

Spain

in

Decline

1621-1700

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King of Spain, Philip IV, 1629, by Velázquez

PHILIP IV

After the portrait by Velázquez

SPAIN IN DECLINE

1621—1700

BY

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HAQ BROTHERS
16
ANARKALI
LAHORE-2
LONDON

MACMILLAN & CO LTD

NEW YORK • ST MARTIN'S PRESS

1961

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First Edition November 1957

Reprinted December 1957

Reprinted April 1961

132691

MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED
London Bombay Calcutta Madras Melbourne

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED
Toronto

ST MARTIN'S PRESS INC
New York

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

FOREWORD

THIS book, *Spain in Decline*, was written in the few years before my husband's death in November 1953, but the last stages of a long illness prevented his revising it for publication. It was intended to be a sequel to *The Golden Century of Spain* published in 1939, which quickly became unobtainable but was reprinted in 1954 and 1956.

In 1927 he began his work at Oxford as Tutor in the Honour School of Modern History with his old Society of St. Catherine's, to which he had first come up as an undergraduate of seventeen.

It was in his teaching of his pupils at Oxford that he became aware of the need for suitable books embodying the findings of research into Spain's Golden Age. Those modern discoveries, which seriously affected the interpretation of sixteenth-century Spain, were his chief concern. What time he could spare from his teaching he devoted to this, which soon became his greatest research interest. In 1946 he was made University Lecturer in Spanish History, but his historical pursuits extended into many fields. He had a lifelong interest in the institution of Monarchy. This enhanced his passion for Spanish History under Philip II and also led him to enquire into the influence of witch belief as an important and neglected factor in the fall of the Stuarts. The outcome of this work was the publication in 1947 of *Four Centuries of Witch-Beliefs*.

His greatest memorial, however, will probably be in the memory of those who knew and were taught by him. Sympathy and kindness underlay all he did and an unfailing sense of humour enlivened his work. It was his delight to attend the weekly meetings of the Dean Kitchin Society at St. Catherine's, which he never missed.

To the service of his pupils he gave himself unsparingly ; their happiness and subsequent careers were matters of deep personal concern to him. Many of them will welcome this book not only for its contents but as a reminder of cherished associations with its author.

KATHLEEN TREVOR DAVIES

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

The author was unhappily denied the opportunity of revising the typescript of this book, and it proved to be imperfect in many details. In addition, the references to the sources from which he was quoting were sometimes missing, and there were one or two passages which he would almost certainly have wished to alter later. The places where it seemed desirable in the circumstances to make any significant changes in these respects have been indicated by square brackets [].

CHAPTER I

THE RULE OF OLIVARES

(1621-17TH JANUARY 1643)

SPAIN, the Hercules of European states, whose labours had astonished the sixteenth-century world, weakened and collapsed in the seventeenth century with a suddenness that calls for a careful diagnosis of the disease. Such a diagnosis shows that Spain's malady had three separate phases: first, the economic and financial debility which set in early and helped to accelerate further declines; secondly, a military decline which was curiously long delayed; and, lastly, a decline of patriotic and religious feelings, which, like a shirt of Nessus, put an end to its labours. Perhaps the most curious feature of the disease was the literary and artistic florescence at the very time when debility and collapse were most imminent. The economic decline had set in long before the accession of Philip IV and the consequent rule of Olivares. Some would place its beginning as early as 1560. Anyone would agree that it was quite obvious in the reign of Philip III. It continued thereafter till the end of the century with unslackening intensity. Each period into which the eighty years may be divided may be regarded, despite moments of success and splendid achievement, as further steps in an almost continuous process of decline.

Philip IV succeeded his father at the age of sixteen (31st March 1621) and immediately made Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares, chief minister in place of the Duke of Uceda. For some twenty-one years Olivares remained the real ruler of Spain and its vast empire. It is, therefore, important to know something of the character and aims of this man, who, like most Spanish ministers of the Crown was never without his detractors.

Don Gaspar de Guzmán came of a younger branch of the famous noble family of Guzmán, the head of which was the Duke of Medina Sidonia. He was born in Rome at Epiphany 1587, and was accordingly christened Gaspar after the traditional name of one of the three Magi. His father, Enrique de Guzmán, second Count of Olivares, had made his mark as a diplomatist under Philip II as Ambassador at Rome (1582-1591). He served afterwards as Viceroy of Sicily and of Naples. In these offices he had shown himself to be proud and arrogant though remarkably successful. As viceroy he had set to work to discourage luxury and extravagance and to better the condition of the common people, with whom he became highly popular. It is noteworthy that one of his most deeply rooted ambitions was that of becoming a grandee, and that his failure to win this honour of being covered in the presence of the king coloured his whole later life, making him a bitter and disappointed man anxious to instil into his children the desire to pursue an ambitious career.

Gaspar de Guzmán, as a younger son, was brought up for an ecclesiastical career, his father cherishing the hope that he would one day see his son a cardinal or even Pope. When the family returned to Spain, Gaspar was sent in 1601 to the university of Salamanca with a gorgeous train of servants and companions. Contemporary accounts differ in accordance with the prejudices of the writers as to the way in which he spent his time at the university. Some declare that he worked hard and showed rare ability, others are equally positive in their assurances that he never as much as opened a book during the whole of his career at Salamanca. However this may be, he was made Rector of the university in 1603 — an incident that prompted the sarcastic comment of the hostile Matías de Novoa to the effect that he became vice-chancellor before he matriculated (*Llegó a ser Rector antes que colegial ni estudiante*). The following year the death of his elder brother left him as heir to the title and lands of his father. Accordingly, at the age of sixteen, he abandoned

his preparations for an ecclesiastical career and went to live at court in company with his father, who still hankered after the rank of grandee, and whose death in 1607 placed Gaspar, at the age of twenty, in possession of the title and lands of Olivares. That he had inherited a full measure of his father's ambition was soon indicated by his marriage of convenience with his first cousin Doña Inés de Zúñiga y Velasco because she was high in the queen's favour and consequently in a good position to satisfy his appetite for advancement. The winning of the lady was said to have involved him in an expenditure of no less than 300,000 crowns.

Though he spent his rent-roll — estimated at some 60,000 ducats a year — lavishly at court he failed to obtain the rank of grandee but gained at the early age of twenty-four the offer of the important post of Ambassador at Rome. Lerma, the chief minister, possibly made this tempting offer to get him away from court, where he might develop into a potential danger. Olivares, thinking perhaps on similar lines, refused and decided to pursue his ambitions at court. His patience was rewarded in 1615, when he was appointed one of the six gentlemen of the household of Prince Philip, the future Philip IV. He seized his good fortune with both hands and set to work with grim determination to stake everything on winning the favour and dominating the mind of the future king. He regarded it as a complete certainty that Philip III would not live long and that with the accession of Philip IV his power could be assured. His task was no easy one, for the young prince seemed at the outset to have taken a violent dislike to him. In face of this difficulty Olivares displayed remarkable tact and self-control, and, after supreme efforts, succeeded in making himself indispensable to the wayward Infante. Before the death of Philip III in 1621 he was certain of the firmness of his hold over the new king. He is accused by many writers, such as Brunel, Bertaut and Madame d'Aulnoy, of encouraging Philip IV in many kinds of profligacy and debauchery in order to strengthen his influence. Such

accusations are probably based upon nothing more solid than court gossip. The available evidence suggests that the new king needed no encouragement. In any case Olivares's position was now so strong that he could get Philip's consent to anything by the simple expedient of asking leave to retire to his own estates.

When Philip III lay dying Olivares said to the chief minister of that king, the Duke of Uceda, 'Now all is mine'. 'All?' asked Uceda. 'Yes,' replied the confident Olivares, 'all without exception.' His confidence was completely justified. He became the most powerful minister of any king in Spanish history. He is better known to posterity than most of the great figures in history owing to the many portraits that have come down to us either from Velázquez himself or attributed to that superlatively great master. They show him as a big, thick-set man with a square head and brilliant black eyes, long moustaches upturned, broad chin beard and an all-pervading air of arrogance and authority. Amongst Spanish ministers of the Crown he is distinguished as one who valued power more than wealth and found his motive power in ambition instead of avarice. To understand him it is necessary to place him side by side with such contemporaries as Richelieu, Strafford, Oliver Cromwell, Wallenstein and Oxenstierna — all of them men who sought from power not self-indulgence for themselves but rather self-sacrifice for what they conceived to be the good of their country. He worked extremely hard and had the assistance of his uncle Don Baltasar de Zúñiga — a former tutor to the Infante — a man of high character, ability and practical experience in politics.

Recognising that Spain had already gone far down the incline of economic decay, he made it his prime task to restore the greatness of the country. He attempted to achieve his purpose by three means, which he adopted often with more vigour than lasting success. First, he did away with corruption, luxury, extravagance and immoral living and strove to put in their place simplicity of life, frugality and hard work. Secondly, he weakened the power of the Cortes in various provinces of the

Peninsula; and, thirdly, he aimed at the centralisation under one government of the whole of Spain and the gradual obliteration of the frontiers of the various regions.

The attack on corruption opened with the putting on trial of those who had held important offices during the previous reign. Thus, for example, the Duke of Osuna, who had played such a brilliant part as Viceroy of Sicily and of Naples during the previous reign, was put in prison on a charge of having enriched himself while in office. His way of life had been such as to give ready colour to such a charge. On his return from Naples he had lived in more than princely splendour. He was in the habit of going about Madrid followed by twenty coaches carrying a multitude of Spanish and Neapolitan gentlemen who enjoyed his favour. Fifty retired captains and ensigns formed his household guard and travelled about his person, clothed in gorgeous draperies sown with precious stones. When he went to joust at a festival in the Plaza Mayor he was accompanied by a hundred lackeys in liveries of blue and silver. Little wonder that he died of *ennui* in prison before being sentenced. Despite his amazing ostentation he was probably one of the greatest Spaniards of his generation.

Olivares did not hesitate to spread his nets for even bigger game. The erstwhile powerful Duke of Lerma, in spite of his dignity as cardinal, was imprisoned at Tordesillas, and though he was set at liberty owing to the intervention of the Pope and the College of Cardinals, he was prosecuted and condemned to pay into the Treasury 72,000 ducats a year with arrears for twenty years in payment of the rents and riches which he was supposed to have acquired during his period of office. Lerma's son and successor, the Duke of Uceda, was ordered to retire to his own house. Thence he was taken to the castle of Torrejón de Velasco, condemned to pay a fine of 20,000 ducats and to be exiled from court for eight years. He would probably have suffered further proceedings but for the intervention of Philip IV himself. Fr. Luís de Aliaga, who had been confessor to Lerma and Philip III

as well as Inquisitor-General — reputedly the third man in the kingdom — was exiled from court (April 1621) and imprisoned in the monastery of Huete. Rodrigo Calderón, who had already been condemned in the previous reign, though with good prospects of pardon, was now executed in the Plaza Mayor of Madrid after bearing himself with a brave resignation that passed into a popular proverb.

Olivares's zeal for reform was powerfully spurred by the vigorous complaints of the Cortes of Castile which met before the end of the year (1621). The Cortes had never been lacking in complaints since the days of Charles V, but this one uttered what amounted to a wail of despair followed by demands for redress rather more radical than had been heard before. One of the *Procuradores* for Granada (Don Mateo de Lisón y Biedma) drew a terrible picture of the condition of the realm with its enormous numbers of civil servants and the reckless extravagance of the administration. He pictured a countryside where 'the people are now turned adrift wandering on the roads, living upon herbs and roots or travelling to countries and provinces' where they would be free from the ruinous *alcabala* and other pernicious forms of taxation that seemed as if they had been specially designed to prevent honest work and vigorous enterprise. The most crying grievance was the costly and oppressive way in which taxes were collected, the expenses of collection often far exceeding the amounts received. When, for example, taxes or monopolies were farmed, every separate item, such as playing-cards, mercury, pepper, corrosive-sublimate and scores of others, had its own courts, judges, officers and procedure, so that the farmers of monopolies and taxes were virtually judges and plaintiffs at the same time and the unhappy tax-payer had no chance of justice. The legal system was such that to be sued for the smallest amount of taxation meant ruin. Consequently men simply abandoned their property and became vagrants.

Olivares was less slow than most rulers of Castile in his compliance with the wishes of this Cortes. The following year

(1622) a Council for the Reformation of Manners (*Junta de la Reformati3n de Costumbres*) was set up for the highly desirable purpose of preventing politicians from following their usual practice of enriching themselves out of the coffers of the State. The main purpose of the council was to register the property of all those who had been ministers of State since the year 1592 and to compare it with the total of their possessions before their year of office began. The difference, it might usually be assumed, represented the amount of which they had defrauded the State. For a similar purpose it was ordered by a royal decree (16th January 1622) that in future all persons appointed to high offices in the State should, before they entered upon office, make a sworn inventory of everything they possessed. At every promotion they were to make another inventory so that the increase of their fortunes at every step in their career should be readily apparent. By a *pragmática* of a few months later (8th May) any attempt on the part of an office-holder to conceal the true extent of his possessions was made severely punishable. The resistance which such measures aroused amongst politicians and civil servants may readily be imagined. As a consequence they soon ceased to be enforced.

The following year (10th February 1623), in response to petitions of the Cortes, a law of twenty-three chapters was issued for the reformation of abuses. By it the number of office-holders (*veintecuatros, regidores, escribanos, procuradores y otros*) in towns and elsewhere, which had grown to preposterous proportions, was reduced to one-third. No one, whatever his rank, was to be allowed to remain at court for more than thirty days in each year. Money-making in connexion with the administration of justice was forbidden. Great lords were ordered to reduce the numbers of their attendants, which were so large as to create a shortage of hands for agriculture and manufactures. Sumptuary regulations forbade extravagance in clothing, and officials were ordered to go round the shops in order to burn ruffs, ruffles, lace and such-like forbidden luxuries. The birth-rate was

encouraged by freeing married persons from numerous burdens and taxes during the first four years of married life and by subjecting bachelors over twenty-five years of age to the burdens from which the married had been relieved. In order to arrest still further the depopulation of the countryside, emigration from Spain without royal licence was forbidden. Instead of ruining themselves at court, grandees, nobles and *caballeros* were ordered to live on their estates so that they could supply their labourers with work and sustenance. So large was the intellectual proletariat seeking employment in the overgrown civil service or in law, medicine or the Church that the teaching of Latin in smaller towns was forbidden lest men should too readily abandon the plough for the pen. Henceforth only towns large enough to possess a *corregidor* or *alcalde mayor* might possess a school in which Latin was taught.

The king set an example of economy. With one stroke of the pen he reduced the number of offices on the councils to one-third, and halved the expenses of the royal household. He was, consequently, able to reduce the *alcabala* to the level of the year 1561 — that is to 456 *cuéntos* instead of 1033. If these reforms — many of them excellent — had been continued with tenacity of purpose the future of Spain might still have been propitious in the absence of the wars in which the country had already been involved. As it was, Olivares's redoubtable measures of reform were soon smothered in an orgy of expenditure. The king and his minister set an example of gorgeous display in bull-fights, theatrical entertainments, weddings and the reception of foreign visitors to the court. Moreover the wars in Germany and the Netherlands soon necessitated heavier taxation than ever before.

Of all the reforms of Olivares perhaps the most permanent and important was the disappearance of the ruff — probably the most extravagant article of daily dress known in modern times. Lisón y Biedma had said, 'A single ruff of linen with its making and ravelling will cost over 200 reals, and six reals every time it

is dressed, which at the end of a year doubles its cost'. Many attempts had been made to suppress them before Philip IV and Olivares issued their edicts. The alternative collar intended was either a plain linen band or else the flat Walloon collar falling on the shoulders. Both were rejected by smart men of fashion. At last an ingenious Madrid tailor, early in 1623, 'submitted to the king and to his brother Carlos a new device, consisting of a high spreading collar of cardboard, covered with white or grey silk on its inner surface, and on its outside with dark cloth to match the doublet. By means of heated iron rollers and shellac the cardboard collar was permanently moulded into a graceful curve which bent outwards at the height of the chin, presenting the surface of light-coloured silk.'¹ The king was delighted and ordered some of the new collars — *golillas* as they were called — to be made for himself and for Carlos. The objections to the new neckwear were overruled by Olivares, who pointed to its economy, no washing or starching being needed, so that it would last a year without any further expense. Thenceforward all Spain, Spanish Italy and America wore the *golilla* till the end of the seventeenth century, and such was still the prestige of Spain that the ruff disappeared rapidly from fashionable Europe.

Next in importance to economy as a recipe for the restoration of the former greatness of Spain came the desire of the Count-Duke of Olivares to weaken the power of the Cortes in the various provinces of the Peninsula. The Cortes of Castile, loyal, not to say subservient, contributed far more than her share towards the upkeep of the Spanish Empire. The three Eastern states on the contrary — Aragón, Catalonia and Valencia —

¹ [Martin Hume, *The Court of Philip IV. Spain in Decadence* (London, n.d.), p. 138. The author is deeply indebted to Hume for much of the information and comment in this chapter, as in other parts of the book, and has followed him closely throughout. No further specific acknowledgment will therefore be made. It must be pointed out, however, that Hume is by no means consistently reliable, but until more research is done on this period there is no alternative to accepting his statements.]

had Cortes which, by harping on their ancient rights and liberties, managed to evade their full share of the burdens of empire. Such an attitude aroused in Olivares an irritation which he made small attempt to conceal. It was not difficult to divine his purpose of putting one single Cortes for the whole of Spain in place of the six Cortes that now existed. As a preliminary step the weakening of the existing parliamentary bodies was pursued with zest. When in 1625 a grant of money for the wars was urgently needed, the Cortes of the three States of the Crown of Aragón were summoned — that of Aragón to Barbastro, that of Catalonia to Lérida and that of Valencia to Monzón, which was not within the frontiers of the kingdom of Valencia. The Valencians, consequently, sent envoys to the king and Olivares to request that their Cortes should meet at a place within the borders of their own kingdom as happened in Aragón and Catalonia. 'Why', the Valencians asked, 'should the Valencians be treated worse than the Catalans and the Aragonese?' 'It is because', answered Olivares, 'we consider you more soft (*muelles*).' 'If you mean', answered one of the envoys, 'that we are more good-natured (*blandos*) in conforming to the will of the King and his ministers, even though it injures our convenience and our rights, that is a merit to be urged in favour of the granting of our request.' When an envoy requested that another day should be devoted to a reconsideration of their request, Olivares replied dryly: 'The King is bound to go away to-morrow. He is going to Saragossa and then to Monzón. If the kingdom of Valencia comes to that city he will hold Cortes there, if not, we will see what must be done.' 'Then I shall write thus,' replied an envoy. 'You can,' replied Olivares brusquely. With that they separated, the Valencians taking with them the worst possible impression of Olivares's arrogance. After this prelude it is not surprising to read that the meeting of the Valencian Cortes (January 1626) was followed by stormy scenes. The estate of clergy and the estate of townsmen were induced only by bribery to grant supplies. The estate of nobles stood firm against royal demands

and threats. They requested the king (11th February) that the Cortes should be kept in session for twelve days so that they could discuss legislation before granting supplies. The king replied that he was leaving next day and that supplies must be granted within half an hour. He then took out his watch and said that the half-hour had already begun. The Cortes sat up all night considering whether to resist or not. At six o'clock in the morning a royal messenger came to inform them that the king had decided to punish the estate of nobles by abolishing their right of *nemine discrepante* in accordance with which votes of supply had to be unanimous. Henceforth a bare majority would suffice. With that the king left for Barcelona. The Cortes, indignant but terrified, then voted the supply demanded unconditionally and unanimously, after which they were expelled from the chamber so that they should not be able to discuss grievances.

The meeting of the Cortes of Aragón was scarcely less troublous, in spite of the fact that the king had taken the trouble to conciliate the stiff-necked Aragonese people. On entering Saragossa early in January, he had the garrison of the Aljafería — a relic of the suppression of the revolt of 1591 — immediately removed, to the immense gratification of the citizens. When, however, the Cortes met at Barbastro, the royal demand for a *servicio* of 3333 men fit and ready for war was refused as too heavy. Instead the Cortes offered only a million ducats payable in the course of ten years. The king expressed his dissatisfaction, threatened to leave for Barcelona, and ordered the Cortes to appoint as their president the president of the ecclesiastical estate — the only member who had voted in favour of all the demands of the Crown. The order led to much violent discussion. The suggested president was refused; but in the end a president approved by the king was accepted — the Count of Monterrey who had married Olivares's sister, Leonor de Guzmán. Meanwhile the Justiciar on the express orders of the king transferred the Cortes to Calatayud, where the four *brazos* met in somewhat

diminished numbers. Meanwhile the excesses of Castilian troops passing through Aragón on their way to the war were regarded as a punishment for the obstinate attitude of the Cortes. But Olivares's slender supply of tact was not completely exhausted, for when the 3333 men demanded of the Cortes were at last granted, the number was reduced to 2000 in view of the poverty of the country.

In Catalonia as in the other states of the Crown of Aragón a gorgeous welcome was followed by the meeting of a disputatious and close-fisted Cortes (28th March 1626), which replied to the demand for a *servicio* with an insistence upon its ancient right that redress must precede supply. Since the merchants and shipmen of Catalonia were among the richest in Spain, their attitude, though irritating, called for tact. Philip consequently wrote with his own hand to the Cortes a most affectionate and flattering letter explaining his need for money and pointing out that if these needs were not supplied he would have to return dishonoured and disappointed to Madrid (18th April 1626). The attitude of this letter is in sharp contrast to the peremptory tone adopted towards the Cortes of Aragón and Valencia. Only when the Catalans remained obstinate despite all his blandishments and showed an inclination to discuss debts owing to them by the Crown — only then did Olivares adopt a severe and threatening attitude. He gave the Cortes three days in which to grant the required supplies and then hurried the king unceremoniously back to Madrid (May 1626). [This action failed to produce the desired effect. The Catalans voted no *servicio* and the Cortes were suspended. Olivares's attempts during the following years to raise loans from the Catalans further strained relations between Barcelona and Madrid. When the king returned to Barcelona in 1632 to resume the suspended Cortes, of which he planned to make his brother, the Infante Ferdinand, President, he found the attitude of the Catalans far from propitious. All along the road to Barcelona the king and Olivares found the people scowling, and at Tortosa subversive

cries were heard because Philip had stayed only a few hours in the town.

At Barcelona the Cortes were induced to accept the Infante as President, instead of the king, who was thus able to return at once to Madrid. The intention behind this move was to allow the Cortes to deliberate at their own pace, without being bound to a crowded royal time-table, as had happened, with such unfortunate results, in 1626. But the Infante at once ran into trouble. A conflict arose between him and the city of Barcelona. He objected to the city councillors wearing their hats in his presence and they insisted that it was their ancient right to do so. Barcelona retaliated by ordering its deputies to hold up all the proceedings of the Cortes. Neither side was prepared to yield, and when the Infante left for the Netherlands the following year, the Catalans had again failed to vote the expected *servicio*, and the Cortes were suspended once more.¹]

Closely connected with the Count-Duke's desire to reduce the power of the Cortes was his desire for strong, centralised and efficient government. The old system of councils for the various departments of government seemed to him to lie at the root of the endless delays for which the Spanish administration had long been notorious. He accordingly set up a series of *Juntas* to take on more expeditiously much of the work of the old councils and thus weaken their authority. At the head of all the *Juntas* was that of *Ejecución*, which was competent to discuss and determine any matter of State that might be submitted to it. The others dealt with the special branches of the administration and taxation to which each of them was restricted. Thus, for example, the *Junta de Armadas* had to deal with naval affairs

¹ [This information on the Catalan Cortes, which differs considerably from the account given by Hume, as also some of the details of the outbreak of the Catalan Revolution, was provided by Dr. J. H. Elliott of Trinity College, Cambridge, whose article, 'The Catalan Revolution of 1640. Some Suggestions for a Historical Revision' (*Estudios de Historia moderna*, iv, Barcelona, 1954), was published too late for its conclusions to be considered by Mr. Trevor Davies.]

such as galleys and galleons, naval stores, officers and officials of the fleet. Among the more important *Juntas* were those of *Donativos*, *Millones* (a special impost), *Almirantazgo* (Admiralty), *Presidios* (frontier garrisons), *Poblaciones*, *Obras y Bosques* (Works and Forests). There was even a *Junta de Vestir* to consider matters of clothing; and a contemporary has described a gathering in the presence of the Count-Duke of grave lawyers and military men for the purpose of discussing what clothing should be worn by the king, the queen, the royal family and servants of the royal household. The procedure of the *Juntas* had its advantages. For whereas members of the old councils were made to give their opinions secretly on the ground that publicity diminished the councillor's freedom in expressing his own opinion, in future every councillor gave his opinion in writing, signed and sealed for the king's perusal. A consequence was that great piles of papers grew up around most trivial questions; and since the king did not want to go through such a mass of reading matter, all was passed over to Olivares, who thus had the means of knowing the secret opinions of the leading men of the kingdom.

The increase in the speed and efficiency of the central Government was really a means to a greater end, which was the unification of the Peninsula. Shortly after his rise to power Olivares sent the king a memorial in which he stated clearly what he considered to be the fundamental problem of politics, viz. the unification of Spain. France, he argued, owed its power to the fact that it was centralised and unified. Italy and Germany, in contrast, were weak owing to their lack of unity. 'You should not be content,' he urged, 'to be king of Portugal, of Aragón and of Valencia and Count of Barcelona; but you should direct all your work and thought, with the most experienced and secret advice, to reduce these realms which make up Spain to the same order and legal system as Castile. If your majesty succeeds in this you will be the most powerful prince in the world.'

That the Count-Duke's desire for the Castilianisation of

Spain had been digested by the king is shown, amongst other indications, by his address to the Council of Castile on his return in 1626 from the states of the Crown of Aragón. 'Anything is better,' he declared, 'than to burden more heavily these poor unhappy vassals of Castile, who, by their love, their efforts and their sufferings, have made us masters of the rest of what we possess, and still preserve it to us, as the head and principal part of our commonwealth. I would far rather take burdens from these poor people than impose further sacrifices upon them, and when I think what they have to pay, and also the trouble and annoyance they have to submit to in the collection of it, in good truth I would rather beg for charity from door to door, if I could, to provide the funds necessary for national defence, than deal so harshly with such vassals as these. . . .'

Olivares's plans for the centralisation of the Spanish monarchy might have had some measure of success had they not come at a time when the great cities of Castile had fallen into decay, and Castile — the centripetal force that kept the Spanish Empire together — had sunk in population and trade. At the same time it was doubly unfortunate for Olivares to be involved in a foreign policy entailing war with a large part of Europe — a war in which the master hand of Richelieu worked with deadly skill and perfidy for the downfall of a Spain burdened with an obsolete scrupulosity and dignity.

The foreign policy of Olivares was an inheritance — almost unavoidable — from the Duke of Uceda, who held in his fumbling hands the helm of Spanish foreign policy during the last years of Philip III. It was Uceda's decision that plunged Spain into the Thirty Years' War, and consequently made a Dutch War almost inevitable when the twelve years' truce (1609) expired in 1621. The situation was made more difficult by the death the same year (3rd July 1621) of the Archduke Albert, to whom the Spanish Netherlands had been ceded, so long as he and his childless wife Isabel Clara Eugenia, daughter of Philip II of Spain, survived. Ambrosio Spínola, the military genius who

commanded the Spanish forces in the Netherlands, and Olivares himself would probably have preferred to remain at peace with the Dutch. But opinion in Spain, which was fiercely opposed to any recognition of Dutch independence, together with circumstances such as the war in Germany, decided them in favour of the renewal of a war that had already done so much to ruin the country's economy. In the Dutch War that followed, Spanish arms won a series of successes which assured the world that economic decay had not yet destroyed their military prowess. Spínola's capture of Breda (1625) after a ten months' siege made a great impression all over Europe and was made ageless by Velázquez's painting commonly known as 'Las Lanzas'. Less usual for the Spain of these times was a great naval victory against the Dutch, which was won by Don Fadrique de Toledo off Gibraltar (1626). The same year the Dutch in America were expelled from Guayaquil and Puerto Rico.

But the Dutch War soon took its place as a sideshow in the Thirty Years' War. The usual family solidarity of the Habsburgs together with the religious convictions of the Spaniards made it almost inevitable that Spain should remain involved. It was in fact Spanish troops that contributed largely to the earliest successes of Imperialist arms such as Höchst (20th July 1622) and Fleurus (9th August 1622). The most important victory of all was that won at Nördlingen (1634) largely by the intervention of the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand on his way to take up the government of the Spanish Netherlands. The cardinal, who had abandoned an ecclesiastical for a military career, justified his choice by this crushing defeat of Swedes and Germans which restored southern Germany to the Catholic fold. Thus the war in the North was not without its glorious moments for Spain. But its ultimate result was unmeasured disaster, because it led to that embroilment with the France of Richelieu which carried in its train a long series of calamities and left the Spanish Empire with few shreds of her former power or prestige remaining to her.

The main bone of contention was the Valtelline — the valley of the Adda, north of Lake Como, inhabited by Catholics but misruled by the Protestant Grisons. As early as 1603 Fuentes, the Spanish Governor of Milan, had had the perspicacity to perceive that this valley was the vital link between the territories of the Spanish and the Austrian Habsburgs. Recognising that the friendship of Savoy could no longer be counted upon, he built a line of forts in the valley as the only sure way of moving troops from northern Italy to Austria and thence ultimately to the Spanish Netherlands. After many vicissitudes the Grisons were forced (1622) to renounce their overlordship of the Valtelline. They consequently allied with France, Savoy and Venice in the hope of recovering it. Pope Urban VIII intervened in the dispute and occupied the valley with papal troops. Richelieu, with typical shiftiness, sent a force to expel the papal troops and then disavowed the officer who had carried out his orders. Spain proceeded to energetic measures for the recovery of the Valtelline, and Richelieu, whose position was insecure owing to intrigues at court and the arming of the Huguenots, was forced to give way. By the Treaty of Monzón (1626) he undertook, without consulting his allies, to guarantee the independence of the Valtelline. This treaty, which has often been misunderstood, was a solid success for Spain, which was enabled to use the pass for military purposes. Had she not continued to hold the Valtelline, her further participation in the 'Thirty Years' War would have been virtually impossible and her hold upon the Spanish Netherlands extremely insecure.

Having lost this important pass, Richelieu sought eagerly for some means of weakening Spanish power south of it in Italy. Means came readily to his hand with the death of Vincenzo di Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua (1627). This led to a disputed succession in which one claimant was the French Duke of Nevers. As the territories of the deceased Duke included places of immense strategical importance on the Alpine passes between France and Italy, the succession question brought about a war

in which France, Savoy and the Empire took part. Ambrosio Spínola consequently led his army from the Netherlands into Italy, but died in the course of the campaign (25th September 1630) — to the great loss of Spain. The war ended in the success of France, the Duke of Nevers gaining the duchy of Mantua together with the important fortresses of Pinerolo and Casale, which were garrisoned with French troops (Treaty of Cherasco, July 1631). Richelieu was already helping Protestants in Germany, together with the Dutch and the Swedes. He consequently decided to join as a principal in the war (1635) — a war which was destined to last for nearly a quarter of a century and one in the course of which Spain was to draw near the lowest rungs of the ladder of national decline.

The long-drawn negotiations for an English marriage culminated in the famous incognito journey of Prince Charles Stuart and Buckingham to Madrid, where the breakdown of negotiations with Olivares led to war by land and sea with England. The English under Lord Wimbledon set out in the autumn of 1625 with a fleet of ninety sail to attack the coasts of Spain. After appearing off Lisbon they sailed on to the Bay of Cádiz, where they developed a formidable attack. A force of 9000 men was landed and succeeded in taking the Tower of Puntal. It was, however, soon repulsed by a force of armed peasants under Don Fernando Girón; and English discipline, already bad, was made worse by the discovery and consumption of large quantities of wine. Consequently the approach of the Governor of Andalucía, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, with a large force caused them to embark hurriedly after losing no fewer than a thousand men and thirty ships. Henceforward Charles I's troubles with his Parliaments and his relations with other powers left him neither the leisure nor the resources for a further conflict with Spain.

The effects of these wars with the greater part of Europe are easily appreciated. The first will already be understood as an acceleration of the economic decline which had already begun generations earlier. The second is the partial disintegration of

the Spanish dominions — largely under the stimulus of France under Richelieu. Not without the incitements of French agents, portions of the Spanish monarchy — already stirred by the centralising policy of Olivares — broke out into open rebellion. Amongst these were the Basques, the Catalans, the Portuguese, the Sicilians and the Neapolitans. It was the revolt of the Portuguese that was the last straw in breaking the back of the Olivares dictatorship.

Strong though the position of the Count-Duke must have seemed, it really depended upon ceaseless activity in relieving the king of the irksomeness of his office and in keeping him amused. From the beginning, Olivares had aroused the hostility of members of the royal family. For this reason he had tried to remove them from the neighbourhood of the court. Thus, for example, he had arranged that the king's sister, the Infanta María, should marry the Habsburg King of Hungary (1628). He had persuaded the king's brother, Cardinal Fernando, Archbishop of Toledo, to adopt an ecclesiastical career by holding out to him the prospect of his becoming Pope. When the lure of military ambitions proved more seductive than the tiara, he was sent to Germany and the Netherlands, where he showed uncommon ability in the conduct of the wars — so much so as to kindle the belief that had he been king instead of his brother the decline of Spain might have been arrested while as yet there was time. But there was one member of the royal family who could not be removed. This was the competent and intelligent French queen, Isabel de Bourbon. Olivares had offended her by his outspoken dislike of the interference of women in the affairs of State. On this matter he had been notoriously offensive to ladies. Even in the presence of Isabel herself, when she had given an opinion on State affairs he had told Philip that monks must be kept for praying and women for child-bearing. For years the yoke of Olivares and his wife had galled the neck of Isabel. Pleasure-loving as she was, she had in her some elements of statesmanship, and her love for her promising young son, Baltasar Carlos,

sharpened her wits to see that with the revolt of Catalonia his great inheritance was slipping away from him. She repeatedly urged her husband to head his own armies in the field. Philip was willing, even eager to do so, but Olivares strongly opposed such a course, knowing that the king's departure for the war would necessitate his own departure with the king in order to maintain his influence, and the leaving of Isabel as regent in Madrid, where she would be well placed for weaving plots against him.


In the struggle about the proposed journey to Catalonia, Isabel for once won the day. Olivares's counsel was overridden by Philip's firm determination to lead his own armies to rescue Catalonia from the French. Olivares strove his utmost to defeat the queen. Physicians were induced to certify that the proposed journey would injure the king's health. Councils voted against the risking of the king's life in the perils of war. Constitutional lawyers produced evidence to show that it was not proper for the king to go. But Philip, tired yet still determined, snatched a paper from the hands of the *Protonotario* who was about to present it, and, tearing it in pieces, cried: 'Bring me no more reports about my going to Catalonia, but prepare for the journey, for go I will'.

Isabel's victory was complete. Despite all last-minute attempts to delay his journey, Philip set out (April 1642) accompanied by Olivares, leaving her free in Madrid to perfect her plans. She rapidly and deftly built up a party of the enemies of Olivares, who were no less numerous among the common people than among the nobility. When Philip returned to Madrid at the end of 1642, dispirited after an unsuccessful campaign, Isabel's plans were complete. In the middle of January 1643 the weary king visited his wife's apartment and that afternoon she staged a scene. Kneeling before him with young Baltasar Carlos in her arms, she begged him passionately to get rid of Olivares before he had completed the destruction of their son's inheritance. In torrents of words she poured out the complaints of years: the wars that had ruined the country, the starving people, the lost provinces, the waste and frivolity

that had been the rule of their lives, and the shame that a king to whose hands God had committed so sacred a task should delegate it to others.

Though Philip made no reply, he was deeply moved, and, on leaving his wife's chamber, he was confronted in the corridor by the kneeling figure of his beloved old nurse and foster-mother, Anne de Guevara, who had long been banished from court by order of Olivares, who feared her influence. She too spoke impassioned words to which the king could only reply, 'You have spoken the truth'. Later that day the Duchess of Mantua, who had been Philip's Governor of Portugal, sat with the king and queen for two hours. She had been kept away from court by the orders of Olivares, but had arrived there the previous day after a ride of forty miles through a storm of sleet. She now gave her version of the revolt of Portugal in such a way as to reflect the utmost discredit upon Olivares. That night (17th January 1643) the Count-Duke was dismissed.¹ He struggled for days in the hope of recovering his lost influence, but Philip, having at last made up his mind, could not be moved. He had often been asked by Olivares for permission to retire to his estates and had always answered no in the belief that his minister was indispensable. Now there was no mistake about his yes. The Count-Duke retired, a broken man, to his house at Loeches and, the following June, to Toro. For some time he continued to hope for recall to place and power, but recall never came. Instead he is supposed — probably on insufficient grounds — to have received a letter from the king saying that the people of Aragón were demanding his head as a condition of recognising Baltasar Carlos as heir to the throne. Whether such a letter was ever sent or not, Olivares went mad and died at Toro (22nd July 1645).

¹ [The historical evidence for this picturesque account of the part played by the queen in his dismissal is extremely slight. Marañón shows in his biography of Olivares that it is probably no more than a popular fabrication based on one or two slender facts.]



SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

132691

CHAPTER II

THE ERA OF REVOLTS

(1631-1665)

IT is easy to attribute the revolts of the Basque Provinces of Catalonia and Portugal, if not those of Sicily and Naples, to the centralising policy of Olivares, tactlessly pursued. To do so is to miss the fact that most Spanish causes have their roots in the Middle Ages at least, and many of them much deeper. The attempt has often been made to interpret Spanish history on the basis of local particularism. This has often been overdone by such writers as Martin Hume and Herculano, who explained the formation of the medieval kingdoms of Spain by the difficulty of communications across high mountains. But it should be remembered that it is not the mountains of Spain that limit those regions where the spirit of autonomy is strongest. The great mountains that run from north to south of Catalonia are very much to the east of the country, but not on the boundary of Aragón; the hundreds of tunnels of the northern railway do not separate Castile and León, but León from Asturias; the Portuguese frontier, too, is not determined by mountain ranges. It is also fanciful to see a great divergence of races as a cause of localism. As Menéndez Pidal has written: 'The dissimilarity of races in the Peninsula is not perceptibly greater than that existing, for instance, in France. . . . The fact that the ethnico-geographical characteristics of the Peninsula do not imply any special tendency towards splitting up into fragments is shown by the variety of dialects in Spain, which is much less than that of France or Italy.' In this era of revolts Spain was not disintegrating just because it was her nature to disintegrate, but

because of the effect of new circumstances upon conditions that had long been present.

The first movement towards revolt and disintegration came in the Basque Provinces, which had long been notable for the tenacity with which they clung to their ancient constitutions and their rights and privileges — amongst which was the claim that, as nobles, they were exempt from taxation. Consequently the imposition of a salt monopoly in 1631, together with certain forced levies and demands for extraordinary taxation, was the signal for revolt in Vizcaya. The rebels were led by a priest named Armona, and the rebellion was to some extent social and, not inconsistently, aristocratic in character — a rising of the poor against the rich. It was not without danger, because the rebels contemplated seeking help from France, England and the Netherlands. The Duke of Ciudad Real, however, was strong enough to reduce the tiny province of Vizcaya to obedience and to order the execution of the ringleaders. Though a small affair, it has its place in history as the first instance of resistance to Olivares's policy of extreme Castilianisation and centralisation of the Peninsula.

The revolt of the Catalans was a matter of far greater and more lasting consequence. The people differed in many ways from those of most other Spanish states. The origin of the county of Catalonia was French rather than Spanish, its nucleus being the conquests of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious south of the Pyrenees. For centuries the Counts of Catalonia had held extensive possessions north of the Pyrenees, a relic of these still continuing in the tiny counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon in the seventeenth century. Again, the language of Catalonia is, in the opinion of some scholars, more closely allied to Provençal than to Spanish. Moreover, Catalonia was more feudalised than the rest of the Peninsula. It possessed the earliest known feudal code, the *Usatges* (1064–1069), whereas none of the other states of the Peninsula possessed a fully developed feudal system. Though united to Aragón (1137) and Valencia (1245) by

possession of a common sovereign, it sturdily maintained its own laws and ordinances. Its Cortes in the fifteenth century probably resembled a modern legislative body more closely than any other assembly in the world. But its independence had been considerably diminished in the course of the sixteenth century by the progressive Castilianisation of Spain and of the Spanish Empire. The wealth of the Indies and the policy of the Habsburgs gave Castile a preponderance that made 'the realms of the Crown of Aragón' all combined comparatively insignificant. Charles V and his two successors had tended to leave them alone in the hope that the separatism which they feared to attempt to eradicate would die from inanition. The Catalans had very different views. Though recently relegated to the background, they were intensely proud of their past and were longing for an opportunity to assert their independence.

From the Castilians, particularly, the Catalans differed in the aims and ideals inherited from past centuries. The Castilians had spent the greater part of the Middle Ages driving the Moors from the Peninsula. Not till 1492 did they see a vision of empire beyond the seas. The Catalan experience had been that of Castile turned upside down. They had contributed little towards freeing the Peninsula from the infidel. Instead they had spent their time building up a Mediterranean empire — the Balearics, Sicily, Sardinia and Naples — and concentrated on the great seaport of Barcelona, the proud capital of this empire. They looked with jealousy upon Madrid, arbitrarily selected as the capital of Spain because it was in the centre of Castile. Here were all the materials for a conflagration. It only needed Olivares to set a torch to the pile.

The occasion for Olivares to apply the torch came with the French invasion of Roussillon. The Catalans showed the utmost patriotic ardour. They raised an army of 12,000 men with whom they helped the royal troops to defeat the French and relieve the castle of Salces, thus saving Catalonia from invasion. In spite of this success they felt that they were being given little credit by

Olivares, who, remembering his old feuds in Barcelona, had instructed the Count of Santa Coloma, the viceroy, to disregard the liberties of Catalonia should they interfere with the king's service. 'If the enterprise can be carried out successfully without violating the liberties of the province,' he wrote, 'let the liberties be respected. But if their observance delays the service of the King, be it for only one hour, whoever attempts to maintain them declares himself an enemy of his king, his blood and his fatherland. Do not allow a single able-bodied man in the province to avoid going to camp nor any woman to avoid carrying on her back straw, fodder and all that is needed for the cavalry and the army. In this the safety of all stands. This is no time to request but to command and make oneself obeyed. The Catalans are by nature fickle: at one time they will and at others they will not. Give them to understand that the safety of the people and of the army matters more than all their laws and liberties. Take the greatest care that the force is well lodged and that they are provided with good beds: if they are not, you should have no hesitation in taking the beds required from the most important persons in the province. For it is better that they should sleep on the ground than that the soldiers should suffer,' etc. The king wrote in a similar strain ordering the summary punishment of any Catalan officials who showed themselves slack in his service. 'It would be a good thing,' he added ominously, 'to make an example of one of them (*Bueno será haya algún castigo ejemplar*)'.

After the campaign in Roussillon the general, the Marquis of los Balbases, son of the famous general Ambrosio Spínola, brought his forces back to winter in Catalonia. Fearing trouble, he instructed his officers 'to dispose of their forces in such a way that the soldiers should always be stronger than the inhabitants of any given town and that they should be concentrated in such a manner as to be available for any emergency'. The soldiers, many of whom had served in Flanders and Italy, were accustomed to plunder the countryside. Their pay was usually in arrears,

with the result that they took what they wanted from the unfortunate peasantry, who appealed in vain to the Marquis of los Balbases. Inevitably many brawls arose between the tough Catalan peasantry and the Castilian soldiers. The Marquis of los Balbases with the king's approval ordered every town to supply what was needed by the troops billeted upon it, specifying the requirements of each officer and soldier. A Catalan deputation sought in vain to persuade him that his demands were contrary to their liberties and were beyond their means. The Marquis replied that the burdens would be quite light when divided among the whole population and that the king's will must be obeyed.

This reply, as might have been foreseen, angered the Catalans ; and as the violence of the soldiery increased, the situation rapidly worsened. Furious fighting took place in many parts of the provinces. At this critical time the Marquis of los Balbases went to Madrid, leaving the viceroy, Don Dalman de Queralt, Count of Santa Coloma, to cope with the disturbances. Coloma believed that as a native of Catalonia he would find it easy to appease his countrymen. He therefore sought to curry favour with the Castilian troops. Such behaviour infuriated the Catalans, who regarded him as a traitor to his fatherland. His limitation of the right to bring accusations before the ordinary courts caused widespread indignation. The clergy inflamed the passions of the masses by condemning from the pulpit the violence of the soldiers. Fights between Catalans and soldiers increased in violence. A certain Don Antonio de Fluviá was murdered by certain soldiers of the Neapolitan *tercio* of cavalry. An *alguacil real* named Monredón, who quartered the troops in the township of Santa Coloma de Farnés, was burnt alive in a house in which he had sought refuge from the violence of the mob. Fierce attacks from the peasantry were followed by reprisals from the soldiers, who especially embittered the natives by burning down churches in which their valuables were stored.

The viceroy, Santa Coloma, kept the court informed of the

course of the disturbances, pointing out quite logically that one of two measures should be adopted: (1) the appeasement of the Catalans by the removal of their chief grievances, *e.g.* billeting and forced contributions, or (2) the strengthening of the army so as to enable them to suppress the rebels. He was unable to get anything from court but vague generalities, *e.g.* that the offenders should be properly punished. The harassed viceroy consequently sought to impress the Catalans with a show of force. He was visited by a succession of embassies from the *Diputación* of Catalonia. Their object was to point out the grievances of the Catalans and to press for a remedy before the disorders grew into a general revolt. The viceroy sought to give a proof of his strength by sending Tamarit, the *diputado militar*, to prison and by ordering a secret investigation in an ecclesiastical court of the record of Pablo Claris, Canon of Urgel and head of the *Diputación*. He also imprisoned two members of the city council of Barcelona who had tried to stop public amusements in the city out of respect for the sufferings of the Principality.

The result of the imprisonment of the *diputado* was that the disorders grew far worse, and the crisis was soon reached. It was customary for companies of reapers to enter Barcelona every June for the festival of Corpus Christi. In spite of the protests of the viceroy, the city council decided that the reapers should be allowed in as usual. They came secretly armed and ready for trouble. They were wild, half-savage men who had little regular employment except in time of harvest.

The streets were crowded when a servant of the royal *alguacil* Monredón saw a reaper who had taken part in the killing of his master and sought to get him arrested. In the course of the struggle that ensued the reaper was wounded. His companions went to his assistance. Out of the consequent brawl a vast tumult arose in which Castilians were killed all over the city amid cries of '*¡Venganza! ¡viva la fe! ¡viva el rey! ¡muera el mal gobierno de Felipe!*' The viceroy's house was surrounded by rioters provided with timber for the purpose of burning it down. On the advice

of the magistrates the viceroy tried to take refuge in some Genoese galleys in the harbour. He changed his mind and sent his son in a skiff to the galleys, whither he arrived safely. He then set out up the hill in the direction of Montjuich, but, overcome by heat, exertion and chagrin, he collapsed. He was found on the ground by the rioters and stabbed to death. That it was a revolt of the lower classes, in which the upper classes took no part, is suggested by an incident in the disturbances. When the rioters found, in sacking the house of the Marquis of Villafranca, a curious clock ornamented with the figure of a monkey which moved its hands backwards and forwards and rolled its eyes, they believed that they had found the devil. They took the clock on the point of a lance to the headquarters of the Inquisition, where the Inquisitors promised to investigate the matter.

The riot — known to history as *El Corpus de Sangre* — lasted three days, during which those who had not made their escape or gone into hiding were murdered. At last the magistrates restored some semblance of order. They also made some show of loyalty to the Crown by offering by proclamation a reward of 6000 *escudos* to anyone who would make known the murderers of the viceroy. The leading position of Barcelona in the province was shown by the fact that the revolt spread throughout the whole of Catalonia. In Gerona, Balaguer, Lérida and Tortosa the rebels murdered Castilians and royal officials; and a body of troops, four thousand strong, was attacked by the peasantry on the road from Gerona to Blanes. In other places Castilian soldiery took a fearful vengeance, thus increasing the fury of the rebels.

The news of the revolt, when it reached the court, led to a sharp division of opinion. The advocates of appeasement struggled so hard against the advocates of severity that the result was a vacillating policy. The Catalans had sent a Carmelite friar, well known for his learning and piety, Bernardino de Manlleu, to plead the cause of Catalonia. Through him the province

offered to be responsible for its own defence if only the troops quartered there were removed elsewhere. The proposal was rejected on the ground that it was a claim to autonomy.

Very wisely the Government chose as the new Viceroy of Catalonia Don Enrique de Aragón, Duke of Cardona. He was a native, gifted and popular, who had been viceroy some years earlier. But he made the mistake of concentrating his efforts on the pacification of Barcelona, in the belief that the country districts would follow the lead of the capital. He failed to recognise the fact that the countryside was being lashed into a fury by the clergy, who were urging revolt from the village pulpits. Even the Bishop of Gerona excommunicated the *tercios* of Arce and Moles and treated them as heretics in consequence of some outrages they had committed. In some places the rebels carried banners on which was painted a crucifix; and the revolt assumed a religious character — an important matter in an age when revolts which had that character, like the Great Rebellion in England, had notable consequences, and movements which lacked it, like the Fronde in France, were devoid of any important results.

Troops on the way to Roussillon were refused lodging by the citizens of Perpignan, who closed their gates and proceeded to defend their walls against their visitors. When their walls had been destroyed by artillery and their city had surrendered, the behaviour of the victorious troops was such that most of the inhabitants took refuge in the mountains.

The Duke of Cardona, having established peace in Barcelona, proceeded to investigate the Perpignan affair. He imprisoned many Castilians who had been guilty of crimes of violence and proposed to bring them up for trial. Such championing of the Catalan cause might well have had the effect of recovering their loyalty to the Crown. But Olivares would stand for no conciliatory treatment. He refused to allow the punishment of the soldiers without the consent of a *Junta* which was sitting in Aragón. This refusal, with its implied disapproval of the

viceroys policy, so depressed the latter that he caught a fever, from which he died in a few days. With his death the Catalans again burst out into revolt. They sent a deputation of their three estates to the king, but Olivares had it detained at Alcalá de Henares and treated it with much lack of courtesy on the ground that the estates were seeking the mediation of the Pope and other foreign princes. The Catalans thereupon published their *Proclamación Católica*, in which they stated their grievances and demands for redress in vigorous language.

At this critical moment the Government chose as Viceroy of Catalonia a learned and pious ecclesiastic, Don García Gil Manrique, Bishop of Barcelona. The bishop was old and lacking alike in energy, resolution and political experience. It was clear that he would not be strong enough to punish the guilty soldiery or to protect the Catalans. His appointment in fact served only to increase the violence of the rebellion.

When the Catalan deputation was at last received in audience at Madrid, Olivares told them that the king was disposed to receive them with the kindness of a father provided they gave proofs of their repentance. The Count-Duke summoned a *Junta* to advise him on the measures necessary for the suppression of the disorders. Some of the *Junta*, notably the Count of Oñate, Don Iñigo Vélez de Guevara, urged moderation and appeasement. Others stood for stern repression: amongst them Cardinal Don Gaspar de Borja, President of the Council of Aragón, who argued, 'A conflagration cannot be quenched without much water, and the fire of disloyalty and rebellion cannot be extinguished without rivers of blood'. Amid such diversity of opinion Olivares decided that the advocates of severity were right; and measures were taken to call all the available troops in the Peninsula to accompany the king to Aragón under colour of a meeting of the Cortes. The troops, it was planned, would then be ready for action on the frontiers of Catalonia. They were to assemble at Saragossa while galleys were to gather off the Catalan coast. The command was given to the self-confident

and rather incompetent Don Pedro Fajardo, Marquis of los Vélez.

The Catalans, seeing that invasion was imminent, assembled the Cortes to consider means of defence. The Bishop of Urgel spoke strongly in favour of peace, but the great majority agreed with a fiery speech by Pablo Claris, Canon of Urgel, in favour of war as part of a general revolt of the other provinces of the Peninsula against Castile, and in favour of seeking the help of France. Accordingly Francisco de Vilaplana was sent as Catalan envoy to visit Richelieu at Amiens. The astute cardinal received him gladly and offered to support the Catalan revolt with a force of 2000 cavalry and 4000 infantry.

To begin the conquest of Catalonia the Marquis of los Vélez marched his army out of Saragossa (8th October 1640). Though the principality had already organised its defences, he crossed the Ebro in the face of some opposition and in a few days led his army with much display into Tortosa, where he took the customary oaths to maintain the liberties of Catalonia. Doubts arising from the conflict between his oaths and the purposes with which he was invading the province were removed by his confessor. The Catalans, on their part, declared his actions null and void and ordered public intercessions to be made and solemn processions to be held throughout the Principality in reparation for the offences to religion and to the Blessed Sacrament committed by the ministers and soldiers of the King of Castile.

The Marquis of los Vélez marched out of Tortosa (7th December) with a force of 23,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry and succeeded in capturing a few days later the immensely strong fortress of Coll de Balaguer, which the Catalan peasants deserted in headlong flight after little more than half an hour's fighting. This success and the taking of Hospitalet a few days later so alarmed Barcelona that a courier was dispatched to France without delay, and the consequent arrival of three regiments of French infantry and 1000 cavalry was needed to restore confidence. The further success of los Vélez in taking Tarragona so dispirited the Catalans that the war might have been given up

but for the revolt of Portugal (1st December 1640) which forced the royal troops to divide their energies.

When los Vélez advanced on Barcelona in January 1641 the citizens proclaimed Louis XIII Count of Barcelona and with French help forced the viceroy back on Tarragona. Louis XIII wrote to the Catalans gratefully accepting the title of Count and nominating M. d'Argenson as his representative. Henceforth Catalonia became one of the main theatres of war between France and Spain by land and sea. Meanwhile the ill-feeling between French and Catalans showed itself with increasing clearness. After more than four years of a chequered conflict the Spaniards won a great success in securing the capitulation of Barcelona (13th October 1652) after a siege of fifteen months. The King of Spain gained the surrender of Catalonia by guaranteeing its customs and privileges, and in the course of the next few months most of the province returned to its old allegiance — largely because the French were found on acquaintance to be even more odious than the Castilians. French and Catalan rebels continued to hold parts of the Principality till the whole was restored in return for Cerdagne and Roussillon at the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The two provinces were for ever lost to Spain. The cost of the rebellion had proved a heavy one for the Spanish monarchy.

The revolt of Portugal which began during the first winter of the Catalan rebellion came at the end of a long chain of historical causation. Even before the acquisition of Portugal by Philip II (1580) the country contained the germs of rapid decline. Exhausted by its efforts to conquer Asia and to colonise Brazil, the small country with its sparse population was losing its pristine vitality. Such Portuguese as were left in Portugal were either enervated by the luxury of the upper classes and the court or, if they belonged to the lower classes, were supporting themselves upon the charity of the king and the Church. The Portuguese of the upper classes, who preserved the old Portuguese spirit of daring, were far away in Asia. The sturdiest peasantry had

found their way to Madeira or Brazil. Thus the best blood in Portugal had been sent across the sea, leaving the great estates to be cultivated by thousands of Negro slaves, whose competition in the labour market reduced the free peasantry to the economic level of themselves. It is not to be wondered at that the acute Dutch observer Cleynaerts perceived that beneath the outward appearance of prosperity the Portuguese kingdom was rotten to the core. This picture is probably an exaggerated one. Nevertheless it helps to account for the comparative ease with which Philip II gained possession of a country so bitterly hostile to Castile. It was racial hostility that was the fundamental cause of the revolt.

Philip II, knowing well the importance of the Portuguese kingdom in the Spanish Empire, had done his best to mitigate this hostility. At the Cortes of Thomar (15th April 1581) he swore 'that he would maintain the privileges and liberties of the Portuguese people; that the Cortes should be summoned frequently to meet in Portugal; that the viceroy or chief governor should always be a native, unless the king should give that office to one of the royal family; that the royal household should be maintained on the same scale as hitherto; that all offices civil, military and judicial, and all dignities in the Church, and in the orders of knighthood within the kingdom, should be conferred upon Portuguese subjects alone; that the commerce of Africa, Persia and India should be reserved to them and carried on only in their vessels; that he would make no grant of any city, town or royal jurisdiction to any but Portuguese; that forfeited or landed estates should never be absorbed in the royal domain, but be regranted to some relative of the last possessor or to some other Portuguese subject; that the King should reside as much as possible in Portugal; that there should always be resident at the royal court an ecclesiastic, a chancellor, a treasurer and two masters of requests of Portuguese birth and nationality, to manage all business relating to their country; that the revenue of Portugal should be kept distinct from that of Spain and spent in

the kingdom ; that all matters of justice should be finally settled there ; that Portuguese noblemen should be admitted to offices in the households of the King and Queen of Spain ; that all customs and duties at the land frontiers should be abolished ; that King Philip should at once grant three hundred thousand crowns out of the royal treasury to redeem prisoners, repair cities and relieve the miseries which the plague had brought upon the Portuguese people'.

These extensive promises were, on the whole, loyally observed by Philip II. Yet their observance did little to conciliate the Portuguese people. In accordance with international law every country at war with Philip II was at war with Portugal and might attack the Portuguese Empire : at the same time the oath of Thomar forbade Spaniards to assist in the defence of that empire. Portugal consequently inherited the enemies but not the defences of the Spanish monarchy. She watched with despair her rich empire in Brazil and the Far East pass to the Dutch and the English. The 'Sixty Years' Captivity' (1580-1640) had been a period of unexampled disaster. It is true that the beginning of the period had been prosperous and that the Asiatic trade had then reached its highest point. But circumstances changed for the worse before the end of the sixteenth century. The destruction of the Armada of 1588 ruined the naval power of Portugal, whose ships formed a considerable part of it. Shortly afterwards (1595) Drake was able to attack the important town of Faro in the Algarve. About the same time Portuguese commerce suffered an annihilating blow from Dutch competition. Cornelius Houtman, a Dutchman who had been employed by the Portuguese as a pilot in Indian seas, extricated himself from financial embarrassments by promising certain Dutch merchants to divulge the secrets of Portuguese commerce on condition that they would get him out of a debtors' prison in Lisbon. In return for this help he led a Dutch fleet round the Cape of Good Hope for the first time (1595). Two years later the Dutch set up a factory in Java. In 1601 they took Malacca from the Portuguese. In 1610

they took from them the Moluccas and Sumatra, and in 1618 they founded Batavia, which became the capital of the trade of the Spice Islands. In 1635 they occupied Formosa.

The English also contributed towards the destruction of the Asiatic trade of their former allies. In 1615 Captain Best defeated the Portuguese at Surat and in 1622 the English helped the Persians to capture Ormuz from the Portuguese. Henceforth what little was left of Portuguese commerce was preyed upon by Dutch and English cruisers.

Simultaneously the Portuguese suffered serious losses in their South American possessions. A Dutch West India Company was founded in 1624 for the purpose of ousting the Portuguese from Brazil. A Dutch expedition captured and again lost San Salvador, the capital of Portuguese South America; and every year Dutch expeditions to Brazil brought home immense plunder for distribution amongst the shareholders of the West India Company. In 1637 Count Maurice of Nassau was sent out with the purpose of entirely destroying Portuguese power in South America. His exploits were highly successful until the news of the revolt of Portugal arrived in Brazil and put fresh heart into the Portuguese colonists.

Indignation at the loss of trade and colonies in East and West was aggravated by misgovernment at home. Philip II had made some effort to observe the promises made at Thomar, but Philip III and Philip IV disregarded them. Thus, for example, the Cortes, instead of being summoned frequently, was summoned only once (1619) during the whole reign of Philip III, and that only for the purpose of recognising the heir to the throne. It was never summoned at all during the reign of Philip IV. This omission was, moreover, suspected to be part of a set plan of Olivares to Castilianise the whole Peninsula. Offices in Portugal were given to Spaniards upon an extensive scale, especially in garrison towns. Spanish churchmen were consecrated to Portuguese bishoprics. The Portuguese Council in Madrid was reduced to a single secretary. Taxation was heavy and the proceeds

were not spent in the country. In 1636 the hand of Olivares was seen in a 5 per cent impost on all classes of goods which was extended from Castile to Portugal. Portuguese estates had frequently been granted to Spaniards — notably the Duke of Lerma, who secured a grant of the royal domains of Beja and Serpa. These breaches of the promises made to the Cortes of Thomar caused deep-seated discontent, which brought to a head the general resentment at the tendency of Olivares to favour Portuguese Jews.

The Jewish question in Portugal had reached an acute stage. During the expulsion of 1492 Castilian Jews fled to Portugal, and King Manoel (1495–1521) treated them tolerantly at the beginning of his reign. Later, from a desire to please the Castilians, he became less tolerant and issued an edict (December 1496) for the expulsion of all Jews over the age of fourteen. Manoel went on to grant that Jews who became Christians should be free from persecution for twenty years (30th May 1497). In 1512 the twenty years' exemption was extended to 1534, and the New Christians, as the Jews were called, flourished enormously. Under John III (1531), however, application was made secretly to Pope Clement VII for briefs establishing an Inquisition on the Spanish model. The New Christians used their enormous wealth at the papal court to buy the Pope's protection, so that the Pope intervened repeatedly upon their behalf; and it was not till 1547 that Paul III was induced to issue the necessary briefs for an unrestricted Inquisition. Although the New Christians were still in a position to buy papal support, the proceedings of the Holy Office gradually became more severe. By the year 1580 the three tribunals of Lisbon, Coimbra and Évora had held thirty-four *autos de fe* in which 169 persons were 'relaxed' to the secular arm in person, 51 in effigy.

In the reorganisation of Portugal (1580) under the Spanish Crown the Portuguese Inquisition was not merged in that of Spain. It was left an independent institution under the Archbishop of Lisbon, for Gregory XIII had refused Philip II's

request that it should be added to the jurisdiction of the Spanish Inquisitor-General. When the appointment of an Inquisitor-General accrued to the Crown it was conferred on the Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, the Governor of Portugal. Under his rule the activities of the Inquisition increased, with the result that large numbers of Portuguese Jews emigrated to Spain, knowing that Portugal in its economic decay offered fewer opportunities for money-making than did Spain.

In their prosperity the Portuguese Jews took advantage (1602) of the financial straits of Philip III and Lerma to bargain for a papal brief granting a general pardon for past offences, including cases on trial. The effect of this document was so great that a grand *auto de fe* of Portuguese Jews at Seville had to be abandoned, for the brief included in its provisions Portuguese who were in the hands of Spanish tribunals. In Portugal itself the three tribunals liberated simultaneously 410 prisoners (16th January 1605).

Such measures aroused the utmost opposition amongst the Portuguese. Furious complaints were made. Vincente da Costa Mattos wrote in 1622 that the Jews lived only for the perdition of the world; of old, God punished those who ill-treated them, but now He punished those who endured them; the decline of the Spanish kingdoms was the punishment sent by God for tolerating them. . . . Luther began by Judaising; all heretics were either Jews or descendants of Judaisers, as was seen in England, Germany or other parts where they flourished. . . . With this feeling about Jews it was not difficult to detect a tendency to favour them on the part of the Government in Madrid. Certain laws of John III forbade Jews to leave the country without first finding sureties. These laws, abolished by Sebastián in order to find money for his crusade, had been revised by Cardinal Henry in 1580 and by Philip II in 1587. By 1601 the revenue of Portugal had become so scanty that the Government had been compelled to impose a tax on salt. Hoping to take advantage of the financial stringency which this measure indicated, and of the reputedly liberal outlook of Philip III, the

Jews offered him 170,000 *cruzados* on condition that he would revoke the laws against them. Their offer was so well received and their hopes rose so high that they offered double the sum for a general revocation of all anti-Jewish laws so that henceforth Jews would be completely on a par with natives and equally eligible for all appointments, offices and honours. The news of Lerma's reception of the Jews roused the Portuguese to a greater fury than any of the oppressions they suffered themselves. It was said that Our Lord was being sold to the Jews a second time and that the Castilians were the Judas who sold Him. Hatred of the Jews was stronger than any other feeling, and Lerma's negotiations with them were the starting-point of the movement that led ultimately to rebellion. When a Portuguese deputation protested to Lerma against the rehabilitation of the Jews, he replied that, if he were to refuse it, the Portuguese would have to find the money, the loss of which his refusal would cause; and the deputation had finally to find 800,000 *cruzados* as a condition that the Jews should not be granted the privileges they sought.

When the Portuguese were informed of this bargain a great outcry arose against its extortionate terms. At last a compromise was reached. The Jews were not given all they demanded, but they were enabled to sell their goods and leave the country should they desire to do so. In consequence of a Jewish crime (1605) this concession was revoked and a payment demanded from the Jews. As soon as this had been paid (1610) various other laws protecting the Jews were revoked. Later on (1627) the Jews bought certain privileges from Philip IV and Olivares for a million and a half *cruzados*. This sale caused fierce outbursts in Portugal, and the additional enlargement of Jewish privileges in 1629 further intensified public indignation, which went on increasing till the final outburst in 1640. The decline of Portuguese wealth and manhood was commonly attributed to the malign influence of the Jews. This is done by a Spanish writer, Juan Adam de la Parra, who, though an Inquisitor and a poet and a man of culture, opposed the removal of Jewish disabilities about 1630.

He did not pander to vulgar prejudice, but addressed himself to arguments of State policy in his essay, which is cautiously couched in Latin, for the matter was too delicate for popular discussion. He deploras the decline of population, of agriculture, of shipping and of the mechanic arts, which he attributes to the insidious practices of the Jews, their avoidance of manual labour and their addiction to usury. Look at Portugal, he says, where this traitorous race stimulated the ardour of foreign conquest, until it embraced East and West Indies, and then cunningly corrupted the native virtue with the wealth and luxury thus acquired, until they have succeeded in eliminating the heroes and destroying the heroic spirit which rendered Portugal so formidable. In this craving for oriental luxuries, shrewdly stimulated by the Jews, which is undermining Spanish virtue, the useful is neglected for the superfluous, and thus agriculture declines. He winds up by foretelling that if the restrictions and disabilities imposed on the Jews are removed they will acquire such power that they will reduce the Old Christians to subjection.¹

The Portuguese, weakened, disgraced and impoverished by the tyranny of the hated Castilians, and plundered by the still more hated Jews, took refuge in one of the most remarkable compensatory fantasies recorded in history — ‘Sebastianism’, the refusal to believe that King Sebastián had really been killed at the battle of Alcazarquivir (1578) and the fanatical belief that he would appear again. As late as 1763 Lord Tyrawley remarked in the House of Commons, ‘What can one possibly do with a nation, one half of which expect that king Don Sebastián, who has been dead two hundred years, is still alive?’ The belief had been so much fostered by the House of Braganza that Sebastianism continued to be cherished for centuries by the mass of the Portuguese people. The fanatical belief that the *Príncipe encubierto* (hidden prince) would one day appear naturally gave rise to a series of impostors;² and the large measure of support

¹ Juan Adam de la Parra, *Pro Cautione Christiana* (Madrid, 1630).

² Miguel Martins d’Antas, *Les Faux Don Sébastien* (Paris, 1886).

which these obtained is a measure of the unpopularity of the rule of Spain.

The originator of the idea of impersonating King Sebastián appears to have been a certain Sebastião González, the son of a tiler of Alcobaça. He had retired after a profligate life to a hermitage near Pennamacor. From this he emerged in July 1584 and declared that he was King Sebastián, that he had escaped from Alcazarquivir and retired to a hermitage, but that the miseries of his people had induced him to come forward and remedy them. Accompanied by two persons who styled themselves Dom Christovão de Tavora and the Bishop of Guarda, he collected money in Pennamacor and its neighbourhood. The trio were quickly arrested and marched through the streets of Lisbon in order to satisfy the public of their dissimulation. The false Sebastián was then sent to the galleys for life and the pretended Bishop of Guarda was hanged.

Next year a certain Mattheus Alvares, the son of a mason at Ericeira, declared himself to be King Sebastián, to whom he bore a considerable personal resemblance. He won the support of a certain rich farmer, Pedro Affonso, whom he created Count of Torres Navas, and whose daughter he promised to marry. With the help of his future father-in-law he raised a body of 800 fanatical followers. They were defeated with heavy loss by royal troops. The pretender and Pedro Affonso were hanged and quartered at Lisbon.

Such severe punishment checked the appearance of impostors in Portugal itself. They now began to appear in Spain and Italy. One Gabriel Espinosa, who resembled King Sebastián, was introduced by a Jesuit named Madujal to Donna Anna, a natural daughter of Don John of Austria. She showered favours upon Espinosa and Madujal and even acted as their advocate to Philip II. Upon examination the claims were found to be absurd and both impostors were executed in 1594.

The most far-fetched imposture came in 1603, a quarter of a century after Alcazarquivir, when one Marco Tullio, a poor

Calabrian peasant who could not speak a word of Portuguese, claimed to be King Sebastián. At Venice he told a carefully concocted story : he had saved his life at Alcazarquivir by staying on the battlefield among the dead bodies ; he had managed to get back thence to Portugal, but when he revealed his identity to King-Cardinal Henry, the king had made an attempt upon his life. He therefore returned to Africa as he was loath to involve his country in a civil war. Later he became a hermit in Sicily. He at last decided to go to Rome and declare his identity to the Pope, but on the way thither he was robbed by his guides and obliged to take refuge in Venice. Some of the Portuguese residents in that city believed his story, and he was arrested at the request of the Spanish Ambassador. He stuck to his story so consistently throughout a series of examinations that the Venetian Government refused to punish him as an impostor. The story of his claim was now so widespread that the enemies of Spain sought to make use of him. The Prince of Orange sent Dom Christovão, son of the Prior of Crato, to request the Venetian authorities to make further enquiries. Expelled from Venice, Marco Tullio visited Padua and Florence, where he was arrested and handed over to the Spanish Governor of Naples. He was imprisoned, publicly exposed, and sent to the galleys. But as he found adherents even in the galleys he was transferred to San Lúcar and eventually executed after causing as much trouble to the Habsburgs as Perkin Warbeck and Lambert Simnel did to the House of Tudor in England.

Such being the condition of public opinion in Portugal, only a slight occasion was needed to put a match to the powder-barrels. The match was applied by the upper class and the Jesuit Order. They had handed over their country to Spain in 1580, in the interests of their class. Now in 1640 they desired to recover their independence because they had found that the Spanish occupation was no longer beneficial. Their desire had, for reasons already stated, the enthusiastic support of the common people. They had also the support of France under Richelieu.

As early as 1636 a French agent wrote: 'All Portugal cries aloud, "When will the King of France deliver us from the Pharaoh of Spain?"'¹ In 1638 Richelieu sent one of his most trusted agents, the Chevalier de Saint-Pé, to make a further report, which, when it came, decided him to stir up a Portuguese rebellion. That this would not be difficult was shown by the refusal of the Portuguese to pay their taxes and by the serious riot that broke out at Évora in 1637 and lasted several months.

The Portuguese malcontents looked for their natural leader in John, eighth Duke of Braganza, the most powerful nobleman and the legitimate heir to the throne. His grandfather had been induced to waive his claims in 1580 by the promise that he should have Brazil in full sovereignty. This promise had not been observed, with the result that the House of Braganza had cherished a grievance against the kings of Spain for sixty years. Duke John was, however, indolent and timid, preferring his music and hunting and the cultivation of the arts to the responsibilities of a crown. His masculine wife, Doña Luisa de Guzmán, daughter of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, was, however, cast in a very different mould. In spite of her Spanish birth she became a Portuguese patriot and determined grimly that her husband should have a throne. To organise a conspiracy for this purpose she used her husband's agent, João Pinto Ribeiro, Professor of Civil Law at Coimbra.

The time was peculiarly opportune, for the court of Margaret of Savoy, Duchess of Mantua, the governor, was filled with Spaniards and unpopular natives. Miguel de Vasconcellos was especially hated for winning the favour of Olivares by his skill in squeezing money out of his fellow-countrymen. The nobles hated him no less for his policy of excluding them from all posts of honour and emolument, and for his personal insolence towards them.

Pinto Ribeiro's first step was to organise a great hunting party at Vila Viçosa to which the discontented nobles were

¹ *Richelieu's Letters*, ed. by Vicomte d'Avenel (1853-1877), vol. vii, p. 858.

invited so that they might be brought into touch with the Duke of Braganza. News of this party brought Olivares some uneasiness. He accordingly attempted to get the Duke of Braganza out of the country by offering him the government of the Milanese, an office usually held by a royal prince. The Duke's refusal of this office on the score of his ignorance of Italian politics increased Olivares's uneasiness, but he perceived the difficulty of arresting the Duke on his own estates without causing serious disturbances. He consequently dissembled his suspicions and directed the Duke in his capacity as Constable to make a tour of the country in order to inspect its defences. He then set a series of traps for him. The traps were avoided and the only result of the order was to bring the Duke into closer contact with the discontented populace. Finally Olivares ordered the whole *ban* and *arrière-ban* of Portugal under the Duke of Braganza to serve the king against the rebellious Catalans and directed the Duke to proceed at once to Madrid. The Duke made various excuses for delaying his journey, and Pinto Ribeiro decided that the day of action had come.

The famous forty nobles who made the conspiracy were not expecting immediate action when Pinto arrived with the news that the blow must be struck at once (1st December 1640). Everything happened according to plan. Ribeiro gave the signal by a pistol shot. The palace was taken by surprise, the guards overpowered, the hated Vasconcellos dragged from his hiding-place and killed, and the Duchess of Mantua escorted to the Spanish frontier. The populace of Lisbon rose in support of the rebellion, and the Archbishop of Lisbon was declared Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. Expresses were sent out to announce the success of the rebellion, and most of the fortresses of the kingdom were peacefully transferred to the conspirators. On 3rd December the Duke of Braganza entered Lisbon as John IV, and a few days later was solemnly crowned in Lisbon Cathedral. A Cortes was summoned to meet in Lisbon for the first time since 1619, and, on 19th January 1641, John IV was declared

King of Portugal as rightful heir of Manoel 'the Fortunate'. Every care was taken to make a show of legality and to assert that the rightful king was being placed on the throne.

The first indication of trouble in Portugal to reach Madrid was the failure of the fish — usually sent from Lisbon for the vigil of the feast of the Conception (8th December) — to arrive. When the obviously serious news came in, the courtiers hesitated about breaking it to the king. Early in December 1640 the king was presiding over one of the ostentatious bull-fights that he loved, given in honour of the Danish Ambassador, when a courier from the Portuguese frontier galloped post-haste to the quarters of Olivares in the palace. The Calle Mayor was soon full of grave faces and important whispers that dreadful news had arrived from Portugal. In the palace, even in the bull-ring, many guessed the news which had come; yet none ventured to whisper a hint to the king, for the grim face of the Count-Duke was rigid, and until he spoke none might break the silence. Hours passed, the bull-fight was over, and on his return to the palace the king sat at play with his friends. The Count-Duke approached him, apparently gay and smiling. 'I bring great news for your Majesty,' he said.

'What is it?' asked the king unconcernedly.

'In one moment, Sire, you have won a great dukedom and vast wealth,' replied Olivares.

'How so, Conde?' asked Philip.

'Sire, the Duke of Braganza has gone mad, and has proclaimed himself King of Portugal; so it will be necessary for you to confiscate all his possessions.'

The king's long face looked longer and his brow clouded for all his minister's carefully assumed jauntiness. He was no fool; he knew how serious the news really was. 'Let a remedy be found for it,' was all he said, turning anew to the game; and the Count-Duke, as he went out, looked sad as if foreseeing the beginning of his own eclipse.

Olivares with his anxious expression might well have had

little confidence in his prospects of putting down the rebellion, for, although Portugal was extremely weak, she had two great advantages.

First, the Catalan rebellion kept the resources of Spain fully occupied at the opposite end of the Peninsula.

Secondly, Portugal could rely upon foreign aid. The Dutch, in spite of colonial quarrels, at once promised to send assistance; and an offensive-defensive treaty was signed with France (1st June 1641) in which the King of France promised to make no peace with Spain till the independence of Portugal was fully recognised. A strong French fleet under the command of the Chevalier de Brézé appeared in the Tagus (7th August 1641) followed by a Dutch fleet under Admiral Gylfels (10th September).

Since the armed forces of Spain were so much occupied elsewhere, Olivares listened eagerly to plans for the recovery of the country by means of a counter-revolution. The Archbishop of Braga, the Primate of Portugal (Dom Sebastião de Mattos de Noronha) and other disappointed nobles were ready to restore Spanish rule. They scored a great success in winning over the Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, Dom Sebastião de Tello, Bishop of Liria, and in persuading him to promise the New Christians a cessation of all persecution if they would join in overthrowing John IV. The Jewish Christians responded readily because John IV had refused them all concessions for fear of offending the Pope. Moreover, the Portuguese revolution had been in motive an anti-Jewish one. Details of the plot were entrusted to a Jew named Baese for dispatch to Madrid. They fell into the hands of the Spanish Marquis of Ayamonte, a relative of the Queen of Portugal and of the Duke of Medina Sidonia. Ayamonte sent the papers back to Lisbon, with the result that the conspirators were arrested on the very day fixed for the rising. Baese confessed under torture. The noble conspirators were publicly executed and the ecclesiastics imprisoned for life.

Meanwhile the Portuguese Government managed to raise an

army which, badly equipped and ill-disciplined as it was, defeated a Spanish army at Montijo (26th May 1644). This success was of little military importance, but it gave the Portuguese confidence to continue the war to ultimate victory more than a quarter of a century later. The failure of Spain to put down the Portuguese and Catalan rebellions has been attributed by Cánovas del Castillo to four causes : (i) the incapacity of Spanish generals, (ii) the lack of veteran troops, (iii) the decline of military and public spirit amongst the Spanish people, and (iv) the lack of economic resources. Another reason for the success of the Portuguese in the early days of the rebellion was the intentional negligence of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the brother of the Queen of Portugal. He was in command of a large body of troops which, promptly used, might have put down the rebellion at the outset. Instead of making any such attempt he was induced by the Marquis of Ayamonte to try to make himself King of Andalucía with the help of his relatives on the Portuguese throne. The plot was betrayed to Olivares by one of Medina Sidonia's agents named Sancho. Medina Sidonia was brought to Madrid, where he confessed his treason and was pardoned on condition that he resided at court, paid a large fine and challenged his brother-in-law, the King of Portugal, to a duel. He fulfilled his promise by challenging him to single combat at Valencia de Alcántara. For eighty days he waited for him with all the apparatus of medieval chivalry, leaving his opponent the choice of weapons, but he waited in vain for the satisfaction of his alleged honour. Another outburst of regionalism in a decaying country came with the attempt of the Marquis of Ayamonte to make Andalucía into an independent republic with the help of Portugal, France and the Dutch. He was, however, arrested, induced by the prospect of pardon to confess his crimes, and executed. Spain seemed on the point of falling to pieces from sheer weakness.

From the Italian side the first sign of the internal disintegration of the Spanish Empire came from Sicily. This is to be accounted for partly by the constitutional position of the island

and partly by its economic disorders. Sicily was governed by viceroys who lived at Palermo, but their authority was limited by the fact that the towns still possessed their ancient privileges, which had been confirmed by the kings of Aragón in the later Middle Ages. Messina traced hers back to the Norman Conquest. It was administered by a Senate composed of six members elected in part by the people and in part by the nobility, and assisted by the councils of twenty guilds of middle-class composition. The *Strático*, appointed by the King of Spain, but irremovable, was the first magistrate of the city. Messina herself levied her own taxes, and her tribunals exercised a jurisdiction from which there was no appeal within her territories. Palermo had privileges which were no less embarrassing to her viceroy. He could impose no tax without the consent of the procurators of the middle class and of the *Praetor*, who presided over the assembly. When a disagreement arose between the representatives of the king and of the native magistrates, Palermo was usually sure of the support of the towns of Catània, Agrigento, Syracuse and Trapani; whilst Messina, jealous of the capital, usually supported the faction opposed to it.

The feudal barons, amongst whom Capmany¹ reckons more than sixty families of Catalan origin, were obstinately attached to their feudal privileges.

Finally, the clergy enjoyed numerous privileges, which dated back to the earliest centuries of the Middle Ages. They were guaranteed by the protection of the Holy See, which had not forgotten the right of suzerainty over Sicily.

Such were the obstacles which were opposed to the regular action of the central Government. Nowhere were the posts of viceroys more difficult or more precarious. In order to maintain their places for some years they were obliged to lean from time to time on the support of Palermo against Messina or Messina against Palermo, to win over at any price influential

¹ Antonio Capmany, *Del establecimiento de varias familias ilustres de Cataluña en las islas y reynas de Aragón.*

magistrates, and to adjourn the solution of the most delicate questions. Dismissable officials were devoted to them, but undismissable officials subjected them to a cantankerous opposition, attributing all useful measures to their own personal influence, and at the same time imputing unpopular measures to the scorn in which their advice was held. The two parties frequently appealed to the Council of Italy, and the quarrel begun in Sicily was continued in Madrid. Always energetic in their feuds, the Sicilians supported their appeals with threats and presents and finished up by obtaining an enquiry, which usually ended in the recall of the viceroy. There was not one example of a viceroy who finished his career with honour during the whole of the earlier part of the sixteenth century. 'Sicilia fatal a sus Virreyes', remarked Cabrera. Most of them were either driven out by the Sicilians or recalled by Ferdinand the Catholic or by Charles V. The hatred of the Italians for Spanish rapacity was shown in the proverb 'The Sicilian officer nibbles, the Neapolitan officer eats, the Milanese officer devours'. Sicily, where the revolt began, counted a population of one million — a large one for a people almost entirely agricultural. The Catalans, the Florentines and the Genoese sent them cloth and silken materials. The Sicilians sent in exchange their wheat which they could supply in plenty. It was to the interest of the Government to protect the agriculture of the province, which was known as the granary of Spain. Charles V, Philip II and Philip III had levied only slight taxes and had respected the privileges of the inhabitants. Circumstances were very different under Philip IV. The necessities of a ruinous war demanded new taxes, and soon the ministers of the Spanish Government resolved to make the Sicilians contribute to public necessities. They imposed heavy taxation upon objects of prime necessity: flour, meat, wine, oil. It was the poor who suffered most, for priests and nobles were exempted. They shared their vexations with foreigners. The French expedition to Orbitello and Piombino resulted in further ills for the Sicilians. In every town or village one man in five was

enrolled and forced to serve as a soldier or as a sailor. If anyone escaped enrolment by flight, the goods of his family were seized if it did not itself put the authorities on the track of the fugitive.

Such was the state of affairs when a famine broke out in the spring of 1647. A drought of unexampled severity had destroyed the harvests of the previous year, and excessive heat led men to fear further disasters. The viceroy, the Marquis of los Vélez, thought he could remedy the trouble by forbidding bakers, under pain of death, to increase the price of bread. He was soon compelled to withdraw this extraordinary ordinance, which had done nothing except add to the general misery. The famine increased every day, and the population of Palermo rose up and set fire to the houses occupied by agents of the central Government. Imprisoned persons to the number of more than eight hundred joined the angry crowd. For three days the capital of Sicily was given over to anarchy. The viceroy, concealed in a monastery, made little attempt to put down the disorder. At last, in fear of his life, he abolished the newly established customs duties, gave the people back the right to elect their own magistrates, and granted a general amnesty to all who had taken part in the revolt. These concessions weakened the authority of the viceroy without soothing the minds of the rioters. Strong in the support of his fellow-citizens, an artisan of Palermo, Giuseppe Alesi, who was elected Captain-General, came to ask the Marquis of los Vélez for the abolition of all duties established since the death of Charles V, the exclusion of Spaniards from all offices, and the reinstatement of Sicilians in their ancient privileges. The existence of a French fleet in the neighbourhood increased his confidence and the revolt spread rapidly. Catania, Agrigento, Syracuse and Trapani joined in the movement of Palermo. The town of Messina alone held aloof from the movement in order to avoid following the lead of her rivals. She suppressed, it is true, the offending duties, but she did so with the cry 'Long live Spain'; and the nobles protested their loyalty to Philip IV. The supporters of Spain

lynched the first magistrate of Palermo, whom they accused of selling Sicily to France. Such divisions weakened the national movement; fallacious promises soothed public resentment, and Sicily was subjected to Spain. But she still had reason to repent, for the new viceroy showed himself quite as hard and quite as treacherous as his predecessor. The importance of the revolt lies partly in its influence on the war in Catalonia and partly in the impetus it gave to the revolt in Naples.

The next step in the internal disintegration of the Spanish Empire came with the revolt of Naples the same year as the revolt of Sicily. Naples, unlike many regions attached to Spain, possessed few traditions of liberty and self-government. Its viceroys, sent from Madrid, were clothed with wider powers than corresponding officials elsewhere. Under them Castilians were appointed to all the important posts and dominated the viceregal councils; the Neapolitans themselves were virtually elbowed out of all participation in the government of their own country. As the meetings of the local parliament were little more than mere formalities, there was no limit to the taxation which the Government could impose, and the sums which the Government wrung annually from the Neapolitans were multiplied seven or eight times during the first century of Spanish rule. Castilian government had not even the merit — the least that could be reasonably expected from a despotism — of breaking down the power of the aristocracy; and it had brought with it a host of other evils besides. Naples suffered at once from the bad consequences of an antiquated feudal system and of modern absolutism and got none of the compensating advantages of either.

The revolt of Naples was preceded and inspired by the revolt of Sicily. It was a revolt of the common people only, having no backing from the upper or the middle classes. Consequently it broke out suddenly and subsided just as suddenly in the summer of 1647. The viceroy, the Duke of Arcos, was a man of mediocre ability who ruled on the advice of Filomarino, the

Cardinal-Archbishop of Naples — a prelate who was out of sympathy with his fellow-countrymen. Lack of money induced the viceroy to levy an excise on fruit, which was the staple food of the very poor. One morning a peasant who had brought some figs to sell in the market (7th July) refused to pay the excise, whereupon a Spanish official seized the basket of figs, threw them on the ground, and trampled them underfoot. This was the starting-point of a furious scuffle. When the row was at its height a young fish vendor from Amalfi intervened — a swarthy little man with large moustaches and a prominent nose, named Tommaso Aniello, commonly known as Masaniello. He was hailed by the crowd as their leader and led them to the palace of the viceroy. The viceroy fled at their approach to Castelnuovo, leaving Cardinal Filomarino to attempt to appease the mob by means of a religious discourse. It was now that Masaniello was proclaimed head of the people. He opened the prisons, burnt down the houses of the tax-gatherers, routed the Spanish guards and put down crime amongst his followers by the rigorous punishment of theft. Thus calm was restored and the viceroy determined to parley with the victorious Masaniello and announced the abolition of several vexatious taxes. He made friends with Masaniello and granted the Neapolitans all the liberties they had enjoyed under the medieval King Fadrique. At the same time he sought to undermine the position of the demagogue, whose swelled head had offended the multitude. A mob-leader who has risen to a position in which he can hobnob with the upper ten usually develops an insufferable self-complacency, which makes him meat for the assassin's knife. Such was the fate of Masaniello, whose body was dragged through the streets amid acclamations of joy. Next day the fickle populace repented and lamented the death of Masaniello as that of a saint and martyr.

Prince Massa was elected as head of the people in place of Masaniello (4th August 1647). Two months later (1st October) Don John of Austria entered the port of Naples, and, by arrange-

ment with the viceroy, bombarded the city. After three days of bloodshed the mob began to doubt the loyalty of Prince Massa and murdered him. They put in his place one Jenaro Anese (Gennaro Annese in the Italian form), a master blacksmith, who left the direction of military operations to Brancaccio, a former *Maestre de campo general* and a bitter enemy of Spain. But these measures offended the wealthier elements of the population, with the result that a counter-revolutionary army was rapidly built up under a general Tuttavilla. The rebels, now finding themselves in considerable danger, appealed to France by nominating as their leader Henry of Lorraine, Duke of Guise, a descendant of the Angevin kings of Naples.

The Duke accordingly went to the turbulent city, which was proclaimed a republic on the Dutch model; he was given the title of Defender of Liberty. But Mazarin, harassed by the first movements of the Fronde in Paris, was inclined to be uneasy about increasing the power of the House of Guise. He therefore dispatched a French fleet to Naples in support of Anese rather than of Guise. The fleet, which was commanded by the Duke of Richelieu, was not strong enough to decide the struggle. The result of the consequent indecision was that by February 1648 Don John of Austria got possession of Naples and of the Duke of Guise, who was sent as a prisoner to Spain. Tranquillity was soon restored in the absence of any intelligent leadership for the rebellion. The ringleaders — amongst them Jenaro Anese — were punished. A new viceroy, a former Spanish Ambassador in Rome, the Count of Oñate, soon ruled over a city that had learned the futility and wastefulness of the rule of the multitude.

The revolts that destroyed Spanish prosperity in the 1640s all had this in common: that they affected injuriously some of the greatest seaports of the Spanish Empire upon which much of the overseas trade of a decadent country depended: Lisbon, so admirably placed for American trade that Philip II was advised to make it his capital; Barcelona, with its great Mediterranean

trade in an age when the Mediterranean was not yet the back-water which many writers have assumed it to have been; and Naples and Palermo, still the greatest ports in Italy. That the shipping and naval power of Spain, together with its imports and exports, declined as a result of the crop of revolts was only what might have been expected.

CHAPTER III

THE REIGN OF PHILIP IV AFTER THE FALL OF OLIVARES

(1643-1665)

ACCORDING to Domenico Zane, the Venetian Ambassador, Philip III once asked Argoli, the famous astrologer of Padua, to cast the horoscope of his heir apparent. Argoli answered that the stars threatened the young prince with so many disasters that he would certainly die in misery. After the fall of Olivares a new day of military glory and economic prosperity seemed to have dawned for the much-harassed Spain. Argoli's dark predictions for Philip IV seemed to have been confuted since the threatening shadow of the ambitious Guzmán had been swept from his path. He appeared, as everyone thought, to be animated by a new spirit. He seemed to sit as diligently as any schoolboy at his desk behind his letters and papers. He read them every one with the utmost care before he signed at the foot the lapidary signature of the Spanish ruler — *Yo el Rey*. Overwhelming disasters had awakened him to the seriousness of the situation. Henceforth he attended to the business of government that he had formerly left to others. Henceforth the real ruler of Spain — except for intervals of idleness — was Philip IV himself. What manner of man was this Philip IV, whose features are so well known to posterity by a number of revealing pictures from one of the greatest portrait painters of all time, and whose thoughts are known from his revealing letters to Sor María de Ágreda, to whom he laid bare his troubled soul week by week for more than twenty sad and agonised years?

He may without doubt be classed as an able man. In the judgement of all he was the first cavalier of his court, the most

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He may without doubt be classed as an able man. In the judgement of all he was the first cavalier of his court, the most

faultless, resolute rider in the tournaments, the best shot and the stoutest of hunters. As a ruler he was animated by the best of intentions, and such was his self-control that despite his naturally quick temperament he was scarcely ever known to forget himself or to fly into a passion. To his kindred he was linked by an unruffled, almost tender, friendship. Nor had any Spanish king ever before shown more courtesy to his servants. 'Goodness,' said Domenico Zane, 'has chosen him to fashion in her own image.' His kindness of heart is illustrated by the almost inconsolable grief he experienced after accidentally shooting a peasant while hunting. He was so opposed to capital sentences that justice was often felt to suffer from his excessive clemency. Although a good Catholic, like all his race, he had little of the bigotry so characteristic of his father and grandfather. His weakness of character showed itself most in his family life, which was marred by his numerous gallantries.

With all this he was undoubtedly a man of many-sided abilities, even making every allowance for the exaggerations of contemporaries, and the fulsome praise of court poets like Calderón. He was passionately fond of taking a part in the impromptu 'private theatricals' performed in the queen's apartments. He was even credited with the authorship of some of those pieces, which are still extant. He is said to have written the following plays: *El rey Enrique 'el enfermo'*, *Dar la vida por su dama* and *El conde de Essex*. But his authorship cannot be regarded as proved. He translated part of Francesco Guicciardini's *Storia d'Italia* and his *Description of the Low Countries*.

He was master of several languages and had read history with care and intelligence. Spanish art writers refer in flattering terms to all kinds of paintings and drawings from his hand, which, however, have long ago disappeared. His critical sense was shown in his appreciation of Raphael's 'Spasimo', in which on its reaching Madrid in 1661 he missed the master's touch, rightly declaring it to be 'none of Raphael's best work'.

Like most of the men of his own day Philip had the most exalted notions of the mission of a Spanish sovereign ; he was a model king in form at least, but he seems to have made it a point of conscience to neglect the very first duties of a ruler. In fact he was what the Spaniards called him — a *rey por ceremonia* — the first master of ceremonies of the State. Six hours he daily set apart for business, that is for the reading and signing of *consultas* ; but he behaved as if he had made a vow neither to verify nor to reject anything. At all times he seems to have trusted the opinion of his councillors more than his own.

In his later years he fell much under the influence of the energetic and intelligent queen, Isabel de Bourbon, whose defeat of Olivares had given her a new accession of prestige and self-confidence. The good relations of king and queen had been strong enough to stand the strain of many royal gallantries, the most notable being that between Philip and the comic actress María Calderón. It began in 1627 when she appeared, a girl of sixteen, as a member of a very clever troupe at the 'Corral de la Pacheca'. She was of no great beauty, but of extraordinary grace and fascination, with a voice so sweet and speech so captivating that she subdued all hearts. Philip saw her on the stage and fell in love with her at once. She was summoned to the room overlooking the courtyard that served the king for a private box, in order that he might listen most closely to the cadence of her lovely voice, and the heart of Philip grew warmer still. From the Corral to the palace was but a step when the king willed it, and the 'Calderona' became Philip's acknowledged mistress. Gifts and caresses were showered on her by the infatuated king, and the Calderona, proud of her position, turned a severe face to all her other lovers, needing, as she said, no favour but royal favour. On 17th April 1629 she had a son by the king, to the great delight of Philip. The child, afterwards Don John José of Austria, was the handsomest member of his house, and Philip's affection for him was intense, as was that of the crowd, who regarded his coal-black hair as more truly Spanish

than that of the blond Habsburgs. Isabel, when she bore a son six months afterwards, was not without pangs of jealousy. But she had no more rivalry to fear from the Calderona. As soon as the actress was well enough to go out she sought the king and, throwing herself at his feet, craved permission, humbly and tearfully, to devote the rest of her life to religion in a convent, now that she had been honoured by bearing a son to the king. Philip loved her still and hesitated, but she firmly refused to cohabit with him again; and with sorrow he gave way, and the Calderona became a nun. She lived to be abbess of a monastery in a remote part of Spain.

The good impression made by Philip IV after the fall of Olivares was noticed with pleasure by many observers at court. Many who had been kept in the background by the imperious minister began to exert a good influence upon public affairs. Friends of Olivares were deprived of many offices and his enemies brought back from prison or exile. Thus, for example, Don Francisco de Quevedo, the severe critic of Olivares and of the alleged corruption of the court, was set free from imprisonment at León. The grandees who in recent years had avoided the palace — or had been exiled — now returned. The king made an impression on his councils by his directness, his prudence and the sound judgement of his addresses. He informed the Council of State of his purpose to go to the front 'to be foremost in dangers, hazarding my blood and my life for the weal of my vassals, reviving in them their old-time valour, which has sadly declined in recent years'. He became regular in his attendance at the Council of State, attended with the utmost punctuality to business, and was ready dressed and giving audiences by seven in the morning. He habitually wrote decrees and other State papers with his own hand. In the summer he left for the front in Aragón, passing through Ágreda (10th July 1643). There on a fateful day in his life he visited the famous monastery and was much impressed by the fine character and wise conversation of the abbess, the famous Sor María de Jesús. This meeting was

the beginning of a correspondence between Sor María and the king, which exercised a profound and, on the whole, salutary influence upon the conduct of public affairs. She began by disposing of any notion on the king's part of recalling Olivares, or of further employing any of his creatures ; and she urged Philip to devote himself personally to the business of government.

Sor María was a mystic of international reputation, whose book *La mística ciudad de Dios*, went through forty-nine editions in many languages. She was born on 2nd April 1602 at Ágreda, in a region famous for its mystics, on the borders of Aragón and Navarre. Her parents, Francisco Coronel and Catalina de Arana, both of *hidalgo* stock, were devoted to the Blessed Virgin, to whose direct intervention they attributed their marriage. From her earliest years she was remarkable for her devotion, love of solitude and mystical spirit. At the age of sixteen she took the veil together with her mother and sister in her parents' house, which had been converted into a monastery. At the same time her father and two brothers became monks in the monastery of San Antonio at Nalda in the province of Burgos, the former being already sixty-three years of age. He and his wife founded a convent of discalced nuns of the Immaculate Conception in the town of Ágreda, where Sor María was destined to play so distinguished a part. Her mortifications caused her to fall into a condition of physical prostration, which prevented her from making any movement. On recovering her health she resumed her exercises with as much fervour as ever. She was elected abbess with a dispensation for her age, and fulfilled the duties of her office for thirty-five years. Having founded a new monastery outside the town with the proceeds of charity, she removed her community into it with the assistance of the Bishop and Chapter of Tarragona. The fame of her sanctity spread all over the kingdom. The Inquisition opened proceedings about her teachings and dismissed her with the most favourable findings. The Sorbonne in Paris also took proceedings about her doctrine and works and in one session of its tribunals condemned

certain propositions in her books. In this controversy a prominent part was played by the restless Eusebius Amort, who wrote a book in refutation of the writings of Sor María. In the course of the controversy the majority took her part against Amort.

Her portrait shows her as the possessor of a thin ascetic face, endowed with a sense of humour. The correspondence which she carried on with the king for twenty-two years includes many letters remarkable for their prudence, exalted patriotic tone and high sense of justice, and for their clearness and precision of style. They are strongly opposed to the rule of Olivares or to any minister's standing between the king and his subjects. Amongst other works of Sor María that have come down to us is one letter to Pope Alexander VII asking him to mediate for peace amongst the many Christian princes who were then at war.

'She must have impressed the king powerfully as being completely disinterested and free from worldly temptation. He was almost in despair at the magnitude of the tasks before him; the strong spirit upon whom he had leant ever since he was a boy had passed out of his life, and he knew not whither to turn for unselfish counsel. Sor María, saintly yet keen, with her sad yet half humorous face, and her shrewd, kindly eyes, seemed to him a very rock of refuge; and in the long talk he had with her she spoke so wisely, yet so fearlessly, of the oppressive government and the ungodly methods of Olivares; she urged the king so powerfully to trust to God and to himself alone; to work and pray and to make his people cleanly, that he went forth from Ágreda refreshed in faith and hope, leaving with Sor María his command that she was to write to him her private counsel when she listed, and pray for him and his with all her saintly soul.

'Thenceforward until death snapped the spiritual link that joined them, the heart of Philip was bared of all its sorrow, its weakness and its sin to Sor María alone. The haughty face with the pathetic eyes and the great projecting jaw remained unmoved before the world, only the deepening furrows in it showing the storm that raged within. Men thought him callous and cold, for

he suffered silently behind his mask. But Sor María knew, and none but she under Heaven, the secret of the king's gilded misery. His cry of agony, of remorse, of pity came to the cloistered nun rather than to the fashionable ecclesiastics who waited upon his smile, and gently hinted disapproval of kingly vice.¹

At the end of July 1643 Philip entered Saragossa and lost no time in moving against the French, who were threatening the centre of Aragón, and the new commander, Felipe de Silva, whom Olivares had jealously consigned to prison, showed an energy and skill that soon changed the whole face of the situation. With this better state of affairs came the first letter from Philip to the nun (4th October 1643), the first of a long series. Isolated letters of his have been published at various times; but in 1885 the whole correspondence, so far as it was known, was published in two volumes by Don Francisco Silvela. 'Sor María, — I write to you leaving a half margin,' wrote the king, 'so that your reply may come on the same paper, and I enjoin and command you not to allow the contents of this to be communicated to anyone. Since the day that I was with you I have felt much encouraged by your promise to pray to God for me, and for the success of my realm; for the earnest attachment towards my well-being that I then recognised in you gave me great confidence and encouragement. As I told you, I left Madrid lacking all human resources, and trusting only to divine help, which is the sole way to obtain what we desire. Our Lord has already begun to work in my favour, bringing in the silver fleet, and relieving Oran when we least expected it; whereby I have been able, though with infinite tardiness for want of money, to dispose my forces here so that we shall, I hope, start work with them this week. Although I beseech God and His most holy Mother to succour and aid us, I trust very little in myself; for I have offended and still offend very much, and I justly deserve the punishments and afflictions which I suffer. And so I appeal to you to fulfil your promise to me, to clamour to God

¹ [Hume, *op. cit.* pp. 380-381.]

to guide my actions and my arms to the end that the quietude of these realms may be secured, and peace may reign throughout Christendom. The Portuguese rebels still raid the frontiers of Portugal, acting against God and their natural sovereign. Affairs in Flanders are in great extremity, and there is risk of a rising unless God will intervene in my favour; and though affairs in Aragón have somewhat improved with my presence, I fear that unless we can gain some successes to encourage people here they are liable to lose heart and to take a course very injurious to the monarchy. The necessities, of course, are numerous and great; but I must confess that it is not that which distresses me most, but the certain conviction that they all arise from my having offended Our Lord. As He knows, I earnestly wish to please Him and to fulfil my duty in all things; and I desire that, if by any means you arrive at a knowledge of what it is His holy will that I should do to placate Him, you will write to me here, for I am very anxious to do right, and I do not know in what I err. Some religious people give me to understand that they have revelations; and that God commands that I should punish certain persons, and that I should dismiss others from my service. But you know very well that in this matter of revelations one must be very careful, and particularly when these religious persons speak against those who are not really bad, and against whom I have never discovered anything injurious to me; whilst others are approved who are not usually well thought about. The general opinion about these persons is that they love turning things over and that their truth cannot be depended upon. I do hope that you will keep your word to me, and will speak with all frankness as to a confessor, for we kings have much of the confessor in us. Do not let yourself be influenced by what the world says, for that is little to be depended upon, seeing the aims of those who move such discourse; but be guided solely by the inspiration of God, before whom I protest (and I have lately partaken of Him, in the Sacrament) that I desire in all things, and for all things, to fulfil His sacred law and the obliga-

tion He has laid upon me as a King. And I hope in His mercy that He will take pity on our pains and help us out of those afflictions. The greatest favour that I can receive from His holy hands is that the punishment He lays upon these realms may be laid upon me ; for it is I and not they who deserve the punishment, for they have always been true and firm Catholics. I hope you will console me with your reply, and that I may have in you a true intercessor with Our Lord, that He may guide and enlighten me, and extricate me from the troubles in which I am now immersed. I the King. Saragossa, 4th October, 1644.'¹

This letter not only gives the reader a wonderful glimpse into public affairs, but it gives the key, more perhaps than any of the six hundred that follow it, to the true character of the pale, long-faced, enigmatic king, upon whom the fortunes of the Spanish monarchy depended. 'He was weak ; he confesses to having no confidence in himself although he is struggling with all his heart and soul to live well and to do his duty. He is unable to struggle successfully against the worldly pleasures that have overcome him and which he pursues still, whilst hating himself for doing so. Conviction forces itself upon him that his personal sins of omission and commission are to be visited in fearful punishment upon whole nations of innocent people. His natural justice and his knowledge of men make him rebel against the suggestions that come to him, even under the cloak of religion, to punish those who in his eyes have done no ill ; and behind his royal robes and stately port we see the poor soul, so remorseful in the knowledge of its sin and insignificance as to feel unworthy even to pray without Sor María's intercession to the Deity he has incensed. Yet with all this humility the true Spaniard peeps out in the conviction that God has His eyes specially upon *him* ; how God's designs for the universe revolve around *his* fortunes, *his* acts, *his* transgressions.'² The comparison with the letters of a contemporary English Puritan, Oliver Cromwell, though strangely incongruous, is none the less striking.

¹ [Quoted in Hume, *op. cit.* pp. 381-384.]

² [*Ibid.* pp. 384-385.]

The influence of Sor María was never strong enough to make a thorough change in the life of the king. In spite of his good resolutions he devolved a large part of his responsibilities upon a minister who took the place of a smaller Olivares. This was Don Luís de Haro, son of Diego López de Haro y Sotomayor, Marquis of Carpio, and Francisca de Guzmán, through whom he was a nephew of Olivares. He was born in 1599 and had entered his political career under the aegis of his uncle. When Philip had dismissed Olivares he had written (17th January 1643) that he wished to govern in person and that Don Luís de Haro would suffice to carry out his orders. In fact the king allowed him a large measure of independent power. Sor María's opinion of him may be gathered from the fact that in one of her letters to Don Francisco de Borja, a former Viceroy of Aragón, she speaks of him as 'the bad finger' (*el dedo malo*), true to her dislike of all ministers standing between the king and his subjects. Unlike his formidable uncle, he was affable and courteous in the extreme, sedulously avoiding all such conduct as might suggest a comparison between himself and Olivares. He concealed his ambition and lust of power beneath a mask of carelessness. He listened patiently to suitors, but, though liberal in his promises, was niggardly in their fulfilment. At the same time he took care that none should leave him disappointed. He was well-meaning and not lacking in natural ability. His chief deficiency was in experience and knowledge of the art of government. Such shortcomings were largely supplied by his secretaries, Lezama and the Count of Monterrey. The Venetian Ambassador Justiniani, comparing Haro with his uncle, says, 'Olivares inspired me with fear: Haro with love'. Until his death at the age of sixty-two (1661) he continued to enjoy the king's confidence.

Philip's resolves to reform himself and to restore his country to her former greatness were usually too weak to stand up against temptation. When the destinies of Spain looked blackest, comic plays were acted at the palace with astonishing frequency, and

Philip installed in the Alcázar as his mistress a comic actress named Eufrosia who was notorious for her scandalous life. Such offences he would admit in his letters to Sor María, pleading in extenuation his weakness of the flesh and bewailing his constant defeats in battle with the enemies of his soul. From time to time private sorrows would shock him out of his easy-going life, as for instance when his queen Isabel died (6th October 1644) and his only legitimate son, Baltasar Carlos (9th October 1646). On hearing of the Portuguese victory at Vila Viçosa (1665) he exclaimed, 'God's will be done!' and fell senseless to the floor. But he was quick to console himself for his sorrows, both public and private, and his efforts to reform his life and to devote himself to the service of his country were as short-lived as they were frequent.

Under the government of a temperamental king and a courtly aristocratic minister, tempered by the worldly wisdom of a mystical nun, Spain slid ever deeper down the slope of national disaster. The death of Richelieu in 1642, followed a few months later by that of Louis XIII, placed the regency in the hands of Anne of Austria, sister of Philip IV. These changes did little to relieve the pressure of France, for Anne of Austria, under the guidance of Mazarin, forgot her fatherland and continued the policy of Richelieu; and the war continued in spite of plans suggested for the marriage of Philip's only daughter, María Teresa, with the young Louis XIV.

It was from the Netherlands that the greatest of all blows to Spanish military power came. Here Don Francisco Melo, a loyal Portuguese, had succeeded the Cardinal Infante as governor after the latter's death in 1641. In May 1643 Melo's Spanish army of about 26,000 men was besieging Rocroi with the purpose of marching on to Paris after having taken it, when the Duke of Enghien, the Great Condé of later years, came to its relief. The battle began about four o'clock on the morning of the 18th, but it was only a skirmish. Enghien renewed the fight the following morning between three and four. The French left was at first

beaten and its centre forced to retreat ; but Enghien, who had learned his tactical expertise under the great Gustavus Adolphus, had columns so flexible that he was able to turn the enemy with his right and completely rout the Walloon and German infantry. He was thus able to hurl his infantry in repeated attacks against the dense mass of more than 20,000 Spanish infantry. His heavy artillery did great execution and the highly trained Spanish veterans suffered a defeat such as no Spanish army had experienced for more than a century. Their reputation for invincibility was for ever shattered. They lost in killed, wounded and prisoners about 14,000 men (19th May 1643). Spanish methods of fighting, which had dominated the battlefields of the world for centuries, were now recognised to be out of date. The military decline of Spain had begun. Pride in the profession of arms had long been the hall-mark of Castilian *hidalgua* : now a peace-at-any-price attitude was observed to have taken its place. When, for example, peace was at last made with Portugal (February 1668) at the expense of terrible sacrifices, including a vast empire and many ports and the unity of the Peninsula, the news was received in Madrid with the utmost jubilation.

In 1644, the year after Rocroi, Piccolomini, the imperialist general who had succeeded Melo, continued to lose ground, including Gravelines, Courtrai, Mardyck and Dunkirk. When the Archduke Leopold, the son of the Emperor Frederick III, was made governor, he won a few minor successes in taking Landrecies and Dixmude. At Lens, however, in August 1647, he suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Great Condé — a defeat which hastened negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia (1648). By this peace, after nearly thirty years of war, Spain recognised at last the complete independence of the United Provinces, which of late years had begun to fear its French allies more than Spain.

The war with France continued — partly because the French refused to restore their very considerable conquests and partly

because the Spaniards hoped to take advantage of the Fronde to extort more favourable terms later on. In this they showed sound judgement, for Mazarin originally demanded the cession of the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté as well as Roussillon; and during the course of the Fronde the most famous French commanders, such as Condé and Turenne, fought for Spain. With these advantages the Archduke Leopold was able to take Gravelines, Dunkirk and Rocroi, and but for quarrels between the various Spanish leaders might have achieved an even greater measure of success. As things were, Turenne, who had returned to French service, defeated the Spaniards at Arras in 1655. Three years later (18th July 1658) the new Spanish commanders, the Marquis of Caracena and Don John José of Austria, defeated the French marshals and took Valenciennes. The exhaustion of Spain and the possibility of marriage alliances with France led soon afterwards to the opening of negotiations for peace.

Hitherto the question of a marriage had been difficult owing to the circumstance that the death of Baltasar Carlos, Philip's only legitimate son, in 1645, had left his only daughter María Teresa heir to the Spanish monarchy. Whoever married her would, presumably, be master of the Spanish Empire. Consequently Philip IV contemplated marrying her to an Austrian Habsburg and not to a French prince. A great change in the situation came when Philip's second wife, his niece Mariana of Austria, whom he had married in 1649, bore him a son (20th November 1657), Philip Prosper (d. 6th November 1661). María Teresa, being no longer heiress apparent, was now free to marry Louis XIV. This possibility was a step towards peace, which Oliver Cromwell's powerful participation in the war on the side of France made more than ever desirable. In 1655 the English had attacked San Domingo without a declaration of war, and, when beaten thence, had taken Jamaica. In 1656 and 1657 they had captured much Spanish treasure at sea. The following year they had contributed to the defeat of Don John José and

Condé at the battle of the Dunes (14th June 1658). Negotiations for the Peace of the Pyrenees were now hastened on.

Peace was now indispensable for an exhausted Spain. Don Luís de Haro had suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Portuguese near Badajoz ; and the battle of the Dunes had shown to all the world that Spain had come to the end of her tether and could struggle no more. Her material resources, faith in herself, belief in her mission, even confidence in the Catholic religion, had all fled, and nothing was left to her but a baseless pride and a gorgeous ritual devotion which lightly covered a scoffing mockery of the noble ideals that had made her temporarily great. There had been many efforts made through the influence of Anne of Austria, Queen of France, to come to an understanding with her brother, ever since the treaty of Westphalia ; but the demands of Mazarin, that the French should continue to hold all they had taken, including Catalonia, had in every case frustrated the attempts. But the aspect of affairs was changing. Catalonia was heartily tired of the French, who left the province less liberty than it had enjoyed under the Castilian kings, whilst the grave discontent and division in France against Mazarin's government had made peace necessary even to him. But that which, above all, contributed to a peaceful agreement was the fact that Philip's health was evidently failing, and that only one life, that of the scrofulous epileptic infant, Philip Prosper, stood between the House of France and the Spanish throne. Mariana, Philip's second wife, was at Madrid quite as much in the capacity of Austrian Ambassador as of Philip's consort, and she had always tried to prevent any closer union between France and Spain ; her object, aided by the Austrian agents who prompted her, being to maintain the alliance between the two branches of the House of Austria, which, in the opinion of not a few, had dragged Spain to ruin.

In the summer of 1656 a serious attempt had been made by France to come to an understanding with Philip. One of Mazarin's skilled diplomatists, M. de Lionne, had arrived with

great secrecy at Madrid and was lodged at the Retiro, where he and Haro held many conferences, with the result that an agreement upon many points was reached, especially upon the retrocession of Catalonia (though not of Roussillon) to Spain. In one of these conferences Lionne noticed that Haro was wearing in his hat, doubtless for a purpose, a medal impressed with the portrait of the Infanta María Teresa. 'If your king would give to my master for his wife the original of the portrait you wear,' said Lionne, 'peace might soon be made.' Haro passed the matter over lightly, for in the absence of a male heir to Philip it would have been impossible to marry María Teresa to the King of France. But the notion was not a new one, and the possibility of bringing about such a match as a pledge of peace between France and Spain had often been mooted among the more circumspect observers in Madrid.

Lionne's negotiations came to nothing at the time; but when the birth of Philip Prosper provided Philip with the desired heir, the marriage suggestion came again to the fore, and made both sides in the subsequent peace negotiations much more conciliatory than they would otherwise have been, especially when there was talk of marrying Louis XIV elsewhere. It was far into the winter (1659) before the terms of the momentous Peace of the Pyrenees could be finally settled by the plenipotentiaries on the Isle of Pheasants in the Bidassoa. More than once they came to a deadlock, for, comparatively easy as the French conditions were, they were very bitter for the pride of Spain to swallow. The nations were still so jealous of one another that Mazarin strictly forbade any of his French followers from crossing the Spanish line during the conference, 'in his fear that the French, accustomed to despise foreigners, and to make fun of those not dressed in their fashion, should give offence to Spaniards, whose behaviour is more serious and more modest'. In return for many concessions the Catalonians became Spanish again under their old constitution, the new King of England and his friends the Portuguese being at the same time

excluded from the treaty. The rejoicings in Madrid, and the adulation of Haro, who was made Prince of the Peace, knew no bounds. For the present all minds were occupied by the ceremonious journey of the king and all his court to the French frontier to conduct his daughter, María Teresa, to her waiting bridegroom.

The peace deserved elaborate celebrations because of its immense consequence for the future and because of the months of hard labour that had proved necessary for its production. The negotiations began on the Isle of Pheasants, which belonged half to France and half to Spain. Here a great pavilion was set up partly in one country and partly in the other, and here Mazarin and Don Luís de Haro, each on his own territory, negotiated peace between 28th August and 17th November. Finally peace was signed on a table the middle of which covered the frontier line between the two countries.

It was agreed by Clause XXXIII that the King of France should marry María Teresa in accordance with the particular treaty signed the same day. According to the marriage contract Philip was to pay as a dowry for his daughter 500,000 gold crowns, a third of this sum to be paid at the time of the consummation of the marriage, a third at the end of the year in which the marriage was consummated, and the last third six months afterwards. Provided the dowry were paid, the Infanta was to make no further claims by way of inheritance or succession from her father and mother. She would make this renunciation before her marriage and afterwards ratify her renunciation conjointly with Louis XIV. Since, as is well known, the dowry was not paid, the question was argued in many places whether the renunciation was valid or not. The territories in the Spanish Netherlands, of which Louis XIV was left in possession, included almost the whole of Artois, Gravelines, Le Quesnoy and Landrecies, together with Avesnes. To these were added Philippeville and Marienbourg as a recompense for the reinstatement of the Prince of Condé, which Spain was pledged to obtain.

The Pyrenees were made the boundary between France and Spain by the French evacuation of Catalonia and the Spanish cession of Cerdagne and Roussillon. Philip recognised the Peace of Westphalia which granted to France the possession of Pinerolo in the Alps and the Austrian Habsburg possessions in Alsace. Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, who had been imprisoned by the Spaniards, was to be set free and reinstated with the bulk of his possessions; but Bar, Clermont, Jametz, Moyenvic and Stenay were to remain in French hands and the fortifications of Nancy were to be razed. In Luxembourg France received Diedenhofen as well as Montmédy and Damvillers.

This peace, as has been said, marks the end of Spain's career as a great power. The close collaboration between Madrid and Vienna, upon which Spanish ascendancy depended, had been shaken by the end of the Thirty Years' War. The Spanish scheme for making Milan a bridge between Spain and the Netherlands had been buried. Henceforth Spain was to be not the victor but the victim of other powers — notably France.

Freed from foreign entanglements by the Peace of the Pyrenees, Philip was able in his last years to concentrate on the problems of the Peninsula itself.

The Catalan rebellion had already been appeased: the rebels had found French oppression more grievous than that of the Castilians had been. Their consequent change of attitude enabled the Spanish commander, the Marquis of Mortara, to besiege Barcelona (1651) with the help of a Spanish squadron under Don John José of Austria. Barcelona with French help put up a stout resistance for fifteen months but at last capitulated (October 1652). When Philip guaranteed the former liberties of the Catalans a large number of places returned to their allegiance and the Catalans grew so loyal as to propose the reconquest of Cerdagne and Roussillon. Henceforth French invasions of Catalonia received so little support from the inhabitants that the war languished and Catalonia settled down as a loyal portion of the Spanish monarchy.

The war in Portugal was less easily disposed of. It was commonly believed in Europe that once Spain had her hands freed from the struggles with France and Catalonia the rebellious kingdom would easily be subdued. These expectations were soon falsified. In the Peace of the Pyrenees Louis XIV had promised to abandon Portugal, but he interpreted this so freely as to send Marshal Schomberg with a large number of French officers to help the rebels. He also encouraged the suggestion that the newly restored Charles II of England should marry Catherine of Braganza. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was thus won at the price of a dowry consisting of Bombay, Tangier, £500,000 and the opening of the Portuguese colonies to English trade. As a result the Portuguese Ambassador in London was able to raise a considerable force of English volunteers to help his countrymen. The Dutch also gave some assistance.

Philip IV, freed from other preoccupations, began in 1660 to intensify the war against Portugal. For this purpose three armies were prepared; one under Don John José of Austria to attack through Estremadura, another under the Duke of Osuna to attack from Castile and a third under the Marquis of Viana to invade through Galicia. During 1661 and 1662 these armies achieved only trivial successes. In 1663 they succeeded in taking Évora. Marshal Schomberg then marched to the help of the city and defeated Don John José at Ameixial, forcing him to retire to Badajoz. The same year the Duke of Osuna failed to induce his raw troops to storm Castel-Rodrigo. Finally, in June 1665 Schomberg defeated the Marquis of Caracena at Montes Claros — a victory which synchronised with the death of Philip IV. It was left for the Government of his son to recognise the independence of Portugal.

The last years of his reign which witnessed defeat in Portugal were darkened by other sorrows. The death of Don Luís de Haro at the age of sixty-two (1661) deprived him of a minister who was popular in spite of his ineptitude. The minister's offices

were divided between Cardinal Moscoso, the Duke of Medina de las Torres and the Count of Castriello, with the result that Don Luís de Haro's son, the Marquis of Heliche, inherited none of his father's power. The disappointed youth decided upon a terrible revenge — no less than that of mining the theatre of the Buen Retiro and blowing up the king while he was attending a play. This Gunpowder Plot was by chance discovered and Heliche's accomplices were sent to the gallows. Curiously enough, the guilty Marquis himself was pardoned in consideration of his father's services. He afterwards showed his appreciation of the king's clemency by fighting gallantly in Portugal, where he was killed.

A few days before the death of Don Luís de Haro, Philip lost his only legitimate son Don Philip Prosper (6th November 1661). But five days after his death the queen gave birth to another son, afterwards the unfortunate Charles II. About this time the king's health began to fail. As a result of getting wet in the hunting-field (1658) he became subject to kidney disease and gradually became paralysed in the right foot and arm. He grew extremely melancholy, remorseful for his past life and full of dark forebodings. He died at last of uraemia (17th September 1665). Before his death he made a will arranging the succession to the throne. First in order came his son Carlos. Failing him and his descendants the crown was to go to the Infanta Margarita (afterwards Queen of Hungary) and her descendants; failing these it was to go to the Empress María and her descendants, and finally, failing all these, it was to go to Catalina, Duchess of Savoy. The purpose of all this was to exclude María Teresa, wife of Louis XIV, who had renounced her claims to the Spanish throne at the Peace of the Pyrenees. The will finishes with the weighty words: 'The Infanta Doña Teresa and all her children and descendants, male and female, are excluded even though they can say or claim that reasons of public policy or others, on which this exclusion is based, no longer obtain; but if the Infanta should become a widow without having borne children of this

marriage — in such case she shall be exempt from the said exclusion and enjoy the full rights of succession’.

He nominated as tutor for Charles II and governor during Charles’s minority Queen Mariana, assisted by a council, consisting of the President of the Council of Castile, the Count of Castriello, Don Cristóbal Crespi, Vice-Chancellor of Aragón, the Archbishop of Toledo and Pascual de Aragón, the Inquisitor-General. From the grandees he nominated the Marquis of Aytona, and from the Council of State the Count of Peñaranda. Just before his death Philip is recorded by tradition to have said to his three-year-old son, ‘Pray God, my son, that you may be more fortunate than I’.

CHAPTER IV

SPANISH CIVILISATION DURING THE REIGN OF PHILIP IV

(1621-1665)

PERHAPS one of the most remarkable features of the court and of the policy of Philip IV was its secular and mildly anti-clerical tendency. Philip II and Philip III had been devoutly religious : they had spent much wealth and energy upon the service of the Church : their policy had been largely directed by ecclesiastics. Under Philip IV all this was changed. Though he was punctual in the performance of his Catholic duties, he was largely indifferent to religion except occasionally in his declining years, when he fell under the influence of Sor María de Ágreda. He made little attempt to conform to Christian standards of morality. At his death he left behind at least seven or eight illegitimate children. Some writers put the number at thirty-two.¹

Ecclesiastical influence disappeared quietly from the palace ; and three important acts of Philip show how far clerics were removed from their former power. The first was the projected reform of the regular clergy. In a letter addressed to the Pope on this subject Philip bewails the multiplicity of religious persons and of monasteries which, he claims, results in slackness and confusion in the practices of the spiritual life, and in the impoverishment of the parish priests. He also points out that the increase of regular clerics leads to a shortage of population to engage in agriculture and commerce. As a result of these representations he obtained a papal brief for the reform of the

¹ Modesto Lafuente, *Historia general de España*, vol. xvi, p. 505, fn. ; vol. xvii, p. 383, fn. (Madrid, 1856). L. Pfandl, *Spanische Kultur*, p. 16 (Kempten, 1924).

religious orders, which he duly approved and signed (4th March 1645).

What may be described as another anti-clerical act of Philip was to forbid the acquisition of any more property by the dead hand of the Church. A third measure with an anti-clerical flavour was to make the clergy pay certain dues and taxes which were imposed during the reign. Thus, for example, the *estado eclesiástico* were forced to contribute to the twenty-four millions payable in six years granted by the Cortes of Madrid in 1638. That such measures were needed for the material welfare of the State is beyond doubt. It was, for example, stated in the Cortes of Madrid of 1623 that there were no fewer than 9083 religious houses for men in Spain, without counting nunneries.¹ Yet these measures aroused the religious feelings of the Catalans and the Portuguese and gave to their rebellions a religious flavour, such as was indispensable for the success of any movement in early seventeenth-century Europe.

The anti-clericalism of the Olivares régime may be illustrated by the favour which that minister extended to the Jews and his interference with the jurisdiction of the Inquisition. In the exhaustion of Spanish finance Olivares in 1634 opened negotiations with the Jews of Africa and of the Levant, and royal licences were issued for the admission of individuals into Spain. In 1641 the Jews sent representatives whom he received and kept with him for some time, silencing the remonstrances of the *Suprema* with the assertion that they were there on the service of the king. It was proposed that the Jews should be allowed to reside in the suburbs of Madrid, in a separate quarter, with a synagogue, as in Rome. Olivares won over some members of the Royal Council and some theologians to his plans; but the Inquisition remained inexorable, and Cardinal Monti, the Nuncio, told the king, in public audience, that Olivares must be dismissed if the harvest of the Lord was to be cleared of tares and the risk of ruining the faith of Spain averted. Incidentally Olivares

¹ Danvila y Collado, *El poder civil en España*, vol. iii, p. 57 (Madrid, 1885).

interfered with the Inquisition, by demanding the papers of certain cases; the Inquisitor-General Sotomayor refused, but finding himself powerless to resist, placed the documents at the foot of a crucifix, whence they were carried to Olivares, who burnt them and released a number of prisoners. It is even said that he contemplated abolishing the Inquisition, but Philip IV was too profoundly convinced of its necessity to both Church and State to entertain such a project; and there well may be truth in the assertion that Olivares's quarrel with the Inquisition was a contributory cause of his downfall. This put an end to all further negotiations between the Government and the Jews, and in 1643 the *Suprema* is found instructing the Valencia Tribunal to forbid the landing of Jews who were on their way from Oran.¹

The secular outlook of the palace seems also to have had a deleterious effect upon the morals of the court and of the people, and while the Church and Inquisition lay under a cloud, old superstitions reappeared. Corruption and immorality were said to be universal. No office, civil or ecclesiastical, was to be obtained except by bribery, and the law-courts were said to decide all cases in favour of the highest bidder. The nobles spent their time in petty and immoral intrigues at court, neglecting the interests of their tenantry. Such a condition of things is vouched for by a number of contemporary writers.²

The terrible depravity of the religious orders in Spain was uncovered in the scandals of the nunnery of San Plácido, which caused no small stir in Madrid and even in distant England. The nunnery had been founded in 1623 under the name of *La Encarnación bendita de San Plácido* with funds furnished by Gerónimo de Villanueva, Marquis of Villalba, *Protonotario* (Secretary of State) of Aragón, and by the family of Doña

¹ Lea, *Inquisition in Spain*, vol. iii, p. 292 (New York, 1907). *Documentos inéditos*, vol. lxxvii, p. 380. Adolfo de Castro, *Olivares y el rey Felipe IV*, pp. 133-134 (Cádiz, 1846). Amador de los Ríos, *Historia de los Judios*, vol. iii, pp. 546-547.

² Countess of Aranda, *Lágrimas de la nobleza*. (Zaragoza, 1639). José Pellicer, *Avisos históricos* (*Semanario erudito*, vols. xxi and xxxii).

Teresa de Silva (also called Valle de la Cerda), who was elected abbess. She had been for some years under the spiritual direction of Fray Francisco García Calderón, a Benedictine of high reputation, who was inclined to mysticism. Villanueva had an agreement with the superiors of the Order giving him the appointment of spiritual directors, and he naturally placed Calderón in charge. Before the year was out one of the nuns became demoniacally possessed; the contagiousness of the disorder is well known from experience in many parts of Europe, and soon twenty-two out of thirty were similarly affected, including Teresa herself. Calderón was reckoned a skilful exorcist, as was likewise the Abbot of Ripoll, who was called in. At the suggestion of the latter, the wild utterances of the demoniacs were written down and a mass accumulated of some six hundred pages, for it was a current belief that demons were often compelled by God to utter truths concealed from man. These largely took the shape of an announcement that the nunnery would be the source of a reformation, not only of the Order but of the whole Church; eleven of the nuns were to be the apostles of a New Dispensation, one having the spirit of St. Peter, another of St. Paul and so forth, Calderón himself representing Christ. They would go forth to redeem the world; when Urban VIII should die he would be succeeded by Cardinal Borgia, who would bestow the cardinalate upon Calderón; then Calderón would be Pope for thirty-three years, and Villanueva, who would be made a cardinal, would have a share in the great work.

For three years this went on, to the despair of the exorcists, and Fray Alonso de León, who had been associated in the direction, having quarrelled with Calderón, denounced the whole state of affairs to the Inquisition (1628). A long enquiry uncovered an appalling story of sacrilege, black magic and immorality combined, for which all persons concerned were severely punished. Calderón, who had attempted to escape to France, endured without confessing three rigorous tortures. He was, nevertheless, condemned as an *alumbrado*, guilty of teaching

impeccability and other heresies ascribed to Illuminism. Doña Teresa was relegated to another nunnery for four years and the nuns were scattered in various houses.

In all this Villanueva was compromised. His house adjoined the nunnery and he was much there, especially at night, after his official duties were over. The conventual discipline had become inevitably relaxed and, in subsequent proceedings, it was given in evidence that he had been sitting in Teresa's lap while she cleaned his hair of insects. He had taken much interest in the demonic prophecies, especially those which foretold his importance in the Church. He had taken part in interrogating the demons and writing what they said, and he had kept the writings in his house. He was pronounced to have been an associate, if not an accomplice, of heretics. Others found him moderately suspect of having incurred these censures (20th March 1630).

It has often been said that a godless age is a superstitious age. The saying is illustrated by the frequent visits made by members of fashionable Madrid society to the nuns of San Plácido. Many went under the supposition that the possessed nuns could foretell the future. It was said that Olivares sought the help of the now (1638) reinstated nuns in his desire to obtain by witchcraft the birth of a male heir. It was commonly said that he had taken his wife to San Plácido, and there in an oratory in the presence of eleven nuns, who used their magic spells, had sexual intercourse with her with the result that she became pregnant.

Recourse to witchcraft in Spain — a country which, thanks to the Inquisition, had escaped the witch mania of the rest of Europe — was a new sign of its decadence and superstition. To demonolatry was again added the terrific offence of sacrilege, also in connexion with the nunnery of San Plácido. After the scandal of 1628 the matter was condoned — probably with justice¹ — and in 1638 the nuns went into residence again. [Hume relates the following story, which Marañón, however, considers untrue.] Villanueva, a dependant of Olivares, lived in a house in the Calle

¹ G. Marañón, *El conde-duque de Olivares*, p. 200 (Madrid, 1936).

de Madera adjoining the nunnery, and told the king of a beautiful young nun whom he had seen there. Philip and Olivares insisted upon seeing this alleged paragon of loveliness, and Villanueva, exerting his authority as patron, obtained an entrance into the locutory for the king in disguise; and for many nights in succession interviews took place. The affair, though very carefully concealed, began to be whispered, before the king and his friends had penetrated beyond the grille which separated them from the beautiful nun; and though Philip's conscience after an offence was usually tender, it did not operate until after the offence had been committed. So determined was he to approach more nearly to the object of his passion that Olivares and Villanueva managed to persuade the nun to agree to a violation of her vows by admitting the king to the nunnery. A passage was then made through the wall from Villanueva's house into the coal-cellars of the nunnery to facilitate the entry of the king. Meanwhile the conscience-stricken young nun had confided to the abbess what was happening. The abbess, who was probably a woman of the highest character, in spite of the scandal through which her house had passed, now took a step which had been taken under like circumstances in other ages. When Villanueva led the enamoured king up from the cellars to the cell in which the interview was to take place, the pair were horrified to see the nun laid out as though dead upon a bier, her eyes closed, her hands crossed upon her breast, clasping a crucifix, whilst tall tapers were burning at the head and foot of the bier. Philip, overcome and conscience-stricken, fled headlong from this reminder of human mortality. The Inquisition was only with difficulty put off the track of this appalling sacrilege. The story of San Plácido is chiefly of interest as illustrating the social and moral decline that followed the decay of ecclesiastical influences at court during the régime of Olivares.¹

If social and moral decline were the dominant theme of the reign of Philip IV, it would be of comparatively little interest.

¹ [Hume, *op. cit.* pp. 348-349.]

The fact that its interest for posterity has endured and is likely to endure is due to its achievements in dramatic art and painting — achievements which are in no small measure due to the generous and discriminating patronage of the king himself, who was also a painter of talent and one of the greatest collectors of pictures in all history. Round him in Madrid were gathered painters whose works are now among the world's greatest treasures.

Though his European fame dates only from the early years of the nineteenth century, some of the greatest paintings Europe has ever known were the work of Diego Rodríguez de Silva y Velázquez (1599–1660), a Sevillian, whose ancestors came originally from Portugal. Velázquez — to give him his mother's patronymic by which he is usually known — studied his art first under the elder Herrera, and later under Pacheco, whose daughter he married. He trained himself by copying the most commonplace things about him in the fields and in the market-place. Then, in order to study the subtleties of the human face, he engaged a peasant lad to be his servant and made innumerable sketches of him in chalk and charcoal, which were used in some of his earlier pictures such as 'Breakfast' and 'The Musicians'. Having won fame in Seville by such works as 'El Aguador' (The Water-Carrier), 'The Adoration of the Magi' and 'Christ and the Pilgrims of Emmaus', he went (1622) to Madrid, where he soon rose high in the favour of Philip IV and Olivares. From this time onwards he painted innumerable pictures of the king, various members of the royal family, and the Count-Duke. He was richly rewarded by the king, and in spite of his championship of Olivares, royal favour was never withdrawn from him after that statesman's fall from power. His studio was visited almost daily by the king. Several of his portraits of Philip IV reach such a level of achievement as has probably never been attained before or since. The finest of all — that in the National Gallery — which shows his pale face and lack-lustre eye, his fair flowing hair, upcurled moustache and heavy projecting Habsburg

under-lip, is inexhaustible in its uncanny revelation of the sad king's inner life.

In this middle period of Velázquez's life the artist produced some of his most famous pictures of buffoons and dwarfs, who are depicted in such a gentle and kindly manner as to attract the sympathy of the beholder. To the same period belong the greatest of his historical paintings. On a journey to Italy, whither the king had sent him to buy art treasures, in 1629, he travelled in company with the great soldier, the Marquis of Spínola. The result of his conversations with the famous Marquis was to come some ten years later, when 'The Surrender of Breda', commonly known as 'Las Lanzas', from the serried ranks of lances breaking the sky, came into existence. It represents the moment when the vanquished Justin of Nassau in front of his Dutch troops is submissively bowing as he offers his conqueror, Spínola, the keys of the town, which, with courteous grace, the victor refuses to accept. Also in this middle period came the greatest of Velázquez's religious paintings, the 'Christ on the Cross', painted for a convent in 1638. The beautiful form on the cross is projected against a black and hopeless sky in utter loneliness and abandonment, the head sunk upon the breast partly concealed by a mass of dark tangled hair.

During his last period, which begins with his second journey to Italy in 1649 and is marked by his bolder style — the *manera abreviada* — he produced his portrait of 'Pope Innocent X', which was later considered by Sir Joshua Reynolds to be the finest painting in Rome. The many portraits of Philip IV's 'Mariana of Austria' and of the 'Infanta Margarita', who is the central figure of 'Las Meninas' (The Maids of Honour), belong to this period of maturity. A few years before his death he produced 'Las Hilanderas' (The Spinners), representing with matchless skill the royal tapestry works. He died in the plenitude of his powers on 6th August 1660, shortly after being responsible for the decoration of the Spanish pavilion for the marriage ceremony on the Isle of Pheasants which concluded the Peace of

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the Pyrenees. He left behind no school but many pupils and others, who borrowed his methods but could not borrow his eyes or his genius.

Of those who came under the influence of Velázquez the most gifted was probably Bartolomé Esteban Murillo (1618–1682). The son of a Sevillian workman of the humbler kind, Murillo began his career by painting rough-and-ready religious daubs to be sold at fairs or exported for native converts in Mexico or Peru. In 1642 he began to travel in the hope of improving his work. He was welcomed in Madrid by Velázquez, who lodged him in his own house and submitted some of his efforts to the king.

His earlier works in what is known as his cold (*frío*) style include paintings on the wall of the Monastery of San Francisco in Seville, the friars of which were too poor to employ an artist of high renown. After making a wealthy marriage in 1648 he developed his so-called warm (*cálido*) style, in which his outlines are softer, his figures rounder and his colouring marked by greater warmth and transparency. His 'Flight into Egypt' and 'Nativity of the Virgin' are among the most delightful examples of this style. His third and last style (about 1650), known as *vaporoso* or vaporous — in which outlines are lost in light and shade as they are in the rounded forms of nature — gradually developed from the earlier ones. To this belongs what many, including himself, believed to be his greatest masterpiece, the 'Charity of St. Thomas of Villanueva'. He died at Seville (3rd April 1682) as a result of falling off a scaffolding at Cádiz whilst engaged on a huge picture of the 'Espousal of St. Catherine'. Murillo was the most truly Spanish of all painters. He knew little of ancient art and he had not travelled in Italy. Yet he produced a great number of paintings: five hundred are to-day attributed to him. All his ideas are of home growth; his mode of expression was purely national and Spanish; his model, nature as it existed in and around Seville. His pictures bear the stamp of deep religious faith which shows itself in the power to mingle the spiritual world with the homely affairs of everyday

life in scenes that touch the sympathies and arouse the tender emotions. In this, though he lacks something in force and perfection of style, he stands supreme among the painters of the world.

No less distinctively Spanish, though in a very different style, was Francisco de Zurbarán (1598–1662). Born in the small township of Fuente de Cantos in Estremadura, he was brought up at first to be a farm labourer, but was later sent by his family, who were impressed by his zeal for art, to study painting at Seville. Such was his industry that before he was thirty he had executed many series of pictures for the adornment of monasteries, friaries and cathedrals in the south of Spain. He is pre-eminently the painter of monks and friars, whom he studied with the minute care which he devoted to nature itself. Not infrequently he depicts the dark fanaticism of Spain, as he does in his picture in the National Gallery of the kneeling Franciscan holding a skull. The Friar's face, beneath the brown hood, is turned to Heaven; the pale features are devoid of all earthly expression and the wild eyes seem unnaturally fixed on some terrific vision. It is one of those rare pictures that once seen fix themselves upon the memory for ever. His art, however, was not entirely devoted to religious subjects. Before he reached the age of thirty-six he was appointed painter to the king and was later employed to execute for the *salon* at Buen Retiro ten works representing the Labours of Hercules. Philip IV used frequently to visit him whilst engaged on these pictures and on one occasion laid his hand upon his shoulder with the words, 'The painter of the king and the king of painters'. As a painter of heads and as a master of colour — sober and subdued yet brilliant and deep — Zurbarán has few equals amongst the artists of the world. He died in 1662 at Madrid, where the greater part of his later life was spent.

A more versatile artist than Velázquez, Murillo or Zurbarán was Alonso Cano (1601–1667), who achieved fame in all three arts of painting, sculpture and architecture. His father, who

lived in the city of Granada, was a carver of those massive reredoses (*retablos*) which are a feature of Spanish churches, and brought Alonso up to the same profession. Later Alonso studied sculpture and painting at Seville, where he distinguished himself by his artistic powers and his arrogant temper. Having severely wounded a fellow-artist in a duel (1637), he fled to Madrid, where he received much kindness from Velázquez and from Olivares, who appointed him to superintend certain works in the royal palaces. A picture of St. Isidro miraculously rescuing a drowning child from a well, which he painted for the church of Santa María, attracted the attention of Philip IV. He was thereupon appointed artist to the king and drawing-master to the Infante Don Baltasar Carlos, whom he treated with an asperity and lack of deference unusual in preceptors to royalty at the Spanish court. In 1644 his career was interrupted and his life embittered by the accusation, on the flimsiest evidence, that he had murdered his wife. He fled to Valencia and was later arrested and put to the torture. Having passed through this without confessing or indeed uttering a cry, he was set at liberty with a character judicially spotless. In 1650 he was appointed by royal influence to a canonry in the cathedral of Granada, which he set to work to embellish with brush and chisel. Later, when his arrogant behaviour led the Chapter to declare his canonry vacant, on the ground that he had not taken orders within the stipulated time, the king, characteristically enough, came to his rescue and arranged matters so that he could become a priest and yet be dispensed from the duty of saying mass. Nevertheless, Cano never again used his brush or chisel in the service of the cathedral. His declining years were largely spent in works of charity, whatever he earned being divided amongst the poor — so much so that during his last illness he did not possess the wherewithal to pay his doctor or to provide himself with the ordinary comforts of the sick-room.

His paintings are remarkably free from Italian influences. They show an eye for form that is extremely fine, compositions

simple and pleasing, and a richness and variety of colour that has rarely if ever been surpassed. His 'Our Lady of Bethlehem' in Seville Cathedral is considered by some to surpass all other Madonnas in the world in serene celestial beauty. His few coloured statues that survive show an elegance in outline and attitude that is peculiarly his own. The little 'Virgin of the Conception' in Granada Cathedral is perhaps the most exquisite work of its kind in the world.

Of his architectural work, which consisted chiefly of heavily ornamented reredoses, little survives. Some of his architectural drawings, however, give a striking impression of simplicity and elegance in design.

Velázquez, Murillo, Zurbarán and Cano are merely a selection of the greatest amongst scores, not to say hundreds, of really great artists, whose works will make the politically disastrous reign of Philip IV for ever memorable and cast a ray of glory upon that king to whose encouragement they were so largely due.

If painting owed much to Philip IV the drama's debt to him is of more doubtful proportions, for it was largely as a result of his efforts that the Spanish stage came to be dominated by the use of elaborate scenery. Hitherto the great dramas of Spain, like those of Shakespeare in England, had been acted with a bare minimum of stage properties. Cervantes in his preface to his *Eight Comedies and Interludes* describes the state of things thus :¹ 'In the time of this famous Spaniard (Lope de Rueda, 1500–1564) the whole apparatus of the acting manager might be packed up in a bag. It consisted of four shepherds' costumes of white skin, trimmed with gilt leather, four beards and wigs, and about four pastoral staves. . . . In those times there was no machinery ; there were no duels between Moors and Christians, either on foot or on horseback ; it was still an unknown thing to see a person appear through a hole in the stage, coming or pretending to come from the centre of the Earth, still more so to see clouds

¹ Karl Mantzius, *A History of Theatrical Art*, tr. Luis von Cossel, vol. ii, pp. 336 *sqq.* (London, 1903).

coming down from Heaven bearing angels or the blissful souls of the dead. The theatre (stage) consisted of four benches placed in a square, and four to six planks laid across them so that the stage was raised four spans above the ground. The scenic decoration consisted of an old drapery, which could be pulled either way by two strings, forming the so-called tiring-room, where the musicians also stood and sang, without guitars, some old romance.'

The use of more elaborate scenery and stage machinery had been creeping in from Italy during the generation before the accession of Philip IV. The two great theatres of Madrid, however, the Teatro del Cruz and the Teatro del Príncipe, were still comparatively simple in their presentations. Moreover, court etiquette forbade the king to attend theatres except *incognito*. Philip therefore set to work to build his own private theatre in the gardens of Buen Retiro — a present from Olivares — just outside the walls of Madrid. He employed the Italian machine-constructor Cosme Loti and produced a theatre on a far more elaborate scale than had ever been seen before. The stage was enormously large and especially arranged for the most extensive use of complicated stage machinery. Foreign visitors were astonished at the scenes it was capable of showing: mountains shooting fire, the sea with ships sailing in various directions upon it, castles which appeared suddenly upon the stage at the touch of a magic wand; Phaeton driving the chariot of the Sun and falling headlong into the abyss; Perseus riding through the air mounted upon Pegasus; Venus journeying across the sky in a chariot of clouds drawn by swans.

All this was very impressive to those who had never seen such things before. Nevertheless its influence upon the drama was, in the long run, far from good. Where earlier dramatists had followed the urge of their fancy all untrammelled, the later ones were fettered by technical considerations of stage machinery; and genius in fetters soon decays. Also the use of scenic effects served to withdraw attention from the quality of the drama and

of the acting. In days when men in ordinary clothing had to act in front of a drab curtain on a bare stage and to hold the attention of their audience for three or four hours, poor plays with a poor plot and poor acting could not be tolerated for a moment. Soon plays were written especially to provide magnificent scenic effects with little regard to plot, characterisation or splendour of diction; and third-rate acting passed unnoticed in a riot of light and colour.

The elaborate use of scenery meant also that the theatre ceased to be national and democratic, because plays could now only be shown in large and well-equipped theatres, such as only the greatest cities could provide. The age when the noblest dramas of the day were acted in village squares was largely over. The play of the future was written to appeal, not to the mass of mankind, but to the sophisticated inhabitants of courts. It tended to pass over the deeper issues of life and to confine itself to esoteric trivialities.

Fortunately, however, these changes in the character of the Spanish drama were slow in coming. The Madrid theatres were slow to imitate the elaborate splendours of Buen Retiro, and the common people in the cheaper places — the *mosqueteros* as they were called — were still the arbiters of taste. Their applause or hisses decided the fortunes of drama and dramatist. Caramuel (*Primus Calamus*, vol. ii, p. 690) describes how the leader of the *mosqueteros* in the middle of the century was a cobbler named Sánchez. To him a young dramatist would go begging him to treat with favour the play he was about to produce, as it was his first work. The cobbler would reply with grave dignity: 'Be assured, Señor poet, your comedy will be treated with justice, according to its deserts'.

For the age of great Spanish dramatists, which had begun at the end of the sixteenth century, still continued. The reign of Philip IV included in its horizon both the brilliant sunset of Lope de Vega (1562–1635) and the dawn and noontide glory of Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681). Great dramatists from Lope

de Vega's prime survived into his old age, such as Tirso de Molina (1584-1648), Guillem de Castro (1569-1631), Juan Pérez de Montalbán (1602-1638), Luís Vélez de Guevara (1579-1644) and Juan Ruiz de Alarcón (1581-1639). New dramatists who had grown up under the influence of Calderón were constantly appearing, such as Francisco de Rojas Zorrilla (1607-1648), Agustín Moreto y Cabaña (1618-1669) and Antonio Coello (1611-1682).

Calderón, though inferior to Lope de Vega in originality and creative power and in the delineation of character, had a keener dramatic sense and an unrivalled dexterity in manipulating the mechanical resources of the stage — a gift of ever-increasing importance in an age when the stage depended so much upon scenery. But his highest gifts were his lofty philosophic imagination and his wealth of poetic diction, and he produced masterpieces in almost every department of dramatic art. The profundity and originality of *La vida es sueño*, the tragic grandeur of *El alcalde de Zalamea* and the convincing truth of his 'cloak and sword plays' such as *Guárdate del agua mansa*, suffice to establish his reputation as one of the world's greatest dramatists. At the same time the devotion, subtlety of thought and lyrical beauty of his *autos sacramentales* — allegorical pieces on the mystery of the Eucharist for performance during the festivities of Corpus Christi — give him a unique place amongst them. Calderón's life was neither blameless nor uneventful. He and his friends burst into a house of Trinitarian nuns (1629) in an attempt to seize an actor who had stabbed his brother and taken refuge there. A court preacher, who condemned this outrage in a sermon before the king, had his affected language ridiculed in a passage in *El príncipe constante*, for which Calderón was sent to prison. He served as a mounted cuirassier against the Catalans in 1640, and distinguished himself for his gallantry at Tarragona. After the death of his mistress (about 1648) Calderón's religious instincts, which had always been strong, gained the upper hand. He was ordained priest in 1651 and from

that time wrote comparatively few secular plays. Before he reached old age the great days of the Spanish drama were finished.

The dramatists of Spain's Golden Age are remarkable for their enormous output. If Lope de Vega's dramas are to be counted in thousands, Calderón's can be reckoned in hundreds. Tirso de Molina stated in 1634 that he himself had composed more than 400 plays during the past twenty years. The eighty odd dramas of this friar of the Order of Mercy are a remarkable evidence of the versatility of his genius. *El burlador de Sevilla y convidado de piedra* is the first play about the adventures of Don Juan Tenorio, which were used by a long series of subsequent dramatists stretching far into the nineteenth century. *El condenado por desconfiado* is probably the only great drama that has ever been created in support of a theological controversy — in this instance the problem of predestination — though it owes its power to qualities such as superb characterisation and dramatic situations unconnected with religious dogma. Tirso reveals himself as a master of tragical pathos in *La venganza de Tamar* and of malicious wit in *Don Gil de las calzas verdes*. His massive intellectual power and artistic self-restraint mark all his work. Though inferior to Calderón in beauty of diction, he excels him in humour, creative faculty and dramatic intuition.

In proportion to the shortness of his career Francisco de Rojas Zorrilla was almost equally fertile in great plays. Amongst his many tragedies and his comedies — in which the *gracioso* plays the chief part — perhaps his masterpiece is *Del rey abajo, ninguno*. It is a brilliant study of the conflict between the highly developed sense of honour of the times and the devoted sense of loyalty to the king. Alfonso XI, surprised at the large gift made by an unknown labourer to his expedition for the conquest of Algeciras, determines to visit him accompanied by Don Mendo. The labourer, García de Castañar, mistakes Don Mendo for the king and discovers that Don Mendo is trying to seduce his wife. He therefore decides that the only solution of

the conflict between devotion to the Crown and honour is to kill his innocent wife Blanca, whom he dearly loves. But Blanca has fled from the attention of Don Mendo and gained the protection of the queen in the court at Toledo. Thither García goes to demand his wife and finds that her would-be seducer is not the king. He complains of his wrongs, and the king requests him to point out the culprit. He then goes into the royal antechamber and kills Don Mendo. The play ends with his proud explanation of the act. His honour demands that even the greatest of grandees, if needful, should die by his hand. Only the king is sacred and none other :

No ha de permitir me agravio
Del rey abajo, ninguno.

The fine characterisation of the faithful Blanca and the noble and dignified García, the beauty of the versification and the language, the facility of the dialogue and the natural and balanced development of the plot, all combine to make this one of the world's great plays, in spite of its distinctively Spanish outlook.

The genius of the greater Spanish dramatists never shone brighter than it did within a few decades of its engulfment in the general decline of the country during the ill-starred reign of Charles II.

THE ECONOMIC DECLINE UNDER PHILIP IV

EVER since the death of Philip II the economic decline of Spain had been running its course. It was recognised by most thoughtful men both inside and outside the country throughout the reign of Philip IV, and its causes were not difficult to discover. They may be summarised as two fundamental ones : first, *empleomanía*, and secondly, the various debasements of the coinage. The *empleomanía* is touched upon by the Royal Council in its *Consulta* of 1619, intended to explain the poverty and depopulation of the country, where it alludes to the multiplication of grammar schools to which peasants sent their children for a smattering of education and thus withdrew them from productive industry. The Cortes the same year asked for a restriction of this abuse, and Fernández Navarrete, in a commentary on the *Consulta*, dwells at some length on the evils that arise in these schools, to which the sons of peasants flock in order to gain the exemptions of the educated classes. An infinite number of them, he says, failed to reach the priesthood, becoming, in consequence, beggars, vagrants and criminals, while many of those who became priests were forced by poverty to dishonourable practices, the public suffering in consequence from lack of labourers and artisans. The superfluity of medical practitioners was likewise one of the standing jokes of the time. Thus, for example, Cervantes in his *Coloquio de los perros* makes the dog Berganza say to his friend Cipión: 'I shall have little hesitation in taking for a portent what, passing through Alcalá de Henares, I heard a student say some time ago'.

'What did you hear him say ?' asks Cipión.

'That of five thousand students who were attending classes

that year at the University,' replies Berganza, 'two thousand were studying medicine.'

'What do you infer from that?' asks Cipión.

'I infer,' replies Berganza, 'that these two thousand students have either to meet with patients to cure, which would be a severe mishap and evil fortune, or they have to die of hunger.'

As late as the middle of the eighteenth century (1753) Gregorio Mayans y Siscas called attention to the crowds of half-educated students who sponged on the community — drones who sucked the honey while they might be of service in driving a plough or handling a musket. The intellectual proletariat found a solution of its problems in a post in the civil service. There was consequently a frenzied rush for office, to which the suggestive name *empleomanía* has been given. The demand for employment in the civil service was so great as to provide its own supply, thus burdening the State with a vast superfluity of employees and depriving it of their services in honest work. In 1674 the ambassador from Lucca wonders at the Spanish revenues, estimated at seventy-five millions, and the absence of any apparent result, which he ascribes to waste in collection — a manifest yet suggestive exaggeration. About the middle of the eighteenth century (1740) Macanaz ranks the excessive number of civil servants first in his enumeration of the causes of the economic decline of Spain; there are, he says, a thousand employees where forty would suffice, if they were kept at work, and the rest could be set to some useful labour. The evil, once it had taken root, continued to grow for centuries.

The debasement of the coinage, the ultimate resort of bankrupt statesmanship, made its first appearance in the time of Philip III and Lerma. It had been considered, but resolutely rejected by Charles V and Philip II. As E. J. Hamilton well expressed it, 'Philip II opposed unsound money no less tenaciously than he fought the cults of Luther and Mohammed'.¹ In

¹ [E. J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain* (Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 73. All the following account is taken from Hamilton.]

view of the necessities of the Government it was decided to cast to the winds the wise caution of Philip the Prudent. A *vellón* (copper and silver) currency was issued of copper totally devoid of silver content; so that 140 *maravedis*' worth of coins were struck from a mark of copper worth 34 *maravedis*. By this means, allowing for the cost of coinage, the Crown made considerably more than 100 per cent profit. As happens in all such cases, the Government's appetite grew with what it fed upon, to such an extent that an ordinance of 1602 (13th June) reduced the weight of all copper coins to half — 280 instead of 140 *maravedis* being now coined from a mark of copper. The following year (18th September 1603) all owners of the copper *vellón* of 1599 were compelled to take it to the mints. It was there restamped at double its former value. The owners then received back the same face value — that is half the weight of copper — they had paid in. Thus again the Government made nearly 100 per cent profit.

The effect of these debasements was, as might have been expected, to drive the copper coinage to a discount as compared with silver or gold coins; and attempts to meet the situation by reducing the amount of copper coinage in circulation were unsuccessful. Public opinion was, however, thoroughly roused against inflation. At last the Cortes offered the king a grant of 17,500,000 ducats on condition that he undertook to coin no more *vellón* for twenty years. The offer was accepted and, for nearly nine years, the condition was observed. In 1617 (July 3rd), however, the king was forced by his necessities to request the Cortes to release him from his undertaking and to allow him to issue 600,000 ducats' worth of copper coins. The Cortes yielded and the Government estimated that a profit of 600,000 ducats could be made by the issue of about 800,000 ducats' worth of copper coinage. Meanwhile, however, in spite of all precautions, large supplies of copper coinage were smuggled from abroad into the ports and frontier towns. Hence this further measure of inflation was greatly intensified.

The Cortes accordingly offered the king a grant of 18,000,000

ducats spread over nine years in exchange for a promise not to mint any more copper (*vellón*) for twenty years. The offer was accepted (18th June 1619). None the less, before the end of his reign, Philip had to seek release from his promise in order to coin another 800,000 ducats' worth. These issues of debased copper were serious chiefly because they provided a precedent for the wholesale issues of Philip IV's reign, which disrupted the entire economic life of the country. Under Philip III the issues were moderate enough to keep prices fairly stable and to enable copper, at no more than a comparatively small discount, to circulate side by side with silver.¹

The effect of the debasement of the coinage was to increase the cost in Spain of all goods and services. Spain, consequently, became a good market to sell to, but a very bad one to buy from. All the merchants in Europe made it their aim to sell to Spain and to avoid goods of Spanish origin. At the accession of Philip IV this habit was one of the many causes that combined to bring about the decay of Castilian agriculture, industry and commerce. Amongst these were the wholesale emigration of young men and the more vigorous competition of the countries of Northern Europe, where the interference of civil servants was less disastrous to enterprise. Philip III had left behind an enormous public debt. Most sources of revenue had been alienated. Under Philip IV, with the increase of *empleomanía*, the vast numbers of tax farmers and collectors — estimated at between 60,000 and 160,000 — absorbed a large proportion of the remaining revenue. At the same time the wars at home and abroad, by land and by sea, soon began to necessitate enormous expenditure. Moreover, after 1630 the imports of precious metals from America fell steeply, so that before the end of the reign they had become negligible.

¹ Juan de Mariana, *Tratado de la moneda de vellón* (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. xxxi, p. 587), says it was declared in 1609 that the premium on silver stood at 10 per cent. He is probably exaggerating. See Hamilton, pp. 92, 93.

For these reasons Philip IV was unable to raise money sufficient to meet his obligations except by the debasement of the coinage — already like a habit-forming drug — on a larger scale than his father had attempted. During the first five years of his reign he coined 37,937,373 marks of copper into 264,144,440 *maravedis*. The high purchasing power thus given to copper caused attempts to import copper coins from abroad. Hence a royal *pragmática* (14th October 1624) provided death and confiscation of property as the penalty for the smuggling, or assisting in the smuggling, of the smallest quantity of copper into Spain. As this was an insufficient deterrent, the jurisdiction over the copper smugglers was transferred to the Inquisition (2nd February 1627) and the death penalty was replaced by burning at the stake.

The inflation of the *vellón* currency caused, as might be expected, a steep rise in *vellón* prices and a premium on silver coins, which rose by 1626 to about 50 per cent. Philip attempted to restrain this rise in prices by setting up a banking company composed of Italian financiers (27th March 1627) for the purpose of reducing the amount of *vellón* currency in circulation. The reduction was to be brought about by allowing possessors of *vellón* to exchange it at one of the banks set up in the greater cities of Castile for the company's obligation to pay 80 per cent of its normal value plus interest at 5 per cent. Twenty per cent of the *vellón* thus obtained was to be perforated to indicate a 75 per cent reduction in its purchasing power. *Vellón* obtained in various ways was to suffer a similar depreciation. In order to enable the banking company to pay its expenses it was accorded many privileges. It proved highly unpopular and few were prepared to surrender their *vellón* on the terms offered.

More drastic measures were taken in an ordinance (7th August 1628) which further reduced the purchasing power of *vellón* by 50 per cent, and the king promised never again to change its value. The private holders of *vellón* were not compensated, though the towns were exhorted to study the feasibility of raising

money for the purpose of compensating *vellón* holders to the extent of half their losses. The promise never again to change the value of *vellón* was broken in 1636 when the coinage was restamped to treble its tariff, the Crown securing the whole of the profit. The revolutions in Catalonia and Portugal in 1640 had the effect of making the Government try to cope with its financial distress by more reckless measures of inflation. These led to a steep increase in *vellón* prices and a still greater premium on silver. The Government thereupon took measures to deflate the *vellón* coinage to about one-sixth of its former face value, again without compensation to those who were thus deprived of a large part of their capital. The king again pledged himself and his successors not again to raise the face value of *vellón*. Yet within less than six months he again resorted to inflation, this time, however, allowing owners to share in the profits. In 1651, alarmed by the further rise in the premium on silver, the king planned to recall all *vellón* from circulation, but the difficulty of raising fresh taxes for the prosecution of the wars led him to abandon the scheme and to resort again to inflation, increasing fourfold the face value of *vellón*.

Gresham's Law had already begun to operate in driving silver out of circulation even before the accession of Philip IV. The operation was virtually complete even before 1625, and accountants began to take *vellón* instead of silver as their standard. By the year 1642 the premium on silver stood at about 200 per cent. In vain the Government sought repeatedly to fix a maximum premium, threatening heavy penalties against those who exceeded it.

The constant changes in the value of the currency and the fear of further sudden changes led to the utmost anxiety. As early as 18th April 1633 public criers announced in Madrid that anyone spreading rumours that the value of *vellón* was going to be changed would be given two hundred lashes and ten years at the galleys. Haunted by fear of inflation, men hastened to change their money into goods, whether they needed the goods

or not. Men rendered desperate by fear of losing the savings of a lifetime engaged in the most reckless extravagance. Money which might one day lose its value by the sudden issue of a new decree ceased to be regarded as possessing any value.

The disappearance of a silver currency led to many practical difficulties. The task of counting large sums paid in *vellón* was enormous. The handling, storing or transporting of it required more and larger warehouses, as may be gathered from the fact that in 1653 the money paid for a pound of wax candles would weigh more than two and a half times as much as the candles. The successive deflationary changes had the effect of lowering the real wages of labour. Worse than all, the sudden changes from inflation to deflation and back again caused wide fluctuations in prices, made it impossible for business men to calculate ahead and thus stifled initiative and enterprise. *Vellón* inflation was thus both an effect and a cause of the economic decline of Castile.

Economic decline went so far, that once-flourishing cities such as Toledo, Granada and Seville were no longer able to raise money for such purposes as the upkeep of roads, bridges and drains and to provide themselves with the arms and munitions of war, though Murcia, Cádiz and Corunna — possibly as a result of smuggling — increased in size. In the country large numbers of villages disappeared and great areas went out of cultivation. Many labourers wandered about the country in search of bare subsistence, and many more left the country to escape the tyrannies of civil servants and the extortions of the multitudes of tax-gatherers. Such was the prevailing poverty that large numbers of Spaniards abandoned their farms and went to live the lives of gypsies. A royal *pragmática* (8th May 1633)¹ threatens a punishment of two hundred lashes and six years in the galleys for anyone, not a gypsy by birth, who lived or dressed like a gypsy, spoke the gypsy language or engaged in gypsy pursuits. In their desperation at the shortage of men ready to do manual labour, the Government enforced a variety of measures

¹ *Novísima recopilación*, Bk. XII, Tit. XVI, law v.

intended to limit popular education, to the detriment of the standard of national culture. Thus, for example (13th July 1627), severe restrictions were placed upon the publication of books, 'because', says the law, 'they are sufficiently abundant already' (*pues ya hay demasiada abundancia de ellos*). 'The hand should be restrained from engaging in superfluous pursuits that yield no profit to the community.'

The embarrassment of the finances is shown by the fact that, in addition to many other increases of taxation, it was thought necessary to add to the hated and disastrous *alcabala* which had been reduced by Olivares after his first crop of reforms at the beginning of his first period of office. The Cortes of Madrid (1623), by the creation of a tax called *cientos*, virtually increased it from 10 per cent to 11 per cent. In 1642 it was increased from 11 per cent to 12 per cent; in 1656 it was raised to 13 per cent and in 1664 to 14 per cent. Thus in future goods paid 14 per cent of their value every time they changed hands even in the process of manufacture. Such a ruinous sales tax — for persons and places not exempt from *alcabala* — could hardly fail to bring Spanish export trade crashing down in complete disaster. The overhead charges, under which Spanish goods laboured, made competition with foreign manufactured goods impossible. The wool on a sheep's back in process of becoming a coat on a man's back would change hands many times — the more so in proportion to the effectiveness of the specialisation of industry. Every time it changed hands it would have to pay 14 per cent in *alcabala*. Should it change hands — as well it might — ten times, the total of sales tax due would be 140 per cent. An export trade could scarcely exist under such ruinous conditions. The civil servant, ignorant, corrupt and irresponsible, cared little for these things. At the same time, other crushing burdens were piled upon the back of the already burdened consumers. Thus, for example, the system of Government monopolies, which already existed, was extended (1632) to cover such commodities as salt, tobacco, gunpowder, nitre, corrosive sublimate, mercury,

sealing-wax, pepper and gum. Five years later (1st January 1637) there was introduced a new form of raising money which has since been introduced into many countries, that of *papel sellado*, or stamp duties on legal documents and other papers. Four classes of paper were sold for various uses at different prices — paper of the great seal, of the second, third and fourth seals, the seals being valid only for a single year. All the time direct taxation was increasing in consequence of the huge *servicios* voted by the Cortes. Thus a country where wealth and population were steeply on the decline was subjected to a steep increase in its already crushing burden of taxation. Under such conditions it was futile to hope for any chance of economic recovery. The *Consulta* of the Royal Council of 1619 ascribed the depopulation of the country to the grinding and insupportable weight of taxation that fell on the peasantry. The mules and cart of the peasant were seized for taxes. He was thus driven from the land and hid himself in large cities or sought a livelihood abroad.

Ten years later (1629) Fray Benito de Peñalosa y Mondragón, while enthusiastically extolling the power and wealth of Spain, describes the condition of the peasantry as the poorest and most completely miserable of all, as though all the other classes had combined and conspired to ruin them. Their cabins and huts of mud walls are described as decaying and crumbling. They possess some badly cultivated lands and lean cattle, always hungry for lack of common pasture, and they are burdened with tributes, mortgages, taxes, *censos* and many impositions, demands and almsgivings that cannot be escaped. 'In place of wondering at the depopulation of villages and farms, the wonder is that any of them remain.'¹

It has already been stated that the chief cause of the impoverishment of the country was the overgrowth of the civil service and the debasement of the coinage. After these, in order

¹ Peñalosa y Mondragón, *Libro de las cinco excelencias del Español que despueblan a España*, fol. 163, 170 (Pamplona, 1629).

of seriousness, come the exactions of the Church. In 1653 Plasencia is spoken of as one of the four most lucrative bishoprics in Spain, with an income of 40,000 ducats, but it is stated that there were years in which it was worth 80,000 — and this at a time when the State was virtually bankrupt, currency in disorder, industry and trade prostrate, and the whole land steeped in poverty. It might be replied that much of the exactions of the Church was returned to the poor in the form of charities and cultural benefits. Such an argument scarcely holds in view of the great sums which the State exacted from the Church. Kings were in the habit of calling upon bishops as well as nobles for contributions towards the expenses of government. Thus, for example, Cardinal Quiroga, when Archbishop of Toledo, is said to have given to Philip II an aggregate of a million and a half of ducats. There were also certain papal grants to the Crown on the revenues of the clergy at large, known as the *subsidio* and *excusado*, which, in 1573, were reckoned at 575,000 crowns a year and in 1658 at something over two million ducats. The *subsidio* had originally been a grant from Pope Paul IV to arm sixty galleys, a purpose which was speedily forgotten. The *excusado* had been a grant from Paul V empowering the king to claim in each parish the tithe of the largest tithe-payer. But owing to difficulties in collection it was commuted. All this wealth which the Crown shared with the Church came ultimately from the impoverished husbandman in the form of tithes, first-fruits and other ecclesiastical exactions, which were commonly practised in all parts of Catholic Europe. Among them was one known as *luctuosa* — the right to the best head of cattle on the death of a peasant. The lay lords had mostly commuted this for a small money payment, but the clergy farmed it out and the farmers exacted it with the utmost rigour, not only on the death of the head of the family, but on the death of every member, so that the survivors in the hour of bereavement were stripped of the means of cultivating their holding. The Cortes assembled by Philip IV at his accession made a forcible and somewhat

rhetorical representation, asking for measures to restrain the multiplication of religious foundations and the purchase of land by religious bodies. These, it was alleged, not only diminished the *alcabala*, but in a few years would exempt all real estate from royal jurisdiction and accumulate all taxation on the destitute poor, thus destroying the population of the provinces, for it was evident that, if the clergy continued to increase as it was doing, the villages would be without inhabitants, the fields without labourers, the sea without mariners and the arts without craftsmen; commerce would be extinct and, marriage being despised, the world would not last for more than a century. Such extravagant declarations suggest anxiety rather than considered judgement.

At the request of the Government, which declared that it could not support such multitudes of religious, Urban VIII in 1634 granted a bull reforming the Orders and suppressing the barefooted ones, but the strength of the opposing influences caused it to be ineffective. In 1677 it was again debated, including the excessive numbers of secular clergy, but action was postponed until there was a better prospect of results. In 1691 measures of disendowment were again considered, and the king deplored the multiplication of monasteries, and the consequent relaxation of discipline, and suggested that the Pope should be asked for authority to appoint visitors with full powers. The excessive numbers of the secular priesthood were, he said, the cause of numerous disorders, to remedy which the Pope was to be applied to for faculties enabling bishops and abbots to reduce their numbers so that all incumbents could live decently. With the turn of the century there was a stronger demand for change; and in 1713 the plain-spoken Macanaz, in a report to the king, presented a terrible picture of the misery and impoverishment resulting from the overgrown numbers and wealth of the clergy.

The most obvious of the causes of the economic decline of a State is usually the extravagance of the Government. Such extravagance was a marked feature of the reign of Philip IV.

One example only needs to be given — the entertainment of the Bourbon Princess of Carignano, a sister of the Count of Soissons, who in France was in arms against Richelieu. The feasts arranged for her welcome began on 15th February 1637, the king himself being present. A large space had been cleared and levelled before the palace of Buen Retiro and built about with uniform scaffolds two storeys high, the posts and divisions all beautified with paintings and gildings. ‘The king and the count-duke’, wrote the English Ambassador, ‘took horse in the Carrera de San Gerónimo, and attended by 200 of the nobility and persons of quality, and two triumphal chariots drawn by twenty oxen apiece, entered the plaza, where they performed a curious masquerade after their manner, full of charges, the one half of the horsemen being led by the king and the other half by the count-duke; the king and the conde and all the rest being richly clad after the same kind. The plaza was round about set full of torches in several heights, and postures, which had so much delight and magnificence in the appearance, that those who have looked curiously into the entertainments of former times say that amongst the Romans they have not read of any greater ostentation.’ The contemporary Newsletters say that there were 7000 wax lights, which alone cost over 8000 ducats, the cost of this one day’s feast being 300,000 ducats — afterwards increased to 500,000 ducats. This enormous expenditure shocked everyone who thought about the matter. ‘The gossips’, said a Newsletter, ‘assert that this great event, which had no other end than pastime and pleasure, which indeed was pure ostentation, was to show our friend Cardinal Richelieu that there is plenty more money left in the world to punish his king.’¹ It would, however, be lacking in a sense of proportion to attribute the economic decline of the vast Spanish Empire to the extravagance of royal entertainments. It should be remembered also that some of the greatest artists and dramatists on earth had their parts in these entertainments, thereby adding in no small degree to Spanish

¹ [Quoted from Hume, *op. cit.* p. 318, fn. 2.]

prestige and culture. Neither should it be forgotten that the large sums said to have been spent were partly a result of a great rise in prices that followed the ineptitude of the Government of the declining country. The new English Ambassador, Sir Arthur Hopton, on being informed that his allowance for diet was to be reduced again from £6 to £4 per day, wrote: 'All the diet of table and stables is three times as dear as in Sir Charles Cornwallis's time,¹ when the £2 a day was first added. A loaf of bread was then worth 12 *maravedís* and it is now worth 34. An *azumbre* (about 2 quarts) of wine was then worth 12 *maravedís*, and now sells for 30; a pound of mutton, which was then worth 17 *maravedís*, is now worth 40; a *fanega* (1½ bushels) of barley then cost 6 *reales* (about 6d.), and 16 now.'² At such prices as these quite a modest expenditure might easily seem enormous.

However deceptive the expenses may have been, courtly festivals were conducted on a scale that astonished Europe. The carnival of 1637 was officially³ admitted to have cost 300,000 ducats and was popularly estimated to have cost half a million. In 1658 the Venetian Ambassador reports his giving to the son of Don Luís de Haro 50,000 pesos for skilfully arranging a ballet for the ladies of the court. Every bull-fight cost him 60,000 *reales*, and the celebration at the birth of Prince Prosper (who speedily died) involved an expenditure of 800,000 pesos. All this, as the envoy remarks, was exacted from the blood of the miserable people, who were poorer in Spain than anywhere else. The immense resources of the kingdom were absorbed by the rapacity of the ministers or were dissipated by the profuseness of the king. It was small wonder that under such extravagance the population is said to have shrunk to about five millions in the last years of the seventeenth century, though in 1586 it had been estimated by the Venetian Ambassador Gradenigo at eight millions.

¹ Sir Charles Cornwallis was Ambassador to Spain 1605-1609.

² [Quoted from Hume, *op. cit.* pp. 321-322.]

Yet it was not so much the extravagance of the court, or the emigration to the colonies, that reduced the power and population of Spain. The land could have endured all these if its rich resources and vast opportunities had been wisely developed. Lying between two seas and holding Sicily and Naples, it commanded the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; with its precious metals which revolutionised the finances of Europe and furnished the basis for the most profitable commerce the world had seen, it was invited to become the greatest of maritime states, with a navy and a merchant marine beyond rivalry, dominating the seas as the Catalans had dominated the Mediterranean in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It was largely secured from hostile aggression by the Pyrenees, and could work out its destinies with little fear from external enemies. Spain's failure to achieve greatness has until recently been attributed to the expulsion of the Moriscos at the beginning of the seventeenth century. But modern research has shown that the number of Moriscos said to have been expelled was far too small to account for the decay of Spanish industry. Further investigation shows that Spanish industry was strangled by the most burdensome and complicated system of taxation that human folly could devise, the weight of which fell almost exclusively on the oppressed producing classes who were least able to endure it. As taxation was virtually at the discretion of the monarch, imposts were added as the civil servants deemed them necessary and with little thought for their consequences. The taxpayer, overburdened with imposts, was entangled with a network of regulations to prevent evasion, and to protect the consumer at the expense of the producer. He was thus crippled at every step by the deadly influence of the anomalous and incongruous accumulation of exactions. The burden of taxation fell entirely upon the poor and never on the *hidalgos*, who were exempt; all that was left unpaid was added to the levy for the succeeding year. A horde of bloodsuckers lived by selling out delinquents, when the costs amounted to more than the taxes. Consequently, the poor were obliged to sell their

property to meet the demands of the tax-gatherer, or to let it be seized and sold, thus becoming beggars and tramps, and every year saw their numbers increase.

The peasant, moreover, was subject to special and ruinous restrictions. The *tasa* or price of grain was officially determined every year, at a maximum above which he was forbidden to sell it; moreover it could not be exported, nor could it be transported by sea from one province to another, to prevent infractions of the prohibition. The result of this was that if the harvest was deficient, grain was secreted and held at exorbitant prices, and this infraction of the law was winked at under necessity. The sufferer was the peasant, who had no means of storing his grain but had to sell it to the wealthy who could withhold it, and so he fared ill whether the harvests were abundant or scanty. Thus production was discouraged and diminishing; the producer realised little, while the consumer paid extravagantly, checking both production and consumption. Lands were left uncultivated and labour was unemployed; everything moved in a vicious circle, and the evil was constantly growing. Trade was similarly strangled. The *alcabala* of 10 per cent and the *cientos* of 4 per cent were levied, as has been remarked, on every transaction, no matter how often an article changed hands. Manufacturers, under this system, had almost disappeared. Spaniards were forced to sell their raw products to foreigners at low prices, for there were no buyers, and to purchase them back in their finished state at sellers' prices. The heavy tariff increased the cost to the consumer, while innumerable smugglers enabled the importers to realise the benefit of the duties. The foreigner, moreover, secured all the precious metals of the Indies, for all exports thither were of foreign goods, with which the Spaniards could not compete owing to the excessive imposts and tributes which doubled the price of everything to the consumer. Yet of the products of these crushing burdens but little reached the Treasury, owing to the system of collection, smuggling and fraud. All this was pointed out in most striking terms to Philip V in 1732

by Don Miguel de Zavala y Auñón in his *Representación al más seguro aumento del real erario*.

The disabilities imposed on agriculture, industry and trade were greatly aggravated by the means of intercommunication, and it is symptomatic of Spanish policy that the energies of its rulers and of its civil servants had been concentrated on everything to the exclusion of internal development. It is true that, under Charles V and Philip II, considerable effort was spent on the waterways; the Canal Imperial de Aragón was built along the Ebro, as well as the smaller canals of Jarama and Manzanares, and there were improvements of the Tagus and Guadalquivir, but these ceased with the overgrowth of the civil service, which lacked enterprise and originality to an alarming degree. Under their rule no attention was paid to roads, which for the most part were mere *caminos de herradura*, or mule-tracks. Even as late as the closing years of the eighteenth century (1795) Jovellanos tells us that there were no communications by waggon between the contiguous provinces of León and Asturias, so the wines and wheat of Castile could not bear the expense of mule carriage to the seaboard. Shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century Charles III undertook to construct highways from Madrid to Andalucía, Valencia, Catalonia, Galicia, Old Castile, Asturias, Murcia and Estremadura, but by the end of the century none of them had reached half-way, and no attention was paid to inter-provincial waggon roads, to enable the miserable peasant to get from village to village or from market to market, save at the risk of exhausting his cattle or losing everything in a mud-hole.

Spain had, in fact, become a paradise for civil servants and a hell to the poor wage-earner to such an extent that the country was crowded with foreigners, who were better equipped than natives for evading the tyrannies and exactions of the civil servants. In a memorial sent by the city of Burgos to the king (apparently in 1616), complaining of the intrusion of foreigners, it attributes the decline in its population (from 5000 householders in the middle of the sixteenth century to a present population of

823) to the foreigners who had taken away their trade, and asks for the prohibition of the transport of goods out of the kingdom. They cited especially the damage done by the competition of English cloth, woollen stuff known as *perpetuán*, and other incorrectly manufactured merchandises. These foreign traders resided in seaport towns, from which they sold their goods in the cities of the coast, to evade abuses in the customs, when they should have taken them to Burgos — the place where the sale should have taken place and the duties been paid. The majority of the ships which carried merchandise were not Spanish; and even the sailors on the fleets from the Indies were mostly foreigners. The Italian Campanella (1640) wrote that the majority of the manufactures were in the hands of Italians, as the majority of agricultural jobs were in the hands of Frenchmen. Sancho de Moncada estimated that foreigners extracted annually from Spain some 20,000,000 ducats by the sale of cloth, fish and timber. On other evidence it is known that there were 40,000 foreigners in Madrid alone engaged in industry; and according to a memorial sent in 1680 by the Marquis de Villars to Louis XIV of France, of whom he was ambassador, the number of Frenchmen established in Spain was 77,000: 20,000 in Aragón, of them 2000 traders and the rest artisans; 1000 in Navarre, hawkers, shepherds, labourers and water-carriers; 1000 in Catalonia, traders and workmen; 12,000 in Valencia; 16,000 in the two Castiles; as many more in Andalucía, etc.

In Seville a mercantile consulate was formed in 1624, with the title of *Almirantazgo*, of the Flemings and Germans. They were granted by the king numerous privileges, including civil and criminal jurisdiction, on the analogy of the *Casa de Contratación*. A memorial to the king made by the City Council of Seville (1643) mentions that Portuguese and naturalised foreigners are the wealthiest merchants and the possessors of the richest Indian trade and the greatest wealth that comes therefrom. Spain's monopoly of commerce with the new world that it had discovered was now no more than a memory.

CHAPTER VI

THE REIGN OF CHARLES II

(1665-1700)

NEVER was the Spanish monarchy in more dire need of an experienced head and a strong arm than in 1665 when a child of four, sick in body and in mind, was proclaimed king, as Charles II. In accordance with Philip IV's will, the regency of the kingdom and the tutorship of the king fell into the hands of the Queen Mother, Mariana of Austria (m. 1649). This woman, obstinate and capricious, proud and incapable, threw all her weight into strengthening the ties between Spain and her native Austria — historic ties that, in the opinion of many of the leading nobles, had brought untold disasters upon Spain. She was Austrian to the backbone and ready to sacrifice to the uttermost the interests of Madrid to those of Vienna. In pursuance of this policy she conferred all possible power upon her Austrian confessor, John Everard Nithard (or Neidhard).

Nithard was born at the Castle of Falkenstein in Upper Austria, 8th December 1607. He had never been a Protestant, as some of his enemies alleged, and some Spanish historians have asserted. On the contrary, he entered the Society of Jesus whilst quite young, his vocation being aroused by an extraordinary escape from great danger. Shortly afterwards he lectured at the university of Graz on Philosophy and Canon Law and, being invited to the court of the Emperor Ferdinand III, became confessor to the Archduke Leopold, who later became Emperor, and to the Archduchess Mariana, afterwards Queen of Spain. When she married Philip IV he accompanied her to Spain, where he won the esteem of the king, who wanted to have him made a cardinal. He had written copiously on the Dogma of the

Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but possessed comparatively little political experience or knowledge of the world. His virtues were many. He was upright, frugal, hard-working and neither covetous nor self-seeking. Yet he was totally unfitted for the task of restoring at a critical time the long-lost greatness of the Spanish monarchy.

The death of Cardinal Moscoso, Archbishop of Toledo, a few hours before the king's, left a vacancy on the Royal Council. Mariana therefore set about the difficult task of inducing Don Pascual de Aragón, who was nominated to the see of Toledo, to resign his office of Inquisitor-General. She was successful, and Nithard was at once promoted to this powerful office together with the vacant seat on the Royal Council — an action which brought to a head the rising discontent. The nobles were jealous and the populace of Madrid hated him for interfering with the performance of certain plays in the theatres. Moreover it was illegal to promote a foreigner to a high office in Spain, and the issue of letters of naturalisation did nothing to quieten the opposition, which found its natural leader in Don John of Austria. The only one of Philip's numerous bastards to have been publicly recognised, this black-haired, handsome, popular prince had the support of the populace, who regarded his black hair as more Spanish than the flaxen Habsburg hair. In his early youth he had shown considerable promise as a Latinist and a mathematician, a ready speaker and a writer of prose and poetry. Philip IV once offered him the archbishopric of Toledo together with the office of Inquisitor-General in order to get rid of his political influence, perhaps on the advice of the Viennese court. He lost his father's favour because he had once called at the palace to show him an enamel representing Saturn looking on complacently at the amours of Jupiter and Juno (who were supposed to be brother and sister), hinting thus at a plan for marrying his half-sister, the Infanta Margarita, as a way of strengthening his claim on the throne. His father, shocked and depressed by his son's apparently measureless ambition, refused

ever to see him again, even on his death-bed. He had been brought up at León in the greatest secrecy, and when, at the age of thirteen (1643), he was recognised by his father he was accorded the title of *Serenísimo*. After having continued his studies he came to be called *Príncipe del Mar*, a title reminiscent of the Don John famous for the victory of Lepanto. He had played an important part in extinguishing Masaniello's revolt at Naples. From that time he was notorious for his licentious way of life. Having visited Catalonia in 1652, he helped to finish off the Catalan rebellion. In 1656, as commander in the Netherlands, he displayed ambition and impetuosity of character but little soldierly ambition. He was greatly dejected by his defeat at Dunkirk, and was recalled to Spain. In fighting the Portuguese he suffered many defeats, notably the battle of Estremoz. He was sensitive to the fact that his companion in arms in the Netherlands, the Great Condé, himself of royal bastard blood, addressed him familiarly as 'Juanísimo' instead of giving him his full formal titles — a point of interest to the psychological historian.

Early in life he had been made Grand Prior of Castile of the Order of San Juan, and in the various commands he had held in Naples, Flanders and Portugal had been not without his hours of success. He had long regarded his step-mother with deep dislike, suspecting her of being the cause of the coolness that had arisen between Philip IV and himself during that sovereign's last years. To her failure to send sufficient supplies he attributed his failures in the Portuguese campaigns. He now saw with the deepest annoyance Fr. Nithard as the most powerful man in the State. Knowing that the queen and Nithard intended to order him away from court, he anticipated them by retiring to Con-suegra, his proper residence as Grand Prior of Castile. There he scarcely made a secret of his intention to conspire for the downfall of Mariana and her confessor.

Meanwhile the internal affairs of Portugal were such as to offer some prospects of the recovery of the kingdom. The death

of John IV (6th November 1656) had been followed by the accession of his mentally and physically feeble thirteen-year-old son Affonso VI. At first the defects of the young king had no evil consequences, for the regency remained in the strong hands of his mother, Leonora de Guzmán. With French help she had put more vigour into the war against Spain, thus securing the defeat of Don Luís de Haro at Elvas (14th January 1659). By the marriage of Charles II of England with Catherine of Braganza she secured not only English assistance but indirect help from France, in spite of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, which had excluded it. All these successes were jeopardised by a palace revolution (21st June 1662). Affonso VI, now a debauched and vicious youth of nineteen, had had his feeble intellect disordered by a paralytic stroke. His mother, disgusted by his riotous behaviour in the streets of Lisbon, had banished one of his boon companions to Brazil, whereupon two courtiers, the Count of Atourgia and the Count of Castel Melhor, persuaded the angry young king to declare himself of age and to take the government into his own hands. He was so successful that his strong and ambitious mother retired to a convent. The two counts who thus rose to power showed considerable capacity, particularly in the conduct of the war. Castel Melhor, however, wrought his own undoing by inducing the king to marry a French princess, Marie (Françoise Louise) Élisabeth, daughter of the Duke of Nemours (1666). The handsome and accomplished young queen soon learned to loathe her husband and fell in love with her brother-in-law, Dom Pedro, Duke of Beja. Another palace revolution followed, in which Dom Pedro exiled his brother to the Terceras Islands and assumed the regency (23rd November 1667).

Here was the opportunity for Spain to win back the rebellious kingdom. Fr. Nithard, however, with all his good intentions, lost it. The armies on the Portuguese frontier, under Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, and the Admiral of Castile, failed completely to make anything of their opportunities. These soon

passed, for Louis XIV renewed the war by virtually invading Flanders (May 1667), and thus virtually forced Spain to make peace with Portugal in order to free herself for the greater struggle. Peace was accordingly signed at Lisbon through the mediation of Charles II of England (13th February 1668). The terms were a crushing loss to Spain. With the sole exception of Ceuta on the coast of Morocco, she restored everything she had won. All the vast Portuguese Empire in Africa and Asia and the farther East, with its precious spice trade, was lost for ever. Brazil, with its gems and gold, the Portuguese harbours and ships and seamen, indispensable as they were for the American trade, all were irremediably lost. It is a sign of the decay of the pristine hardihood of the Spanish people that this peace that robbed the monarchy of so much was received in Madrid with the utmost jubilation.

The peace with Portugal had been hurried on because not only Flanders but Franche-Comté also was being invaded by French armies in what is commonly called the War of Devolution, from the ingenious pretext put forward by Louis XIV on behalf of his wife. Investigating the local customs of Brabant, one of Turenne's secretaries, named Duhan, discovered the so-called Law of Devolution, whereby the children of a man's first marriage inherited all his property and the children of a second one inherited nothing. Applying this local rule to European politics, Louis claimed that his wife María Teresa, as the child of Philip IV's first marriage, should inherit Brabant instead of Charles II, who was only a child of a second marriage (viz. that with Mariana of Austria). María Teresa's renunciation of all her claims at the Peace of the Pyrenees was dismissed as invalid on the ground that the dowry upon which the promise was conditional had not been fully paid. In spite of the obvious flimsiness of these claims, which were easily refuted by Spanish jurists such as Ramos de Manzano, Louis XIV persisted in his war, with all the arrogance habitual to the temporary master of Europe.

In the Spanish Netherlands the governor, the Marquis of

Castel-Rodrigo, with the 6000 Germans, Spaniards and Flemings he had been able to gather, was powerless to put up serious resistance to a well-equipped army of 50,000 men. But the very swiftness of the French onslaught was its undoing. England, the United Provinces and Sweden were all afraid that France was now stepping into the over-mighty position that Spain had held a century earlier. The three powers therefore formed the Triple Alliance to mediate between France and Spain. This action induced Louis to state the terms upon which he was willing to make peace, but they were far too extravagant for Madrid to accept. They included all Louis's claims on behalf of his wife in the Netherlands or compensation in the form of Franche-Comté. The latter province, which was virtually undefended, had been invaded by an army under Condé, who took its capital, Besançon (February 1668), and rapidly completed the conquest of the whole province.

The Spanish Government made desperate efforts to meet these attacks. Soldiers were levied in Galicia, Asturias and Castile to sail from Corunna to the Netherlands. Money was raised in the shape of gifts from the nobles and a tax on carriages and mules. At the same time the Government's liabilities for *juros* (annuities) were cut down by about 15 per cent, and the property of private persons on the treasure fleet from America was seized. The commander of the armies in the Netherlands should, it was decided, be Don John of Austria — on the face of it a sensible decision, for Don John had had experience as Governor of the Netherlands during his father's reign and, despite his defects, he had won some reputation as a soldier. But Mariana's real reason for nominating him was to get him out of Spain, where his presence was a constant embarrassment to Fr. Nithard. Don John, knowing this and indignant at many things that were going on at court, was unwilling to leave the country. Consequently, after sending the troops in small bodies to Flanders, he asked to be relieved of his command on grounds of ill-health, which his physicians fully corroborated. Mariana

and Nithard, quite well aware that ill-health was only an excuse, ordered Don John to go back to Consuegra and made the Constable of Castile General and Governor of Flanders in his place.

The war, however, was soon over, for the pressure of the Triple Alliance caused Louis to agree to treat for peace. Negotiations took place at Aix-la-Chapelle (2nd May 1668), where the Spaniards in their eagerness for peace made a disastrous mistake. They allowed Louis to retain his conquests in the Netherlands, which were of enormous value to Spain, in return for the restitution of Franche-Comté, which was of little or no value. The inhabitants had little or no regard for Spain: they were heavily taxed and their nobles were given little public employment. So lukewarm was their loyalty to Spain that the Parlement of Dôle had refused to grant subsidies for the defence of their province against France. It would have been far more advantageous to have ceded Franche-Comté in return for the extensive districts of the Netherlands occupied by the French. Worst of all, it was clear that the sacrificed provinces would buy only a short period of peace. Louis XIV was merely drawing back in order to make a greater spring. He drew back so far, not simply because of the Triple Alliance, but because in view of the probable early death of the King of Spain he had come to a secret understanding with the Emperor Leopold I (19th January and 2nd February 1668) for a partition of the Spanish dominions when Charles II died. In accordance with its terms the Austrian Habsburgs were to secure everything but the Netherlands, Franche-Comté, the Philippines, Navarre, Rosas, the African possessions, Naples and Sicily, which were to go to France.

Meanwhile the disastrous negotiations increased the growing opposition to the rule of Fr. Nithard, which found its natural leader, as ever, in Don John of Austria. The hostility between the two became increasingly violent. When it was proposed to send him to Flanders, Don John asked the Council with fierce sarcasm: 'Why not send the Reverend Confessor to Flanders?'

To so saintly a person God would not fail to grant victories over the French.' When Nithard pointed out that soldiering was not his profession, Don John replied: 'As for that, my father, we see you every day doing things which are by no means part of your profession'. Nithard was silent and showed no signs of anger, but while Don John was away arranging the transport of troops to Galicia, his friends, mostly nobles, were attacked. The Duke of Pastrana was banished from court and heavily fined. The Count of Castriello retired mysteriously from the Council of Castile, after a secret conference with the Queen Regent, and his place was occupied by the Bishop of Plasencia (Diego Sarmiento Valladares), a close friend of Nithard.

A worse fate was meted out to Don John's strong partisan and personal friend, Malladas, a rascal who had frequently fallen foul of the law, though an Aragonese *hidalgo*. He was accused of hiding near the Convent of La Encarnación for the purpose of assassinating Nithard. He was, arrested at eleven at night and garrotted three hours later on the written orders of the queen without any form of trial or any definite accusation being brought against him. It is true that Malladas's reputation was far from good. He had formerly been a captain in the army of Estremadura and had afterwards held a Treasury post, from which he had been expelled for corrupt practices. Yet this summary execution offended public opinion and infuriated Don John so much against Nithard that he finally decided on his refusal to go to Flanders.

Mariana, brushing aside the evidence of ill-health which he produced, ordered him to go into exile at Consuegra, forbidding him to approach within twenty miles of the court on his way thither. Don John obeyed. Meanwhile a certain Captain Pinilla had a long private interview with Mariana. What passed between them is unknown, but the apparent result of the interview was the arrest of Don Bernardo Patiño, brother of Don John's chief secretary. He was arrested at the house where Don John was accustomed to stay, and all the papers in the house

were seized. It was then decided to arrest Don John himself and to imprison him in the Alcázar of Segovia. The Marquis of Salinas was accordingly sent to Consuegra with a body of soldiers for this purpose. On his arrival he found that Don John had already escaped, leaving behind a furious letter to Mariana (21st October 1668) in which he defended his conduct in escaping from the toils of Fr. Nithard: 'I beg your majesty on my knees with heart-felt tears not to heed the perverse advice of that poisonous basilisk'. Should any harm befall Patiño or any of his friends and supporters, he solemnly protested that the resulting disasters would not be his responsibility.

Mariana, infuriated by this letter and by a horoscope amongst Patiño's papers foretelling a higher position for Don John, placed both documents before the Council for their consideration and advice (29th October 1668). The reply of the Council came to her with something of a shock. It seemed to suggest that even a partly packed and subservient body was beginning to feel some gusts from the tempest of public opinion. Though it condemned Don John's failure to go to Flanders and his flight from Consuegra and other items of his conduct, it advised Mariana to settle her differences with him and to give him a safe-conduct enabling him to return to Consuegra or even to court. One councillor, Antonio de Contreras, went further. He stated as his personal opinion that Nithard should be removed and that the queen should find another confessor, who should be a native of Castile.

In an attempt to soothe public opinion, which held him personally responsible for the death of Malladas, Nithard issued a manifesto in defence of his conduct. This drew a spirited reply from the partisans of Don John and gave rise to a fierce war of pamphlets, masses of which still survive in the old libraries of Spain. Satires and libels, some printed, some in manuscript, passed from hand to hand, and were everywhere discussed, even amongst the ladies of the palace, who were divided into *Nithardistas* and *Austriacos* according as they espoused the cause of Fr. Nithard or Don John of Austria.

Meanwhile Don John had made his way in disguise through Aragón to Barcelona, where the Catalans of all classes welcomed him with enthusiasm. Even the viceroy, the Duke of Osuna, had to bow to public opinion and treat him with the utmost deference. From the Torre de Lledó, in which he was housed, he wrote to the President of the Council of Castile, to the cities of Valencia and Saragossa, and to various important persons, explaining his conduct. He wrote also to the Queen Regent bluntly demanding the departure of Fr. Nithard from Spain. Public opinion was now so clearly shown in Don John's favour that Mariana decided to swallow her anger and to request the Duke of Osuna and others to induce the prince to come and make up his quarrel with the Government. Don John wrote again to the queen declaring that Fr. Nithard must go away before he left the place of safety in which he was installed.

After much discussion and mediation Don John decided to go to court accompanied by a considerable force of cavalry and infantry. As he made his way through Aragón he was received everywhere with cries of 'Long live the King', 'Long live Don John of Austria', 'Death to the Jesuit Nithard!' At Saragossa Nithard was burnt in effigy in front of the Jesuit headquarters. At Torrejón de Ardoz, three leagues from Madrid, Don John held a review of his troops (24th February 1669).

The situation seemed like the prelude to civil war, such as Castile had not known since the revolt of the *comuneros* nearly a century and a half earlier. In view of the futility of armed resistance when public opinion was so hostile to her confessor, Mariana wrote a conciliatory letter to Don John, asking him to lay down his arms. Don John's reply was equally courteous but firmly insistent upon Nithard's immediate departure. He was visited by the Papal Nuncio, who requested him to remain where he was for four days in order to give time for his grievances to be remedied. He replied that the first grievance to be remedied was Fr. Nithard, who must leave the court within two days:

‘If he does not leave by the door,’ said Don John, ‘I will come myself and throw him out by the window’.

Public opinion now rose so high against Nithard that even members of his own Jesuit Order besought him to leave Spain in order to save the country from the miseries of civil war. The Council of Castile was inclined to favour Don John, and finally, in company with the Council of Aragón, proposed the departure of Nithard. The Vice-Chancellor of Aragón, Crespi de Valdaura, the Council of State and the majority of the Junta agreed with them. Nithard had counted on the support of his creature Valladares, whom he had made President of the Council of Castile, when Castrillo had retired through old age; the Marquis of Aytona, who was in bed with an attack of gout; and the Admiral of Castile. In fact none of these influential men afforded him much assistance. At last the Council dispatched Don Blasco de Loyola on the disagreeable errand of informing the Queen Regent that her confessor must be sent away. She was compelled to yield, and Fr. Nithard left Madrid, to the immense satisfaction of the crowd (Monday, 25th February 1669). He went with dignity, refusing the large sums of money offered him for his journey and taking nothing out of Spain but his habit and his breviary.

Emboldened by his success in getting rid of the hated Jesuit, Don John grew more insistent and threatening in his demands, with the result that public opinion began to veer round to the side of the Queen Regent. She was able to secure his retirement to Guadalajara, where negotiations were continued on her behalf by the Cardinal of Aragón. The danger of civil war was still so great that she offered very large concessions as the price of peace. In answer to Don John’s demands for political reform she offered to create a *Junta de Alivios*, of which he should be President, for the purpose of effecting economies in the administration, the lightening and more equitable incidence of taxation and various reforms in the army and in the administration of justice. She also offered to restore him to the vacant post of

Governor of the Netherlands, to set Bernardo Patiño free and to allow Don John to visit the court after he had disbanded his troops. At the same time she sought to strengthen her position by raising a body of Life Guards from amongst the noblest families of Spain. It was commanded by the Marquis of Aytona, who was noted for his hostility to Don John. The regiment, which was accoutred in the French fashion like the troops who had fought under Schomberg in Portugal, was known as the *Guardia Chamberga*. It aroused so much fear and indignation among the populace and drew such denunciations from Don John that it was decided to send it away to the frontier. Civil war still seemed imminent, but the Queen Regent was not without powerful support, and when she offered Don John the post of Viceroy of Aragón he accepted it — to the surprise of all Madrid — in flattering and almost humble terms. He possibly hoped that such an appointment would help him to increase his power and influence in view of a time when the throne itself might come within his reach.

In spite of his bastardy such a contingency was far from improbable. Charles II was the last male heir of the direct line of the Spanish Habsburgs. It was generally believed that his life would be a short one, for he was the terrible result of several generations of continuous inbreeding in the Habsburg family. He suffered so severely from rickets that he was not weaned till he was four years old, and fourteen wet nurses were employed to suckle him. His mind was so disordered that at the age of nine he could neither read nor write, in spite of the efforts of his tutor, the famous jurist Ramos de Manzano. His bodily weakness was such that exposure to fresh air caused his eyes to run profusely and the shaking of a coach made him sick. After any serious exertion he would suffer from fever. He was, however, much interested in bull-fights. His disposition was usually kindly, though, like many weak people, he was subject at times to transports of anger. In 1670 he fell so seriously ill that his recovery was despaired of, and it was rumoured throughout

Spain that his frail life alone stood between the country and civil war at home and foreign invasion. His restoration to health was therefore the cause of immense jubilation and the inspiration of minor poets. It was noted with pleasure that upon his recovery the king seemed stronger than he had been before his illness.

The departure of Nithard and the retirement of Don John to Aragón were followed by a period in which Peñaranda conducted the foreign policy of Spain and another favourite of the Queen Regent held sway. This was Don Fernando de Valenzuela. He was the son of a Spanish captain, a native of Ronda, who had married Leonora Enciso de Talavera in Naples. Here Valenzuela was born and after his father's death his mother had taken him to Madrid. He was said to have combined within himself the recklessness of his father and the prudence of his mother. A man of fine appearance, adaptable and pleasant in conversation rather than educated, he possessed few scruples, and though he had the ability to rise quickly he was unable to maintain the position he had won. He loved poetry and the drama and wrote both poems and plays, which were performed before the court.

On the death of the Duke of Infantado, who had rewarded his services by conferring on him the cloak of the military Order of St. James (Santiago), he offered his support to Fr. Nithard. The hard-pressed Jesuit received him gladly and introduced him into the palace so that he might keep him informed of all that passed there. Valenzuela made good use of his opportunities and won the love of the Queen Regent's favourite maid of honour, Doña María Eugenia de Uceda. They were married with the full consent of the Queen Regent, who conferred on Valenzuela the post of equerry to mark the occasion. During the struggle with Don John of Austria, Valenzuela did important services to Mariana and to Nithard, giving them many proofs of his loyalty and ability. When Nithard left Spain (1669) Valenzuela retained the confidence of Mariana, who used him as a means of communication with the exiled Jesuit. With the help of his wife he became the most trusted supporter of the Queen

Regent, whom he kept informed of every detail of everything that happened in the palace, visiting her late at night in order to do so. For this reason he came to be known as *el duende de palacio* (the palace elf). The Queen Regent showered favours upon him. She appointed him chief equerry, and, when the Master of the Horse, the Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, objected that Valenzuela was not a person of high enough rank to match such an appointment, she created her favourite Marquis of San Bartolomé de Pinares. Henceforth Valenzuela was virtually chief minister. He sought to win support amongst the nobility by the lavish distribution of honours, offices and favours of all kinds. At the same time he sought popularity among the masses by pouring into Madrid an endless supply of food and other commodities and providing a continuous series of bull-fights, dramatic performances and entertainments of all kinds. He also increased employment by setting on foot great building schemes in the capital, such as the rebuilding of the Plaza Mayor, the Panadería and the Toledo Bridge. Nor did he neglect the young king, who was now beginning to show a fondness for hunting. He accompanied him on his hunting expeditions, being wounded in the thigh on one occasion by a shot which the inexperienced Charles II intended for a stag.

But in spite of all his efforts he aroused much jealousy and hostility, which showed itself in the circulation of a multitude of savagely satirical pamphlets. He was particularly attacked for his intimacy with the Queen Regent and for his alleged sale of offices and titles. One cartoon fastened during the night to one of the palace walls showed Mariana with her hand on her heart saying, 'This is given away', and Valenzuela pointing to the insignia of a number of offices and titles and saying, 'This is for sale'.

As Charles II was now growing up, the enemies of Valenzuela tried to influence him in favour of Don John of Austria. Valenzuela tried to counter this move by getting Don John appointed Viceroy of Sicily so that he would have to leave Spain

in order to deal with a revolt that had broken out in Messina. The supporters of Don John, however, were able to extract from the young king a letter inviting him to court. When Charles II came of age (6th November 1675) it was fully expected that he would make Don John his chief minister. Don John had already been conducted to the palace by the Count of Medellín, and Charles II was about to sign a decree appointing his half-brother to this office when his mother appeared and at last prevailed upon him to change his purpose and to send Don John back to Aragón. Don John and his followers were plunged into the deepest disappointment after all their preparations for a triumphant success, leaving the Queen Regent and Valenzuela supreme. The Councils of State and of Castile determined that the Junta of Government which had functioned during the king's minority should continue for two years longer.

In order to secure their victory over Don John they exiled the king's confessor and the Count of Medellín, who was considered responsible for influencing the king in favour of his half-brother. Meanwhile titles and offices continued to be showered upon Valenzuela. He became in quick succession Marquis of Villasierra, Ambassador to Venice — without the obligation of leaving Spain — Governor and General of the coast of Andalucía, and Master of the Horse in preference to all the grandees who sought this appointment. Finally, as if to justify these preferences, he was made a grandee of Spain of the first class (2nd November 1676). He went to live in the palace in the rooms which had formerly belonged to Prince Baltasar Carlos, thus enjoying a privilege to which Lerma, Olivares and Nithard had never attained.

The effect of all these advancements was to arouse the bitter hatred of the grandees and other nobles of Spain and to confirm their zeal for the cause of Don John, who was living in Saragossa, the period of his office as Viceroy of Aragón having expired. He sought to embarrass Valenzuela by championing some of the old liberties of Aragón. Meanwhile the nobles did their best to

instil into the feeble mind of Charles II the view that his half-brother alone was capable of restoring the pristine splendour and greatness of his country. Finally they made a solemn pact (15th December 1676) binding themselves to work together for the removal of the Queen Regent from the court, the imprisonment of Valenzuela and the setting-up of Don John as chief minister: 'In virtue of the present instrument we say that we bind ourselves upon our honour, faith, and word as *caballeros*, which we exchange, and of the *pleito-homenaje*, which we make one to another, to employ ourselves, our houses, estates, rents, and dependencies to the said purposes and to whatever means are best suited to their achievement, without any reserve whatsoever'. The document was signed by twenty-four of the leading nobles, including the Dukes of Alba, Osuna, Medina Sidonia, Uceda and Arcos, the Duchess of Infantado and Don John himself.

Though the noble conspirators laid their plans with the utmost caution, Valenzuela seems to have got wind of them, for he disappeared one night without anyone's knowing where he had gone. Shortly afterwards the king was persuaded to steal out of the palace late at night (14th January 1677) and to make for Buen Retiro outside the walls, accompanied only by one gentleman-in-waiting. He found Buen Retiro well guarded by the conspirators and wrote thence to his mother forbidding her to leave the palace. In vain she spent the night writing passionate letters to her son. The letters — even those that were allowed to reach him — were of no effect. Next day the whole body of courtiers presented themselves to kiss the king's hand at Buen Retiro and to applaud the course he had taken.

Don John had already been called to court (27th December 1676). He left Saragossa with a large and splendid escort, but was met at Hita by the Cardinal of Toledo and others, who requested him on the king's behalf to dismiss his armed guards. Don John replied that before he would go any further it was necessary that the queen should leave the court, that Valenzuela should be imprisoned, and that the *Guardia Chamberga* should be

disbanded. All these terms were agreed to, the Queen Regent being exiled to Toledo. The Chamberga Guards were sent to Málaga for embarkation to Messina to help in putting down the revolt. The Duke of Medina Sidonia and Don Antonio de Toledo left with 200 horsemen (17th January 1677) for the Escorial, where Valenzuela had taken refuge earlier, by the king's order. The exciting story of Valenzuela's arrest in spite of the measures taken by the prior and monks of the Escorial to hide him in a secret room as a preliminary to enabling him to escape is told at length in José de Quevedo's *Historia y descripción del Escorial* (1849). Suffice it to say that Valenzuela was at last arrested on 22nd January and imprisoned in the fortress of Consuegra.

Next day Don John arrived at court and received the warmest welcome from king, courtiers and people. His first acts as chief minister were to praise the services of the grandees who had joined in the plot against Valenzuela, and to declare void all the grants, titles and offices that had been conferred upon him, including his title of grandee, 'there not being found in him any of the qualifications necessary for this honour'. All Valenzuela's possessions were collected with the most rigorous care. The value of them — some 32,000 doubloons — was far smaller than rumour had led most men to expect. His wife, María de Uceda, was reduced to such utter poverty that she had to make her living by begging from door to door at Talavera and died insane. Valenzuela himself after much hardship was exiled to the Philippine Islands where he was imprisoned in the fortress of San Felipe de Cavite. He was treated at first with much severity. Gradually, however, he got into the good graces of the governor and was allowed to go out of prison and arrange the acting of plays written by himself. Finally he was given permission to go to Mexico. There he was well received by the governor, the Count of Galve, the brother of the Duke of Infantado, who had been his first protector. He was given a pension of 1200 *duros* upon which to live. At last the kick of a

colt he was breaking-in brought his colourful career to an end.

Though Valenzuela was no statesman and though he had risen to power by unworthy methods, he aroused more hatred than he deserved. His rule was not punctuated by any of the crimes usually associated with the rule of worthless favourites. If he did little good, at least it may be said that he did little harm.

Among the strange features of the fall of Valenzuela was the erratic simplicity of Charles II. The scandalous methods and the sacrileges which had accompanied Valenzuela's arrest at the Escorial had been the result of the king's orders. Moreover, a conversation next day between the prior of the Escorial, Fr. Marcos de Herrera, and the king about Valenzuela's arrest goes to show how strangely weak-minded Charles really was.

'Then you have taken him?' asked Charles with a smile.

'They have taken him, sire,' answered the prior ashamedly, and proceeded to narrate the circumstances of Valenzuela's capture.

'And his wife?' asked Charles.

'His wife has come to Madrid, and I make bold to beg your Majesty that you will vouchsafe to protect her and her unfortunate husband.'

'His wife, yes; him, no.'

'Sire, is it possible that your Majesty forgets his unfortunate servant?'

'You will understand,' answered the king, 'that I received a revelation from a servant of God to the effect that Valenzuela must be arrested in the Escorial.'

'That would more likely be a revelation of the Devil,' said the infuriated prior, 'and believe me, your Majesty, I have no axe to grind in defending Valenzuela. I have never received from him anything except this cough-drop (*pastilla de benjú*),' he said, holding up a pastille.

'Take it away . . . take it away,' shouted Charles, darting backwards and crossing himself. 'Do not carry it with you, for it is probably an instrument of witchcraft or poison.'

The prior found it difficult to hear such talk without failing in the respect due to his sovereign by bursting into a loud laugh. He therefore kissed his hand and took leave of him, reflecting sadly upon the mental condition of him in whose hands were the reins of government.

Such a king was incapable of sustained effort, so almost complete power fell into the hands of Don John (1677-1680). The accession to power of Don John aroused the most extravagant hopes. The rôle he had played in Flanders, Italy, Portugal, Catalonia and Aragón was regarded, in spite of his many failures, as a glorious one. It was fully believed that he was capable of restoring the former prosperity and glory of Spain.

Such hopes were soon disappointed. Don John showed himself haughty and unapproachable and seemed to devote his time less to public affairs than to the satisfaction of his spite against those who had enjoyed the favour of Valenzuela or who had failed to assist his own ambitious plans. Thus, for example, many of the leading nobles were exiled from the court. Among them were the Admiral of Castile, the Count of Aguilar, who had been Colonel of the Chamberga regiment, and the Marquis of Algava, who had been Master of the Horse. Even the President of the Council of Castile, the Count of Villa-Umbroso, a magistrate famous for his learning and integrity, was removed from office simply because he had not signed the Pact of the Nobles. Anyone who appeared to win the king's favour at once fell under the suspicions and jealous measures of Don John, who lived in constant fear of the Queen Mother at Toledo, whom he surrounded with spies.

The disappointment of the people in his rule was profound. They found none of the advantages they had been led to expect from it: neither a reduction of taxation, nor a lowering of prices, nor a better administration of the Treasury or of justice. On the contrary, they found Don John more intent upon court intrigue than the welfare of the country and more ready to amuse the king with trifles than to train him in the art of government.

The consequent revulsion of opinion was so strong that a popular rising might have followed but for the deep ingrained reverence of the Spaniard for the monarchy. At a time when the critical condition of the French war demanded the utmost vigour on the part of the Government, Don John squandered his time and energy in paltry bickerings about points of court etiquette intended to emphasise his own dignity. Madrid was consequently flooded with bitterly satirical pamphlets, the authors of which Don John tried hard to find and punish.

Spain was suffering serious losses in the war with France. After the astute diplomacy of Louis XIV had broken up the Triple Alliance of 1668, the Dutch were left isolated in Europe ; and the destruction of their Republic could not be regarded with indifference by the Spanish Government, as it would have left the Spanish Netherlands indefensible. The consequent Treaty of The Hague (30th August 1673) provided that Spain should make war upon France, while the Dutch undertook to restore to Spain all the places she had lost to France since the Treaty of the Pyrenees. At the same time the Emperor placed on the Rhine an army of 30,000 men. Henceforth 12,000 Spanish troops commanded by the Count of Monterrey served under William of Orange in a series of campaigns — the majority unsuccessful — that lasted till the Peace of Nijmegen. The chief result of the war, from the Spanish point of view, was the loss of Franche-Comté in 1674 after a stubborn resistance from the Spanish garrison. The chief scene of fighting was Catalonia, where the French under Marshal Schomberg foiled attempts to recover Cerdagne and Roussillon for Spain in spite of the brilliant exploits of Catalan *migueletes* (mountain militia). The one considerable French success was the taking of Puigcerdá, the capital of Cerdagne, which the Count of Monterrey failed to relieve.

The fortunes of the war in Catalonia were profoundly influenced by the course of events in Messina, the largest city in Sicily. Here the Spanish governor, Don Luís de Hoyo, was short-sighted enough to stir up the common people in the hope

of weakening the aristocratic senate of the city. The result was the rise of two hostile factions, the Malvezzi, who supported the nobles and the old constitution, and the Merli, who supported the common people against their oppressors. The Malvezzi soon made themselves masters of the city and appealed to Louis XIV against the viceroy's attempt to put them down. The French at first regarded Sicily as a diversion in the Catalan war. Colbert's son, however, persuaded Louis XIV to undertake the conquest of the whole of Sicily as a stepping-stone to the naval command of the whole of the Mediterranean. After the arrival of a great French fleet (3rd January 1675) the Senate of Messina solemnly swore fealty to Louis XIV, but the mass of the Sicilian people were too hostile to the French for them to make much headway. The Spaniards, perceiving the necessity for a powerful fleet, turned to their Dutch allies, and Admiral de Ruyter arrived at Cádiz (28th September 1675) and passed thence to Barcelona to pick up the Spanish troops assembled to serve under Don John of Austria. Don John, however, finding that court intrigues at Madrid had reached a critical stage, informed the Dutch Admiral that he would not accompany him to Sicily. So de Ruyter sailed to Sicily without Spanish troops and joined the Spanish fleet. A fierce naval battle against the French fleet off Stromboli (7th January 1676) was indecisive. In a second battle on 21st April — when de Ruyter was mortally wounded — and a third on 2nd June, the French were victorious.

It now looked as if the French would win possession of the whole of Sicily. They were, however, thwarted by the hostility of the Sicilian people and the prodigious efforts of Cardinal Portocarrero, the new Viceroy of Sicily. To these factors must be added the change of attitude of England, which had hitherto been in alliance with France. Fearing French naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, the English now dropped the French alliance, with the result that Louis XIV abandoned his Sicilian adventure. The French viceroy, La Feuillade, embarked his troops at Messina, leaving most of his supporters to their fate. This fate

was not an easy one. The Senate of Messina was abolished, together with all the liberties and franchises by means of which they had oppressed the poor. Henceforth the viceroy levied taxes without constitutional hindrances. The advance of monarchy, which was a feature of life in most parts of seventeenth-century Europe, was now complete in their city. Meanwhile negotiations for the Peace of Nijmegen were hastened by the attitude of Charles II of England towards Louis XIV, whose alliance he abandoned in favour of a Dutch alliance (Treaty of the Hague, 10th January 1678). Louis XIV's attempts to bribe the English Parliament in order to paralyse the war effort failed, and his great exertions in the Netherlands brought him to the verge of bankruptcy. The Peace of Nijmegen followed in August and September 1678. By its terms Spain had to give up Franche-Comté and an important strip of the Spanish Netherlands containing twelve strong places, amongst them Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Ayre, Cambrai, St.-Omer and Ypres. As the Spanish plenipotentiary, Don Pedro Ronquillo, recognised, Spain had little choice about agreeing to these hard terms: 'Better be thrown out of the window,' he remarked, 'than from the top of the roof.' Spain could only be thankful that in exchange for all her cessions France evacuated Charleroi, Binche, Ath, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Limburg, Ghent and other places in the Netherlands, together with Puigcerdá in Catalonia.

So weak had Spain become that the conclusion of the Peace of Nijmegen was hailed with joy, in spite of the great loss of territory which it involved. It was then that Don John decided upon a French marriage for his sovereign. He did so because the Queen Mother in her exile at Toledo, whither many were turning with hope, was planning an Austrian marriage, which would probably restore her influence with the king. As he was unable to thwart this plan with a Portuguese match, a French one was the obvious alternative. He therefore suggested a marriage with the eldest daughter of the Duke of Orléans, the brother of Louis XIV.

The suggestion was popular in Spain, where people remembered with affection Isabel, the French queen of Philip IV. It was also favourably received by Charles II, who fell in love with her picture and the flattering descriptions he had heard of her. None the less it was curious that Don John should be anxious to hurry on the king's marriage, for a queen would be sure to diminish his own influence with the king. Also, if he had hopes of ultimately succeeding to the throne, in spite of his bastardy, the birth of an heir would effectively destroy them. There were some who whispered the foul suspicion that Don John hoped by this marriage to undermine the king's health, and to bring about his early death, thus levelling his own path to the throne. The preliminaries for the marriage were settled during July and August 1679, and Charles II's bride, Marie-Louise, reached the Spanish frontier at Irún on 3rd November, but before the ceremony took place Don John himself was dead.

The fact that he was losing influence with the king, who was being induced to call back many of the exiles, probably hastened his death. On one occasion, when this question was under discussion and a courtier pointed out that Don John was opposed to such restorations, Charles was reported to have said: 'It matters little that Don John opposes it: I wish it and that is enough'. None the less he was visited frequently during his last illness by the king, who showed the utmost anxiety about his health, and before he died (17th September 1679) he nominated the king as his heir. He was only fifty years old at his death, which was due to ague with various complications. As was usual at these times poison was suspected. He was never married but left behind him a bastard daughter of great beauty who became a nun.

One important result of his death was the restoration of Mariana from her exile. She returned to Buen Retiro after an effusive reconciliation with her son amidst the plaudits of the populace who had cursed her on her departure two years earlier.

The ability of Don John has been variously estimated. The

Bishop of Embrun told Louis XIV : 'He was skilful in diplomacy and politics : he spoke fluently almost all the European languages, and the German language, difficult as it was, he learnt in Consuegra in order to be able to talk with the Queen. He is liberal at all times and knows how to gratify with gifts proportionate to the importance of the individual or of the occasion. He discusses theories with discrimination even if his opinions are not in keeping with them.' Don Alonso de Cardenas, a former Ambassador in England, remarked that 'the sharpness of his understanding resembled the sharpness of knives which blunt their edge in cutting a slice of bread'. He has often been described as the last great man of the Spanish Habsburg House. Such an estimate is exaggerated. Though he gained a few victories, the loss of Portugal and a large part of the Spanish Netherlands was largely due to his defeats. At the same time it must be admitted that his defeats were partly due to the economic decline of Spain and the incompetence of a government which failed to send him sufficient reinforcements and supplies.

As a temporary measure, the government of the Spanish Empire was entrusted to a secretary of humble origins who had had the adaptability to enjoy the favour both of Don John and of Valenzuela. This was Gerónimo de Eguía. The deft and rapid way in which he transacted business had won the king's confidence, and he began to hope to become chief minister, with the support of the king's confessor, who preferred not to be eclipsed by the influence of a minister of the first magnitude. With the help of the Duchess of Terranova, Eguía succeeded in getting the Queen Mother and her partisans removed from all influence and in keeping the Queen Consort amused. He managed to persuade Charles II that he ought to govern by himself alone ; and in the circumstances this meant government by Eguía.

This happy condition of affairs was interrupted when one of the wealthiest of the grandees, the Duke of Medinaceli, was made chief minister by the combined influence of the Queen

Mother and the Queen Consort. Though intelligent, courteous and upright in character, he was too indolent to carry on the business of the State himself and entrusted much of it to the Magna Junta, composed of the Presidents of the Council of Castile and of the Council of Finance, the Constable, the Admiral, the Marquis of Astorga and three theologians.

The chief difficulties of the Magna Junta were financial ones due mainly to the expenses of the wedding festivities. Riots broke out owing to the mysterious death of a merchant who had propounded schemes for lessening the burden of taxation whilst increasing the revenue. When this disturbance died down it was followed by others. The alteration in the value of money made by Eguía and a tax on manufactured goods imposed by Medinaceli caused widespread distress amongst artisans and shopkeepers. One incident in the disorders was a strike of bakers, which caused the court to go one day without bread. When a greedy baker offered to sell it at the enormous price of three *reales* a loaf he was sentenced to two hundred lashes and a period at the galleys (30th April 1680). Next day a *pragmática* fixing a low price for shoes caused 400 shoemakers to gather outside the house of the President of the Council of Castile, shouting: 'Long live the King. Death to the bad government.' They were induced to disperse only by the withdrawal of the obnoxious *pragmática*.

While the Government was losing its prestige and authority with the people, the business of State was constantly subordinated to petty jealousies and female intrigues at court. The king's confessor, Fr. Reluz, played upon Charles's religious instincts in an attempt to secure the dismissal of Medinaceli. When the perplexed king consulted Eguía on the matter, he suddenly decided that it would be to his interest to support the chief minister. Medinaceli was consequently continued in office, and the confessor was replaced by Bayona, a Dominican professor at the university of Alcalá (July 1684), and given the bishopric of Ávila. The Duchess of Terranova, an opponent of Medinaceli,

was also relieved of her position as Keeper of the Queen's Wardrobe on the transparent pretext of her poor health. The Duchess tried in vain to dissimulate her fury. 'I am going home to enjoy some rest and I do not intend ever coming back to the palace or ever thinking of it,' she is supposed to have said in taking leave of the queen. With that she banged a fist on the table, smashing a fan to pieces and trampling it under her feet. Though she was succeeded by the Duchess of Albuquerque, a partisan of the Queen Mother, she continued to exercise considerable influence over Marie-Louise and Charles II.

Thus Medinaceli's position at court remained unassailable in a Spain faced with endless problems of financial stringency, accentuated by the demands of the Dutch for the repayment of their loans made during the war in 1675. 'Never,' exclaimed Charles, 'have I seen more demands and less money to pay them. If this goes on I shall have to refuse to give audiences to creditors.' But Medinaceli was, soon faced with the enmity of Mariana, whose pension had been allowed to fall into arrears. He was deprived of all his offices and succeeded by the Count of Oropesa, who made a good beginning by giving an impression of superior energy and skill. He strove to reform the financial administration and to reduce State expenditure and taxation. He abolished many superfluous positions in the army, the law courts and the civil services, increased the hours of work and reduced the pay of many office-holders, assuring them at the same time of its punctual payment. He dealt also with a crying need in the reform of the expenditure of the royal household. An estimate made by order of Charles II in 1674 showed that, out of a total governmental expenditure of about sixteen and a half million ducats, more than two millions were spent on royal households and palaces — that is to say almost as much as the total revenue derived from the *alcabala*.

So successful were Oropesa's reforms that Spain was actually able to send money to help the Austrian Habsburgs in their struggle against the Turks in the plains of Hungary. His

administration had, however, one serious weakness — the corruption of subordinate officials. Amongst these were Don Manuel García de Bustamente, who carried on the infamous traffic in offices of many kinds in Church and State. Many nobles were mixed up in these dealings ; and the Countess of Oropesa herself was suspected of shady practices, such as sharing the profits of a scheme for selling meat at a higher price.

Oropesa's strength and weakness made him many enemies at court. He was not an ambitious man. He would have been content with a quiet life away from the intrigues and responsibilities of power. To his wife, however, the breath of life was power, pomp and splendour. She strove to the utmost to keep her husband in office, but her position was weakened by the death of Queen Marie-Louise of Orléans (12th February 1689) and the marriage of Charles and María Ana of Neuburg, daughter of the Elector Palatine and sister of the Emperor Leopold. The new queen, having gained a powerful ascendancy over the king, placed herself at the head of the opposition to Oropesa, with the full support of Mariana. The king, unable to hold out against such a powerful combination, wrote to Oropesa a kindly letter of dismissal (24th June 1691). His departure was greeted with approval by the populace, who blamed him for all the disasters of the country. Many now hoped that the king would now govern in person without appointing a chief minister, but Charles oscillated continually between the two extremes of excessively hard work and complete idleness and refusal to take the slightest interest in the business of State. The fall of Oropesa was therefore on the whole disastrous to the Spanish State. It placed power for the time in the hands of the haughty, capricious and greedy queen and her circle of confidants and sycophants. Foremost among these were her German attendant, the Baroness of Berlips, popularly known as the Partridge (*la Perdiz*), and another German who had fallen into disgrace in Portugal, Henry Jovier Wiser, nicknamed *el Cojo* (the lame) by reason of his physical infirmity. These two got rid of the queen's upright

confessor and replaced him by Fr. Chiusa, a man of their own shady type. The three of them set to work to make fortunes at the expense of the State. Offices and dignities of every kind were regularly put up for sale. Thus, for example, the Secretary of State, Juan Ángulo, was so stupid and incapable that the king himself made fun of him. It is a sign of the degradation that had overtaken the grandees of Castile that they allowed such appointments to pass with little opposition. All appointments seemed to be made at the queen's caprice when Charles, in his characteristic manner, suddenly asserted himself. He secretly summoned a really able man, Don Manuel Arias, and made him President of the Council of Castile (1692). Arias had written a useful memorandum suggesting remedies for many of the ills of the Spanish monarchy. For a time it looked as if the king were going to surround himself with able men and restore the situation. His outburst of energy subsided, however, as suddenly as it had arisen, and the queen's creatures continued to enjoy some measure of power.

For a time there was no chief minister and the king consulted whom he would. When, however, Charles fell seriously ill in 1693, the care with which he was nursed by the Count of Monterrey raised that nobleman to a high place in his favour. From that position he was soon removed by the Duke of Montalto. Montalto, however, had powerful rivals. He also shrank from the responsibility of governing a country in so disastrous a condition. He therefore suggested the distribution of the toil of government by dividing Spain into four great districts, three of which might be divided amongst his rivals, the Constable, the Admiral and the Count of Monterrey. When Montalto's health forbade his taking a share of this division, a fresh division was made, under which he received Aragón, Navarre, Valencia and Catalonia; the Constable, Galicia, the Asturias and the two Castiles; and the Admiral, the Andalucías and the Canary Isles. Each of these governors was superior to all the tribunals and councils within each district. Thus the

king lost much of his power, and protests against the scheme were widespread. After some feeble and ineffective efforts at financial reform the governors fell to quarrelling among themselves.

Meanwhile the campaigns against the French in Milan, Flanders and Catalonia failed dismally. One Spanish army after another was defeated, and discontent in the country rose rapidly, its most prominent mouthpiece being the Cardinal Archbishop Portocarrero, who spoke repeatedly with much energy and candour to the king. The disastrous War of the League of Augsburg was ended by a separate peace which Spain, the Dutch and England signed with France at Ryswick (29th September 1697), to the exclusion of the Emperor.

Considering the great successes of Louis XIV, his demands were by no means exorbitant. He returned all parts of the Spanish Netherlands which he had occupied since the Peace of Nijmegen, with the exception of a few regions which he claimed under the terms of earlier treaties. Also he returned all the territory occupied in Catalonia, including Barcelona, Gerona and Rosas, in the condition in which they had existed before the war. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Treaty of Ryswick was received with rejoicing in Spain. Louis XIV's moderation was doubtless due to his designs for claiming the whole Spanish monarchy on the death of Charles II.

The matter of the Spanish succession henceforth became the all-absorbing question everywhere in Europe. Charles II, having had no children by either of his wives, was not expected to have any. Some Spanish writers assert that Louis XIV, on the strength of private information sent him by Queen Marie-Louise, had long known that Charles would never have any offspring and had laid his plans accordingly. After the Peace of Ryswick Louis entrusted the building up of a French party in Spain to the Marquis d'Harcourt, whom he sent as ambassador to Madrid. Harcourt's astuteness, tact and reputation as a soldier won him much popularity and strengthened the French party. He won

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over *la Perdiç* and *el Cojo* with money bribes, and the queen's confessor, Chiusa, with the hope of a cardinal's hat; and finally he dangled before the queen's eyes the prospect of marriage with the Dauphin as soon as she became a widow. He even suggested the return of Roussillon to Spain and the reconquest of Portugal with French assistance. By such means he almost succeeded in winning over the German queen from the Imperialist, or Austrian, faction. He was further helped by the tactlessness of the Imperial Ambassador, who offended Charles by constantly harping upon the question of the succession and reminding him of the imminent prospect of death. Equally important was Harcourt's success in detaching Cardinal Portocarrero from the Imperialist faction, by playing upon his mistrust of the Admiral. Portocarrero was a man of little ability or learning, but greatly revered for his piety and for his open-handed generosity to the poor. He also possessed considerable influence over the king. He was followed in his support of France by Rocaberti, the Inquisitor-General, and other influential persons. He also succeeded in getting the king's confessor, Matilla, whom he had so often denounced, replaced by Fr. Froilán Díaz, a professor at Alcalá and a man of high character, though small ability.

With all these advantages the French party would probably have attained an easy supremacy but for the return from exile of the Count of Oropesa, who used his great influence, first for the Emperor Leopold and then for the Prince of Bavaria, whom the majority of jurists supported.

Not content with intrigues at the Spanish court, Louis XIV sought to better his prospects in the international field by making the First Partition Treaty with William III of England (11th October 1698). This allotted Spain, the Indies and the Netherlands to the Electoral Prince of Bavaria; Naples, Sicily, the Marquisate of Finale and the Province of Guipúzcoa to the Dauphin; and the Milanese to the Emperor's son, the Archduke Charles of Austria. England, Holland and France bound themselves to use military means to compel the Bavarian and Austrian claimants to

accept the division should they refuse to do so. This was a clever scheme to set Louis's former opponents by the ears: England and Holland against the Emperor and the Emperor against Bavaria. It also infuriated Charles and his subjects against England, the Spanish Ambassador in London, the Marquis of Canales, being ordered to protest strongly against the insult which this treaty offered to the Crown and people of Spain.

So great was the annoyance of Spain that it threw a large number of supporters into the party of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, whom Charles decided to nominate as heir of all his dominions. The death of the Electoral Prince (8th February 1699) at the age of six, however, changed the whole situation. Henceforth the French and Austrian claimants were left to monopolise the struggle, for other claimants, such as the Duke of Savoy and the King of Portugal, were ignored.

While Harcourt played his cards with superb skill in favour of the Dauphin, the queen strove her hardest to keep Charles favourable to the Austrian claimant. Charles was most anxious that his dominions should not be partitioned and he believed that France would be most likely to prevent partition. His last days were troubled by crowds of ministers, ambassadors and magnates all persistently pressing their views upon him. As a result his illness grew so much worse that the last sacraments were administered to him by the Patriarch of the Indies (20th September 1700). Next day his condition was still more critical. Then a brief improvement in his condition gave Cardinal Portocarrero an opportunity of influencing him in the absence of the queen and other supporters of the Austrian candidate. The cardinal exhorted him to make his will and designate therein the heir to his crown, in order to save his dominions from civil war. He pointed out that the majority of the Council of State had decided in favour of the French candidate; that they represented the will of the people; and that the Pope had also advised the same decision. Charles could no longer resist such powerful arguments. He sent for his secretary Ubilla and ordered him to

draw up his will. On 3rd October it was presented for signature and duly sealed. 'God alone,' said Charles, 'is He who gives kingdoms, for to Him alone they belong. Now I am nothing,' he added with a gasp.

His will named the Dauphin as his successor and also nominated a Junta to govern until the new king's arrival. It consisted of the queen (*con voto de calidad*), the Presidents of the Council of Castile and of Aragón, the Archbishop of Toledo, the Inquisitor-General, together with one grandee and one councillor of State to be nominated in a codicil. The provisions of the will were to be kept secret. Nevertheless they were communicated the same night to the French Ambassador, Blécourt, and by him reported at once to Paris. The king's health underwent such a vast improvement that he began a round of enjoyment. The Austrians began to believe that a will was being made in favour of the Archduke Charles. On 26th October, however, the king grew so seriously ill again that he appointed Portocarrero to govern the kingdom as his lieutenant. The last sacraments were again administered. After a brief recovery he died between two and three in the afternoon of 1st November.

Immediately after Charles's death his will was opened and its contents announced to the great crowd of ambassadors and magnates in the antechamber of the palace. It is said that the Duke of Abrantes, who made the announcement, first saluted the Austrian Ambassador and, after an exchange of effusive compliments, said, 'I have the greatest pleasure, my dear friend, and the most genuine satisfaction in taking leave for ever of the illustrious House of Austria'. Thus with a ponderous jest the crown of Spain passed from the House of Habsburg to Philip, Duke of Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin of France. The Junta of Government at once dispatched a courier to the French court bearing a copy of the will with a letter to Louis XIV begging him to recognise his grandson as King of Spain. The courier had orders that in case of Louis's refusal he was to go on to Vienna and offer the crown of Spain to the Archduke Charles.

CHAPTER VII

SPANISH CIVILISATION UNDER CHARLES II

THE reign was reactionary in so far as the great nobles, who had largely been excluded from State affairs ever since the fifteenth century, now played an important part in government affairs and in intrigue. The king's minority, together with the ambitions of Don John of Austria, gave them many opportunities of recovering something of their medieval power and influence. These they used to the full. Yet they showed, as a class, little capacity, while their vices and luxurious living made them large targets for the satirists of the period.¹

High positions of influence and power were held by the clergy, who took part in political intrigue and increased the wealth of the Church. The confessors of the king and of the queen usually had considerable political influence. Most other important persons were strongly influenced by ecclesiastics — e.g. the Queen Mother by Fr. Nithard, Valenzuela by the Jesuits and Don John of Austria by Fr. Francisco Monterón, a Franciscan friar, a native of Naples, who claimed to be the recipient of divine revelations. Another friar, Fr. Pedro Matilla, exercised great influence over Queen María Ana and her favourite Mme Berlips. Finally, at the end of the reign it was Cardinal Portocarrero, Archbishop of Toledo, who decided the fate of the crown of Spain, so much so that Louis XIV acknowledged his services.

The influence of the clergy was assisted by the deeply religious disposition of the king. During the ministry of the Duke of Medinaceli the *Gacetas* scarcely record any other royal

¹ Danvila y Collado, *El poder civil en España*, vol. iii, pp. 207-213 (Madrid, 1885).

activities than the visiting of various churches and shrines and the attendance at religious festivals. *Autos de fe* on a large scale were staged by the Inquisition on days of special rejoicing, such as a royal marriage or the birth of a prince.¹ Thus, for example, Charles II's marriage with Marie-Louise in 1680 was celebrated by an *auto de fe* in which one hundred and eighteen accused persons were sentenced — some of them to perish in the flames.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the reign of Charles II witnessed any great growth in the power or pretensions of the Church. On the contrary, certain measures were taken to keep ecclesiastical power within bounds. The issue of further licences for the foundation of religious houses was forbidden.² The Papal Nuncio was forbidden to interfere in the affairs of the religious orders;³ and the Inquisitor-General was forbidden to issue censures about temporal affairs. Charles II consulted the Grand Junta about the conflicts of jurisdiction between the Inquisition and the secular courts. Its report, issued on 21st May 1696, condemned in strong terms the intervention of Inquisitors in secular affairs and the overweening claims to privilege made by their servants. This report might have had considerable results but for the fact that the royal confessor, Fr. Froilán Díaz, acted in the interests of Rocaberti, the Inquisitor-General.⁴

Till the last years of Charles II's reign Spain had been honourably distinguished amongst the nations of Europe by its refusal to take any part in the witch mania that had been ravaging Europe since the fifteenth century. The Inquisition had from the first maintained a sceptical attitude towards the existence of witchcraft. Now, however, when the rest of Europe was rapidly emancipating itself from demonological fancies, the Spanish

¹ J. A. Llorente, *Histoire critique de l'inquisition d'Espagne*, vol. iv, pp. 3 *sqq.* (Paris, 1818).

² *Novísima recopilación*, Tit. XXVI, ch. i, law i, Danvila y Collado, *El poder civil en España*, vol. iii, p. 217.

³ Tit. IV, ch. i, law iii.

⁴ J. A. Llorente, *Histoire critique de l'inquisition d'Espagne*, vol. iv, pp. 11-22 (Paris, 1818).

court became the focus of one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of witch mania.¹

In January 1698 Charles secretly consulted the Inquisitor-General, Tomás de Rocaberti, Archbishop of Valencia, about the widespread rumours that attributed his sickness to sorcery. He asked him to investigate the matter and find a remedy. Rocaberti appealed for help to his fellow-Dominican, Froilán Díaz, who in April took his seat in the *Suprema* of the Inquisition in Madrid. Díaz eagerly promised his help; and, hearing that certain nuns of Cangas in the diocese of Oviedo in Asturias were possessed with devils, he determined to seize the opportunity of forcing the devils to give him information about the king's illness. He accepted the current view that demons under the torture of priestly exorcism could be forced to reveal facts beyond human ken; and that such proceedings were not only lawful but laudable if done for a good purpose.² With the help of Rocaberti, Díaz induced the exorcist at Cangas to ask the demon whether the king or the queen was suffering from sorcery. The demon replied on oath that the king had been bewitched at the age of fourteen. Later the exorcist obtained the information that the spell was administered on 3rd April 1675 by the Queen Mother. Her means had been a cup of chocolate containing a charm confected of the members of a dead man. The demon also revealed that the remedies for the king's bewitchment were inunction with blessed oil, purging and separation from the queen.

These remedies were vigorously applied and the demons went on answering questions, frequently contradicting their earlier statements. The whole affair was so closely associated with the question of the Spanish succession that it aroused world-wide interest. The Emperor wrote that a Viennese demoniac had made revelations about Charles II's bewitchment. He also sent to Madrid a celebrated exorcist, Fray Manes Tenda, who exercised

¹ H. C. Lea, *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. ii, pp. 170 *sqq.* (New York, 1906).

² Tomás Sánchez, *In Praecepta Decalogi*, Lib. II, cap. xiii, n. 24, 25.

his arts upon the king without any effect except the aggravation of his malady.

The queen, who was accused of a second bewitchment of the king in September 1694, was infuriated by these proceedings. After the suspiciously rapid deaths of two successive Inquisitors-General, she obtained the appointment of Baltasar de Mendoza, Bishop of Segovia, to the vacant post (3rd December 1699); and induced him to order the arrest of Fr. Tenda and the examination of Fr. Froilán Díaz.

The letters which Díaz had written to the exorcist at Cangas were obtained and used as the basis of an indictment before the Inquisition. He was accused of putting his confidence in demons and of making use of them to discover secrets. Díaz replied that he had acted under the orders of Rocaberti — who died 13th June 1699¹ — at the pressing instance of the king; also that he had done no more in obtaining answers from demons than was sanctioned by St. Thomas Aquinas² and other doctors of the Church. After some resistance the king was induced to consent to the prosecution of Díaz. The unhappy confessor sought refuge in Rome. He was promptly arrested on his arrival, shipped back to Cartagena and lodged in the secret prison of the Inquisition in Murcia. The majority of the *Suprema* were convinced that no question of the Faith had been involved in Díaz's proceedings. Mendoza, however, placed most of them under arrest and secured an opinion against Díaz from the remainder. The tribunal of Murcia was ordered to try him. When it reported him innocent, Mendoza took the case over himself and Díaz was confined for four years in a cell of the Dominican house of Nuestra Señora de Atocha. With the accession of Philip V, Mendoza, as a member of the Austrian faction, lost all his influence and retired to his diocese. Fr. Froilán Díaz's case, however, broadened out into a struggle between the Spanish Inquisition and the Roman Curia

¹ J. A. Llorente, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2. Lea, *op. cit.* vol. ii, p. 172, gives the date as 19th June.

² *Summa*, Sec. Q. xcv, art. iv, ad. i.

over questions of jurisdiction, and the luckless priest lay forgotten in his dungeon. It was not until 17th November 1704 that his case was heard. He was then absolved by a unanimous decision and restored to his seat on the *Suprema* with all his arrears of salary.

Though superstition was obviously the tool of political intrigue in this lengthy case, the very fact that it could be so used is an indication of the decadence of the Spanish intellect, which a century earlier had led the world.

The outstanding constitutional change of the reign was the disappearance of the Cortes of Castile. It had been summoned on 31st August 1665 to meet on 15th October, in order to take the oath to Don Carlos. But on the death of Philip IV (17th September) the Queen Mother decided that a meeting of the Cortes was no longer necessary (27th September). It was never summoned again. The Cortes cities were, however, asked for their consent (August 1666) to the promotion of Fr. Nithard to various offices in the Government. All replied in the affirmative except Ávila, Córdoba and Granada, which did not reply at all. These three were under the influence of nobles hostile to Fr. Nithard.

The Cortes of some other provinces of the Peninsula continued to assemble. Those of Aragón met at Calatayud in 1678 and at Saragossa 1684–1686. Those of Navarre assembled in 1677 (10th April) to receive the accustomed oath, which was taken in the king's name by the viceroy, the Count of Fuensalida. Catalonia and Valencia had no assembly of their Cortes throughout the reign of Charles II.

With the decay of parliamentary institutions went a decline of freedom of expression. Thus, for example, an *auto* of 8th May 1680 forbade the licensing of any book or pamphlet for printing until it had been examined by the appropriate tribunal.¹ Another *auto* (1689) restricted freedom of public discussion in the university of Salamanca. Yet another (19th August 1690) restricted

¹ *Novísima recopilación*, Bk. VIII, Tit. XXI, law x.

the activities of court printers. Still another (22nd November 1686)¹ subjected all printers to the Superintendent of Printing (*el superintendente de impresiones*) and his sub-delegates. Even a theological work by a certain Dr. Barambio — on cases reserved for the Pope — was prohibited (10th November 1694) as being opposed to the *regalias*.

Spain throughout the reign of Charles II was sunk deep in economic depression. On this matter all observers, both native and foreign, were in agreement. A few quotations selected from a multitude will suffice to illustrate their views. At the beginning of the reign a Dominican Friar, Fr. Juan de Castro, addressed to the Queen Regent Mariana his *Memorial sobre la pérdida de España, y su comercio* which was printed in 1668.² He attributes much of the poverty of the country to failure to produce goods at home, and the export of so much money for the purchase of foreign luxuries. 'The condition of the monarchy', he wrote, 'is known to everyone as well as the precarious condition in which it stands. . . . This condition foreign countries watch and Spaniards bewail.' Everywhere, he declared, Spaniards were exploited and cheated by foreigners, and only the most drastic measures could save the monarchy from imminent disaster.

Shortly before the middle of the reign Federico Cornaro, the Venetian Ambassador (1678–1681), wrote to his Senate: 'In recent years this monarchy has undergone severe shocks and scourges. For plague has wasted whole cities and provinces, the people have been destroyed and trade dislocated by famine and bad harvests. The greed of other countries has competed in taking away her wealth, also her easy-going negligence has been turned to the profit and advantage of others: so that she is like a skeleton out of the relics of which France, England and Holland have built up their own profit and advantages.

'Spain is naturally barren; by reason of its warm, dry climate

¹ *Novísima recopilación*, Bk. VIII, Tit. XV, law ii.

² Juan Sempere y Guarinos, *Biblioteca española económico-política*, vol. iii, pp. ccxci *sqq.* (Madrid, 1804).

it is parched by the sun and the winds. So much so, that, with the exception of Andalucía and certain other maritime provinces, one can journey for whole days over wide expanses of country without finding cities or dwelling-places, the whole countryside lying derelict and out of cultivation.' ¹

Another Venetian Ambassador, Giovanni Cornaro (1681–1682), wrote: 'Madrid is the royal residence; its climate is most genial: its soil fertile and productive: potentially rich enough to satisfy every requirement but for the shortage of population. In its sparsity of population the countryside is comparable to the deserts of Libya or the great open spaces of Africa.' ²

'The Kingdoms of Castile,' wrote Sebastiano Foscari (Venetian Ambassador, 1682–1686), 'oppressed by a thousand sorts of burdens and imposts, yield at times a revenue of twelve million pieces of eight. But they are so deeply immersed in the depths of poverty by reason of depopulation, cessation of trade and frequent and injurious changes in the currency that it is uncertain how much revenue they can actually provide.' ³

Several years earlier Girolamo Zeno (Venetian Ambassador, 1673–1678) had observed: 'The ancient worth of the Spaniards has perished. For, corrupted by idleness, they live for pleasure, while, without study or experience, they obtain the command of forces, whether by land or sea: hence the proverb that the generals of that country are produced in their mothers' womb. The famous universities of Alcalá and Salamanca benefit only the friars and other religious orders. On them fall the richest mitres. Good education is not expected from the most exalted nobility. Yet it is they, in spite of their crass ignorance, who are in a position to obtain lucrative appointments, generous allowances and the foremost places on those well-endowed councils. A country suffering from so many inveterate diseases will evidently need a prolonged period of convalescence, when the

¹ Barozzi e Berchet, *Relazioni*, Series I, vol. ii, pp. 453 *sqq.* (Venice, 1860).

² Barozzi e Berchet, *op. cit.* pp. 478 *sqq.*

³ Barozzi e Berchet, *op. cit.* p. 532.

time comes for it to dissipate its exhaustion with a long rest and to try and live a more orderly life.'¹

Towards the end of the reign Pietro Venier (Venetian Ambassador, 1695–1698) gives some significant details of the general economic decline of the country. 'Even in the royal palace a certain amount of economy has been adopted. Yet it avails little in view of the exorbitant expenditure, chiefly on pensions, which are inherited by wives and children and so almost hereditary. Suffice it to say that more than three hundred and fifty ladies live on them. The finances are in such a state that a large part of the revenue is pledged before it comes in and a considerable part of it is absorbed in the payment of interest. Yet the extravagance continues. It is the view of men of intelligence, not that a new plant should be grown — a thing only possible in time of peace — but that the produce should be new, which is so advantageous, not only for the growth, but for the preservation of the state.

'This would yet be easy did there exist some devotion to trade, for there is no power in the world better suited for it. While the circle of the Crown embraces so many states upon many seas in two hemispheres, with the gifts of nature and with industry and skill the various parts would remedy one another's deficiencies. But as things are, other nations profit by it, owing to the neglect of agriculture, the supineness of the government, and the national indolence of Spaniards, who without stores or organisation have abandoned seamanship. So that only a few ships of Biscay occupy themselves in gathering the produce of the earth. These have almost lost the art of navigating by the stars, and yet their renown was once spread from pole to pole.

'The habit of the people has reduced internal trade to little and foreign trade to less still. None the less silk factories are prolific. In those of Valencia, Granada and Andalucía they do not rely merely on the favour of Heaven for the success of their enterprise. The chief factories are spread out as far as Toledo, Seville, Granada and Valencia; but their products have no beauty

¹ Barozzi e Berchet, *op. cit.* p. 433.

or sound variety of colour. Black lace is made in small quantities in Valencia and Blanes and its manufacture has been set up with little success in Madrid. Stockings are manufactured in Toledo, and recently four stocking factories have been established in Madrid and three in Valencia for the English market.

‘Paper of poor quality is manufactured at Briguiella, and glass of a thick dull type at San Martín de Val de Viessa. Galicia supplies flax for fabrics ; but it is of a coarse kind. Considerable quantities of common bombazines are produced, especially at Alconcel, Sigüenza and Cuenca. The most flourishing industry is the making of cloth at Segovia, Cuenca and Sigüenza. The cloth is, however, heavy owing to their ignorance of the art of making the yarn thin. Owing to the scarcity of things of this kind, together with their mediocre quality and the inclination of Spaniards — like other people — for more beautiful foreign products, other countries supply Spain with them in enormous quantities. The Dutch and English carry away the wool and export it again manufactured into bombazine and fine draperies. . . . The Genovese supply paper and some silk fabrics. Hamburg and France supply a large part of the linen of Westphalia and Brittany and many other kinds of manufactured goods in small consignments through Geneva. . . . The Portuguese furnish tobacco, sugar and other sweet matter. But the French most of all trade with Spain in time of peace and continue to do so in time of war by concealing their identity (*dissimulati sotto altrui nome*).

‘Of the states of the Spanish Crown in Europe the people of Naples and Milan profit by the export to Spain of silken and golden lace, those of Flanders with fine linen, hangings, white lace and other manufactures. All these nations carry back in exchange only raw material and no manufactured goods (*solo i frutti della terra e del clima, niuno della industria*).

‘The unfavourable features of this exchange of goods would matter little if they did not extend also to America. The Spaniards send little thither except wine, from which they derive much profit owing to their care in preventing the planting of vines

there. But commodities of every imaginable kind, manufactured goods and raw material alike, are exported to America from foreign countries under pretence of coming from Spain. They consist chiefly of wax, spices, paper, cloth, and also mercury, which is a special monopoly of the king, from which all other persons are excluded. The American exports to Spain include hides, china ware, grain, and tobacco, but mainly gold and silver. Two convoys serve for this transport.'¹

In consequence of the deep-seated economic decay Charles II's Government devoted some attention to the restoration of industry. An *auto* of 1679, in imitation of similar measures taken in France, gave substantial privileges to factory owners and workers. It enabled them to claim expenses when they journeyed to distant places in order to give instruction in their arts. It exempted them from many onerous public duties, granted them duty-free imports of raw materials, and freed them from some of their liabilities for *alcabala*. Another law (13th December 1692)² satisfied the scruples of nobles by declaring that the ownership of factories did not involve the demeaning of one's nobility. Such measures were quite insufficient to restore the manufacturing hours of the Peninsula.

Amongst other reasons for their failure were the disturbances arising from frequent revaluations of the coinage. Thus, for example, a *pragmática* of 10th February 1680 reduced the value of certain coins — of an alloy of 20 grains of silver to the mark³ — valued at eight *maravedís* to two, and certain others worth four *maravedís* to one. Another *pragmática* of the following May removed two-*maravedí* pieces of the same alloy from currency, compensation being paid out of the exchequer. A further *pragmática* of 9th October 1684⁴ provided that the former eight-

¹ Barozzi e Berchet, *op. cit.* pp. 642 *sqq.*

² *Novísima recopilación*, Bk. VIII, Tit. XXIV, law i.

³ Coins of this alloy of $\frac{1}{10}$ silver were known as *moneda de molino de vellón ligado*. Lea, *History of the Inquisition in Spain*, vol. i, p. 564. This alloy had been tried in 1660.

⁴ *Novísima recopilación*, Bk. XII, Tit. VIII, law v.

maravedí pieces should be valued at four and the former four-*maravedí* pieces should be valued at two. Two years later (14th October 1686) new prices were fixed for the mark of silver, and the value of the gold *escudo* raised from 15 to 19 *reales*. Pieces of two, four and eight *escudos* were similarly raised. The seigniorage due to the coiners, added to the charge, caused these pieces to be current at a premium of from 50 to 100 per cent. Next month (4th November) the eight-*real* piece which was worth 10 silver *reales* was valued at 128 *cuatros* of *vellón* and the four-*real* piece at half that amount. Three weeks later (26th November) the gold *castellano* was raised in value from 24 silver *reales* to 25. These arbitrary variations between the legal and the intrinsic value of the currency caused fluctuations in prices, widespread fears of further depreciation in the purchasing power of money, and all kinds of undesirable speculative enterprises.¹

The Marquis de Villars draws a striking picture of the devastating effect on trade and industry of the *pragmáticas* of 1680. 'The wool trade of Segovia', he wrote, 'almost the only trade from which Spaniards still derive money, slumped heavily as a consequence of the lowering of the value of money which caused the price of wool to double. Foreigners would no longer buy it unless the Spaniards would reduce its price proportionately. . . .

'But the entire prohibition of copper money which was made some months later, after the ministry of the Duke of Medinaceli, completed the ruin which the devaluation had begun. It is claimed that Spain contained fifteen million crowns' worth of this currency, and as the king did not fulfil his promise, made at the time of the prohibition, to compensate the owners of the currency, great sums which had been in circulation throughout the kingdom were transformed into a useless mass entirely lost to the king and his subjects. Administrators and farmers of public money, who had none but money of this kind in their cash-boxes, became insolvent and many private persons suffered a similar fate.

¹ M. Colmeiro, *Historia de la economía española*, C. lxxxii (Madrid, 1863).

'Thus the king and his subjects were equally deprived of their revenues and as a necessary result the whole kingdom suffered from a lack of money. Bankers were seen to possess neither friends nor credit with which to cash bills of exchange, merchants were unable either to meet their own liabilities or to collect the money owing to themselves. Whole bodies of merchants had consequently to be given letters of credit, for four months at first, which were then renewed. This help, however, did not suffice to re-establish them because, as money was always lacking, trade remained still in abeyance. Foreigners derived fresh profits from this new disaster to Spain. They purchased at low prices the forbidden copper coinage and sent it to Genoa or England or elsewhere, and sold at a profit this metal with its considerable silver content. . . . Then two contradictory conditions were seen to exist simultaneously, an extraordinary shortage of money and extremely high prices for food and other commodities. Both went so far that soon a large number of people in Madrid were seen to pledge and finally to sell their furniture in order to live. Foreigners found in this a new method of despoiling the Spaniards, who were compelled by want to dispose of their silver plate, jewellery and other precious possessions at prices far below their value.' ¹

Another cause of the decay of industry was a rooted disinclination for hard work. A memorial which Charles II received from an unknown petitioner in 1686 stated that 'the most precious of metals, the most indispensable, the most excellent, and the most reliable that ever has been or ever will be, is the sweat that glistens on the brow. It is the only wealth that can support a powerful state. For where it is lacking gold and silver will not long remain. For it alone is the coinage that all the world over possesses the highest value.' ²

¹ Marquis de Villars, *Mémoires de la cour d'Espagne, 1678-1682*, pp. 276 sqq. (London, 1861).

² Konrad Häbler, *Die wirtschaftliche Blüte Spaniens im 16^{ten} Jahrhundert*, pp. 19-20 (Berlin, 1888).

As a result of the Spanish disinclination for work, foreigners came to Spain in larger numbers than ever, attracted by high wages, and took back home with them much of the remaining wealth of the country. 'A more obscure commerce,' wrote the Marquis de Villars, 'as profitable to France as it has long become necessary to Spain, is yet one of the most essential reasons for her exhaustion. As the country is extremely depopulated and the few remaining inhabitants, either through idleness or through pride, avoid the fatigue of all labour of a low or exacting kind, a great number of poor Frenchmen are to be found spread out everywhere. Their work and industry make up for the idleness of the Spaniards. The French who take the trouble also take the profit, and however small the earnings of each individual labourer may appear, the sum-total of all their earnings attains to a huge total owing to their great number. They have been estimated in recent years at sixty-six thousand. Each one of them, without living permanently in Spain, stays there only long enough to extract money. Others take the place of those who go back home, and this mobile population of persons constantly entering and leaving Spain does not cease to supply almost all the large number which is indispensable to the country.

'Accurate knowledge of the sums which they take away is difficult to obtain ; but if each of them on the average sends only ten *pistoles* a year out of Spain, the total would amount to eight million *livres*. It is unquestionable that the most wretched amongst them does not take away less and that many take away more. Whole populations of France, which possess little trade of their own, enrich themselves from this trade, which is all the more lucrative inasmuch as those who engage in it derive their great profits from Spain without carrying thither any capital except this industry and their labour.'¹

During the reign of Philip IV agriculture had been alternately cherished and neglected. In the last years of Charles II's reign intelligent measures had been taken to revive it, but the decline

¹ Marquis de Villars, *op. cit.* pp. 285 *sqq.*

had gone so far that legislation, however wise, was powerless to reverse it.¹

During the struggle for power of opposing factions that filled the reign of Charles II, no one found the time to devote himself to the restoration of Spanish prosperity. One after another during his period of power made a pretence of economic reform merely for the purpose of currying favour with the multitude. Neither Nithard nor Valenzuela nor Don John busied himself in earnest with this long-neglected problem. It is true that Valenzuela, when he came into power, set up a special council to deal with trade. Don John, also, as Viceroy of Aragón, more than once summoned representatives of the guilds to consider measures for the arrest of the rapidly advancing ruin of the land. Medinaceli during his short period of power (1682) freed the nobles from some of the restrictions on their engaging in trade² as the Cortes of Aragón had done for that country in 1626. Such measures may only have been taken for appearance's sake. In any case the energy behind them was insufficient to produce any considerable result.³ In 1683 the manufacturers of Toledo, Seville, Granada and Valencia were summoned to consider the making of new industrial laws. The results of their labours were published the following year. Similar industrial laws had been produced for the regulation of silk weaving as early as 1675 and changed in 1692.⁴ A *Junta de comercio y moneda* was founded in 1669, but did little before its reorganisations of 1681 and 1683. A third followed in 1691.⁵ A law of 1679 encouraged the immigration of foreign craftsmen into Spain.⁶ In Aragón

¹ K. Häbler, *op. cit.* p. 43.

² *Nueva recopilación*, Bk. V, Tit. XII, law ii.

³ K. Häbler, *op. cit.* p. 89.

⁴ *Op. cit.* laws i and v.

⁵ José Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda con aplicación a España* (London, 1824).

⁶ E. Larruga, *Memorias políticas y económicas sobre los frutos, comercio, fábricas y minas de España*, vols. i-xix; vii, 210 *sqq.*; xviii, 2-15 (Madrid, 1787-1800). *Voyage d'Espagne curieux historique et politique fait en l'année 1655*, vol. 4, pp. 125-126 (Paris, 1665).

in 1674 there met under the presidency of Don John a Junta for trade and industry which revised and enlarged the laws of 1626.

Under Philip IV customs duties were a burden on trade rather than a source of revenue. They could not be increased. They frightened foreign traders away so much that the Government itself enabled foreigners to evade them when bringing their goods into Spain.¹ At the same time natives were compelled to pay them in full. Such measures so increased the imports from foreign traders and discouraged those from natives that not infrequently less than a quarter of the customs duties due were actually paid. The date when this policy of favouring foreign imports began is not quite certain. Campomanes in his *Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos y su fomento*² puts it in 1654. Ulloa's *Rétablissement des manufactures et du commerce d'Espagne*³ dates it from two royal ordinances of 1661 and 1666.

Such a ludicrous method of assisting trade to defraud itself had serious results in encouraging fraudulent evasion — so much so that the customs revenue sank to not more than a third of its previous value. About 1675, therefore, the Government changed its policy and sought, by abolishing the compulsory record, to arrest the shrinkage of trade and the attempts to defraud the revenue. It achieved the first purpose but not the second. Amongst the ministers of Charles II were no men of outstanding determination and principle. The Count of Oropesa did not attempt the impossible task of making Spain independent of foreign imports. He merely strove to save for Spain that amount of industry and trade which was not already dead.⁴ Silk and wool weaving appeared the most promising industries to salvage, though he was well aware that the decline of technical skill would make it impossible to compete with the foreigner in the production of the finer materials. He therefore fostered the production of the coarser types of cloth suitable for common use ;

¹ Häbler, *op. cit.* p. 90.

³ P. 72 (Amsterdam, 1753).

² Ap. i, p. 463 (Madrid, 1775-1777).

⁴ Häbler, *op. cit.* p. 91.

and enabled the *Junta de comercio* strongly to control foreign imports for the benefit of the home producer. Oropesa's schemes needed careful nursing in their early years. When, however, he was put out of office for the first time in 1691, his opponents, who succeeded him, paid little attention to them. His second ministry was too short for him to resuscitate them. Moreover, the succession question had by that time become so absorbing that little energy was left for other considerations. Consequently at the death of Charles II Spain was scarcely less of a corpse than its monarch.

The decline of industry and commerce was inevitably reflected in the finances of the Government. Philip IV had left the country in such financial stringency that the Junta of regency was glad to make peace with Portugal at almost any price. The Regent and Fr. Nithard would have liked to inaugurate their period of rule with some remission of taxation, but such a gesture was out of the question, for it was found that the cost of the court alone amounted to one and a half million ducats.¹

The financial management of the country during the period 1668-1684 resembled that of the reign of Philip III. As that period ended in the reforms of Olivares, so also the frivolous Nithards and Valenzuelas and the rest were followed by a reformer in the insignificant shape of the Count of Oropesa. By his time it had become axiomatic that any increase in taxation brought about a decline in revenue. Oropesa acted on the belief that the converse was true. From the 27,000,000 ducats of the Castilian budget he remitted 5,000,000, consisting of the product of all customs duties which had been imposed since 1656. After doing this there remained only a free income of 320,000 ducats to meet an expenditure commonly estimated at 9,000,000 ducats. Oropesa sought to solve the problem by dismissing superfluous officials and cutting down expenditure upon the court and the army. At the same time he laboured under the supposition that

¹ Some notion of its extravagance may be obtained from Núñez de Castro, *Sólo Madrid es corte*, 2nd ed., p. 177 (Madrid, 1669).

the free income of the State could be raised to 4,700,000 ducats. If the 4,000,000 ducats owing to owners of *juros*— even at the reduced interest rate — had not been held back Oropesa's revenue would have fallen little short of the 9,000,000 ducats. His Juntas, however, could devise no further remedies for the financial ills of the country. When he had to give up his labours he had merely succeeded in making himself and his collaborators unpopular in return for a momentary relief. Thus the State which had a century before dominated the world dithered into the trough of decline. Only a revolution could have saved her.

It is improbable that the further economic decline of Spain was accompanied by a further decline in population. There exists, however, no reliable census taken later than the reign of Philip II. None the less, figures for the chief cities of Castile show — with the exception of those of Andalucía — a serious drop in population between 1594 and 1646. By the latter date almost all had lost half this population and many had lost three-quarters of it, those who lost most being the inland cities — especially those of the North.¹ The movement of population during the reign of Charles II is less clear. Clearly some of the largest cities and a number of others in Castile proper and Estremadura dropped in population during this period. On the other hand, the great majority of medium-sized and smaller towns increased a little in size. Murcia, Cartagena and Córdoba were also larger than they had ever been even at the end of the sixteenth century. Burgos had increased her population threefold between 1646 and 1694, and Cuenca had doubled hers. The general impression arising from these facts is that the population of Castile as a whole was slowly rising during the reign of Charles II after its catastrophic fall under Philip III and Philip IV.

On the other hand, the great city of Seville — the largest but one, probably, in the Peninsula — underwent a serious decline in population as well as wealth. 'The state of the rest of Spain', wrote the Marquis de Villars, 'may be judged by that to which

¹ Häbler, *op. cit.* p. 157.

Seville is reduced. This city, which was formerly so powerful by reason of its great size and population and the accumulated wealth of centuries, by reason of the extent of its territory and its river in close proximity to the sea which provides so many advantages for every kind of foreign trade and especially American trade — this city since the year . . . [lacuna in MS.] has been reduced to a quarter of its former population, and not a twentieth part of the territory formerly cultivated remains so. Hence though customs and duties have been increased threefold since that time, the decrease in population and values has reduced this total below a third of what they formerly amounted to.

‘A trade representative of this town made these representations and many others in 1680. It is credible that if this town — fifty years ago one of the richest in the world and so well endowed — is in a state of such deep depression, the rest of Spain is scarcely in a better condition.’¹

The movement of population in the other provinces of the Peninsula was of a different character from that of Castile. In Aragón population rose steeply in the earlier half of the seventeenth century to reach its maximum about 1650, and then to decline under Charles II. The best estimate available² considers that the number of households in 1603 was 70,985, which postulates a population, reckoned at five per household, of 354,925. By 1650 the households had risen in number to 77,981, which suggests a population of 389,905, *i.e.* an increase of about 35,000 or 10 per cent during the earlier half of the seventeenth century. By the year 1717 the number of households had sunk again to 75,244, which gives a population of some 376,220, *i.e.* a decrease of rather more than 3 per cent.

For the Peninsula as a whole the population of 5,777,900 which it possessed in 1723 was about three millions less than that of the end of the sixteenth century. It is probable that the loss

¹ *Mémoires de la cour d'Espagne sous le règne de Charles II, 1678-1682*, pp. 289 *sqq.* (London, 1861).

² Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda*, vol. i, p. 194.

took place mainly under Philip III and Philip IV rather than under Charles II.

The condition of the chief centres of population and wealth in Castile may be deduced from the amount of royal revenue derived from each province. In spite of the upheaval of the War of the Spanish Succession, the figures for 1714 are probably substantially true for the last years of Charles II's reign.¹ According to Uztariz's figures the province of Seville paid the largest revenue to the Crown — 315,463,007 *maravedis*. Out of a total revenue for the whole of Castile of 2,400,433,652 the province of Toledo and La Mancha came next with 275,686,600, followed by Granada with 242,918,475 and Madrid with 201,725,025. The smallest revenues were derived from Murcia, Soria, Toro and Zamora with 38, 35, 34 and 23 million *maravedis* respectively.

The decline in population and revenue was partly due to emigration. Fernández de Navarrete had stated that 40,000 men left Spain every year, either to settle in America or to defend the Netherlands, Italy or African strongholds (*presidios*). It is probable that emigration increased with economic hardship later in the century. Thus, for example, the Marquis de Villars wrote from Madrid to Louis XIV, on 22nd February 1681: 'The galleons left on the 28th of last month. I am assured that in addition to the persons who sailed for business reasons, more than six thousand Spaniards have passed over to America for the simple reason that they cannot live in Spain.'²

The Golden Age of Spanish literature and art survived the accession of Charles II, only to collapse before his ill-starred reign was half finished. Pedro Calderón de la Barca lived till 1681. In spite of the splendour of his lyrics, his picturesque 'cloak and sword' plays, his impressive *autos sacramentales* and

¹ Gerónimo de Uztariz, *Teórica y práctica de comercio y de marina*, p. 389 (Madrid, 1742).

² Dépêche du marquis de Villars, du 22 février 1681. *Archives du Ministre des Affaires étrangères: Correspondance d'Espagne*, cited by Ch. Weiss, *L'Espagne*, vol. ii, p. 65 (Paris, 1844).

his mastery of the stage-craft of his day, he was, as a dramatist, merely a splendid imitator of Lope de Vega. The other dramatists of the reign were less gifted imitators of the same master, and like Calderón himself not untainted with the prevailing preciousness and obscurity of Gongorism. The Portuguese Juan de Matos Fragoso (1608–1692) is in many of his works hardly more than an accommodator of olden dramas to the taste of audiences of his own day. His *La venganza en el despeño, y tyrano de Navarre* is taken bodily from Lope's *El príncipe despeñado*. A better drama, *El sabio en su retiro, y villano en su rincón*, though it contains much lively and amusing dialogue, is based on the well-known plot of a king — this time Alfonso *el Sabio* — conversing incognito with one of his subjects. Its mannerisms and bombastic language make it a typical product of the age of literary decadence. The same indictment applies to the swashbuckling, foppish priest and (non-resident) prior Juan Bautista Diamante (1625–1687). His *El honrador de su padre*, written before the accession of Charles II (1658), is probably only an adaptation of Corneille's *Cid*. His best religious play, *La Cruz de Caravaca*, is chiefly remarkable for the extravagance of its miraculous element. Hacen, a Moorish king of Murcia, is induced by a vision of the Blessed Virgin to treat his Christian captives with consideration, and to take an interest in their religion. He requests a captive priest to let him see Mass celebrated. The priest laments his inability to comply owing to the lack of a cross. Whereupon the angels send down from Heaven a cross made of pieces of the Cross of Calvary. Hacen and his subjects are thus converted to Christianity.

The best work of Juan de la Hoz (1622–1714) — a member of the Council of Finances and a censor of the theatre, — *El castigo de la miseria*, is clearly derived from Cervantes's *El casamiento engañoso* and influenced by a similar story by María de Zayas. None the less it has its merits, an ingenious dramatic development of the plot and some well-barbed satire. The French dramatist Scarron was sufficiently impressed by it to 'lift' its best parts in

his *Le Châtiment de l'avarice*. With this little band of merely clever imitators, the Spanish drama — one of the brightest lights of all time — flickers out.

Other types of literature grew scarcer as the reign of Charles II neared its inglorious end. The only fine piece of historical work of the period is the *Historia de la conquista de México* (1684) by the scholarly Antonio de Solís (1610–1686), who, like so many Spaniards of his age, had an ambition to excel as a dramatist. The *Historia* is written in a clear and elegant classical style and is chiefly interesting for its chapters on the social life, customs and religious beliefs of the natives of Mexico, and for the eloquent speeches which he puts into the mouth of Montezuma.

It is characteristic of the age that its best-known work written by a Spaniard is an expression of the decadence of that mysticism which was one of the noblest features of Spain a century earlier. Miguel Molinos (1628–1696), the apostle of Quietism, wrote his *Guía espiritual* in Italian (1675), and it rapidly became the common property of all Europe rather than of Spain. Its teaching differs from the mysticism of the age of Santa Teresa in that it is the negation of human activity and learning — a kind of spiritual nihilism, in sharpest contrast with the unflagging industry in this world that so strikingly distinguished its predecessor.

The consciousness that the great creative age of Spanish literature was over shows itself in the emergence of the painstaking and scholarly bibliographer. Nicolás Antonio of Seville (1617–1684) spent a large part of the leisure in his busy life as a Government servant in compiling his *Bibliotheca hispana vetus*, an index of Spanish writers from the time of Augustus till 1500, and his *Bibliotheca hispana nova* (1672), of writers from 1500 to 1672. These works have continued to serve as the great reference books of Spanish scholars up to the present day.

The decline of Spanish art, particularly painting, was parallel with the decline of literature. Murillo survived till 1682, the year after the death of Calderón. With his death no Spanish painter of the first rank was left. Those who remained were

mostly imitators either of Velázquez or of the Venetian or Flemish schools, and showed but little individuality. Juan Carreño de Miranda (1614-1685) maintained something of his own personality — though following closely his master Velázquez — in his portraits of Charles II, Mariana of Austria and Potemkin. The religious pictures of Juan de Valdés Leal (1630-1691), in the cathedral of Seville and elsewhere, reveal an attempt, not altogether unsuccessful, to rival the work of Murillo. The last court painter of any notable achievement was Claudio Coello, who died in 1694; and with his death the decline of painting everywhere in Spain — in Granada, Seville and Valencia as well as Madrid — was complete. The general decay of art extended to work in gold, silver and bronze, where the baroque style prevalent in the rest of Europe was exaggerated to an extreme degree. The extravagant lines and ornamentation common in the architecture of the period vitiated almost all the Spanish metal-work of the time, and emphasise the impression of artistic decadence.

In this age of national and intellectual decay the pride of the Castilian remained a source of perpetual astonishment to foreigners. Lady Fanshawe wrote in 1664: 'That afternoon the Duke of Albuquerque came to visit my husband and afterwards me, with his brother Don Melchior de la Cueva. As soon as the Duke was seated and covered, he said, "Madam, I am Don Juan de la Cueva, Duke of Albuquerque, Viceroy of Milan, of his Majesty's Privy Council, General of the galleys, twice Grandee, the first Gentleman of his Majesty's bed-chamber, and a near kinsman to his Catholic Majesty, whom God long preserve!" and then rising up and making me a low reverence with his hat off, said: "These, with my family and life, I lay at your Excellency's feet."'¹

The same spirit penetrated to the lowest social strata. Everyone made pretensions to noble blood, and even the labourers in

¹ *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe*, ed. B. Marshall, pp. 154 *sqq.* (London, 1905).

the fields worked with swords by their sides in token of their exalted claims. The gorgeous display in which the higher nobility passed their lives was the standard by which all the lower orders sought to live.

In view of the veneration for noble birth, it is surprising to find that it was possible to buy titles of nobility. The Marquis de Villars¹ tells of a Jew, Don Ventura Dionis, who bought the title of Marquis from the king for 50,000 crowns shortly before the *auto de fe* of 1680. For a larger sum his father had been made a Knight of the Order of Santiago, although it was well known that his uncle was one of the chief men of the synagogue of Amsterdam.

¹ *Mémoires de la cour d'Espagne*, p. 191

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Printed in Great Britain by
 Lowe and Brydone (Printers) Limited, London, N.W.10

