise
48 Al-Vedud	Seven (Mü'minleri)	The Loving One
49 Al-Mecid	Şani Pek Yüce	The Most Glorious One
50 Al-Bais	Diriltici	The Resurrector
51 Aş-Şhid	Hazır ve Nazır	The Witness

52	Al-Hakk	Gerçek	The Truth
53	Al-Vekil	Vekil	The Trustee
54	Al-Kavi	Tüm Kudretin Tek Sahibi	The Posseser of all Strength
55	Al-Metin	En Dayanıklı	The Firm One
56	Al-Veli	Koruyucu Dost	The Protecting Friend
57	Al-Hamid	Hamedilen	The Praiseworthy
58	Al-Muhsi	Mevcutları Bilici	The Counter
59	Al-Mubdi	Köktenyaratıcı	The Originator
60	Al-Muid	Onarıcı ve Diriltici	The Restorer
61	Al-Muhyi	Hayat Verici	The Giver of Life
62	Al-Mumit	Ölüm Verici	The Taker of Life
63	Al-Hayy	Diri	The Everliving One
64	Al-Kayyum	Ayakta Tutucu	The Self-Subsisting
65	Al-Vacid	Algılayıcı ve Bulucu	The Perceiver and Finder
66	Al-Macid	Azamet ve Şan Sahibi	The Noble
67	Al-Vahid	Benzersiz Tek	The Unique
68	Al-Ehad	Eşsiz Bir	The Onl One
69	As-Samed	Hacetleri Giderici	The Satisfyer of All Needs
70	Al-Kadir	Kudret Sahibi	The Able
71	Al-Muktedir	Tasarruf Sahibi	The Powerful
72	Al-Mukaddim	Öne Alıcı	The Promoter
73	Al-Muahhir	Geri Bırakıcı	The Retarder
74	Al-Evvel	En Başta	The First
75	Al-Ahir	En Sonda	The Last
76	Az-Zahir	Aşıkâr	The Manifest One
77	Al-Batın	Gizli	The Hidden One
78	Al-Vali	Yönetici	The Governor
79	Al-Müteali	Zatı En Yüce	The Most Exalted
80	Al-Berr	İhtiyaçları Karşılâyan	The Source of all Goodness
81	At-Tevvab	Tevbeleri Kabul Edici	The Acceptor of Repentance
82	Al-Muntakim	Cezalandırıcı	The Avenger
83	Afuvv	Affedici	The Pardoner
84	Ar-Rauf	Şefkat ve Merhametli	The Compassionate
85	Malik-il-Mülk	Mülkün Sahibi	The Owner of Sovereignty
86	Zül Celali vel ikram	Celal ve İkrâm Sahibi	The Lord of Majesty and Bounty
87	Al-Muksit	Adalet Sahibi	The Equitable One
88	Al-Cami	Toplayıcı	The Gatherer
89	Al-Gani	Zengin	The Self-Sufficient
90	Al-Muğni	Zengin edici	The Enricher
91	Al-Mani	Önleyici	The Preventer
92	An-Nafi	Yarar verici	The Propitious
93	Ad-Darr	Zarar, Bela Verici	The Distresser
94	An-Nur	Nur Verici	The Light
95	Al-Bedi	İcad Edici	The Originator
96	Al-Hadi	Doğruyolu Gösterici	The Guide
97	Al-Baki	Sonsuz Kalıcı	The Everlasting
98	Al-Varis	Varis-i hakiki	The Supreme Inheritor
99	Ar-Reşid	Erdemli Öğretici	The Righteous Teacher
100	As-Sabur	En Sabırlı	The Most Patient
101	As-Sadık	En Doğrucu	The Most Faithful
102	As-Settar	En Örtücü	The Concealer

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¹ Professor Butros Abu-Manneh did not take part in the conference. His contribution was added afterwards.