

# **PRINCE AWRANGZIB**

## **A STUDY**

*by*

**DR. S. MOINUL HAQ**  
*General Secretary*  
*and*  
*Director of Research*  
**PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY**



**PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY**  
30 New Karachi Housing Society  
**KARACHI-5**

**4935**

1962

**Collection of Prof. Muhammad Iqbal Mujaddidi  
Preserved in Punjab University Library.**

پروفیسر محمد اقبال مجددی کا مجموعہ  
پنجاب یونیورسٹی لائبریری میں محفوظ شدہ



# PRINCE AWRANGZIB: A STUDY

*by*

**DR. S. MOINUL HAQ**

*General Secretary*

*and*

*Director of Research*

PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY



HAQ BROTHERS  
16  
ANARKALI  
LAHORE-2

PAKISTAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY  
30 New Karachi Housing Society  
KARACHI 5

1962

Copyright owned  
by  
Pakistan Historical Society  
1962

Price : Rs.  
S. 12

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
Preface .. .. .	iii
Introduction .. .. .	v
Education .. .. .	2
Awrangzib's Combat with a furious Elephant ..	4
The Bundelah War, 1635 .. .. .	5
The Deccan .. .. .	8
Akbar's Deccan Campaigns, 1599-1605 .. .. .	10
<u>Shāhjahān's</u> early Operations and Fall of Aḥmadnagar ..	11
1630—34 .. .. .	
<u>Shāhjahān</u> goes to the Deccan .. .. .	12
Bijāpur and Golconda acknowledge Mughul Supremacy, 1636	13
Awrangzib's First Viceroyalty .. .. .	14
Conquest of Beglanah .. .. .	15
Awrangzib's Dismissal .. .. .	15
Awrangzib as Governor of Gujarat, 1645 .. .. .	17
Mughul Campaigns in Central Asia .. .. .	18
Murād's Campaign, 1645-46 .. .. .	20
Awrangzib's Campaign, 1647 .. .. .	21
Governorship of Multān and Sind, 1648-52 .. .. .	24
Qandahār Campaigns, 1648-52 .. .. .	29
The Persians capture Qandahār, 1648 .. .. .	30
Awrangzib marches on Qandahār .. .. .	31
Second Seige of Qandahār, 1652 .. .. .	33
<u>Shāhjahān</u> censures Awrangzib .. .. .	35
Second Viceroyalty of the Deccan, 1653-57 .. .. .	38
Awrangzib's Financial Difficulties .. .. .	39
Awrangzib's Revenue Reforms in the Deccan .. .. .	42
Murshid Quli Khan's Work as <i>Diwān</i> in the Deccan ..	43
The pay of the troopers is raised by Awrangzib ..	46
Reforms in Artillery .. .. .	48
<u>Shahjahān's</u> unkind Treatment of Awrangzib .. .. .	49
Administrative Reforms .. .. .	49
Financial Difficulties .. .. .	50
Awrangzib's Recommendations Ignored .. .. .	52
Sultan Muḥammad's betrothal .. .. .	54

	PAGE
War with Golconda and Bijāpur .. .. .	55
Golconda's Difault .. .. .	56
Mir Jumlah .. .. .	58
Mir Jumlah joins the Mughul Service .. .. .	60
Golconda attacked .. .. .	61
Siege of Golconda .. .. .	62
Awrangzib Censured for not sending the booty to the Court	64
Karnatic .. .. .	65
War with Bijāpur .. .. .	66
Immediate causes of rupture .. .. .	68
Awrangzib opens his Campaign against Bijāpur, Bidar and Kalyāin captured.	69
Kalyani captured .. .. .	71
<u>Shivāji</u> punished for raiding Mughul territory, 1657 ..	72

## P R E F A C E

The Pakistan Historical Society have decided to publish an English translation of Khwāfī Khhān's chapters on 'Ālamgīr in his monumental work, *Muntakhab al-Lubāb* (vol. II, pp. 1-565, in the Bibliotheca Indica text). The second volume of the *Muntakhab* begins with Prince Awrangzib's march from the Deccan in 1657 and his involvement in the War of Succession with Dārā. To present a complete and full picture of 'Ālamgīr's life and activities it was necessary that a brief account of his work as a Prince should have been appended to it as an Introduction. The present treatise is an answer to this need, and should be treated as an introductory study to the English Translation of the *Muntakhab*.

**KARACHI :**  
*August, 1962*

S. M. H.





## INTRODUCTION

To be able to properly assess the work of Prince Awrangzib one has to keep in mind his relations with his father (Shāhjahān), elder brother (Dārā) and his sister (Jahān-Ārā Begam). Dārā and Awrangzib were opposed to each other from the earliest days of their princely careers. The main cause of their mutual dislike was the difference in their approach to religion and their outlook on life; later, the question of succession made their relations worse. Dār — proud, haughty and vain, a typical wine-drinking, pleasure seeking but highly cultured prince who had been completely spoiled by Shāhjahān's excessive fondness for him<sup>1</sup>— was a free-thinker, trying to pose as a mystic and playing havoc with the Sufistic doctrines, particularly the concept of *Waḥdat-al-Wujūd*, by interpreting them in a most irresponsible manner. He ridiculed the Shari'ah by referring to its teachings and practices as *Islām-i-Majāzī* and emphasizing the view that fundamentally there was no difference between Vedantic and Sufistic philosophies. Some of his poetical utterances could just not be tolerated by the Muslims.<sup>2</sup> He would pose as a believer in *Waḥdat-al-Wujūd* and attempt writing in the style of eminent Ṣūfī poets, without realizing that no one would take him seriously; talking of *Waḥdat-al-Wujūd* ill fits a Prince engaged in conspiracies and plans to secure the Peacock Throne: one can not be a King and a *darwīsh* together. Nor could any Muslim accept his view that there

<sup>1</sup> Dārā was given the title of Shāh (King)-i-Buland-Iqbal and allowed to sit in the presence of the Emperor in the *Darbār*, a unique privilege in the days of Mughul ascendancy.

<sup>2</sup> For instance :

قادری گشت قادر مطلق - ازے هر فنا کمال بقاست

Tr.—Qādrī (poetic name of Dārā) became the Almighty; after very annihilation comes eternal life;

and again : هم محمد توئی وهم الله - این عنایت تراست ارزان

Tr.—Thou art Muḥammad and thou art Allāh; this favour is conferred on thee.

was no fundamental difference between the Kuranic concepts and the philosophy of the *Upanishads*. He translated the *Upanishads* into Persian, and called that book, *Sirr-i-Akbar*. Referring to it he says: "Any difficult problem or sublime idea that came to his mind and was not solved in spite of his best efforts, becomes clear and is solved with the help of this ancient work, which is undoubtedly the first heavenly book and the fountain-head of the ocean of monotheism, and, in accordance with or rather an elucidation of the *Kur'ān*. And this *verse* appears to have been revealed for this very ancient book:

انه لقران كريم في كتب مكدون لا يمسه الا المطهرون - تنزيل من رب العالمين

(Ch. LVI: 77, 78, 79.)

It is ascertainable that the above verse does not refer to the Psalms, the Pentateuch and the Gospels, nor to the Secret Table (*Lawḥ-i-Mahfūz*), as the word *tanzil* cannot be applied to the latter. Now, as *Upanikhat* is a hidden secret. . . . and the actual verses of the *Kur'an* can be found in it, it is certain that the hidden book (or, *Kitāb-i-maknūn*) is a reference to this very ancient book. This *Fakir* has known unknown things and understood the un-understood problems through the medium of this book. And (he) had no other object in view (in translating this work) except that he would be personally benefited or that his issues, friends and the seekers of the Truth would gather its fruits. The graced one who, having set aside the promptings of passion, and casting off all prejudice, will read and understand this translation,—which is entitled *Sirr-i-Akbar* (or, the Great Secret)—will consider it to be Divine utterance, he will have no anxiety or fear or grief and will be helped and fortified with Divine grace. . . . ."<sup>1</sup>

Evidently no Muslim could accept these views. The Sufistic thought was a development of some aspects of the teachings of the Prophet who was, therefore, the central figure in *Ṣufism*. On the contrary in the *tawhīd* system of Akbar, now preached by Dārā, the doctrine of *risālat* (prophethood of Muḥammad) was totally ignored or at best given an obscure position,

<sup>1</sup> M. Mahfuzul Haq, *Majma'-al-Bahrain* (Calcutta, 1929), pp. 13-14.

and orthodox Islam was condemned as *Islām-i-Majīzī* (superficial Islam).

Awrangzib on the other hand was not only orthodox in his religious views, but exceptionally pious in his conduct, courteous in his behaviour and sympathetic in his dealings with the people generally and with his colleagues and subordinates in particular. A brave fighter and a capable general, ever ready to risk his life like an ordinary soldier in the thick of the battle, he had become the idol of the Mughul army. His adherence to the teachings of Islam had made him almost a hero in the eyes of orthodox Muslims. Against this popularity of his younger brother, Dārā counted on the support of the Emperor and his influential daughter, Jahān-Ārā, besides the non-Muslim nobility. Shāhjahān's fondness for Dārā had so completely blinded him to realities that he would cast to the winds all considerations of justice and fair-play when the interests or demands of that Prince were concerned. Even in his policy decisions taken on important issues he allowed himself to be influenced by the advice of Dārā and his supporters, in total disregard of the ultimate consequences of his action. Dārā would not leave the Court, though he had been appointed governor of a province. From the administrative point of view this was bad enough, but what was worse was the fact that it gave him frequent opportunities of poisoning the views of the Emperor and the Court against Awrangzib. For more than twenty years Awrangzib was the victim of a persistent and effective campaign of propaganda. Apparently it only harmed his immediate interests and lowered his prestige because he was often censured and reprimanded by the Emperor; on one occasion he was dismissed from service. However, this harsh treatment meted out to him was not an unmixed evil; it made him more cautious and self-reliant: Dārā drew his strength from the patronage of the Emperor and his Court, Awrangzib relied on his own merit and the support of the people.

We know that since the last quarter of the sixteenth century the atmosphere at the Mughul Court was charged with a controversy between two groups—non-Muslims supported by free-thinkers and nominal Muslims who had no love for Islam and had received training in the traditions left behind by Akbar and Abu al-Faḍl,

and the orthodox and genuine believers in Islam who were influenced by the views of the *Mashā'ikh* and the 'Ulamā and the teachings of men like Shaykh 'Abd al-Haqq and Shaykh Ahmad of Sirhind. Under Akbar and in the earlier years of Jahāngīr's reign the former group wielded considerable influence, but in Shāhjahān's time the orthodox section had recovered its position to a large extent. Dārā and Awrangzīb represented the two groups in the royal family. Shāhjahān was orthodox in his views, but he was not strong enough to control Dārā's religious vagaries because of his irresistible attachment to that Prince.

\*

\*

\*

The contemporary source-material for a study of Prince Awrangzīb's work has to be handled with great care.<sup>1</sup> Shāhjahān's historians could not help censuring Awrangzīb, even though it might be in a subdued tone, particularly when they referred to his dealings with the Emperor and the Court. The modern writers, including the well-known Hindu historian Jadunath Sarkar, have uncritically accepted the versions of Shāhjahān's panegyrists—'Abd-al-Hamid, Sālīh Kanbulah and Wārīth, for instance—and formulated their conclusions on the basis of their versions. Most of the Western historians have relied too much on European travellers, who of course were not immune to the racial and religious prejudices of the period; nor are they known to have shown any anxiety to sift actual truth from the mass of *bazar* gossip which it was so easy to collect and swallow. Moreover, none of these travellers was a historian or a scholar. It is not surprising therefore that their works abound in statements which are baseless and have no connection with facts of sober history. Even when they write as a first-hand authority, being an eye-witness to a particular fact, their statements have to be checked up, because there was always a likelihood of their misunderstanding the course of events leading to it. Totally ignorant of the trends of Eastern thinking and the socio-political values of Islamic society they were incapable of making objective comments on problems and personalities. Under these circumstances it would be risky to accept their versions unless they are corroborated by other and more invulnerable evidence.

<sup>1</sup> A detailed criticism of the leading authorities will be given in the English translation of Khawāfī Khān's book.

In studying Awrangzib's work therefore the task of the historian is not easy. Fortunately, however, we have a large number of his own letters available in several collections. They contain detailed references to his work as an official of the Government and later as the Emperor of Hind-Pakistan. One of the collections, the *Ādāb-i-Ālamgīrī*, contains letters written by him as a Prince.<sup>1</sup>

Without a careful study of his letters we get an incomplete picture of Prince Awrangzib's personality and work. Here an attempt has been made to study the various problems of the period in the light of the *Shāhjahān-Aurangzib* correspondance, and it would not be too much to mention that it throws considerable light on several aspects of Mughul history.

The War of Succession should have formed part of this study, but we have not included it because a detailed account with our comments and notes will be found in the English Translation of *Khawāfi Khan's* History of 'Alamgīr, which, it is hoped, will be published shortly.

KARACHI :  
August, 1962

S. MOINUL HAQ

<sup>1</sup> Sayyid Najib Ashraf Nadawī has published the letters addressed to the Emperor, and to his brothers and sisters by Awrangzib under the title *Ruqqu 'āt-i-Ālamgīr* (*Matba' Ma'arif, Azamgarh, 1929*). It is a pity that only one volume of the proposed series could be published. The editor has written a learned introduction and published it in a separate volume. References in the present work are to the numbers given in the Azamgarh edition.



## PRINCE AWRANGZIB: A STUDY

Awrangzib, sixth child of Prince Khurram<sup>1</sup> by his beloved wife, Mumtāz Maḥal, was born on Sunday, 15 *Dhī al-qa'dah*, 1027 A. H. (1618 A.C.)<sup>2</sup> at Dohad.<sup>3</sup> Awrangzib was still a baby when his father revolted against Jahāngir, in 1623. For several years Khurram had to keep himself moving from place to place, sometimes being forced to offer full-fledged battles to the Imperial forces. Throughout these wanderings of her husband, Mumtāz Maḥal remained by his side, and quite naturally the education of her children must have been interrupted by these frequent movements. It is therefore creditable on the part of Khurram to have saved his children from remaining illiterate, as had been the case with his grandfather, Akbar. However, we do not find a detailed account of Awrangzib's early education anywhere. In 1626, when hardly eight years old he had to leave his parents and accompany his eldest brother, Dārā, to the Court of Jahāngir. The latter had written to Khurram that his past sins would be forgiven only if he would send the two Princes as hostages to the Imperial Court and surrender the forts of Rohtas and Asir<sup>4</sup>. In 1628 when Shāhjahān

1 Prince Khurram and his family were in the retinue of the Emperor, Jahāngir, who was returning to Agra from Gujarat. See *Tuzuk i Jahāngiri* (ed. by Syed Ahmed), pp. 249-50, hereafter to be referred to as *Tuzuk*.

2 The well-known poet ṭālib Kalīm composed a chronogram, the last couplet being: آفتاب خامه از بهر سال تاریخش + زدرقم آفتاب عالم تاب The phrase آفتاب عالم تاب gives the date of his birth.

3 Dohad: 22' 50" N, 74' 20" E. It may be mentioned that Awrangzib had an attachment for his birth-place. To his son, 'Āzam, he wrote that the inhabitants of Dohad should be treated with kindness, that village being his birth-place. Letters nos. 31 and 58 in *Ruqqa 'āt i 'Ālamgiri* ed. by Sayyid Najib Ashraf, lithographed (1929.) at Azamgarh, hereafter to be referred to as *Ruqqa'āt*.

4 Mirzā Muḥammad Hādī's supplement to the *Tuzuk* of Jahāngir. See *Tuzuk*, p. 397.



was proclaimed Emperor<sup>5</sup> the two Princes came to Agra and rejoined their parents; Mumtāz Maḥal went as far as Sikandrah to meet her sons. On the following day, Dārā and Awrangzib were presented before the Emperor who received them with great affection. A pension of five hundred rupees per day was awarded to Awrangzib.

### Education

An idea of Awrangzib's education and his literary attainments can be formed from his numerous letters. It may however be mentioned that none among the Mughul Princes, many of whom were highly educated persons, excelled him as a scholar. He is not an author in the technical sense of the word, but his letters, it cannot be doubted, contain the wisdom and learning of many original works. He discusses the relevant problems in a manner as if he was writing a book, freely quoting from the *Qur'an* and *Ḥadīth* and well-known authors. This could not have been possible for a person who had not received excellent education under expert teachers. On the basis of references to the works of great writers it may be concluded that he had studied the various subjects under experienced and famous scholars of the period. Of these the following have been mentioned by contemporary or later authorities:

1. Mullā 'Abd al-La'if Sulṭānpurī: He seems to have been one of his first teachers because he had died in 1036 A.H.<sup>6</sup> when Awrangzib was only nine years old.

2. Mīr Muḥammad Hāshim Gilānī: He was an eminent scholar of the period and was reputed for proficiency in several branches of knowledge, particularly Medicine and Mathematics. Shāhjahān had appointed him *Ṣadr* and Chief Medical Officer of the Empire. He was the author of notes on the famous commentary of the *Qur'an*, *Tafsīr i Bayḍāwī*.<sup>7</sup>

5 Jahāngīr had died in October 1627 at Lahore. Prince Khurrām was in the Deccan at the time. Sa'dallah Khān sent an urgent message to him. It was not before 4 February, 1628, that Khurram could ascend the throne at Agra; he assumed the title of Shāhjahān (King of the world).

6 Mawlawī Raḥmān 'Alī, *Tadhkirah i 'Ulamā i Hind*, p. 132. An Urdu translation of this useful book, with copious notes, has been published by the Pakistan Historical Society.

7 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhūrī, *Pādshahāmah* (Calcutta ed.) II, pp. 25-26.

3. Mullā Muhan Bihārī: He died in 1068 A.H.

4. Sayyid Muḥammad Qannawjī: Awrangzib had studied Imām Ghazzālī's well-known work, *Ihya al-'Ulūm*, with him. It has been stated that even after ascending the throne Awrangzib held literary sittings thrice in a week, and Sayyid Muḥammad always attended them. In 1092 A. H. he is mentioned by the author of the *Ma'āthir i 'Ālamgīrī* to have met the Emperor at Ajmer. 'Ālamgīr presented a sum of one thousand rupees and two trays of fruits to his former teacher. He also participated in the compilation of the *Fatāwā i 'Ālamgīrī*<sup>8</sup>.

5. Shaykh Aḥmad Mullā Jiwan: He belonged to Amethi, in Lucknow district, and was one of the reputed scholars of his time. Awrangzib seems to have studied a number of important books with him and was always very respectful towards him. When in Madīnah, Mullā Jiwan wrote a commentary on *Manār*, with the title of *Nūr al-Anwār*. His commentary of the *Qur'an*, *Tafsīr-i-Aḥamdī*, is a well-known work. The Mullā died in Delhi in 1130 A.H. ; he was buried in his native town.<sup>9</sup>

6. Shaykh 'Abd al-Qawī Burhānpurī: Awrangzib had a great regard for him. On ascending the throne he conferred upon him a *manṣab* of 1500, and often consulted him in privacy on vital problems. In the fourth regnal year he was given the the title of I'timād Khān.<sup>10</sup>

7. Dānīshmand Khān: He was an Iranian by birth and had come to the subcontinent as a trader. Here he joined service under the Government and rose to the position of *Mīr Bakshī*. Shāhjahān was highly impressed by his eloquence. 'Ālamgīr promoted him to the rank of 5000.

8. Mulla Ṣāliḥ: He is mentioned by Bernier who has reproduced a long speech delivered by the Emperor before his teacher, in which he criticized the type of instruction imparted to him. The

8 Raḥmān 'Alī, op. cit, pp., 215-16; *Ma'āthir i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 206.

9 Raḥmān 'Alī, p. 45.

10 For details of his life see *Ma'āthir al Umarā*, I, pp. 227-29.

whole story seems to be doubtful, particularly because such an interesting story has not been mentioned by any other writer. Even if the incident is taken as a fact it is highly improbable that Awrangzib would have used the language attributed to him by Bernier.<sup>11</sup> Nor can we accept Smith's suggestion that Mullā Shāh "may be the Mulla Sale of Bernier's narrative." Mullā Shāh, though reputed to be the spiritual guide (*pīr*) of Dārā, had good relations with 'Ālamgīr.

9. Sa'd-allāh Khān: The learned *Wazīr* of Shāhjahān has also been mentioned as one of the teachers of Awrangzib.

Gifted with an intelligent mind and strong memory, Awrangzib benefited immensely from his studies and became a great scholar. His interest in learning did not diminish under the pressure of work after his accession to the throne. In fact, it was after becoming the Emperor at the age of forty-three that he learnt the *Qur'an* by heart and became a *Hāfiẓ*, a unique distinction among the Mughul Emperors<sup>12</sup>.

#### **Aurangzib's Combat with a furious Elephant: 28 May, 1633**

Aurangzib was in the fifteenth year of his life when he performed a remarkable feat of bravery, which "made his fame ring throughout India, and showed what stuff he was made of".<sup>13</sup> Under orders from Shāhjahān an elephant fight, a favourite form of recreation, was arranged below the walls of the Palace at Agra, near the banks of the Jamuna. Two huge elephants, named Sudhakar and Surat-Sundar were set to fight a combat. The three eldest sons of the Emperor, Dārā, Shujā' and Awrangzib were watching the fight, sitting on their horses and not far from it. The brutes were madly charging each other when one of them, Surat-Sundar,

11 Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, Tr. by A. Constable, second edition, revised by V.A. Smith (London, 1914), pp. 154-57.

12 The date of his learning the *Qur'an* by heart, 1071 A.H. is yielded by the chronogram *Lawh Mahfūẓ*. See '*Ālamgīrnāmah*, p. 1091.

13 J.N. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib* (Calcutta, 1912), I, p. 9.

fled away. Sudhakar, disappointed in an attempt to overtake his adversary, turned in the direction of the Princes and attacked Awrangzib. The Prince, though a mere boy, did not lose his presence of mind, remained firm in his position and flung his spear at the brute, wounding him in the forehead. A panic was now created and people began to flee in different directions. In the meantime, the elephant had thrown the horse of Awrangzib by forcibly charging it with his long tusk. Awrangzib was now in a critical position, but he did not lose nerve. Jumping up from the ground and drawing his sword he resisted the charge of the brute. At this moment succour came, and Surat-Sundar also ran up and attacked his adversary from the rear. Sudhakar was thus over-powered and fled from the field. Shāhjahān greatly appreciated the courageous conduct of his son and conferred on him the title of *Bahādur*, but at the same time he said to Awrangzib: "What, if something had happened, we would have been faced with disgrace (*ruswāi*)?" Awrangzib's reply is remarkable and gives an indication of the trends of his future ideas. He said: "Had it happend otherwise, it would not have brought us any disgrace; in fact disgrace lies in the behaviour of my brothers. Death covers the faults of the kings; (in death) there is no disgrace."

#### **The Bundelah War, 1635**

Bundelkhand, a vast jungly tract, south of Gwalior, had been annexed to the Muḡhul Empire in the time of Akbar. In 1602 a Bundelah Chief, Bīr Sing, <sup>14</sup> was hired by Salīm (Jahāngīr) to murder Abū al-Faḍl who had exasperated the Prince by constantly using his influence on Akbar against him. Though a brigand chief, he was raised by Jahāngīr to the status of a noble and made a *manaṣabdār* of 5000 *djāt* and *sawār*.<sup>15</sup> His son, Jhajhar Singh, who had succeeded to the *gaddī* of his father, presented himself before Shāhjahān after his accession and was attached to the Court; one night however he suddenly decamped. He was pursued by the Imperial forces and

<sup>14</sup> Bīr Singh took part in the Deccan wars. He is stated to have collected immense wealth and constructed a magnificent temple and palace in Mathura.

In the printed texts of *The Tuzuk* and *Pādshahnāmah*, Bīr Singh's name has wrongly been shown as Narsing. See *Tuzuk*, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Shaykh Farid Bhakkari, *Dhakhīrat al-Khawānīn* (Pakistan Historical Society MS.), f. 52a.

brought back as a captive. The Emperor forgave him and ordered his *jagīr* to be restored. Later, Jhajhar, who had continued his father's occupation of a brigand, attacked Chaurāgarh in Gondwānah, murdered its Chief, Bhīm Narāin, and seized his territory. Bhīm's son made a complaint to the Emperor who sent a warning to Jhajhar and ordered him to surrender the territory of Gondwānah to the Imperial officers and send the plundered wealth (ten lakhs) to the Treasury.<sup>16</sup> Bīr Singh having come to know of this order before it could be delivered to him decided to raise the standard of revolt. He wrote to his son, Vikramajit, who was fighting under Khān Zamān in Bālāghāt to withdraw and join him immediately, which he did.

Shāhjahān despatched a punitive expedition against Jhajhar under the command of Awrangzib who was to be assisted by three officers, 'Abd-Allāh Khān, Khān Jahān and Khān Dawrān. This being Awrangzib's first assignment, he was encouraged by the award of a promotion to the *marṣab* of 1000 plus 5000 *sawār*. In the meantime, Jhājhar had been given an ultimatum—he must pay a penalty of 30 lakhs, cede a portion of his territory and surrender. This being rejected by him, the Imperial forces moved into his territory. It was an extremely difficult campaign, but the Muḡhuls continued their march forward. Every day the forces had to cut their way through the jungles to make a route for themselves. Early in October, the Muḡhuls besieged the fort of Urchha, Jhajhar's headquarters. Unable to stand the siege, Jhajhar fled to Dhāmuni, south of the river Betwa. The Muḡhuls also followed him and captured the strong fort (18 October), but Jhajhar had again slipped away. His pursuit was resumed, and Chaurāgarh where he had taken shelter was also captured. Ultimately Jhajhar was overtaken in his flight and forced to give battle to the pursuers; he was defeated and driven into the jungles. The victorious Muḡhul forces however would not let him take any rest. The Gonds who hated him as plunderer of their territories took advantage of the situation and surprised his party in the heart of the jungle, killing him and his son. The Gond chiefs sent their heads to the Emperor's

16 'Abd al-Hamid, I, Part 2, p. 95.

camp at Saihur, where they were exposed to the public gaze. About a crore of rupees were recovered from the buried treasures of the Budelah Chief, and territories yielding nearly fifty lakhs as revenue were added to the Muḡhul dominions.<sup>17</sup>

At Awrangzib's request the Emperor paid a visit to Urchha and ordered the temple built by Jhajhar's father to be razed to the ground. Evidently this step was taken to demolish a monument which the father of a rebel chief had built to perpetuate the memory of his dynasty. It is interesting that the Hindu historian, J.N. Sarkar, who is regarded as a great authority on Awrangzib has wrongly translated 'Abd al-Hamid's text to show that "the temple was converted into a mosque." The actual words of the text are :

بت خانہ کہ نرسنگہم دیو نزدیک منازل خود در کمال رفعت و  
حصانت بنیاد نہادہ بود با امر بادشاہ اسلام پرور از بیخ برانداختند  
و بہ یمن قدوم ارفع مراسم کفر بہ مناسک اسلام مبدل شد -

Sarkar translates the above passage thus: "the Islam-cherishing Emperor demolished the lofty and massive temple, and erected a mosque on its site." He then showers rebukes on Devi Singh, who was made Rajah in place of Jhajhar, for raising no objection to this order. "The temples of his (Devi Singh's) gods might be defiled, his brave and proud clansmen might be butchered, insolent aliens might trample his fatherland down 'with the hoofs of their horses', the princesses of his house might be dragged into a shame worse than death,—but he could now enjoy the lordship of the country, he could now sit on the throne of Urchha and call himself a Rajah and the head of the Bundela clan, and therefore he rejoiced."<sup>18</sup> It is rather surprising that a twentieth century historian should feel so strongly on the punishments awarded to a rebel against the State. Jhajhar Singh's family was a usurper and was regarded as such by the people of Urchha. His father had risen to the position of a Rajah for an act of base murder committed at the instance of an exasperated Prince. Jahāngir's action in removing the Rajah of Urchha and handing over the *gaddi* to Bir Singh was not praiseworthy, however, deeply indebted he might have felt to him for

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>18</sup> Sarkar, I, p. 29.

murdering his enemy, Abu al-Faql. Nor had Bir Singh and his descendants proved themselves worthy of the honour, for they did not abandoned their old profession of robbery. Lastly, Jhajhar was a rebel against the State and had refused to surrender to the Imperial forces. Under these circumstances one could hardly take exception to Shāhjahān's punitive measures.<sup>19</sup>

From Urchha, the Emperor moved towards the Deccan. At Dawlatābād, Awrangzib took leave of his father (14 July, to proceed to the south and assume office as Viceroy of the Deccan.

### **The Deccan**

From the most ancient times the Deccan had been politically and culturally a separate region; basically there was no unity between the cultures of the north and the south. Nevertheless the Imperialistic ambitions of some of the powerful monarchs of the north had brought their armies to the Deccan: these invasions created, though for a limited period only, what may be called politico-administrative unions. Before the advent of the Muslims, the Mauryan Emperor, Ashoka, was the only Ruler of the north who held sway over the south; but it is evident that his hold on the latter region was weak, because it did not survive him. More than five centuries later, another ambitious monarch of the north invaded the Deccan; Sarmudragupta's conquests in the south were however followed by no substantial results; certainly they did not contribute to the cultural integration of the two regions. With the establishment of Muslim supremacy conditions began to change. During the first century of their rule, the Sultāns of Delhi were engaged in consolidating and stabilizing their administration and taking necessary measures to guard the Sultanate against the Mongol raiders. After enforcing his administrative and economic reforms which made his

<sup>19</sup> The desecration of a house of worship by a Government is undoubtedly an act which cannot be praised, yet the pages of history are full of such deeds. In Sarkar's own country mosques were desecrated in and after 1947; many of them are even today in the hands of usurpers. Only recently (October, 1961) in certain places in U.P., Hindu rioters desecrated the mosques with impunity.

Empire safe against the Mongols, 'Alā al-Dīn Khalji (1296-1316 A.C.) decided to conquer the south. In three successive campaigns (1309-11) his general, Malik Kāfūr, carried his victorious arms right up to the southern-most extremity of the subcontinent, bringing the whole of the Deccan and the territories in the south under the sway of his master. Taking a realistic view of the situation, Sulṭān 'Alā al-Dīn left the administration of the conquered territories to the local Rajahs from whom they had been seized. These Chiefs agreed to govern their old dominions as units of the Sulṭānate on behalf of the Central Government. Nevertheless, 'Alā al-Dīn's campaigns proved to be a vital stage in the evolutionary process of the cultural unity of the north and the south which the Muslims wanted to achieve and the foundations of which had already been laid by some of the Ṣūfī missionaries.<sup>20</sup> Besides the rise and growth of a Muslim population, a new language, the "Deccani Urdu,"<sup>21</sup> had begun to develop, and in course of time it became the strongest link between the peoples of the two regions. Muḥammad bin Tughluq took a more decisive step to strengthen this politico-cultural bond; his creation of a second capital of the Empire at Dawlat bād, though primarily intended to solve some administrative problems, resulted in the development of Islamic civilization and the Urdu language. Politically, Muḥammad bin Tughluq's scheme failed, because even in his own life time the Deccan became independent of Delhi<sup>22</sup>. For two centuries and a half after the death of Muḥammad bin Tughluq the Rulers of the north were not in a position even to think of the reconquest of the Deccan. During this long period the Bahmanī Kingdom, and later its five successor

20 The names of a number of Ṣūfī-Shaykhs who had started missionary work in the south before the campaigns of Malik Kāfūr are mentioned in biographical works. For an account of Sayyid Ḥusām al-Dīn Tigh Brahnaḥ (d. 680 A.H.) and his son, Sayyid 'Izz al-Dīn Ḥasan (d. 699 A. H.), see 'Abd al-Jābbar Khān, *Mahbūb al-Tawārikh* (Hyderabad), Vol. I, p. 393, *et. seq.*

21 The first person who wrote in "Deccani Urdu" was a Ṣūfī-Shaykh, 'Ayn al-Dīn Ganj al-'Ilm (707 A.H.); for his life see *Tadhkirah Awliā i Dakhan*, I, also see *Tārikh-i-Urdū Adab* (Pakistan Educational Publishers Ltd. Karachi, 1961), I.

22 The foundations of the Bahmanī Sultanate were laid by Ḥasan Gangū Bahmanī in 1347 A.C. Ten years earlier an independent Hindu State, Vijayanagar, had been founded in the southern regions.



States,<sup>23</sup> had sufficient time to enhance their resources and strength. Culturally the Deccani Muslims and the people of the north drew their inspiration from the same fountain-head—the Islamic system of civilization—but politically the southerners were anxious to preserve and jealously guard their independence.

### Akbar's Deccan Campaigns, 1599-1605

When the Mughul Emperor, Akbar, started his career of conquest, besides the five States mentioned above there was a small Kingdom, that of *Khāndesh*, in the valley of the Tapti, with *Burhānpūr* as its capital. The Kingdom of *Berar* had been absorbed by *Ahmadnagar*.

In the last decade of the sixteenth century Akbar decided to secure the allegiance of the Deccan States; he sent diplomatic missions to their Rulers. His envoys met with no substantial success, and military operations had to be started in 1593. The Mughuls however achieved only a partial success in their early campaigns. Akbar therefore decided to go to the south and supervise the operations himself. About the middle of 1599 he crossed the *Narabada*, took possession of *Burhānpūr* and laid siege to the strong fortress of *Asirgarh*. He could not proceed further and had to return to the capital, because Prince *Salim* taking advantage of his absence had raised the standard of revolt. The Mughul forces ultimately captured *Ahmadnagar* in 1600, and *Asirgarh* in the following year; *Berar* had already been annexed in 1596. The newly conquered territories in the south were constituted into three new *Ṣubahs*: *Ahmadnagar*, *Berar* and *Khāndesh*. Akbar's annexations in the south proved to be the beginning of the long Mughul wars in the Deccan.

Of the three *Ṣubahs*, *Ahmadnagar* did not remain in Mughul possession for long. *Malik 'Anbar*, an able General in the service of that State, set up a Ruler, named *Murtaḍā Nizām Shāh II*, and carried on the war in his name. He soon recovered much of the old *Nizām-shāhī* territory including

23 i.e. *Bidar*, *Berar*, *Ahmadnagar*, *Bijāpur* and *Golconda*.

the city of Ahmadnagar itself. For several years the Mughuls conducted a fruitless campaign; in 1616 however Prince Khurram retrieved their position to some extent by negotiating a treaty according to which Ahmadnagar and other conquered territories were restored to the Empire. Nevertheless, hostilities were soon resumed and Malik 'Anbar once again succeeded in forcing a war on the Mughuls by besieging Ahmadnagar. Jahāngir again sent Prince Khurram to the south (1620). The Prince was more successful in his campaigns than several other Imperial Commanders who had preceded him, and ultimately he was able to force the Deccanis to surrender the Mughul territories and pay an annual tribute of five million rupees. On Malik 'Anbar's death (1626), the Mughul chances of success became more probable, but the affairs in the north culminating in Mahābat Khān's *coup* did not allow the Imperialists to make much progress in the south. At the time of Jahāngir's death in 1627 the position of the Mughuls in the south was not much better, as far as territorial acquisitions were concerned, than what it had been at the commencement of his reign.

#### **Shahjahan's early Operations and Fall of Ahmadnagar, 1630-34**

Shāhjahān thus inherited from his ancestors a situation in which he had no option but to follow the policy laid down by Akbar. To have withdrawn his forces from the Deccan, leaving its States in complete independence, would have meant a defeat of Mughul arms and prestige. Two years after his accession, therefore, he ordered the Imperial forces to resume operations. In the meantime Malik 'Anbar's son, Fath Khān, a treacherous intriguer, had killed his master and placed upon the throne a boy of the royal family, named Husayn Shāh. Finding himself unable to resist the Mughul arms he offered submission. Fath Khān's surrender enabled the Mughuls to direct their attention to Bijāpur, because its Ruler, Sulṭān Muḥammad 'Ādil Khān, had refused to acknowledge Mughul sovereignty. Accordingly the Imperial forces marched into his territory and laid siege to Bijāpur. Āsaf Khān, the Mughul Commander, soon found that the Bijapuris were determined to offer a stiff resistance; moreover his provisions had also run short. He was thus forced to raise the siege and withdraw to Miraj, in the west of

Bijāpur (1631). Shāhjahān greatly perturbed by the death of his wife, decided to return to the north. Āṣaf Khān was now recalled and Mahābat Khān was given the charge of the Deccan. Mahābat's position was by no means enviable; Faṭḥ Khān having intrigued with the Bijāpuris was now holding the strong fort of Dawlatābād. Shāhji Bhonsla, the father of Shivaji, had also taken service with the Sulṭān of Bijāpur. Mahābat decided to besiege Dawlatābād, and assigned the task of conducting the siege to his son, Khān Zamān. Faḥ Khān once again was forced to surrender to the Mughuls. He was now sent to the Imperial Court, along with his master, Husayn Shāh, who was ordered to be put in the prison—fortress of Gwalior (1633). Mahābat Khān's success was however short-lived. His attempt to capture Parendra having failed, the Mughuls withdrew to Burhānpur. Shāhjahān was annoyed at this failure and censured the old General. Distracted by his failure and sufferings Mahābat died in October, 1634.<sup>24</sup>

### Shahjahan goes to the Deccan

These developments in the south were being closely watched by Shāhjahān from his camp in Bundelkhand. However, it was not possible for him to resume his march to the south before the end of 1635. In February 1636, the Emperor, accompanied by Prince Awrangzib, arrived at Dawlatābād. Shāhjahān had already sent *farmāns*<sup>25</sup> to the Rulers of Bijāpur and Golconda asking them to acknowledge his sovereignty and pay the arrears of tribute. Ādil Shāh was also warned against giving protection to Shāhji Bhonsla, who was still in revolt against the Mughuls. The *farmān* addressed to Quṭb al-Mulk of Golconda was more severe in tone: "we have received reports that in the country of that pole-star of the sky of grandeur, people indulge in public reviling of the leading *Companions* of the Prophet (*sabb-i-aṣḥab-i-kibār*), and that protector of Government does not prohibit

<sup>24</sup> Farid Bhakkari (ff. 32b—37a) has given a detailed account of Mahābat Khān's life, particularly his campaign in the Deccan, to which he was an eye-witness. The siege and capture of Dawlatābād have been described in great detail.

<sup>25</sup> For the text of the two *farmāns*, see 'Abd al-Ḥamid, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 126-33 .

it.... We therefore order that he should stop this evil and condemnable practice in his dominion.... Secondly, it has also been reported to us that he allows the *Khuṭbah* in his country to be recited in the name of the Ruler of Iran. As he claims to be a disciple of ours (*murīd i mā*) why does he show that consideration to the Ruler of Iran?... Keeping in view the intense devotion (*wuṣṭā i khilāṣ*) of his late father towards us, we confer that country on him.”

### **Bijapur and Golconda acknowledge Mughul Supremacy, 1636**

Knowing that Bijāpūr would not accept the terms offered by him, Shāhjahān as a pre-cautionary measure, despatched a force towards Bālāghāt to seize the forts of Udgīr and Ausā. The Government of Bijāpūr however agreed to these terms and sent apologies for its past conduct; but at the same time it sent money to the commandants of the two forts to continue the resistance. When Shāhjahān came to know of this treachery, he decided to attack Bijāpūr. The courtiers of the Sultān were greatly perturbed and once again he begged for peace. Bijāpūr signed a humiliating treaty: it had to acknowledge Mughul supremacy, pay an annual tribute of two million rupees, remain on peaceful terms with Golconda and submit to the Emperor's arbitration in its differences with that Kingdom. It also promised to help the Mughuls in suppressing Shāhji's revolt. The Sultān was not asked to cede any territories; on the contrary he was allowed to include in his dominion about 50 *parganhs*<sup>26</sup> of the now extinct Kingdom of Aḥmadnagar. The text of the treaty and a portrait of Shāhjahān in a frame set with pearls and emeralds were sent to the Sultān; he swore on the *Qur'an* to obey the terms.

With Golconda, Shāhjahān's relations had not been so bad. Its Ruler had helped him during his revolt against his father, Jahāngīr; subsequently he had demonstrated his goodwill by sending presents to him on his arrival in the Deccan in 1631. Their relations had however been affected adversely by the fact that Quṭb al-Mulk had allowed the Shi'ahs to recite *tabarrā* (public reviling of the *Companions* of the

<sup>26</sup> The acquisitions included Sholapur and Wangi in the west, Bhalki and Chidgupta in the north-east, and Pconā and Chakan districts in the Konkan.

Prophet) and also had the name of the Persian King included in the *Khutbah*. The presence of the Emperor and his force was enough to terrify the King of Golconda and make him accept the terms offered to him (1636); they were harder than those given to Bijāpūr. Besides acknowledging Muḡhul supremacy and agreeing to pay an annual tribute of 2,00,000 *huns*,<sup>27</sup> he had to stop *tabarrā* in his dominion, substitute the name of the Muḡhul Emperor for the Persian Monarch in the *Khutbah* and promise help in case of a war with Bijāpūr; he was also forced to coin money in the name of Shāhjahān. Some months were taken by the Muḡhul forces to force Ślāhji into submission. The Maratha chief who had tried to continue the struggle for sometime, now yielded to the Muḡhul Commander and surrendered the boy whom he had put up as the King of Golconda; he was allowed to take service with the Government of Bijāpūr.

#### Awrangzib's First Vicerealty

Having settled the affairs of the Kingdoms of Bijāpūr and Golconda and placing the Deccan provinces in the charge of Prince Awrangzib, the Emperor left for the north in July 1637.<sup>28</sup> Awrangzib's jurisdiction extended over a vast territory, which had 64 forts, mostly perched on hill tops; it yielded five crores as revenue.<sup>29</sup> Awrangzib whose contribution to the successful operations in Bundelkhand and the Deccan had not been small was duly honoured and rewarded for his services by the Emperor on the eve of his departure from the south.

Early in 1637 the Prince returned to the Court; on 8 May he was married to Dilras Bānū, the daughter of Shāh Nawāz, a scion of the royal family of Iran.

27 It was a gold coin worth about 7 s. 6 d. in those days.

28 The Sulṭān of Bijāpur is stated to have requested the Emperor to return to the north as the presence of a large Muḡhul army in the Deccan was scaring the people and difficulties were being created in the restoration of normal life. Cf. 'Abd al-Hamid, I, Pt. 2, p. 202.

29 The Muḡhul territories in the Deccan were divided into four provinces: *Khandesh*, Berar, Telinganah and Dawlatābād.

### Conquest of Beglanah

On his return from Agra, Awrangzib was ordered by the Emperor to conquer the small principality of Beglanah which lay between Khāndesh and Surat coast. The trouble with the Rulers of Beglanah had started in the time of Akbar who wanted to annex it. Under instructions from the Centre, Awrangzib sent a small contingent of 7,000, commanded by Malojih, a Marahtha chief, and Ṭāhir Khān. Mulhar the capital of the State was besieged; after a month's blockade it surrendered. The Rajah was allowed to join service under the Mughul Government and his territory was annexed; his son-in-law, who ruled over Ramnagar, was given a sum of 10,000 rupees because his expenses were more than his income and he was allowed to retain his princepality.<sup>30</sup>

### Awrangzib's Dismissal

Awrangzib's first viceroyalty of the Deccan lasted till 1644 when he was suddenly dismissed from service. He had arrived at Agra on 2 May, and was received at the Court and honoured with the award of *Khil'at*: four weeks later (28 May) he was dismissed, "deciding to withdraw himself from the service of the State and to live in retirement, having been advised by a few senseless and stupid persons lacking wisdom and breadth of vision (*bī dānīshān-i-khīrad tabāh wa nā ba khīradān i naẓar kūtāh*) for doing a few things which were not liked by His August Majesty." This is the official version of Awrangzib's dismissal; Ṣāliḥ Kanbā's text modifies it by saying that Awrangzib's advisers were *darwīshes* and the Prince's ideas were influenced by their sacred words (*anfās i mutabarrakah i-īshān*).<sup>31</sup> Evidently Awrangzib's intention to go into retirement as a *darwīsh* could not have annoyed Shāhjahān to such an extent. The real cause of dismissal may be read in one of Awrangzib's letters written ten years later, when he was appointed Viceroy of

<sup>30</sup> 'Abd al-Ḥamid, II, p. 109 *et. seq.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, II, pp. 373, 376. Also see Kanba, II, p. 406.

the Deccan for the second time (1656). Influenced by Dārā's propaganda against his younger brother, Shāhjahān had been continuously slighting Awrangzib (*ihānat wa khiffat*) and disregarding his recommendations even in official letters. Mentioning this in a letter to his elder sister, Jahān-ārā Begam, he writes: "Ten years from now, this disciple having realized this and having found himself to be an obstacle in the path (*muḳh i maṭlab*), had resigned (from office). Later, simply with a view to please the real guide (*pīr wa murshid i haqīqī*), which is one of my chief aims I accepted this position and have suffered what I have suffered. It would have been better if the Emperor had excused me (from service) at that time, so that taking to a life of retirement I would not have made myself the dust of any one's heart and escaped all these troubles. Even now the remedy of this situation lies with His Majesty, whose opinion always points to the right path. A decision as to whatever is in the interests of the external and internal conditions of this disciple may be taken; so that on knowing the opinion of His Majesty I might try to act upon it."<sup>32</sup> There can be no doubt that Awrangzib's words betray extreme frustration on his part. The harsh treatment of Shāhjahān to which Awrangzib was subjected

<sup>32</sup> A later writer relates an interesting story in this connection. He says that Dārā invited the Emperor with his three sons to see a new house which he (Dārā) had built. When conducting them to an under-ground chamber he found that Awrangzib had stayed behind and was standing near the door. The attention of the Emperor having been drawn to this rather unusual act, he asked Awrangzib why he had done so. The Prince replied that he would explain the reason later and subsequently returned to his place without obtaining permission from the Emperor. When this was reported to Shāhjahān he ordered the dismissal of the Prince. Seven months later Jahān-ārā asked Awrangzib why he had behaved in that manner on the occasion of Dārā's feast. Awrangzib replied that Dārā had taken the Emperor and the Princes to a one-door under-ground chamber. If this had been done with a purpose then the mere locking of the door would have been enough to bring about the end, because Dārā was constantly coming out and going in the room on the pretext of looking after the arrangements of the banquet. If however it was an omission on the part of Dārā not to have kept a guard over the door then he thought it was proper for him to act as a guard. Jahān-ārā was so pleased with this reply that she recommended to the Emperor to reinstate Awrangzib. The Emperor accepted the recommendation. See *Aḥkām i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 4.

This story does not find support from confirmed historical facts; it mentions, for instance, the presence of three brothers at Dārā's house. This is incorrect; Shujā' was not in Agra, at the time.

had started with his dismissal in 1644 and continued for over thirteen years until he was forced to intern the old Emperor and deprive him of the throne.

### **Awrangzib as Governor of Gujarat, 1645**

On the occasion of the celebrations held to mark the recovery of Jahān-ārā gifts and rewards were given to the courtiers and other deserving persons. Jahān-ārā recommended the case of Awrangzib also; Shāhjahān pardoned him and restored his old rank of 15,000 *dh̄rī*, 10,000 *sawār* with additional 10,000 horse.<sup>33</sup> Two months later the Emperor decided to go to Kashmir; Awrangzib accompanied him up to Delhi, where he received his appointment as Governor of Gujarat. The territories of this province were considered to be among the most turbulent areas in the Empire. Robbery had become the time-honoured and hereditary calling of several tribes there, such as the Kūlis and Kāthīs. This state of affairs had been in existence since the days of Akbar who had conquered and annexed it to the Empire. In the time of Shāhjahān one of the Mughul Governors, Ā'zam Khān (1635-41), had taken vigorous measures to suppress lawlessness and forced the chief of Nawangar to promise the payment of tribute and maintain peace. The result was that the condition of the province had improved considerably. In 1645 Awrangzib assumed office as Governor. He took firm steps to suppress robbery and recruited for this purpose a larger army than he was bound to keep by his rank as a *Manṣabdār*. Even the Emperor was happy to know of the Prince's reform measures and gave him a slight promotion in rank.<sup>34</sup> Though not liberal in rewarding his merit, Shāhjahān was soon forced by circumstances to extend official recognition to Awrangzib's genius as an administrator and military commander. He had been in Gujarat hardly for eighteen months (April 1645 to September 1646) when he received orders to meet the Emperor in Lahore. Here he was appointed Governor of Balkh and Badakhshān; we find him proceeding to Peshawar in February 1647.

<sup>33</sup> 'Abd al-Hamid, II, p. 398.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 510.



### Mughul Campaigns in Central Asia

To the north of the Hindu-Kush range lay the territories of Balkh and Badakhshān, with the Oxus as their northern frontier. Badakhshān's fame as a ruby-yielding territory was more of a fable than fact; its soil was interspersed with ridges and valleys, and it had a scanty population. Balkh was comparatively more open and fertile, and a number of streams flowing down the Hindukush supplied water to its fields which yielded good crops. Being separated from Afghanistan by lofty ranges of mountains and extensive plateaus, the only routes for an army coming from the south lay through narrow passes in the hills; while from the north the nomadic hordes of Central Asia could easily enter the land. The two provinces of Balkh and Badakhshān, with a small revenue of 25 lakhs<sup>35</sup> of rupees, were a dependency of the Kingdom of Bukhārā. In the seventeenth century, the Ruler of Bukhārā, Imām Qulī Khān, was a pious and wise man; after a long reign of 32 years he retired from active life in 1642 and went to Madīnah. His brother, Nadir Muḥammad, who had been acting as Governor of Balkh and Badakhshān, succeeded to the throne. Nadir Muḥammad soon made himself unpopular with the army chiefs who decided to place his son, 'Abd al-'Azīz, on the throne (April 1645). The revolt of 'Abd al-'Azīz became a general signal for rebellions all over the country. Nadir Muḥammad, unable to meet the situation, made a compromise with his son by giving Trans-Oxiana to him and retaining Balkh and Badakhshān for himself.

This was the situation in Balkh and Badakhshān when Shāh-jahān decided to send an expedition for their conquest. Keeping in view the inhospitable nature of the country and the obvious difficulties which an invading army from the south would have to surmount in the course of a campaign, it is not easy to appreciate

35. 'Abd al-Ḥamid remarks: "Praise be to Allah! In this God-given Eternal Empire an officer of the Government holding a *manṣab* of 5000 *dhāt*, 5,000 *sawār*, *dū-aspah*, *si-aspah*, receives 25 lakhs of rupees;" the holder of this *manṣab* was counted among the officers of the third rank in Mughul hierarchy. See 'Abd al-Ḥamid, II, p. 543.

the soundness of Shāhjahān's plans of conquering that land by force of arms. The decision to send an expedition therefore was based on emotion rather than sane policy; "since Nadhr Muhammad's attempt to seize Kabul and his ignominious retreat," 'Abd al-Ḥamid remarks, "the Emperor was anxious to conquer Balkh and Badakhshān which were an ancestral heritage of the noble (Mughul) dynasty and also a key to open the route to Samarqand, the seat of the 'Arsh-like throne of the Ṣāhib Qir'ān Quṭb al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn."<sup>36</sup> However strong their personal inclinations towards the reconquest of Central Asia might have been, the Mughul Emperors in the seventeenth century had not even as much chance of establishing their rule in the area as their great ancestor Babur had. Thrice did he conquer Samarqand before the establishment of the Mughul Empire, but everytime it was lost to him after a short rule. If it was difficult to conquer and rule over it from Farghānah or Kabul it was certainly more difficult to govern it from the distant headquarters of the Government at Agra. Moreover, Babur's soldiers were far more sturdy than the men in Shāhjahān's army, and they could stand the rigours of mountain warfare much better; yet they had failed to keep the territories under their control for long. Shāhjahān and Aurangzib were therefore wrong in presuming that the Mughul forces or Rajput contingents could successfully keep hold

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 482.

It appears this emotional weakness was inherited by Aurangzib also. Long after his heroic exploits in Balkh he wrote in a letter to Prince to Mu'azzam (Bahādur Shāh I): "His Exalted Majesty (Shāhjahān) was extremely anxious to conquer the ancestral territories of Balkh, Badakhshān, Khurāsān and Herat. Repeatedly the Imperial forces were sent in that direction under Murād Baksh, and most of these territories were conquered. But owing to the lack of courage of that wretched fellow who withdrew from there without any orders from the Court, the captured territories were lost and all labour and money were wasted. It is for this reason that it has been said, that 'a daughter is better than an unworthy son.' Keeping in view the saying, 'if the father has not achieved a thing the son should,' this mortal also entertains a desire (for that). What other plan can I follow than send a strong army under my son in that direction. But in spite of repeated warnings you have not been able to capture Qandahār; how could you undertake to lead that expedition?" See *Ruqqa'āt*, No. 1.

over these mountainous regions. Sarkar thinks that "the prosperity of his reign and the flattery of his courtiers had turned his head, and that he was dreaming the vainest of vain dreams." This is too harsh a comment on Mughul statesmanship; evidently at the time of writing, Sarkar did not have in mind the various attempts made by Bābur to conquer and rule Samarqand.<sup>37</sup> It is a known fact that he had neither a prosperous reign nor a team of flattering courtiers; he could not afford to dream "the vainest of vain dreams".

### **Murad's Campaign. 1645-46**

It may be mentioned here that in spite of his anxiety to reconquer Central Asian territories Shāhjahān was not responsible for taking an initiative in opening hostilities; the war was precipitated by his officers. Lalī Beg, Thānahdār of Ghurband, took permission from the Amīr al-Umarā, and captured the fort of Kahmard in June, 1645, without using any force. He was, however, unable to retain it for long, and had to abandon it to the enemy. Shāhjahān did not approve of either the capture or the abandonment of the fort. Nevertheless, the situation had so developed that a decisive campaign could not long be postponed. A reconnoitring force moved from Kabul and went across the Hindu Kush to bring necessary information about the region; in October 1645, a body of sappers were ordered to make a road. However, it was not before June, 1646, that the main force, 50,000 strong, commanded by the twenty-two year old Prince Murād moved into the hills. Murād's chief adviser was the Amīr al-Umarā, 'Alī Mardān Khān. The Prince met with no opposition worth the name; he took the fort of Qundūz on 22 June, and ten days later entered the city of Balkh itself. Nadir Muḥammad Khān had been promised the restoration of Balkh if he remained friendly. He had agreed to this, but on the entry of the Mughul forces in Balkh he became suspicious and fled towards Persia. Aṣālat Khān and Bahādur Khān, who were sent in his pursuit, could not overtake

<sup>37</sup> The dates of Babur's three attacks on Samarqand were: 1497 A.C.; 1501 A.C.; 1511. A.C.

him. The conquest had been easy enough, but Murād was not prepared to bear the slightest discomfort. Even in his first letter to the Emperor he requested that he should be recalled. The request was repeated, but the Emperor would not accept it. Murād decided to leave the place without permission. When the Emperor came to know of this he sent Wazir Sa'd-allāh Khān to settle the matter. The Minister tried to persuade Murād to abandon the foolish idea, but he did not accept his advice. Sa'd-allāh Khān therefore, removed the Prince from command and made new arrangements. Asālat Khān and Bahādur Khān were jointly put in charge of the province of Balkh, and Qilich Khān was appointed to look after Badakhshān. The *Wazir* was able to do all this in 22 days only, after which he returned. Murād was punished for his actions and deprived of the *manṣab*.<sup>38</sup>

#### **Awrangzib's Campaign, 1647**

Awrangzib who was now assigned the task of leading a fresh campaign into Balkh reached Kabul on 3 April, 1647; four days later he resumed his march towards Balkh. 'Alī Mardān Khān accompanied him as his chief adviser. From the outset the Prince was handicapped by the inadequacy of fighting forces sanctioned for the campaign. He was to have only 25,000 men with him, while in the previous year Murād had led an army twice as strong. Moreover the people of Balkh had now become hostile to the Mughuls, since Murād's soldiers had started a campaign of loot after his return from there. Some of the officers who had received orders to join Awrangzib had lingered behind and were unable to proceed beyond Afghanistan; actually therefore he had to conduct the operations with a force smaller than was sanctioned by the Emperor. Nevertheless, Awrangzib wasted not one moment of his time; leaving Kabul on 7 April he crossed the Shibpur pass and arrived at Kahmard which was serving as a half-way depot for his army. From Kahmard Awrangzib sent a reconnoitring party of 500

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 560, 579.

men; the Commander, Khalil Beg, proceeded too far into the narrow valley of Dehrah-gaz. Here the Uzbegs led by Nadhr Muḥammad's son, Qutluq Muḥammad, fell upon him. Khalil Beg decided to offer resistance and sent an express message to Awrangzib for reinforcements. The Prince immediately despatched a contingent, on whose arrival the Uzbegs lost heart and retreated to another post (20 May). On the following morning Awrangzib moved with the main army along the bank of the river and sent 'Alī Mardān Khān with the vanguard to dislodge the Uzbegs who had concealed themselves in the neighbouring hills and ravines. The Uzbegs attacked the Mughuls, but 'Alī Mardān Khān defeated and chased them for several miles and returned to the camp with some prisoners. On 25 May, Awrangzib entered Balkh, and making hurried arrangements for its defence he resumed his march three days later. He was confronted with difficulties and opposition by the enemy almost at every step; however, he proceeded on despite incessant fighting on the way. The Uzbegs were dislodged from Timūrābād where they wanted to check the Mughuls (2 June), and the Imperial forces continued their advance in spite of the hit and run tactics of the enemy, until they reached Pashai where Awrangzib captured the camp of their Commander, Beg Ughli.<sup>39</sup>

The discomfited forces of the enemy, having slipped away from before Awrangzib's army, now managed to reassemble in his rear at 'Alīābād. Another large army led by Subhān Qulī had in the meantime arrived from Bukhārā, evidently to attack Balkh.<sup>40</sup> Awrangzib was informed of this concentration of the enemy forces on 5 June; the same day he broke camp and decided to hasten back to Balkh. Two days later the large Uzbek army commanded by their Ruler, 'Abd al-'Azīz Khān, and his brother, Subhān Qulī Khān, attacked the Mughuls not far from the town of Fayḍābād. A hotly contested battle was fought in which the Mughuls gained a clear victory over the enemy. On 11 June Awrangzib entered Balkh, having in the meantime received from 'Abd al-'Azīz a message that

39 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, II, p. 694.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 695.

133569 -

he was ready to open parleys for peace. It was in the course of this battle that Awrangzib had come down from his elephant and joined the congregational prayers on the field of battle. This he had done in spite of the warnings of his officers. He remained absolutely calm during the prayers, unaffected and unmoved by the violence of the battle which was in full swing. Besides the obligatory *farā'id* he also offered the *sunnahs*<sup>41</sup> and *nawāfil*<sup>42</sup>. On hearing this 'Abd al-'Aziz was astonished at the strength of Awrangzib's faith in Islam and his courage and calmness. He is stated to have remarked: "To fight with such a person is to ruin oneself."<sup>43</sup>

'Abd al-'Aziz had already begged for peace; his petition contained a proposal that Balkh should be given to his brother Subhān Qulī Khān; Awrangzib referred the matter to the Emperor. In the meantime 'Abd al-'Aziz considering it fruitless to continue the war left the place and crossed the Oxus on inflated skins. Nadhr Muḥammad Khān, who was lying as a refugee at Belcheragh, now opened negotiations with Shāhjahān and reminded him of his promise to give the territories to him. In September he sent Kafsh Qalmāq as his envoy to Awrangzib; ten days later his grandson Qāsim was presented before the Prince. Awrangzib had to take a prompt decision because winter was approaching fast. He decided to hand over Balkh to Nadhr Muḥammad and formally delivered its possession to Qāsim and Kafsh Qalmāq on 1 October. Two days later his victorious army began its homeward march.

It took Awrangzib more than three weeks to perform the perilous journey to Kabul which was reached on the 27th.<sup>44</sup> Shāhjahān's

41 *Sunnah*: Lit. a path or a way; here used for that part of prayers which is not obligatory but is performed because it was done by the Prophet and enjoined by him.

42 *Nawāfil*: Pl. of *nafl*: Lit. a voluntary act; here used for supererogatory portion of the prayers.

43 Musta'id Khan, *Ma'āthir i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 531.

'Abd al-'Aziz Khān's actual words were: باچنین کس در افتادن بر افتادن است

44 The winter had set in this year very early and was extremely severe. For this reason the Mughul forces suffered losses on their homeward march. The details of losses may be read in the *Bādshāhnāmah* of Muḥammad Wārith.

campaigns in Central Asia cost him nearly four crores of rupees, and in spite of Awrangzib's brilliant victories in the campaign the Mughuls could not extend their sway over its territories.

For the young Awrangzib however this war was immensely advantageous; the Mughul generals and officers could see his military genius in full play. If the army were to make a selection for the Throne from among the sons of Shāhjahān their choice would certainly fall on him.

### Governorship of Multan and Sind, 1648-52

For a few months Awrangzib had to stay beyond the Indus evidently because he had to be near enough to undertake the defence of Kabul in case of an invasion by his erstwhile adversaries in Central Asia. It was therefore not before March, 1648, that orders were issued for his new assignment as Governor of Multan; in the following year, Sind was also placed in his charge. Though he held this office till 1652, he had to go twice to besiege Qandahār during these four years and was therefore unable to devote much of his time to administrative reforms which these territories badly needed. Sind had been annexed by Akbar in the last decade of the sixteenth century, but even during a period of more than fifty years the Mughul officers had not succeeded in clearing its territories of the forces of lawlessness. Awrangzib was the first Governor who seriously set himself to the task of guarding the people against the inroads of predatory chiefs and bandits. It appears, he succeeded to a considerable extent in creating peaceful conditions and maintaining law and order. This was not a mean achievement; it is however surprising that the historians of Shāhjahān's reign do not even mention his work in this connection. This deliberate omission can have only one explanation: Dārā's propaganda against Awrangzib had by now completely changed Shāhjahān's attitude towards the latter; his actions were looked upon with suspicion and often provoked the Emperor's wrath. Dārā was no doubt the favoured son of the Emperor and the courtiers found it to their advantage to show every respect to him and to his ideas. After the Balkh expedition which had added immensely to the popularity and fame of Awrangzib the efforts of Dārā to place difficulties in the former's path had become more intense.

Fortunately for the historian of the period we have from now (1650) onwards a series of letters<sup>45</sup> written by Awrangzib to his father, brothers, sisters and officers of the State; they contain first-hand information on problems which are in one way or the other connected with his activities. Quite a few of the important facts relating to the Prince's activities would have remained hidden from history if these letters had not been preserved by Awrangzib's secretary, Qābil Khān. One of these important problems is the administration of Multan and Sind, on which the only first-hand source of information is the collection of his letters. An account of the lawlessness prevailing in the area is given in the first letter written by him to Shāhjahān. "The unruly men of the Nahmardī and Jukiya<sup>46</sup> (tribes) in the hilly region of Thatta," he writes, "had never surrendered to the previous *Shāhahdārs* and continuously indulged in highway robbery and in creating disturbances." He had sent a force under Malik Husayn to subdue them and refers to his success in these words: "he has advanced ten stages from Thatta and reached Kahirah and Bela where lie the haunts of Nahmardī and Jūkiyahs. He has had the *Khuṭbah* recited there in your august name; and Hārūn and Khatartal, brother of Kanbhūdī, chiefs of the Nahmardī tribe, Murīd the leaders of the Jūkiyahs, have submitted (to the Imperial authority) and offered *a pi ḥkaḥ*. Ja'far Nahmardī, a relative of Mansingh, zamindar Panjur Kachh and Makran and his kinsmen, the sons of 'Alī Karānī, a leading chief of the area, Hājī Runchat and Jam Jum'ah, the leading persons of that region, who had not paid any heed since the days of the Tarāns have now surrendered. Madh, the leader of the mischief-makers of the hills near Qandahār, had tried to come down to Kahirah and Bela. On hearing of the approach of the victorious army he fled to the hill of Nigar. Malik Husayn sent against him a party of his men who,

<sup>45</sup> Awrangzib's secretary, *Shaykh* abu al-Faḥ Qābil Khān, who served him for more than a quarter of a century, kept the copies of the letters written from 1650 to the time of his accession to the throne. This collection is known as *Ādāb-i-Ālamgiri*.

<sup>46</sup> J. B. Smyth, compiler of the Gazetteer of Sind, this confirms statement. "The Jakhias, also included in Samas" he writes, "infested the Delta two centuries ago, robbing merchants, . . . ." See B Volume I, p. 10,



guided by the local zamindars, made forced marches and, covering 70 *krūhs* in two days, attacked his camp. He offered battle in which he became the morsel of the blood-drinking sword with many of his followers. More than forty of his men and his daughter were made captive by our victorious forces and brought by them to the camp.

“In the meantime the said Mansingh sent his *wakīls* with a letter that in Panjur, Kachh and Makran also the *Khutbah* had been recited in the name of Your Majesty. Since owing to the never-decaying prestige of my *pīr* and guide (Emperor) such brilliant victories have been obtained by our victorious army, they made a triumphant retreat to Thatta, . . . . Sattahalah, son of the zamindar of Kakralah who had met Malik Ḥusayn had come to Multan to improve his affairs. (In his absence) his brother, the wretched Gabhah, who lived in Kachh, prompted by envy and instigated by the zamindar of that place, had assembled a force and started encroachments upon that *parganah*. A party, led by Amir *Khān*'s sons, *Ḍiyā al-Dīn Yūsuf* and *Abu al-Makārim*, assisted by the soldiers whom Malik Ḥusayn had left there by way of precaution, has been sent to subdue that wretched fellow; it was supported by a fleet of *urābs* (corvettes) and artillery. Unable to withstand the attack he fled away. However, the commanders have been directed to completely finish the mischief of that wretched fellow and spare no efforts in that connection.”<sup>47</sup>

The only justification for quoting a considerable portion of this important letter is that these details are not to be found in any contemporary work: and of course no one can question their authenticity.

Another incident which may be mentioned is the submission of the Baluch tribes of Hots and Nūhānis. The Hot chief, Isma'īl, had contacts with the Court; he had sent presents to the Emperor and was able to secure the patronage of *Dārā*. As his territories touched the frontiers of the province of Lahore he put forward the

47 Sayyid Najib Aḥraf Nadawī, *Ruqqa'āt i 'Ālamgīr* (Letters of 'Ālamgīr) (Dar-al Musannifin, Azamgarh, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 2-3.

claim that he was subordinate to its Governor and had nothing to do with the *Şūbahdār* of Multan.<sup>48</sup> Encouraged by a letter from Dārā he refused to come to Awrangzib and continued to pursue a course of action which was not desirable. Awrangzib who was determined to put down turbulence, no matter who the offender was, mentioned this to the Emperor and secured his orders to the effect that in future Isma'il Hot would be subject to and under the Government of Multan. Awrangzib was now in a position to take action against Isma'il. He was forced to surrender the forts which he had forcibly taken from another Beluch chief, Mubarak of Babri.<sup>49</sup> On 20 June he (Isma'il) paid his respects to Awrangzib at Multan.<sup>50</sup> Another Beluch tribe which had to be brought under control was that of Nuhānis. The lands of their chief, 'Ālam Khān, lay on the road from Multan to Qandahār. Awrangzib therefore wanted to deal with him in a friendly manner, but the proud chieftain failed to appreciate this gesture and refused to wait on him. Awrangzib was therefore obliged to take the Emperor's permission to use force; he was subdued and offered submission.<sup>51</sup>

Awangzib's letters written to *Shāhjahān* about the affairs of Sind and the steps taken by him to suppress brigandage and lawlessness in that region throw ample light on one of the important chapters of Mughul history. Sind was full of turbulent zamindars who continuously disturbed the peace of the country. The officers of the Mughul Government had failed to improve the condition of the Province. Awrangzib was therefore anxious to establish peace by punishing the brigand chiefs and recalcitrant zamindars. It took him more than a year to restore order and bring the unruly elements under control.

Awangzib was equally anxious to make the people of Sind prosperous by encouraging trade and commerce. Till the sixteenth

48. Awrangzib refers to the haughtiness of Isma'il in these words: "Isma'il's head had been turned by the heat of pride". (*dimag hash az bukhār-i-pindār pariṣhan shudah*).

49 Letter to *Shāhjahān*. See Najib Ashraf, p. 7.

50 *Ibid*, p. 8.

51 *Ibid*, p. 11.

century Thatta had been a busy centre of internal and foreign trade. It was connected with Multan and Lahore through the Indus; "great trade is carried on at Thatta and ships of 300 tons might be brought up to Larry Bunder."<sup>52</sup> This is corroborated by James Rennel who refers to this town in these words: "The city of Thatta, . . . . . was, in the last century, very extensive and populous, and was a place of great trade; possessing manufactures of silk, carmania wool, and cotton: and was also celebrated for its cabinet ware."<sup>53</sup> Subsequently Thatta's trade decreased on account of the accumulation of sand which closed it to the ocean-going vessels. Awrangzib wanted to revive the trade; for this purpose he built a new port in Sind. His enemies at the Court however created a suspicion in the mind of Shāhjahān that by increasing the volume of trade Awrangzib wanted to increase his own income. He therefore asked the Prince to submit a detailed explanation of the steps taken by him to build a new port. Awrangzib's reply suggests that the Emperor's letter was strictly official in tone; "the income of the ports," he explains to his father, "depends on two things: the duty paid by the traders on their goods (*'ushri-mli tujjr*), the presents and the cargo freight. . . . Your Majesty has remitted the customs duty; my ship having only one deck has just arrived from Surat and is not yet in service, a ship belonging to the *Khāliṣah* is still incomplete, and the coming of other ships and activities of traders in this port have not started; under these conditions how can an idea of the income be formed?" He was also asked to explain why a fort had been constructed near the port. This, he says, was indispensable if the port was to grow into a prosperous centre of trade. In conclusion he adds that in course of time the Government would get precious gifts and novelties in *pi sh k sh*, and what the income would be could be guessed. However Awrangzib received no encouragement from the Centre, nor did the campaign of Qandahār allow him

<sup>52</sup> Kerr's *Voyages and Travels* (IX, 130—31), quoted in Sarkar, II, 124.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭah mentions the port-town of Lahri, which was a prosperous and wealthy place.

<sup>53</sup> *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan or the Mogul Empire* (London, 1792), p. 183.

to give enough time to his own Province; we do not hear of the project any more.

Besides the obstacles placed in his way by Shāhjahān's Government, Awrangzib was confronted with another problem. He had to increase the strength of his army to crush the forces of lawlessness. Instead of receiving a bigger jagir to meet the additional expenditure his emoluments were curtailed; "I used to get in the beginning ten months' salary (in the year), and now a jagir has been conferred on me which does not provide even seven month's salary," besides this, "the last three harvests have been visited by calamities". In view of these difficulties he requested Shāhjahān to give him financial assistance. The Emperor's reply was bitingly sarcastic; "Why do you not give gold mohurs to the soldiers?" Evidently Awrangzib felt deeply aggrieved by these words; he wrote to his elder sister: "As to my gold mohurs, they will not be enough even for a single month's pay of the soldiers after the clearance of my debts which are in the knowledge of His Majesty."<sup>54</sup>

#### **Qandahar Campaigns, 1648-52**

Qandahār, now constituting the southern district of Afghanistan is separated from the subcontinent by a series of hills, known as the Sulayman Range, on the east and a vast desert area in the south. It receives its water supply for irrigation purposes from the Helmund and its tributaries. Qandahār's strategic importance was that no major army coming from Central Asia or Persia *via* Herat could avoid the route passing through it. For Kabul's defence also Qandahār was a vital base. The Mughul Government therefore could ill-afford to leave it in the hands of its powerful neighbour, the Şafawī Ruler of Persia. As a gateway of commerce its importance was perhaps greater than as a military outpost. The sea routes being dominated by the Portuguese the major portion of the Hind-Pakistani trade to Persia and onwards followed the route which passed through Multan, Pishin and Qandahār.<sup>55</sup> For these reasons Qandahār had

<sup>54</sup> Najib Ashraf, *Letters*, p. 228.

<sup>55</sup> According to the English traveller, Richard Steel, who wrote early in the sixteenth century, 16,000 camels laden with merchandise went to Persia by this route. Kerr, *op. cit.* IX, 209, 212, 213.

become a bone of contention between the Mughuls and the Safawis, and had been changing hands between the two mighty Empires of Asia. Bābur had captured it in 1522; in 1545 Humāyūn had to recover it from his brother, 'Askari. Early in Akbar's reign, the Persian Ruler seized an opportunity of snatching it from the hands of the Mughuls (1558); they, however, recovered it in 1594. Thirty years later, in 1623 Shāh 'Abbās of Persia re-captured it after a siege of six weeks. Jahāngīr was anxious to send an expedition to reconquer the place, but his problems at home did not allow him to give a practical shape to his scheme. Shāhjahān was more lucky than his father, because the Persian Governor of Qandahār, 'Ali Mardān Khān,<sup>56</sup> handed it over to the Mughuls and joined service under them in 1638. Ten years later the young Persian Monarch, Shāh 'Abbās,<sup>57</sup> decided to attack Qandahār.

#### The Persians capture Qandahar, 1648

About the end of September 1648, Shāhjahān learnt that the Persians were mobilising a large force at Herat. He consulted his advisers; it was decided that the Emperor himself should move to Kabul and send a large army to defend Qandahār. Some courtiers, however, suggested that no steps should be taken in a hurry, as the Persians would not venture a major campaign in mid-winter. Shāhjahān foolishly accepted the proposal and postponed his march to Kabul. The calculations of the Mughul officers about Shāh 'Abbās proved to be utterly wrong; he marched on Qandahār and laid siege to it in December. Soon his forces gained an advantage by capturing two guard towers which lay at an eminence about three quarters of a mile to the north of the city. The Mughul Governor, Dawlat Khān,<sup>58</sup> it is surprising to note, had completely neglected this important

<sup>56</sup> He soon rose to the rank of a first-grade *Amir* and was given the title of *Amir al-Umara*.

<sup>57</sup> He had ascended the throne as a boy of ten in 1642.

<sup>58</sup> He belonged to the Bhatti tribe of the Panjab and had joined Mughul service under Jahāngīr. He had distinguished himself by acts of personal bravery in the Deccan wars under Shāhjahān and had risen to a *manṣab* of 5,000. But he was now sixty years of age and had lost much of the vigour of his youth. It was unwise on the part of the Government to have appointed him as the commander of Qandahār.

point of vantage. Early in January 1649 the Persians were able to place three big guns in positions and begin the bombardment of the city. They demolished the parapets of the fort, ran their trenches right up to the edge of the ditch and crossing it on wooden bridges managed to come as far as the walls of an outwork, called Shir Hāji. The Mughuls offered stiff resistance, but they could not stop the enemy from laying mines. More serious than the advance of the Persians was the mutiny of a section of Dawlat Khān's forces. Two Tartar chiefs, Shādī Uzbek and Qipchāq Khān began to intrigue with some men in the garrison and ultimately succeeded in creating disaffection in a section of the defenders. Dawlat Khān soon found himself confronted with a crisis which he was unable to overcome. On 5 February the traitors admitted an envoy of the Persian Ruler; six days later Dawlat Khān surrendered the fort to the besiegers. The fall of Qandahār came as a severe shock to Shāhjahān's Government; to a large extent however he himself was responsible for this reverse. By postponing his campaign he had given an opportunity to the Persians to besiege and capture the fort. Dawlat Khān also cannot be absolved of responsibility. He had a garrison of 7,000 men and a large store of provisions which could have lasted for two years. Dawlat Khān could certainly continue the defence until the arrival of a relieving force from Kabul. It may be noted that only 400 men of his garrison had fallen when he surrendered the fort.

#### **Awrangzib marches on Qandahar**

The disconcerting news of the siege of Qandahār reached Shāhjahān at Lahore about the middle of January, 1649. He issued immediate orders to Awrangzib and Sa'dallah Khān to proceed to Qandahār. The two wings of the army, moving respectively from Multan and Lahore, met near Bhira. Awrangzib reached Kabul in March, and without losing much time he advanced on Qandahār. By the middle of May the Mughul forces were besieging the city. Old Qandahār lay about two miles from the modern town on the road to Herat; it stood on a high ridge and was strongly fortified. Of its many towers the highest was known as Lakah and was considered to be almost impregnable. It commanded the citadel, which was

known as Dawlatābād, and was situated lower down on a separate eminence; further below was the town, surrounded by three walls, which, at places, were ten yards thick. They were of clay and stone but were so stiff that, according to an English officer who wrote his account in 1878, a revolver bullet fired from a distance of ten yards would merely lodge in its surface and could be picked out by the nail. The Mughuls had added two guard-towers to its already strong defences. To the west and north-west lay at a distance of 40 and 50 miles respectively the forts of Bist and Zamindāwar, which served as outposts against an invader coming from that side.

The siege commenced on 16 May; on the following day a Rajput contingent tried to attack the ridge but the incessant shower of bullets by Persian guardsmen drove them back.<sup>59</sup> Awrangzib now started constructing underground lanes to reach the fort. This was a difficult task in the face of heavy firing from the fort guns, but Awrangzib's determination remained firm. By 4 July three lanes were ready and arrangements were made to drain the ditch. The next stage was to assault the fort, for which the Mughul army was not adequately equipped. They did not have a single big gun while the Persians had many. Their gunners also were superior to those of the Mughuls. In one day twenty-five of their guns<sup>60</sup> hit the covered lane which had reached half way across the ditch and destroyed it. Awrangzib was thus confronted with an extremely difficult situation; he could not even wait for reinforcements because winter was approaching fast. On 5 September, in obedience to the Emperor's orders, he decided to raise the siege and withdrew his forces.

In the meantime the Mughuls had scored a victory over the enemy at another place. A contingent of the Imperial Army under Qilich Klān had been posted near the fort of Bist with orders to ravage the

<sup>59</sup> The Rajput *Coup de main* was not approved by Awrangzib; he expressed his surprise that it was made without his previous permission. 'Amal i Şahlih, Vol. III, p. 83.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p. 85.

According to Wārith, the Persian gunners, "in one day fired 25 times on the covered lane....."

surroundings territories and send supplies of grain to Qandahār. In July, Qilich Khān's small force was attacked by a large Persian army and was forced to retire to Sang-i-H<sub>ṣ</sub>iār, about 24 miles south west of Qandahār. Awrangzib also ordered Rustam Khān Dakhanī to go to Sang-i-Hiṣār and reinforce the Mughul garrison there. On his way Rustam Khān defeated a small Persian force, taking a number of men as prisoners. Rustam Khān soon joined Qilich Khān. The main battle between the Mughuls and Persians was fought at Shāh-Mir on 25 August. The Persian army counting 30,000 had spread themselves over a long line near Kushk-i-Nakhūd. A strong reinforcement under Murtadā Qulī had joined them early in the morning on the day of the battle. Fighting commenced soon after noon time and lasted for three hours. The small Mughul force fought brilliantly against over-whelming odds. At one stage their right wing appeared to be giving way to the pressure of Persians charges, but before it was too late Rustam Khān rushed to its aid and turned the tables. The Persians fled from the field leaving a vast quantity of arms and equipments to be captured by the victors. On the following morning the Mughuls went to Kushk-i-Nakhūd, but found it to have been evacuated by the enemy. This was considered to be a great victory, the Emperor and his Court went into rejoicings and celebrated it by awarding honours and promotions to the officers concerned.

### Second siege of Qandahar, 1652

“The first siege of Qandahār”, Sarkar rightly observes, “had failed for want of heavy guns and material.” In the second attempt, therefore, an effort was made to provide the army with necessary equipment for a major siege.<sup>61</sup> As before, Awrangzib, assisted by Sa‘d-allāh Khān, was to lead the campaign. The main army commanded by Sa‘d-allāh Khān, took the road passing through the Khyber Pass, while Awrangzib with a small force advanced by the western route *via* Pishin. Both the armies met near Qandahār, the siege commenced on 2 May, 1652. Shāhjahān himself stayed in Kabul from where he could easily send necessary directions to the

<sup>61</sup> Sa‘d-allāh Khān's army had 50,000 horsemen, 10,000 musketeers and gunners, eight big guns, twenty elephant guns and twenty camel-guns. *‘Amal-i-Ṣalīh*, III, 139.



besieging force. This however was a wrong step. Evidently he could not have judged the situation from such a long distance; in fact he should have given more powers to Awrangzib. By his frequent interference the Emperor created difficulties for the Prince and his officers. In those days communications being slow and unreliable the commander of a campaign was perforce given wide powers.

However, the Mughul generals took positions and the work of sapping was started. As it was likely to take some time it was decided that the outlying posts should be subjected to sudden assaults. On 20 June a surprise attack was attempted by Rājrup and Mahābat Khān. Rājrup sent his men to the top of the hill in the darkness of the night, but the defenders were alerted by the noise of the Raja's halt which was at a short distance. They pushed the assailants back, slaying them in large numbers during the course of their flight; Rājrup was censured for this stupid action. Now the only course for the besiegers was to carry the saps nearer the fort and breach its walls. This was hard work, "and many of S'adullah's men were wounded and slain. . . . The enemy issued from three sides, and from sunset to dawn fired their muskets incessantly from loop-holes opened in the fort-walls, so as to give no opportunity to Awrangzib's workmen."<sup>62</sup> Another misfortune which befell the Mughuls was that some unskilled workmen over-charged two of the big guns with powder, causing them to burst. Awrangzib now realized that with his inadequate equipment he could not breach the walls of the fort and it could be taken only by an assault; this, unfortunately for him, the Emperor did not permit. Awrangzib had to continue his efforts to batter the walls of the fort, but with no results.<sup>63</sup> The

<sup>62</sup> *Wārith*, quoted in Sarkar, I, 157.

<sup>63</sup> Awrangzib's letters throw interesting light on Shāhjahān's unnecessary and positively harmful interference in the operations of the siege. In reply to the Imperial orders to batter the walls from two sides the Prince wrote: "We have not enough big guns to batter the walls from (two) sides simultaneously and it would not be proper to attempt it unless we have means for that." Continuing his account he points out that in consultation with Sa'dallāh Khān he had decided to raise an eminence on the side of his camp and then they would batter the walls

(Contd. on page 35)

portions of the walls damaged by the Mughuls in the day time were repaired by the defenders in the night. Moreover, the Persians started making sorties in the night; on 19 June they came in large numbers and fell upon the trenches of the besiegers. They were ultimately repelled but not before a number of Mughul soldiers were killed and captured. The Persians also had been suffering heavy losses, but the position of the besiegers was daily becoming more precarious. Awrangzib's last request to the Emperor for an assault was made on 3 July; two days earlier Shāhjahān, taking action on Sa'dallah Khān's report that the guns could effect nothing, had already issued orders for the raising of the siege. At Awrangzib's request however he agreed to postpone the abandonment of the siege for a month; but the news of his previous order had spread in the camp and no one was now serious in continuing the operations. Awrangzib found it impossible to push the siege with vigour, and ultimately he was forced to issue orders for raising it. He refers to this in his letter to the Emperor containing his report of the raising of the siege. <sup>64</sup>

### Shahjahan censures Awrangzib

The failure of the Mughul army to recapture Qandahār hit the prestige of the Emperor; his frustration is evident in his letters to Awrangzib. He censures the Prince and accuses him for the defeat. Instead of appreciating his services he declares him to be unfit for a great task and says in a boastful tone: "We are not going to abandon Qandahār. We shall arrange to capture it by any means whatsoever." In a previous letter he had written to Awrangzib: "It is surprising that despite such vast preparations you could not capture the fort." Awrangzib's reply to these provocative censures was

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 185.

(Contd. from page 119)

from there. But Shāh jahān insisted that the guns should be set against two walls: "It is not proper to batter the walls from one side." Awrangzib was convinced that the Emperor's orders were wrong but like an obedient officer he agreed to carry out the Emperor's orders. "Although" he writes to his father, "it is known to me what (little) effect the two Surat guns on this side (in fact only one which is in working order) will make on the walls of the fort, yet the orders of His Majesty are to be obeyed by the world and are not to be qualified by any thing." *Najib Ashraf, Introduction*, pp. 181—83.

marked by moderation and respect. When he came to know that Dārā was going to be entrusted with the command of the third campaign he reminded Shāhjahān that in the beginning when the question of sending an expedition to Qandahār was under discussion he had suggested that the supreme command should be given to his eldest brother and that he would be willing to act as the commander of his Advance Guard; the implication was that he would have no objection to work under Dārā, although the latter had persistently carried on a propaganda against him. The Emperor's reply to his offer was severely harsh: "Every man can perform some work; it is a saying of the wise that one should not test (the capacity of) a person who has already been tested."<sup>65</sup> In his reply Awrangzib tells his father that his own reputation as a general was involved in the success or failure of the Qandahār expedition, and therefore, he could not have purposely done anything to slacken the efforts as far as the siege was concerned.

A careful examination of Awrangzib's letters on the subject, which contain relevant passage from Shāhjahān's censoring epistles, makes it abundantly clear that the Prince attributed his failure at Qandahār to the Centre's frequent interference. Shāhjahān did not accept this explanation; on the contrary his attitude towards Awrangzib which was greatly influenced by Dārā and his partisans became openly hostile. This is indicated by his orders about Awrangzib's transfer to the Deccan; he was to proceed direct to the south and was not allowed to pay a flying visit to Multan the seat of his Government. He met the Emperor on 7 August and was ordered to leave for the Deccan on the 10th. His march through the Panjab was necessarily slow because rains had set in and the rivers were in floods. The Emperor censured him for this although he could not have been unaware of the factors which made it difficult for the Prince to march rapidly. In fact Awrangzib's position at the Court had become most unenviable. Dārā had by now gained a complete hold on Shahjāhān's conscience; this had made Awrangzib helpless. He

<sup>65</sup> Sarkar's rendering of the latter portion of the statement is: "It is a wise saying that men of experience need no instruction." The actual Persian phrase is

عقلاء گفته اند که آزموده را نباید آزمود

refers to his miserable plight in a letter to Jahān-Ārā by quoting the following couplet:

گر تو اے گل گوش بر آواز بلبل می کنی  
کار مشکل می شود بر بے زبانان چمن

*Translations:* O Rose! If thou shalt listen to the murmurs of the nightingale (only);

Those who cannot open their tongues in the garden shall be confronted with great difficulties.

For a student of history it is not difficult to discover the main causes of the failure of Awrangzib's expeditions. The Persians had several advantages over the Mughuls; in gunnery they were undoubtedly superior to the Indians; their line of communications was not only shorter but also better defended than that of the Imperial army. From Herat the scene of the battle was only 360 miles, which a cavalry force could cover in ten days, while the Mughul base of operations, Kabul, was separated from it by mountainous regions. Moreover, Kabul could not supply all that a vast army needed in the course of a long-drawn siege; it had to depend on the sub-continent for basic supplies. Besides, these handicaps, Awrangzib's difficulties were enhanced by Mughul red-tapism and the Emperor's readiness to listen to and act upon the advice of his enemies. Even the well-known Hindu historian, J. N. Sarkar, whose unsympathetic and often unfair criticisms of Awrangzib's actions and policies are well-known, admits that "in truth it is unjust to blame Awrangzib for the failure to take Qandahār. Throughout the siege he was really second in command. The Emperor from Kabul directed every movement through Sadullah Khān. His sanction had to be taken for every important step, such as the removal of guns from one battery to another, the disposition of troops, the date, hour and point of assault. Fast couriers brought his orders from Kabul to Qandahār in four days and the Prince had merely to carry them out. Indeed so thoroughly subordinate was Awrangzib that during the first month of the siege only one despatch from him reached the Emperor, while Sadullah corresponded frequently and the Emperor's letters were often written to the Prime Minister, to be afterwards shown to the

Prince.”<sup>66</sup> Lastly, Mughul statesmanship failed to realize that the Indian forces had never captured Qandahār from the Persians by force of arms. Both Akbar (in 1594) and Shāhjahān (in 1638) had got its possession through the desertions of its Persian Governors. To wrest it from the hands of a strong garrison after having subjected it to a regular siege was not easy, particularly when the dynasty holding it was strong and resourceful. When Dārā led the third campaign against Qandahār in 1651 he had an army much stronger and far better equipped than that of Awrangzib, three years earlier, but in spite of these advantages he could not achieve better results.

### Second Viceroyalty of the Deccan, 1653-57

As has been stated above Awrangzib was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan in July, 1652, but it was not before 9 September that he could cross the Indus. Passing through Delhi on 17 November and Agra on the 28th, he reached Burhānpūr on 3 February 1653.<sup>67</sup> Reporting his arrival to the Emperor he added: “I am engaged in settling the affairs of this place. As soon as the affairs of Pain Ghat are settled, I shall leave for Dawlatābād, *inshā'allāh*.”<sup>68</sup> He had to stay in Burhānpūr for about nine months in spite of Shāhjahān's repeated instructions to move to Dawlatābād. It appears that the Emperor did not have in his mind a complete picture of the problems which the Prince had to tackle and was therefore unable to realize the magnitude of his task. Since 1644 when Awrangzib had last left the Deccan the Mughul territories were governed by six Viceroys<sup>69</sup>. None of them had been able to check deterioration which had left

<sup>66</sup> Sarkar, I, 165.

<sup>67</sup> Sarkar gives 30 January as the date of Awrangzib's arrival at Burhānpūr, but 15 *Rabi 'al-Awwal* mentioned in the Prince's report to the Emperor was on 3 February.

<sup>68</sup> The Mughul territories in the Deccan, were divided for administrative convenience into two regions: Pāin-ghāt included Khāndesh and a part of Berar: the rest were called Balaghat.

<sup>69</sup> They were: Khān Dawrān (May, 1644-June, 1645): Jai Singh (officiated till 17 July, 1645): Islām Khān (July 1645-November 1647): Shāh Nawāz Khān (officiated till July 1648): Murād Baksh (July 1648—September, 1649): Shāistah Khān (September 1649—September, 1652).

marked traces on all branches of administration. Agriculture, which was the main industry of the region and the source of livelihood for an over-whelming majority of its people, had suffered greatly and the revenue collected by the Government stood at a low figure. The annual revenue of the four Deccani provinces was 3,62,00,000 rupees, but in 1652, the actual collection was only one crore, i.e. less than one third. Thus the Deccan was a deficit area of the Empire and large subsidies had to be sent by the Centre.<sup>70</sup> Awrangzib sent to the Emperor an account of the conditions prevailing in the Province and told him that he would remain in Burhānpūr because he wanted to take some preliminary steps to reform the administration. Shāhjahān however showed great impatience, and only three months after his arrival at Burhānpūr the Prince received instructions to leave for Dawlatābād without delay. In a respectful manner he explained to the Emperor that "the deterioration of the administrative affairs of the Deccan<sup>71</sup> had not been attended to during the last ten years," and therefore it would not be possible to repair the damage in a short time; moreover there was nothing which demanded his immediate presence at Dawlatābād.

#### **Aurangzib's financial difficulties**

Before describing Awrangzib's administrative reforms it is necessary to make some references to his financial difficulties. It has already been stated that the officers of the Government could collect only a part of the revenue in the Deccan. This state of affairs made it a deficit area; its jagirdars also could not get from their assignments enough money to meet their expenses. They complained to the Viceroy and told him that they would not be able to maintain their quotas unless more productive *jagirs* were assigned

70 In one year Khān Dawrān had been able to show a surplus but that was only at the expense of the peasantry. By using torture he had forced the collectors and peasants to deposit in the Exchequer more than they normally did. He boasted for "sending money" to the Centre while other Governors had to get subsidies, but he had done this only by following the policy of killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. His extortions and cruelties brought about great misery and made the conditions worse.

71 *Barham khurdgi-i-wilāyat-e-Dakhan.*

to them in other Provinces. The deficit in expenditure was mostly met by subsidies from the reserve fund in the treasuries of Dawlat-ābād; this was consequently decreasing fast. Awrangzib fully realized the delicacy of the position. In a distant Province like the Deccan with two powerful States, by no means friendly to the Mughals, at its borders, it was absolutely necessary to keep some money in reserve. He therefore suggested some measures for raising the income instead of continuing the policy of consuming the reserve funds. He wanted to take away from the *jagirdars* lands yielding revenue equal to the deficit and place them in the charge of the State collectors. It was obvious, some of these *jagirdars* would not like to remain in the Deccan after being deprived of their lands. This would mean a decrease in the strength of the army, which of course was unthinkable. Awrangzib therefore proposed that the *jagirdars*, who would thus suffer a loss on account of the transfer of their lands, should get assignments of *jagirs* in other Provinces and that a portion of his own cash salary should be made a charge on the treasuries of Malwa and Surat. He also explained to the Emperor that his *jagirs* in the Deccan yielded about 17 lakhs less than those held by him when he was in Multan. Under these conditions it was not possible for him to make the two ends meet. The Emperor ordered him to change his lands with better ones in the possession of other *jagirdars*: the latter naturally complained to the Emperor, but he did not change his decision and confirmed the transfers.

Awrangzib's second request about his cash salary being made a charge on the treasuries of Malwa and Surat was rejected. Instead the Emperor allowed him to select productive *Mahals* in the Deccan in lieu of his cash salary. Awrangzib made a selection of Elichpur and Ankot; but the Emperor put their revenues at a figure much higher than the actual collections. Awrangzib therefore refused to take them and asked for cash payment. In fact *āhjahān* had lost confidence in his son as a result of the persistent poisoning of his ears by Awrangzib's opponents. Even when he accepted the Prince's request for a particular assignment he would add impossible conditions to it. Often the Emperor questioned the entries of the

statements submitted by Awrangzib.<sup>72</sup> The letters written by Awrangzib from Dawlatābād contain some references to the orders issued by the Emperor in respect of his *jagir* and salary as well as his arrangements in connection with the revenue affairs of the Deccan. Almost on every issue, however unimportant, the Emperor disagreed with him and often reprimanded him quite unjustly. The Emperor had received certain reports about the *parganah* of Asir. Without making any enquiries about the matter he wrote a nasty letter to Awrangzib. "From the statements....sent to this Court by Muṭṭafit Khān" wrote the Emperor, "it becomes clear that you have realized forty lakhs of dams from this *pārganāh*....., to keep for yourself the most productive villages in a *parganah* and assign the less productive ones to others is an act of injustice and unworthy of a Muslim. You are therefore ordered to take twenty lakhs worth of less productive lands in the *parganah* in lieu of your cash salary.... so that your income would be sixty lakhs which is normal for twelve months." Awrangzib's reply is marked by an indignation which was not unjustified. He wrote: "It is clear to the enlightened mind of your Majesty that this disciple, since the day of his appointment to the *ṣubah* of the Deccan, has never associated himself with an act of injustice which is unworthy of the Islamic character (*musalmānī*) of the disciples of a perfect guide like yourself.....The forty lakhs of dams of which thirty-three lakhs came from the village of Bahādar-purah.....and for which I have been rebuked (by you) so harshly were not *taken* by me, but before my departure to this country the Revenue Officers of the Imperial Court under orders from Your Majesty had transferred it to my name from that of aīstah Khān at the same (estimated) revenue. It is most surprising that the authorities of the Revenue Department, particularly the Prime Minis-

<sup>72</sup> Aurangzib had made a request for the assignment of Nadrbar and submitted a statement of its revenues. The Emperor expressed his opinion that the figures were not correct. Awrangzib's reply is interesting: he wrote to the Emperor that the statement submitted by him was based on "the calculations made by His Majesty's officers (*diwāniān*)," adding that "in such matters no wrong facts could be presented." In conclusion he said: "previously this *parganah* had been assigned to brother Murād Bakhsh against six lakhs of dams: if it is assigned to me on the basis of the same cash figures I shall deem it to be a great favour." See Najib Ashraf, *Letters*, p. 107.



ter (*Dastūr i Ā'zam*) who has a retentive memory, did not point it out to you at the time of submitting the statements, that they had themselves transferred the lands in my name." Awrangzib's feelings had been deeply injured by the unwarranted rebukes of *Shāhjahān*; this is indicated by his remarks which follow the above statement. The officers did not place before the Emperor the real facts, "perhaps because" he adds, "they do not have enough courage to submit to Your Majesty the true facts in such affairs, otherwise there is no possibility of their forgetting them. (I wonder that) contrary to the usual practice, in these days such things, without proper investigation, are being presented before the Imperial Council, and listening to them by Your Majesty is allowed to cause annoyance to Your mind. That a reference to Islamic character (*Musalmānī*), which is the source of eternal blessings, should have been made by Your Majesty's truth telling tongue in connection with a trifling matter of this perishable world is something in which I am helpless".

The rather lengthy extract from the letter of Awrangzib proves that in censuring his actions the Emperor showed an indiscreet impatience; ultimately he had to regret. Awrangzib, who was an honest and hard-working young man, was not prepared to let the officers have their own way in matters connected with his administrative responsibilities; nor would he allow the Emperor to take advantage of his position in unjustly censuring his actions. The result was that almost on every issue the Emperor and the Prince disagreed. Despite these discouraging factors Awrangzib continued to perform his duties and work in connection with administrative reforms with devotion and earnestness.

### **Awrangzib's Revenue Reforms in the Deccan**

*Shāhjahān* was anxious that the highly unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in the Deccan should be improved. When appointing Awrangzib he had impressed upon his mind the need and urgency of alleviating the condition of the peasantry and extending agriculture. Awrangzib on his part had promised to undertake the work but had at the same time requested the Emperor to provide certain facilities to him; he wanted a rather long tenure, and qualified personnel for

his staff besides some money. The Emperor was so keen on reform that Awrangzib had hardly been three months in Burhānpūr when a reminder was received by him to proceed to Dawlatābād after completing his work in Painghat.<sup>73</sup> This was followed by repeated reminders and warnings often containing censorious and indignant remarks. Awrangzib had very early written to his father from Burhānpūr. that disorder which had continued and extended during a period of ten years could not be undone in a short time. It seems that even after the enforcement of the reform measures the Emperor was not satisfied with Awrangzib's work. The latter referring to Shāhjahān's remarks says: "The administration of the affairs pertaining to the various *parganahs* is the direct responsibility of the revenue officers (*dīwāniān*) and as far as lay in their power, they have not been guilty of negligence. To debate upon what his disciple has done in the short period that he has been in the Deccan would be tantamount to indulging in boastfulness, which is not the usual practice of this humble creature, so he has neither entered this valley (of giving boastful account of the work done) himself, nor agreed to the officers of this region adopting that course. But as this disciple considers the compliance of His Majesty's orders almost as binding as the commands of the Real Benefactor how could he allow himself to be negligent in matters pertaining to the administration of this country. If the reform and rehabilitation of the territories which have been lying in a state of neglect, due to various reasons, for a long time have not been carried out to the extent to which they should have been then it is not because of negligence.....In due course of time, signs of prosperity will gradually become apparent, *insha'allah!*"<sup>74</sup> Awrangzib had given this explanation when he "had in three years succeeded in doubling the revenue of many *mahāls*. Very soon his Viceroyalty was destined to become memorable for ever in the history of land-settlement in the Deccan."<sup>75</sup>

#### Murshid Quli Khan's work as *Diwan* in the Deccan

The main credit of Awrangzib's reforms in the Deccan goes to his *Dīwān*, Murshid Quli Khān who organized the revenue

<sup>73</sup> Letter 3: 51 in Najib Ashraf, *Intr*: p. 199.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, Letter 3: 59.

<sup>75</sup> Sarkar, I, 188.

system in that region as Muzaffar Khān Turbatī and Todar Mal had done in the north, under Akbar, about three quarters of a century earlier. Murshid Qulī Khān had joined the service of the Mughul Government with 'Alī Mardān Khān when the latter had surrendered the fort of Qandahār to Shāhjahān. Since then he had served the Empire with distinction, both as a soldier and as a civil officer. He was Awrangzib's *Bakhshī* in his campaign in Balkh, and had served the Prince with ability. When Awrangzib was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, Murshid Qulī Khān was ordered to accompany him as *Dīwān* of Bālaghāt. Three years later he was given the charge of Painghat also and thūs became the *Dīwān* of the entire Mughul Deccan.<sup>76</sup>

On taking charge of the Province, Awrangzib noticed that the condition of the peasants had been far from satisfactory since 1630-32, when a severe famine had raged in that area. The Mughul campaigns against Shivaji's brigandage in the territories of Bijapur had considerably added to their miseries. There were other factors also which adversely affected the interests of the cultivator. In the north the plots of land under cultivation were properly marked and measured by iron *jarībs*, and then revenue was assessed either on the basis of a *bigah* or sharing of the actual produce. The work of assessment on a systematic basis had been done under Akbar. In the time of his successors the same records were carefully maintained and figures were changed only when local conditions demanded it. In the Deccan, on the other hand, no such attempt had been made so far. The traditional practice prevailing there may be called plough rent system: the peasant cultivated as much land as he could and grew whatever crop he liked paying a fixed sum to the State for each plough and team.<sup>77</sup> Evidently this system was highly un-satisfactory. The cultivators unable to bear the harshness of revenue collectors had started fleeing away from their fields, and many a flourishing village had been turned into wilderness. The revenue figures were gradually coming down; in 1631 Shāhjahān had cut

<sup>76</sup> MFor urshid Qulī Khān see *Ma'athir al-Umarā*, III, 493—500.

<sup>77</sup> *Ma'athir al-Umarā*, III, 496.

down the revenue of Khandesh by one half, but even that could not be collected.<sup>78</sup>

Such was the condition of revenue administration when Murshid Quli Khān started his work on reform. Evidently the new measures adopted by him were on the lines of Akbar's revenue reforms in the north. The first task before the new *Diwān* was to repopulate the ruined villages by rehabilitating the dispersed peasantry. For this purpose a number of petty officers, such as *Amīns*, had to be appointed; in some cases new headmen or *Muqaddams* had to be appointed and surveyors were asked to measure the land and prepare records of holdings. To encourage the peasants he provided them with facilities of various kinds as for instance *taqāwī* loans for purchasing implements, cattle and seeds. As regards assessment of revenue three methods were adopted. In certain areas, presumably those where primitive conditions prevailed, he continued the old practice of plough-rents; a fixed sum was realized for each plough and team. In other places the two well-known systems—sharing (*batāī*) or measurement (*napāī*) were introduced.

In the system of sharing (*batāī*) the share of the State varied according to crops and other circumstances. Where crops depended on rains only the share of the State was one-half of the produce. For crops irrigated from wells it was one-third in the case of grain, and from one-fourth to one-ninth for other crops, varying according to the cost of production; for crops irrigated from canals

<sup>78</sup> The well-known Deccan statesman, Malik 'Anbar, had introduced some revenue reforms, a reference to which has been made by Grant Duff. Malik 'Anbar, he says "abolished revenue farming, and committed the management to Brahmin agents under Mahomedan superintendence: he restored such parts of the village establishment as had fallen into decay; and he revived a mode of assessing the fields, by collecting a moderate proportion of the actual produce in kind, which, after the experience of several seasons, was commuted for a payment in money settled annually according to cultivation". In a footnote the author adds that "his assessment was two fifths of the produce of Government lands. Tradition says his money commutation was about one third." *Vide, History of the Mahrattas* (Fourth edition, London, 1878), I, 80-81.

Moreland holds the view that Malik 'Anbar's system did not last long and "may have died with him...in any case that could scarcely have survived the calamities of the next ten years. *The Agrarian system of Muslim India* (Reprint, Allahabad, n. d), p. 183.

accurate information is not available; but it appears that in some places it was less and in others more than on the lands irrigated by well. The third method was measurement which was common in the north. According to this settlement the share of the State was fixed at one-fourth; it was determined on the basis of the prevailing prices at the market and the quality and quantity of the crop. The peasants preferred measuring to sharing, as in the former case they had to pay only one-fourth instead of one-half; as the Government was anxious to attract the cultivators it would be reasonable to infer that they were given the option. The reforms were undoubtedly based on sound principles and methods which had yielded excellent results in the north, but their successful operation depended on the ability and integrity of the *Dīwān* and his staff. Murshid Quli Khān was keenly interested in his work and there was nothing which he would not be prepared to do with his own hands. Besides personally supervising the minutest details he is stated to have sometimes visited the fields and measured the land with the *jarīb* in his hands. It is due to the sincerity of his intentions," writes Shāh Nawāz Khān, "that he has become immortal, i.e. his fame for giving this *dastūr al'amal*, will continue with the passage of years and months."<sup>79</sup> The system introduced by Murshid Quli Khān is known after him as "the *dhārā* of Murshid Quli Khān" His reforms completely changed the complexion of the revenue administration and brought prosperity to the country; "in 1658 the accurate observer Bhimsen Burhānpūrī saw not a single piece of waste land near Awrangabad; wheat and pulse were sold at 2-1/2 maunds a rupee, *jawār* and *bājra* at 3-1/2 maunds, molasses at half a maund, and yellow oil (*ghee*?) at four seers."<sup>80</sup>

### The pay of the troopers is raised by Awrangzib

Awangzib always showed consideration to the officers who served the State with honesty and ability, and supported them in their legitimate demands. The Emperor, for instance, issued a Regulation (*dābṭah-i-dāgh*) that every officer posted in the Deccan

<sup>79</sup> *Ma'athir al-Umara*, III, 496.

<sup>80</sup> *Dilkusha* as quoted in Sarkar, I, 194.

was to bring his contingent to the muster, where the horses of his troops were to be branded. This was a necessary step for checking the number of horses maintained by each officer; in case a commander was found to have kept less than the number assigned to him, he would be obliged to refund the excess amount charged by him. This order appeared to be sound in principle, but Awrangzib took a realistic view of the situation and explained to the Emperor that the Regulation would bring hardship to the officers. He said that the situation in the Deccan was not normal; the officers could not realize their nominal pay from their *jagirs*; some had not been able even to take possession of the lands assigned to them. They therefore depended mainly on the cash allowances paid to them from the Treasury. If therefore they would be forced to refund the excess sums charged by them in the past through deductions in future their condition would become worse than what it had been. This would naturally affect the strength and efficiency of the army in the Deccan, "a province which besides being extensive in territory is, unlike the *Ṣubahs* of Bengal and Gujarat, situated on the frontiers of two Rulers who have large treasuries and forces".

Another defect of the *Dagh* Regulation, pointed out to the Emperor, was the reduction of the troopers' pay from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 17/- or Rs. 15/- p.m. The Central Government had taken this step with a view to reduce the expenditure on administration; but, Awrangzib wrote to his father, no horseman could keep himself and his horse "in proper fighting trim."<sup>81</sup> The Prince was rather emphatic in explaining the dangers inherent in the enforcement of the Regulation. In previous years most of them were receiving Rs. 32/- p.m., and they had not got as many of their horses branded as they should have done, with the result that large sums of money in the form of balances were still outstanding against their names in

<sup>81</sup> Aurangzib's actual words were:

پیدا است کہ این نوع مردم کہ بدین قلیل لوکر باشند، حال اسپان  
ایشان چه خواهد بود، و از آنها چه کار خواهد کشود

*Translation:* It is evident what the condition of the horses of men drawing such a small pay would be and what they would be able to achieve.

the office records. If the Imperial orders were to be enforced these sums would have to be realized from the *jagirs*, and it is not difficult to guess what the result would be. The officers would not be in a position to retain their forces in full strength. This was a great risk because the Provincial Government needed adequate forces to maintain law and order.<sup>82</sup> Shāhjahān accepted Awrangzib's proposal and withdrew the orders relating to the reduction of the troopers' pay.

### Reform in Artillery

Besides Revenue and Finance, Awrangzib wanted to improve the various branches of the Army also, particularly his Artillery. In 1650 a capable officer, Mir Khalil was appointed *Dārūshah-i-Tūp-khānāh*; he took measures to eradicate the prevailing abuses. Though only a *Dārūshah* he made arrangements in this branch, which were far better than those of the *Shāhdārs* of the Province.<sup>83</sup> He toured the country and visited every fort; most of them were found in a state of neglect. He supplied them with necessary provisions and stores. He would call the musketeers and make them undergo a test; a target, three yards square, was prepared, and every one of them was given a chance to shoot with his match-lock from a distance of forty paces. Those who could not hit the mark even once were removed from service. Similarly old men who were unfit for service were put on pension. Within six weeks he improved the efficiency of the artillery and defence garrison, effecting at the same time a saving of Rs. 50,000 a year. Awrangzib was highly pleased with the honesty and efficiency exhibited by Mir Khalil in the discharge of his duties as *Dārūshah*; as a mark of appreciation of his service he appointed him Qila'hdār of Fathābād which was an important frontier post.<sup>84</sup> Mir Khalil was succeeded by Hu'hdār Khan<sup>85</sup> the next incumbent of the post was Mukhtār Khan.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Letter No. 10:64 in Najib Ashraf, p. 117.

<sup>83</sup> *Ma'athir al-Umarā*, I, 786.

<sup>84</sup> He says that it was necessary to place this important fort in the charge of a trusted officer, and therefore he selected Mir Khalil who "is an experienced and well-behaved slave and has rendered satisfactory service in the Artillery." Letter 5:53 in Najib Ashraf, *Letters*, p. 95.

<sup>85</sup> *Ma'athir al-Umarā*, III, 943 et. seq.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 620 et. seq.

### Shahjahan's unkind Treatment of Awrangzib

Since his failure at Qandahār, Awrangzib was receiving a most unfair treatment from the Emperor. It is hardly necessary to repeat here that the main cause of Shāhjahān's unkindness to the most capable and devoted of his sons was the incessant poisoning of his ears by Dārā and his partisans. Dārā's enmity towards Awrangzib has been attributed by some writers to the sharp differences in their religious ideas and beliefs; this may be partly correct, but the real cause was the elder brother's fear of the immense popularity and capacity of the other. He knew that succession to the Mughl throne was not governed by any rigid law; often even a Prince had to struggle for it. Unconsciously perhaps Dārā realized that Awrangzib's attainments and character had made him almost a hero in the orthodox circles, while his vanity and haughtiness as well as his religious vagaries, particularly his unconcealed hostility towards orthodox Islam (which was derisively termed as *Islam-i-Majāzī*) had alienated from him the sympathies of many a Muslim nobleman. He thought it necessary therefore to discredit Awrangzib both as an officer and as a Prince. He tried and succeeded in winning the sympathy of his eldest sister, Jahān-Ārā Begam, otherwise known as Begam Şāhibah, who was a favourite of Shāhjahān and had great influence at the Palace. No doubt Begam Şāhibah often came to Awrangzib's rescue and saved him from being permanently condemned by the Emperor, but her personal sympathies were always with Dārā. It would be worthwhile to examine the circumstances which continuously added to the displeasure of the Emperor.

### Administrative Reforms

The Deccan as has been stated was a *problem province* for the Mughls; their hold on its territories had never been firm and on its frontiers lay two powerful kingdoms with large forces, by no means friendly to them. Moreover, its administration had deteriorated owing to a variety of causes; several Viceroys had been tried but



they had all signally failed to improve it. Awrangzib was therefore expected to introduce reforms and raise the level of its administration. Shāhjahān's impatience in regard to the improvement of conditions in the Deccan is understandable, but it is surprising that in spite of his personal knowledge about the affairs in the south he was unable to appreciate the magnitude of the task entrusted to Awrangzib. On his arrival at Burhānpūr the Prince received repeated instructions from the Emperor to proceed to Dawlatābād. Perhaps Awrangzib knew that it would be wrong for him to leave Burhānpūr before settling the affairs of the area. He therefore sent detailed accounts of the problems demanding his attention as well as the steps that were taken by him to improve the state of affairs.<sup>87</sup> The Emperor did not agree with him and only three months after his arrival at Burhānpūr, he received a stern warning that immediately after receiving the Imperial order he should move to Dawlatābād.<sup>88</sup> In his reply Awrangzib explained to the Emperor that the conditions in the Deccan were too bad to be repaired in a short time, while the situation in Dawlatābād did not require his immediate presence there; he also added that he would carry out the reforms without delay and would not let personal inconvenience interrupt his work.<sup>89</sup>

### Financial Difficulties

Shāhjahān was also unable to appreciate Awrangzib's difficulties in regard to finance. The new *jagirs* assigned to him on his appointment as Viceroy of the Deccan were far less productive than those held by him as Governor of Multan. According to calculations his income would now be reduced by 17 lakhs of rupees. He wrote to the Emperor that in keeping with the dignity of his position as Viceroy of the Deccan and the responsibilities he would be re-

<sup>87</sup> Letter No 16:48 in Najib Ashraf.

<sup>88</sup> Letter No. 3:51.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

quired to discharge in that capacity it was necessary that he should be assigned better lands in *jagir*. The reduction in *jagir* was therefore incomprehensible to him and he wrote a letter to his eldest sister, who had some influence at the court, complaining about this action of the Emperor: "if His Majesty wants this devoted servant to live in retirement then Baglānā, which had been previously awarded to him as *al-tamghā*, would be sufficient; but if he through his kindness to his disciple and benevolence to the humble ones, wants to honour him with the assignment of the administration of a large Province than he should put his affairs in a state which might not bring him into disgrace before his colleagues and the people of the Deccan, and might not thus leave him to become the target of the Imperial wrath for his inefficiency."<sup>90</sup> Awrangzib's complaint was not baseless. The lands assigned to him did not yield even one-fourth of the recorded revenue. Similarly the remaining one-third of his salary which he was authorized to take in cash could be realized from the crown-lands set apart for the purpose; he had therefore to draw it either from the reserve fund of the Deccan or from the treasuries of Malwa and Surat. He sent detailed reports to the Emperor giving actual figures of collections in the lands assigned to them. *Shāhjahān*'s decision in the matter was very clumsy: he authorized Awrangzib to select the best lands for himself. This, the Prince pointed out, was unfair as well as impolitic. The nobles who would be deprived of productive lands would certainly leave the Deccan, which would adversely affect the strength and efficiency of the military forces. He suggested that instead of transferring the productive lands from the *jagirs* of the Amirs to his own, he should be given lands in other Provinces. *Shāhjahān* did not accept the proposal and he was therefore compelled to keep most of the unproductive lands with him; he took only a small number of *maḥāls* from the crown-lands and other *jagirdars*.<sup>91</sup> The latter naturally started a campaign of propaganda against him.

<sup>90</sup> Letter 2: 134 in Najib Ashraf, p. 230.

<sup>91</sup> *Birākhi az maḥ l-i-khāliṣah Sharifah*, Letters No. 12:68 and 3:59.

### Awrangzib's Recommendations ignored

Besides frequent censures of the Emperor, Awrangzib's work was constantly interrupted on account of interference from the Centre even in matters of details. He adopted the only course which he thought was practicable in the circumstances. Instead of taking decisions on problems that came up before him he referred them to the Court. Multafit Khān wanted fifty thousand rupees for constructing dams in Khandesh and Berar. Awrangzib directed him to send his demand to the Court. Shāhjahān became furious and wrote to him: "it was expected from that disciple that in a case like this he should have advanced the money from the Imperial Exchequer, making it conditional on the approval of the Court."<sup>92</sup> Awrangzib's explanation was obvious; he referred to past experience which had prompted him to take this action.

Awrangzib had to face other difficulties also in the performance of his routine duties. Quite frequently the Emperor rejected his recommendations with regard to promotions and appointments. He recommended, for instance, Hushdār, son of Multafit Khān, for the post of *Dārū Ghah-i-Tupkhānah*; the Emperor rejected the recommendation, and ordered the appointment of Safī Khān or Mīr Ahmad Riqwī. Awrangzib was deeply hurt by this order of the Emperor.<sup>93</sup> Another case mentioned in his letters is that of the Qil'ahdār of Asīr. This fort had been placed in the custody of Awrangzib, but when he decided to send an officer of his choice to take charge of it, they stopped him. Awrangzib wrote to Jāhān-Ārā that no reason was given for the Imperial order, adding that it was his misfortune that in spite of his long record of twenty years of devoted service he could not win the Emperor's confidence even to the extent to which his nephew had been able to do.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>92</sup> Letter No. 17:73.

<sup>93</sup> Letter No. 2:58.

<sup>94</sup> Letter No. 27:159.

Another source of anxiety was that his opponents constantly poisoned the Emperor's ears against some of the most devoted officials working under him. When he was in Multan, for instance, the Emperor wrote to him that Malik Husayn had been reported to be maltreating the peasants. The Prince knew that the reports against the official were baseless; he therefore explained to the Emperor that besides the thieves and unruly persons Malik Husayn had never treated any person unjustly. Had he been guilty of unnecessary harshness, ".....I would have warned him myself and would have never allowed him to indulge in cruelties; most probably interested persons have misstated the facts."<sup>95</sup> Later, orders were received from the Court requisitioning the services of Malik Husayn; he was retained at the centre and given a promotion. Awrangzib could easily read the motive behind this action of the Central Government; his reaction was sharp. In a letter to Jahān-Ārā who had considerable influence over his opponents he wrote: "If this practice continues and the officers serving under me are called to the Centre and given promotions higher than they deserve, no one will remain with me; the band of workers whom I have been able to bring together during a period of twenty years will be dispersed. In that case it will not be possible for me to discharge my duties in a satisfactory manner. If, however, that is considered advisable then orders might be issued so that I might willingly ask all my capable officers (*Nawkarān-i-Kārāmadanī*) to proceed to the Court, which will fulfil the purpose of my "friends" (*Azizan*)." Continuing the statement he asks, if His Majesty had not thrown him out of his confidence then what could be the purpose behind this action? In conclusion, he requested his sister to speak to the Emperor about him in privacy and then inform him about his reactions, so that he might beg forgiveness.<sup>96</sup>

#### **Sultan Muhammad's betrothal**

Awrangzib's opponents did not miss any opportunity of intensifying the Emperor's displeasure and then widen the gulf between him

<sup>95</sup> Letter No. 3:8.

<sup>96</sup> Letter No. 27:159

and his son. As an instance the question of the betrothal of Awrangzib's eldest son, Muḥammad Sulṭān, with Shujā's daughter may be mentioned. The two brothers, Shuja' and Awrangzib, had arranged two matrimonial alliances of their children to strengthen the family ties. Muḥammad Sulṭān was to be married to Shujā's daughter, while his son, Zayn-al-Dīn, was engaged to a daughter of Awrangzib. Shāhjahān wrote to Awrangzib to marry Muḥammad Sulṭān elsewhere; Awrangzib expressed his inability to violate the pledge which he had given to Shujā' by annulling the betrothal. He, however, told Shāhjahān that he would willingly carry out the Imperial orders in respect of the engagement of his other sons; but Shāhjahān treated this as an act of disobedience and punished Awrangzib by depriving him of the fort of Asīr. Awrangzib's reaction to this order is significant; "if this is due to my refusal to accept the proposed engagement," he wrote, "then I am helpless, because whenever the matter came up before His Majesty he gave me an option of accepting (or rejecting) his proposal. For certain reasons I did not want and do not want even now to accept it. I told him the truth. If, however, His Majesty had given a definite order then, although in view of justice His Majesty never exercises pressure on an humble slave like myself in such matters, I would have had no option.<sup>97</sup> Besides such matters some minor incidents were also used by interested persons to provoke the Emperor's wrath on Awrangzib; quite a few instances of such occurrences may be read in his letters.

The detailed references to Shāhjahān—Aurangzib correspondence in the above paragraphs leaves no doubt as to the existence of a party at the Imperial Court, which was constantly working against Awrangzib. Every effort was being made by them to malign him and make him the object of the displeasure of his father. Dārā was obviously the leader of this group; Jahān-Ārā Begam, though not hostile to Awrangzib, was certainly in sympathy with her elder

<sup>97</sup> Letter No. 27:159.

brother. Their methods were subtle and effective; every thing was done after careful planning. The result was that Shāhjahān, perhaps unconsciously, walked into the trap and began to behave as if he himself was the leader of the anti-Awrangzib faction. For the Empire, he failed to realize, it was highly dangerous; the efficiency of administration was adversely affected and the influential Courtiers were almost forced to form themselves into groups. It is surprising that Shāhjahān though a shrewd and experienced statesman, was unable to check the growth of these evil tendencies. Undoubtedly he wanted Dārā to succeed him, and there was nothing objectionable in it, but the method which he was following to assure his succession to the throne was certainly bad. A spirit of rivalry existed among his grown-up sons; instead of killing it Shāhjahān made it more intense and ultimately allowed it to develop into hostility, at least between Dārā and Awrangzib. It was not long before he had to reap the fruits of his unwise policy.

#### **War with Golconda and Bijapur**

No problem pertaining to the foreign policy of the Mughuls presented greater complications than their relations with the Sultans of Bijapur and Golconda. A long era of conflict and wars had come to an end with treaties which had been signed in 1636. It appears, however, that the Deccan Sultans had accepted peace not without reservation; they violated its terms whenever they found a suitable opportunity. Some of the Mughul Viceroys before Awrangzib were not competent officers. Taking advantage of their weakness the Sultans stopped sending tribute to the Court; nor did they pay any heed to the other conditions of the treaties. Awrangzib wanted to undo this state of affairs and make the Sultans discharge their obligations under the treaties. On reaching Burhanpur he sent Ja'far Khān and 'Abd al-Laṭif as his envoys to the courts of Bijapur and Golconda; at the same time he wrote to the Emperor that the Sultans should be directed to deal with the Mughul Government through the Viceroy of the Deccan.<sup>98</sup> Shāhjahān ignored this request. Awrangzib repeated it but the Emperor paid no attention to his remonstrances. The result was

<sup>98</sup> Letter No. 2:50, and 6: 54.

that the *Wakils* of the Sultans continued to stay at the Court where they could easily win the patronage of Dārā and counteract Awrangzib's proposals for reform.

#### Golconda's default

The Sultān of Golconda had promised to send every year two lakhs of *hun* as tribute; but in spite of the fact that his country was rich<sup>99</sup> and fertile he had not paid it and owed to the Empire a huge sum of money in the form of arrears. Awrangzib asked Quṭb al-Mulk to pay the arrears, adding that the Emperor had permitted to pay half of the eight lakhs due from him in the form of elephants. The Sultān, however, remained unmoved in spite of repeated reminders from the Prince. Another cause of complaint against the Sultān was the latter's aggressions in the Karnatik. The whole of this region covering the territory below the Krishna up to Tajore "was covered with a number of petty Hindu principalities, the jarring fragments of the ruined empire of Vijaynagar."<sup>100</sup> Both the Sultans had been raiding these territories from time to time. For the absorption of one of these principalities, with Chandragiri as its capital, there was now a race between Bijapur and Golconda. The chief of Chandragiri, Sri Ranga Rayal, sent one of his confederates, Sri Niwas, to Awrangzib with a petition that "raising him up from the dust of disgrace he (the Emperor), should incorporate his state into the protected territories" and issue orders to the Sultans not to encroach upon his frontiers. As a mark of gratitude for this help he was prepared to send to the Imperial Court "fifty lakhs of *hun*, twenty elephants, precious jewels as annual tribute (*pishkash*) with gifts and rarities." . . . In conclusion he had added: "If his being an unbeliever stood in the path of this assistance . . . he would embrace Islam with all his dependents . . .".<sup>101</sup> In forwarding the petition of the Rayal, Awrangzib strongly recommended his case to

<sup>99</sup> "The Kingdom of Golkonda speaking generally," says Tavernier, "is a rich country, abounding in corn, rice, cattle, sheep, fowls and other commodities necessary to life . . . there is also an abundance of fish . . ." *Travels in India* (London, 1925), p. 121.

This is corroborated by Awrangzib *vide* Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*.

<sup>100</sup> Sarkar, I, 214.

<sup>101</sup> Letter No. 1:84.

the Emperor. The latter asked the Prince to send a man to Chandragiri and ascertain if the request of the Raja was genuine. In compliance with this order Awrangzib sent Muḥammad Mu'min to the capital of the Raja, but in the meantime the Sultans of Golconda and Bajapur secured the permission of the Emperor to seize his territories. The Emperor who had received precious *nadhirs* from the Sultans now criticized Awrangzib for sending his agent to the Raja, completely forgetting that the step had been taken under his own orders. To cover up his indiscreet action Shāhjahān wrote to his son: "To send an envoy to the Raja of Karnatik was improper. You should have frightened the Sultans<sup>102</sup> and forced them to send a handsome *pīshkash* to the Court and to yourself."<sup>103</sup>

This was bad diplomacy, but Awrangzib was helpless; he had to carry out the instructions of the Central Government. Nevertheless he explained to the Emperor that the attitude of the Sultans had been far from commendable; they had attacked Karnatik, plundered its territories and captured its treasures and forts, but after doing all this "they had not sent any thing to the Court from the vast booty seized by them." Nor was it a wise step to have ignored the Raja's offer to send a handsome *pīshkash* and also embrace Islam. Shāhjahān again tried to justify his action by telling him that 'Ādil Khān (Ruler of Bijapur) had sent a rare elephant. Awrangzib's reply was interesting; he pointed out that of the many elephants seized by him the Sultan had sent only one to the Court, and he was certainly lucky that this trifling present was accepted by His Majesty. However, in view of the change in Shahjahān's policy, Awrangzib had to write a letter to Quṭb al-Mulk which was contradictory to what he had written earlier. The only impression left on the mind of the Sultan by this confused policy of the Emperor was that it would pay him if he could keep himself in contact with the Court party led by Dārā, the Viceroy of the Deccan could be safely ignored. He also thought that he could then violate the conditions of the treaty which he had signed with the Mughuls. Besides the payment of the tribute the two main terms of this treaty were that the calumination

<sup>102</sup> In the correspondance between Shahjahān and Awrangzib the Sultans are referred to as *dunyā dārān i dakhan*.

<sup>103</sup> Letter No. 3:86.



of the *Ṣahābah* (Prophet's *Companions*) would be discontinued and that the Sulṭan would include in the *Khūṭbah* the name of the Mughul Emperor. Now taking advantage of the situation at the Imperial Court Quṭb al-Mulk again started the evil practice of cursing the Prophet's *Companions*; he also renewed his contacts with Persia. The differences between the Mughuls and the Deccani Sulṭans had so far remained behind the screen. A wholly unexpected incident, however, forced the parties to become openly hostile to each other, and resort to arms.<sup>104</sup>

### Mir Jumlah

Muḥammad Sa'id, who later came to be known as Mir Jumlah, was the son of an oil merchant of Iṣfahān. In 1630 he came to Golconda where he soon attracted the notice of 'Abdallāh Qutab Shāh who appointed him his Chief Minister. Being a capable officer he soon extended his influence over the Court. The Sulṭan sent him as the leader of an expedition against Karnatik; here he exhibited great ability in capturing some of the strongest fortresses belonging to the Chief of Chandragiri. He amassed considerable wealth and raised his vast *jagir* in the Karnatic almost to the position of an inde-

<sup>104</sup> The Deccan Sulṭans had persistently followed a policy of winning the friendship of the Persian Rulers with a view to strengthen their opposition to the Mughuls. The Ṣafawīs encouraged them by extending their support because like them the Rulers of the Deccan were also Shi'ahs. Political rivalry between the Ṣafawīs and the Mughuls had been greatly accentuated by their differences on Qandahār. Highly courteous in their diplomatic correspondence the two Monarchies were always ready to seize an opportunity of stabbing the other in the back. Abusing the *Companions* of the Prophet, particularly the first three Caliphs, has been a common practice with some sections of the Shi'ahs. The Deccan Sulṭans, like the Ṣafawids, indulged in this evil practice. Shāhjahān advised by Awrangzib, had forced them to stop it. It is a well-known fact that Awrangzib was more particular than any one else to have this practice stopped. The Persian Monarchs were therefore unhappy with the Mughuls and encouraged the Sulṭans to create difficulties for them. When Awrangzib was engaged in the war of succession the Persian Monarch wrote letters to Quṭb al-Mulk and 'Ādil Shāh to take advantage of the difficulties of the Mughuls. He also made an attempt to encourage Dārā by inviting him to his country: he promised to help him in reconquering the Empire with the assistance of Persian forces. At the same time he wrote to Awrangzib advising him to suppress his enemies. For these letters of the Persian Monarch see *Munṣha'āt i Tāhir Waḥid*.

pendent State. The phenomenal rise in the position and wealth of Mīr Jumlah alarmed his patron, whose ears were being continuously poisoned by the former's enemies. Mīr Jumlah could easily notice the change in his master's attitude, and being a shrewed and far-sighted person he could read the future. He therefore contacted the Courts of Bijapur and Persia and also approached Awrangzīb's envoy in Golconda. Awrangzīb informed the Emperor that Mīr Jumlah was afraid that Quṭb al-Mulk would throw him into prison and it would be advisable for the Government to give him protection.<sup>105</sup> On receiving the Emperor's approval to this proposal, Awrangzīb directed Mu'min, who was on his way to Karnatik whither he had been sent to contact Mīr Jumlah, to assure him of the Emperor's patronage. In the meantime Quṭb al-Mulk, being alarmed by the possibility of his *Wazir's* joining the Mughul service, started cajoling him with a view to call him to his capital and then arrest him by a trick.<sup>106</sup> However, Mīr Jumlah relying on the Sulṭan's word returned to his Court; here he soon came to know of the evil intentions of his master. Accordingly he tried to escape from his clutches and ultimately succeeded in returning to his *jagir* in Karnatik.<sup>107</sup> In the meantime his son had assured the Mughul envoy that Mīr Jumlah "was not satisfied with Quṭb al-Mulk and had made this conciliation only out of expediency. If he could be assured that he would receive the Imperial favours in the form he desired then he would certainly go to His Majesty's Court."<sup>108</sup> Awrangzīb on his part continued his efforts to secure the services of a capable officer like Mīr Jumlah, but the latter was simply biding his time; in fact he was more keen to remain in the Shi'ah Kingdom of Golconda than go over to the Court of a Sunni Emperor. On receiving a report to this effect from Muḥammad Mu'min, Awrangzīb wrote to his father that Mīr Jumlah was not genuine in offering himself for service at the Imperial Court.<sup>109</sup> It was however not

<sup>105</sup> Letter 11:67.

<sup>106</sup> Letter No. 13:69.

<sup>107</sup> According to Awrangzīb's statement the Sulṭan wanted to blind him. See letter No. 15:71.

<sup>108</sup> Letter No. 3:86.

<sup>109</sup> About the strength of Mīr Jumlah's forces, Awrangzīb wrote: he had 9000 horsemen, 5,000 servants and 4,000 of the Sulṭan's men, in addition to 20,000 infantry *vide* letter no. v2:88.

long before Mir Jumlah became convinced of the fact that his life and property were not safe as long as he remained in the Qutb-Shāhi Kingdom. He therefore reopened negotiations with Awrangzib.

#### **Mir Jumlah joins the Mughul service**

Awrangzib wrote to the Emperor that the Deccani Sultans were contemplating an attack on Mir Jumlah, and the latter having been perturbed by these reports had sought the protection of the supporters of His Majesty's Government. As he had no other means of safeguarding himself against the tyrannies of the Sultans<sup>110</sup> he had strong hopes of receiving aid from the Court. Shāhjahān authorized Awrangzib to let Mir Jumlah and his son join the Mughul service. Awrangzib immediately informed Mir Jumlah that the Emperor had allowed him to join the Mughul service; at the same time he asked the Emperor to send his orders direct to Mir Jumlah. Accordingly Muḥammad Āṣif Kaṣhmīrī was despatched with an offer of a manṣab of 5,000 for Mir Jumlah and 2000 for his son Muḥammad Amīn. Before his departure for the north, however, Muḥammad Amīn had been arrested by Qutb al-Mulk.<sup>111</sup> Awrangzib wrote to Shāhjahān that he should direct the Sulṭān to set Amīn free because he had already been offered service under the Mughuls.<sup>112</sup> Shāhjahān accepted the suggestion and authorized him to direct the contingent posted at Jatya to proceed to the fortress of Qandahār (lying midway between Awrangābād and Ḥaidarābād) and that he should either take the command in his own hands or send his eldest son. Awrangzib was also directed to write to Qutb al-Mulk that the Emperor had taken Mir Muḥammad Sa'id and his son into his service; he should therefore release Muḥammad Amīn and allow him to proceed to the Court, or else an army would be despatched against Golconda."<sup>113</sup> Awrangzib carried out these instructions; a

<sup>110</sup> As in many other cases the two Sultans of the Deccan were equally interested in crushing Mīr Jumlah.

<sup>111</sup> The immediate cause of the arrest was an act of misbehaviour by Amīn. He came to the Court in a State of drunkenness, lay himself down on the royal carpet and vomitted. The Sulṭān ordered his arrest: Muḥammad Amīn showed to him the letter of Awrangzib containing an offer of service under the Mughuls. Qutb al-Mulk, however, took no notice of it.

<sup>112</sup> Letter 9:95.

<sup>113</sup> Letter No. 10:96.

contingent of forces under Hadi Dād Khān, was sent to Qandahar with directions to wait there for further orders. He also wrote to Quṭb al-Mulk asking him to release Amīn Khān, restore his property, adding that in case of non-compliance of these directions by the Sulṭān he would be compelled to send his son to lead an expedition against him.

### **Golconda attacked**

Although Shāhjahān had given him full permission to launch an attack on Golconda, Awrangzib feared that the Court party might create difficulties in his way at a later stage. In view of these apprehensions he wrote to the Emperor, as a precautionary measure, that "if the doors of the machinations of the agents of the Sulṭān and acceptance of their presents are closed and no interference from that side is made then the entire territories which Mīr Jumlah has conquered in the Karnatik and which are not less extensive than the Kingdom of Golconda itself with all its precious treasures, will be conquered and added to the Empire without much difficulty."<sup>114</sup> In a subsequent letter he was more straightforward and more emphatic in telling the Emperor that the Sulṭān would approach him in all humility and send petitions seeking mercy, but that it would be impolitic not to take advantage of the situation and listen to the protestations of the interested courtiers in his favour.<sup>115</sup>

Having taken this precaution, Awrangzib ordered his eldest son, Prince Muḥammad Sulṭān, to march on Ḥaidarābād (26 December, 1655) and deliver Muḥammad Amīn from imprisonment; he reached Nandir on 7 January 1656. Quṭb al-Mulk took no notice of the Prince's march towards his capital because he expected help from Bijapur.<sup>116</sup> Two weeks later Awrangzib decided to move in person and take charge of the operations in his own hands.<sup>117</sup> In the meantime Quṭb al-Mulk seeing that the Mughul forces had come dangerously near his capital released Muḥammad Amīn. Awrangzib

<sup>114</sup> Letter No. 12:98.

<sup>115</sup> Letter No. 16:102.

<sup>116</sup> Letter No. 14:100.

<sup>117</sup> As usual he informed the Emperor that he was leaving Awrangābād to direct the campaign personally, *vide* Letter No, 15:101,

therefore ordered Prince Muḥammad to encamp at a suitable sight near Ḥaidarābād. Quṭb al-Mulk now shut himself up in the strong fort of Golconda, while Prince Muḥammad Sulṭān threw his camp by the side of a big tank known as Ḥusayn Sāgar. Quṭb al-Mulk's behaviour was now incomprehensible; almost every day he would send messages to the Prince begging for peace; but at the same time his forces frequently attacked the Mughul camp and minor actions were fought between the parties. The site of Prince Muḥammad's camp being too open, it was difficult for him to put up a strong line of defence; accordingly he moved into the city of Ḥaidarābād and occupied it. Quṭb al-Mulk was now forced to open negotiations for peace, but the Prince said that he could not take a decision until the arrival of his father. Before Awrangzib reached Ḥaidarābād (6 February) Quṭb al-Mulk's forces had started bombarding the city from the ramparts of the fort of Golconda. On his arrival the infantrymen of Golconda, ten to twelve thousand in number, began to throw rockets and bullets on his forces.<sup>18</sup> Quṭb al-Mulk thus offered Awrangzib with a *casus belli*. Though tired after a two-week journey, Awrangzib immediately drove his elephant forward and ordered a general attack. The battle raged till the evening, when some of the Golconda forces fled towards the jungle, while others withdrew to the fort.

### Siege of Golconda

Awangzib now decided to besiege the fort without delay, although he was not equipped with heavy guns which were so necessary for undertaking the siege of such a strong fortress. Nor had Shā'istah Khān and some other nobles, who had been ordered by Shāhjahān to join Awrangzib, arrived by that time. It was therefore not a full-fledged siege but only a surrounding of the fortress by the Mughul forces. The Deccanis were consequently able to send their forces to fight open battles; two such actions had been fought on 12 February near the walls of the fort and on 13 March at a distance of 20 miles. In these clashes the Deccanis had suffered defeats, which had convinced them that it was beyond their power to expel the Mughuls. The Sultan therefore started making appeals

<sup>18</sup> Wārith (p. 181) as quoted in Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 296.

and sending presents to Awrangzib, but the latter was determined to bring the Deccan problem to an end by conquering Golconda.<sup>119</sup> In the meantime, however, Quṭb al-Mulk's agents had been able to persuade D r and some influential courtiers to influence the Emperor who rather abruptly issued instructions to Awrangzib to stop the siege operations and restore the territories conquered by him to the Sulṭan. This letter reached Awrangzib when he has already given his terms to the Sulṭan. The pressure of the siege had forced Quṭb al-Mulk to send his old mother to plead on his behalf. Out of consideration for the old woman's request Awrangzib had agreed to grant peace to her son; Quṭb al-Mulk was to pay an indemnity of one crore of rupees besides jewels, elephants, etc., and to offer his daughter in marriage to Prince Muḥammad Sulṭān.

In these circumstances Shāhjahān's letter placed Awrangzib in an awkward position, but as usual he decided to carry out the instructions of the Emperor and ordered a withdrawal of the besieging forces on 20 March 1656. Four days later Prince Muḥammad Sulṭān was married to the daughter of Quṭb Shāh; the bride joined the camp of her husband on 10 April. The Sulṭan swore on the *Qur'an* that he would obey the Emperor's commands. Besides the payment of tribute he had to cede the districts of Ramgir. The first instalment of 25 lakhs was reduced by 15 lakhs at the request of the Sulṭan's mother; subsequently Shāhjahān made a further reduction of 20 lakhs.

<sup>119</sup> Sarkar criticizes Awrangzib for "coverting" the rich and fertile kingdom of Golconda and praises Shāhjahān who "was loth to ruin a brother king for merely trying to bring his disloyal *Wazir* under discipline." See Sarkar, I, 237. This comment is based on a misreading of facts and an attempt to censure Awrangzib. It is evident from the past history of the Mughul-Deccan relations that nothing short of the end of the Sultanates as independent Kingdoms could bring peace to the people of the south. The only alternative to annexation was a withdrawal by the Mughuls of their claims on them: this however would have been suicidal to the interests and prestige of the Empire. Sarkar is wrong in attributing Shāhjahān's policy of not pushing the war to a logical end to his sympathy for a "brother king," its main reason was the pressure exercised by his eldest son, Dārā, who in his turn was moved by his jealousy against Awrangzib,

### **Aurangzib censured for not sending the booty to the Court**

The agents of Abd-all h Qutb Shāh as well as some of the advisers of the Emperor had presented before him highly exaggerated accounts of the wealth acquired by Aurangzib in his campaign against Golconda. Shāhjahān accordingly wrote to him to send the entire booty to the Court. Aurangzib who had absolutely no intention of retaining anything besides what had been assigned to him by the Emperor himself felt deeply aggrieved by this nasty letter. Originally the decision of the Emperor was that "out of Qutb al-Mulk's *pishkash* the jewels and elephants would belong to His Majesty while the cash would go to the Provincial Government." On this basis he had borrowed money for the expenses of the War. Ignoring this fact and forgetting his original orders Shāhjahān now forced Aurangzib to deposit the entire booty, acquired in cash as well as in kind, in the Imperial Treasury at Dawlatābād. Aurangzib was thus left poorer by 20 lakhs, which he had borrowed to meet the expenses of the war. Shāhjahān in fact went a step further, he censured him for he had been made to believe that the Prince and his son had received valuable presents from the Sulṭān.

Aurangzib was so deeply hurt by these letters of his father that instead of writing to him directly he explained the whole position to Mīr Jumlah, who had been appointed Wazīr at Delhi,<sup>120</sup> and to some other nobles at the Court.<sup>121</sup> He made it clear that the presents which had been retained by him were of poor quality and were in his opinion unworthy of being submitted to His Majesty. The elephants presented by the Sulṭān were of low price and the diamonds dark and defective.<sup>122</sup> He rightly adds that if his intention had been to conceal the presents he would not have accepted them in the presence of Mīr Jumlah and other nobles. Shāhjahān's treatment of his Viceroy and the rumours spreading about it could not fail to affect the attitude of the Sulṭān. "On hearing about the

<sup>120</sup> Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 302.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303-06.

<sup>122</sup> In fact Aurangzib was reluctant to accept these presents because of their poor quality. However, at the special request of the Sulṭān's envoy and a clear understanding that their price would not be deducted from the amount of the tribute he accepted them, Cf. Sarkar, I, 244,

absence of the Emperor's confidence and trust in me and his indifference towards my affairs and the objections that are made by the Court, along with the highly exaggerated rumours which are being spread by the people" wrote Awrangzib "the Rulers of the Deccan pay no heed to what I write and say. They considered it unnecessary to contact me and take no notice of my warnings. They have not carried out the instructions which I had issued to them, nor are they likely to do it in future."<sup>123</sup>

Awrangzib's campaign against Golconda, despite the obstacles placed by Shāhjahān in the path of its complete subjugation was an important event in the history of Mughul foreign policy. For more than a half a century the Mughuls had been trying to force the Deccan Sultanates to become their allies and recognize them as sovereigns. The Sultans, on the other hand, preferred to behave as hostile neighbours; the Mughuls therefore had no alternative but to force them into vassalage or annex their territories. As a farsighted statesman Awrangzib had realized this very early but Shāhjahān would not let him take a decisive step. However, Awrangzib's victories in 1656 brought Golconda's sovereignty to an end. Its Ruler pledged himself to the payment of a regular *pishkash* (tribute) and the recognition of the Emperor as his sovereign.

### **Karnatic**

Quṭb al-Mulk wanted to retain the Karnatik but Awrangzib's contention was that it was the *Jāgīr* of Mir Jumlah and therefore it became a part of the Empire on his joining Mughul service. Quṭb al-Mulk tried to use his old weapon of bringing *Dārā* (to the tune of 15 lakhs in this case) and rousing his jealousy against Awrangzib. He could not, however, succeed in this attempt because Mir Jumlah was present at the Court, and he could advise the Emperor and explain to him that Awrangzib's proposal was sound and advantageous. Shāhjahān agreed and his orders were carried out by Awrangzib. Quṭb al-Mulk however, continued to harrass the Mughul Viceroy by making occasional encroachments on parts of Karnatik. It was only after the War of Succession that Awrangzib could enforce the surrender and total incorporation of Karnatik in the Mughul Empire.

<sup>123</sup> Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 306.



### War with Bijapur

The attitude of the Mughul Government towards Bijapur hād throughout been rather soft. After the treaty of 1636, 'Ādil Khān was treated by the Emperor as a subordinate ally.<sup>124</sup> For the Sulṭān the great advantage of peaceful relations with the Mughūls was that he could utilize his army and other resources in expanding his territories. During this interval of peace he was able to conquer and annex territories of Konkon in the west and of Mysore in the south in addition to his acquisitions in the Karnatik. In 1654 he had sent an expedition to the Portuguese territories of Goa and Salsette and conquered some parts of their territory also.<sup>125</sup> The frontiers of the Kingdom of Bijapur now extended from the Arabian Sea in the west to the Bay of Bengal in the east. The Emperor addressed him as 'Shāh' instead of 'Khān,' which had naturally raised his status above that of other subordinate allies. But the Sulṭān did not feel quite comfortable in his subordinate position and often acted in a manner which indicated that he enjoyed full sovereignty in his dominions. He awarded the title of Khān Khānān to his Courtiers and arranged elephant combats, which were considered to be the prerogatives of the Emperor. He would avoid walking over a distance to receive the Imperial *farmān* because it was a clear sign of his vassalage to the Emperor. The latter on coming to know of this state of affairs sent specific instructions to Awrangzib to see that the Sulṭān received the *farman* after walking on foot in the usual way. "This time also" reports Awrangzib, "his intention was to deprive himself of this honour, as on the previous occasions, . . . . . as soon as he heard of the arrival of the Imperial *farmān* he declared himself to be ill, in order to avoid by this trick the

<sup>124</sup> Sarkar's view that the Sulṭān of Bijapur "had not become a vassal prince, nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute" is not correct. His interpretation of *pishkash* as "presents and not tribute" is unwarranted. Moreover, whatever the interpretation of *pishkash* it was a clear symbol of the superiority of the person to whom it was made. By agreeing to send *pishkash* to the Emperor the Sulṭān had formally acknowledged the sovereignty of Shāhjahān. This is corroborated by the fact that Shahjahān often censured the Sulṭān for showing a disregard to the Emperor's prerogative, as for instance, he was censured for conferring the title of Khan-Khanan at his courtiers. See Sarkar, I, 253-55.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. D'Anvers, *The Portuguese in India* (London, 1894), II,

observance of the ceremony of receiving it.” However, Awrangzib’s *ḥājib* had been sent with the Emperor’s messenger, and therefore the Sulṭān “could not translate his wish into action, although he tried hard.”

The most serious offence of ‘Ādil Shāh was his persistent efforts to help Golconda in its war against the Mughuls. Awrangzib informed the Emperor that the Sulṭān of Bijapur was making preparations to send forces to Golconda. “I have therefore sent a note” he adds “to Bijapur.....and if he does not give up his intention.....then the punishment (*tanbih*) which he deserves will be inflicted on him.....” He repeated the same news in a subsequent letter.<sup>126</sup> ‘Ādil Khān, in the meantime, apologized to Awrangzib informing him that he had no intention of assisting Golconda, but secretly “he was making preparations for sending reinforcements and had posted his men at the frontiers etc.”<sup>127</sup> This information of Awrangzib was correct because shortly after this “the foolish ‘Ādil Khān....sent a *bhatyārah*, named Afḍal with fifteen thousand horsemen to assist Quṭb al-Mulk....and the party had already marched twenty miles from Ḥaidarābād.”<sup>128</sup> Awrangzib realizing the serious consequences of the junction of Bijapur forces with those of Golconda immediately marched against ‘Ādil Khān. The latter, terrified by this news of the advance of Mughul forces, quietly called his army back. Awrangzib too withdrew to his camp. ‘Ādil Shāh however instigated Shivaji to create trouble for the Mughuls near the border of Junnair.<sup>129</sup> ‘Ādil Shāh played another trick also; he asked Shivaji’s father, Shahji Bhonsla, who had joined service at Bijapur, to seize that portion of Karnatik which Mīr Jumlah had captured on behalf of Golconda. Since Mīr Jumlah had accepted service at the Imperial Court, his territories in the Karnatik were supposed to have passed under the way of the Mughuls. Awrangzib therefore directed his officers posted in that region to go to the

<sup>126</sup> Letters No: 12:98 13:99.

<sup>127</sup> Letter No. 15:101.

<sup>128</sup> Letter No. 16:102.

<sup>129</sup> Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 313.

<sup>130</sup> The author of the *Basatin al-Salatin* (p. 343) has used the phrase, *jawab-i-hansaranah*.

assistance of Mīr Jumlah's agent, Muḥammad Ḥāshim. The Mughul contingent resisted the attack of the Maratha officer and expelled him from Mīr Jumlah's territory. 'Ādil Shāh's evil intentions were betrayed by his efforts to fortify the border posts near Junnair and build a new fort there. But Awrangzīb's prompt action had defeated his designs and his officers "having demolished the said fort, had left no traces of it." Thus, 'Ādil Shāh had all along been acting in a hostile manner, trying to create difficulties for the Imperial officers. It was not therefore surprising that Awrangzīb was in favour of taking a strong attitude on the Bijapur question. Shāhjahān who was now having the benefit of Mīr Jumlah's advice agreed with his view. He therefore wrote a strong letter to 'Ādil Shāh pointing out to him that he had been guilty of violating the terms of the treaty. 'Ādil Shāh consulted his officers. They told him that they were ready to offer resistance to the Mughul forces; he therefore sent a sharp reply to the Emperor's letter.<sup>130</sup> The same evening he had a conversation with Afḍal Khān and asked him about the possible results of war with the Mughuls. Afḍal painted a horrible picture of the conditions that were bound to follow in the wake of a war. The Sulṭān was deeply affected by his words and ordered the envoy, who had already covered three stages, to return. 'Ādil Shāh now changed his reply into an apology and stopped the practices which had annoyed the Emperor.<sup>131</sup> The Bijapur Mughul relations had reached this stage when 'Ādil Shāh died on 4 November 1656.

#### Immediate causes of rupture

Awangzīb sent the news of 'Ādil Shāh's death to the Emperor and also informed him that the courtiers of the late Sultan had placed upon the throne a youth reported to be his "adopted son of unknown origin."<sup>132</sup> The Mughul Emperor naturally resented the

<sup>131</sup> This story is related in detail in the *Bastāin* See pp. 342-44.

<sup>132</sup> The question of 'Ali 'Ādil Shāh's origin has assumed some importance because of his being placed upon the throne of Bijapur without any reference to the Emperor who had been acknowledged as its suzerain. The author of the *Bāsatīn* devotes a paragraph to his birth. He does not say clearly but his words indicate

*Contd. on page 208.*

procedure adopted by the courtiers of Bijapur. It was their duty to report to the Emperor the death of the late Sulṭan and their intention of placing an "adopted" son on the throne. Instead they crowned the youth hurriedly and offered the Emperor with a *fiat accompli*. Shāhjahān took a severe step: Awrangzib was directed to start preparations for a campaign against Bijapur, which however was not to be opened before Mīr Jumlah had joined him. Awrangzib, in the meantime, ordered the border defences to be repaired and instructed his officers posted there to accept in service any of the Bijapur commander or soldier who might approach them with a request to that effect. Mīr Jumlah could not reach Awrangābād before 16 January 1657.<sup>132</sup>

### **Awrangzib opens his campaign against Bijapur Bidar and Kaljani captured**

Two days after Mīr Jumlah's arrival the Mughul army began to move in the direction of Bijapur. The siege of Bidar commenced on 28 February. Bidar being a strong and well defended fort, it took the Mughuls almost a full month to capture it (30 March).<sup>133</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Before Mīr Jumlah joined him Awrangzib had received a request from Shivaji offering his services to the Mughuls if he was given the territory of Kcnkan. Awrangzib, recalling to his mind that on a previous occasion Shivaji had failed to fulfil the undertaking given by him to Prince Murād, asked him to accept certain conditions.

<sup>134</sup> Perhaps the siege would have continued for a longer time, if a serious explosion had not taken place on the 29th. The commandant of the fort, Sayyid Marjān was severely burnt and his stock of powder was completely destroyed. He therefore sent his seven sons with the keys of the fort to Awrangzib.

*Contd. from page 208.*

that he was the son of Muḥammad Shāh, by a woman of questionable position. The historian has cleverly avoided mentioning her name or status: he adds however that the King was happy "to receive this great gift and kindness". Nevertheless Awrangzib's envoy at the Court of Bijapur, Muḥammad Zamān Khān, calls him adopted son of obscure origin". (*Pisar-i-khwāndah-i-majhūl al-nasab*). This definitely shows that he was not the son of Muḥammad, but only an *adapted son*. Evidently in his official report, the envoy could not call the son of the Sulṭan as adopted son, and then adds to it the epithet, 'of obscure origin'. Awrangzib therefore reported to the Court that he was not the son of the late Sulṭan. See *Basatin*, pp. 361-62; Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 319.

Awrangzib's gain in capturing the fort was not insignificant; he captured 230 big guns besides 12 lakhs of cash. The next objective of the Prince was Kalyani "a place of considerable strength". He directed Mahābāt Khān to go in advance and clear the route to Kalyāni<sup>135</sup>. On receiving information that the line of advance was safe, Awrangzib commenced his march in April and was able to besiege the fort early next month. Mir Jumlah managed to push his trenches right up to the edge of the ditch despite the ceaseless firing of the defenders. More troublesome were the roving bands of the Deccanis who continuously threw rockets in the Mughul ranks. Besides this they fell upon Mughul convoys of provisions, which had to move under strong escorts.

Awrangzib in the meantime pressed the siege and was anxious to capture the fort at the earliest possible moment. He therefore ignored the presence of the Bijapur forces near his own camp. This led them to think that the Mughuls were afraid of a decisive engagement; they became more audacious and posted a strong army of 30,000 men at an hour's journey from his camp. The Prince now had to pay attention to these operations. Giving out that he was moving with the major portion of his army to Bhalki to secure provisions and leaving a screen of tents round the fort he made a sudden march and fell upon the Bijapur forces on 28 May. The Mughul vanguard commanded by Mir Jumlah and Dilir Khān were attacked by the sons of Bahlul Khān; they were however repulsed. Then fighting became general, and the battle raged for six hours. The Bijapuris put up a stubborn fight, but they could not withstand the repeated charges of the trained soldiers and were scattered in all directions. The Mughuls pursued them to their camp, and burnt their tents. Awrangzib returned to the trenches in the evening with fresh laurels of victory added to his reputation as a general and resumed the operations of the siege.

<sup>135</sup> Mahābat Khān had to fight a stiff battle with the Bijapur forces on 12 April. Sarkar lays emphasis on the point that Mahabat's instructions were to ravage the country; shortly after this statement he gives an account of the battle of 12 April.

**Kalyani captured**

The Bijapuris could not repair their position for nearly two months. It was not before the third week of July that reports of their preparations to reassemble the broken ranks of their army were received. Awrangzib immediately despatched a portion of his forces under the command of Prince Muḥammad Sulṭan and Mir Jumla. After covering forty-eight miles the two generals sighted the army of Bijapur and defeated it. The Bijapuris were pursued by the Mughuls who now entered Gulbarga, the old capital of the Bhamanis.<sup>136</sup> In the meantime Awrangzib's men had succeeded in demolishing the parapets of the fort on one side and scaling a tower on the other. The garrison had built a wall across the tower and now they fought the assailants from behind it. The Mughuls had to face a terrible situation, but they exhibited remarkable courage and demolished the wall although the Bijapuris continuously "flung on their heads lighted bombs, blazing sheets steeped in naphtha, and bundles of burning grass." The dauntless courage and determination of the Mughul soldiery were soon rewarded. Two days later Dilāwar Khān, the commandant of the fortress, offered to surrender on condition of being allowed a safe passage. Awrangzib accepted the offer; on 1 August he received the keys of the fort from Dilāwar Khān and allowed him and his men to return to Bijapur. Without any bloodshed, besides actual fighting, "Bidar and Kaliani, the guardian fortresses of 'Adil Shah's north-eastern frontier, had fallen and the way now seemed open for an advance on Bijapur itself. But a cruel disappointment was in store for Awrangzib; his victorious career was to be suddenly checked. The Bijapur agents had intrigued hard at court; Dārā's jealousy was rising in proportion to the success of his younger brother, and he at last persuaded the Emperor to put an end to the war."<sup>37</sup>

On the part of Shāhjahān no step could be more unwise than ordering a withdrawal of the Imperial forces. The fall of Bijapur was now only a question of time. Its conquest would have closed a very complicated chapter of Mughul foreign policy. But as usual Shāhjahān instead of looking at the problem from the point of view

<sup>136</sup> Awrangzib had ordered that special care was to be taken of the tomb of Khwaja Gisudaraz and those who took shelter in it. See Kanbūh, III, p. 260.

<sup>137</sup> Sarkar, I, 277-78.

of the Empire, took a fateful decision simply to please Dārā whose greatest fear was that Awrangzib was becoming too popular and strong for him.<sup>138</sup> The agent of 'Ādil Shāh, Ibrāhīm Khān Bachhtar, met Dārā who persuaded the Emperor to grant peace to Bijapur. Shāhjahān's terms included a war indemnity of one crore and a half, cession of Bidar, Kaljani and Parenda besides the forts of the Nizām-Shāhī Konkon and Wangi. The Sulṭan accepted these terms. When ratifying the treaty, Shāhjahān reduced the indemnity to one crore. Awrangzib decided to stay in Kalyani and see that the Bijapuris fulfilled the obligations imposed on them by the new treaty. Before any substantial step could be taken to enforce the terms Shāhjahān fell ill, and all sorts of rumours, including reports of his death, spread throughout the subcontinent. These rumours upset every thing, and Awrangzib had no option but to accept whatever he could easily get from Bijapur. Mir Jumlah was despatched towards Parenda to take delivery of the fort. On 4 October Awrangzib left Kalyani for Bidar and having stayed there for a little over one week to repair its defences, he took the road to Awrangābād on the 18th.

#### Shivaji punished for raiding Mughul territory, 1757

During the Mughul-Bijapur war, Shivaji tried to take advantage of what he thought was a delicate situation for Awrangzib. It has been mentioned that soon after the commencement of hostilities Shivaji had sent a message, "professing himself a servant of the Emperor," and offering his services to him. Awrangzib expressed his willingness to accept the offer under certain conditions. He was however not sincere in making the offer; "Shivaji although he professed obedience, and humbly demeaned himself, towards Awrangzib no sooner saw the army at a distance, and ready to engage in what he hoped would prove a long struggle, than he resolved on seizing this opportunity of augmenting his resources by plunder....."

<sup>138</sup> It appears Dārā had been in contact with the Government of Bijapur for a long time: two years earlier Awrangzib had complained to his elder sister, Jahān-Āra, that Dādā Bhāi Jeo (Dārā).....has sent his servant, Mulla Shawqi, with some messages (*ishārāt*) and powers to accept the requests of the Ruler of Bijapur....." See Letter No. 27:159.



Having thus prepared himself for raids on Mughul territory "he one night surprised and plundered the town of Joonere, carrying off three lakhs of pagodas in specie, 200 horses, some valuable clothes, and other articles." When Shivaji learnt of the victorious march of Awrangzib forces and it became almost certain that Bijapur would soon fall into his hands "he wrote to Awrangzib in the most humble strain, begging forgiveness for what had passed, and promising to continue steadfast in his allegiance for the future."<sup>139</sup> Awrangzib adopted a mild attitude towards the Maratha chief and wrote to him that although his actions did not deserve forgiveness he would condone them because he had repented and "our court is not a court of disappointment."<sup>140</sup> Awrangzib knew that neither the protestations of loyalty and devotion made by Shivaji nor the solemn promises and undertakings given by the Government of Bijapur could be relied upon in case of a crisis in the north. Before leaving the Deccan for Agra, therefore, he made necessary arrangements for the safety of the Mughul territories

<sup>139</sup> Cf. James Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas* (London, 1878) Vol. I, pp. 136-37.

<sup>140</sup> The original text is: این دزگه ما درگه نامیدی لیست . See Najib Ashraf, *Introduction*, p. 323.





