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MUSLIM THEOLOGY

By

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

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It is told of 'Abd al-Malik that the Koran was on his knees when the news came that he had become caliph. He put the book aside with the words? "This is a parting between me and thee."[1] From very early times the state collected certain taxes (*mukūs*) which were unknown to the religious law. This is perhaps responsible for the idea that tax collectors were changed into wolves and hyaenas.[2]

The government had its supporters. Sulaiman was addressed as al-Mahdī, and the same title was given to 'Umar II,[3] a poet said, "The commander of the faithful and the wounds he inflicts are like fate; none can find fault with it,"[4] a rebel is said to have invited men to dethrone the caliph, Mu'āwiya, and to disbelieve in God.[5] Al-Ḥajjāj, the scape-goat of a later time, regulated his religion by the Koran[6] and is acclaimed as "he who set up the tent of Islam."[7] He was no pietist for he said "It is more needful for men to obey me than God; for He says, Fear God as far as you can, but He says, Hear and obey, making no exception. So, if I tell a man to go through this door and he refuses, I can kill him lawfully."[8] He also said, "Would that God, if he had created us for the next world, had made us independent of this by freeing us from care about food, and drink, clothing and marriage; or that He, when He put us in this world, had made us independent of the next and delivered us from anxiety about what will save us from punishment."[9]

At a later date there were still those who taught that Mu'āwiya had a title equal to that of the first three caliphs and a preacher in Baghdad said, "At the resurrection God will draw Mu'āwiya to himself, set him at his right hand, veil him with his hand, and then show him to all men like a bride."[10] One said, "To be in a company where nobles and the police are, is dearer to me than to go apart so that men should accuse me of opinions that lead to hell."[11] Akin in spirit were those who carried over into Islam the ideas of the Ignorance, men who drank wine, sang the old songs, and imitated the old generosity. It was

[1] Mubarrad, 575.
[2] Jāḥiẓ Ḥayawān., 6, 24.
[3] b. Qut. *Ma'.*, 183; b. Sa'd, 5, 245.
[4] Agh., 10, 93.
[5] Agh., 16, 7, 111.
[6] Jāḥiẓ H., 5, 63.
[7] Agh., 20, 13.
[8] Jāḥiẓ H., 3, 5.
[9] Jāḥiẓ Bayān., 1, 145.
[10] Maḳdisi, 126, 399.
[11] b. Sa'd, 6, 191.

this spirit which made the Arabs the aristocracy of Islam, looked down on all *mawāli*, and called such a distinguished Muslim as Ḥasan al-Basri, a barbarian.[1] The father-in-law of 'Uthmān fasted at night because it was easier than fasting during the day.

The caliph only smiled at his excuse.[2]

"A governor, after consulting with those who have knowledge, must act on his own initiative"; this is an attempt to combine the views of the government party with those of the saints.[3] Religious sanction was given by the tradition, "Patience is better than resisting an evil lord."[4]

Anti-government. At the other extreme, in one sense, were those who opposed the government because it did not come up to their ideal, they had no rival candidate except the ideal of the rule of saints learned in the book of God. Everything which the government did was wrong. One would not water his animal from a well dug by the government,[5] another lost his foot by gangrene because he had paid court to al-Walīd.[6] This feeling finds expression in many forms. I marvel at our brothers of al-Iraq who call al-Ḥajjāj a believer.[7] We thought that the only illegal trade was taking office; taking office is unbelief.[8] I shall not get anything from the government's world without its taking something better from my religion.[9] One dirham got by trade is better than ten of pension.[10] A man takes his religion with him when he comes into the presence of the government; he comes away without it.[11] Sa'īd b. Jubair said that al-Ḥajjāj and those like him had perverted judgment, abandoned religion, done violence to the servants of God, killed prayer, and humiliated Muslims.[12] It is not surprising that those who thought thus wept with joy at the death of al-Ḥajjāj.[13] In fact, every prominent man in the government was an unbeliever.[14]

Ascetics. The ascetics are the true antithesis to the religion of the rulers, but they are not always their opponents; the lines of division between the parties cross in unexpected places.

[1] b. Sa'd, 7 I., 119.
[2] Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, 5, 106.
[3] b. Sa'd, 5, 139.
[4] b. Sa'd, 4 I., 166.
[5] Sha'rani, 43.
[6] Sha'rani, 33.
[7] b. Sa'd, 5, 394.
[8] b. Sa'd, 6, 54.
[9] b. Sa'd, 6, 60.
[10] b. Sa'd, 6, 68.
[11] b. Sa'd, 6, 145.
[12] b. Sa'd, 6, 185.
[13] b. Sa'd, 6, 195.
[14] b. Sa'd, 6, 193.

The fear of God and the possibility of eternal fire lay heavy on these men.

One always looked as if he were coming back from the funeral of his best friend. Another said, "The thought of death leaves the believer no joy, his knowledge of God's laws leaves him neither silver nor gold, his obedience to God's command leaves him no friend."[1] A man lay dying and his friends visited him to give him hope; he said, "I have no hope though I have fasted eighty Ramadans."[2] Rabī' b. Khuthaim was a famous ascetic; a mosque in Kazwin was named after him and in it was a tree which grew from a tooth-pick of his. 'Abdullah b. Ṭāhir had it cut down because the common folk rubbed themselves against it.[3] He disapproved of poetry, would touch pig's fat rather than dice, swept out the latrines, and gave away all the booty he gained by fighting. He would not enter a mosque where women were and would not give his little daughter permission to play because he did not want it written of him that he told any one to play. He lived with the thought of God always before him; he said, "Works not done for God's sake alone are little."[4]

These men had the judgment so continually before them that when fire was mentioned a man's limbs started out of their sockets[5] and another fainted when he saw a head peering out of an oven.[6] One thought that hell had been created for him only.[7]

This temper is found in unexpected places; al-Aḥnaf, the friend of kings, did not like to pray in the Maḳṣūra.[8] One was a vegetarian, refusing even to eat ghee, he did not pray in mosques, was unmarried and continent.[9] Abū Mūsā said, "I prefer to have my nostrils filled with the smell of a corpse rather than with the scent of a woman."

Again, "Nothing is more terrible to me than women," while a man had no use for women, but kept pigeons as pets.[10] The avoidance of women, so contrary to Muslim practice, seems due to Christian influence; woollen clothes, the dress of monks, was due to this; one who wore wool was told to put off his Chris-

[1] b. Sa'd, 6, 114. [2] b. Sa'd, 6, 121. [3] Bal., 322.
[4] b. Sa'd, 6, 128. [5] Sha'rani, 40. [6] Sha'rani, 43.
[7] Sha'rani, 32. *Ma'ārif* 225. One story is often told of more than one man.
[8] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 68. [9] *Ibid.*, 7, I, 74. [10] *Ibid.*, 4, I, 84.; 5, 110; 7, II, 60.

tianity.[1] From this circle comes, "Much laughter kills the heart."[2] One of them was "busied with his soul."[3]

At times their religion was greater than their common sense. "He is too pious to drink out of glass but not too pious to kill 'Ammār," is a bitter condemnation of the fanatic.[4] Muḥammad b. Sīrīn was told, "You will be concerned with things, which in your eyes are thinner than a hair, in the time of the prophet we counted them fatal"; he said, "True; I think the trailing of the loincloth is one of them."[5] Some were more sensible; one defended himself for his trailing garment: "It was swank to wear them long; now it is swank to wear them short."[6] Another famous ascetic was Abū Dharr who got into trouble for criticising Mu'āwiya. He was noted for his poverty and generosity; he married a black woman for he wanted a wife who would lower him, not exalt him; prayed behind an Abyssinian, and condemned holding office under the government.[7] Another owned salt land giving a revenue of two dinars. He lived on this income, sent gifts of dates to his friends, and accepted no presents. He would go to a marriage feast but would eat nothing as his stomach was not accustomed to rich food. He would not become collector of the religious tax, excusing himself by, "I do not want riches; what I have is enough."[8] It was, and is, common to set a jar of water outside a shop for passers by to drink. One said, "If I pass the door of a money-changer or tax gatherer, I do not drink of his water."[9] Another had an underground room in his house and did not come out except for prayer.[10] The ideal of complete retirement from social life is revealed in the desire, "I have no wish to be a reporter of traditions, a religious story-teller, or a giver of legal opinions."[11] Of course, this attitude was both upheld and attacked; on the one side, "If there is advantage in social life there is safety in solitude"[12] and on the other, "I have more need of the community than a widow."[13] Some of these men were given the name of Weepers. Some one said

[1] 'Iḳd., 1, 250. Cf. *Talbīs Iblīs*, 208. He was pious, a hermit, always meditating on God; he wore wool and ate no meat. b. Sa'd, 5, 225.
[2] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 125.
[3] *Ibid.*, 7, II, 25.
[4] *Ibid.*, 3, I, 186.
[5] *Ibid.*, 7, I, 58.
[6] b. Sa'd, 7 II., 15.
[7] b. Sa'd, 4, I.
[8] b. Sa'd, 5, 304.
[9] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 83.
[10] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 107.
[11] b. Sa'd, 6, 114.
[12] Sha'rani, 49.
[13] b.Sa'd, 7, I, 104.

in the hearing of one of them, " No verse in the Koran is more terrible to me than the words of Moses, ' It is only Thy testing which misleads whom Thou wilt and guides aright whom Thou wilt.' " The weeper said that if the Koran was terrible to any one he would not speak to him again as long as he lived."[1]

The pietists had their critics. A woman saw some men walking slowly and speaking in low tones. She was told that they were pious. Her comment, was " 'Umar was heard when he spoke, went fast when he walked, and hurt when he hit. He was truly pious."[2]

They opposed all novelties and wanted to go back to the pastoral life. One, who did not leave enough to buy a winding sheet, said that the price might be borrowed from a keeper of cattle, but not from a tiller of the soil.[3] Another said, " This is a land of trade. If one owes you money and offers a load of straw, take it not ; it is usury."[4]

The middle way. It is tempting to call this the representatives of common sense. 'Abdullah b. 'Umar, the son of the second caliph was one of the most prominent.

To those who fasted continually, 'Abdullah b. Mas'ūd was held up as an example. No scholar ever fasted less than he ; he held prayer to be better than fasting for that made him too weak to pray.[5]

They were not sticklers for external forms. Abū Mūsā was reciting the Koran to 'Umar when the call to prayer was heard. 'Umar said, " We are at prayer."[6] The same feeling prompted the words, " I have gone on pilgrimage and *'umra* twenty-odd years, but only one of each is credited to me "[7] ; and to one who made long prayers, " Worship is thought of God and avoidance of things forbidden."[8] It produced the proud claim, " Am I not a Muslim ! My face is towards God wherever I am."[9] Another man performed no ceremonial works of supererogation.[10]

They objected to the casuistry in which men were beginning to delight. When asked a hypothetical question, one man told

[1] b. Kutaiba, *Mukh.*, 100. [2] b. Sa'd, 3, I, 208. Tab. I. 2754.
[3] b. Sa'd, 6, 56. [4] b. Sa'd, 6, 187. [5] b. Sa'd, 3, I, 109.
[6] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 81. [7] b. Sa'd, 5, 95. [8] b. Sa'd, 5, 100.
[9] b. Sa'd, 5, 105. [10] b. Sa'd, 6, 207.

the enquirer to wait till the problem arose in fact, and then he would exert his mind to answer it.[1]

These men accepted the government. 'Abdullah b. 'Umar is their spokesman. In a time of civil war he prayed behind any governor and paid the religious tax to him.[2] If the government was good, he was content; if bad, he endured; for breach of the oath of homage was the worst sin after idolatry.[3] (He is said to have regretted not fighting against 'Abd al-Malik.)[4] Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiya is cynical; he advised men to show the Umayyads their faces, if they were in power, for so they would save their own lives and religion and get from them God's money to which they had the better right.[5] Need was felt of defending the integrity of those who took service under the government; so the tale is told of the kadi of Baalbak, who was a scholar and traditionist, yet so poor that he had no vest and only a borrowed shawl (*tailasān*). He was ready to take the job of keeper of the treasury, which was worse than kadi, if it were offered him.[6] These men did not ask anything from authority but took what was given them; it was provision from God.[7] They were not ascetics. 'Abdullah b. 'Umar liked his food nicely prepared,[8] though there are tales to the contrary.

In religion they were conservative. Hold fast to the religion of the schoolboy and the bedouin; go not behind this.[9] And again; Earlier peoples went astray because they were not of one mind about their prophets and set book against book. The Koran was not revealed for one part to be set against another; but one part confirms another. Act up to what you know of it; what is ambiguous, believe.[10]

A believer showed his horror at hearing 'Umar recite the Koran on leaving the latrine. The caliph crushed him with the retort, "Did Musailima teach you this?"[11] A short definition of the pious is that they do not use charms nor observe omens and do not use the cautery.[12]

'Ubaidullah b. Ḥasan, who was kadi of Basra at a later date,

[1] b. Sa'd, 3, II, 61. [2] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 105. [3] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 134.
[4] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 136. [5] b. Sa'd, 5, 70. [6] b. Sa'd, 7, II, 172.
[7] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 110. [8] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 109. [9] b. Sa'd, 5, 275.
[10] b. Sa'd, 4, I, 141. [11] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 64. [12] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 52.

is the heir of these men. He stated that the Koran taught both predestination and free will.[1]

Their position is summed up in a sentence, the best of you are those who get something from both worlds.[2]

Religion and reason. The study of religious problems found opponents. To the scholar with his traditions based on a chain of witnesses it was urged that knowledge is not the repeating of the much you have heard, but fear only.[3] The scholar is one who avoids this world, sees his own faults, and worships God always.[4] It was worse when men used their reason on what they knew; what such men said on the authority of the companions was to be accepted; what they said on the authority of reason was to be thrown into the latrine.[5] "I am a follower not an innovator"[6] are words put into the mouth of Abū Bakr. Other sayings are; do not argue, for argument leads to disbelief in the Koran[7]; whoso exposes his religion to argument multiplies sects[8]; theology is strife; deeds fit a man better than words.[9] Sa'īd b. Jubair said; The destruction of this people comes from its learned men.[10] Again, I take refuge in God from the knowledge of scholars.[11] Halfway stands the saying, The excellence of knowledge is dearer to me than the excellence of worship; the best of your religion is piety.[12]

On the other side, Abū Bakr is reported to have defended his appointing 'Umar, "I did for the community what I thought best. I used my understanding as well as I could."[13] In argument one escapes lies,[14] is as emphatic as, The best of worship is sound reason.[15]

Some disliked Mujāhid's interpretation of the Koran because they thought he had questioned the people of the book.[16] This recalls the frequent commands that the Koran was not to be shown to those who were not Muslims. This secretiveness, it would now be called an inferiority complex, seems due to the consciousness that contact with other religions was hurrying Islam along a path which many disliked.

[1] b. Ḳut. *Mukh.*, 55.
[2] Sha'rani, 27.
[3] Sha'rani, 24.
[4] Sha'rani, 32.
[5] b. Ḳut. *Mukh.*, 70.
[6] b. Sa'd, 3, I, 129.
[7] b. Sa'd, 5, 236.
[8] b. Sa'd, 5, 273.
[9] b. Sa'd, 5, 274.
[10] b. Sa'd, 6, 183.
[11] b. Sa'd, 7, II, 25.
[12] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 103.
[13] b. Sa'd, 3, I, 142. Cf. 5, 139.
[14] b. Sa'd, 7, I, 105.
[15] b. Ḳut. *Mukh.*, 100.
[16] b. Sa'd, 5, 344.

Rabī' b. Khuthaim said that only nine words of theology were needful; Exalted be God; Praise to God; There is no God but God; God is most great; commanding what is right; forbidding what is wrong; reciting the Koran; asking blessing from God; and taking refuge from evil.[1]

Of course the good old times were the best when companions who wore silk did not find fault with those who wore wool and those in wool did not pick holes in those in silk.[2]

SUMMARY

The confusion described in the previous section was made worse by the coming of theological strife. Theories arose out of questions of practical politics. If 'Uthmān had died in his bed without the prestige of a martyr he would never have become the symbol of a party. As it was, his murder and the following civil war raised the question, What makes the imam, the head of the community? Two answers were given. Those who claimed to follow the *sunna* of the prophet, to live according to the practices and ideas formulated by him, and therefore came to be called Sunnites, said that the imam was made by the choice of the community. Those who accepted as their leader 'Alī, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, said that it was relationship to the prophet which made the imam. They were the *shī'a* of 'Alī, the party, and are called Shi'ites. These parties are called the "*dīn* of 'Uthmān, the *dīn* of 'Alī," but as *dīn* may mean no more than "obedience" the phrase must not be stressed.[3] Relationship to the prophet was soon explained as appointment by him; and it was alleged that he had appointed 'Alī and his descendants. Later, the Shī'a went its own way.

After the battle of Siffin this question entered on a second stage when those, who found that they had thrown away victory by listening to an appeal to their religious feelings, vented their rage on 'Alī and put the blame on him by declaring that he was unworthy to be imam. These dissidents, who became the

[1] b. Sa'd, 6, 133. [2] Sha'rani, 41. [3] Tab. II, 342.

Khārijites,[1] by their claim to be the only true believers, raised the question, What is a Muslim, and many subsidiary questions. Their own answers were emphatic, troubled by no doubts, and in reaction to them appeared the Murjites,[2] who declined to say that any specified person was or was not a Muslim, leaving the answer to God at the judgment. They called attention to the relation between faith and works.

Then predestination and free will came to the front. Although consideration of the divisions in Islam aided by meditation on the Koran might have started speculation on these subjects, there is some evidence to show that Christian influence encouraged, if it did not start, this movement of thought. Another question was associated with predestination, that of the nature of the Koran, the word of God, whether it was created or uncreated.

While some followed these and wilder speculations, others appealed to the Koran, the whole Koran, and nothing but the Koran, the religion of children and old women, rejecting all reasoning as innovation, heresy. Out of these varied elements Muslim orthodoxy grew.

The following summary of the history is interesting though wrong in detail. "The first heresies to appear in Islam were that of free-will and that of the Murjites; then came the Shī'a till such ideas as union with God and incarnation were introduced."[3] Muslim historians attribute these heresies, as they call them, to foreign influence; the process is only a repetition of the past for 'the Jews perished when the children of foreign concubines multiplied among them and introduced speculation.'[4] Heresies and errors were due solely to the children of captives.[5] Others ascribed them to Persian influence.[6] Mukhtār was led astray by the Saba'iya.[7] More definite statements are made about free-will. Ma'bad al-Juhani was the first to introduce the doctrine of free-will in Islam, learning it from one of the Asāwira, Abū Yūnus Sansawaih.[8] Another story says that at

[1] *kharaja* to go out, came to mean rebel, and then a special brand of theological rebel.

[2] From *raja'a* to postpone, or *rajā* to hope.

[3] *Ijtimā' al-juyūsh al-islāmiya*, 85 f.

[4] Malaṭī, *Tanbih*, 67.

[5] *Farḳ*, 101. Cf. *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, 13, 394 f.

[6] b. Ḥazm, 2, 115.

[7] *Farḳ*, 34.

[8] Maḳrizi, 2, 356.

one time only two men talked of free-will, Ma'bad and Sanhawaih.[1] The following is worth quoting as an illustration of the attitude of orthodoxy to the beginnings of Islam. "The cause of the secession of most sects from Islam was this. Persia by the extent of its empire and its superiority to other nations—they called themselves free and lords and others their servants—suffered much by losing their empire to the Arabs. The calamity was so much the worse because they despised them. They tried to resist Islam by arms under Shanfad, i.e., Sanbādh (138/755), Ashnis, ? Ustādhsīs (150/767), al-Muḳaffā, i.e. al-Muḳanna' (158/774), and Bābak; earlier under 'Ammār Khidāsh and Abū Muslim al-Sarūḥ. Then they thought that craft would be more successful; so some made show of Islam and perverted the Shī'a by pretending love for the prophet's family and detestation of the wrong done to 'Alī, and led them by various ways from the truth. Some induced them to believe in the Mahdī, who will bring the true religion (for true religion cannot be had from unbelievers, as they are called the Companions). Others claimed that their leaders were prophets. Some talked of incarnation and cancellation of the law. Some made fun of them, imposing fifty prayers daily; some said seventeen prayers of fifteen *rak'as* each, as 'Abdullah b. 'Amr b. al-Ḥārith before he became a Khārijite, a Ṣufrite. 'Abdullah b. Saba pretended to be a Muslim, and was the first to stir up the people against 'Uthmān. 'Alī burnt some of his adherents for declaring him ('Alī) to be God. From these sources came the Ismā'īliya and the Ḳarmaṭians."[2]

There was a tendency to ascribe everything to foreign influence. Some ascetics cavilled at the recitation of poetry and this was said to be foreign asceticism.[3]

[1] b. Sa'd, 7, II, 27.
[2] M., 2, 362. Cf. b. Athīr, 8, 21.
[3] Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1174.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY SECTS

Shī'a. Khawārij. Murji'a. Anthropomorphism. Relations between the Sects.

SHĪ'A

Like most Muslim parties the Shī'a was both political and religious[1]; for it the imam was a religious necessity not a political expedient. Sunni writers often call them *rāfiḍi* (pl. *rawāfiḍ*).[1] The first political actions, the attempted revolts in Kufa of Ḥujr (51/671) and Ḥusain (61/680), were confined to Arabs; the motive for them was probably hatred of the Syrian domination quite as much as attachment to the family of 'Alī.[2] But at an early date, during the lifetime of 'Alī himself if the stories are to be believed, religious ideas were joined to the political. These stories centre round 'Abdullah b. Saba. It has been suggested that he was two persons as he has at least two names, b. Saba and b. Sawda, and two homes, Kufa and Sanaa.

He was a converted Jew who, before his conversion said of Joshua what he later said of 'Alī. That he said to 'Alī, "Thou art thou," is doubtful; anyhow he was banished to al-Madāin. He taught that 'Alī was not dead, as a demon was killed in his stead, but was in the clouds, his voice the thunder and the lightning his whip; he would return to drive the Arabs with his stick, filling the earth with justice as it is now filled with violence and oppression. When told that the commander of

[1] The name is explained in several ways. It was given because they would not recognise Abū Bakr and 'Umar, A. 10; by Zaid to those who refused to follow him, *Mukhtaṣar*, 34; by Zaid because they would not stop cursing Abū Bakr and 'Umar, Maḳrīzī, 2, 351; because they reject Islam, b. Ḳutaiba, *Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 97; by Mughīra b. Sa'īd to those who opposed him, N. 54. Friedlaender, *Die religioes-politischen Oppositionsparteien.*

[2] For the history, see Wellhausen, *Die religioes-politischen Oppositionsparteien.*

[3] Friedlaender, 'Abdullah b. Saba. Z.A. vv. 23, 24.

the faithful had been wounded, men had died of a slighter wound and recovered from a graver, he said, "If you brought us his brain in a hundred bags, we still know that he will not die till he drives us with his stick."[1] He is said to have taught metempsychosis and the indwelling of the divine in the imams. This is doubtful, for he seems to have recognised only one iman, The points in his teaching are the supernatural character of the imam, the return of the dead to this world, and a messianic idea.

At first sight it seems a bad joke to call Ḥasan an imam; but some of his followers took him seriously, perhaps for political reasons only. After he had made his peace with Mu'āwiya, one of his adherents, al-Jarrāḥ b. Sinān, who had been a ring-leader in the opposition to Sa'd b. abī Waḳḳāṣ in Kufa in 21/641 and was a Khāriji,[2] seized his horse by the bridle and stabbed him in the thigh, cutting the limb to the bone. The assailant was trampled to death and Ḥasan was taken back to al-Madāïn where he stayed till the wound was healed.[3]

The events that ledtothe death of Ḥusain—it is absurd to call them a rebellion—became important in religion. Though many left the Shī'a after the death of Ḥusain,[4] his martyrdom put sentiment and emotion at the service of the Shī'a. Mukhtār's battle-cry, "Vengeance for Ḥusain," was followed by both Arab and *mawla*. Some were armed only with wooden clubs or staves and were given the name of *kāfirchōb*, heretic-hammers. It may be that this was the customary weapon of the Mesopotamian peasant, as Wellhausen suggests, but a theological meaning was read into it; that they would not use iron weapons till he, whom they expected, should come.[5]

[1] Ṭabarī, I, 2942; Ash'arī, 15; Shahrastānī, 132; Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 3, 56; Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, v. 23, p. 325, quoting Berlin (Ahlwardt), No. 4876.
[2] Ṭabarī I., 2606. *Talbis Iblis*, 100. [3] Nawbakhtī, 21. Cf. *Farḳ*, 26.
[4] Nawbakhtī, 23.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 4, 185, with the additions from J.O.A.S., 28, 63. The bearers of staves are also called *Khashabiya*. The name is explained in several ways. The troops, which Mukhtār sent to Mecca, armed themselves with the wood which b. al-Zubair had collected to burn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiya. The same troops did not draw their swords from their sheaths but carried staves. *Ansāb al-Ashrāf*, 5, 231. These staves are mentioned at the battle in which 'Ubaidallah b. Ziyād was killed, 67/686. b. Ḳutaiba, *Ma'ārif*, 300. When Muhallab besieged the *Khashabiya* in Nisibis he said, "They are only slaves with sticks." *Aghānī* 6, 50.

They had a bad repute for, "if fighting Muslims were lawful, fighting the *Khashabiya* would be."[1] Ibn Ḥazm connects them with the stranglers, the followers of Abū Manṣūr. Mukhtār gave out that he acted at the command and in the interest of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiya, the imam, whose deputy he was. Mukhtār seems to have had modest ideas about the imam, indeed it is doubtful if he took him seriously, though his other adherents were not so limited. All those who accepted b. al-Ḥanafiya as imam are called Kaisāniya, a name of uncertain origin.[2] Some taught that the imam did not die but was removed to Mt. Riḍwa, where he sat between two springs, one of milk and one of honey, a lion on one side and a leopard on the other, while his food was brought to him daily.[3] Others said that he was put on Mt. Riḍwa as a punishment for doing homage to 'Abd al-Malik. Some said that he was appointed by 'Alī to follow Ḥasan and Ḥusain as imam; others that he was the direct successor of 'Alī; Ḥasan and Ḥusain acting under his orders. About 100/718, Ḥamza b. 'Umāra taught that he was a prophet and b. al-Ḥanafiya god.[4]

Some taught that the dead would come back to the earth in their own bodies, 'Alī would kill Mu'āwiya, destroy Damascus, and drown Basra.[5] Here are fresh ideas; the appointment of the imam, his disappearance, and the return of the dead. The prophet appointed the imam who in turn appointed his successor. This might happen directly, by naming the person appointed, or indirectly by giving a description of him or by a symbolical act. 'Alī, for example, had once made b. al-Ḥanafiya his standard bearer. The hidden imam; he is taken away from men and lives in hiding till he returns as the mahdi, the messiah, who will fill the earth with justice as it is now filled with wrong-doing. The return of the dead recalls the chiliastic ideas of early Christianity.

Mukhtār taught that God can change his mind (*badā'* is the technical term). One story says that he produced this doctrine to explain away a defeat when he had promised a victory.

[1] b. Sa'd, 6, 195.
[2] Mukhtār was nicknamed Kaisān for his cleverness; it was the name of a freedman of 'Alī; or of the chief of Mukhtār's bodyguard. Nawbakhtī, 20, 24.
[3] *Mukhtaṣar*, 36. [4] Nawbakhtī, 25. [5] Nawbakhtī, 37.

The idea was familiar from the 'cancelled' verses of the Koran ; Mukhtār transferred it from the realm of law to that of history.

Some of the Kaisāniya thought that the world was eternal.[1]

It was not long before men, who were not related to the prophet, claimed to be imams because one of his family had appointed them. They made even higher claims and are known as the extravagant (*ghāli*) though the name may be applied to any extremist.

Bayān b. Sim'ān al-Tamīmī (executed 119/737) was a follower of Ḥamza b. 'Umāra.[2] Some of his disciples said that he was imam, appointed by Abū Hāshim b. al-Ḥanafiya while others made him a prophet. He applied to himself the words *hādhā bayān* (Koran, 3, 132). God is in the form of a man and will perish entirely, except his face (Koran 29, 88). There are two Gods, one in heaven and one on earth ; the God of heaven is the greater and men know that he is the greater and honour him.[3] In the might of the greatest name Bayān called on the planet Venus and it answered him. He was the first to say that the Koran was created.[4] Later reports of his teaching are fuller, but seem to have added details from others.[5]

Janāḥiya. These followed 'Abdullah b. Mu'āwiya, a descendant of 'Alī's brother Ja'far, who was killed by Abū Muslim in 130/748. They held that the spirit of God dwelt in Adam, the prophets, 'Alī, and his sons, and then in 'Abdullah, who claimed to be God and was worshipped. He said, " Knowledge springs up in my heart like truffles and grass." They denied the resurrection because the world does not come to an end. They permitted wine, bracksey, and other forbidden things.[6]

Mughīra b. Sa'īd al-'Ijlī.[7] He learnt magic, sleight of hand,

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 182.
[2] Ṭabarī II., 1610. Nawbakhtī, 25.
[3] Kashshī, 196.
[4] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 2, 148.
[5] God is light in the form of a man. *Mukhtaṣar*, 134. The spirit of God was in the prophets, then in 'Alī, then b. Ḥanafiya, Abū Hāshim, and Bayān. *Mukhtaṣar*, 145. Maḳrīzī, 2, 352.
[6] The history in the *Farḳ* and the *Mukhtaṣar* is wrong because it makes adherents of Mughīra meet 'Abdullah b. Mu'āwiya († 130/748) after the death of Muḥammad the Pure Soul († 145/762). A similar tale is told of the *Ḥarbiya*. Ash'ari, *Maḳālāt*, 22. They seem to be called *Ṭayyāriya*. *Ghunya*, 165.
[7] A *mawla* of Bajīla. b. Ḳutaiba *Ma'ārif*, 300.

and tricks from a Jewess[1] and claimed to be a prophet who knew the great name of God. His imam was Muḥammad, probably Muḥammad Bāḳir, though some say the Pure Soul. He taught that God was a man of light, with a crown, limbs, and heart from which sprang wisdom. The letters of the alphabet are as the number of God's limbs, the alif standing for his feet as it is curved. He had no opinion about the return of the dead.[2] He forbade the use of water, even from the Euphrates, into which any impurity had fallen.[3] He was put to death with Bayān.[4]

He taught that 'Alī could raise the dead, 'Ad, Thamūd and other ancient nations.[5] His theory of creation was peculiar.[6] "God was quite alone; when he wished to create things he uttered the greatest name; it flew and fell on his head as a crown.[7] This is the word, 'Praise the name of your most high lord' (Koran, 87, 1). Then he wrote with his finger on his palm the good and bad deeds of men. He grew angry at the bad and sweated; from his sweat were formed two seas, one salt and dark, the other bright and sweet. He looked in the sea, saw his reflection, and went to seize it but it flew away. He plucked the eye out of the reflection and made of it a sun. He ground up the reflection saying, 'It is not fit that there should be a God beside me.' He made all things from the two seas, idolaters from the dark salt, believers from the bright sweet one.[8] He made the shadows of men and the first was Muḥammad,[9] as it is said, 'If the merciful had a son, I should be

[1] Kashshī, 147.

[2] If his school taught that Mughīra was imam after the Pure Soul, either they did not believe in their master's death or they believed in his resurrection. Nawbakhtī, 53 f. Ibn al-Athīr connects him with Muḥammed Bākir and Ja'far Ṣādiḳ., 5, 155.

[3] b. Ḥazm, 4, 185.

[4] Ṭabarī II., 1619 f.

[5] b. Ḳutaiba, *Ma'ārif*, 300.

[6] Ash'arī, 7; *Mukhtaṣar*, 150; *Farḳ*, 230.

[7] v.l. fell on his crown. b. Athīr, 5, 155.

[8] God struck Adam's right shoulder and every life created for heaven came out, white, pure. He said, "These are the men of heaven." Then he struck his left shoulder and every life created for hell came out, black. He said, "These are the men of hell." Ṭabarī, *Commentary*, 9, 78. The author seems to approve the tradition.

[9] The first thing created by God was the shadow of Muḥammad; men were created before their bodies. *Farḳ*, 230,

the first of worshippers' (Koran, 43, 81). He sent Muḥammad to all men though he was a shadow. He asked the heavens to protect 'Alī, they refused; he asked the earth and the hills, they refused; then he asked men. 'Umar went to Abū Bakr, told him to take on himself the duty of protection and to betray him. Abū Bakr did so. This is the word, 'We offered the faith to the heavens, the earth, and the hills' (Koran 33, 72). 'Umar said, 'I will help you against 'Alī if you will make me caliph after you.' This is the word, 'Like the devil when he said to the man, believe not.' (Koran, 59, 16.) The devil was 'Umar.'' When the mahdī comes, Gabriel and Michael will do him homage between the corner and the station. He will raise up seventeen men, each will be given so many letters of the greatest name; they will put armies to flight and subdue the earth.[1]

Abū Manṣūr al-'Ijli (or of 'Abd Ḳais) was born in Kufa, brought up in the desert, and was illiterate. He claimed to be imam after Muḥammad Bāḳir.[2] He asserted that he was the *kisf* (if they see a piece of heaven falling. Koran, 52, 44), that he ascended to heaven where God stroked his head,[3] and said to him in Syriac (or Persian), "Go, take this message from me." He was then sent back to earth, Later he said that 'Alī, the other imams, and himself were prophets and apostles. Jesus was the first to be created then 'Alī. There were always apostles. He denied heaven and hell saying that they were men; heaven is the family of Muḥammed and earth the Shī'a.

Muḥammad brought revelation, Abū Manṣūr the interpretation. He explained religious duties and things allowed as persons to be loved, and things forbidden as persons to be hated.[4] His teaching was anti-nomian as God can forbid nothing which strengthens man. He declared that six of his sons would be prophets, the last being the mahdī. One claimed to be a prophet, amassed much wealth, and was put to death by the caliph

[1] Ash'arī, 9. Much of this story comes from Persian sources. Reitzenstein and Schaeder, *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus*, 217. Shahrastanī, 182. Birūni, *Chronology*, 99.

[2] Appointed by Ja'far Ṣādiḳ. Ash'ari, 24. The imam was Muḥammad Bāḳir and after him the Pure Soul. B. Ḥazm Or., 843 f. 93 r.

[3] This is said of the Jew Abū 'Īsā. Makrīzī, 2, 478.

[4] Shahrastānī ascribes this doctrine to the *Kaisāniya* generally, deriving it from their idea that religion is obedience to a man (p. 109).

al-Mahdī who confiscated his goods. Abū Manṣūr was executed by Yūsuf b. 'Umar.

His followers were professional murderers, like the Thugs, killing their victims by strangling them or breaking their heads with stones. Hence their name stranglers. They attacked all saying, Let us hurry our enemies to hell and our friends to paradise. They were still active in the lifetime of al-Naẓẓām who feared a visit from them in Ahwaz. The tribes of 'Ijl and Kinda, especially, had a bad name as belonging to this sect. [1]

It may be noted as a curiosity that, while most of the Shī'a abused the companions of the prophet in general, the Kāmiliya called 'Alī an unbeliever for allowing himself to be supplanted by the first three caliphs.

Another odd thing is the prominence of women in these sects. Maila was the companion or nurse of Abū Manṣūr, Ḥamīda was a leader among them and had been a follower of Laila, who acquired notoriety because she never had new clothes but patched and re-patched the old. [2]

Ibn al-Ḥanafiya published a warning against two women in whose houses the extremists met. [3]

Abu 'l-Khaṭṭāb Muḥammad b. abī Zainab (executed 138/755), was a *mawla* of Asad. [4] The accounts of his teaching do not agree; perhaps they refer to two stages. The imams are prophets and proofs of God to his creation; there are always two, one speaking and one silent. Muḥammad was the speaker and 'Alī the silent; they are still in the earth and have to be obeyed. Abu'l-Khaṭṭāb was a prophet, ordained by Muḥammad and 'Alī or by Ja'far, to be obeyed. He permitted false witness to be given to enemies. [5] Al-Shāfi'ī said, "I reject the testimony of no sect save the Khaṭṭābiya for they permit lies. [6] It was also said that he and Ja'far were gods, he being the greater. Men, who cried *Labbaika Ja'far* were burnt by Khālid al-Ḳasrī. [7]

[1] *Journal of Indian History*, vol. VIII, p. 41. He, who has killed forty of his adversaries, enters heaven. *Ghunya*, 166.

[2] Jāḥiẓ *Ḥayawān*, 2, 97; 5, 170; 6, 129. *Bukhalā*, 39;

[3] *Ṭabarī* II, 731. [4] b. Ḥazm, 2, 114.

[5] Enemies also in b Kutaiba, *Ma'ārif*. The reading 'friends' in several places, though more difficult, seems nonsense.

[6] Ijī, 290. [7] *Aghānī* (1st ed.), 15, 121.

Of course, some of his followers denied that he had been killed. According to one account he taught that the acts of worship had a hidden meaning and that the externals were not binding on those who knew the imams.[1] This looks like an anachronism. It is said that Abu'l-Khaṭṭāb was taught by Maimūn al-Ḳaddāḥ so the sect was called Maimūniya.[2]

These sects were highly fissiparous; several sprang from Abu 'l-Khaṭṭāb. One held that his divinity passed to one Ma'mar; the light that is God then passes from Ja'far, who became an angel, to Abu 'l-Khaṭṭāb, and from him to Ma'mar, Abu 'l-Khaṭṭāb in his turn becoming an angel. Ma'mar was the God of the earth and obedient to the God of heaven.[3] Is this a reminiscence of the demiurge? Another version is that the light of God was in 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib and passed through Abū Ṭālib, Muḥammad, and 'Alī to Ma'mar and they are all Gods. This looks like a hostile parody. Ma'mar gave up the prayers, taught the transmigration of souls, that the world has no end, and that heaven is happiness in this life and hell pain. He was followed by Bazīgh[4] whose disciples held that Ja'far is God, but what men see is a simulacrum and not God.[5] All men get revelation; indeed it is all that comes into the mind. Some men are more excellent than Gabriel and Michael.[6] Men do not die but, when their worship is perfect they are raised to heaven. They claimed to see their dead morning and evening; the same idea is put in other words, "death is a flying of their souls in the twilight."[7]

'Umair b. Bayān al-'Ijlī[8] (executed by Khālid al-Ḳasrī) admitted that men die but they have children who are imams and prophets. He worshipped Ja'far and claimed to be a prophet.

He, or his school, interpreted the cow which the Israelites were told to kill as 'Āïsha, wine and *maisir* were Abū Bakr and 'Umar, Jibt and Ṭaghūt were Mu'āwiya and 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ.[9]

[1] b. Athīr, 8, 21.
[2] Kashshī, 225.
[3] *Talbīs Iblīs*, 182.
[4] Ījī, 346.
[5] That the Ja'far and Abu 'l-Khaṭṭāb seen by men were devils is a parody. Nawbakhtī, 40.
[6] Cf. Ījī, 346.
[7] *al-Bad' wal-ta'rīkh* 5, 129.
[8] The name is doubtful.
[9] Maḳrīzī, 2, 352.

Some held that al-Sarrī was a prophet sent by Ja'far as the strong the faithful (K., 28, 26 Moses). They said that Ja'far was Islam, which was peace, which was God, and they were the children of Islam as the Jews claimed to be the children and friends of God (K., 5, 21). They went on pilgrimage to Ja'far. All these were Khaṭṭābiya.[1].

Some taught that all the imams were Gods.

Sharī'ī said that God was in five persons, Muḥammad, 'Alī, Ḥasan, Ḥusain, and Fāṭima[2] and there were five contraries, Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, Mu'āwiya, and 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ. Some held that the five contraries were partly good because through them the goodness of the five good was revealed; others held that they were wholly bad. Some taught that Salmān the Persian was God.

Ibn Ḥazm remarks with contempt that Bazīgh was a weaver, Ma'mar a corn dealer, and 'Umair a dealer in straw. All came from Kufa.[3] Bayān was named al-Tabbān, the dealer in straw.[4] The followers of Ja'far came out with the dealers in straw.[5]

Abū Hāshim gave his designation to the 'Abbasid 'Alī for his son Muḥammad (28), who was still a child.[6] The followers of 'Abdullah b. Mu'āwiya quarrelled with the 'Abbasids about this designation so Abū Riyāḥ (? a Janāḥī) was made arbitrator. He decided for the 'Abbasids and most of the others joined them. This Muḥammad is the imam, God, he knows all and gives life and death. They did not deny power to God, i.e., did not accept free will, and were undecided about the 'return.' Whoever knows the imam may do as he pleases. They divided into three sects.

Abūmuslimiya. These declared that Abū Muslim is the imam and is alive or was a prophet sent by Manṣūr and knew all secret wisdom. Faith is knowledge of the imam. They abolished the fixed religious duties.[7] They are also known as *Khurramdīniya.*

[1] Nawbakhtī, 39. b. Ḥazm B.M. Or 843 f. 93r. For a person as a place of pilgrimage, see Wigram, *The Cradle of Mankind*, 143.

[2] Or Muḥammad, 'Abbās and the three sons of Abū Ṭālib, 'Alī, Ja'far and 'Aḳīl. *Ghunya*, 167.

[3] b. Ḥazm, 4, 186.

[4] *'Uyūn al-aphbār*, 2, 148.

[5] Aghānī, 121, (1st ed.), 15.,

[6] Nawbakhtī, so *Mukhtaṣar*, 37.

[7] so Ash'arī, 22.

2. Ruzāmiya. "They attached themselves to earlier generations"; this probably means that they did not regard the Companions as infidels. In secret they reverenced Abū Muslim believing that the spirit of God was in him and that he was killed.[1]

3. Hurairiya, called after a certain Abū Huraira. These were the true 'Abbasid party; they honoured Abū Muslim but held that 'Abbās was designated and that subsequent imams must be of his family. They "attached themselves to earlier generations" in secret and would not call any of them unbelievers.

This 'Abbasid party was almost the same as the Rawandiya. There are two accounts of their doctrine. One says that the prophet appointed 'Abbās who passed on the office of imam to his children; the imam must be of this family. The other says that the spirit, which was in Jesus, passed into 'Alī and then through the imams to Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad, thus the imams are Gods. The Rawandiya called Manṣūr the Lord who fed them. They believed in transmigration and were anti-nomians. They thought that the spirit of Adam was in 'Uthmān b. Nahīk who killed Abū Muslim, and that al-Haitham b. Mu'āwiya was Gabriel.[2]

Some there were who said that Muḥammad was God; others said that God did not create anything but committed the whole work of creation to Muḥammad.[3] Some said that all prophets from Adam onwards were God. The *Ghurābiya* said that because Muḥammad was as like to 'Alī as one crow to another, Gabriel made a mistake and took the revelation to the wrong man. Some said that it was not his fault; others said that he did so on purpose.[4]

The 'Ulyā'iya said that 'Alī was God; he was the highest though Fāṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusain in some sort shared in his deity. Muḥammad was his slave and messenger.[5]

The Naṣriya, in the province of Jordan and Tiberias, cursed Fāṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusain because they were devils in human

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 328, 337. Ash'arī, 22.
[2] Ṭabarī III, 129 f., 418.
[3] *Minhāj al-sunna*, 1, 239.
[4] b. Ḥazm, 4, 183.
[5] Kashshī, 253.

form. They said that 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Muljam was the most excellent of men because he freed the spirit of Godhead in 'Alī from its admixture with the darkness and filth of the body.[1]

Abū Ḥulmān of Damascus taught that God dwells in all beautiful forms.[2]

The school of Aḥmad b. al-Kayyāl and the Ḳarmaṭians are outside the development of Muslim theology; enough has been said to show that the time of this development was one of ferment when any strange idea could find welcome by some.

This is the place for a moderate branch of the imamites.

The Zaidiya took their name from Zaid, the great-grandson of 'Alī, who led a rebellion at Kufa and was killed in 122/740. They took up a position between the true Shī'a and the other sects as is shown by the statement that Zaid was a pupil of Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā. Most of them recognised Abū Bakr and 'Umar as lawful imams although 'Alī was the best Muslim and had the clearest right to be imam. This was the source of the doctrine that the less excellent might be imam; some added the condition, if he is advised by the most excellent. They admitted that there might be two imams at the same time and were ready to accept any descendant of Ḥasan or Ḥusain who was fit for the office and claimed it by the sword.[3] Reason shows that an imam is necessary.[4] They agreed with the Khawārij that those who commit grave sins go to hell for ever. On other doctrines they differed among themselves considerably.

Some said that faith was knowledge of God, confession, and the avoidance of those sins to which a threat of punishment was attached. Others taught that faith was the sum of all good deeds, and the commission of those sins to which a threat of punishment was attached was not unbelief. Some allowed the right of private judgment; others disallowed it. Some were determinists, holding that God created the acts of men; others said that men's acts were acquired by them and done by them.

[1] b. Hazm, 4, 188.
[2] *Farḳ*, 215.
[3] Our imam is not one who drops a veil over himself but one who unsheathes his sword. Kashshī, 261 f. "Fit" includes being learned in the law and pious *Muḥaṣṣal*, 180, N. 1.
[4] Ījī, 297.

Some said that God knows by knowledge, wills by will, lives by life, etc.; others denied this.

They divided into three main branches.

Jārūdiya.

The prophet appointed 'Alī imam by description not by name. This sect went beyond Zaid by calling unbelievers those companions who made Abū Bakr and 'Umar imams. Some said that the prophet appointed Ḥasan and Ḥusain. Others said that 'Alī appointed Ḥasan who appointed Ḥusain. After him, the imam had to be chosen by a committee from among the children of the brothers. They were not agreed on the person of the mahdī. The other two branches called the Jārūdiya unbelievers.[1]

Sulaimāniya.

These were disciples of Sulaimān b. Jarīr; they acknowledged the first two caliphs but called 'Uthmān an unbeliever. The imam has to be chosen and it is enough if two good men unite to select him. They rejected the doctrines of *badā'* and *taḳiyya* (the right to conceal one's religion in time of danger), the first of these was peculiar to the Shī'a. Sulaimān converted many of the Shī'a by his criticism of the doctrines of *badā'* and *taḳiyya*.[2] Rebellion against the imam is unbelief.

By this time men had begun to realise some of the difficulties in forming a clear idea of God and to see that it was not easy to reconcile his omnipotence with his moral character. The first dogmatic statements were childish. This sect taught that it is wrong to say that God can do wrong or tell lies, and that he cannot do these things; because he cannot do wrong or tell lies. Again, if it has been revealed that God will not do something, they must not say that he can or cannot do it. But if there has been no revelation and the thing is not repugnant to reason, they may say that he can do it for they do not know the unseen. According to others, God can and cannot do wrong,

[1] Sections of the Jārūdiya expected different mahdīs. Some looked for Muḥammad the Pure Soul; others Muḥammad b. al-Ḳāsim who rebelled in Ṭāliḳān, 219/834; and others Yaḥyā b. 'Umar who rebelled in Kufa, 250/864. Nawbakhtī, 56 ff.

and can do what he knows he will not do. The Sulaímāniya taught that it was allowable to say that God can do what he knows he will not do, in the sense that if he were to do it, it would become known to him. Clearly they tried to reconcile an abstract possibility with a possibility limited by conditions.

Butriya, Abtariya, or Ṣāliḥiya.

Disciples of Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ b. Ḥayy of Kufa (167/783)[1] and Kathīr al-Nawwā. They got this name because Kathīr had the nickname of al-Abtar. They recognised the first two caliphs and said that 'Alī was the most excellent of men who gave up his position to others of his own free will, cheerfully doing homage to them. They rejected 'Uthmān, Ṭalḥa, al-Zubair, and 'Āïsha; though another report makes them reserve judgment on 'Uthmān. To rise in rebellion with any descendant of 'Alī is a duty and any such insurgent is imam.[2] They allowed wiping the shoes,[3] the drinking of date-wine (forbidden by the Shī'a), and the eating of eels. Al-Nawbakhtī calls them men of tradition who were partisans of 'Alī but combined this with respect for Abū Bakr and 'Umar. They thought that a substance might be void of accidents which could afterwards originate in it. Knowledge and other activities may occur in the dead.[4]

Here we return to the main body of the imamites.

While the extremists were engaged in developing their wild theories, the moderates built up Shī'a orthodoxy. Nearly every prominent member of the family of 'Alī was recognised as imam by some sect or other, either by direct or indirect designation. Details are tedious and may be found in an appendix. Some said that religion consisted in recognising the imam and keeping the laws given by the prophet; others said that the only obligation was to know the imam. He was given special grace by God which saved him from all errors and sin.

[1] *Fark*, 24. [2] Kashshī, 152.

[3] Wiping the shoes. Is it lawful under some circumstances to wipe the shoes instead of washing the feet when making ready for prayer? By some freak, this detail of ritual became symbolical of the differences in Islam. The Shī'a forbad it; others allowed it. Books on theology solemnly record the views of the several authorities.

[4] Sam'ānī, f. 348a.

Some held that he knew everything; others that he was infallible in religious matters. The death of 'Alī al-Riḍā (203/818), leaving a son only seven years old raised the question whether a child could be imam. It was discussed in terms of Mu'tazili theology. If God can bid men obey a minor, then he can impose responsibility on a minor.

This is inconceivable, so likewise, the ability of a minor to solve knotty problems in law is inconceivable. If you admit that the imam may be almost adult, where will you stop? You will descend down the years till you have to admit an infant in cradle and swaddling bands as imam.[1] Nevertheless, some held that it was unbelief to say that the knowledge of the imam in his cradle was not equal to that of the prophet. Others held that knowledge was common to all; that if a man could not learn from the imams or from others what he wanted to know, then he might use his own judgment.[2]

The reverence felt for the imams is best shown by some sayings attributed to them. 'Alī said: No believer whether in the east or the west is hidden from us.[3] Ja'far said: One who loves 'Alī is forgiven the drinking of wine.[4] Al-Riḍā said: If you want God to look at you and you to look at him with no veil between you, devote yourself to the family of Muḥammad and that one of them who has the authority.[5]

It was the belief of some that the imams could work miracles. At a later date it was said that they were more excellent than all prophets and angels; they have the books of the prophets, the staff of Moses, the seal of Solomon, the shirt of Joseph,[6] the ark, the tablets of the law, etc.[7] They are the purpose of the creation of the world, the means by which God acts here and hereafter, and the necessary ambassadors between God and men. All outflowing of goodness begins in them. They are almost emanations of the divine. The prophet said: I have left you two weighty things, the book of God and my family.[8] Belief in the return of the hidden imam became part of the regular Shī'a creed.

[1] Nawbakhtī, 74.
[2] Nawbakhtī, 49 f.
[3] Kashshī, 68.
[4] Kashshī, 185.
[5] Kashshī, 281.
[6] The text has, Abraham.
[7] Muḥammad Bāḳir, *I'tiḳādāt*, 294.
[8] Muḥammad Bāḳir, *I'tiḳādāt*, 288 f.

There is some evidence that the earlier imams did not like the new movements in thought. Muḥammad Bāḳir said: The Koran is neither created nor uncreated; it is the word of the creator.[1] Ja'far said: A man does not lead himself, God leads him and he must be grateful.[2] Reasoning (*ḳiyās*) is not of my religion.[3] God curse Muḥammad b. Muslim who says that God did not know things till he had created them.[4] Mūsā Kāẓim, when asked if Adam had any of the essence (*jawhariya*) of God, said: No good Muslim (man of the *sunna*) can ask this.[5]

Beside an infallible imam there was no place for an uncreated Koran. They saw that the various sects of Islam and also heretics, who did not believe in it, used the Koran as an argument and by it overcame their opponents; so it was obvious that the Koran needed an authoritative person to interpret it.[6] This person was the imam. Also all the Shī'a, except three, believed that it had been altered.[7] Originally, seven men were mentioned by name in it, but the Ḳuraish removed all except Abū Lahab.[8]

A few faint traces of philosophical thought are found. As sight is due to the combined action of light and the eye so knowledge is due to the union of reasoning, which is the eye, with the word of the imam, which is light.[9] A report by one person is not a secure basis for action, much less for knowledge.[10] The words attributed to Ja'far, "If we receive mercy, it is by his mercy; if we are punished, it is for our sins," are contrary to Mu'tazili doctrine.[11]

Some early teachers held that an imam was needed to teach men about food, medicine, poisons, trades, and crafts. (The idea was widespread that medicine could only have been discovered by a prophet.) The Twelvers taught that the imam is a grace to help perform the duties imposed by reason, to avoid the evils known by reason, and to guard religion from

1 Kashshī, 305. 2 Kashshī, 263, 375. 3 Kashshī, 125 cf. 155.
4 Kashshī, 113. 5 Kashshī, 306. 6 Kashshī, 264.
7 b. Ḥazm, 4, 182. 8 Kashshī, 187. 9 *Muḥaṣṣal*, 27. N. 4.
10 *Irshād*, 236.
11 Kashshī, 147. A doctrine of original sin is implied, i.e., Christian influence.

addition or diminution.[1] Sin against God will be forgiven on repentance and sin against man when restitution has led to repentance.[2]

Later the Mu'tazili doctrine was adopted, but theologians are shy of declaring that the Koran is created.

They held that it is unbelief to affirm the existence of eternal attributes; one who does this is as the Christians.[3] Some said that all knowledge came by inspiration.[4] A prophet might pretend to be an unbeliever to save his life[5]; he could not commit sin, neither before nor after his call to be a prophet.[6] A Muslim may command what is right and forbid what is wrong only at the bidding of the imam.[7]

They would only pray behind a worthy man,[8] they forbid the use of date-wine,[9] while eels are a vexation to them.[10] Some allow nine wives and forbid cabbage because it sprang from the blood of Ḥusain.[11] One who has gone to hell, may be taken out by God in his mercy.[12]

KHAWĀRIJ

At first, the Khawārij were sincere according to their narrow ideas; later they degenerated or it may be more correct to say that any, who wished for a life of crime and violence, called themselves Khawārij. They were men of fasts and prayers; the recitation of the Koran threw some into fits of screaming.[13] "Compared to their prayers and fasts, the prayers and fasts of any one of you are contemptible; but their faith does not pass their shoulders." Others called them dogs of hell. They were of all degrees, but a general description of their ways of thinking and acting can be given. Mirdās was a typical ascetic; it was the high-handedness of Ziyād which made him a Khāriji.

All sects disputed him. Heretics claimed him because he

[1] *Arba'īn*, 427.
[2] *Bab al hadi ashar.*
[3] Ījī, 30, 32.
[4] *Intiṣār*, 153.
[5] Ījī, 219.
[6] Ījī, 200.
[7] Ījī, 331. Cf. b. Ḥazm, 4, 171.
[8] b. Ḥazm, 4, 176.
[9] Taftazānī, 166.
[10] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 1, 111.
[11] b. Ḥazm, 4, 182.
[12] *Bayān al-adyān* (ed. Schefer), 157.
[13] *Talbīs*, 270.

neglected his person ; the Shī'a claimed him ; and the Mu'tazila claimed him for his piety and understanding and because he withstood Ziyād by quoting, " None bears another's burden " (Koran, 6, 164) when the viceroy wished to punish the innocent with the guilty. Mustawrid was constant in prayer and a fervent fighter. Convinced that they were the only true Muslims they treated all others as infidels and their severity to them is in striking contrast to their gentleness to the *dhimmīs*. They were typical fanatics, carrying their ideas to their logical conclusions and having no sense of humour in their dealings with one another and with other Muslims.

Wāṣil and some companions met a band of Khawārij and feared that they would be killed. Wāṣil told his companions to let him do the talking and went forward to meet the Khawārij, who asked who they were. " Unbelievers, seeking protection to hear the word of God " (K., 9, 6). The Khawārij expounded their doctrines and Wāṣil accepted them point by point for himself and his fellows. The Khawārij then claimed them as brethren and insisted that they must join them. " Not so," said Wāṣil, " you must bring us to a place of safety," finishing the quotation. They did so.[1]

A man belonging to their straitest sect lost his temper with a slave girl and sold her to one who was not a Khāriji. Some of his friends said that he had done wrong ; others refused to express an opinion. They appealed to their imam. He declared that the man had done right, excommunicated those who had condemned him, those who had suspended judgment, and the man himself for not at once excommunicating his critics.[2]

A man asked Tha'laba's daughter in marriage saying that he did not mind what bride price he paid if she were ready for marriage and a Muslim. The mother declared that the girl was a Muslim whether she were grown up or not, and had no need to be invited to accept Islam.

The suitor was not satisfied with this answer so Tha'laba stopped the marriage. Ibn 'Ajrad heard the story and declared

[1] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 1, 196.

[2] *Farḳ*, 87. cf. Ash'arī, 110 ; tabarra'a, to break off relations with ; excommunicate does not carry any ecclesiastical connotation.

that the girl had to be invited to accept Islam and that she must be excommunicated till she had accepted. Tha'laba disagreed and this led to a breach between them.[1]

The followers of Najda decided that he had done wrong in writing to 'Abd al-Malik and in other things also and called on him to repent. He repented. They then decided that the imam could do nothing of which he could need to repent and summoned him to repent of his repentance. He refused and there was a breach. Shabīb, the famous fighter, took up his quarters in a church. The villagers begged him to quit it because, though he was kind to the weak and those who paid tribute, the government troops were tyrants and would kill them for sheltering him.

At once he left the church and camped outside the village.[2]

They were ready to pull the leg of an opponent. They were facing the troops of Ibn al-Zubair and were the first to hear of the defeat and death of Muṣ'ab. They asked the enemy what they thought of 'Abd al-Malik. "Erring and a deceiver" was the answer. Two days later they asked again and got the reply, "A guide in the right path."

Their want of humour laid them open to the wiles of their enemies and al-Muhallab took advantage of this weakness. He sent a man to ask them this question, "Two men set out to join you; one died on the road, the other failed to pass your test. How do you judge them?" Some said that the first was a believer and the other an unbeliever; others that both were unbelievers. A bitter dispute followed. He also sent a Christian who prostrated himself before Ḳatarī, one of the Khāriji leaders. This conversation took place:

Ḳatarī. Worship belongs to God.

Christian. I worshipped only you.

A Khāriji. He has worshipped you and not God. "You and what you worship apart from God are fuel for hell" (K., 21, 98).

Ḳatarī. These Christians worship Jesus and it does not hurt him.

[1] Ash'arī, 112. [2] Tabarī, II, 934.

A Khāriji killed the Christian, Ḳatarī rebuked him, and the was a dispute.

A Muslim critic is severe. The piety with which a Khāriji adorns himself consists in exaggerating the evil of others' bad deeds, while he heeds not his own excesses and the wrongs he inflicts on men, forgetting that God does not wish the worst evildoer to suffer, and that all men have rights.[1] Again, "You do not know a lawyer who does not think it lawful to fight them. The chief of the Ḥilsiya was ready to fight Najda.[2]

The Khawārij helped to develop Muslim thought on several subjects.

1. The doctrine of the imam. They deserted 'Alī because he put the decision about the caliphate in the hands of men whereas judgment belongs to God alone. Some, the followers of Najda, took the logical step of declaring that an imam was unnecessary when men knew how to rule their social life by the book of God. Neither reason nor revelation demands an imam.[3] Most, however, were not so radical. They accepted Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān during the first six years of his reign. After these three the community was not limited in its choice to Ḳuraish; anyone who had the needful knowledge of religion might be imam, even an Ethiopian slave. This doctrine was embodied in a tradition.[4] Further, the imam might always be called to account and, if need be, deposed.

2. The doctrine of man. They held that they were the only Muslims and that all who did not agree with them were unbelievers. In the beginning there was no question of having Khāriji sympathies, a man had to come out and take part in the war against evil; if he did not do so he was an unbeliever. Consequently, they were not bothered by the question of faith and works; there was no faith without works. Later they became less strict. Some even allowed *taḳiyya*, that a man might conceal his religion if it were dangerous to proclaim it.

Out of this rose the question of the extent of the 'abode of Islam,' or as they preferred to call it, 'the abode of the unitarian

[1] Jāḥiẓ. *Ḥayawān*, 1, 103.
[2] Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 3, 88. Those who took no part in civil strife. From *ḥils*, saddle cloth.
[3] b. Khaldūn, 3, 26.
[4] b. Sa'd, 8, 224.

faith.' For the extremists it was the camp of the Khawārij. The Azāriḳa made a practice of killing the children of their opponents. Other sects disapproved but the discussion on the position of children here and hereafter was set going. Some held that the child of Muslim parents was not a Muslim till it had of its own choice accepted Islam. The children of unbelievers would go to hell. Christian doctrine may have helped the growth of these ideas, but they started on Muslim ground. Pains suffered by children also called for explanation.

As there is no faith without works, grave sins are clearly unbelief and those who commit them are punished for ever in hell. The followers of Najda taught that venial sins would be punished, perhaps in hell, perhaps not, and that the punishment would not be everlasting. This sect also met the problem of offences committed in ignorance and solved it in this way. Religion falls into two parts.

(*a*) Essentials. The knowledge of God and His prophets, respect for the lives and property of Muslims, condemnation of force, and general acceptance of all that God has revealed.

(*b*) Unessentials. All else is not binding on men till they have been taught.

They went so far as to teach that one who feared to use his understanding on the second class, lest he should go wrong, was an unbeliever.

The Khawārij drew a distinction and made *shirk*, the failure to believe in one God, worse than *kufr*, unbelief. They also distinguished between *kufr ni'ma* and *kufr shirk* (*kufr al-milla*). It is tempting to suppose that the two meanings of the word helped this distinction, that the first phrase means 'ingratitude for blessings received' and the second 'complete unbelief.' Anyhow the second is much more serious. The knowledge of God is the one thing that separates faith from unbelief.

3. They had various peculiar ideas. Some thought that a frivolous tale like that of Joseph could not be part of the Koran. Others said that a prophet would come to the gentiles; a Koran would be written in heaven and be revealed to him as a whole, not in parts. He would supersede the religion of Muḥammad. A dispute about the sacred tax paid by a piece

of land, whether it was a tenth or a twentieth, gave rise to a sect. Some said that drunkenness by itself was harmless, it only became unbelief when it was joined to another sin such as the omission of a prayer. Shabīb allowed a woman to be imam.[1]

The later Khawārij diverged from the earlier in thought as widely as in politics; those who debated whether 'capacity' was with or before the act had as little in common with Shabīb and the Azāriḳa as had those who fought on the side of 'Abdallah b. Mu'āwiya.

Opinions on free will, the will of God, and the creation of the Koran are attributed to them; but these are not special Khāriji doctrines and will find their fit place in the chapter on the Mu'tazila.

They all held that the Koran was created.[2] One sect held that the morning and night prayers were each of two sections.[3] Some said that a sinner had to be punished, then asked to repent, and, if he refused, put to death. One who denies God is not an absolute unbeliever unless he sets up a second. Some gave man a cosmic significance for, "if God destroyed responsible beings, the world would perish; for he created it for them alone and without them its continued existence has no meaning."[4] Some taught that God's friendship towards believers and hostility to unbelievers were among his essential attributes.[5] They did not accept the "agreement of believers as one of the bases of Islam.[6]

The chief sects are the following:—

Azāriḳa.

They took their name from Nāfi' b. Azraḳ, † 65/686. The occasion for the rise of the sect was the marriage of an Arab woman to a client, both being Khawārij. Her family objected to the man, presumably because he was not an Arab, though this is nowhere stated.

'Alī and the two arbitrators were absolute unbelievers, the land of Islam was the abode of unbelief, and all who dwelt in it

[1] *Mukhtaṣar*, 90.
[2] Ash'arī, 124.
[3] Ash'ari, 126.
[4] Shahrastānī, 100.
[5] *Farḳ*, 73.
[6] *Farḳ*, 337.

unbelievers. They did not condemn the earliest Khawārij. They killed at sight those who disagreed with them, men and children, enslaving the women. All who committed grave sins were unbelievers, punished for ever in hell. The children of unbelievers were in hell. Those who shared their views, but did not come out in open rebellion were unbelievers. All who wished to join them had to pass a test. They accepted the literal meaning of the Koran as their rule of life and did not allow the exercise of private judgment. Prophets may commit sins.[1]

They rejected certain practices, the penalty of stoning for adultery, and the statutory penalty for slandering respectable men (but not women). Mutilation was the punishment for every theft. It was lawful to break faith with those who had been promised safe conduct.

Najdāt.

The followers of Najda, † 72/693.

Sins like fornication and theft were not absolute unbelief but persistence in a small sin was. It was better to come out but it was permissible not to take part in open war. A man might conceal his faith both by words and deeds. For the abode of war they said the abode of concealment and there it was allowable to kill *dhimmīs*. Their chief doctrines have been already mentioned.

Ibāḍiya.

They took their name from 'Abdullah b. Ibāḍ who flourished at the end of the Umayyad dynasty.

'Alī and the two arbitrators were 'ungrateful for favours'; other Muslims were unbelievers but not absolutely so, social intercourse and inter-marriage with them was allowed. Only the camp of the government army was the 'abode of war' (abode of unbelief). Muslims might be killed or despoiled but only in war. They did not approve of offering all the choice between the Ibāḍī doctrine and the sword but an evil imam might be

[1] Iji, 218. All prophets can sin and sin is unbelief. *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 1048.

resisted in any and every way. One, who committed a great sin, was a unitarian (*muwaḥḥid*), not an unbeliever and not a believer. A prophet's claim to be a prophet and his personality were sufficient evidence of his mission ; men had to follow him without further proof.[1] The Ibāḍiya expressed no opinion on the fate of unbelievers' children ; those of believers were treated like their fathers. The witness of those, who disagreed with them, was allowed in law.

In later times they adopted ideas from various sources. Peculiar is the idea that repentance profits only those who sin in ignorance and repent quickly.[2] The Nukkār held that the names of God are created. When all moral agents are dead, the world will come to an end.[3]

They are said to have taught that God always wills that those things, which he knows will be, will be, and that those, which he knows will not be, will not be.

Ṣufriya.

Named after Ziyād b. al-Aṣfar.

All who oppose the Khawārij are absolute unbelievers. Those who do not come out are not unbelievers. Muslim countries are the abode of absolute unbelief. They did not permit the killing of children : in another version they did not consign them to hell. They prayed behind a man they did not know. They married their women to other Muslims in the abode of concealment, but not where the Khāriji faith ruled ; they allowed concealment of faith in word but not in deed. Every grave sin is unbelief, this is absolute and worship of the devil. Sins, for which no penalty is fixed in the Koran, e.g., the omission of prayer, are unbelief. A criminal is not an unbeliever and has faith till he has been punished by authority. They expressed no opinion on adulterers.

"We think ourselves Muslims ; perhaps God does not think so."

[1] *Farḳ*, 210 ; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 175. Ash'ari, 106.
[2] M.S.O.S. (1899), vol. II, pt. 2 ; 57.
[3] This is the logical deduction from the belief common to Christians and Jews that the world was made for man. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, 36. Poulter, *Life and Works of Saadya*, 212.

THE EARLY SECTS

MURJI'A

A Khāriji was sure that his sect was right and all others damned; the Murji'a[1] took the opposite view, held that there was hope for all. The movement is a development of the views of moderates like 'Abdullah b. 'Umar, and it may be a reaction against the Khawārij. It was not a compact school; the name was given to all who thought alike on some subjects, so Jahm the determinist, and Ghailān the Mu'tazili, are included in the group. Men of all sects except the Shi'a bear this label. It is reported that Ibn al-Ḥanafiya was the first of the sect for he said, "I do not testify that anyone is safe or is one of the men of heaven—except the prophet—not even 'Alī my father."[2] Another report makes his son Ḥasan the first of the school; it is said that he wrote on this doctrine.[3]

Shahrastānī is careful to point out that Ḥasan was a Murji' only so far as orthodoxy allowed.

Politics had some share in the birth of this school; it declined to pass judgment on 'Alī and 'Uthmān, would not say that one was better than the other, much less that one was an unbeliever, and left the decision to God.[4] When a man is called a Murji' who hated 'Alī, it probably means no more than he refused to exalt him above Abū Bakr. Muḥammad b. Sīrīn is called the most Murji' of men, the slowest to pass judgment on others. As they would not judge the head of the state, so they would not any Muslim; religion was the affair of the heart and God alone knows its secrets.

Al-Ḥārith b. Suraij belonged to this school. He started from the point that an Arab Muslim was no better than one of another race, and ended by fighting with unbelievers against Muslims. A poet reminds him that he is pledged to works and urges him

[1] Three explanations of the name are given. It is connected with 'hope,' meaning "those who say that there is hope for all"; with 'postpone' meaning "those who postpone judgment"; and also "those who postpone 'Alī," putting him in the fourth place after the prophet. That it means "to put works below faith" looks like an invention of the theologians.

[2] b. Sa'd, 5, 68.

[3] b. Sa'd, 5, 67, 241; Shahrastānī, 106.

[4] b. Sa'd, 6, 214.

to fight unbelievers because the theology of the Murji's has made him a polytheist.[1]

Doctrine. Faith is the one thing needful; a believer has it, an unbeliever has it not. If faith is present, sins do no harm; if it is not present, virtuous acts do no good. The orthodox[2] said, the Murji'a put works below faith; the Karrāmiya said, They deny the need for works. Faith was defined in several ways.

Yūnus. Faith is knowledge of God, love of, and submission to him; he who has these is a believer. Pride made the devil an unbeliever. The lack of any other good quality does not injure faith. According to Shahrastānī, he taught that love and devotion take a believer to heaven, not knowledge and good deeds.

Abū Shamir.[3] Faith is knowledge of God, love of and submission to him with the heart, and confession; if prophets have been sent to bear witness of him, they must also be believed. These as a whole compose faith; separately they are not faith nor parts of it. Faith does not assume a knowledge of the subject matter of revelation. Those who disagreed with Abū Shāmir's doctrines of God and human will were unbelievers.

Abū Thawbān. Faith is confession of God and the apostles. Those acts, which reason declares to be necessary, and those, which reason says need not be done, are not part of faith.

Ghassān[4] b. Abān of Kufa. Faith is knowledge and confession of God, the prophet, and revelation in general. Thus a man might believe that it was his duty to go on pilgrimage to the Ka'ba and yet think that it was in India. There are no degrees of faith, it is indivisible, and cannot increase or decrease. Another report says that it can grow but not diminish.

Abū Mu'ādh al-Tawmanī. Faith is what protects from unbelief; it is several qualities, anyone of which alone is not faith nor part of faith.[5] The omission of one is unbelief. Great

[1] Ṭabari II, 1575 f. cf. Gabrieli, *Il Califfato di Hisham*, 53.
[2] Orthodox is used for want of a better word.
[3] Contemporary of al Naẓẓām. Jāḥiẓ *Bayān*, 1, 89.
[4] *Ansāb*, 408 v.; *Farḳ*, 191.
[5] According to *Ansāb*, 112 v., the doctrine of "parts of faith" was the same as Abū Shamir's.

sins do not cause unbelief. The neglect of a religious duty for reasons of business or pleasure leads to corruptness; otherwise such neglect is unbelief, because of the spirit which prompted it.

A summary of the ideas of the Murji'a is contained in a poem by Thābit Ḳuṭna († 110/728). Omitting what is obvious the creed is: judgment on what is doubtful must be postponed, all, who call themselves Muslims, are Muslims, what has been revealed about the perplexed and the disobedient must be believed (*wa'īd*), Muslim blood may be shed only in self-defence, nothing can reverse the decree of God which is righteous, he who fears God will get the reward of the righteous 'Alī and 'Uthmān will both be rewarded, every man will meet God alone, every Khāriji, who uses the right of private judgment, is wrong.[1]

Some of these men had more than a rationalist idea of religion; the seat of it was in the heart, that is to say, the mind, but it was also emotion and act. They named this religious principle faith. It could be analysed but if one tried to break it up it ceased to be itself. Some argued that as faith makes the difference between the believer and the unbeliever, a man either has it or has it not, then it must be a constant; there are no degrees in faith. Others, starting from passages in the Koran which speak of an increase of faith (8, 2; 9, 125; 33, 22), held that it can grow but not diminish.

Others held that it may both increase and decrease. Some taught that a man must be able to give a reason for his faith; others taught that this was not necessary.

Some said that all sins were grave because they were all rebellion against God[2]; others kept the usual division of grave and venial.

Some said that prophets could commit grave sins. Opinions differed on punishment. Muslims might be sent to hell for ever or might be punished outside hell. Muḳātil b. Sulaimān taught that a sinning Muslim would be punished at the resurrection on the bridge over hell.

[1] Aghānī (2nd) 13, 50. On p. 48 the words "the *mujtahid* is right" are used, but not in a theological sense. This use suggests that the phrase was familiar in its theological meaning of "the right of private judgement."

[2] In books on theology, 'rebellion' is a common term for sin.

The heat and flame would reach him and he would suffer according to the measure of his sin, like a popcorn in a frying pan over a hot fire. If God forgave one his sin, he would have to forgive all of the same degree of wickedness. It was agreed that repentance wiped out grave sins; they argued whether it was an act of grace on the part of God or whether it was a man's right. The Mu'tazila were not the only people to say that God 'must'. Some taught that everything except idolatry would be forgiven. Some taught that prayer was a sign of weakness for those strong in faith do not pray.[1] A certain 'Ubaid taught that God's knowledge, word, and religion had always been something different from himself and that he was in the shape of a man. Theology was still in its infancy.[2]

Later this name took another meaning. Maḳdisī found in the mountains south of the Caspian people who had no mosques, did not wash after physical defilement, but paid large sums annually to the government and claimed to be unitarians. These were unanimously held to be Murji'a.

Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān b. Thābit († 150/767 or the next year), besides being the founder of a school of law, was important for the development of theology though it is hard to disentangle his teaching from that of his followers.[3] He approached theology in the spirit of a preacher and his enemies, who were many, took his rhetoric at its face-value. It is not easy to decide whether the words attributed to him are genuine, foisted on him by foes, or corrected by friends.

A man is a believer though he does not know that the Ka'ba is in Mecca.

The faith of Abū Bakr and that of the devil are equal.

My faith is that of Gabriel.

"Ablution is half of faith," so wash twice that your faith may be perfect.

If a man worships this sandal and by it draws near to God, I see no harm therein.

How can I heed the words of one who puts no kindness in his religion?

Prayer is not part of religion.

[1] Malaṭī, *Tanbīh*, 112. [2] Ījī, 359 f. [3] *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 13, 324 f.

No wonder that it was said, " He was a teacher, we took the good and left the bad." A correction by a friend is, " He, who does not know that the Ka'ba is in Mecca, is an unbeliever."

He was a leader of the Murji'a and his teaching is typical. Faith is in the heart alone and is belief in or knowledge of God, the apostle, and his message. It cannot be divided. By comparing contradictory statements we may conclude that the core of faith is the same in all but it can vary in intensity.[1] The arguments for faith are not part of it. Works are not part of it but are the channels through which it works. It could grow by the addition of works only during the lifetime of the prophet when revelation could still impose new duties.[2] Abū Ḥanīfa accepted all practising Muslims as believers and prayed behind one of bad character.

God was a creator before he began creating.[3] He alone knows his nature.[4] His ordinance rules the world.[5] He creates the capacity which man uses or he creates the acts of men.[6] Capacity may produce a good act or its bad opposite.[7] If God had not sent prophets, men must have known him by reason after considering the work of his hands.[8] Unbelievers receive blessings.[9] He, who exercises his judgment and finds the truth, gets a double reward, one for seeking the truth and one for finding it.[10] Contradictory sayings are ascribed to him; " the wickedness of the wicked does not hurt you," and, " the blessed can become miserable by the acts of the miserable."[11] He would not decide whether the children of unbelievers go to heaven or hell.[12] If heaven and hell are created they will perish. Some say that he was the first to teach that the Koran was created though he afterwards withdrew this opinion. Rebellion against an unjust imam is not allowed.[13] The imam must be from Ḳuraish.[14] 'Alī was right in fighting Ṭalḥa and al-Zubair.[15]

[1] *Musāmara*, 2, 17. 41.
[2] Taftazānī, 129.
[3] *Musāmara*, 85.
[4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 312.
[5] God endures by the attribute of endurance, *Rawḍa Bahiya*, 66, looks a anachronism.
[6] *Fiḳh Akbar* I, 11. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 312.
[7] Taftazānī, 106.
[8] *Musāmara*, 157.
[9] *Itḥāf al-sādat*, 2, 9.
[10] b. Ḥazm, 3, 247.
[11] *Rawḍa Bahiya*, 8; *Fiḳh Akbar* I, 14.
[12] *Musāmara*, 234.
[13] *Musāmara*, 278.
[14] *Firaḳ al-Shī'a*, 10.
[15] *Firaḳ al-shī'a*, 14.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM

Orthodox Islam of a later date condemned some early thinkers because, in trying to formulate their religion, they used words which implied that God was like man or had a body. These men did not form a school, indeed many of them belonged to the Shī'a ; and it is a mistake to say, as Maḳrīzī does, that they were a reaction against the Mu'tazila. They are one of the many facets of early Islam, one of the attempts to give a reasoned statement of the faith.

The Koran says that God is on the throne, is light, has a face, eyes, and hands. So the most obvious course was to say that he was a body with form and limbs. Dāūd al-Jawāribi went further than any in giving a detailed list of his members. The next step was to say that these terms, when applied to God, do not mean what they mean when applied to men. So he is not in things or on the throne except as being above it. If he is on the throne he must touch it. Some said that he filled it, others that he did not fill it because there was still room on it for him to seat the prophet beside himself.

Then it was asked if the throne supported God. The Koran speaks of angels that carry the throne (69, 17). Some held that they do not support God. It was said that God, when he grows angry, grows heavier and the throne groans under his weight like a camel saddle. Others explained that it was the throne which grew heavier, not God. Opinion was divided whether eight angels or eight kinds of angels carried the throne.

Hishām b. Sālim al-Jawālīki was a client of Bishr b. Marwān but belonged to the Shī'a. His doctrine is this :

God.

God is a spreading white light in the form of a man with five separate senses, limbs, and black hair which is black light. His upper half is hollow and his lower solid ; this is probably an attempt to find a meaning for the word *ṣamad*. His heart is the source of wisdom which springs out of it as water wells from springs.[1] He moves and this movement is will and the doing of the thing willed.

[1] *Fihrist*, 177 n. 2.

Physics.

The universe consists of bodies only.

Man.

Everything which is done is body; the acts, movements, and rests of men are bodies, so men can make bodies. Capacity is a body and part of the agent; it is before the act and all healthy men have it.

Others said that he was solid throughout.

Muḳātil b. Sulaimān, one of the great ones of the Murji'a, was a contemporary of Jahm in Khurasan.[1] He said that God was a body, flesh and blood in the form of a man. Some said that God had three dimensions and colour but not taste, smell, and touch, was in a particular place, and moved about after the act of creation. Again, he is in all places, more than filling them, is finite but bigger than all else.

Again, he is of the same measure as the world, and again, men do not know how big he is. Some made him a spiritual body, others infinite but not body. Some held him to be space, infinite, in whom all exist. Another idea is that he is not in a place, but is where he was. He is said to be everywhere in the sense that he controls all; or his essence is everywhere. Or God may appear as a man, as Gabriel did to Muḥammad. An extreme form of this doctrine is that men see God in this world, they may meet him in the streets, may touch him, take his hand, visit him, and he will visit them. Most held that God will be seen.

Some said that God's power and other qualities are not things, for things are bodies. At first he had not knowledge, power, etc., but in the act of creation he willed and his will is movement; movement means making, not change of place. Some went so far as to say that he was not alive and then came to life. It was held that man's obedience pleases and helps God while disobedience weakens him.

God makes only bodies and gives to men the same power. He knows what will be before it happens, except the deeds of

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 205.

men ; these he knows only at the time of their happening, otherwise he would prevent sins. The letters and sounds which make up the Koran are eternal.

Hishām b. al-Ḥakam the Shī'ī and Muḥammad b. Karrām are always named as the finest examples of the anthropomorphist movement.

The difference was slight between those who said that God was a body, though not as other bodies, and those who said that God had face and hands because the Koran stated the fact though none knew how it was possible. Mālik said : God is on the throne, the fact is known, the manner of it is unknown ; faith in it is necessary, enquiry about it is innovation. In the same circles the names of God were held to be God. Some took up an intermediate attitude on the Koran ; they would not say that the divine knowledge in it was created or that it was not God but the commands and prohibitions were created. They did not permit rebellion against an evil imam. Discussion of theological problems was of course forbidden.

They allowed great weight to tradition, taught that God knows by an eternal knowledge, and will not send good men to hell for all eternity, they accepted the intercession of the prophet, and were determinists. Heaven and hell were created. The question, can God do what he has said that he will not do, is an absurdity.

These men called themselves the people of the Sunna or of Tradition ; their opponents called them *Ḥashwiya*.[1] This name was used freely.

Al-Shahrastānī talks of the anthropomorphists of the *Ḥashwiya*; the *Ḥashwiya* of the Sunna are also mentioned. Another name was *Nābita*.

A man is called a follower of the Sunna when he is opposed to a Rāfiḍī but a *Ḥashwī* when he is contracted with a Mu'tazilī[2] A Shī'ī theologian makes fun of them by calling their adversaries *Kishrī*.[3]

[1] Literally 'stuffing'; so-called "because they sat at the side."—'Amr b. 'Ubaid was the first to use this word, applying it to 'Abdullah b. 'Umar. *Minhāj al-Sunna*, 1, 241. cf. Maḳdisi 38. Halkin, JAOS 54 (1934). i.

[2] *Aghānī* (1st) 9,112.118.

[3] Muḥammad Bāḳir al-Majlisī. *I'tiḳādāt* 300.

They are said to have been a mean ignorant lot. Ibn Ḥawḳal, writing in the middle of the fourth century, refers to them. In Sus they were always quarrelling with the local Shī'a, who were called *Mūsāwī*, and as there was only one mosque and they prayed separately, there were ten prayers daily.

Al-Shahrastānī calls these *Ṣifatiya*, a name not used by al-Ash'arī. He uses this name because they believed that the divine attributes were eternal. This may be true, but misled by later theology al-Shahrastānī has got the emphasis all wrong, ascribing to this question much greater importance than it possessed at that period.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SECTS

Religious differences affected people in different ways; one man had six sons, two belonged to the Shī'a, two to the Murji'a, and two were Khawārij [1]; Ja'far b. Mubashshir would not speak to his brother who was a *Ḥashwī* [2]; while an adherent of 'Alī met regularly a follower of 'Uthmān without dispute or quarrel. [3] Another man could not love 'Alī because he was responsible for the death of his grandfather who fell at Siffīn. [4] Ḥasan al-Baṣrī visited the dying Jābir al-Ju'fī, one report adds, by stealth. [5] During the civil war Muṭarrif b. 'Abdullah († after 87/706) neither gave nor asked news of it; he fled from it while Ḥasan stayed in his house and forbade taking part in it. [6] Those killed in wars between Muslims are not martyrs, only volunteers. [7]

Ibrāhīm al-Nakha'ī († 96/714) speaking of 'Alī and 'Uthmān said, " I am neither a Saba'ī nor a Murji'ī; I think more highly of 'Alī than of 'Uthmān but would rather fall from heaven than say hard words about the latter." [8] He thought the doctrine of the Murji'a an innovation and would not meet them because he feared them as a greater danger to the community than an equal number of the *Azāriḳa*. [9] Sa'īd b. Jubair († 95/713) warned men against sitting with the Murj'ia. [10]

[1] b. Sa'd, 6, 204. [2] *Murūj al-dhahab*, 5, 443. [3] b. Sa'd, 6, 71.
[4] b. Sa'd, 7, 2, 170. [5] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 132. [6] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 103.
[7] b. Sa'd, 5, 220. [8] b. Sa'd, 6, 192, *cf.* 7, 1, 82.
[9] b. Sa'd, 6, 191. [10] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 166.

It is reported that al-Sha'bī had been a Shī'ī yet he said, "If the Shī'a were birds, they would be vultures; if animals, asses."[1] One disliked the Shī'a because everything bad began with sh, like *Shaitān*.[2] Another would have repeated what the Shī'a said only he had performed his ablutions.[3] The same dislike is expressed strongly in the words, "I do not weep for fear of death nor for desire for the return," and, "If God loves me he will not bring me back to earth."[4]

A man knocked at the door of Abū Ḳilāba († c. 104/721 or 2) who said, "Come in, if you are not a *Ḥarūrī*"; he thought that heretics should be put to death.[5] Muṭarrif said to a Khāriji, "If I had two souls I would follow you with one; having only one, I shall not risk it."[6] Mālik did not think it right to pray over a dead Ibāḍī or *ḳadarī*, to follow their funerals, or to visit them when sick.[7] Some, who were themselves not strictly orthodox, said, "The knowledge of God is not in the anthropomorphists, they do not obey him; it is in the *ḳadaris*—if there is such a thing—and they obey him."[8] The friendship of Hishām b. al-Ḥakam for 'Abdullah b. Zaid the Ibāḍī and of Ṭirimmāh the Khāriji for Kuthayyir the Shī'ī were noted as remarkable.[9]

The whole duty of man is summed up, "Love an upright Muslim and an upright man of the Banū Hāshim, but be not a Shī'ī; hope for what you do not know, but be not a Murji'ī; know that good comes from God and evil from the self, but be not a *ḳadarī*; love all who do good, even a Sindhi with a bored ear."[10] The Murji'a retorted by claiming 'Umar II as one of themselves and the Shī'a replied with the words of Ibn al-Ḥanafīya, "Whoso loves us, God will do him good even if he is in Dailam."[11] Many disliked religious discussion; "leave what God has left alone," was advice given to those who discussed *ḳadar*.[12] The freedom of the will was a most objectionable doctrine. 'Abdullah b. 'Awn b. Muthannā would not greet one who held it.[13] When it was mentioned in his presence he

1 b. Sa'd, 6, 173.
2 Jāḥiẓ *Ḥayawān*, 3, 7.
3 b. Sa'd, 6, 216.
4 b. Sa'd, 4, 1, 65; 6, 64.
5 b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 135.
6 b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 104.
7 *Mudawwana*, 1, 165.
8 Ash'ari, *Maḳālāt*, 430.
9 Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1, 59.
10 b. Sa'd, 6, 173.
11 b. Sa'd, 6, 218; 5, 70.
12 b. Sa'd, 5, 139.
13 b. Sa'd, 7, 2, 25.

said, "I am too old for this; I go back to the time when only two men talked in this way, Ma'bad al-Juhanī and Sanhawaih."[1] One man declared that anyone who attributed anything of will to himself was an unbeliever.[2] Al-Shāfi'ī put his thought into forcible words. "If men knew the possibility of error which is in theology they would flee from it as from a lion. It is better that a man should meet God laden with every sin, short of polytheism, than with a knowledge of theology. If your theology is right you get no reward; if it is wrong you are an unbeliever. Theologians should be beaten with palm branches and paraded through the camps." Sometimes he was satirical. "Theologians have made me aware of things of whose existence I never dreamed." He congratulated a man who had not understood what Ḥafṣ al-Fard said.[3] The only sectarians whose evidence he would not accept were the *Khaṭṭābiya* for they thought it lawful to tell lies.[4]

Mālik would not accept heretics as witnesses; Abū Yūsuf called a student of theology a *zindīḳ*. Ibn Ḥanbal condemned al-Muḥāsibī because his refutation of heretics led men to study heresy and to the free exercise of thought. New terms like substance and accident were especially disliked.[5] Al-Damīrī was wiser in saying that new terms have to be invented for the wise scholar is like the soldier who does not wait for the fight to begin before preparing his arms.[6]

[1] b. Sa'd, 7, 2, 27.
[2] *Subkī*, 241, 282; *Itḥāf al-sādat*, 2, 48.
[3] b. Sa'd, 5, 396.
[4] Ījī, 290.
[5] *Itḥāf al-sādat*, 2, 48; *Talbīs*, 178.
[6] Damīrī, 1, 11.

CHAPTER III

BEGINNINGS OF THEOLOGY

Stage I.

Three questions came to the front, as it seems, about the same time. The relation between God's omnipotence and men's life or the problem of predestination and free will; the nature of the Koran, whether it was created or not; and the question of the divine attributes. Those who took the side of free will were called *ḳadariya*.[1] Later it was said that the verse of al-A'sha

God chose for himself fidelity and righteousness and put blame on men

proved that he was a *ḳadarī*. He had learnt the doctrine in Hira.[2] This statement raises the question whether it was Christian influence which started the discussion of this problem. Probably it arose inside Islam for very little study of the Koran would bring into prominence the conflicting statements contained in it on this point. Contact with Christians probably hastened developments.

There are indications that the discussion began in Syria. 'Abdullah b. 'Umar had a friend there whom he suspected of doubting God's controlling providence.[3] Of Syria also it is said, "We attacked this land and met those who say that there is no providence."[4] All agree that Ma'bad al-Juhanī was a *ḳadarī* and, though he lived in Basra, it may have been in Damascus that he was executed in 80/699.[5] Hishām ordered Khālid al-Ḳasrī to have Ja'd b. Dirham executed in 125/743 because he

[1] The name is taken from *ḳadar* "arrangement" and then "providence." The movement was so called because it raised the question of the extent of God's government, just as the early *Khawārij* were called *Muḥakkima*, those who questioned the rightness of the arbitration.

[3] *Aghānī* (3), 9, 113.

[4] Subkī, 1, 50; also *Mudawwana*, 1, 407.

[5] Vlieger, 201.

[6] Abu'l-Maḥāsin, 1, 222.

said that the Koran was created. Khālid said to the crowd, "This man says that God did not speak to Moses and did not take Abraham as his friend."[1] In the same year, Ghailān was put to death,[2] and other *ḳadaris* had been killed or banished.[3] Yazīd III is called a *ḳadarī*,[4] and Marwān II learnt the doctrines of the creation of the Koran and of free will from Ja'd.[5] Al-Shahrastānī notes that some of the Umayyads favoured the *ḳadaris*. A year or two later Jahm b. Ṣafwān was put to death in Khurasan as a heretic.

A letter of Marwān II is preserved in which he says, "I will gird up my loins against the *ḳadaris* and smite them with my sword."[6] It was quite natural that the government should support the doctrine of predestination; all that is, including the state, has the favour of God.

Religious ideas were not always taken seriously. The tale was told of the bedouin thief who pulled goods out of tents with his crooked camel-stick and explained that it was his stick which stole not he. One of the audience cried, "If that man were alive now he would be a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa."

Ibn abī Lailā was travelling with an important Syrian when a porter passed them carrying pomegranates. The Syrian took one and hid it in his sleeve. Ibn abī Lailā could not believe his eyes and concluded that he must have made a mistake. A poor beggar passed and the Syrian gave him the fruit. Ibn abī Lailā asked his companion what he meant by stealing. The Syrian answered that his theft was one bad deed while the good act of giving would get the reward of ten. The reply was, "Your bad deed remains bad and the good act is not accepted from you."

Khashnām b. Hind, one of the extremists, was hot tempered. He was always calling his son's mother a harlot. He explained. I divorced my wife and then sinned with her once. So I speak the truth. One fornication is not so bad as ten thousand lies. God knows that I sinned only from fear of guilt in slandering her and He will make the sin a good act.[7]

[1] b. Athīr, 5, 196. [2] Ṭabari II, 1733. [3] Ṭabari II, 1777.
[4] Ṭabari II, 1874. [5] b. Athīr, 5, 329. [6] Ṭabari II, 1851.
[7] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 3, 6.

A parasite said, "God curse the *ḳadaris*. Who can turn me from eating this food? It was written on the tablet that I should eat it."[1]

In the same way the doctrines of the Shī'a were parodied. The followers of 'Alī were reported to believe that he was the *dābbat al-arḍ* and would be raised to life again before the resurrection.[2] Farazdaḳ could call the prophet "that Ḳuraishite."[3]

The doctrine of an uncreated Koran is strange and seems an intrusion on the unity of God, yet it arose at an early date. John of Damascus noted that it was heresy to say that the Koran was created.[4] A tombstone from Mosul, perhaps of 200 A.H., declares that the Koran is the word of God, revealed not created.[5]

It may be that the explanation is to be sought in the tendency which puts the law beside or above the lawgiver. The Greeks had the Fates and the Babylonians the tablets of fate. Among those who came in contact with the Muslims, the Jews believed that the Law had been created before the world. On another side the Christians taught that the Logos existed eternally in God. Using one meaning of this word John of Damascus argues that, as the Muslims admit that Christ is the word and spirit of God, they must admit also that He is uncreated, or admit that God was once without reason and spirit.[6] In the meaning of word the Logos may well have provoked the doctrine of the uncreated Koran. One story says that Bayān b. Sim'ān was the first to say that the Ḳoran was created, another gives the credit for this to Abū Ḥanīfa though he afterwards recanted. A third makes Bayān the leader in an attack on Abū Ḥanīfa for saying that the Koran was created.[7]

Attributes.

One source of the doctrine of the divine attributes may be the usage of the Koran, which joins to the mention of God such

[1] Jāḥiẓ, *Bukhalā*, 160.
[2] b. Sa'd, 3, 1, 26. *Dābbat al-arḍ* is one of the signs of the resurrection; cf Koran, 27, 84.
[3] *Aghānī* (2), 19, 39.
[4] Migne, 96, 1341.
[5] *Repertoire Chron. d'Epigraphic*, 1, 95.
[6] Migne, 96, 1341; 94, 768.
[7] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 2, 148; *Rawḍa bahiya*, 46 f.

epithets as wise, powerful. This in its turn may go back to the custom of poetry. The Christians had elaborated a system of attributes. As the idea of God is much the same in both religions, it is not surprising that the lists of attributes largely agree; still it is natural to suppose that the earlier influenced the latter. John of Damascus teaches that they belong to God by nature and are not taken from elsewhere; anticipating the Muslim doctrine that they are not other than God.[1] A list of attributes common to both faiths is given in the appendix.

Other doctrines.

There are hints that Muslims were attracted by the idea of salvation by suffering. It is said that prophets are the most afflicted of men[2]; and more generally that fever removes the sins of Muslims as fire takes away the dross from iron.[3] The idea did not find favour.

At the centre of development was Abū Sa'īd Ḥasan al-Baṣrī who died in 110/728, aged 87. Being the son of a prisoner of war he did not escape insult from Arabs. He belonged to the severe wing; when he walked he looked as if he came from the funeral of a near relative, when he sat down as if he were ordered to execution, and if fire were mentioned as if it were created solely for him.[4] His interest was in the next world only, unlike Muḥammad b. Sīrīn, his contemporary and rival, who was fond of poetry.[5] He had no use for outward show, saying that those, who wear wool, hide pride in their hearts and show humility in their dress.[6] His religion was a force that mastered him. Faith is not something that you want or put on but it is a burden on the heart and works confirm it.[7] The mystery of the divine mercy was great; wonder not at those who perish but at those who escape.[8] He had the homely sense that is so evident in many of the traditions; when asked why he did not remonstrate with unjust governors he replied that their swords were sharper than his tongue.[9] As a private person he had criticised the administration asking what need

[1] Migne, 94, 860.
[2] b. Sa'd, 8, 238.
[3] b. Sa'd, 8, 226.
[4] b. Kutaiba, *Ma'ārif*, 225.
[5] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 121.
[6] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 123.
[7] Jāḥiẓ *Bayān*, 3, 96.
[8] Mubarrad, 91.
[9] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 128.

there was of police, but when he was made kadi he saw that some control was necessary.[1] As kadi he took no pay.[2]

He accepted the government as being set up by God. He said, Do not fight him (? Ḥajjāj) for the government is a punishment from God and you cannot turn away His punishment by your swords; if it is a test, be patient till God decides. And again, God only made Ḥajjāj governor as a punishment.[3] His respect for authority was not blind for he criticised Mu'āwiya. The caliph had done four things, one of which would have been fatal. He took power by force without consulting anyone; he appointed Yazīd his successor; he let Ziyād be considered his relative; he had Ḥujr b. 'Adī put to death.[4] Therefore he did not take the government at its own valuation. When he was told that these men shed blood and say that their acts are in accord with God's decree, he answered, "The enemies of God lie."[5] He was a moderate; he blessed 'Uthmān and cursed his murderers; of 'Alī he said that victory had always helped him till he appointed the arbitrator.[6] Because he was impartial the Shī'a said that he hated 'Alī.[7]

He did not fight in the civil war, but did not flee from his home.[8] He knew that it was not the sword, but repentance which would change men's hearts.[9]

Many deny that he taught the freedom of the will, but the denial is so insistent as to rouse suspicion. One report says that he began by holding the doctrine of free will, but later dropped it.[10] Later writers tried to save his reputation for orthodoxy. He taught some measure of human responsibility. A thief, who had been impaled, said that he suffered by the decree and ordination of God. Ḥasan asked, "Did God destine you to steal?"[11] He said that all was by the decree and ordination of God except sin.[12] He thought that God had so created the world that it went on more or less by its own momentum.[13]

[1] Mubarrad, 152.
[2] b, Sa'd, 7, 152.
[3] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 119, 120.
[4] Arnold, 15.
[5] b. Kutaiba *Ma'ārif*, 225.
[6] Mubarrad, 562.
[7] *Durar wal-Ghurar*, 30a.
[8] b. Sa'd, 7, 1, 103, 119.
[9] *Ibid.*, 125.
[10] *Ibid.*, 122. *Der Islam*, 21, 67-83 and Obermann J.A.O.S., 55, 138 ff. Ṭabari III, 2,492, He is called a *Mu'tazili*. *Rawḍa bahiya*, 29 f. The *ḳadaris* led him astray.
[11] Arnold, 14.
[12] Arnold, 12.
[13] b. Sa'd, 7. 1, 127.

If men agree to obey God it is not without profit, for He adds guidance to their guidance and piety to their piety. [1]

He was conservative by nature and did not approve of novelties but saw that new weapons were needed to meet new attacks. [2] Some of the leaders of the *ḳadaris*, those who held the freedom of the will, belonged to his circle, [3] and story makes the Mu'tazila a schism from his teaching.

He does not speak of the attributes.

No details are known about the doctrine of Ma'bad except that he was the first to discuss predestination in Basra. [4] He belonged to the circle of Ḥasan and his teaching owed its popularity to the support of 'Amr b. 'Ubaid. [5] He is sometimes called a Mu'tazili. [6] Ja'd b. Dirham, besides teaching that the Koran was created, said that necessary knowledge founded on reasoning was an act without an agent. [7] It must be noticed that, for Muslims, necessary included both *a priori* and historical knowledge. This idea of an act without an agent was developed later.

Abū Marwān Ghailān b. Marwān al-Dimashḳī al-Ḳubtī is said to have been a *ḳadari*, a Murjī', and a Khāriji; but this is a rhetorical flourish. He was the author of letters which were famous. [8] He looked askance at human authority and reproved Maimūn b. Mihrān for taking a post under government. [9] It was poetic justice that the caliph Hishām set Maimūn to argue with him. Ghailān asked; Does God will that He should be disobeyed? Maimūn countered with the question; Is He disobeyed against His will? To this Ghailān had no answer. [10]

His main doctrines were these. Man does good and evil. Sinful Muslims may be punished, may even be sent to hell. For the same sin there is always the same punishment. The imam need not be from Ḳuraish. On faith he agreed closely with Abū Thawbān. Man's knowledge that he is created and that the world is ruled is necessary, an act of God and therefore not faith. Further, man is commanded to know justice, the unity of God, His promises and threats, and the law. Faith consists of this second knowledge with love, submission, and

[1] *Iḳd*, 1, 331. [2] Arnold, 13. [3] *Ma'ārif*, 225.
[4] Abu'l-Maḥāsin, 1, 222; Malaṭī, *Tanbīh*, 30; Or. 2,675 f. 86b.
[5] Makrīzī, 2, 356. [6] *Farḳ*, 93. [7] *Farḳ*, 262. [8] Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1, 239.
[9] b. Sa'd, 7, 11, 178. [10] Ṭabari II, 1,733.

acceptance of the prophet's message.[1] Knowledge that the creator is one is revealed. There is no faith in unbelievers. He is reported to have taught that what God wills happens, what He does not will does not happen, but that He can do things without willing them.[2]

The next stage in the movement came from Ḥasan's circle. The accepted version is that discussion arose about those, Muslims of course, who committed sin. Some said that they were still believers; others said unbelievers; Ḥasan called them hypocrites; then Wāṣil put them in a class by themselves and called them corrupt (*fāsiḳ*). This proposal was not accepted, so Wāṣil left the gathering and Ḥasan said, "He has left us" (*i'tazala 'annā*); hence the name Mu'tazila. This tale is told also of 'Amr and Ḥasan and of 'Amr and Ḳatāda.[3] The story is not convincing; with the explanation of *Ḥashwiya* as "those who sit in the corner," it is a popular etymology. The verb *i'tazala* was used to denote recluses and those who took no part in the civil wars.[4] Men called Mu'tazila accused ibn 'Awn of holding back the people from joining Ibrāhīm in A.H. 145.[5] Certain Mu'tazila of Basra tried to recall the licentious poet Muḥammad b. Munādhir to a religious life.[6] As the theological party was markedly devout, it is not strange that it appropriated an existing name which already had a religious connotation. The discussion about the right classification of sinners may well be historical, for small differences have often brought into prominence fundamental divisions. It has to be noted this doctrine of sin (*al-manzila bain al-manzilatain*) takes only a tiny place in the teaching of the school.

There were two leaders in this movement. Abū Hudhaifa Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā al-Ghazzāl was a client of amazing ingenuity for, although he could not pronounce r, and avoided words containing that sound, he could say anything he wished in beautiful Arabic. He was the head of an organisation. A poet says, Beyond the pass of China, on every frontier to far distant Sus and beyond the Berbers, he has preachers. A tyrant's jest,

[1] *Uṣūl al-din*, 32, cf. 257. [2] Ash'ari, 513.
[3] b. Kutaiba *Ma'ārif* 243; *Durar wa Ghurar*, f. 33r; cf. L.A., 13, 467.
[4] Nallino R.S.O., 7, 429 ff. [5] b. Sa'd, 7 ii., 27. [6] *Aghānī* (1), 17, 10.

an intriguer's craft does not break their determination. If he says "Go" in winter, they obey; in summer they fear not the month of burning heat."[1]

'Amr b. 'Ubaid b. Bāb († 145/762) was also a client, the caliph Manṣūr esteemed him highly. As a leader he was eclipsed by Wāṣil; one report makes him a convert of Wāṣil.[2] He was a missioner of Yazīd III. His prayer, "Make me rich in wanting you; do not make me rich in being able to do without you"[3] would suggest that he was religious at heart. Manṣūr said of him when he died, "A believer, a *Ḥanīf*, who believed in God and made the Koran his religion. When men disputed about the sunna, he expounded tradition clearly and wisely. If fate had left any alive, it would have left Abū 'Uthmān.[4]

It has been argued that the Mu'tazila was the spiritual wing of the 'Abbasid propaganda.[5] The argument is that all Muslim sects were partly political and as some Umayyads persecuted the Mu'tazila, it must have been on the side of the 'Abbasids. The only real argument is the preaching activity of the Mu'tazila but there is no evidence that it was political. No historian hints at it. The first half of the second century was a time of intense religious activity when the extreme Shī'a indulged its wild dreams and prophetasters were plentiful. Religious men may well have been goaded into defence of the Koran and sunna, thinking only of the hereafter. Maḳdisī says that the Mu'tazila was not political.[6] 'Amr b. 'Ubaid was in the service of Yazīd III, who is called a *ḳadarī*, and Marwān II had dealings with Ja'd.[7] The Mu'tazila, who helped Ibrāhīm, were definitely against the 'Abbasids. Hārūn put Mu'tazilī theologians in prison.[8] This may have been far-sighted statesmanship, because the sect was growing too uppish, and Ma'mūn's policy may have been belated gratitude; but this is guesswork. Further *Umawiya* seems to be a name for the Mu'tazila.[9]

The teaching of Wāsil († 131/748).

2) God is just, therefore he cannot compel men to do wrong

[1] Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1, 37. [2] *Durar wal Ghurar*, 32 v. [3] *'Uyūn*, 2, 290.
[4] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 1, 209. [5] E.I. art. *Mu'tazila*. [6] Maḳdisī, 37 f.
[7] b. Athīr, 5, 329. [8] Arnold, 32. [9] *Kitāb al-Intiṣār*, 132, 144; Cf. 160 f.

and then punish them for doing it. As men are punished and rewarded, it is clear that God has given them power to act as they choose and made them responsible for their acts. There is only one eternal God; if there were another eternal there would be two Gods. This doctrine became later the "denial of the attributes," the phrase in which the dispute crystallised. Ibn Ḥazm states that the Mu'tazila invented the term attribute.[1] Of course they did not deny that God was alive, active, etc.; they denied that His life had existence of some sort apart from Himself. The doctrine of the attributes appears suddenly and we have to guess at its antecedents so it looks as if Wāṣil's teaching was directed against the eternity of the Koran, for it is the only thing which, so far as we know, was regarded as eternal in those early days. Faith was the sum of certain good qualities so the sinning Muslim did not deserve the name of believer,
3 which was a name of honour. He was clearly not an unbeliever but was corrupt and would go to hell for there were only two divisions in the after life but his punishment might be alleviated. Wāṣil was more severe in his judgment on 'Uthmān than 'Amr was.[2] Wicked men had broken the unity of Islam by civil strife. Wāṣil would not decide which was in the wrong; his formula was, "either 'Alī or Ṭalḥa was wrong." A practical consequence was that he would accept the testimony of two men who both belonged to the party of 'Alī or to that of Ṭalḥa. On whichever side they stood, they might both be good Muslims. But he would not accept the witness of two who belonged to different parties; for one of them was certainly a bad Muslim. In this 'Amr b. 'Ubaid was stricter than Wāṣil for he condemned both sides.[3]

Another doctrine sprang up in Khurasan. Jahm b. Ṣafwān was lieutenant to al-Ḥārith b. Suraij and was executed in 128/746. He is a one man school for, though he had followers, none developed his teaching. He criticised Muḥammad and the Koran. He read a verse and said, "How clever Muḥammad is!" Then he read, "The Merciful settled himself on the throne," and said, "Could I scratch that out, I would." Then he read *Sura* 28 and, when he came to the name of Moses, he said, "What is

[1] b. Ḥazm, 2, 121. [2] *Intiṣār*, 97 f. [3] *Farḳ*, 101.

this? He told part of this story in another place and did not finish it; then he told it again." He also gave a legal ruling which contradicted the Koran.[1] The *Sumaniya* asked him if he could see his God. After long thought he answered much as the Christians do, "The spirit, which is in Jesus, is the spirit of God from His essence. When God wants to produce something, the spirit enters into one of His creatures and speaks by its tongue, ordering or forbidding what He wills. It is an invisible spirit."[2] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal says that Jahm was mostly concerned with the doctrine of God. "Nothing is like God. He is below the seven earths as He is on the throne. No place is empty of Him and He is not in one rather than another. He has not spoken and does not speak. In this world and in the next no one looks at Him. He cannot be described, is not known by any attribute or act, has no limit or end, and is not comprehended by reason. All of Him is face, light, and power; He is not two different things. In Him is neither upper nor lower, no parts or divisions, neither right nor left. He is neither heavy nor light. Whenever you think that He is something which you know, then He is different from it."[3]

He was an old-fashioned Muslim, oppressed by the greatness of God. Nothing can be like God. He has power so man can have none. Man's will, capacity, and deeds are all created by God. What can be said of man cannot be said of God; in the language of the schools, Jahm denied the attributes, so that it is wrong to say that God is alive or that He is a thing, which would imply that He is like other things. On the contrary, He is *mushī' al-ashyā'*, He wills things.[4] His acts are not infinite. As power by itself is blind and produces only the irrational, God must have knowledge (this is inconsistent). He did not know till He had originated knowledge; some add, in a substrate. It is said that Jahm argued that God's knowledge does not precede phenomena because that would imply change in Him because knowing that a thing will be is different from knowing

[1] Yāfi'i, *Marham*, 185.
[2] Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, *Radd 'ala 'l-Zanādiḳa wal-Jahmiya* (B. M. Orr., 3,106) f. 2b.
[3] *Ibid.*, f. 3. Cf. Malaṭi, *Tanbīh*, 70 f.
[4] Shahrastānī, *Iḳdām*, 151; V. 1, *munshi'*, Al-bad' *wal-ta'rīkh*, 5, 146.

that it is. There is one knowledge for every knowable. It is said that God originated His life.[1] He cannot be seen. Heaven and hell were created and must come to an end with their inhabitants and God will then be alone as He was at first. The Koran cannot be eternal but is a created body. Movements are bodies for otherwise they would be like God who is not body. Reason without revelation is a sufficient guide to what is right. Faith is in the heart, it is knowledge of God, the prophet, and revelation; it is one and cannot be divided into belief, word, and deed. Ignorance is the only unbelief and there is no faith in an unbeliever. Those who know God and deny Him with the tongue, or believe in Him and not in the prophet, are not absolutely believers or unbelievers.[2] The faith of a prophet is no more than that of a common man unless there is excess of good works, for knowledge knows no degrees.

Though both these schools agreed in denying the attributes and the eternity of the Koran yet they were far apart in spirit. Jahm took no interest in the moral problems raised by theology and was concerned to defend God against man and nature. Al-Jāḥiẓ puts him in one class with those who deny nature.[3] Wāṣil was concerned with defending God against himself, in maintaining the absolute.

Meantime, common men rejected the theologians and clung to the crudities of early Islam, as these tombstones show.

He testifies that there is no God but God, that He has no partner, that Muḥammad is His servant and messenger, that the garden is true and the fire true, he believes in His providence entirely, both what is good and bad. (Egypt, 179/795).

The Koran is the word of God, revealed not created, good and bad both come from Him, the garden and the fire are true, Munkir and Nakīr are true, God will be seen without doubt on the day of resurrection. (Mosul, 200/815?)

All that can be worshipped between His throne and the foundation of the earth, except His face, will perish; Islam is what He

[1] *Talbīs Iblīs*, 88.

[2] If a man believes in his heart, he can be anything externally even an idolater. b. Ḥazm, 4, 204.

[3] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 4, 96.

sent, religion is what He decreed, truth is what He said, justice is what He ordered. (Egypt, 227/840)[1]

A few historical notes may be added. The wazir Abū 'Ubaidullah Mu'āwiya was suspected of believing in the freedom of the will in 161/777[2] and in 169/785 certain *ḳadaris* were sent as prisoners from Medina to the caliph Mahdī who, however, set them free.[3] The inhabitants of Hims drove out Thawr b. Yazīd († 153/770) and burnt his house because he upheld the freedom of the will.[4] A tradition says that the *ḳadaris* are the followers of al-Dajjāl.[5] The imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiḳ declared that this doctrine contained a lie against God, hatred of the prophet's family, and made it lawful to tell lies about them.[6]

Bakr, the nephew of b. 'Abd al-Wāḥid, was a contemporary of Wāṣil; al-Jāḥiẓ has some stories about him.[7] His teaching was peculiar.

Man.

Man is something other than the body. There are no secondary acts. Children cannot be guilty; even God cannot make them guilty. They do not feel pain though their crying seems to show the contrary; it would be unjust of God if they were to feel it. Pain inflicted on children may be punishment for their parents; that inflicted on animals may be for the benefit of mankind.[8]

Religion.

At the resurrection God will be seen in a form which He will create and in it He will speak to men. There are two versions of the teaching about sin. (1) A Muslim, who commits great sins, is a hypocrite and so denies God, but he remains a Muslim even in hell. (2) A Muslim who commits venial sins without repenting is as much an unbeliever as one who worships idols.[9] It is even said that he is worse off than an unbeliever.[10] Works of supere-

[1] *Repertoire chronologique d'Epigraphie arabe*, 1, 43, 95, 222.
[2] Ṭabari III, 490. [3] Ṭabari III, 534. [4] *Marham*, 116.
[5] L.A., 10, 55. [6] Kashshī, 252.
[7] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 6, 104. Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 338. [8] *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*, 58.
[9] b. Ḥazm, 3, 229; 4, 191. [10] Maḳrīzī, 2, 349.

rogation do not atone for neglect of duties. There was no uncertainty about the election of Abū Bakr.[1] 'Alī and Ṭalḥa were hypocrites or unbelievers but, because they fought at Badr, they are in heaven.[2]

Bakr forbade the eating of onions and garlic.

Zarāra b. A'yan († 150/767) was the greatest of the Shī'a in law, tradition, theology, and as a partisan.[3] He accepted 'Abdullah b. Ja'far (no. 16)[4] as imam but afterwards reverted to Mūsā (no. 17). Some said that the Koran was his imam.[5] He raised the question whether the doctrines of the Christians, Jews, Magians, and idolaters were willed by God and shocked the imam.[6] The doctrine:—

God.

For each of His activities God produced a phenomenal attribute and, before He did this, He was not knowing, powerful, and alive. He did not know things before they were created.

Man.

Capacity is health and is before the act. Zarāra seems to have been responsible for the development of the idea of capacity. (See next chapter.)

Religion.

Zarāra was a determinist and taught that God does not burden men above their strength because they do only what He wills and decrees.

Faḍl b. Shādhān taught that God is not body; He is in the seventh heaven above the throne; His qualities are different (*khilāf*) from those of creatures in every sense; nothing is like Him; He hears and sees. The perfect religion was given to the prophet who had laboured in the path of God and served Him till the certainty came to him. Prophecy is the reward of good works. The prophet gave this knowledge to one whom he made his representative. There is always one such man;

[1] Or., 3,736 f. 7b.
[2] *Fihrist*, 220.
[3] Shahrastānī, 142.
[4] b. Ḥazm, 4, 45.
[5] The numbers refer to the genealogical table.
[6] Kashshī, 102.

his knowledge comes from the prophet not by direct revelation.[1]

'Alī b. Ḥasaka and al-Ḳāsim b. Yaḳṭīn taught that prayer, alms, and fasting are men.[2]

Muḥammad b. Bashīr claimed to be the deputy of Mūsā (no. 17). He taught that Mūsā had shown himself to the men of light in light and to the men of foulness in foulness in the likeness of their fleshly humanity and then, though he was among them, their sight was veiled from apprehending him.[3]

Stage 2.

Before going further some definitions are needed.

Time and Space. Each of these was a succession of units. A cause happened in one unit of time and its effect in the next. Continuance was existence in two successive units of time. Rest was continuance in one unit of space for two of time. Motion did not always involve change of place for cessation was motion. Some even held that rest was a form of motion. They defined rest as motion in one unit of space for two of time while movement was change from one unit of space to another, starting apparently in one unit of time and arriving in the next.

Secondary effects. Any by-product of an act was a secondary effect. In throwing a stone the original act ended when the stone left the hand; its path through the air was a secondary effect. Similarly eating was a primary act but the taste of the food was secondary. The technical name for this process, for the chain of causation, was *tawallud*, engendering, and such effects were *mutawallad*.

Will. This had a narrower meaning than it has in English. It was a guide and director rather than a cause. The cause was power, which was blind. Set power to work and it would produce one effect or, equally probably, its opposite. Will concentrated power on an object and made it intelligent. So some argued that God had no will, because his knowledge was all the guide which his power needed. The possession of two words for will led some into the splitting of hairs.

Acquisition (*kasb*, *iktisāb*). An act may be looked at from

[1] Kashshī, 335. [2] Kashshī, 321. [3] Kashshī, 297.

several points of view. Writing, for example, is to the physiologist an activity of the body accompanied with changes in the muscles and nerves: to the teacher it is an art. In a servant it may come under the head of duty to a master. Among the many possible aspects, every act has two, a godward and a manward. The relation to God is creation and the relation to man is acquisition. Through this relation man becomes responsible for his acts and so liable to reward or punishment. It seems that this word must have been taken from the Koran which constantly uses it for the action of men; it speaks of "acquiring good" and "acquiring evil."[1]

Capacity (*istiṭā'a*).[2] Capacity is not the same as acquisition; it is the power in man of acquiring an act. Men differed whether it came before the act in time, or with it, or both. They differed whether it was normal healthy manhood and the absence of hindrances or something beyond this. It is curious that Theodore Abū Ḳurra uses this word; "in the body is the existence, equipment, and capacity for all the movements of man's nature," and "the Word is impassible for there is no way, preparation, or capacity for suffering to reach His divinity," He also speaks of "the power of capacity" and "the capacity of powers."[3] Apparently he borrowed the word from the Muslims for it has no root in Christian dogma. It is clear that this idea grew out of the usage of the Koran[4] and is a generalisation of a special case, the pilgrimage. "The pilgrimage is a duty for all who can" (3, 91). The Shī'a discussed the word, can. One said that it meant one who had health and a mount; another, he who has the needful food and a mount is capable of going on pilgrimage even if he does not go; the imam disapproved of this answer and said that such a man was bound to go on pilgrimage but was only capable of doing so if he had the imam's permission. Zarāra b. A'yan had a theory of capacity.[5]

[1] Ash'arī, 72. Some of the *Zaidi* sect taught that men created their acts and this word is used of that activity of men.

[2] Sometimes translated "faculty." Prof. Massignon (*Lexique*) translates '*grace*' which suits only the use of the term by al-Najjār.

[3] Abū Ḳurra, Sermons, 122, 133, 124.

[4] The Koran is fond of this root for it occurs more than forty times while *ḳdr* occurs only four times in the sense of "can" and *mkn* not at all.

[5] Kashshī, 97 f, 113.

Other words with the same meaning are used instead of *istiṭā'a.*

Al-Shahrastānī is careful to point out that 'power' as understood by theologians is different from the "capacity for action or passion" of philosophers.[1]

At this point a difference appears for theologians use elementary ideas from philosophy. It is almost correct to say that all the ingredients of later orthodoxy were present at the beginning of speculation.

One suspects that ideas, which developed in a school, were often ascribed to the founder though it is hard to prove it.

Ḍirār b. 'Amr was the first leader with a position in Basra that was almost official; he was contemporary with Wāṣil[2] and also met Ḳuṭrub († 206/821).[3] His doctrine was this.

God.

To say that God is powerful means that He is not impotent, and so with the other attributes. This is an attempt to define the absolute without limiting it. God has a nature (quiddity) which only He knows; He knows it directly, men know it by inference.[4] Abū Ḥanīfa is said to be the source of this idea. The will of God is twofold. (1) That which is the thing willed or, in other words, the will to create is the act of creation. This formula means that the divine will needs no instruments, but passes at once from plan to performance. The statement that God's being willing is His essence refers to this aspect of His will.[5] (2) That which is command, or act, or the creation of man's acts. One act can be the work of two agents; man's acts are done by both God and man; God created them, man acquired them. God cannot be seen with the eyes but at the resurrection man will be given a sixth sense to perceive Him.

Physics.

A body is an assembly of accidents, ten at least, which are close together but do not interpenetrate, for two things, whether

[1] *Milal*, 44.
[2] *Farḳ*, 16. [3] Jāḥiẓ, *Bayān*, 1, 34.
[4] Ḍirār was not sure if God's real nature could be known. Ījī, 105.
[5] Ījī, 60.; *Dict. Tech. Terms.* 519.

bodies or accidents, cannot be in the same place. No body can be without such accidents as colour, taste, life, or their opposites. These come into being united and then they cannot be separated, otherwise you would have colour without a coloured thing. They endure for more than one unit of time. In other words, incompatible qualities can inhere in a body at the same time, one latent, the other manifest. On the other view qualities could only exist successively, one vanishing before the other appears; proving that accidents do not endure. Other accidents like movement, pain, and knowledge inhere in bodies, do not form part of them, and do not endure for more than one unit of time. One report says that God can turn accidents into bodies. A thing endures because God creates in it enduring; if He does not create it, the thing ceases to be. Oil is latent in the olive, but does not interpenetrate it; there is no sweetness in honey till it is eaten, no blood in the body till it is wounded; fire is not latent in flint for, if it were, it would burn it. Weight and lightness are parts of a body.

Man.

Man is like other bodies, nothing more; capacity is part of man; perception is created by God, acquired by man, Man can sometimes make length, breadth, and depth, though they are parts of bodies. Secondary effects of action, which man by his will can prevent, are his; those, which he cannot prevent, are not his. He can cause effects outside himself, they are created by God, acquired by man.[1] Ḍirār tries to say that man, by obeying nature, can make it serve him.

Religion.

God can do better for man than he has done; He has infinite grace, if it were given to an unbeliever, he would believe and deserve reward.[2] Faith and knowledge of God can be only in a rational adult but religion comes from revelation not from reason, which does not apply to God. Without revelation there is no obligation on a rational adult. All men might be unbelievers. No prophet could be exalted above the others.

[1] Cf. Ījī, 117. [2] b. Ḥazm, 3, 165; 4, 192.

It would be better to have a Persian, Ethiopian, or Nabataean as imam rather than one of Ḳuraish; he would be easier to remove if unsatisfactory. The reading of the Koran is the Koran, God creates it and man does it. Ḍirār rejected the readings of Ubai and b. Mas'ūd. Heaven and hell are not yet created; Adam was in a garden on the earth. Ḍirār denied the punishment in the grave[1] and some of the common eschatology. After the death of the prophet the authority in religion is the agreement of the community. God created unbelief in the unbeliever and made it evil.

Ḥafṣ al-Fard was at first a Mu'tazili but became a determinist. He had been a pupil of Abū Yūsuf Ya'ḳūb in canon law. His encounter with al-Shāfi'ī has been mentioned. His teaching was the same as Ḍirār's except on the divine will. He said that God's will was twofold[2]; (1) of essence, it determined all acts outside Himself and the acts of creatures; and (2) of action, which was His command to men to obey Him. This will of action was not God. Bishr al-Marīsī taught the same doctrine.

By this time some ideas, which the Mu'tazila afterwards made their own, were in the air and influenced later thinkers. Thus God was not a substance with parts and position; He was without time, space, or limit. On the other hand, as God could be known, He must have some connection with reason and conscience. So the quest for a righteous God came into conflict with the absolute and any attempt to give him a character was stigmatised as a denial of His omnipotence.

Ḥusain b. Muḥammad, commonly called al-Najjār, lived about the turn of the century. Al-Naẓẓām enjoyed heckling him.[3] "His doctrine of God was that of the Mu'tazila except about will, generosity, and predestination; he belonged to the Murji'a." He was not a Mu'tazili because he taught that God has a quiddity.

God.

God is everywhere in essence, not only in knowledge and power; this omnipresence is not indwelling (*ḥulūl*).[4] "The light of heaven and earth," means that He is their guide. He

b. Ḥazm, 4, 66. [2] *Fihrist*, 179. [3] *Fihrist*, 179. [4] *Tabyīn kadhib*, 149.

wills by Himself (*linafsihi*) He is not forced or reluctant; again definition by negation. His willing is negative, even non-existent, for it is the absence of compulsion.[1] He always willed that what He knew would happen at a certain time, would happen then. His will is universal and covers good and evil and all the acts of men.[2] His generosity means that He is not stingy; His speech is a denial of dumbness; truthful (*ṣādiḳ*) is always able to announce truth. He is not seen by the eyes, but can give them the power of the mind so that He is known by them.[3] In the hereafter He may cause pain to children or may be gracious to them. He has such grace that, if He bestowed it on men, they would all believe.

Reason.

It is man's duty to get a knowledge of God by reason. God must be known in all His relations to men; other things may be known in some relations only.

Physics.

The doctrine of body was that of Ḍirār, except that accidents occupy space before their union into body.

Man.

Man is body and spirit; he has a phenomenal power, that of acquisition, which is incompatible with creative power. His acts happen by the combined powers of God and man.[2] Capacity is with the act and does not endure; it is not an essential part of man but is help from God and suffices for one act only. Guidance and help from God is capacity for faith; desertion by him is capacity for unbelief. Man can produce effects in himself alone, but not pain and perception for these are acts of God. Man is not the author of secondary effects.

Religion.

Faith is knowledge of God, the prophet, and his commands, with submission; it is created.[5] One, who has had the opportunity but has not got this knowledge or, having it, does not

[1] Ījī, 57, 60; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 132. [2] Marzubānī, *Muwashshaḥ*, 379.
[3] *Marham*, 218. God is not seen, does not see Himself or another.
[4] Ījī, 106. [5] *Tabyīn kadhib*, 150.

confess it, is an unbeliever. The parts of faith are not faith; one part alone is not righteousness and the want of any part is sin but not unbelief.

There are degrees of knowledge and of conviction; faith can grow but not diminish. Nothing short of unbelief makes a man an unbeliever. A believer, who dies in sin, will be punished but may be taken out of hell later. God may impose on unbelievers burdens beyond their strength because He has deserted them, not because they are weak.

The span of man's life is fixed; one who is murdered, dies at his appointed time. A false prophet cannot work miracles. The word of God, the Koran, is created; when it is read, it is an accident; when written, a body. The community has to choose a suitable man to be imam.

Al-Najjār had many followers in Rayy; the school broke into three sections, the *Mustadrika,* the *Barghūthiya,* and the *Za'farāniya.* These last held that the word of God was not God because it was created, yet it was unbelief to say that the Koran was created. Al-Shahrastānī comments that they were either talking nonsense or used the terms word of God and Koran for two separate things. Some said that sight, as applied to God, meant knowledge.[1]

Bishr b. Ghayyāth al-Marīsī († c. 218/833), hardly deserves a place for his theology but was important in his day as he was the personification of heterodoxy. He was the son of a Jew of Baghdad,[2] a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa, studied canon law under Abū Yūsuf, enjoyed court favour, and took part in disputations in the presence of Ma'mūn.[3] At one of these debates were present the catholicus, the followers of Zoroaster, the chief herbad, the head of the dispersion, the leaders of the Sabians, Anastasius the Greek, the theologians, and 'Alī Riḍā.[4] The *kitāb al-ḥaida* says that Bishr's doctrine was the only one taught in public, but this is an exaggeration.[6] He was hated bitterly as the scurillous tales about him show. Here are two. A youth died and was buried. Some one saw him in a dream and was

[1] *Tamyīz,* f. 327a.
[2] Dozy s. v. Marīsa. [3] Ṭabari III, 1,039 f. [4] *Kitāb al-iḥtijāj,* 211.
[5] Or. 3104 a report of a dispute between Bishr and 'Abd al-'Azīz b Yaḥyā (*Fihrist,* 189). It adds nothing to our knowledge of his theology.

surprised to see that his hair had gone white. He explained that Bishr had been buried in the same cemetery and, when he was put into the ground, hell gave such a groan that the hair of all of them had turned white. Again, one orthodox scholar attended the funeral of Bishr and was reproved for having done so. He said that he had never been to a funeral for which he expected so great a reward. He had said, "O God, this man did not believe that he could look on You; prevent him from gazing on Your face; he did not believe in the punishment of the grave, punish him as You never punished any other; he denied the balance, make his balance light; he denied intercession, let none of Your creatures plead for him." Ibn Ḥanbal said that he was a preacher not a dialectician and the only difference between him and a Christian was that he said the Muslim prayers.[1] He did not meet Jahm, but accepted his teaching. A poet says of him, "He would have a true belief in God, were it not mixed with determinism."[2]

Bishr followed al-Najjār for the most part in his doctrine of God and man's will, Ḥafṣ al-Fard in his doctrine of the will of God, and the Murji'a by saying that faith was accepting as true by heart and tongue. Faith can only be in a rational adult.[3] Bowing down to the sun was not unbelief but a sign of it.[4] Capacity was with the act.[5] Every sin was deadly because it was rebellion though sinful Muslims might be let out of hell. The Koran was a miracle and was created.[6] Bishr rejected the punishment in the grave and much of the popular eschatology. 'Alī was right and his opponents Ṭalḥa, 'Āïsha, and Mu'āwiya were wrong.[7]

Hishām b. al-Ḥakam was a client; he was a leader of those who said that God was a body; he also thought that 'Alī was God. It is stated that he was a pupil of Jahm and a dependent of Yaḥyā al-Barmakī and presided at the gatherings held by him for religious discussion.[8] He was a quick-witted controversialist.

[1] Or. 2,675 ff, 150a., 152a. [2] Sīrāfī, *Biographies of grammarians*, 47.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256. [4] Shahrastānī, 107; Sam'ānī, 524a. [5] b. Ḥazm, 3, 54.
[6] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 308; Yāḳūt *Biog. Dict.*, 1, 177. [7] Nawbakhtī, 13.
[8] The fall of the Barmakīs was in 187/803. One acount brings Hishām to Baghdad in 197/812 or 199/814, the year of his death. He is said to have debated with 'Amr b. 'Ubaid, 145/762. There is no way of resolving the confusion.

In the presence of the caliph someone reminded him that 'Alī and 'Abbās had brought a dispute to Abū Bakr for settlement, and asked which of them was in the wrong. It was impossible to say "'Alī," to say "'Abbās" would have angered the caliph, so he said that both were right, like the two angels who came with a problem to David to test him.[1] When asked if Mu'āwiya had been at Badr he said, "Yes—on the other side." In a discussion with a Magian he said that he could see nothing outside the universe although there was no darkness to prevent him. He assumed that the Magian, who did not contradict him, could see nothing because there was no light. "How was it that the two religions, though always contradicting each other, agreed that there was nothing outside the universe?" The Magian made a sign of assent.[2] In one year Hishām held five different opinions about God.

The reports of his teaching are not always consistent.

God.

God is a body with limits; His length, breadth, and depth are equal[3] or nearly equal; one part is not superior to another. He is a spreading light of a special size in a special place, like pure molten metal, shining on all sides like a round pearl. He has colour, taste, smell, and touch; His colour is His taste, His taste His smell, and His smell His touch. He is absolute colour. It may be that the mountain Abū Ḳubais is bigger than He. Another statement, that God has the most perfect form, seven spans of His own measure, implies an anthropomorphic idea. The eternal existence of God differs from that of the inhabitants of heaven for theirs is derived from outside themselves.[4]

All that exists is either body or the act of a body; the creator cannot be a mere act.[5] God was not in place; then He moved and by His movement formed place and was in it; this place

[1] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 2, 150. [2] *'Uyūn al-akhbār*, 2, 153.
[3] *Revelation*, 21, 16. The length, breadth, and height of the heavenly city are equal.
[4] Kashshī, 177. [5] *Biḥār al-anwār*, 2, 94.

was the throne. He touches it and fills it exactly. The term, existing (*mawjūd*), as applied to Him means that He is body, a thing. According to one report, He is unlike other things; in b. al-Rawandī's account of Hishām's doctrine, there is some likeness to other things, otherwise men could know nothing of Him.

One account says that God always knew Himself; another denies this. He did not always know things; He only knew them after not knowing them, otherwise, as knowledge implies a known, things would be eternal. He knows by a knowledge which is not God, not other than God, and not part of Him. Hishām adopted the axiom that what describes another cannot be itself described and so evaded the question whether God's knowledge and other attributes were eternal or originated.

There are as many acts of knowledge originated by God as there are things known and they are none of them in a substrate (*maḥall*). Some say that Hishām held the attributes other than knowledge to have a beginning. His opponents asked what God was before He was alive! According to al-Jāḥiẓ, Hishām taught that God knows what is under the earth by rays which emanate from Him and reach down into its depths; but for this connection He could not know what is there.

God moved and His movement was will and the doing of the thing willed. His will is an attribute, not He and not other than He. He is finite in essence, infinite in power; He cannot act unjustly but is the author of all, even of evil. He can turn a pebble into a mountain covering a league of ground without adding to it or taking from it accident or body.[1]

Reason.

Knowledge is either necessary or ratiocinative. Necessary knowledge is cast into the mind without being acquired or coming by examination, for God gives it to whom He will.[1] Knowledge of God cannot be derived from the attributes of bodies (accidents) for it must be necessary, and some of these accidents are known only by reasoning.

[1] *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*, 60.

Physics.

Body means a thing, existing, self-existent ; some are eternal. Colours, tastes, and scents are bodies. Hishām did not use the term accident, but called movement, will, dislike, knowledge, good and bad acts, attributes of body, not it and not other than it. Creation, enduring, and perishing were such attributes. All these except rest are entities (*ma'nā*).[2] Oil is latent in the olive and fire in flint. There is no such thing as an atom. Movement is the transfer of a body from one unit of place to a third without its passing through the second.

Man.

Man denotes the body which is inert (*nawāt*) and the spirit which is active and a light, the perceptive part. The acts of man are created by God. Capacity is five things, health, absence of obstacles, sufficient time, tools (hand, axe, etc.,) and motive ; if these are present, the act occurs. Part of capacity is before and part with the act.

Religion.

God cannot punish children in the next world, they are in paradise. If He had known beforehand what men would do, this world would not be a time of testing. The devil knows what he has put into men's hearts without himself entering them ; perhaps the air is his instrument. The Koran is an attribute of God, neither created nor creator.

The Koran has been taken up to heaven ; that which is on earth has been changed.[3] A prophet may sin and make mistakes and will get a revelation to set him right ; an imam cannot sin. The imam is as well known as the *ḳibla* so the election of Abū Bakr was apostasy.

As the senses need the mind to correct and control them so men need the imam. The Muslim community cannot agree in error and historical knowledge based on the general report (*tawātur*) of unbelievers is true.

That only bodies exist and that volition is a kind of motion

[1] *Biḥār al-anwār*, 2, 94. [2] Horten, Z.D.M.G., v. 64, p. 391.
[3] Malaṭī, *Tanbīh*, 20.

are Greek ideas. To set God above human limitations Hishām made him with all his parts convertible. The phrase "spreading light" occurs in the *Theology* of Aristotle which was translated about 227/841.[1]

Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Nu'mān, commonly called Shaiṭān al-Ṭāḳ though the Shī'a called him Mu'min al-Ṭāḳ. The usual account makes him contemporary with the imam Ja'far though b. Ḥazm calls him a contemporary of al-Naẓẓām.[2]

He taught that God knows about Himself and is not ignorant. He knows things only after He has willed them, not through any defect in Himself but because the things are not there to be known. Will is movement and ordination (*taḳdīr*) is the same as will.

All human knowledge is necessary but God can grant it to some, withhold it from others, and yet hold all responsible.

The teaching about man and capacity was that of Hishām b. Sālim with the addition that things happened only if God so willed it.

[1] p. 111.

[2] b. Ḥazm, 4, 181.

expressed in homely terms, but they were hampered by the Arab respect for words as such; any phrase, which suggested a limitation of God, was suspect even if it were nonsense. The critics said of one that he limited God's power to do good but not His power to do evil; they did not see that a just God is limited of necessity. God cannot be perceived by the senses so he will not be seen in the hereafter; the beatific vision was explained in several ways.

As God is righteous He cannot be the author of evil, so it must be the work of men or devils who are both responsible for their acts. God has given them power to use as they like and they are answerable for it. Why did not God create men good and prevent them from being bad? This question is impossible. Goodness is only good when the doer acts of his own choice; when he is forced there is neither good nor bad in him.[1] Then other questions arose. What will happen to children and lunatics in the next world? Has God any control over the power which He has given to men? What of happenings which are the indirect results of human acts, whether intentional or otherwise? Can one who is not a believer do a good act?

Some held that this is the best of all possible worlds and saved the divine omnipotence by asserting that God could repeat this best for ever. Some taught that any infidel would be converted if God turned on him the full force of His grace; some then said that such a convert would deserve as great a reward as one who had had no special help from God.

They held various views about man. He was spirit, he was body, or a combination of the two. In physics most accepted the doctrine of the atom but all bodies are complex. The movement of the world is due to the interplay of substances and accidents. Human action is differentiated from all other only by the presence of will. Capacity was before the act; this was held to be consistent with the freedom of the will. Some taught that man acted directly on his surroundings while others said that will was his only activity and all external effects followed by force of nature. Faith dropped into the background and

[1] Guidi, *Lotta*, 20.

knowledge took its place, for faith was knowledge of God and every one, by first principles, can have this, so there was no talking about it.

When a man became conscious of self, he must know that he depended on one who created and provided for him. This was knowledge by reasoning and inference. A man might know about God by hearsay, by the report of parents or teachers, and some held that such knowledge was no better than unbelief. Faith was usually defined as knowledge of the divine commands and the amount of disobedience, which would make up wickedness, was carefully calculated. Some held that a detailed knowledge of all God's commands was essential while others were content with an outline acquaintance with the chief. The man who used his own judgment was right in questions of detail though not necessarily so in matters of principle. As usual, sins were classified as great or small, but the idea of wickedness (*fisḳ*), the man who was neither a believer nor an infidel, fell into the background.[1] Forgiveness without repentance was impossible; repentance for sins against men involves restitution.[2] The doctrine of intercession was rejected. Prayers for the dead and alms given on their behalf are useless.[3] Whether prophets can sin, before or after their call,[4] and the relative rank of prophets, believers, and angels were in dispute. Saints cannot work miracles. The Koran is created; its relation to the word of God is not discussed. That word is either creative or commanding, laying duties on men. There is a like division of the will of God.

They differed on a man's duty in upholding right and resisting evil and, consequently, about the imam; some thought him an unnecessary luxury and others came near to the Shī'a. Most said that any Muslim might be imam, even though he were not the most excellent one alive.

They taught that martyrdom was not to be sought and later it was said to be the patient endurance of suffering. They

[1] He who commits great sins is an unbeliever by ingratitude not by polytheism. Or. 2,606 f., 147a.

[2] *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 162. [3] *Ghunya*, 175.

[4] Prophets must be free from grave sins otherwise none could respect them. Ijī, 219.

would have nothing to do with much of the popular eschatology and denied the prophet's ascent to heaven.

About A.H. 300 they became more psychological and discussed minutely the question of repentance. Later still they grew more philosophical and the split into the schools of Basra and Baghdad became prominent. Those of Basra held that God continues in His essence but not by an attribute of continuance while those of Baghdad held that the necessary continues without continuance, while the phenomenal requires an external continuance.[1] Few could speak as plain as b. Ḳutaiba, "Words cannot be opposed by silence, doubt cannot be healed by hesitation, heresy is not cast out by orthodoxy."[2] They also held divergent views about the nature of a thing.

Many problems arose during their discussions to which they gave different answers. If a man dies a violent death, does he die at his appointed time or not? What will happen to animals in the hereafter; will they get any compensation for the pains they suffered here? Will noxious animals go to hell? Can God impose on a man duties beyond his strength? Are unlawful things part of the provision (*rizḳ*) which God gives to men? Most taught that man's actions were the result of suggestions (*khawāṭir*) which came to him from outside. The idea apparently comes from the "whisperings of Satan" mentioned in the Koran. They were not agreed on how these suggestions worked. It is notorious that they were intolerant to their opponents, the traditionists; they were not a happy family in themselves, according to 'Abd al-Ḳāhir, they were even more ready to call each other unbelievers. The movement had two branches:

The Basra School.

Speculation was active during the first half of the third century when most of the famous Mu'tazila lived. One of the earliest was Abu'l-Hudhail Muḥammad b. al-Hudhail al-'Allāf who died in 226/841 or 235/850 about one hundred years old. At one remove he was a pupil of Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā though nothing but the name is known of the connecting link, 'Uthmān al-Ṭawīl. He presided at Ma'mūn's meetings for religious

[1] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 66 f. [2] *Ikhtilāf al-lafẓ*, 60.

discussion although the caliph had called him a denizen of hell. He was not respected though some nice things are said of him. Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir called him a hypocrite saying that he would rather be ignorant and famous than learned and unknown, and mean and respected rather than honourable and despised. He is called a liar and a miser and was a good hater. According to al-Jāḥiẓ, he had an era of his own; it began on the day he gave a capon to Muwais b. 'Imrān. In his youth he disputed with a Jew, who asked what he thought of Moses and the Law. He replied, "If they are the Moses and the Law, which are mentioned in the Koran, I accept the one as a prophet and the other as a revealed book." Once he was asked to prove that the world was created without using motion and rest as arguments; he retorted, "You are like the litigant who told his opponent to come before the judge but to leave his evidence behind." A man said to him, "If you try to mislead and overcome in argument, and your antagonist is al-Naẓẓām, the best for you is that men should doubt both of you." Abu 'l-Hudhail replied, "Fifty doubts are better than one truth." He could not answer the question when men perceive that sleep is pleasant. It is not during sleep for the mind is absent, not before falling asleep for the non-existent cannot produce effects, and not after waking because the sleep is ended.[1]

God.

One report says that there is some likeness between God and the universe while another says there is none.[2] God is everywhere in the sense that He controls all. The attributes are His essence; He knows by a knowledge which is His essence. and acts by power which is His essence, but His knowledge is not His power.[3] Men speak of different attributes because God's activities manifest themselves in different ways. Al-Shahrastānī rightly objects that this reduces the attributes to aspects of God and this is modalism. The attributes may be expressed by adjectives but not by finite verbs (e.g., *samī'*

[1] Damīrī, *kitāb al-ḥayawān* art. *birdhawn*.
[2] b. Ḥazm, 4, 193; *Intiṣār*, 8.
[3] Cf. *Ṭabaḳāt al-umam*, 666 (*Mashriḳ*, 1911).

but not *yasma'u*) for the verb demands an object and suggests the existence of something besides God. As God knows himself His knowledge must be infinite. As an abstract proposition we can say that God can do evil but from an ethical standpoint He cannot; if He could it would be a defect in Him. There is a limit to what He can do, His grace is not infinite. If all that God can do were to become actual, He could do no more; but this all never passes from potentiality into act.[1] The eternal is infinite and has no parts or whole therefore the phenomenal must be finite and have parts and a whole. God can do what He has said that He will not do; but not the impossible, He cannot combine life or power with death or strip substance of its accidents. He can give life without power and sight though the eye is blind. There are two accounts of the divine will. One makes it inhere in God, the other implies that it is not in God and states that it is not in a substrate; the disciples of Abu 'l-Hudhail followed the second view. The cause of creation is God's purpose to benefit His creatures. It happens when He wills a thing and says to it, "Be"; this creative word is not in a substrate.[2] Creation is not the thing created.[3] Compounds are not the result of combination, but were created compound. The creative word is not the same as the command which imposes responsibility on men, the moral command. This inheres in some body. The will that there should be belief is not the same as the command to believe.

Reason.

Knowledge and belief are different in kind. Human knowledge is of two kinds, necessary or acquired. Knowledge about God and the proofs of His being is necessary. Man's being rational involves that he knows himself and this knowledge is followed in the second time by knowledge of God; if it does not so follow the man is an unbeliever. Having this knowledge

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 193; 5, 95. Cf. *Intiṣār*, 9 f.
[2] Later report, which may be right, says that God destroys a thing by saying to it, "Disappear."
[3] *Khalḳ*, like the English creation, may be either the act of creation or the thing created; in the first sense it may be called created metaphorically, in the second it is so really. Ash'arī, 363 f, 366.

he must obey all he knows of the unity and justice, that is, all that God imposes on him. If a man only knows God by hearsay he is equally responsible.[1] Other knowledge got through the senses or by reasoning is acquired though God can make it necessary.[2] Knowledge cannot grow or diminish, i.e., a thing is known or not known.[3]

Physics.

The atom can suffer rest and movement, but no other accidents and it is not body, for body has three dimensions. The atom is the unit of existence; it has existence and the power of combination. The smallest number of atoms which can form a body is six; this combination gives front and back, top and bottom, right and left. In another place it is suggested that two atoms, which have no length, combine to form a body which has length; in other words, two atoms with the accident of combination produce length. Two accidents may be in one place at the same time but not two bodies. The doctrine of the creative word made it necessary to say that an accident need not have a substrate. Accidents are of two sorts. Those, the nature of which is known, such as movement, rest, life, and death, men can produce them and they can be renewed; and those, the nature of which is not known, like colours, tastes, smells, power, hearing, and sight, men cannot produce them and they cannot be renewed.

Movement and rest are not the same as modes of existence (*kawn*) and both need two times. The definition of these terms was hard. Rest is the arrival of a second body in the first place, movement the arrival of a first body in the second place, or, movement reaches a body in the second place. At creation a body was not preceded in its place by anything, so it was neither moving nor at rest.[4] Movement, which may be perceived by sight or touch,[5] is not always transfer from one place to another, though actions of the heart are not movements, and there is no "leap" (see al-Naẓẓām) but rests during movement.

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 258. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 32. [3] Maḳrizi, 2, 346.
[5] *Dictionary of Technical Terms*, 1274. *Farḳ*, 144.
[4] *Murūj al-dhahab*, 7, 232.

There cannot be two movements in one atom though one movement may be the effect of two agents. There is only one movement; it is differentiated by the addition to it of direction.

Endurance and destruction are entities not in a substrate and are not the same as what continues or is destroyed. The order of nature is not fixed, it might be better to say that it does not exist, for a stone may be thrown into the air and yet not fall. God has caused the world to stand on nothing.

A later writer says that Abu 'l-Hudhail called the non-existent pure denial.[1]

Man.

Man is the body; all parts of it, except the hair and nails, are the agent. Life, soul, spirit, and the five senses are accidents; the soul is something other than the body, spirit,[3] life, and the five senses. Perception lies in the heart not in the senses. Suggestions are accidents of the nature of thought or knowledge; those for good come from God and those for evil from the devil; they are not essential to action for even without them man is responsible. The will causes its immediate effects to follow inevitably. Capacity is an accident, something more than bodily soundness and health; actions of the heart occur at the same time as capacity, those of the members in the second time. Man can cause in himself movement, rest, will and knowledge, but cannot cause accidents like colour and taste, the nature of which is not known. Secondary effects of his acts are his work, such as the pain caused by a blow or the noise produced by knocking two objects together. So a dead man can be responsible for events which happen after his death. The example given is of a man shooting an arrow which kills an enemy while he himself has been killed before his arrow reaches its mark. A dead man cannot know or will. All other secondary effects are the work of God, so man cannot produce perception or knowledge in another.

[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 34.
[3] He was the first to say that spirit is an accident which does not endure. b. Ḥazm, 4 215.

The acts of men are not like the acts of God. He has no power over what He has put in the power of men, for there cannot be two creators to one act. (Cf. what is said about two agents and one movement.)

Religion.

Man has one appointed time; so if he dies a violent death he dies at his appointed time. There are two versions of the doctrine of the hereafter. One is that then men will act by necessity. It was commonly said that Abu 'l-Hudhail was a *ḳadari* in this world but a determinist in the next. The other is that all action will cease. This is explained on the ground that what has a beginning must have an end so, as men's acts obviously begin, they must also end. It is more likely that the explanation is to be found in religion and not in philosophy. Abu 'l-Hudhail wanted to describe a state of peace, perhaps inspired by Christianity or neo-Platonism. Theodore Abū Ḳurra writes, "when the resurrection takes place and all things become unchangeable."[1] And in the *Theology* of Aristotle, "in the upper world the soul has no need to speak or act."[2]

Faith is the name given to the sum of good deeds, both essential and supererogatory. The resolve to do a deadly sin is in itself one. The theft of five dirhams is wickedness. Acts may be good though not specifically directed to the service of God; this means that unbelievers can do good deeds, which is contrary to the general view.[3]

Revelation not reason tells us that the punishment for sin is eternal. The beatific vision consists in men knowing God in their hearts. Animals will not go to heaven. For pain suffered in this world compensation will be given in the next even if it were not inflicted for instruction or warning.[4] The "balance" is a metaphor for the judgment; the "bridge" may be real but this is not definitely affirmed.

Unbelievers will be punished between the two blasts of the trumpet.[5] In time of danger, a man may hide his faith (*taḳiyya*).

[1] p. 20. [2] p. 15; Cf. 107 f.
[3] Muḥammad told Ṣa'ṣa'a that his saving girls from death was of no use as it was not done for God's sake. Mubarrad, 279.
[4] Ījī, 151 f. [5] Ījī, 273 f, 270.

What is not perceived by the senses can be accepted only on the report of twenty witnesses, one or more of whom must be a man of heaven, one who cannot lie. This would rule out most of the traditions.

The Koran is an accident and may be in many places at once. Its relation to the word of God is not defined.

In matters of history Abu 'l-Hudhail suspended judgment on the killing of 'Uthmān, also on 'Alī, Ṭalḥa, and 'Āïsha, but he condemned Mu'āwiya. It is said that he regarded 'Alī and Abū Bakr as equal in merit.[1]

Abu 'l-Hudhail tried to think of God as an all pervading providence with a character, for he is his attributes. Yet he could not free himself from the idea that God cannot be defined in any way. He tried to keep God simple for he was haunted by the fear that complexity means being compound, and all compounds are created. So he says that God has only one activity which appears in many forms because of its various effects. The same idea is found in John of Damascus.[2] The creative will not in a substrate is really an intermediary between God and the world. He tried to save man from being an automaton by making him independent of suggestions from outside, and to separate morals from theology. His doctrine of knowledge, that all thinking men must recognise the being of one creator, implies a natural religion which is the foundation of Islam, and mental deficiency in all who do not accept it. His theory of men who cannot lie and are the only witnesses to truth recalls the doctrine of the Shī'a.

A younger contemporary of Abu 'l-Hudhail was

Abū Isḥāḳ Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Naẓẓām († 231).

He had been a pupil of Khalīl b. Aḥmad.[3] None of the *ḳadaris* combined more kinds of unbelief than he. In his youth he associated with dualists, materialists, sceptics (those who say that arguments are mutually destructive), and a few philosophers. Following the materialists he denied the existence of atoms, following the dualists he said that he who does justice cannot do injustice, and from Hishām b. al-Ḥakam he took the idea

[1] Malaṭī *Tanbih*, 33.
[2] Migne, 94, 860.
[3] *Durar wal-Ghurar*, 38 v.

that colours, tastes, smells, and sounds are bodies.[1] He could not keep a secret, was generous, and could see a joke. Quick witted, he was a good companion though he did not suffer fools gladly. Al-Naẓẓām is sweeter than safety after danger, health after sickness, and plenty after famine.[2] His enemies said that he was drunk morning and night; he was at least no enemy to the wine cup, for he wrote:—

I take the soul from the bottle; there is no sin in blood without a wound.
Then I am drunk and have two souls while the bottle lies a soulless body.

In spite of his knowledge and his rank as a theologian he fell into sin because he loved a Christian youth and composed for him a book to prove that the trinitarian doctrine was better than the unitarian.[3] He paid a formal visit of sympathy to one whose son had died. The father was disconsolate because his son had not read his father's book on doubt, a work that made you doubt everything. The visitor advised him to read his own book and then he would doubt that he had ever had a son.[4] Al-Naẓẓām tells of a journey wherein he met nothing but bad omens but which ended fortunately; it cured him of any belief in such things.[5] He was trustworthy in speech and seldom erred as to truth and falsehood. A fault, which never left him, was that his hypotheses were bad though his arguing from them was good. If only he had verified his premises instead of his deductions! He began with a guess, argued from it, and forgot that the foundation of his reasoning was a guess. But if he said that he had seen something none doubted his word.[6] He was thirty-six when he died.[7]

God.

The statement that God is wise affirms His being and adds that He is not ignorant. John of Damascus said much the same.[8]

[1] Sam'āni, *Ansāb*, 564. [2] *Durar wal-Ghurar*, 38 r.
[3] b. Ḥazm, *Ṭawḳ al-ḥamāma*, 122. [4] *Talbis Iblis*, 43.
[5] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 3, 139. The children of the Mu'tazila do not believe in djinn. *Nishwār al-muḥāḍara*, 274.
[6] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 2, 83. [7] *Ṣarḥ al-'uyūn*, 125. [8] Migne, 94, 836.

God has power and knowledge for the Koran says so ; we may not say that He has life for the Koran does not say so. Most authorities say that al-Naẓẓām denied will to God ; in Him power is the motive force and knowledge gives it the needed direction. But He acts by choice, does justice because He chooses to do it. In speaking of al-Naẓẓām, al-Ash'arī uses the word will, presumably for convenience, and says that God's will has two aspects. In one it is creation for, unlike man, no weakness hinders His power from passing at once into action. In the other, it is a command to men to obey Him ; though this will to faith does not create it as men are not tools in the hand of God. The statement that God hears means that He knows, for perception does not exist in Him.

God cannot do wrong, for evil and untruth are produced only by imperfect bodies and there is no imperfection in Him. Probably al-Naẓẓām meant to say that God was righteous and so could do no wrong. He cannot omit doing the best possible for men so He cannot increase the delights of heaven and the pains of hell and cannot push into hell a child standing on its brink.[1]

He can do the like of what he has done for an infinite number of times, but not better. The cause of creation is the purpose of it, the benefit of His creatures. In the beginning He created all things and they appear as from a storehouse in time.[2] This idea is Jewish. God created the world on the first day just as in the preparation of a dinner all the food is cooked at once and the courses are set on the table one by one.[3] He has no power over what He has put in man's control and cannot make life or power in the abstract.[4] He cannot create ignorance or wrong.[5]

Reason.

A reasoning man when he considers himself and the world about him must know that he has a creator. Other questions

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 238.
[2] *kumūn* ; this word is used in another sense for oil being latent in the olive.
[3] Tanchuma, *Bereshith*, 2 ; Cf. 4 Ezra, 4, 41 f ; *Book of Treasures*, 358.
[4] God cannot reduce the combinations in the world to atoms. As atoms do not exist, this is obvious.
[5] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 133 ; Taftazānī, 68.

then arise. Is the Creator a body? Can He be seen? Is anything like Him? Did He create for some good purpose? Man must find reasoned answers to these questions.[1] What is known by the senses is necessary and cannot be known by ratiocination and report; what is known by analogy and ratiocination cannot become necessary knowledge.[2] Two classes of men obey God, in other words He is known in two ways, by thinkers and by good men.

Knowledge and ignorance are akin, also faith and unbelief; they are not different in kind for the same faculty produces both.[3]

Physics.

The world consists of substance and movement which is the only accident. All action is movement; rest is movement in intention, strain.

At creation all was in a state of strain.[4] Colours, sounds, tastes, power, heat, and light are all bodies. These ideas are clearly Stoic; some of them came through Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. One report assumes that bodies endure,[5] though this is denied; endurance is not an entity.[6] Bodies are of different sorts, light and living, heavy and dead; one sort cannot change into the other.[7] There are no atoms so there is no limit to the parts into which a body can be divided. Two bodies may interpenetrate each other and occupy the same space; thus fire is latent in stone and oil in the olive. Perception is due to such interpenetration.[8] All animals, apparently the animal soul is meant, are of one sort. Fire, if free from impurity, would ascend to the throne of God. (This also suggests Stoic influence.) Movement is all of one sort; it is in the body in the

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 16.

[3] The real nature of both is the imposition of form on the power of intellect; the distinction between them is by something external; i.e., the agreement or otherwise of this form with the connected fact. Ījī, 337.

[4] b. Ḥazm, 5, 55.

[5] Ash'arī *Maḳālāt*, 367. Denied; *Marḥam*, 194. *Muḥaṣṣal*, 11 N.2. "Substance is always being renewed; were it not so the world would come to an end" (*Musāmara*, 221), is inconsistent with the doctrine of creation, but that does not make it impossible for al-Naẓẓām to have held this view.

[6] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 42. [7] *Farḳ*, 119; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 54.

[8] Critics made fun of this. Abū Lahab saw Muḥammad therefore bits of Muḥammad are in him; Abū Lahab is in hell so bits of Muḥammed are in hell.

first place and by it the body moves to the second. It may be by "leaps"; a body may pass through units of place without occupying them; hence movements differ in speed.

Man.

Man is spirit, a subtle body[1] pervading the material body which is both an obstacle to it and a tool for it.[2] Life is the spirit, not something added to man. All spirit is of one kind and its actions of one kind; when it leaves the body it moves upward through the world.

Al-Naẓẓām seems to say that the spirit is joined to the body by the soul and by it perceives through the medium of the senses; which are part of man; but the Mu'tazila did not distinguish clearly between the soul and the spirit.[3] Knowledge and will are movements of the mind. Man's only act is will and that as the result of suggestions which are necessary and both from God. The bad are not to mislead men but to make their choice real. The will is movement in man; what happens outside him is the work of God through nature. Those acts, which proceed immediately from will, follow it inevitably. Capacity is the man himself. As God cannot do evil, bad deeds are the work of men.

Religion.

Any act, which God could have commanded but has not, is evil because it is forbidden; any, which He cannot command, is evil in itself. Any act, which He could have forbidden but has not, is good because it is not forbidden; any, which He cannot forbid, is good in itself. So right and wrong are independent of the will of God. In this world there is no reward; any blessing which is given here is to increase faith and encourage obedience. Faith is shown by avoiding deadly sins. The theft of two hundred dirhams (the legal minimum taxable) is wickedness. Deeds which are equal in merit or demerit will get the same reward or

[1] The spirit is subtle bodies, coursing in the body like rosewater in the rose, lasting from birth to death. They suffer no diminution or change so that, if a limb is cut off, the parts of spirit in it retire into the remaining limbs. *Dictionary of Technical Terms*, 541.

[2] Stoic. Cf. *Book of Treasures*, 465. [3] *Tamyīz* f, 44a.

punishment. The children of Muslims and unbelievers will go to heaven and so will animals for no distinction is made between animals, children and lunatics. Rather it is the spirits of animals which go to heaven where they are given fair bodies.[1] The eternity of punishment is known only by revelation.

In heaven bodies are necessary so that the spirits may eat and drink. In hell men will not be tortured beyond what they can bear; if they were, they would not feel it.

Prophets may commit venial, but not degrading,[2] sins through negligence or error, but this is blameworthy; they may be punished for such sins though their followers need not be.[3] Miracles do not happen.[4]

The creative word of God is an accident, movement. The word of God is a body, a combination of separate sounds, which cannot be in two places at once. Two reasons are given for the miraculous nature of the Koran; (1) because it tells of things both past and future which would be otherwise unknown and not because of its form and style; (2) because God prevented men from making anything like it though it was in their power to do so. Spirits cannot serve men or give information to them. Arguments founded on analogy or the agreement of the community have no value in religion.

An imam is not necessary. Al-Naẓẓām defended 'Alī and condemned Ṭalḥa, 'Āïsha, and Mu'āwiya; he accepted the witness of two followers of 'Alī or two of Ṭalḥa but not that of two belonging to opposing parties. He rejected some practices accepted by the community, such as the *tarāwīḥ*, criticised the Companions, and, it is said, did not believe in prophecy. It is claimed that al-Naẓẓām was the first to say that a practising Muslim might be an infidel.[5]

Simplification is the mark of this system. The world is made up of two parts only, matter and motion. God has no will for the union of knowledge and power produces action. The same activity of man becomes according to circumstances faith or

[1] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 3, 122. [2] Ījī, 220. [3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 168.
[4] Another report says that God creates the miracles of the prophets at the time they happen. *Intiṣār*, 52.
[5] *Ghunya*, 176.

unbelief. Capacity, that unnecessary addition to psychology, is rejected ; possibly on the ground that what can only be thought does not exist, another borrowing from the Stoics. It must be said that al-Naẓẓām had the makings of a philosopher ; with a little luck he would have been a great scientist. He raised several problems but they did not attract attention outside the Mu'tazila. Following his lead, the nature of external acts, which follow from man's will, was discussed. Other ideas, such as the spiritual nature of man, did not find much acceptance.

The Baghdad School.

Abū Sahl Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir († 210) was a slave-dealer, a poet, and a leper as well as a theologian. It is suggested that he belonged to Kufa and migrated to Baghdad. Hārūn ar-Rashīd imprisoned him for being a Shī'ī ; the only evidence for this creed is a certain preference for 'Alī. In a poem he set him above the Khawārij :—

> The father of Ḥasan, the son of 'Abbās, and the orthodox
> were not among their forefathers.
> Lights in darkness, nobles, these are the leaders, not bedouin.
> The bottom is not as the top, bedouin are not the mine of
> wisdom.[1]

He wrote poems on theological subjects and was largely concerned with the proofs of the existence of God to be drawn from nature.

> How glorious is reason as a pathfinder, as a friend in hard
> times and good,
> As a judge who decides on the unseen as easily as a witness
> on what he has seen.[2]

One bit of controversy is preserved. A determinist asked him,
"Do you praise God for your faith ?"
"Yes."
"Then he likes to be praised for what he has not done (according to Mu'tazili principles) ; a practice he has condemned in

[1] Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān*, 6, 155. [2] *Ibid.*, 6, 95.

his book." "He condemns only him who likes to be praised for what he has not done: what he has neither helped nor ordered to be done." Thumāma then said, "No, God praises me because I did as I was told and I praise him for giving me the command and strengthening me to obey it."

The determinist was silenced.[1]

God.

Of course, reason is a sufficient guide to the knowledge of God. His will is twofold.

1. *Essential.* God always wills man's obedience but not his sins; this will has no connection with sin, but may be connected with all else. So arose the formula, "God was always willing"; though most of the Mu'tazila did not accept it. The critics said, "If God knew that a man would act in a certain way and did not prevent him, then He willed that act."

2. *An attribute of action.* This again is twofold. (*a*) If the act of will is within God, it is creation; (*b*) If connected with something outside Him, it is the moral command.

Creation, therefore, is God's willing a thing; it is not the creative word "Be"; it is not the thing created, but precedes it. One report says that God did not create accidents[2]; which looks like an inference from the doctrine of *tawallud* (see below). Another report says that some accidents are the work of God, some the work of men, and some of both together.[3]

His power is infinite, He has in store better than He has given to men; so Bishr called those, who held that God had done His best for men, unbelievers. If He were to grant His grace to one who, He knew, would not believe, that man would believe of his own accord and his claim to reward would not be diminished by receipt of that grace.

It is said that Bishr dropped this doctrine, reverting to the idea that God must do what is most advantageous to men.[4] God has given men sufficient grace, by preaching and the prophets, to meet their duties. He need not do for men all He can; He must do what is best for their religion. Conversion is a

[1] Arnold, *Mu'tazila*, 30.
[2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 135.
[3] b. Ḥazm, 4, 197; *Ansāb*, f, 83b.
[4] b. Ḥazm, 3, 165.

difficulty to Bishr as his theology here is static. He taught that God is a friend to believers, friendship being shown in revelation, praise, and grace; He is an enemy to unbelievers, His hostility being shown in the opposites of these three blessings. He was alone in teaching this, a doctrine which makes it impossible for an unbeliever to believe.

It would have been better if God had put the wise (believers) in heaven at first and, if He had known that a man would come to believe, that He should not have let him die before disbelieving.

Reason.

Man may know one aspect of an object and not know other aspects of it, but he cannot both know and not know the same aspect at the same time. This knowledge may be necessary or acquired or one aspect may be known by necessary and another by acquired knowledge. Accidents can be known only by acquired knowledge though under several aspects.

The process of knowing is that in the first unit of time a man gets an idea, in the second he reflects on it, and in the third he knows.

In things religious man knows God in the third unit of time after knowing himself.[1] Knowledge may be intuitive, e.g., that man did not make himself, based on the senses, or based on reason. Presumably the two first kinds are necessary. That based on a general report is acquired. Reason does not tell us that sins may be forgiven.

Physics.

At creation, a body is actually at rest.

One atom cannot support accidents. Eight atoms form a body, two make a line, four a square, and eight a cube. Movement, rest, all the acts of men, heat, and cold are accidents, not bodies. Endurance is an entity; accidents endure till they are replaced by others, so oil is latent in the olive and fire in stone.

Cause comes before effect though there may be no interval between them. Secondary effects may be the work of man;

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 260.

thus, when a man feels the pain of a blow and knows that someone has hit him, that someone has caused the pain and the knowledge. This is the famous doctrine of *tawallud* always associated with the name of Bishr. Movement is not in the first place and not in the second, but by it a body moves from the first to the second.

Man.

Man is body and spirit, both together are the agent. A man can will without the act following necessarily. He can act without suggestions, for both suggestions come from the devil and there was no devil to insinuate them into the first rational man. Capacity is soundness, health, and freedom from defects; it is both before and with the act.[1] God has a part in the acts of men by way of naming and judgement; that is, He judges that every act is right or wrong, so men call them good or bad, virtue or vice.[2] God has given men power to produce accidents, colours, tastes, and such like, but not life or death.

Religion.

Works of supererogation are part of faith. If a man repents and sins again, the punishment of the first sin is not blotted out so, if an unbeliever is converted and then sins without repentance, he is punished for his unbelief. God can punish infants without being unjust; His doing so means that, if they had grown up, they would have become sinners. Blasphemy by a child is a lie not unbelief. The theft of ten dirhams is wickedness.[3] The punishment in the grave is real.

Unbelievers will be punished between the two blasts of the trumpet. The 'balance' is a metaphor for the judgment; the 'bridge' may be real and not metaphorical. Heaven and hell are already created.[4] 'Alī was right; his opponents, including Mu'āwiya, were wrong. Men are allowed to seek martyrdom.[5]

Thumāma b. Ashras of Basra († 213) was connected with

[1] b. Ḥazm, 3, 22.
[2] Cf. b. Ḥazm, 4, 203, an exaggeration.
[3] b. Ḥazm, 3, 54.
[4] Īji, 254, 270, 273 f.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 4, 202.

Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir, moved in court circles, and, it is said, persuaded al-Ma'mūn to adopt the Mu'tazilī creed. He was hardly a theologian and in another age would have been called a wit. Once when love was the subject of talk, Thumāma contributed this: When the substances of souls are mingled in the union of likeness, a spark of spreading light is begotten. By it the eyes of the understanding are lightened and vital natures leap at this brightness. From this spark is formed a light peculiar to the soul, which is united to its substance and is called love. Thumāma is accused of drunkenness and of grosser sins and did not always take his religious duties seriously. As he watched men hurrying to the mosque on a Friday in fear of being late for prayers, he said: Look at these asses! What did that Arab do to these men?[1] Like Bishr al-Marīsī he was hated; a ghostly voice was heard at sea crying: Cursed be Thumâma and Bishr.[2]

He had no system of theology. He taught that God has no quiddity and created the universe by His nature, a form of the philosophers' identification of God with the first cause, though it is denied that he taught this. God did not know things until they came into being and before they were created they were not.[3] God did not create anything as a basis for inference. By reason men know right and wrong. Knowledge is the product of reason and therefore has no agent (see below). A man is mature when he has a necessary knowledge of religious matters; such a man is responsible to God. Otherwise he is in the position of a child and, like some who know not God, is excusable. Will is the only act of man; all else happens without an originator and is ascribed to man by metaphor only. Thumāma came to this position by arguing that if God is the cause of secondary acts, He is the author of evil and that, if man is the cause, then a dead man can act. Here he contradicted Abu 'l-Hudhail. Capacity is health, soundness of limbs, and absence of weakness; it is before the act.

Sin can be only when a man knows God and then denies or disobeys Him. A wicked man, who does not repent, abides in

[1] *Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth*, 60. [2] *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 7, 148.
[3] Or. 2,606 f. 152. v.

hell; on earth he is neither a believer nor an infidel. Heaven and hell are places of reward and punishment; those who have deserved neither, at the resurrection turn to dust; they are animals, 'people of the book' who have only a hearsay faith, worshippers of idols, and the children of Muslims. A prophet needs no miracle to establish his message, only sound doctrine. If the Koran is the work of God, it is created; if it is the work of nature, i.e., a secondary act, it has no agent, it is not created and it is not the creator. The criticism that he combined contradictory ideas is just.

Ma'mar b. 'Abbād "reasoned most acutely in denying the divine attributes and control." It is recorded that he was sent by Hārūn al-Rashīd to argue with a Sumanī in the presence of an Indian king. The Mu'tazila of Basra accused him to the government of teaching that things existed to infinity. He fled to Baghdad and died there, hiding in the house of Ibrāhīm b. al-Sindī b. Shahīk.[1] He had unusually queer ideas. He taught that each attribute inhered in God by an entity, this in its turn needed a second to attach it to God, this second needed a third, and so on to infinity. Similarly an accident inhered in a body by an infinite series of entities. Creation had a cause, this cause needed a second, and so on to infinity. Rest and movement, which are modes of being, differ by an entity. Things, which are alike, are like by an entity and separate by an entity and, though it is not expressly stated, it is to be assumed that each entity requires an infinite series.

Where do these ideas come from? Something of the sort was known in India. Professor Das Gupta writes that in the Nyaya system, "the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect cannot be known until that has produced another effect and that another *ad infinitum*."[2] Indian influence in other branches of knowledge is certain so it is not surprising to find it in philosophy, even if undigested. The explanation

[1] b. Hazm, 4, 194 = Or. 843. f. 99a. Among other proofs the line of verse in *Nafḥ al-ṭīb*, 2, 418 shows that the name is Ma'mar.

[2] *Indian Philosophy*, 1, 159.

proposed by Max Horten[1] that an accident needs the extra quality of inherence before it can exist in a substrate does not account for the chain of causes in creation and is also too philosophical; he has overrated the technical equipment of these men.[2]

God.

The doctrine of attributes has already been described.[3] God is in the world in the sense that He controls it, not as a spatial presence.[4] He does not belong to the sphere of time so He cannot be called eternal (*ḳadīm*) till creation has taken place. He created the causation of movement and rest and this is His will. His will is not Himself, not the thing willed, and not creation, command, or statement; it inheres in Him, not in a substrate, and may be positive or negative. He created substances, but not accidents. He does not create power for anyone, for power is the work of the body. He cannot create power over life or death for anyone and cannot combine life, power, or knowledge with death. He did not create life and death, for they are accidents, but He did create the causation of life and death. Ma'mar made a distinction between *ḳādirun 'ala 'l-jauri* and *ḳādirun an yajūra.*

Physics.

Undivided substance is not body. Eight atoms make a body which is long, broad and deep; such a body produces accidents, and these are infinite in number. Critics said that this made body more powerful than God; for He created a finite number of bodies and each body produced an infinity of accidents.

1 *Die philosophischen Systeme*, 277.

2 The suggestion is put forward by S. Horowitz that Ma'mar tripped over the fact that no logical judgment is possible unless something is common to the two terms. He extended this into the world of things and said that no two things could be connected directly but must have a link, this link another, and so on. This is ingenious and meets the case; there is no evidence for it and it must stand on its own merits.

3 One account says that God cannot know Himself because that would involve Him in the duality of knower and known; He cannot know anything else because that would mean that His knowledge was caused by something else. *Farḳ*, 323. b. Ḥazm, 4, 194. This is contradicted by *Intiṣār*, 53; al-Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt* is silent.

4 *Farḳ*, 140.

Animals produce accidents by choice; other things produce them by nature. Secondary effects have no agent. At creation all was at rest. All bodies are really at rest, for rest is a mode of being.[1] Movement means that a body is at rest in the first time and in the second. Accidents alone are perceived, not bodies. Oil is latent in the olive, fire in the stone. Bodies endure by an endurance and come to an end by a cessation, which are accidents or entities with the usual chain to infinity. Critics say that this makes bodies create and destroy themselves. Another account is that cessation is a quality inhering in something other than the thing which perishes; this agrees with the other statement that God cannot destroy the world entirely.[2]

Man.

Ma'mar tried to say that man is a spirit; critics charge him with giving divine attributes to man. Man is an atom, which does not occupy space, an entity which cannot be divided,[3] neither body nor accident; it is in the body in the sense of controlling it, it uses the body as a tool. There is neither movement nor rest in the atom which is man. He has knowledge, power, will, but no accidents like colour or the power to combine. The soul is not the five senses and neither they nor it is the body. Life and capacity are something other than man. Capacity is an accident, other than health and soundness. Man's only act is will; all else is the work of the body by nature. Perception is not a voluntary act but is the work of the substrate in which it occurs. The act which follows immediately on the will is made necessary by it. Like Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir, Ma'mar introduced the third time into his system. A man wills to move at once. It may be that he remains at rest in the second time; but this rest is not an acquired act or a failure to move. It is due to man's constitution or to nature, like burning by fire. The failure can occur only in the third time. The devil cannot enter the mind of man but by external signs he knows what goes on there.

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 204. There is no movement in the world.
[2] b. Ḥazm, 5, 41; Ash'arī, 367. [3] b. Ḥazm, 5, 74.

Religion.

That God is *mutakallim* (the normal sense is speaking) means that He causes speech. He only created His word in the sense that He made it necessary. The word is the natural act of the body in which it inheres, just as bodies, when struck, emit sound. The Koran is the act of the place where it occurs, so it is an accident and cannot have been created by God.

Vision in dreams is natural and does not come from God. There is no act of God in miracles.[1] The pains of infants[2] and the causing of infidelity are the work of nature.[3]

Ma'mar would not decide whether 'Alī or Ṭalḥa and 'Āïsha were in the right but he condemned Mu'āwiya.

A fragment of a treatise on theology by Abū Yūsuf Ya'ḳūb al-Kindi has been preserved[4]; the treatment of predestination is more profound than that of the theologians.

The world is an organised whole and God, who made it, controls it.

Man can choose what he will do, but this power is not absolute. He acts freely, not by constraint, within the limits set by his being linked up with the other parts of the world and by the control of God who cannot let any of His creatures upset the order of the universe.

Much of the speculation recorded in the previous pages now seems to be nonsense; how could it ever have seemed to be true? Men soon saw the difference between intuitive and acquired knowledge; some knowledge they had to find, some found them. "Necessary" knowledge was an act without an agent (Ja'd), was of higher quality than acquired and so suited to the majesty of God, who can only be known by it (Ghailān). It is hopeless to express these ideas in orthodox English terms.

Hishām b. al-Ḥakam extended this idea and said that accidents, which have no being of their own, cannot be proofs of the being of God. It was soon realised that knowledge of God was not the same as belief in him (Ghailān, *Ibāḍiya*). The next step was to make knowledge and belief different in kind. Man, being

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 177. [2] b. Ḥazm, 3, 120. [3] b. Ḥazm, 3, 49.
[4] *al-'iḳd al-farīd*, 1, 334.

a rational animal, knows God necessarily; other knowledge is not necessary though God can make it so. Knowledge does not grow or diminish; a thing is known or it is not known (Abu 'l-Hudhail). Al-Naẓẓām taught that reasoned knowledge can never become necessary, can never have the value of the higher quality.

Men can produce accidents, the nature of which they know; they cannot produce those the nature of which they do not know. He, who set a stone rolling, produced movement but he, who painted it yellow, did not produce the colour. This, I say, is a mystery.

OPPOSITION

As Islam disowned the extravagances of the extreme Shī'a, so it cast off the crudities of those who were called anthropomorphists (*mujassima*), *Ḥashwiya*, and *Nābita*. These names were given by enemies and were used loosely. Al-Jāḥiẓ says that these people were more religious than other Muslims, but feelings were bitter for a man exclaimed "I smell a *Ḥashwi*," and one was found hiding behind a wall.[1] These names were given to Dāūd al-Ẓāhiri († 270/883) and to b. Ḥanbal († 241/855) whose followers made God a body. An extreme example of these ideas is the statement that, before the creation, God was on a fish of light swimming in light.[2] They were charged with teaching that God is finite in essence; this may be a deduction which they themselves did not draw.

There is no system of theology. All that can be done is to record ideas which were current, some among one group, some among another of the *Ḥashwiya*, occasionally mentioning a well-known name. Some ideas are recorded only because they contradict the Mu'tazila. Dāūd held that God had only seven or eight attributes.[3] God sits on the throne; He will be seen in both worlds. The creation of dead matter alone is allowable. Saints work miracles. A prophet need not bring revelation, miracles, or a law; he may resolve to commit grave sins after his call. Muḥammad was an unbeliever before his call.[4] Some

[1] *Marham*, 242.
[2] Damīrī, 1, 189 art. *djinn*.
[3] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 135.
[4] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 160.

people in Syria had no respect for the Companions. Dāūd and others said that the Koran was originated not created while some said that it was an accident but eternal.[1] Followers of b. Ḥanbal held that God's word was words and sounds which inhere in His essence ; it is eternal. The parchment and binding of the Koran are eternal.[2] The Koran has a heart, hump, tongue, and two lips ; it sanctifies, intercedes, and strengthens.[3] Successive sounds inhere in God. The written name of God is God. The eternal word dwells in bodies and yet does not leave the essence of God.[4] In the Koran are passages which have no meaning or are to test men. Angels can commit grave sins.

Revelation did not institute the office of imam. Victory can make a man, who does not belong to Ḳuraish, imam. It was wrong to call Mu'āwiya a usurper. Yazīd was more excellent than Ḥusain and was accepted as imam. Noxious animals go to hell to punish sinners ; they are given a nature which enables them to enjoy hell or their bodies are protected from its heat. Al-Jāḥiẓ adds that people with these ideas are not as bad as those who think that God torments children to annoy their parents.[5] Men need not command the right with sword or voice even though the conditions usually stipulated are fulfilled.

It is not right to earn a living ; God fixes prices without calling to His aid rain or drought.

At a later date an anthropomorphist in Herat said that animals killed by followers of al-Ash'arī were not lawful food.[6]

One taught that adjectives like wise and powerful are applied to man in their real sense and to God by analogy, an idea which he is said to have taken from the philosphers.[7] Marius Victorinus said that God was not *exsistens* but *quasi exsistens* though He is above all.

Both the Muslim and the Christian want to say that there is a great gulf between God and man, but have chosen their words awkwardly. Some set the agreement of the community on a level with the Koran as a base of religion ; so b. Khuzaima

[1] Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, 583 ; Taftazānī, 79. [2] Ījī, 63, 65.
[3] Jāḥiẓ, *Rasāil*, 154. [4] *Irshād*, 74. [5] *Ḥayawān*, 3, 122 f.
[6] Subkī, 3, 117. [7] Ash'arī, *maḳālāt*, 184, 483.

calls the Shī'a unbelievers for making 'Ali the most excellent after the prophet, thus contradicting the agreement.[1]
B. Ḳutaiba went further and set agreement above the Koran, "the Sunna controls the book not the book the Sunna."[2] "God only said to Moses as much of His speech as he could bear,"[3] this implies that the Koran is not the whole of the word of God.

Al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī († 213/857) though better known as a mystic was an authority in theology and, in spite of it, almost won the approval of b. Ḥanbal. He would not inherit from his father because he differed from him in his religious opinions. From the little that is recorded of his teaching it is manifest that he was a forerunner of the later orthodoxy. With al-Shāfi'ī, Mālik, b. Kullāb, and many more he held that one, who believed in God, would go at least to paradise though he could not defend his faith by argument.[4] Faith is created and does not include the arguments for it.[5] Reason is a power, which apprehends knowledge, but is not knowledge.[6]; this definition was rejected by later thinkers. Other accounts of reason are that it is a subtle body situated either in the heart or in the brain, or it is what perceives things in their real nature; Jahm and the Mu'tazila said it was a sixth sense.[7] He inspired later divines.[8]

Those who called themselves the followers of "custom and the community" or of "tradition" were given other names by their opponents. The Mu'tazila called them determinists; the Murji'a called them doubters (*Shakkākiya*) because they qualified their claim to be Muslims by the addition 'if God will'; the followers of Jahm and Najjār called them anthropomorphists, and the Ismā'īliya and such like called them *Ḥashwiya*.[9]

[1] *Tawḥid*, 31.
[2] *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*, 250 cf. 260; Malaṭi, *Tanbih*, 67.
[3] Ṭabari III, 2,503.
[4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 254
[5] Subkī, 2, 42.
[6] *Rawḍa Bahiya*, 75; *Musāmara*, 2, 17. 53.
[7] *Fiḳh akbar*, I, 19.
[8] Subkī, 2, 37.
[9] *Ghunya*, 159.

CHAPTER V

REACTION

Contemporary with al-Muḥāsibī was Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah b. Sa'īd al-Ḳaṭṭān, commonly called Ibn Kullāb, who engaged in controversy with 'Abbād b. Sulaimān and died shortly after 240/854. He is called a *Ḥashwi*[1] and a theologian of the traditionists.[2]

His doctrine.

God exists but not by the quality of existence; elsewhere, existence is said to be one of His attributes. His essence and his soul (or self) are God. Eternity is an entity and God is eternal by an eternity inhering in His essence. He always was before time and place and is as He was, on the throne (or above it but not touching it) and above all. The attributes, which include friendship and hostility, face and hand, are not He and not other than He; they inhere in God but not in each other, for what is descriptive cannot be described. They had no beginning (*azalī*) but do not possess eternity (*ḳidam*).[3] Generosity is an attribute of essence and those of action are eternal. His followers could not decide if divinity were an entity.

God willed that all that is should come into being, but the school would not say that He willed sins. He does not create anything till He says to it "Be," but that word is not creative. He was always speaking with the word which is His eternal attribute; the two names *kalām* and *ḳawl* mean the same thing. His word is one but becomes many, command, prohibition, and statement, by its connection with the thing commanded, forbidden, or told. There is no such reason for its being

[1] *Fihrist*, 180. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 254.
[3] They do not endure, come to an end, are not eternal or phenomenal; were always uncreated. b. Ḥazm, 4, 208.

called *kalām* or *ḳawl*. It is not *ḥurūf*, which may mean words or sounds. Ibn Kullāb distinguished between the word and the book, the Koran; the word inheres in the essence of God, the Arabic Koran is a guide to this entity and is created,[1] though it is neither body nor accident. In other words, the reading of the Koran is other than the matter read; the matter inheres in God, the reading is created, acquired by man. 'Abbād called him a Christian for saying that the word was God,[2] and a Christian said that if Ibn Kullāb had lived, all Muslims would have become Christians.[3] God creates, man acquires; the act may be the work of two agents.

Faith is confession of God and the prophet; it is based on knowledge and belief in the heart. Confession without knowledge is no faith.

Faith is created.[4] Ibn Kullāb taught the doctrine of *muwāfāt*, that in God's sight a man always is what he will be at his death. If he dies a Muslim, he has always been one in the sight of God. Men will see God; this belief is based on the axiom that all that is can be seen. "The light of the world," these words, as applied to God, do not need to be explained.

Ibn Kullāb did not accept the doctrine of atoms.

Some of his disciples taught that *istiwā*, God's seating Himself on the throne, was an essential attribute.[5]

Muḥammad b. Karrām was born in Nisabur or possibly in Sijistan. He suffered prison and banishment for his opinions and died in Jerusalem in 255/869. He was associated with Aḥmad b. Ḥarb the ascetic, who belonged to the Murji'a and was accounted one of the *abdāl* though, as a traditionist, he related "things which had no foundation."[6]

Numbers that could not be counted in Nisabur and Herat followed b. Karrām; they were mostly of the meaner sort. The school bore a good reputation for piety and it may well be that the founder did not understand what he was talking about. It is hardly fair to call him a reactionary as he allowed a place in his system to reason but he belonged in essentials to the literalists.

[1] Ibn Taimiya, *Risāla Ba'albakiya*, 393, 398. [2] Subkī, 2, 51. [3] *Fihrist*, 180.
[4] *Rauḍa Bahiya*, 75. [5] b. Ḥazm, 2, 123. [6] *Ta'rikh Baghdād*, 4, 118.

The doctrine of God.

God is substance, unique in essence, and has weight. He moves about. The throne is a place for Him which He touches from above, the more worthy direction. He is bigger than it and finite on the side where He touches it ; it is part of His majesty that He is as much above the whole throne as above any part of it. He is separate from the world and was always creating and providing before the world was.

The doctrine of the attributes was orthodox.

God is a substrate for phenomena, which arise in His essence by His power, but do not become attributes, though they have no end. Had they an end, a succession of phenomena in His essence would be inevitable, and this is impossible. These phenomena are His touching the throne, His acts of will, utterances, hearing, and sight. The world (phenomena outside God) came into being through the medium of an origination in His essence when He said to it " Be " and willed that it should be. This act of will and the utterance were forms. (Is this a faint echo of Plato ?)

God's word (*kalām*) is eternal, but not his utterance (*ḳawl*) [1] ; the word is many phenomena in His essence, statements about the past and future, books revealed to the prophets, promises, threats, and laws. His command is twofold ; the creative command, which is followed necessarily by an effect, and the moral command or statement, which is not followed necessarily by any effect. His knowledge is twofold ; He knows things by His knowledge and knows this knowledge by a second. He has no power over bodies and accidents when He has once created them. He cannot do other than He has done and cannot destroy the world so as to return to his original solitude. [2] He is the author of both good and evil. The knowledge of God, of right and wrong, depend on reason only. Truth is a report which has a spiritual reality behind it.

Natural philosophy.

Phenomena come into being in the second unit of time when

[1] *Ḳawl* applied to the Koran is not orthodox. L.A., 15, 427.
[2] b. Ḥazm, 4, 205 ; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 97.

the origination is exhausted. No body or accident, which has ceased to be, can be renewed but another like it can be created. All accidents may endure for more than one unit of time. Whatever can be predicated of the living can also be predicated of the dead, except having power. The first creation was alive. Life may be in one atom.

Man.

It is determinism to say that capacity is with the act.[1]

Religion.

God need not do the best He can for man. Faith is confession by the tongue not by the heart; as it was in all at the creation, so children are believers. Hypocrites are believers in this world with a faith like Gabriel's though they will be punished hereafter. Speaking of the present, a Muslim must say, "I am a believer"; speaking of the future, he may add, "If God will." A general intention to accept Islam is enough, a special intention is not needed for prayer. Prophets may commit sins, but not such as would unfit them for serving as witnesses, and they cannot pervert their message. All who hear a prophet must accept him though they have no proof of his mission. (This idea was taken from the *Ibāḍiya*.) Saints may be more excellent than prophets; the school said that b. Karrām was more excellent than some of the Companions. Sinners will go to hell but may be released by the intercession of the prophet.[2] Those Muslims who did not agree with b. Karrām would not be punished eternally.[3] He, who uses the right to private judgment, is right even in matters fundamental. There may be two imams at the same time if they are in different countries; it is said that dislike of 'Alī was the reason for this doctrine. Both sides at the battle of the Camel were in the right. Reason shows that the resurrection is needed to reward the good and punish the wicked; but revelation tells that reward is merited.

The school broke into twelve sections, but their specific

[1] Makdisi, *Geog.*, 38. [2] b. Ḥazm, 4 45. [3] *Fihrist*, 212.

differences are not recorded. The only thing to do is to give a list of their opinions, noting that one section often contradicted another. God is in a form, He is body, or occupies space. He meets the throne instead of touching it ; He is opposite to it and nothing is between Him and it while the space between is finite. His will (*mashī'a*) is concerned with universals, His acts of will (*irādāt*) with particulars and give to the world the peculiarity of being as opposed to not-being. One act of creation produces one thing or two of the same sort. For the creation of anything there are many phenomena in the essence of God and it is the same for destruction. These are will or the creative word "Be." Eternal power creates this will or this "Be" which, in turn, create things. Phenomena inhering in His essence are originating (intransitive), those, which do not so inhere, are originated. The Karrāmiya claimed that all intelligent men agreed with them that phenomena inhere in the essence of God.

God knows things, but not His knowledge. His word (*kalām*) is the power to speak ; the Koran is utterance (*kawl*), God does not speak by the utterance inhering in him, but by his being an utterer (*kāïliya*). God speaks when He creates sounds or words in Himself.[1]

As power to speak, the word is one ; as utterance it is many inhering in the essence of the creator. It is letters and sounds which are phenomenal or eternal. God's hearing is the power to listen. He has five powers corresponding to k, n (the consonants of *kun* = be), will, hearing, and sight. If God is to be seen He must be in front of the seer. Any name may be given to God which reason approves or His acts suggest.

The world will not come to an end. Bodies will be renewed but this is a gathering of the scattered parts not a restoration of what has ceased to exist.

The prophet and his companions accepted the twofold confession as evidence of faith. Hypocrites are believers. Hypocrites are unbelievers and will go to hell. One, who believes in God but not in the prophet, is both a believer and an unbeliever.

[1] *Arba'in*, 177.

The dead are punished without being brought back to life. A prophet ceases to be a prophet at death.[1]

Muḥammad b. Al-Haiṣum tried to make the system less ridiculous. He explained it in this way. To say that God is body means that He is self-existent ; that He is above affirms His majesty. He does not occupy space but is eternally separate from the world. Creation and destruction denote an effective will (following Koran 16, 42 : 36, 82). But the doctrine that God is a substrate for phenomena was beyond his power to correct.

He used the same words as the anthropomorphists, but in different senses.[2]

[1] Iji, 12, 22, 25, 64, 161, 270, 277 ; *Marham*, 166, 178, 244, 247. *Irshād*, 58. b. Hazm, 4, 205 ; *Rawḍa Bahiya*, 13 ; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 57, 97, 114 N., 1., for later history, see Barthold, *Turkestan*, 289.

[2] Or. 2,606 f., 163b.

CHAPTER VI

INTERLUDE

The third century of the Hijra was a time of great menta. activity, but some of the Mu'tazili theologians were second rate men, inferior to their forerunners, and did nothing for the progress of theology, playing with words and doing violence to grammar in the attempt to say something new. One or two were "extremists" who tried to introduce into Islam the transmigration of souls and doctrines borrowed from Christianity.

Hishām b. 'Amr al-Shaibāni, commonly called al-Fuwaṭi, lived in the time of al-Ma'mūn and was a pupil of al-Naẓẓām. He could not accept the theory of the "leap" so gave up his master's doctrine of substance. His teaching is now set out.

God.

God is always where He was but not in place. His movement is His making something and is not transfer from one place to another. Once He has made a thing He cannot make another like it.[1] He uses no tools; He does not revive the earth by rain, but He revives it when rain falls. He always knew Himself by an eternal knowledge, but we must not say that He always knew things because that would mean that things are eternal.

He always knew that things would be at the time they come into being.[2] It is wrong to say that He has His attributes. We must not say that God knows that He will punish a sinner, who does not repent, and will not punish one, who repents, for such statements involve a condition and God's knowledge is not conditioned. He did not create unbelievers for that would involve the making of two things, a man and his unbelief.

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 196.

[2] b. Ḥazm, 2, 127.

He cannot combine opposites; so life, knowledge and power cannot be in the same person with death. He cannot do wrong; so the question whether He can is absurd. The term *wakīl* (caretaker) may be used of God only in reading the Koran for it implies that He is only the agent of one mightier than Himself. Seeing God means more than knowing Him in the heart.

Reason.

Accidents can be known by proof, by reason. Proofs of God's being must be known, necessarily, by perception; so no accident can be a proof of God. The Koran is accidents so it cannot be a proof of God or of His apostle. Knowledge, which claims to be knowledge of the non-existent, is knowledge of something like it.

Physics.

The atom is neither moving nor at rest, neither solitary nor in combination. A body consists of six corners (*rukn*), each of six atoms; this combination forms a substrate for accidents. Al-Fuwaṭi agreed with Abu 'l-Hudhail in his list of accidents. The creation of a thing is a quality of it, not it and not something else. The atom needs entities for its origin, endurance, and renewal.[1] What has not yet come into being is not a thing; what has ceased to be is still a thing. The beginning of what can be renewed is not the thing, the beginning of what cannot be renewed is the thing itself.

God keeps the earth at rest by creating an upward strain below it.

Man.

Man is an atom which has its seat in the heart. Al-Fuwaṭi was a fervent defender of human freedom and shocked the orthodox by denying that God unites the hearts of men (Koran 8, 64); he denied that God exerts any control over men. Capacity is something other than man and endures. Will does not make the act willed inevitable. The devil does not enter men's hearts; he whispers to them and God introduces the whisper into the heart. Al-Fuwaṭi was the first to teach the doctrine of *muwāfāt*

[1] Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 42. Endurance is a *ma'nā*.

that man always is in the sight of God what he will be at death.[1]

Religion.

Faith is all good deeds which God commands or approves; there are two degrees of it: (1) faith in God (*billāhi*), the want of this is unbelief, and (2) faith about God (*lillāhi*), intentional omission of it is unbelief while the unintentional omission is wickedness. This unintentional omission may even be a venial sin. It is interpretation and not revelation which teaches men that deadly sins will be punished in hell. To be a deadly sin the refusal to pay the religious tax must be permanent; a temporary refusal is not even error.

Al-Fuwaṭi taught that heaven and hell are not yet created and in other ways was unorthodox in his views on heaven. He denied miracles; it seems that this denial was connected with his rejection of accidents as proof. He explained the "twenty men of heaven" whom Abu 'l-Hudhail required as witnesses to a fact in this way; twenty is an indefinite number and men of heaven means reliable witnesses.

If the state was righteous and at peace, an imam was necessary, but the necessity was not a religious matter.[2] In time of strife an imam cannot be appointed; this was an attack on 'Alī.[3] If there is no imam, any one can kill an apostate if he can do so safely.

Others say that al-Fuwaṭi allowed the murder of those who disagreed with him; this seems to be a slander. In his desire to glorify the Companions he declared that 'Uthmān was not besieged in his house and was killed by a few malcontents from Egypt. Ṭalḥa and al-Zubair had no intention of fighting 'Alī; the battle was begun by the common soldiers.

'Abbād b. Sulaimān al-Ṣaimari[4] was a pupil of al-Fuwaṭi and argued with b. Kullāb. Writers on theology say very little

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 58. "Some are born and live believers but die unbelievers, etc." (b. Ḥanbal, 3, 19) was held to support this view.
[2] *Iḳdām*, 481. [3] Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 271.
[4] Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, 395. Ṣaimari seems to be the correct form of the *nisba*. Ḍaimari, the form preferred by Mr. Halkin in his translation of *Farḳ bain al-Firaḳ*, is not given by al-Sam'āni. There is no point in giving all the corruptions.

about him and rightly ; the exception is al-Ash'arī who reports his views at length. His doctrine is not important, but it is given here to show what could pass for theology. His teaching was very like that of al-Fuwaṭi and some details of it have already been given under that of his master.

God.

There is no time relation between God and the world ; He is different in Himself, not by a difference and not as other things are different from men. He is not an entity (*ma'na*). The eternal always was ; this statement is true because the proposition is convertible and its two terms identical.[1] As He has no self or essence, He does not exercise His attributes through it and He does not know by knowledge. To say that God knows is to establish a name for Him and the existence of knowledge about a knowable. He always knew the knowable, things, atoms, acts, accidents, and creation ; we cannot say that He always knew creatures, bodies, and compounds, because these exist only in time. We must not say that God is a knower for the proposition is not convertible ; if it were, the consequence would be that God is the only knower.

The attribute living includes all the others, but they are distinct one from another ; knowledge is not power. We may say that the Creator always was one but not that the Creator always was for this expression implies always creating. 'Abbād also rejected the expression, God was always not creating. Predicates like knowing (participle) are names of God ; like knows (finite verb) are attributes. When the community has agreed that it is an error to deny a predicate to God, that predicate is a name of God. His names fall into three classes : (1) those given for no action as knower, powerful (essential attributes) ; (2) those given for an action as creator, provider, willing (attributes of action) ; (3) those given for the acts of others as known, object of prayer. We must not say that God was always creating, seeing ; and similarly with all attributes of action. We may say that God the seer was always. He has

[1] *fī ḥaḳīḳati 'l-ḳiyās.* Comparison of the passages where this phrase occurs shows that it means a convertible proposition.

neither hands nor feet ; these words may only be used of Him in the Koran and Tradition. Merciful (*raḥmān*) is an essential attribute. Unique (*fard*) and gentle (*laṭīf*) may not be applied to God, but " gentle to men " is allowed. God is not the speaker (*mutakallim*) he is the speaker to (*mukallim*). To say that God hears does not mean that he knows what is audible. The word of God is one, it is mental speech (*kalām nafsī*) ; it becomes many, command, statement, promise, by the coming into being of the things to which it refers.[1]

All that God does is right. There cannot be anything profitable for man which He does not do ; if there were, He would be unjust. He does not create unbelief but gives the unbeliever power not to believe. He does not create anything which we call evil or bad, like hunger or sickness ; even the pains of hell are not evil, either really or metaphorically. Pain is not bad even though there is no compensation.[2] The purpose of pain is to distinguish between natures with and without reason.[3] The question, Can God do what He knows He will not do ? is answered by quibbles which can hardly be translated.[4]

Reason.

We can argue from the seen to the unseen. The proofs of truth are the Koran, the agreement of the community, and rational arguments.

Accidents are not proofs of God. This is inconsistent as the Koran is accidents ; al-Ash'arī noticed this. Miracles may or may not be proofs of prophecy, but must not be used as such.

Physics.

There is no cause of creation. The mark of the originated is that it is made, not that it was not and then was. Things, atoms and accidents had some sort of being before they were created but this is not true of bodies. 'Abbād would neither say that a thing was the same as it was before it came into being nor that it was different. The creating of a thing is not the thing

[1] *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 6. [2] *Irshād*, 159. [3] Schreiner, *Kalam*, 30.
[4] Another statement is : What God knows will be is necessary ; what He knows will not be is impossible ; neither is in the realm of power. *Muḥaṣṣal*, 130.

but it is creation for creation means both a thing and the act of creating. An atom does not occupy space; weight is its density. A body is an atom and accidents which cannot be separated from it. Accidents cannot be seen for only bodies occupying space can be seen. "Moving" describes a body and movement but movement is not different from the thing in motion. Movement may be cessation (*zawāl*). Movement and rest are contiguities (*mumāssat*). A body may be united to two or more at the same time. A cause is always followed by its effect. Contraries are what cannot be united.

'Abbād could not decide whether a thing which had been renewed was the same as the original. Words are an essential part of the universe and there is a natural proportion between a word and its meaning; therefore, in the language of the schools, God cannot change the meaning of words.[1]

Man.

Man is human, a convertible proposition. He consists of atoms and accidents and has six senses, the sixth being sexual feeling. Capacity endures but is not a cause. The description of action is confused. The will does not make the act, which follows it, necessary. Life implies the power to act and excludes inability, which is death; but some inability exists. The power to act is particular, limited to one act or species of acts; inability is general and applies to all. A man cannot act by exhausted power when inability is present. He can refrain from a direct act but cannot stop the indirect acts which result from a direct act. 'Abbād did not allow the expression, "I use or act by power." Man can act only when power is helped by a religious motive; though this does not apply to infants, madmen, and animals. Consequently, the virtues of the wicked are sins. In the hereafter an amputated limb will be restored to its owner.[2]

Religion.

The doctrine of faith is that of Al-Fuwaṭi. The acts of one who knows not God are unbelief. A wicked man is not a believer

1 *Mīzān al-I'tidāl.* The root *ḳsm* has a stronger meaning than *fsm.*
2 *Uṣūl al-dīn,* 261.

though we may say, "He has believed." Good men know that God will recompense every sin, dividing those who committed it from those who did not. They know not what the recompense is, but the recompense knows. It is a matter of revelation. Repentance for a secondary act is possible only after it has happened. The avoidance of big does not remit the punishment of small sins unless there is repentance. The curse of God on unbelievers is justice, not advantage to them. The community cannot agree on a matter when it is divided on one like it and *vice versa*. A special statement by God can never become general nor a general become special. The office of prophet is a reward for the works of a prophet and endures as long as the world. The Koran is accidents and is not a guide to the prophet. Animals will be present at the judgment and will then be annihilated. There is no imam after 'Alī. Muslims may do all that the imam can do.

'Alī did not appoint an arbitrator and there was no battle between him and Ṭalḥa and al-Zubair. 'Abbād held peculiar views on prayer; if a prayer is interrupted for a good reason such as saving a child from drowning, the part, which has been performed, is not valid.

Abū Mūsā 'Īsā b. Ṣabīḥ, commonly called al-Murdār, was a contemporary of Abu 'l-Hudhail and a pupil of Bishr al-Mu'tamir. He was an ascetic and austere man, known as the monk of the Mu'tazila, who called all who disagreed with him infidels. Ibrāhīm al-Sindī said to him: Paradise is as wide as the heavens and the earth, but only you and three others, who agree with you, will enter it. Al-Murdār was abashed and could find no answer. On the other hand it was said that one who had gathered all virtues while yet young was the pupil of al-Murdār. His doctrine:

God.

As God is a free agent, He can do wrong,[1] but then He would be an unjust God; therefore He does nothing wrong. There are proofs that He does no wrong; did He do wrong there would be proofs of it. He wills evil in the sense that He allows it to

[1] Maḳrīzī adds: and it does not hurt His divinity.

happen. There is no end to what He has made. To the question: Can things be unknown to God, al-Murdār replied: We do not admit that He can do things contrary to Him. God cannot be seen by the eyes. Creation is not by a word.

Physics.

Creation is not the thing created; creation itself is created but not by a creation. The theory of secondary effects is the same as that of his teacher Bishr. A secondary effect is not the act of God and it may have two agents. Colours, tastes, scents, and perceptions cannot be secondary effects.

Man.

Capacity is an accident other than health and soundness of body. Two classes of men obey God; one knows Him and draws near to Him by good works, the other, not knowing Him, ponders over the evidence for His being and so arrives at knowledge of Him.

Religion.

The Koran is created; men can produce something equal to or even better than it. Those who commit great sins are in hell for ever.[1]

'Uthmān and his murderers were both wicked but his sin was not bad enough to deserve death.[2]

Abu 'l-Faḍl Ja'far b. Ḥarb († 236/850) was a pupil of Abu 'l-Hudhail in Basra and of al-Murdār and was connected with the court of al-Wāthiḳ.[3] He became a leader of the Mu'tazila in Baghdad and is called a Zaidi.[4]

God.

God is everywhere in the sense that He controls all. He hears by His attribute of hearing.[5] Being a free agent, God can do wrong, but the evidence provided by His wisdom assures us that He does not do it. " He willed unbelief to be bad and

[1] Or., 2,606 f. 152a. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 288. [3] *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 7, 163.
[4] Shahrastānī is wrong in saying that he was a disciple of al-Naẓẓām.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 2, 140.

the opposite of belief," means that He ruled it to be so. It is false to say that God was always hearing. He can do what He knew and had said that He would not do. "If what He knew could not happen, was part of something, which He would have known that He would do, then the declaration that it would happen, would have come first." He has done the best He can for men. He has such grace that it would lead unbelievers to believe of their own accord, but they would deserve a lesser reward than if they had believed without grace. Divine help (*tawfīḳ*) is not constraining grace but, if a man believes, he has it. It is said that Ja'far gave up this doctrine of grace. God will not be seen.

Reason.

Reasoned knowledge cannot become necessary. Reason gives knowledge of God, His laws and attributes, and of the punishment due to a failure to know Him, without need of revelation.[1] There may be delay in knowing God; if so, it is a time of pondering on the evidence, a religious blessing to an unbeliever.[2]

Physics.

Ja'far attacked al-Naẓẓām for rejecting the theory of atoms. His list of accidents is that of Abu 'l-Hudhail. Things inhering in bodies are called accidents, there is no religious reason against it. He had a peculiar theory on the relation of the whole to its parts. A part was quite different from the whole; his critics drew the inference that the whole was different from itself.[3]

Man.

Spirit may be an atom or an accident. Life is an accident. The soul is an accident of the body, one of its tools, like health and soundness; it has not the qualities of atoms and bodies. Capacity endures, accompanying a primary act but not a secondary. "At the moment an act happens, capacity is needed, not to do what has been done, but because an act

[1] Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 258. Cf. *Rawḍa Bahiya*, 11.
[3] *Farḳ*, 154; Cf. Taftazānī, 74.

cannot be done by a powerless, dead instrument." A present primary act cannot be done by an expired power. Capacity alone is not enough for a shut eye cannot see. One, who is prevented from acting, has the power but cannot use it. The will makes necessary what follows it immediately. The suggestions are necessary to will.

Religion.

Faith is created.[1] If infidels in a state of unbelief were to have belief instead of their unbelief, it would be good for them; we do not say that they can believe in any way while in unbelief. Some Muslim sinners are worse than unbelievers. Venial sins send men to hell for ever.

After the judgment noxious animals will be sent to hell where they will help in tormenting the wicked though they themselves take no harm.[2]

The Koran is the word of God; it is an accident created on the Tablet, it remains there and cannot be in two places at once. In the hearts of men it is a repetition (*ḥikāya*), made by men.[3]

The legal penalty for drunkenness is an error. The less excellent may be imam. 'Alī was the most excellent; 'Uthmān was innocent; his murderers were guilty; Ṭalḥa and his associates repented.

Abū Muḥammad Ja'far b. Mubashshir al-Ḳaṣabī of Baghdad was also a pupil of al-Murdār. He converted the people of 'Ana, who had been followers of Sulaimān b. Jarīr, and disputed with Bishr al-Marīsī.

After the death of al-Murdār he was the most pious of the Mu'tazila in Baghdad. His teaching was very like that of his namesake Ja'far b. Ḥarb; the records are not so full and the only peculiarities are these.

Reason.

Reason shows that God must punish those who sin against Him without knowing Him.[4] Knowledge is part of the knower.

[1] *Rawḍ-i Bahiya*, 75.

[2] In hell are scorpions with stings like palm trees. Ṭabari, *Commentary*, 14, 107 (Sura, 16, 90).

[3] b. Ḥazm, 4, 197.

[4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256.

Man.

The soul is neither body nor atom but something between the two. The will does not make the act inevitable.

Religion.

Intentional sins are great sins for they are breaches of law; small sins may be punished though the man ultimately gets a reward. A Muslim sinner is a unitarian not an infidel or idolater. Determinists and anthropomorphists are as bad as apostates. Prophets may sin by carelessness or error and are responsible for what they do in this way.[1] The eternity of punishment is known by reason. The land of Islam is a land of wickedness.

Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. 'Abdullah al-Iskāfī († 240/854) was a pupil of Ja'far b. Ḥarb and a leader of the Mu'tazila in Baghdad with leanings to the Shī'a, he is even called a Zaidī. He disputed with al-Ḥusain b. 'Alī al-Karābīsī. His doctrine:

God.

God is everywhere in the sense that He controls all. He always works through His attributes; 'He sees' means that He knows things visible. Noble (*karīm*) is both an attribute of essence and action. Creator means that He makes without using limb or tool. As God is a free agent He can do wrong,[2] but His providence shows that He does not act unjustly. He is a speaker to (*mukallim*) not a speaker (*mutakallim*) for the form *takallama* suggests incarnation. With God the act of speaking is the thing said; with man it is not so. God did not create musical instruments, wine, or pigs.[3]

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 168.

[2] There is confusion here. It is said that God can do wrong to infants and madmen but not to rational beings (Shahrastānī 41; *Farḳ*. 155). This is a libel. Al-Sam'ānī says that God cannot do wrong to infants and madmen (f. 53a). Apparently some words have dropped out. Al-Ash'arī has nothing of this; he lets al-Iskāfī say: "God can do wrong; but bodies with the intelligences in them and the blessings with which God has blessed His creation show that He does not do wrong. The intelligences alone show that God is not a doer of wrong. Wrong-doing cannot be joined with what proves that God is not the source of wrong. They asked, What about it, if he does do wrong? He said: It will be done; and bodies will be stripped of the intelligences which show by their mere existence that God does not do wrong" (p. 202). The same idea struggles for expression in *Farḳ*, 188. Without a just God the world is chaos.

[3] b. Ḥazm, 3, 53. 140; 4, 202.

Reason.

Good and bad deeds are good and bad in themselves without any cause why they should be so. Otherwise the doctrine is that of b. Ḥarb .

Physics.

A body is a compound of at least two atoms. The list of accidents is that of Abu 'l-Hudhail ; all, except combination, may inhere in one atom. Two colours but not two movements may also inhere in one atom. In the world of phenomena, enduring means lasting for two units of time ; in eternity, it means lasting for ever. Accidents, which endure, may be renewed but not those which do not endure. Fire is latent in stone and wood. The order of nature is not fixed so fire may meet wood without causing a conflagration and a stone may rest in the air without falling. A series of phenomena without a beginning is impossible, so the universe must have a beginning. An endless series means that the agent does not precede his act. If the beginning is not subject to change, i.e., if He is God, He can maintain the universe in being for ever. This argument is directed against Abu 'l-Hudhail.

Man.

Life may be in one atom ; it is not a quality but a mode of behaviour (*ḥukm*). A man cannot be alive without having some power. A primary act needs an existing power in the agent, a secondary act does not ; so capacity endures, both preceding the act and accompanying it. A secondary act may occur after the agent is dead. Cause is twofold ; a volitional cause precedes the act, a necessitating cause is with it. The act of will may be with the external act, it makes necessary the act which follows it immediately, otherwise the act happens in the third unit of time. Intended acts are primary, unintended are secondary. If a man falls into a fire, which another has lighted, he is the cause of his own pain. If a man has done one of two contraries, we must not say that he can still do it ; but he can do the opposite. A blind man cannot see ; this is inconsistent

with the belief that the order of nature is not fixed, perhaps man was held to be outside nature.

Religion.

The teaching about faith and noxious animals is that of Ja'far b. Ḥarb. The curse of God, which rests on unbelievers, and the pains of hell are good and a blessing. The word of God is a created accident; it may be in many places at once, written, spoken, or remembered. Clear verses of the Koran are those which can have only one meaning; doubtful verses may have two or more.[1] The verb *lafaẓa* must not be used of the recitation of the Koran. Some Muslim sinners are worse than *zindīḳs*. Determinism is worse than anthropomorphism; anthropomorphists like al-Najjār and Jahm know God, the determinists do not. It is unbelief to doubt that both are really unbelievers.

'Alī was the most excellent but the less excellent may be imam.[2] 'Uthmān was not a wicked man; his murderers were wicked; Ṭalḥa and his associates repented of what they had done.

'Alī al-Aswārī was at first a disciple of Abu 'l-Hudhail and later of al-Naẓẓām. Few details of his teaching are reported, presumably because there was little distinctive in it. His theology was that of al-Naẓẓām.[3]

God.

Al-Aswārī tried to reconcile the omnipotence of God with his character. God cannot do wrong or tell lies. Does his foreknowledge clash with His omnipotence? The answer is that if God has made up His mind to do a thing, it is idle to ask if He can leave it undone. A special case of the general question is whether a man can become a believer if God knows that he will not. The reply is that the man is not responsible and cannot become a believer. Two statements are separately right, on the general question, that God knows what will happen and does what He pleases, in the special case, that God has commanded men to believe and that some do not believe; and

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 222. [2] Cf. *Murūj al-dhahab*, 6, 58.
[3] *Dictionary of Technical Terms*, 661.

any attempt to combine the two is impossible. Critics said that this made God limited in His power, weaker than men, and dead matter.[1] Another form of the criticism is that God can do only one thing while man can do the thing or its opposite. Al-Aswārī tried to get away from the tyranny of words.

God cannot leave undone what is best for men, cannot punish believers or children in hell, and cannot do that which would make all men unbelievers.[2] He cannot create ignorance of Himself in an unbeliever.[3]

Man.

Life and capacity are no other than the man. Man can do either the thing he sets out to do or its opposite; he is not consistent like God.

'Alī, Ṭalḥa, and al-Zubair had no intention of fighting when they went to Basra.

Abū Bakr 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Kaisān al-Aṣamm was a judge during the reign of al-Mu'taṣim 218/833 to 227/842.[4]

Physics.

Al-Aṣamm extended the Mu'tazili doctrine that attributes cannot have an independent existence to the universe and "denied accidents." There is nothing but body, in other words, that which is broad, long, and deep. Accidents are inseparable from the body in which they inhere; movement and rest do not exist, only bodies in motion or at rest.[5] Consequently, God cannot create life or power except in a body. Another consequence was that the idea of latency was rejected; an accident cannot lie hid in a body watching an opportunity to manifest itself.

Man.

Man is one substance, body, perceptible by the senses; there

1 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 94. al-Sam'ānī, *Ansāb* f. 37a; b. Ḥazm, 2, 183. 193; 3, 102 4, 197.
2 b. Ḥazm, 3, 170. 3 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 133.
4 Mas'ūdī, *Tanbīh*, 356; Cf. *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 6, 21;
5 b. Ḥazm, 5, 56.

is no life or spirit except the body, " I do not know what spirit is." Capacity and its opposite are no more than the man himself.

Religion.

Faith is the sum of good deeds. A sinful believer is wicked ; belief in one God and good deeds save him from being an unbeliever or hypocrite. That sins will be punished is known, not by revelation or interpretation, but because good men are opposed to bad. Al-Aṣamm was orthodox on sinners and hell.[1] Angels, who have never sinned, are higher, but those, who have sinned a little, are lower than prophets.[2] The Koran is a created body.[3]

Neither reason nor revelation makes an imam necessary.[4] The consent of the community alone makes an imam. If Muslims can restrain themselves from evil, they need no imam.[5] If there is no imam, a sufficient number of Muslims may enforce the law. A just imam may take the sword to destroy evil men ; otherwise the sword should not be used in " commanding the right."

If 'Alī was self-seeking, he was wrong ; if he sought the public good, he was right. Mu'āwiya was imam by agreement, 'Alī was not. 'Alī, Ṭalḥa, and al-Zubair were wrong in fighting ; those who held aloof were right.[6]

Muḥammad b. Shabīb was a pupil of al-Naẓẓām[7] and belonged to the Murji'a as much as to the Mu'tazila ; beyond this nothing is known of his life. It seems that he prided himself on speaking a language which all could understand.

God.

God can do wrong, as an abstract possibility, but as wrongdoing implies a defect in the doer, he does not in fact do wrong. There is no sense in asking, What if He were to do wrong ? Muḥammad gave this illustration as an explanation. Were God to say that only a donkey can enter this house, and a man

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 45. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 295. [3] Shahrastānī, 53.
[4] b. Khaldūn, *Muḳaddima*, 3, 26. [5] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 271.
[6] *Firaḳ al-Shī'a*, 15; Cf. b. Ḥazm, 4, 153; Arnold, 32. [7] Shahrastānī, 41.

could enter it, that would not mean that the man could become an ass.

Physics.

Movement and rest are modes of being and do not endure. Tension in the first place becomes motion to the second; the mode in the second may be rest or motion; if motion it involves transfer to the third place. Movements cannot be renewed. Enduring has no separate existence. Destruction is an accident originating in a body which is then destroyed in the second time; it is not called destruction till the second time.[1]

Man.

Capacity is in man before the act.[2]

Religion.

Faith is knowledge and confession of God, His prophets, and all the community has agreed on, the five pillars of religion. It includes humility; pride destroyed the faith of the devil. Works are not so important as faith.[3] There are degrees in faith; any part of it is a virtue but the omission of any one part is unbelief, he who believes in God but not in the prophet is an infidel.[4] Error in matters of uncertainty is not unbelief. Sin does not destroy faith; a Muslim (Mu'tazili) sinner is still a believer though wicked. Sinners may be sent to hell, for a time or for ever.[5] God can pardon great sins without previous repentance. The same good deed must always get the same reward, the same sin the same punishment. God cannot punish one sin and forgive a worse.

Certain verses of the Koran are clear proofs; there is no need to search for their meaning, the truth is at once evident. Such are the histories of earlier peoples. Ambiguous verses, like those which tell of the resurrection and judgment, can only be understood after reflection.

Abu 'l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. Muslim al-Ṣāliḥī was both a Murji' and a Ḳ*adari*[6] and took part in disputations with al-Khayyāṭ.

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 87. 231.
[2] b. Ḥazm, 3, 22.
[3] Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 242.
[4] al-Sam'ānī, *Ansāb*, s.v.
[5] Shahrastānī, 105.
[6] Shahrastānī, 104.

God.

Al-Ṣāliḥī "denied the attributes" but the statement that God knows is more than a denial of His ignorance. He knows but not as others know, is capable but not as others, is a thing but not like other things, and all these statements mean the same; that is, the attributes are interchangeable (modalism) though His qualities are peculiar to Himself. He always knew objects of knowledge and compounds in the sense that He knew they would be at the time of their being created; things were not known before they were created. His eternity is expressed by the ungrammatical and untranslatable phrase *ḳablu 'l-'ashyā* (an adverb is made to govern a noun); this is an attempt to say that eternity and time are not commensurate. He cannot combine contraries, can speak through another and be silent through another, and can change the meaning of words.

Reason.

Knowledge is necessary. Man's knowledge of God is one, for He cannot be known by two kinds (acts) of knowledge; one, who knows Him at all, cannot at the same time be ignorant of Him. All else, eternal or phenomenal, can be both known and unknown. Knowledge that a body exists becomes knowledge that it is originated when men know the originator, not by something other than knowledge. This is explained by an illustration from family life; a man becomes a brother by getting one, not by getting a relationship. Only things which exist can be known. Only those who know God are responsible.[1] What seems to be knowledge of the non-existent is really knowledge of something like it.

Physics.

Atoms are bodies and cannot be anything else. All accidents inhere in atoms, the exception is combination, and even that can inhere potentially; an atom may be without accidents and later they may inhere in it.[2] Bodies are not seen, only the accident, colour. The non-existent has no kind of reality

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 155. [2] Cf. *Ansāb*, 348a.

it is not a thing. Lifeless matter might have been the only thing to be created.[1] Weight and lightness are not the same as light and heavy objects. The order of nature is not fixed. Contraries cannot be united, so life and death cannot co-exist in one person. If two accidents can be joined, their contraries can also be joined; as ignorance and weakness are found joined with life, so knowledge and power can be joined with death. Therefore, dead things and lifeless matter may show knowledge and power. Critics objected that this left no proof that God is alive.

Man.

Man is an atom situated in the heart and this atom is the substrate for all accidents. God has given man the power to make accidents including life and death, but not bodies. Before an act, capacity is the power to do it or to leave it undone; at the time of acting, it is the power to do it and even at the time of not doing it, it remains power to do it; an act is not done by power which has ceased to be. So capacity is before and with the act.[2] Man cannot produce secondary effects. Following up his argument on contraries al-Ṣāliḥī said that sight was consistent with blindness and that there might be perfect sight, no obstacles, and yet no vision. The face sends out rays which are reflected from the mirror.

Religion.

Faith is knowledge and unbelief is ignorance.[3] Faith does not increase or decrease and is one undivided quality; so is unbelief. Knowledge of God is love of and submission to Him. Belief in God does not involve belief in the prophet. Belief in the Trinity is not unbelief but can be only in an unbeliever.[4] Prayer is not worship because faith is the only worship. God can pardon sins without repentance. Only those who know

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 152. This is not the ordinary Mu'tazili doctrine.
[2] In al-Ash'arī's statement the word capacity is used in the title of the section, but in the paragraph on al-Ṣāliḥī the word power is used; 233.
[3] Faith is acceptance of the prophet's message, partly in general and partly in detail, Iji, 275.
[4] Shahrastānī, 107.

God are responsible to Him.[1] The dead are punished in the grave without being brought back to life.[2] Reason and revelation show that an imam is necessary.[3]

Abū 'Uthmān 'Amr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ († 255/869) was a client of the tribe Kināna, was for a time at least in government service, and suffered for his attachment to Ibn al-Zayyāt († 233/847). He was a disciple of al-Naẓẓām and wrote books which roused the scorn of strict Muslims. Two sayings show what men thought of him, "I trust his wit but not his religion," and, "I think his manner of prayer is to omit it." He was a man of letters rather than a theologian, while his interests were largely with students of natural philosophy. In his view the wise man would combine religion with philosophy for the one completed the other; the wisdom of God was displayed even in despised objects of creation. He was fair-minded and could applaud the Khawārij for their dislike of falsehood, contrasting it with the readiness of advanced Shī'a to lie to their enemies.[4] He was a worthy pupil of his master, quoting with approval the words, "Fifty doubts are better than one truth," and "Truth is the lost camel of all who are cut off from it by perplexity and he who finds his lost camel rejoices in it."[5]

God.

God is neither body nor form and cannot be seen with the eyes. He is righteous, does no wrong, and does not will sins. Strictly speaking God has no will; it is convenient to speak of His will, but it would be more exact to say that there is no carelessness in His acting and He knows all which is involved in it, besides He is under no compulsion from without. He cannot omit doing the best for men; if He does not do that best, He will do something equivalent and can go on doing this to infinity. He cannot punish good Muslims and children and cast them into hell fire.

Reason.

Knowledge is necessary and comes by processes of nature. Experience and the truths taught by prophets help reason to

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 155. [2] Ījī, 270. [3] Ījī, 297.
[4] *Intiṣār*, 141. [5] *Ḥayawān*, 2, 48. 6, 11.

grow.[1] All thinking men must know that they have a creator and till they know Him they cannot obey His commands. Man becomes a responsible agent by natural development so there is no point in saying that God makes him one. Al-Jāḥiẓ rejected the view of Hishām b. al-Ḥakam that accidents give no knowledge of God; everything points to Him, "a mountain is not a better guide to God than a pebble."[2] Experience, which will lead to God, can only occur in a world compounded of good and evil.[3]

In other words; man is a rational being in a rational world; the exercise of his reason on his surroundings makes him conclude that this world of change has its origin in a creator, who is the source of reason, and conscience tells him that this creator is righteous. "Men need nature, then knowledge, then justice."[4] Till man has reached these conclusions he is not a moral agent, carrying the law within himself. Except for the intrusion of the prophets the process lies wholly inside nature; we should call it deism. A report is true when it agrees with the facts and there is belief in this agreement.[5]

Physics.

Bodies are originated, they cannot be destroyed but change from one state to another by change of accidents.[6] Another statement is that bodies may be divided into their parts which, it may be presumed, then unite in other combinations.[7] Bodies have natures with activities peculiar to them. They act by nature; that is, they produce the accidents in them, which are not the direct work of God.[8]

Man.

The substance of the percipient is not differentiated; it is the soul which perceives through the openings in the body. The senses are all of the same kind; the difference between them is due to the various objects perceived by them and to the obstacles to perception. Things perceived by the senses are of

[1] *Rasā'il* (ed. Sandūbī), 125. [2] *Ḥayawān*, 3, 92. [3] *Ḥayawān*, 3, 93.
[4] *Ḥayawān*, 4, 69. [5] D.T.T., 848. [6] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 66, 87, 230.
[7] b. Ḥazm 4, 195. [8] b. Ḥazm, 3, 58.

three kinds, incongruous, congruous, and opposites. Will is knowledge and absence of neglect. One account makes out that al-Jāḥiẓ denied that will was an accident and denied its existence. Will to a man's own act was absence of neglect, to the act of another man an inclination to it. The only act of man is will; all else follows by nature or is the work of God. The phrase used depends on the theology of the writer who sets forth al-Jāḥiẓ' view.[1] An extreme statement is that acts are ascribed to man though they proceed from nature.[2] The pains of infants are the work of nature[3]; this is directed against the doctrine of compensation. It is men who produce their own good and evil deeds. The soul leads men astray from the truth.[4]

Religion.

Faith is of two grades; there is the faith of the philosopher who can defend his belief in one God with arguments and that of the plain man who believes simply in God and His prophet. This latter is saving faith. An unbeliever, meaning one troubled by doubt, is something between a rebel against God and a gnostic (*'ārif*).[5]

The Koran is a body. The statement that it might turn into a man or a woman is a malicious deduction drawn by enemies.[6] Al-Jāḥiẓ sympathised with those who explained away the "balance" because a literal interpretation made the judgment too material.[7]

Prophets are needed. A prophet can commit venial but not degrading sins; he must become aware of them and avoid them after once committing them.[8] The character of Muḥammad was one proof of his mission.[9]

Eternal punishment is only for obstinate unbelievers, not for those who tried to believe but found no proofs of faith.[10] God does not send sinners into the fire; it draws its people to itself and holds them by nature.[11] Men do not remain in the fire for ever but turn into its nature.[12]

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 84. [2] *Durar wal-ghurar*, 39b. [3] b. Ḥazm, 3, 120.
[4] b. Ḥazm, 3, 49. [5] *Durar wal-ghurar*, 39b.
[6] *Rivista di Studi Orientali*, 7, 426. [7] *Rasā'il*, 150.
[8] Ījī, 200. [9] Ījī, 214. *Rasā'il*, 146. [10] Ījī, 261, 284.
[11] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 239, 336. [12] Maḳrīzī, 2, 348.

Reason and revelation show that an imam is necessary[1] and he must be the most excellent. If homage has been done to the less excellent for a poor reason such as the sickness or absence of the most excellent, then that homage is not valid.[2]

It is said that al-Jāḥiẓ thought highly of 'Alī[3] and it is also said that he accepted Wāṣil's judgement that either 'Alī or Ṭalḥa was in the wrong.[4]

Abu 'l-Ḥusain Aḥmad b. Yaḥya, called b. al-Rawandī († 298/910), was once a Mu'tazili but was cast off by them and is said to have forsaken religion. It is not certain that all the ideas ascribed to him belong to his Mu'tazili period. He was more learned than wise.

God.

God's knowledge is originated; He did not know till He created His knowledge. "God always knew" means that He knew that things would be before they came to be. Similarly, His power arranged them before they were.

Reason.

Prophets either confirm the conclusions of reason or contradict them; in either case they are useless. A thing cannot be known under one aspect by two acts of knowledge. Impossible groups of words are nonsense.

Physics.

Body is eternal; there is an unending series of phenomena in the world. The non-existent is not a thing. "Before a thing exists, it cannot be described by what pertains to itself." The argument is that a knowable can be known before it is, an act commanded before it is done, therefore a relation exists first. In the same way a thing can be defined by its relations before it is but not by its own qualities. Movement is a name for two modes in two places; perhaps movement in the first and rest in the second. The earth is at rest; it descends but under it is an ascending body and the result is equilibrium.[5]

[1] Iji, 297. [2] Māwardi, 5. Cf. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 292. [3] *Intiṣār*, 155.
[4] *Farḳ*, 101. [5] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 62.

Man.

The real man is an atom in the heart, something other than the spirit which inhabits the body. Power is the capacity to do or not to do. Inability is particular not general, is limited to one act. God gives motives to help a man to do what he dislikes. If the devil gives motives to sin, God gives others to overcome them. A violent death, if primary, is the work of the murderer; if secondary, it is due to the contrary of the spirit.

Religion.

The teaching about faith is that of the Murji'a, al-Marīsī, or al-Ash'arī.[1] Unbelief is denial. Works of supererogation are not commanded by God.[2] The nature of the command, whether categorical or hortatory, is known from the context.[3] Worship of the sun is not unbelief but a sign of it. Wicked Muslims are not in hell for ever. Revelation alone shows that reward is merited.

The Koran is an entity and an individual, neither body nor accident. There are solecisms and contradictions in it.

Abu 'l-'Abbās 'Abdullah b. Muḥammad al-Nāshī, called b. Shirshīr, († 293/906) was a grammarian, prosodist, and theologian; "his skill as a logician was so great, that he could overturn any proofs alleged by grammarians in favour of their theories." Al-Ash'arī wrote a book against his doctrine of names and attributes.[4]

God.

God has attributes really, man has them tropically; God is really a thing, man is a thing only by a trope or he is made a thing (*mushayya'*). Another way of saying this is that thing means the eternal but is used tropically for the contingent.[5] Al-Nāshī did not accept the argument from design, that the world shows signs of God's wisdom, because man's acts show some signs of wisdom. If God knows that He will not do something, He cannot do it; He does not mislead men[6]; He does not originate man's acquisition or act.

[1] Shahrastānī, 107; *Farḳ*, 193; Ījī, 275. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 199.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 210. [4] *Tabyīn kadhib*, 129.
[5] Taftazānī (margin 2), 17. [6] b. Ḥazm, 3, 47; 4, 194.

Religion.

Muslim sinners may go to hell and then be released from it.[1] The same reward or punishment must be given to all who do the same good acts or sins; Yūnus had taught this. A prophet is really truthful, only by a trope can he be said to act.

The Sālimiya were not Mu'tazila but were sufficiently like them to be noticed beside them. Through two men, father and son who were both called b. Sālim, they were disciples of Sahl al-Tustari († 283/896) and were as much mystics as theologians. They tried to rise above a materialist conception of God; He is always creating and is everywhere consequently His voice is heard in every reading of the Koran and, similarly, Gabriel came to Muḥammad without leaving his place in heaven. The unity of God is safeguarded by saying that what He perceives by His whole being He perceives by one attribute. His will (*mashī'a*) is one like His knowledge and uncreated; for every object willed (*murād*) there is an act of will (*irāda*), a doctrine taught by some of the Karrāmiya. The certainty of revealed, or perhaps intuitive, knowledge is opposed to the promptings of reason and the results of argument.[2]

God wills that man should do right and not wrong; He wills sins in His organism not by His agency. At the resurrection all creatures will see God as their nature allows them. In the grave believers eat, drink, and are married for this is the only bliss they know. The devil did not persist in his disobedience; this may be a hint that the Sālimiya did not believe in the eternity of evil and hell. Faith is a name of God, a deduction from Koran 5, 7 "who do not believe in *īmān*."

God is a mystery; this seems to be the meaning of two utterances which may be variants of one. "God has a secret, were it revealed providence would be abolished," and, "deity has a secret, were it revealed prophecy would be abolished."[3]

Some of the exponents of the young theology fell under the attraction of foreign ideas and strange mixtures resulted. Two disciples of al-Naẓẓām broke away from monotheism under the influence of dualist and Christian ideas; they were Aḥmad b.

[1] b. Ḥazm, 4, 45. [2] *Ḳūt al-ḳulūb*, I, 129.
[3] *Ghunya*, 179; Massignon, *Essai*. 268.

Ḥāīṭ and al-Faḍl al-Ḥadathī.[1] They belonged to Basra and Aḥmad died during the reign of Al-Wāthiḳ. It may be assumed that they taught the same doctrine.

Aḥmad followed al-Naẓẓām in denying the existence of atoms, in the doctrine of the leap, and in asserting that God cannot add to the blessedness of heaven or the misery of hell.

Dualism and transmigration are the root ideas in this system. The universe has two lords, one eternal who is God, and one created who is Jesus. Jesus is the son of God by adoption not by birth and may cease to be. They are both creators, but it was Jesus who created Adam in His image and will hold the judgment at the last day. Jesus was identified with the first reason and it is He who will be seen for the sight of God is the seeing of the first reason. To Him, God said, " I have not created anything fairer than you." Jesus was reason before He clothed Himself in a human body.

God created all the souls of men at once and set them in a world of bliss ; He offered them the chance of deserving reward ; some refused and stayed where they were, but others accepted and were moved into this world. The ordinary doctrine of transmigration is developed though one version says that sinners are punished by passing into the bodies of children as well as of animals. In this connection, Aḥmad used al-Naẓẓām's idea that the spirit of all animals is one, extending it to say that every kind of animal has its apostle. The spirit was created before the body which is only a mould for it. Aḥmad taught that the worlds were five, that where the spirits were in the beginning, two heavens in the higher of which is no eating and drinking, this world of trial, and hell. The thoroughly bad go to hell, the thoroughly good go to heaven and become angels. Neither the soul nor the universe has an end.

These men criticised Muḥammad for his many marriages and said that Abū Dharr was a greater ascetic than he. The Mu'tazila expelled them from their society.

Transmigration appeared in different forms in the teaching

[1] b. Ḥazm, 1, 78. 91 ; 3, 120 = Or. 843 f. 235b ; 4, 197. For variants in the names, see Friedlaender. The name of Aḥmad is usually associated with transmigration but Ījī, 340 gives this doctrine to al-Faḍl.

of others. Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Banūsh[1] taught that God created the universe all at once; He created monads, alive, intelligent, equal, and gave them the choice of staying as they were or of earning the right to something better. Some rose to be men, others sank to be animals. These again sank as low as possible and then began again from the starting point. The animal form was a punishment. Animals were not responsible; kings and prophets also were not responsible, forming the world of recompense.

Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ḳaḥṭabi thought that the newly created beings asked for the honour of being tested; some accepted the trial and some did not.[2]

Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Shalmaghānī, Ibn Abī 'Udhākira (executed 322/934), claimed to be the Holy Spirit, the supreme truth, lord, God, the eternal, the manifest and the concealed, the quintessence of all ideas; he called himself Messiah because the Jews called their God Messiah. He taught that God dwells in everything as it can contain him. He created the contrary to define its opposite (cf. al-Sharī'ī), thus he was revealed in Adam and his devil, each of whom points to his opposite by the mutual opposition in idea. The proof of truth is higher in rank than the truth; the contrary is nearer to a thing than what is like it. When God dwells in the temple of a human (*nasūtī*) body, by miraculous power he manifests that he is God. After the death of Adam, the godhead showed itself in five successive men and their devils, who were their contraries. This process was repeated; the godhead appeared in Idrīs and his devil, Nūḥ and his devil, Ṣāliḥ and his, Ibrāhīm and his, Hārūn and Fir'awn, Dāūd and Jālūt, Sulaimān and his devil, 'Īsā and his devil, and 'Alī and his. In the intervals, the godhead was divided, always among five, except when it was divided among the disciples of 'Īsā.[3] Finally, it was united in Ibn Abī 'Udhākira.

[1] b. Ḥazm, 1, 90; Shahrastānī, 43; *Farḳ*, 258. The name is quite uncertain.

[2] *Farḳ*, 259.

[3] This is confused. The godhead is united in the pairs named and is divided in the intervals. The disciples of 'Īsā are the only bearers of the divided godhead who exist at the same time; in the other periods the bearers are successive.

God shows Himself in everything in every aspect (*ma'nā*) and is in everyone in the thoughts of his mind so that the unseen becomes to Him as the seen.

The community was arranged in grades, each being lord of the one below it. As usual, this doctrine was accused of being antinomian. Everyone, who is master of his soul, knows and sees the truth, is an angel. Their knowledge is paradise, departure from the doctrine is hell. They taught transmigration and allowed community of women. One who did not permit this would be a woman in his next incarnation. The higher in rank had to practise sodomy with the lower to introduce into him the light.

One, in whom the godhead is united, cannot be a father or a son; so Ḥasan and Ḥusain are not sons of 'Alī, Mūsā and Muḥammad betrayed Hārūn and 'Alī; they are the two traitors (cf. *al-Dhammiya*). 'Alī allowed Muḥammad the years of the seven sleepers, 350 (!) and then the Muslim law will be overthrown.[1]

[1] Yāḳūt *Biog. Dict.*, 1, 301. Abu 'l-Fidā year 322; B. Ḥazm, 4, 187 : 5, 117 (Or. 843 f. 94, 207b).

CHAPTER VII

SECOND STAGE

Abū Ya'ḳūb Yūsuf al-Shaḥḥām was the youngest disciple of Abu 'l-Hudhail, had some connection with Ma'mar, was employed by the kadi Ibn abī Dāūd in the reign of al-Wāthiḳ, and was the teacher of al-Jubbāī. His doctrines were usually those of his master; his own contributions are now set down.

Doctrine of God.

The attributes are of three sorts: (1) of essence, (2) of action, and (3) those which, under different aspects, belonged to both the two former classes. Thus noble, when it describes God's character, is an essential attribute, but when it means that He is a great giver, it is an attribute of action. Attributes of action are not eternal.

Al-Shaḥḥām is notorious for being the first to teach that the non-existent has a sort of reality, in the language of the schools, that the non-existent is a thing. Before a thing is created it has individuality and qualities. So God knows everything which He can create as it will be when He has created it; He also knows bodies, substances, and accidents which have not been and never will be created. At the moment of creation a body has all its characteristics but a man is not a believer nor an unbeliever. This is an attack on the tradition. A man is blessed or wretched in his mother's womb. No Mu'tazili could admit that faith and unbelief, the work of a man's own soul, could exist at the time of creation, much less before it.

As the non-existent has qualities, creation is the giving of being to these qualities.[1]

[1] Rāzī, *Arba'in*, 69.

Doctrine of Man.

Here also is an innovation; al-Shaḥḥām broke away from the axiom that an act can have only one agent. God can do what he has put it into man's power to do; therefore an act can have two agents. This does not mean that God and man act as partners. If God does the act, it is necessary; if man does it, it is acquired. In other words, God does the act and man acquires it. This is the account given by al-Ash'arī though 'Abd al-Ḳāhir denies it to al-Shaḥḥām and calls it the doctrine of the Ṣifātīya.

Any act, which follows immediately on the will, is made necessary by it.

Abū 'Alī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbāī (born 235/850, died 303/915) was a pupil of al-Shaḥḥām and the teacher of al-Ash'arī; he was the head of the Basra Mu'tazila and had a big following in Khuzistan. He had no special knowledge of letters,[1] was no debater, and would ask al-Ash'arī to answer for him. The anecdotes told about the two suggest that the disciple enjoyed pulling his master's leg. Al-Jubbāī once said that whoever does the will of another obeys Him. Al-Ash'arī said that in that case God obeys a man when doing for him what he desires; al-Jubbāī agreed and accepted this definition into his system. Consequently we do not expect to find it a closely knit piece of reasoning.

God.

The essence of God is like other essences in its real nature, but is distinguished from them by being necessary, by having life, perfect knowledge, and perfect power.[2] He is everywhere in the sense that He controls all. It is convenient to call Him a thing, though He is other than things. He is not seen with the eyes. The attributes give information about Him; to say that He knows tells us that He is not ignorant. Eternity is his most peculiar characteristic; one account makes it an attribute, another makes it the object described by attributes. One report says that the attributes tell that God is alive without

[1] Yāḳūt, *Geog. Dict.*, 2, 13.

[2] Ījī, 10.

defect ; another makes them the shadow cast on eternity by time, we say that God hears and sees because things seen are other than those heard. It is said that " seeing and hearing " mean knowing things visible and audible, but this is denied. The attributes are of two kinds, of essence and action ; some like ' generous ' belong to both classes. ' Perfect ' may not be said of God, apparently because it is not used in the Koran. His hand is his kindness. He knows through Himself (*linafsihi*) ; which drew the criticism that He is determined by Himself. He always knew things, both substances and accidents, before they were created ; before creation we ought not to call them things, but it is convenient to do so. God acts by His essence. Speaking of attributes of action al-Jubbāī was careful of language. We may say that God was always seeing (adjective) in Eternity, but He was not seeing (finite verb or participle) as there was nothing to see ; He only began to use sight after creation. Therefore He was not always seeing (finite verb or participle) and so we may say that He was not always doing good or evil ; here al-Jubbāī was carried away by words. The question beloved of sophists, " Can God do what He has said He will not do ? " is empty words with no meaning behind them. He does not cause secondary acts ; the wind does not cause the sea to be rough, His creative power is not exhausted.

The will is an attribute ; it is phenomenal acts of will which are not in a substrate (Logos doctrine) ; God also creates a glory, which is not in a substrate, whereby He glorifies Himself.[1] The will is like man's will but is not desire ; it is not command, judgment, nor affirmation ; is with the thing willed. The will that a thing should be is not the thing and not the creation of it ; God cannot say to a thing ' Be.' His command is formed of three acts of will, will for the origination of the act, will that there should be a command, and will for the act commanded by it. God does not command allowable acts and sins. He creates death, conception, and makes women pregnant. A name for Him may be derived from any of His activities. When He gave men power to do certain things, He retained that power for Himself.[2] He cannot give them power to make colour, taste,

[1] *Guide des Egarés*, 1, 286.

[2] Iji, 44, 292 says the contrary.

smell, heat, and cold. 'Speaker' as applied to God means that he is the giver of speech. As one attribute cannot be qualified by another, we ought not to ask whether the attributes are eternal or created.

Later writers ascribe to al-Jubbāī or to his followers a more abstruse doctrine. The attribute of knowingness (*'ālimiya*) is additional to the essence and is due to knowledge which is not additional.[1] Will and unwill (to coin a word) are originated in a substrate but willingness (*irādiya*) and unwillingness (*kirāhiya*) are originated in the essence.[2] God does not will by His essence.

Al-Jubbāī was careful not to use of God any word, which meant knowledge, but implied previous deliberation or doubt. 'Above' as applied to God has a metaphorical sense only. "Light of the heavens and the earth" means that He is the guide of those who dwell therein. A wise God must reward the good and punish the wicked; critics complained that al-Jubbāī often said "God must," thus limiting His power. God may pardon a sin in one and punish it in another; al-Jubbāī was the only one to teach this. There was nothing to prevent God from creating men in heaven and giving them knowledge of Himself as a necessary part of their being, instead of imposing it on them as a duty.

Reason

Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is and is real knowledge when it is consistent with itself. It may be in the dead or in inanimate objects. It is necessary or acquired (reasoned); acquired need not have a basis in necessary knowledge. Knowledge of God, which is based on argument, is not necessary; this was not the view of Abu 'l-Hudhail.[3] That based on a general report is necessary. In itself it is neither good nor bad; its object determines its moral quality, so reasoning may be evil (the later view). One act of knowing may be joined to two knowables; the syllogism gives knowledge. A thing may be known under one aspect, unknown under another; it

[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 132 and N. 1.
[2] Ījī, 25. Similar ideas are ascribed to the followers of b. Karrām. Shahrastāni, 82.
[3] *Arba'īn*, 89.

cannot be both affirmed and denied, for denial involves not-being and what is affirmed cannot be denied under any aspect. Man cannot cause perception in himself and neither perception nor knowledge in another. Opinion is not a kind of belief; doubt is an entity and at the beginning of obligation it is justified; inattention (*sahw*) is an entity, not under man's control, and is a contrary of knowledge. So long as reason lasts, obligation lasts; man can arrive at the knowledge of God and of right and wrong by reason. The first thing for a man to know is that he did not create himself; it is his duty to know God, for it is a sin not to know Him. The institutions of religion and the eternity of punishment are known by revelation only. A prophet can only confirm truths known by reason.[1]

Physics.[2]

All that can be predicated of what is, except existence, can be predicated of what has not yet come into being; practically, the non-existent is a thing. God will create an annihilation, which is not in a substrate, and by it will destroy all atoms for he cannot destroy some only; revelation and reason show this. Annihilation is an accident opposed to bodies. The atom is not body, but is a substrate for accidents and may have the two modes of existence and any of the other accidents. All are of the same stuff and a group of eight make a body.[3] They differ individually not essentially; this seems to mean that they differ by their accidents. Movement and rest, which are the only modes of being, are of the same sort and inhere in bodies. The earlier opinion was that body and mode were perceived together, the later that mode was perceived by touch. Movement and primary rest do not endure; movement may produce rest or secondary movement, rest produces nothing. Movements are of different kinds (rests also); they differ in speed by the number of rests in them. Movement occurs in a body in the second unit of time and there are as many movements as parts in the moving body. When a substrate moves,

[1] Ijī, 182.
[2] Much of the physical theory is omitted as it has no bearing on theology.
[3] Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, p. 315 implies six.

the body in it moves, though the movement need not be transfer (i.e., circular movement). The atom cannot be without accidents and these cannot change into bodies. One accident of combination inheres in two atoms. An accident may be in many places at once; this was a consequence of the doctrine of the Koran. Some are not in man's power.[1] Some, such as colour, power, life, may endure but not by the addition of the entity of endurance. Movement and the accidents, which a man causes in himself, do not endure; rest endures in inanimate, but not in animate things. Only those accidents, which endure, can be renewed; those things, the nature of which men know or the like of which they can do, cannot be renewed. Bodies and colours are perceived by sight, and bodies but not accidents by touch. There is no order of nature; fire may be in cotton and not burn it. The act of creation is created; at creation all was at rest. One unit of work needs one unit of power. There cannot be two creators to one thing. It is the agent not the cause which makes the effect necessary. An act has two causes, one before it in the previous unit of time, and one with it. Endurance and destruction do not need entities of endurance and annihilation; when black succeeds white in a body, it is the annihilation of the white. Weight and lightness are inseparable from the heavy and the light thing; a body grows heavier by the addition of parts. A shadow is not an entity; it is only that one thing hides another. Time is when a thing happens; times are the movements of the sphere of the sky for God made them times. The earth is flat, the knowledge that it is at rest is necessary. The prevention of a thing is also the prevention of its contrary.

Man.

Life is an accident; it needs an organism but does not need spirit which is a body though perhaps without accidents. Life is not individual so the life of one may be the life of another. The senses are different in kind and accidents in the percipient; life without perception is impossible. The perception of an object

[1] They are destruction, colour, taste, smell, heat, cold, moisture, dryness, life, power, desire, and dislike. Cf. Abu 'l-Hudhail.

is not the object ; a rejection of the idea of Ḍirār that there is no sweetness in honey till it is eaten. Sight cannot be combined with blindness. Capacity is before the act, is more than bodily health and soundness, and requires a more developed organism than does life ; incapacity is an entity contrary to capacity. Man wills his will ; al-Jubbāī was alone in thinking this and it was his later opinion. Acts may occur when the power to do them is exhausted. Man must be doing or not doing. Secondary acts must follow on the primary, which are the causes of them, but they may occur without the primary. Though an act is willed the man may be prevented from performing it. Man is the author of his acts, he creates them ; al-Jubbāī saw that 'create,' which was commonly used for the acts of God, meant no more than other words, which had been used of men. Therefore God cannot create faith, righteousness, or their opposites in man. Man cannot cause pleasure which is of a different order from pain. The stilling of hunger and thirst are entities and are caused by God. Sleep is in a class by itself. Reason and revelation show that death is something positive,[1] an entity caused by God.

Man has only one appointed time ; even if it is twenty years hence, it is his time and there is no other, except hypothetically. The suggestions (promptings to good and evil) are accidents. Speech is something other than sound and endures. Another view is recorded that it is sound cut into words and does not endure. One word or words without meaning and written or remembered words are speech. This is close to the orthodox doctrine of mental speech.

Religion.

Every quality approved by God, except works of supererogation, is part of faith. It is also said that hearsay faith does not make a believer ; here faith evidently means knowledge. Blasphemy by a child is a lie but not unbelief. Man is not responsible till he knows that there is a creator who will punish the creature's neglect of him. As God has made men responsible,

[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 68, N. 2.

he must give them reason and knowledge, power and capacity; and as He has put evil passions in them, He must give them motives to follow the right and avoid evil. Had He not given them reason and revelation, He would have had no obligations towards them; obviously He has none towards children and madmen. He can make men adult (moral agents) by other roads than the usual way of experience. All responsibilities imposed on men may be regarded as forms of grace. In the narrower sense, grace does not precede obligation though it may precede the special act it helps by one unit of time; God gives grace and then demands faith. Al-Jubbāī hinted at the doctrine of grace taught by Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir but did not accept it.[1] Grace is given as a help to faith; given to an unbeliever, he is helped to believe in the second unit of time. The wealth of God is not diminished by giving and is not increased by hoarding. He has done, and cannot help doing, what is most profitable for men; if he failed to do this He would be imperfect. If a man is helped by grace to believe, he does not deserve so great a reward as one who believes without that aid; therefore God should give grace to all and reward them as if they had not received it. God can inflict undeserved pain if He gives compensation; this compensation is one example of God's bounty, it is peculiar in being deserved. He can give it to one who has been wronged though He does not compensate the wrongdoer for the evil he did. Compensation to an animal will be for the fact that another was allowed to hurt it, not for the actual hurt. Reward differs from mere bounty because given in larger measure and bringing greater glory to the recipient.

Good may produce evil and evil good, but evil remains evil in spite of any profit that may come from it. Grace may be unpleasant, like bitter medicine. The pains of hell are neither good nor bad for good is blessing and evil is futility so punishment in hell is not profitable, merciful, or wicked, but righteousness and wisdom. Inaction cannot merit praise or blame; yet religious sins, like the omission of prayer, are bad because they are the omission of good acts. Reason shows that merit and demerit cannot be equal. 'Guidance' is guidance, not

[1] b. Ḥazm, 3, 165.

merely the statement that a man is on the right road. If a man goes wrong at the beginning of a chain of reasoning, he is responsible only for the first error; subsequent mistakes are outside his control. If God has promised to forgive a sin in one, he should not punish it in another.

Without repentance a great sin takes the sinner to hell and venial sins add up to a great sin. The theft of five dirhams is wickedness; the purpose to steal one-third of that sum, with the resolve to do so, and the actual theft make up the theft of five. Repentance for a single sin is not accepted.[1] Good works are weighed against bad and the result decides reward or punishment.[2] Punishment is profitable to the sinner in the sphere of religion. Deeds have no quality in themselves; circumstances and connections make them good or bad.[3] Fear excuses the profession of a false religion. There is no certainty of salvation. Determinists and anthropomorphists are in the same position as apostates. The punishment in the grave is real; the time of it is not known. Munkar and Nakīr are not angels; Munkar is the stumbling speech of the infidel at the judgment and Nakīr is the scourging by angels.[4] It is not certain that the 'bridge' exists.[5] Heaven and hell are already created.[6] Devils are weaker than men. Al-Jubbāī did not accept the traditions about al-Dajjāl.[7] The office of prophet need not be a reward for good works; the function of a prophet might have been discharged in some other way. A prophet may commit venial sins through error and carelessness, but after his call he is sinless.

It is wrong to recognise the authority of wicked men.

Five are needed to choose the imam who must be from Ḳuraish.[8] Al-Jubbāī also taught the Zaidi doctrine that a man, presumably of Ḳuraish, could become imam by claiming the office by force and by appealing to the community to accept him.[9] Al-Jubbāī declared that 'Uthmān was in the right and excommunicated his murderers but would not decide on the relative merits of the four orthodox caliphs. His doctrine of

[1] b. Ḥazm, 3, 243. [2] Ijī, 262. [3] Ijī, 138. [4] Ijī, 270.
[5] Ijī, 273. [6] Ijī, 254. [7] *Marham*, 159.
[8] b. Ḥazm, 4, 167; Ijī, 302. [9] Ijī, 307.

the Koran was very like that of Abu 'l-Hudhail, that it is an accident and can be in many places at once. He differed from the rest of the Mu'tazila by holding that the word of God endures.[1] When a man reads the Koran, God creates a word for himself along with the spoken word, and this word is heard, letter by letter, with every recitation.[2] Al-Juwainī adds further details. The "word" is words which accompany the sounds but are not those sounds; they are in the written book also but are not the visible letters and lines; they are heard though they are not sounds. In every recitation are the sounds, the reading (sense), and the word of God. During the recitation the word inheres in one who is not God; when the reader stops, the word ceases to be in him. If many recite a verse together, the word of God is in each one yet it is still one.[3] Both God and man need a special constitution to produce those sounds which are speech.[4]

Al-Jubbāī explained the phrase "sealing the hearts" to mean that God put a mark on unbelievers so that the angels knew whose hearts to seal.[5]

It seems that al-Jubbāī was the first to recognise that a word might have different meanings; for example, a Christian was a believer in his own religion though not a believer in the full sense of being a Muslim. So he differentiated the literal sense of a word from the religious. He also held that the ascription of an attribute (*waṣf*) was the same as the attribute (*ṣifa*) and the giving of a name the same as the name.

To sum up; this doctrine is an approach to orthodoxy. It allows more room to revelation by making that the source of the institutes of religion. It admits the punishment in the grave and is moving away from the idea that the office of prophet is a reward for good works. The emphasis on the moral side of religion is new.

Abū Hāshim 'Abd al-Salām († 321/933), the son of al-Jubbāī, was like his father in theology but superior to him because he was versed in letters.[6] He wrote a refutation of Aristotle, which was worthless as he did not understand the technical

[1] *Farḳ*, 218. [2] *Iḳdām*, 310; *Marḥam*, 176. [3] *Irshād*, 71.
[4] *Iḳdām*, 288 [5] *Iḳdām*, 121. [6] Yāḳūt, *Mu'jam*, 2, 13.

terms.[1] It is said that he was a drunkard and died in drink. His teaching was very like that of his father and the disciples of the pair were called *Bahshamiya*.

Doctrine of God.

Abū Hāshim takes a prominent place in the history of theology by his doctrine of "states" by which he thought to solve the problem of the divine attributes. According to one account this doctrine started from the problem of likeness and difference. Why is one thing like another and different from a third? Some said that things were like or unlike essentially and that generic names were mere words to which no reality corresponded; like such words as nearness, distance. . . . These indicated only a relation between two things, a relation which disappeared as the things moved. Others said that things were alike or unlike according as they had certain qualities in common or not. Abū Hāshim avoided the word quality or attribute which had acquired dangerous associations in the strife between the Mu'tazila and the orthodox and declared that the statement 'God knows' means that He is in a state of knowing and similarly for the other attributes. These states require another by which they are connected with God.[2] A state cannot be known in isolation but only in connection with the essence to which it gives character. These states cannot be distinguished from the attributes of the orthodox except that they need a state to join them to God. States are neither known nor unknown, existent nor non-existent, eternal nor phenomenal, neither God nor other than God. It is obvious that Abū Hāshim was striving towards the conceptualist position but he was a child in philosophy. States fall into two classes.[3]

1. *Caused:* they presuppose life as a condition and demand an organism in the substrate; they become qualities of the whole substrate. Knowledge, power, and life are examples of this class.

[1] Kifṭī, 40.

[2] One story reports four states, knowledge, power, will, life, which are joined to God by a fifth. *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 1042. *Muḥaṣṣal*, 55 and N. 2.

[3] *Iḳdām*, 131.

2. *Uncaused:* they follow directly from the essence. Examples are the ability of a substance to occupy space and to be a substrate for accidents.

'Abd al-Ḳāhir adds a third class; those which are due neither to the essence nor to a cause,[1] but he gives no example to make his meaning plain.

God is different from all else—apparently by that state which joins other states to His essence—so He cannot be called 'first' or 'preceding' for these names imply likeness.[2] Reason and revelation show that he may be called thing. He may be known under one aspect and unknown under another because, e.g., the connection between life and power is known by reasoning. His will is an accident and is only creative; that is, it has no connection with the moral character of the acts of men. Thus Abū Hāshim escapes from saying that God wills sin, by rejecting the 'will of command' of earlier theologians and the 'acquisition' of al-Shaḥḥām. God produces secondary effects, e.g., he employs the winds to stir up the sea. No organism is needed to produce the word of God; Imām al-Ḥaramain interprets this to mean that the word of God is mental speech not words and sounds.[3]

Reason.

Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is, accompanied by a feeling of ease and satisfaction. Beliefs endure and can become knowledge. The later view was that knowledge and reasoning cannot be evil. No knowledge is too abstruse for man, but he cannot reason about two things at once and one process of knowing cannot be joined to two knowables; yet syllogistic

[1] *Farḳ*, 180 f. This book gives another explanation of the origin of this doctrine. It began with the question why a piece of knowledge is peculiar to *A* rather than to *B*. Is it due to the self, an entity, or to neither? If to the self, there must be a separate appropriation for each piece of knowledge. If by an entity, then Ma'mar's doctrine of the connection of one entity to another up to infinity is right. If by neither, appropriation to *A* is not more likely than to *B*. Abū Hāshim got out of the difficulty by his theory of states.

Substance is only a substrate for accidents; it is differentiated by genus and species which are general ideas and, unlike other accidents, pervade it. Later 'state' meant 'general idea.' Abelard used *status* in this sense.

[2] The essence of God is like other essences. *Muḥaṣṣal*, 111.

[3] *Irshād*, 60.

reasoning seems to be regarded as correct. To know that one knows is not the same as knowing a thing. Only things can be known; so knowledge of the impossible is knowledge without an object.[1] Thus the knowledge that God has no equal or partner is knowledge without an object. Similarly, in the later view, summary knowledge has no object. Knowledge, formed by the addition of detail to the first outline is still summary. Hearsay information, which is not knowledge, may be like it. That based on a general report is necessary, though one version adds, after religion has imposed obligation. Information, which is based on the evidence of a few, is like that based on a general report so far as it is the basis of knowledge and action, but differs from it in being acquired. Opinions, pleasure, pain, repentance, and dreams are kinds of belief. One man cannot create belief in another. On the later view doubt is not an entity The power to reason is associated with doubt, obstinate ignorance is asssociated with conviction, so the power to reason cannot be united with obstinate ignorance.[2] Casual thinking does not cause the knowledge which results from it; God causes it. Intentional thinking is the cause of resultant knowledge.[3]

Inattention is corruption of the mind and sleep is temporary inattention. The first duty of man is to know the Creator by a special attribute. A prophet teaches truth to which unaided reason cannot attain.[4] Revelation alone shows that the world can be destroyed.[5] Reason shows that inanimate objects cannot have knowledge and cannot feel pain.

Physics.

Creation is God's putting a thing in a state, a mode of existence. When first created everything was at rest. The atom has size, endures and has position independently of others[6]; and all are of one sort. At creation an atom may have no accidents except a mode of existence, but afterwards it must have them.[7] Those, which originate in a body after it has

[1] Ījī, 154. [2] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 26; N. 1. [3] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 29; N. 1.
[4] Ījī, 182. [5] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 98; N. 1.
[6] Abū Rashīd, 38, 40; Biram, 63; N. 3.
[7] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 56. A less exact statement. Abū Rashīd, 43.

come into being, can only be removed by their contraries. All can be renewed except those which cannot endure or are the work of men. Those, which are the work of God but look like the work of men, can be renewed. One combination inheres in two atoms.[1] Movement exists only when the body is in the second place. All combinations are secondary effects for they depend on nearness, the cause of them. God cannot produce secondary effects or can only do so by an intermediate cause.[2] Revelation shows that some atoms cannot be annihilated unless the whole world is destroyed. Destruction is an entity.[3] Weight is an accident other than the heavy thing; lightness is not an entity.[4] Differences can exist only between things; likeness consists in having special, as opposed to general, qualities in common.

Man.

Life is an entity, something more than harmonious health, needs an organism, and is individual; so there cannot be two lives in one substrate nor can the parts essential to life in one be in another also. Soul is the same as spirit and is an accident. Perception is nothing but the percipient.[5] Life cannot be without capacity which can cause both action and inaction though a living being may be neither doing nor not-doing. Abū Hāshim was inclined to give up the idea that incapacity is an entity contrary to capacity. Suggestions are accidents. That which calls to reasoning and proof is like a command from God, a secret voice or mental speech put in the heart or sent by an angel. That from the devil is a secret voice by which he speaks to men. An organism is needed for all the acts of life, including speech.[6] Pleasure is merely getting the thing desired; it is neither an entity nor an accident. The pain of a blow is the secondary effect of the injury to the part affected.[7]

[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 81; N. 1. One combination cannot be in three atoms for, if it disappeared from one, it would have to disappear from all.
[2] Ījī, 120 f. [3] Biram, 70 N. 3. [4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 46.
[5] According to al-Juwainī the percipient is a state of the individual. *Irshād*, 100.
[6] *Iḳdām*, 132. [7] Ījī, 123.

Abū Hāshim rejected the idea that death is an entity, on the ground that, if it were, it would not be contrary to life.

The moral side of life is sharply emphasised. A man can be punished twice for one act, for doing wrong, and for omitting to do right. Hence another name for the school, *Dhammiya*, the blamers.

Reward or punishment can be earned by the act of a deputy. Repentance for one sin is useless while the man persists in another. It is also useless when the power to commit the sin has been lost.

Abū Hāshim would not use the word *jazā* (reward) for it could only be used for an act done, not for one omitted. A man, who did good works equal to those of a prophet, but committed one sin without repenting, would go to hell for ever. In a long life a man can accumulate good works which make him equal to a prophet.

Religion.

But for destruction there would be no object in God's imposing obligation. His bounty is not a matter of justice for there is no compulsion on him to be bountiful. God need not give grace if without it a man would deserve a bigger reward than he would deserve with it; otherwise he must give it. He requires faith without prevenient grace. He can inflict pain without man having done anything to deserve it, but only as a warning and when compensation is given afterwards, perhaps in this world. But mere compensation is unworthy of him unless its usefulness depends on its being recognised as compensation.[1] Reason cannot prove that the killing of animals is lawful; only religion teaches that they may be slaughtered for sacrifice or food. Things are good or bad; good cannot produce evil nor evil good. Inaction may merit praise or blame. If a man knows all about Islam, all the doctrines of Abū Hāshim with their proofs, except one, he is an unbeliever. The author who quotes this adds, "We agree with his conclusion, but not with his premises." Punishment is profitable to the sinner in this life. One, who goes astray at the beginning of a chain of reasoning,

[1] Iji, 151 f.

is punished for the first and subsequent errors. Merit and demerit may be equal so Abū Hāshim postulated in the next world a place intermediate between heaven and hell.[1] Man's destiny is settled by the difference between the reward and punishment which he has earned; the less is substracted from the greater. Religious sins (e.g., omission of prayer) are bad because they cause evil. It is not wrong for God to forgive a sin in one and punish it in another. Determinists and anthropomorphists are in the same position as *dhimmis*.

Prophets may make mistakes and these are sins; they may commit small sins which do not shock mankind. Prophets after their call are the only men who can work miracles; they must bring knowledge which would be otherwise unobtainable. The Koran on earth is not the word of God; negroes, Turks, or Indians can produce something like it. There is always a man of Ḳuraish fit to be imam; if two are chosen the election is not valid. Revelation shows that heaven and hell are already created.[2] In the next world it may be that an amputated limb will be restored to its owner; what really matters is the power which is life.

Abū Hāshim and his father belonged to the Basra school of the Mu'tazila which often contradicted in details the school of Baghdad.

Abu 'l-Ḥusain 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. Muḥammad al-Khayyāṭ was one of the Mu'tazila of Baghdad and lived in the second half of the third century of the Hijra. The historians of dogma do not often quote him but his book, *Kitāb al-Intiṣār*, tells something of his opinions.

God.

God is a thing in the sense that He exists, He has no quiddity.[3] He knows by His self; He always knew that things would be when they were created, "He knows that a thing has moved by the addition of motion to the thing not by the addition of knowledge to himself." His power is co-extensive with His knowledge.[4]

[1] *Irshād*, 221; Ījī, 262 f. The intermediate state of Wāṣil in another form.
[2] Ījī, 254 f. [3] *Intiṣār*, 87. [4] *Ibid.*, 112, 123.

Reason.

Reason and analogy do not always produce knowledge which is accepted by all.[1] A general report by unbelievers is true and the source of necessary knowledge.[2] Al-Khayyāṭ rejected reports made by single individuals because, it is said, he wished to invalidate much of the law.

Physics.

Before creation bodies are bodies, infinite in number; this is a corollary from the doctrine that God could always act.[3] All that can be predicated of existing things, except creation and movement, can be predicated of non-existing, for at the time of origination a thing is at rest. Atoms come to an end because God annihilates them; annihilation is not an entity.[4] The order of nature is fixed. Bodies do not endure by endurance.[5] Bodies differ by unessentials; accidents resemble one another in unessentials and differ in essentials. This means that bodies are formed of atoms which are all of one sort; accidents, because they are not bodies, must differ from them.

Man.

Capacity is soundness of limb and absence of damage. In a voluntary agent the power to do or not to do an act is the power to do or not to do its opposite; when the act has been done, the opposite can no longer be done by the same exertion of power.[6] An act cannot be done by two agents.

Religion.

It is not incumbent upon God to give grace yet it is clear that he gives it for obligation presupposes it. Sinful Muslims are neither believers nor unbelievers.[7] A prophet cannot err in his message but can commit small sins. Cancellation (*naskh*) refers to God's commands and so differs from the Shī'a doctrine of change of mind (*badā'*) which refers to facts of history.[8] There

[1] *Ibid.*, 160.
[2] *Ibid.*, 167.
[3] *Ibid.*, 123.
[4] Abū Rashīd, 67; Biram, 70 n. 3.
[5] Abū Rashīd, 58.
[6] *Intiṣār*, 11. 66.
[7] *Intiṣār*, 167.
[8] *Intiṣār*, 127.

must be a reason why 'Alī was not elected successor to Abū Bakr, but it is not known. Al-Khayyāṭ did not accept all the miracles ascribed to Muḥammad, he defended Abu 'l-Hudhail for his doctrine of rest in heaven, and al-Fuwaṭi for not calling God *wakīl*.

Abu 'l-Ḳāsim 'Abdullah b. Aḥmad al-Balkhī, commonly called al-Ka'bī, († 319/931) was a pupil of al-Khayyāṭ and belonged like him to the Mu'tazila of Baghdad. Al-Jubbāī thought more highly of him than of his teacher.

God.

God is everywhere in the sense that He keeps and controls all. Knowledge of His attributes is, in some sort, knowledge of His essence. He cannot be both known and unknown ; for instance, one who knows that God is alive must know that He has power for the connection between life and power is known by necessity. Yet it is reported that determinists and anthropomorphists know him in part and do not know him in part. He endures without the attribute of endurance.[1] The doctrine of will is that taught by al-Naẓẓām ; the best statement of it is this—in a state of imperfect knowledge will is the direction of energy to a chosen object ; God has perfect knowledge so He has no need of will. Will is another name for His creative energy.[2] It may mean either that God acts himself or gives orders to men.[3] He wills, commands, and makes obligatory allowable acts. He must have made the world when he did, otherwise he would have been slow in following the dictate of His wisdom. He can do wrong. He cannot be seen. In Him seeing and hearing mean knowing ; the school taught that these mean more than knowing.[4] He cannot do the impossible but might have done other than he has done.[5] He must do the best He can for men to help them as moral agents. If He were to do wrong, the basis of moral and intellectual life would be overthrown.[6]

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 109 ; *Rawḍa bahiya*, 67.
[2] *Iḳdām*, 238 f. ; *Irshād*, 37. One witness says that God has no will, one makes it a kind of accident, and yet another makes it the knowledge of profit in an act. Ījī, 57.
[3] Shahrastānī, 53.
[4] Shahrastānī, 54 ; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 124.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 2, 185 ; 3, 36.
[6] This idea struggles for expression in Ash'arī, 557 ; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 148 N. 1.

He cannot do what men do or, according to another version, what is like the action of men.[1] The names of God are known by revelation only and cannot be given Him by human reason.[2]

Reason.

Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is. Belief passes into knowledge without any external cause for the change. Hearsay belief is not knowledge but, if in agreement with the truth, it is as good as knowledge and is saving faith. You cannot know without knowing that you know. Knowledge based on a general report is reasoned though some deny this. Acquired knowledge is got only by testing and reasoning and this takes time.[3] Reasoned cannot become necessary knowledge; the question whether it must be based on necessary was left undecided. One act of knowing may be joined to two objects; some truth is too obscure for the mind to grasp. The object determines the moral character of knowledge. Doubt is an entity. The mind may cause secondary knowledge, ignorance, or inattention. A man can cause belief in another. Man must know God because it is his duty to be grateful to Him; the knowledge that God is eternal is the basis of the knowledge that he is Creator. The knowledge that phenomena need a creator is necessary. In the next world knowledge is reasoned and obligatory.

Physics.

Things have some kind of being before they are created, they can be known and discussed, occupy space,[4] but are not substances or accidents. Atoms are of different sorts, have no size, are never without accidents, and endure by endurance.[5] It is stated that they may be stripped of all except colour.[6] An atom is annihilated when God does not create endurance in it; to destroy some it is not necessary to destroy all.[7] There is no empty space; if two atoms are separated it can only

1 Ījī, 43, 292; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 130. 2 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 116.
3 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 211; Cf. Ja'far b. Ḥarb.
4 Abū Rashīd, 12. 5 Abū Rashīd, 1, 38, 32, 59.
6 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 56; *Irshād*, 14.
7 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 87.; Abū Rashīd, 69, 74; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 98; N. 1.

be by the presence of a third between them.[1] A single atom cannot have position but this is not due to its nature.[2] Two make a line, three an area, and four a solid (pyramid); rather, two in combination make length.[3] Every accident needs an atom in which to inhere and no accident inheres in another.[4] They do not endure and are not renewed. Endurance is an entity but destruction is not.[5] Fire is not latent in wood or stone; air can be changed into water.[6] Everything is good in some way.[7]

A mode is an entity other than movement or rest, but inseparable from them; it is perceived by touch or perhaps body and mode are perceived together. It does not always endure. Movement is different in kind from rest; it may cause movement or rest, while rest may cause rest. When a body moves, it is only its surface which moves.[8] Movement is never primary so God does not move a body unless another pushes or pulls it. Combination is due to movement or rest; al-Ka'bī would not distinguish composition (*ta'līf*) from combination (*ijtimā'*). Lightness is an entity. The order of nature is fixed.

Man.

Man's spirit is a substance (*jawhar*) which does not occupy space.[9] Life does not endure; it needs an organism and food. Man cannot create anything and cannot cause that, which he cannot move, to be at rest. He must have capacity or incapacity, must be doing or not-doing. Capacity does not endure, is before the act, and is health, soundness, and freedom from obstacles; when it comes to an end, God creates a power so that the act happens by the capacity. Incapacity is an entity contrary to capacity; it may be an external hindrance.

Perception is by the mind and reason so seeing and hearing mean knowing.[10] The will is not willed and is before the act. Pleasure cannot become pain nor pain pleasure. As life does

[1] Abū Rashīd, 24. [2] Abū Rashīd, 40. [3] Pines 6 f; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 63.
[4] Biram, 55; N. 3. [5] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 87, 231.
[6] Abū Rashīd, 36 f.; Biram 45, N. 3. Bodies interchange as all are made of the four elements. This seems inconsistent with the theory of atoms.
[7] b. Ḥazm, 3, 105. [8] *Ghunya*, 177.
[9] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 102; N. 1. [10] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 44.

not endure, it cannot be renewed; a man is renewed with the character he had. All the atoms in a living body can be renewed. Reason and revelation teach that death is an entity; it must be in an organism and is contrary to life, power, and knowledge. Man has two appointed times, a natural death and a violent; a murdered man is not dead because death comes from God and killing from the murderer.[1]

Religion.

God must do the best for men so obligation is necessary. Those under obligation could not be created in heaven. If the interests of the individual are neglected, it is for the good of the majority. God ought not to let a man know that he will die in unbelief because this is an incentive to sin. If grace can cause pleasure or pain equal to it, then God must prefer to cause the pleasure. Inaction does not merit praise or blame. Reason does not show that sins are forgiven. Small sins will not be punished in hell but they may add up to make a great sin. Reward is the necessary result of God's generosity—this is determinism—and all of it may be given in this world. Repentance restores the right to reward which was lost by sin. Under threat of violence, a man may commit a sin if it is not so wicked as the threat.

The mission of a prophet may be to enforce duties or to bring worldly advantage, like the knowledge of a new language. One, who has been given divine protection, is sinless and infallible. A prophet may work miracles before his call while saints do not work startling miracles. He, who affirms that Muḥammad is a prophet with a true message, is a believer whatever else he may say. Heaven and hell may be already created; if created, they may be renewed at the judgment, but they cannot pass away once their inhabitants have entered into them.[2] Munkar and Nakīr are not the names of angels.[3]

Reason and revelation teach that an imam is necessary; a man of Kuraish should be chosen before another who might be more suitable.[4] Justice is treating men alike by removing

[1] Taftazānī, 144; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 143.
[2] Īji, 270.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 237.
[4] Īji, 297; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 275.

weakness and giving prosperity and guidance.[1] If a believer loses a hand and then turns infidel, he goes to hell but his hand turns into an animal and goes to heaven; if an infidel loses a hand and then is converted, he goes to heaven while his hand goes to hell.[2] If the majority of the people of a land are Muslims, the land is the land of Islam. Al-Ka'bī could not make up his mind about 'Uthmān and his murderers. There must have been a reason why 'Alī was not elected instead of Abū Bakr but men do not know it.

Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. al-Ikhshīd († 326/938) was a disciple of al-Jubbāī. Of his teaching little is recorded and less is worth notice. The accident of destruction has position though it does not occupy space; literally, is in a direction.[3] Repentance is valid if the sinner is sorry for the effects of his sins even though he has no intention of forsaking them.[4] Ibn al-Ikshīd diverged from his master and returned to the traditional view that it is purpose which gives moral value to actions.

At this stage ideas have been more closely defined. Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is and is real when consistent. Opinion is not belief and, therefore, not in the same class as knowledge. Man's knowledge of God is not necessary when based on reason. Acquired knowledge does not need to be based on necessary. So taught al-Jubbāī who apparently rejected the definition of reason as a modicum of necessary knowledge; he might have accepted the view of al-Muḥāsibī.

Abū Hāshim made belief the raw material of knowledge. Reason is in all mental processes, opinion, emotion, and the will. Only things can be known so knowledge of the impossible is knowledge without an object. Casual thinking is not the cause of the resultant knowledge; God is the cause of this. Intentional thinking is the cause of the resultant knowledge. A prophet teaches truth to which unaided reason cannot attain. The " states " may be explained in this way :—an object cannot be known in itself, only in its manifestations. These are qualities which are common to many things and are general

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 132.
[2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 261. It seems that 'Abd al-Ḳāhr misunderstood what he heard.
[3] *Musāmara*, 221. [4] b. Ḥazm, 4, 61; 203.

ideas, universals. The object is the substrate, the qualities are modes. Al-Khayyāṭ admitted the awkward fact that what seemed to some a truth of reason did not seem so to all. Moral obligation cannot apply to necessary knowledge. Al-Ka'bī saw that some knowledge was too high for man. He cannot know without being aware that he knows. Man's duty to God imposes on him the obligation of knowing God. In the next world knowledge is both necessary and obligatory.

BASRA AND BAGHDAD

The Mu'tazili schools of Basra and Baghdad are often mentioned. Differences existed within the schools, but individuals are never mentioned. It is enough to state the points on which they differed from their forerunners.

Basra[1]

God.

God endures by an endurance which is a personal attribute, not one additional to His essence.[2] Seeing and hearing are something more than knowing.[3] God does not see himself for He cannot be seen.[4] He created His will before the things he willed,[5] it is something other than knowledge.[6] One act of will is connected with one object. He wills every act of man which He commands.[7] He has no power over the acts of men though the power to do them comes from Him.[8]

Reason.

The gift of reason is an act of God's grace. Reasoned knowledge can become necessary. Man's knowledge that he knows is reasoned. The mind does not produce knowledge as a secondary effect. Man can act reasonably in moments of inattention.

[1] The *ḳadariya* of Basra, who taught that God and his word are originated, cannot have been Mu'tazila; *Farḳ*, 52.
[2] *Raḍḍa Ṭahiya*, 66. This is contradicted; *Arba'in*, 185. This was the view of al-Bāḳillāni.
[3] *Irshād*, 43. [4] *Farḳ*, 166. [5] *Farḳ*, 127. [6] *Arba'in*, 147; D.T.T., 555.
[7] *Irshād*, 37; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 209. [8] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 94.

Physics.

A thing is what can be known.[1] Empty space exists. Atoms are perceived by sight and touch; they do not need entities outside themselves for their origin, endurance, and renewal. Movement may be in one atom. Atoms must have modes of being but may be without other accidents; one cannot change into another. Every accident is appropriated to its substrate. Names can be changed. Composition (*ta'līf*) is not the same as combination (*ijtimā'*).

Man.

Man is the living thing; the spirit is the soul and is not alive. Life is more than power and can exist without food. Power is an accident. Power to do right involves that of doing wrong.[2] Dumbness is a corruption of the organs of speech.

Religion.

Reason shows that God must reward good acts and may remit the punishment of sins.[3] Punishment of sin is good even if it bring no profit to others; the eternal punishment of sinners is not the best for them. God cannot send pain to avert evil. Truth and falsehood are species of one genus. One who hesitates whether an infidel is an infidel, is himself one. If a man is to die in unbelief, God should tell him so.

Baghdad

God.

Endurance in God is an attribute additional to existence; this, however, is denied.[4] He has knowledge and power for he has said so; he has not life and hearing.[5] His word is an accident which cannot be in two places at once.[6]

Reason.

Reasoning (*naẓar*) is not an entity. Man's knowledge that he knows is necessary. Suggestions are needed for man to be

[1] Cf. Ikhwān al-ṣafā, 4, 52.
[2] *Farḳ*, 116.
[3] Ījī, 256; *Irshād*, 216, 222.
[4] Ījī, 72; *Rawḍa bahiya*, 67.
[5] Ash'arī, 508.
[6] Ash'arī, 192.

under obligation, also for the attainment of knowledge though sound reasoning does not make it necessary.[1] God cannot create in man knowledge of Himself which man is bound to accept.[2] He, who knows that God is, must know that He is not seen and does not occupy space. He, who knows that God created one thing, must know that He created all.[3]

Physics.

Part of the world cannot come to an end without the whole.[4] Motion does not produce rest nor rest motion.[5] Bodies differ by externals; accidents differ in themselves and resemble each other by externals.[6] Man can produce colour and one colour can cause the same as a secondary effect.

Religion.

Some said that God must do the best for men in both worlds; this best is the most agreeable to wisdom in ordering the world. He cannot remit punishment.[7] Punishment is not good if it bring no profit to others. Punishment and the curse of God in this world is the best for sinners. Sin may cause what is neither sin nor virtue; it cannot cause virtue. Badness is in the thing itself so bad acts and unbelief are not of the same class as good deeds and faith.[8] He who hesitates to condemn an infidel is one.[9] Murder cannot be a small sin. It is wrong to pray behind wicked men. 'Alī was the most excellent.

Some of the ideas of the Mu'tazila were carried to Spain and were by Muḥammad b. 'Abdullah b. Masarra († 319/931) combined with that form of neo-Platonic philosophy which went by the name of Empedocles. He taught that the throne of God rules the world. This was the result of his philosophy, that God was too exalted to come into connection with anything else. He emphasized the unity of God till the attributes became names for the one being. He taught that the power and knowledge of God are created. The knowledge is twofold: (1) knowledge of universals which is originated as a whole;

[1] Ash'arī, 482.
[2] Ash'arī, 550.
[3] Ash'arī, 394.
[4] Biram, 74.
[5] Ash'arī, 413.
[6] Ash'arī, 353.
[7] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 148; *Irshād*, 216.
[8] Ash'arī, 353.
[9] Malaṭī, 33.

and, (2) knowledge of particulars which follows on events as they happen. Then the rank of prophet can be earned by a devout life. Men are responsible for their acts.[1] The disciples of the master denied the foreknowledge of God.

About a hundred years later a schism was caused in this school by Ismā'īl b. 'Abdullah al-Ru'aini. His date is uncertain but Ibn Ḥazm († 456/1064) was a contemporary of him and his grandson. Ismā'īl is said to have understood the language of birds and to have had the gift of prophecy. He was a leader of men who was obeyed; some gave him the legal alms from their property.

He taught that the world does not come to an end, there is no resurrection of the body only continuance of the soul, and judgment follows immediately after death. He claimed that his followers are the only Muslims, allowed *mut'a* marriage, and rejected the right to private property. All that a man had a right to was his food; otherwise the proceeds of trade and brigandage were alike.

He alleged that the prophet had expected the judgment and resurrection quickly.[2]

[1] b. Ḥazm, 2, 126; 4, 80; 198 f; *Ṭabaḳāt al-umam*, 666.
[2] b. Ḥazm, 4, 80; 199 f.

CHAPTER VIII

ORTHODOXY

Abu 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī died in 324/935. "The Mu'tazila held their heads high till God sent al-Ash'arī and he made them withdraw into sesame shells."[1] He lived on a *waḳf* founded by an ancestor, spending seventeen dirhams a year. One wonders whether this tale was invented to show that strict piety was not confined to the Mu'tazila. He was stepson and disciple of al-Jubbāī till in 300/912 he broke away from the Mu'tazila. The story is that he asked his master:—

"What do you say of a believer, an unbeliever, and a child?"

"The believer is in heaven, the unbeliever in hell, and the child in a place of safety."

"But should the child ask God why he did not let him grow up that he might earn a bigger reward?"

"God would say that He knew that he would be a sinner if he grew up."

"The unbeliever would ask why God did not kill him that he might not sin."

Al-Jubbāī had no answer. After the story al-Subkī adds, "God is not responsible to any and his decrees cannot be questioned."[2] The story is of the same class as those which explain the origin of the name Mu'tazila.

It is reported that he thrice saw Muḥammad in dreams. Twice the prophet said, "Help the traditional beliefs." After the second command he gave up theology and spent his time on the Koran and tradition.

In the third vision Muḥammad asked what he had done and then said, "I did not tell you to drop theology but to defend the traditional beliefs for they are the truth." The tale describes what happened even if the dressing is fictitious. The Mu'tazila

[1] *Ta'rikh Baghdod*, 11, 346.

[2] Subkī, 2, 250.

had been drawing nearer to the traditional beliefs and al-Ash'arī made the whole turn.

The difference is illustrated by the use of words. Al-Jubbāī would not use *'āḳil* of God because the idea involved was prevention (*'iḳāl*) : al-Ash'arī said that *ḥākim* involved the same idea (*ḥakama*, part of a bridle), but he would not use *'āḳil* as it was not sanctioned by tradition.[1] Al-Ash'arī passed through three stages, (1) Mu'tazila ; (2) he admitted seven intellectual attributes, life, knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight, and speech but explained the others away ; (3) he accepted all the attributes as face, hand, etc.[2] He was the most bitter enemy of the Mu'tazila as a converted *dhimmi* is the most bitter foe of his former faith.[3] He described his method thus : "I do not begin a discussion of theology ; but when men go deeply into what is not fitting in religion, I call them back to God's decrees."[4]

There is nothing new in his theology, he became a traditionalist so that his school could speak of "our master Ibn Kullāb" while al-Subkī says that his creed was that of Ibn Ḥanbal.[5]

There are two stories of his death bed ; one lets him say, "God curse the Mu'tazila, they have invented and told lies" ; the other version of his last words is, "I do not call any of this *ḳibla* an unbeliever, they point to one God, there is only a difference of terms."[6] Later writers confused the teaching of al-Ash'arī with that of his followers and it is hard to separate his doctrines from later additions.

God.

First of all God is the Creator. He is one and eternal by His essence and exists by existence.[7] The quiddity of God is His existence.[8] It is said that endurance is an existential (*wujūdī*) attribute over and above His existence.[9] The existence of God is not the same as that of the world ; this difference is due to

[1] Subkī, 2, 251. [2] *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 4. [3] *Tabyīn kadhib*, 40
[4] Subkī, 2, 247 ; Cf. Maḳrīzī, 2, 238.
[5] *Iḳdām*, 303 ; Cf. b. Khaldūn, 3, 49 ; Subkī, 3, 99.
[6] *Tabyīn*, 148 f ; Cf. *Rawḍa bahiya*, 23, 33.
[7] *Lidhātihi, linafsihi ; Uṣūl al-dīn*, 88, 90, 123 ; *Iḳdām*, 91 ; Ījī, 72.
[8] Ījī, 12 ; Cf. Existence is the reality in both the necessary and the possible. *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 1460.
[9] Ījī, 72.

His peculiar essence, not to something added to it.[1] There is no difference between the name and the attribute (between *waṣf* and *ṣifa*).[2] There are two versions of the doctrine of the attributes or names. One is that the names are of three sorts: (1) those which indicate His essence, they are He; (2) those, like creator, which indicate action, they are not He; (3) those, like knower, which indicate qualities, they are not He and not other than He.[3] The other version also has three classes, essential, active, predicative (e.g., face, hand); they are eternal and endure by the enduring of the Creator; His enduring endures for itself, and the kernel of His enduring is an enduring for Him, for it, and for the attributes.[4] God knows by knowledge, lives by life, and so on. The attributes inhere in His essence and are not He and not other than He. This account of the attributes is presumably less exact than the first. His knowledge is not like human knowledge.[5] One report says that His knowledge is different (*khilāf*) from God, but uncreated and eternal.[6] It is one, eternal, embraces all things, and does not change by variations in the things known;[7] in this it is like the eternal existence in its relation to events in time. In God sight and hearing are not the same as knowledge.[8] The eye of God is explained as a predicative attribute or as meaning sight.[9] His power is one, connected with all that can exist; His will is one, connected with all that can receive individuality. He was always saying "Be" to what He willed to create.[10] He does not will evil absolutely, He wills it as the act (acquisition) of a sinner.[11] This is another way of saying that His will is not the same as His satisfaction (*riḍā*). This was one of the points on which al-Ash'arī differed from al-Māturīdī. (See below).

The word of God is one, it never quits His presence,[12] an essential uncreated attribute. It is mental speech; spoken sounds are called word only by analogy.[13] Though one, the word was from all eternity command, prohibition, and statement.[14]

[1] Ījī, 90; 9. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 115, 128.
[3] *Irshād*, 84; Ījī, 159; *Cf. Fiḳh akbar*, 21.
[4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 109. [5] *Tabyīn*, 149. [6] b. Ḥazm, 2, 126. [7] *Iḳdām*, 218
[8] *Iḳdām*, 341 [9] Ījī, 76. [10] b. Ḥazm, 2, 212.
[11] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 104; 106. [12] b. Ḥazm, 3, 5; 4, 211.
[13] Ījī, 70; *Iḳdām*, 291.
[14] *Irshād*, 69; *Iḳdām*, 304; Maḳrīzī, 2, 359. contradicted *Marham*, 196.

The nature of the command, whether categorical or hortatory, must be deduced from the circumstances.[1] God created the throne and was as He was before ; the sitting on the throne is an act which God originated in it ; it is neither descent nor movement. The descent to the lowest heaven is an attribute.[2] God can do neither wrong nor the impossible.[3] He is not bound by reason so nothing compels him to accept the repentance of the penitent ; He can torment believers and take unbelievers into heaven.[4] He is Lord and can do what He likes with His creation ; should He send all men to hell, it is not injustice ; should He take them all to heaven, it is not wrong. All gifts come from Him and cause Him neither profit nor loss ; gratitude does not help and unbelief does not hurt him.[5] His love is His will to honour and reward believers.[6]

Reason.

Reason is knowledge because some modicum of knowledge is needed if there is to be reasoning. Knowledge is that whereby the substrate, in which it inheres, becomes knowing.[7] Knowledge derived from perception is the basis for reasoned knowledge and so is of higher rank ; presumably it is necessary.[8] All knowledge comes by reason, but it is made necessary by revelation ; this applies to man's knowledge of God.[9] If the arguments for religious truth are false, then that truth itself must be untrue, so that any attack on the philosophical basis of his creed was an attack on the faith.[10] The distinction between right and wrong cannot be known by reason. The premises of a syllogism do not cause the conclusion ; it follows from them because God, the only agent, creates it as a matter of custom.[11] One act of knowledge may be joined to two knowables.[12] All certainties (*yaḳīnī*) are necessary knowledge.[13]

This first duty of man is to know God.[14]

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 215.
[2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 113 ; *Tabyīn*, 150.
[3] b. Ḥazm, 2, 185 ; 4, 213.
[4] *Kitāb al-luma'*, f. 62b.
[5] Maḳrīzī, 2, 360.
[6] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 75 ; N. 3.
[7] Subkī, 2, 42 ; *Irshād*, 9.
[8] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 10.
[9] *Iḳdām*, 371 ; Shahrastānī, 73.
[10] b. Khaldūn, *Muḳaddima*, 3, 114.
[11] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 29.
[12] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 70 ; N. 2.
[13] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 71 ; N. 3.
[14] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 28 ; N. 3.

Physics.

Creation and the created are one.[1] The combination of two atoms makes a body.[2] A body cannot be without some accidents like colour but may be without others like sound.[3] Some, i.e., the hot, cold, dry, moist, colour, and the modes of existence pervade the whole body.[4] That glass has taste[5] may be a logical conclusion which al-Ash'arī himself did not draw. Everything, body or accident, which has once existed, can be renewed.[6] A body ceases to be when God does not create enduring in it or cuts off enduring from it.[7] An accident ceases to be in the second unit of time because enduring is impossible to it.[8] The renewal of an accident is the existence of it after it has ceased to be.[9] The theologians found it hard to explain movement. Movement comes to a body in the second place; or if a body is in a place, its mode is rest in it or transfer to another; while a first mode in the second place is rest in it and movement from the first.[10] Weight does not exist; a thing is heavy because it has more parts, light because it has fewer.[11]

Each kind of phenomenal power is different from every other kind and also from the power of God; in other words, power is not capable of doing two opposites. This is directed against the doctrine of al-Naẓẓām that one power, as it is rightly directed or not, produces faith or unbelief. Impotence is an attribute of the weak and is inability to do something and its opposite.[12] There is no nature; the heat of fire is created at the moment it is touched.[13] All that is can be seen, so God can be seen; the non-existent cannot be seen. But God has so ordered the world that some things are not seen.[14]

Man.

Man is not a spiritual substance (rejection of the teaching of Ma'mar); the soul is a body susceptible of existence and death,

[1] Subkī, 2, 261. [2] b. Ḥazm, 5, 105; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 63; N. 3.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 56; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 94; N. 3. [4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 41. [5] b. Ḥazm, 4, 219.
[6] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 233. [7] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45, 87; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 98; N. 1.
[8] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45; b. Ḥazm, 4, 205; *Ibāna*, 32. In *Ibāna badan* or *shakhṣ* is used for 'body' and *na't* for 'accident.'
[9] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45. [10] *Farḳ*, 144. *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 40. [11] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45.
[12] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 36; *Ma'ālim al-kalām* (not paged); Or. 3,091 f. 51b.
[13] b. Ḥazm, 5, 14. [14] *Ibāna*, 19; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 97; Ījī, 86.

or an accident resulting from the constitution of the body, which does not endure for two units of time and is only the life.[1] Life can exist without an organised body (*binya*). If this were not so, either one accident would inhere in many atoms or a separate life would inhere in each atom.[2] The acts of men happen by the power of God, phenomenal power having no effect on them. Motive, power, and the act are all created by God for He is the only effective force in the world.[3] The proof of the above statement is this.

A purposed act presupposes a plan; this demands full knowledge of all involved in the act; man knows his acts only in part so he cannot be the author of them.[4] Yet man is a voluntary agent,[5] he produces acquisition not creation.[6] Acquisition is the name for an act which inheres in a substrate, the power of man.[7] The only effect of man's phenomenal power is the belief that the act is made easier when the means to it are sound.[8] Secondary acts are done by God. There is in man a capacity which is more than a harmonious constitution; it is with the act.[9] Capacity for a good act is not capacity for a bad, its contrary.[10] Men were made responsible before receiving capacity, so more may be demanded from them than they can perform.[11] Power and impotence are not of the same genus.[12]

By speech the substrate, in which it inheres, becomes a speaker.[13] In this world men are in the sight of God what they will be in the hereafter; the doctrine of *muwāfāt*.[14]

There can be no perception in the dead[15]; this contradicts what was taught by b. Karrām and Muḥammad al-Ṣāliḥī. Man shows his love to God by not disobeying him.[16]

[1] *Iḳdām*, 329. [2] *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 263. [3] *Marham*, 146.
[4] *Iḳdām*, 67 f.
[5] Maḳrīzī, 2, 358. This is the more reasonable interpretation of *al-fā'il al-mukhtār*.
[6] *Tabyīn*, 149. "Acquisition" was taken from the Koran; others preferred "*ikhtiyārī*."
[7] Maḳrīzī, 2, 360. See "differences." [8] *Iḳdām*, 78.
[9] b. Ḥazm, 3, 54; *Ma'ālim*. [10] *Luma'* f. 48v.; *Fiḳh akbar*, 12.
[11] Makrīzī; 2, 360. *Irshād*, 128. [12] *Luma'* f. 52r.
[13] *Irshād*, 60. [14] b. Ḥazm, 4, 219.
[15] *Rauḍa bahiya*, 15. [16] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 75; N. 3.

Religion.

Faith. Al-Ash'arī gave more than one definition of faith. It is belief in God, His prophets, and His revelation; or it is belief in the prophet's message, partly in outline, partly in detail; or it is knowledge of the existence of the creator.[1] It involves knowledge so it can only be in an adult of sound mind.[2] One who accepts the truth by hearsay is not an unbeliever but does not deserve the name of believer (*mu'min*) till he knows to some degree that the world needs a creator, that that creator must be one, that prophecy is true, and also some proofs of these truths.[3] Faith is belief in the heart, but public declaration is inseparable from it. This belief includes knowledge and a statement which involves knowledge; it is words and works; so it can grow or diminish.[4] *Tawfīḳ* is the creation of faith, *khadhlān* the creation of unbelief, so faith and good works occur when God helps a man, unbelief and sin when he deserts him.[5] He who commits a great sin, believing it to be lawful, is an unbeliever.[6] Denial with the tongue is not unbelief but a sign of it.[7] It is a parody to say that, if a man believes in his heart, he can be anything outwardly, even an infidel.[8] Islam is a wider notion than faith.[9] The tyranny of words appears in the statement that the faith of God is eternal, the faith of man created.[10]

Sin. Right and wrong are what they are because God has declared them to be so.[11] He may, of his mercy or at the intercession of the prophet, pardon a sinning believer who die sunrepentant, or he may in his justice punish him in hell, though he will at least take him to heaven.[12] Ibn Ḥazm allows that al-Ash'arī was orthodox on heaven and hell.[13] "We hope for heaven for sinners."[14]

God can inflict pain on children in this world or the next

[1] *Iḳdām*, 472; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 248; Ījī, 275; Or. 3,091 f. 66a.
[2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 255. For exaggerations on both sides, see *Rawḍa bahiya*, 21 f. As faith includes belief in the prophets, it cannot be a duty before prophets have been sent, *Musāmara*, 166.
[4] *Ibāna*, 10; Subkī, 1, 47; *Iḳdām*, 472.
[5] *Ibāna*, 77; Shahrastānī, 74.
[6] *Ibāna*, 10. [7] b Ḥazm, 3, 216. [8] b. Ḥazm, 4, 204.
[9] *Ibāna*, 10. [10] *Tabyīn*, 150.
[11] *Luma'*, f. 63r. [12] Maḳrīzī, 2, 360. [13] b. Ḥazm, 4, 45. [14] *Ibāna*, 19

and it does not impair his justice.[1] The idea of compensation is dropped.

Grace. God need not do what is good for men, what is best for them, or be gracious to them; yet he has done these things for them.[2] The provision which he makes for them includes things lawful and unlawful.[3] There is no graciousness to unbelievers.[4]

Koran. Al-Ash'arī does not face the problem of the Koran and the world of God. The word is a concept inhering in the self[5]; the expression indicates what is in the self and is called word only by analogy.[6] The words revealed by the tongues of angels to the prophets are guides to the eternal word[7]; the thing indicated, the Koran, is pre-existent and eternal, the indication, the expression or reading, is created.[8] The reading differs from what is read as a statement differs from the thing mentioned. In reading the Koran, the sounds are created; what is read is the word of God metaphorically not really.[9] What is read is not miraculous but is created in the likeness of the miraculous.[10] The miracle, which men strive to rival, was always with God, has not been separated from him, and was not sent down to men.[11] It is a miraculous composition but not less than a whole *sura* can be a miracle.[12] There are always divines who can interpret the ambiguous verses.[13] The mujtahid is always right in essentials.[14]

The beatific vision. All that is can be seen so God can be seen[15]; this is allowed by reason and necessitated by revelation.[16] God will be seen in the hereafter without form or limit,[17] not in place or by the impinging of rays of light. This vision is a peculiar knowledge connected with existence and excluding non-existence. Or it may be a perception beyond knowledge.[18] God has not given to the people of his heaven anything nobler than to look at and see Him.[19]

[1] *Ibāna*, 72; *Iḳdām*, 410.
[2] Shahrastānī, 74; *Ibāna*, 9.
[3] *Ibāna*, 12.
[4] *Ibāna*, 68.
[5] *Iḳdām*, 320.
[6] Maḳrīzī, 2, 359.
[7] Cf. b. Ḥazm, 3, 6; 4, 211.
[8] "A new doctrine"; *Iḳdām*, 313; *Fiḳh akbar*, 23.
[9] *Iḳdām*, 313.
[10] b. Ḥazm, 4, 207.
[11] b. Ḥazm, 3, 15.
[12] b. Ḥazm, 3, 10; 4, 207.
[13] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 223
[14] *Tabyīn*, 151.
[15] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 97.
[16] *Iḳdām*, 356.
[17] *Tabyīn*, 149.
[18] Maḳrīzī, 2, 360.
[19] *Ibāna*, 16.

The prophets. The sending of prophets is possible not necessary. When God sends His prophets with miracles men must hearken to them. A miracle is an act of God to confirm the authority of a prophet.[1] A false prophet can work miracles only if he claims divinity.[2] Muḥammad was but is no longer a prophet.[3] (Cf. Differences). The miracles of the saints are real.[4]

The imam. The office of imam is a fundamental part of religion; reason shows that it is allowable, revelation that it is necessary.[5] The holder of the office must be from Ḳuraish.[6] The office is not hereditary but is by appointment; the holder must be the most excellent of his age.[7] The historical order of the four orthodox caliphs is the order of their excellence[8] God looked with favour on 'Uthmān and 'Alī but 'Uthmān was the more excellent.[9] One man, if he is a mujtahid, can appoint the imam and the appointment is binding on all; but if the man chosen is not fit for the office, the appointment is not valid.[10]

Suggestions (*khawāṭir*). The devil whispers to men; this contradicts the teaching of Jahm and the Mu'tazila.[11]

While al-Ash'arī was developing his system, Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī († 333/944) was formulating a similar doctrine in Transoxiana. Nothing whatever is known about his life. He was held to be a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa and his school is often called Ḥanafī. It is not known why the two systems are so much alike.

Differences between al-Ash'arī and al-Māturīdī

Thirteen points of difference are enumerated; seven are called verbal and the rest are differences in thought.[12]

1. Must the words "if God wills" be added to the statement "I am a believer?" Al-Ash'arī required them, al-Māturīdī did not.

2. Can a man predestined to heaven go to hell and one predestined to hell go to heaven? Al-Ash'arī said "no," al-Māturīdī "yes."

1 *Irshād*, 179.
2 b. Ḥazm, 4, 213. Perhaps refers to the school.
3 b. Ḥazm, 4, 215.
4 Maḳrīzī, 2, 360.
5 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 272.
6 Ījī, 302.
7 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 293; *Farḳ*, 344.
8 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 304.
9 *Tabyīn kadhib*, 151.
10 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 280.
11 *Ibāna*, 12.
12 *Rawḍa bahiya*.

3. Can an infidel receive blessings? Al-Ash'arī, no;[1] al-Māturīdī, yes.

4. Is a prophet still a prophet after death? Al-Ash'arī; he ceased to be a prophet at death but still belonged to the class of prophets. Al-Māturīdī; he is still a prophet.

5. Is will (*irāda*) the same as satisfaction (*riḍā*)? Al-Ash'arī, no; al-Māturīdī, yes.[2]

6. Is faith which rests on hearsay valid? Al-Ash'arī, no; al-Māturīdī, yes.

7. *Acquisition.* The disciples of al-Ash'arī gave this explanation: God creates in a man the resolve to do something and the deed. The man has no effective but only an acquisitive part in the deed. Acquisition is the connection of human power with the deed, but without causation. There is a proverb, "More subtle than the acquisition of al-Ash'arī."

Al-Māturīdī; external acts and inclination, motive, and will are all the work of God; the direction of man's power to one of two possible acts is acquisition and it is not the work of God. When this resolve has come into being God creates the act.

Real differences.

8. Can God punish a good man? Both held that revelation proves this impossible; al-Ash'arī held that reason did not prove it impossible and al-Māturīdī taught the opposite.

9. Is knowledge of God made necessary by reason or revelation? Al-Ash'arī said revelation; because God's promise and threat are revealed proofs. Al-Māturīdī said reason; because it is the instrument by which necessity is known, it does not create necessity.

10. Are the attributes of action phenomenal or eternal? Al-Ash'arī said phenomenal and al-Māturīdī eternal.

11. Can the word which inheres in God be heard? Al-Ash'arī, yes and al-Māturīdī, after some hesitation, no.[3]

12. Can God demand of man what is beyond his power to give? Al-Ash'arī, yes, al-Māturīdī, no.

[1] *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 9. [2] Spitta is wrong here. [3] Taftazānī, 84.

13. Are prophets without sin? Al-Ash'arī held that they might commit venial sins through carelessness,[1] al-Māturīdī held that they were without sin.

A few more facts can be gleaned about the teaching of al-Māturīdī. Protection (*'iṣma*) is not compulsion; it helps man to do what is right, turns him from evil, but does not destroy the testing which exercises the power of choosing.[2] He, who uses private judgement, may make mistakes.[3] Moses heard a sound which represented the word of God.[4] Revelation, not reason, tells that God can be seen.[5] The school of al-Māturīdī was not a mere echo of his ideas; Samarkand and Bukhara were centres of thought which sometimes differed.

God.

God knows by knowledge, but He does not create by creation.[6] Some held formation (*takwīn*) to be an eternal attribute.[7]

Reason.

Samarkand said that God made right and wrong what they are and reason only perceives them.[8] Reason is an instrument of clear thinking, not a cause which produces an effect; it shows the effect which God usually makes to follow an antecedent. Some held that reason was effective only after revelation came.[9]

Religion.

Samarkand said that faith was created while Bukhara said not.[10] Samarkand said that faith is a duty imposed by reason before the coming of any prophet; Bukhara agreed with al-Ash'arī.[11] Reason allows that man may be under obligation to do what God knows will not happen; this occurs.[12] Some held the sending of prophets to be necessary.[13] Prophets may commit small sins so that they can sympathise with those who need their intercession.[14] They can get knowledge without revelation

1 *Farḳ*, 210. After the call prophets are without sin.
2 *Rauḍa bahiya*, 59; Taftazānī, 145.
3 Taftazānī, 151.
4 *Musāmara*, 76.
5 *Arba'īn*, 198.
6 *Fiḳh akbar*, 1, 22.
7 *Muḥaṣṣal*, 135.
8 *Musāmara*, 158.
9 *Mu sāmara*, 154.
10 *Muṣāmara*, 2, 48.
11 *Musāmara*, 166.
12 *Musāmara*, 157.
13 *Musāmara*, 181.
14 *Fiḳh akbar*, 1, 26.

but not of what God has kept secret.[1] They are more excellent than archangels, believers than angels, and women than houris for men are rewarded for good works while angels are not.[2] The blessings promised by revelation are pure bounty.[3] The doing of the best for men, provision of livelihood, and compensation for ills are not incumbent on God for the opposites are not opposed to wisdom.[4] Forgiveness of unbelief contradicts wisdom.[5] Doubtful verses are those the meaning of which is not known in this world.[6] Some hesitated over the return of the spirit to the body for the punishment in the grave.[7] At the judgment an accusation by a domestic animal or a dhimmi will be more grave than one by a Muslim.[8]

The next great name in the school of al-Ash'arī is Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭīb al-Bāḳillānī († 403/1013) who had his home in Baghdad. He was at one remove a pupil of al-Ash'arī. Stories told of him show that he had a pretty wit. He was sent as ambassador to Constantinople where he was admitted to the presence of the emperor by a door so low that he had to stoop; to avoid the appearance of bowing to the emperor he went through the door backwards. On another occasion Ibn al-Mu'allim, a leader of the Shī'a, saw him coming and said, "The devil has come to you," al-Bāḳillānī sat down by him and quoted, "We sent the devils to the unbelievers" (Kor., 19, 86).

Al-Bāḳillānī saw that words might take on a special sense in the usage of religion yet this new meaning did not do away with the original profane sense.[9] He held also that if the arguments for religious truth were false, then that truth itself must be untrue, so that any attack on the philosophical basis of his creed was an attack on the faith.[10] He observed the outward forms of religion punctiliously and was a voluminous writer though only a few tracts have survived.

God.

The existence of God is not different in kind from that of the

[1] *Musāmara*, 202. [2] *Musāmara*, 183. [3] *Musāmara*, 155.
[4] *Musāmara*, 155, 181. [5] *Musāmara*, 177, 216. [6] *Musāmara*, 35.
[7] *Musāmara*, 232. [8] *Musāmara*, 185. [9] *Tamyīz* f. 7a.
[10] B. Khaldūn, 3, 114.

universe,[1] and His knowledge is of the same sort as man's.[2] He endures by His essence, not by an attribute of endurance; this enduring is a continuance of His being which does not depend on anything else and is a personal (*nafsi*) attribute, not an addition to His essence.[3] It is not certain that man can know his quiddity.[4] After some hesitation al-Bāḳillānī accepted the doctrine of states, though this conflicted with his general position; he called them entities inhering in God. There is a state which makes the other states (attributes) necessary.[5] The attributes are distinct from each other; there are fifteen, always with God, and other than he.[6] His knowing his knowledge is that knowledge,[7] in other words, in God there is no duality of knower and known. His face is His existence, His hands are an affirmative (*thubūti*) attribute, additional to His essence.[8] He has only one name; the attributes may be used as appellatives (*tasmiyāt*) and any word, which denotes one of His qualities, may be a name for Him so long as it does not suggest anything derogatory. There is no need for revelation here.[9] God is the only creator and therefore the only cause; He cannot do other than he has done.[10] Ibn Ḥazm affirms that al-Bāḳillānī did not understand that God's willing and creating unbelief was different from His being pleased with it.[11] Reason and revelation tell us that God can be seen.[12]

Reason.

Knowledge is cognition of a thing as it is.[13] The usual classification of knowledge was accepted. Reason is a modicum of necessary[14] knowledge, for no reasoning is possible without some knowledge. There are three kinds of religious judgments:—

1. Known by reasoned proof; as, that the universe is originated and has a creator; his power, will, knowledge which are deduced by reason; that the prophets are his messengers.

1 Ījī, 90 (al-Ash'arī differed). 2 b. Ḥazm, 2, 136.
3 *Rawḍa bahiya* 66 f; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 109; Ījī, 72.
4 Ījī, 105. 5 Shahrastānī, 67; *Iḳdām*, 131.
6 *Irshād*, 79; b. Ḥazm, 4, 207; Cf. 2, 216. 7 Ījī, 54.
8 Ījī, 75. 9 b. Ḥazm, 2, 151; 4, 214; al-Ījī, 161.
10 b. Ḥazm, 4, 223. 11 b. Ḥazm, 4, 220. 12 Ījī, 83.
13 *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 1057. 14 Subkī, 2, 42.

2. Known by revelation; the laws about actions necessary, forbidden, and allowable.

3. Known by both reason and revelation; those attributes of God not deduced by reason, i.e., hearing, sight, the word, and the power to pardon sinners. For these the main reliance is on revelation as the evidence of reason for them is weak.[1]

Necessary knowledge is incompatible with obligation.[2] The knowledge of good and evil is not necessary for, if it were, all would agree; they do not.[3] Knowledge follows necessarily on reasoning but is not caused by it.[4] Doubt does not always precede reasoning.[5] One act of knowledge may apprehend two connected knowables.[6]

Physics.

Al-Bāḳillānī accepted the theory of atoms. Things do not need endurance to continue; this is deduced from the fact that existence is one both in God and in all else. Accidents, being phenomena which cannot endure, disappear in the second unit of time without needing a destruction; substances disappear by the removal from them of modes of being so that existence is no longer possible for them, neither in place nor in anything like it. At one time al-Bāḳillānī believed that the Creator destroyed substances by direct action.[7]

Ibn Ḥazm argues that such disappearance has no agent as God does not create it, and this is unbelief.[8] The idea is expressed in another way; when God wants to destroy a thing he cuts off the modes of existence from it.[9] Things exist only for one unit of time and are continually being re-created. There is no order of nature as God is the only cause; that there should be an apparent order is only custom; God need not act thus. Endurance and destruction are not entities.[10] Accidents only exist when they become manifest (cf. Ḍirār) so there is no heat in fire and no blood in man.[11] Every quality, which does not

[1] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 35; Cf. *Iḳdām*, 237.
[2] *I'jāz al-kur'ān*, 15.
[3] *Marham*, 124.
[4] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 29; N. 1.
[5] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 26; N. 1
[6] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 70; N. 2.
[7] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 98; N. 1.
[8] b. Ḥazm, 4, 222.
[9] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45, 67, 321.
[10] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 90, 109.
[11] b. Ḥazm, 4, 218; 5, 62.

exist independently, is a state, whether life is necessary to it or not. For example, the property of occupying space does not presuppose life.

Man.

The spirit is an accident, it is life and is other than the soul; this life is situated in one of the smallest parts of the body.[1] There are six senses, the sixth being the perception of pain or pleasure.[2] God alone creates man's acts, creating the act while man gives it its character; thus God creates the acts of bowing and prostration while man makes them prayer.[3] Man is connected with his acts in the sense that he gives them a character by which they merit recompense. Voluntary acts are felt to differ from involuntary; the reason is that man's power is not connected with his acts in the same way as is his knowledge.[4] Impotence can only be where it is conceivable that power might be; so it is wrong to say that man has not the power to do what is outside the sphere of human activity.[5] God imposes on man duties above his strength when he tells him to do what he cannot do because he is already doing the opposite; thus an unbeliever cannot obey the command to believe because his unbelief is the opposite of faith.[6]

Religion.

Al-Bāḳillānī's teaching on faith is the same as al-Ash'arī's and there is no need to add to the confession the words "if God wills."[7] Repentance for one sin is accepted only if the sinner repents of all.[8] A man must repent every time he remembers a sin; otherwise it becomes another sin.[9] Avoidance of great sins does not bring the forgiveness of small.[10]

All that is said about the movement of the soul, its being in green birds, its coming back to the tomb, refers to part of the dead man; God will create a new body for man's new life.[11]

[1] b. Ḥazm, 5. 74, 77.
[2] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 76; N. 2.
[3] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 27; Iji, 106; Shahrastānī, 69 f; *Iḳdām*, 73-6.
[4] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 30.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 5, 11; *Irshād*, 178.
[6] *Minhāj al-sunna*, 2, 15.
[7] Iji, 275; *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 253.
[8] b. Ḥazm, 3, 243.
[9] *Irshād*, 229 f.
[10] b. Ḥazm, 4, 219.
[11] b. Ḥazm, 4, 217; 5, 74. 77.

He gives earthly but not religious blessings to unbelievers.[1] It is conceivable that a prophet may commit sins, even great sins, except falsifying his message and may even be careless in delivering it, but revelation shows that he does not do such things.[2] Reason admits that he might have been an unbeliever before his call, but this has never happened.[3] Angels are more excellent than prophets.[4] Some, who lived after Muḥammad, are more excellent than he.[5] A miracle is not an incontrovertible proof that a man is a prophet for God can work miracles through a saint or sorcerer though not through a liar.[6] It is only the summons to emulation which differentiates the miracles of a prophet from those of a sorcerer.[7] Saints can work miracles so long as it is not for self-glorification.[8] Al-Bāḳillānī did not allow that a prophet could impose a law on men by making a future miracle, even though it should come to pass, a proof of his mission.[9] Two acts, which are not miraculous, cannot combine to form a miracle.[10]

Paradise is already created for Adam was driven out of it.[11]

Moses heard the voice of God; usually only the voice of the reader of the Koran is heard.[12] The word of God is an eternal attribute; it is read by tongues and remembered in hearts but, like man's knowledge of God, it does not inhere in them. The reading of it and man's knowledge of it are created; the things read and known are uncreated for on earth the Koran is a report of the eternal.[13] The division of the verses and arrangement of the chapters is the work of men.[14]

Less than one chapter is not a miracle.[15] Its miraculous character resides in the wonderful composition and high degree of eloquence.[16] There is a limit to the excellence of the Koran which God can compose.[17]

[1] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 11; b. Ḥazm, 2, 222. This is partial agreement with al-Māturīdī against al-Ash'arī. *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 9.
[2] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 58; b. Ḥazm, 4, 224; Ījī, 218 f.
[3] *Musāmara*, 196. [4] Ījī, 238; Mu'tazili doctrine.
[5] b. Ḥazm, 4, 2. 27. Reported by al-Sumnānī, rejected by b. Ḥazm.
[6] Ījī, 182; b. Ḥazm, 5, 2. 11.
[7] b. Ḥazm, 4, 214; 5, 2.; Contrary Ījī, 177.
[8] Ījī, 193. [9] *Irshād*, 183. [10] Ījī, 202.
[11] *Tamyīz* f. 124a. [12] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 44.
[13] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 47 f.; b. Ḥazm, 4, 211. [14] b. Ḥazm, 4, 211.
[15] b. Ḥazm, 4, 220. [16] Ījī, 200. [17] b. Ḥazm, 4, 221.

The punishment in the grave is real. If a man has been executed and his body left exposed to the public gaze, he may be recalled to life and questioned by the angels without men being aware of it.[1] The imam must be the most excellent of his time; al-Bāḳillānī enumerated eleven qualifications of the imam,[2] and inclined to put 'Alī on an equality with 'Uthmān.[3]

Abu 'l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḳalānisī was a contemporary of al-Bāḳillānī and Ibn Fūrak.[4] His theology was very like that of Ibn Kullāb, as al-Shahrastānī remarks.

God.

God is above the throne but does not touch it and is not body.[5] He is eternal by an eternity which is an entity in him.[6] His attributes are without beginning (*azalī*) but not eternal (*ḳadīm*) and they cannot be called enduring because endurance cannot inhere in them.[7] His two hands are one attribute.[8] Whatever exists in itself can be seen, so God can be seen.[9] The mental speech of God is eternal but is so called only in eternity. In eternity the word was not command and statement because these are phenomenal; then it became statement and command by itself, not by an entity for it is an attribute and so no entity can inhere in it.[10]

Reason.

Knowledge derived from reason is higher in rank than that got from the senses.[11] A rational man must know that knowledge which can be got by reason.[12] One, who believes in the truth without being able to prove it yet suffers from no doubts to trouble his faith, is a believer.[13]

Physics.

The enduring of a body is other than the body and inheres in it; so a body can be renewed, but an accident, in which

1 Ījī, 272.
2 b. Ḥazm, 4, 110. 166.
3 *Musāmara*, 280.
4 *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 6.
5 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 113.
6 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 89; *Itḥāf al-sāda*, 2, 21.
7 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 90.
8 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 111.
9 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 97.
10 *Raudḍ bahiya*, 50; Subkī, 2, 51.
11 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 10.
12 *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 256.
13 *Uṣūl al-dīn* ,254.

nothing can inhere, cannot be renewed. Destruction is an accident which is created by God in the body (v.l. atom) destroyed; by it the body disappears in the second unit of time after the coming of destruction.[1] Rest is two successive modes of existence in one place; movement is two successive modes of existence, one in one place and one in another.[2] Weight is an accident other than the heavy thing.[3] Speech may be in what is not alive[4]; this may be a deduction from miracles. Only sound or speech can be heard.[5]

Religion.

Al-Ḳalānisī inclined to the idea that faith is good works.[6] Wrong-doing is in the wrong-doer, even if only in part of him.[7] The uncertain verses of the Koran are those of which God alone knows the meaning.[8] The scholars of the community, who are present, shall appoint the imam; no quorum is fixed.[9] The less excellent, if suitable, may be imam even though the more excellent is on the spot. Al-Ḳalānisī would not decide between 'Alī and 'Uthmān.[10]

Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Fūrak was put to death by Maḥmūd of Ghazni in 406/1015 or 6, ostensibly because he said that Muḥammad was not a prophet after his death. This may have been only a deduction drawn by enemies from the idea that spirit (soul) is an accident which endures for one unit of time only; the opposite doctrine is ascribed to him, that Muḥammad is alive in his grave, a prophet for ever.[11] The following doctrines are worth noting.

God has only one name but many appellations (*tasmiyāt*)[12]; the divine attributes are like human qualities.[13] The first duty of man is to seek reasoned knowledge[14]; knowledge is defined as what makes action possible.[15] The soul is the breath which goes out warm from the body after coming in cold.[16] A prophet may have been an unbeliever before his call[17] and may commit

[1] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 45, etc. [2] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 40; Cf. *Farḳ*. 144.
[3] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 46. [4] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 29. [5] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 97.
[6] *Irshād*, 225. [7] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 132. [8] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 222.
[9] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 281. [10] *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 243. 304. [11] *Rawḍa bahiya*, 14.
[12] b. Ḥazm, 4, 214. [13] b. Ḥazm, 4, 209. [14] Damīri, 1, 193.
[15] *Mawāḳif*, 1, 73. [16] b. Ḥazm, 4, 215. [17] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 160.

venial sins like killing women and paederasty.[1] In presence of danger prophets and saints have used words of repentance though there had been no sin.[2]

There is no obligation on man to do the impossible. If there should be, it is because God is absolute lord; even then, the purpose is not to fulfil the obligation but to display man's helplessness.[3] In reading the Koran two voices are heard, that of the reader and that of God.[4]

Abū Isḥāḳ Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Isfara'īnī († 418/1027) was a contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbār, who asked him:—If God did not give me guidance and condemned me to perdition, did he do to me good or evil? Al-Isfara'īnī answered:—If he withheld what is yours, he did wrong; if he withheld what is his —he shows mercy to whom he will.[5] Peculiarities of the teaching are the following.

God.

The most specific quality of God is a mode of being which differentiates him from others.[6] He has an attribute which makes him independent of space.[7] His word is not heard.[8]

Reason.

Man's first duty is to reason and the use of it is incompatible with doubt.[9]

Religion.

Saints do not work miracles, the Mu'tazili doctrine.[10] Man's gratitude cannot equal God's goodness so it may be hurtful to one who thinks he has done his duty; to presume to thank God as he deserves is unbelief. Man has the power of making something like the Koran, but God has turned him from doing so.[11] Prophets cannot tell lies through their carelessness.[12]

Abu 'l-Ma'ālī 'Abd al-malik al-Juwainī, Imām al-Ḥaramain († 478/1085) belonged to the school of al-Ash'arī. He got his

1 b. Ḥazm, 4, 224.
2 *Marham*, 226.
3 *Marham*, 98.
4 *Risāla lahiya*, 44.
5 Subkī, 3, 114.
6 Shahrastānī, 72.
7 *Muḥaṣṣal*, 130.
8 Taftazānī, 84 (cf. Māturīdī).
9 *Muḥaṣṣal*, 26; N. 1; 28 N. 3.
10 Ījī, 243; *Iḳdām*, 390.
11 Ījī, 200.
12 *Dict. Tech. Terms*, 1048.

name Imām al-Ḥaramain because he took refuge in the holy cities from persecution. He was recalled by Niẓām al-mulk who built a school for him in Nishapur. It is reported that he said, "Do not study theology; had I known to what theology would bring me, I would never have studied it," but al-Subkī rejects this tale. He is also reported to have said that God knows only universals; this is rejected as a Ḥanbalī lie, based on his statement that God cannot have a detailed knowledge of infinity which is essentially undefined. He affirmed that he died in the faith of the old women of Nishapur. He assumed that the doctrine of matter and form is only another way of expressing the doctrine of substance and accidents. His book, *Irshād*, provides several instances of his muddled thinking.[1]

God.

Before the phenomenal world was, the Creator was alone in His being and attributes, and there was nothing beside Him; He does not occupy space or direction, is not a substrate for phenomena and needs no substrate. He endures in Himself (*linafsihi*). His endurance is not a quality produced by something (*ma'nā*) in Him; it is a personal attribute and is of the essence, not additional to it. (Earlier teachers regarded it as additional to the essence.) God is the only agent; what He can do is infinite, though it does not follow that He does it all; purpose is not the motive of His action. He does not change His mind. He wills all things, good and bad; what He wills happens and what He does not will does not happen. His command is not the same as His will, for He commands what He does not will and wills what He does not command. What He knows will not happen does not happen. Strictly speaking, He cannot love or be loved. He has all perceptions but is not perceived.[2]

Existence is not an attribute for it is the essence and adds nothing to it. The names of God are His attributes; they are known by revelation not by reason and men cannot make names for Him by reasoning. The attributes may be classified as follows:—

[1] Article on al-Juwainī in Subkī, Vol. III

[2] *Iḳdām*, 109.

1. Personal (*nafsī*) ; each endures as long as the essence and is not caused. They are affirmative.

2. Conceptual (*ma'nawī*) ; due to a cause inhering in God.

3. Affirmative (*thābit*) ; they are the hands, eyes, and face. In another passage it is said that the face of God means His existence.

An attribute considered with the essence makes a duality. Revelation shows that the attributes are additional to the essence and are separate from each other ; e.g., knowledge is not power. Each attribute is one, e.g., knowledge is one and is not multiplied by the multiplication of things knowable ; this is known by revelation, not by reason. The will is real ; God's unlikeness to phenomena is a personal attribute. The imam inclined to the idea that knowledge was the essence of God.

At first al-Juwainī taught a doctrine of states like that of Abū Hāshim though he does not speak of a state by which the state-attributes were united to God. Later he gave up this doctrine.[1]

God speaks with an eternal word which has no beginning. This word (*kalām*) is speech (*ḳawl*) inhering in Himself, mental speech, not words or sounds. It is one but manifests itself in all forms of speech ; it is command, prohibition, or statement. It is connected with the phenomenal but is not itself phenomenal.

Reason.

The first duty of an adult is to aim at that sound reasoning which gives the knowledge that the world is not eternal and so needs a creator. Religion imposes the duty of supporting belief by rational proofs. Knowledge is cognisance of a thing as it is. Human knowledge is :—

1. *Necessary*. This is not in man's power to have or not to have. It is connected with some want or necessity. What is known by general report is known by necessity. One, who doubts knowledge based on a general report, is as one who doubts intuitive knowledge ; it is like knowing one's mother. Contrary to custom, God can make necessary knowledge depend on the report of one man. The difference between voluntary movement and trembling is known by necessity.

[1] *Iḳdām*, 131.

2. *Intuitive.* This is not in man's power but is not connected with any necessity or want. The boundary between necessary and intuitive knowledge is uncertain.

3. *Acquired.* This is the result of man's phenomenal power and is all ratiocinative.

Necessity does not mean that the quality of necessity inheres in a thing, it means that God has commanded it.

Sound reasoning produces human knowledge, but not as a cause produces its effect. This statement is illustrated in this way; knowledge and will are both needed in an act of will but neither separately can be the creator of the act. Reason is a modicum of necessary knowledge.

Rational proofs (*dalīl 'aḳlī*) are founded on facts and on beliefs. They fall into classes: (1) those of which the probative force is known by necessity; (2) those of which the force is known by reasoning (*naẓar*). Proofs are also classed as: (1) rational proofs which always indicate the thing proved and cannot do otherwise; (2) proofs founded on a true report or a categorical imperative.

Revelation is the basis of all religious knowledge; reason is a tool and by itself cannot establish any of the divine laws. Revelation does not contradict reason. A man must believe what reason allows and revelation affirms, as obligation, right, and wrong. The foundations of belief are two: (1) those apprehended by reason, not by revelation; (2) those apprehended by revelation, not by reason. Every article in the creed depends on knowledge of the word of God and belief in its truth, for revealed knowledge is based on the word of God. So what leads men to accept the word of God cannot be revelation. Reason supported by revelation says that God may be seen and is the sole creator; that He will be seen is known only by revelation.

A miracle is a proof only when it is joined to the claim to be a prophet. No one ever believed in such a miracle and then doubted that there were prophets; this shows that this belief is by necessity. It is noteworthy that in one place the argument from agreement is put first and that from the Koran second.

Physics.

An atom is an atom even when it does not exist ; existence is a state in an atom. Essences differ by their states. At the moment of origination an atom has not endurance. No atom can be without accidents so God destroys atoms by not creating accidents in them. (Destruction *i'dām* is just non-existence, *'adam*, which is pure negation and so can produce no effects). Accidents do not endure, they succeed one another in a substrate and are not latent in it ; if they endured, they could not cease to be. There are no secondary effects. Power, whether divine or human, is applied to its object at the moment it comes into being ; that is to say that power cannot work on the non-existent or what already exists. Atoms and accidents can be renewed, this is proved by what revelation in the Koran says of the resurrection ; the thing renewed is the thing first created.

Man.

Life is an accident by which the spirit lives ; the spirit is subtle bodies permeating the corporeal body ; life lasts as long as this association. Phenomenal power, which in men is equated with capacity, is an accident and not before the act ; it is connected with one act only and not with two opposites. Al-Juwainī indulges in some verbal gymnastics. Impotence (*'ajz*) is the correlative of human power so man is not impotent for acts which are outside his sphere, e.g., involuntary acts like trembling. Human power does not cause existence, but acts on essences and their states.[1] The acts of a man are not connected with reward and punishment. Obligation (*taklīf*) may be for more than a man can do. It may take many forms. Al-Juwainī says that reason admits the possibility of its taking the form of combining two opposites ; elsewhere this is declared impossible. This idea of obligation is proved by the Koran and is admitted by all. The example given is that he who sits cannot stand because the capacity to stand is not yet created in him.

[1] This is almost contradicted. *Iḳdām*, 78. According to al-Juwainī, the Mu'tazila taught that human power could produce existence which was not all of one sort.

Religion.

Faith is belief in God and accepting as true what He says; it is mental speech and presupposes knowledge.[1] A man may say, "I am a believer," but in speaking of his state at death he must add, "If God wills." Repentance is giving up sin, being sorry for it, and also resolving not to return to it, except for those sins which a man can no longer commit. Reason and revelation show that God is not forced to accept repentance. The conversion of an infidel is not repentance; conversion and repentance remove the burden of unbelief. Regarded as rebellion against God, all sins are great; yet there are degrees in sin. God's guidance is the creation of faith in man. (This word has other meanings in the Koran). *Tawfīḳ*, which is the same as grace, is the creation of the power to do good; desertion is the creation of the power to do evil. If revelation praises the doer of an act, that act is good; goodness is not something over and above God's declaration that it is good. Badness is the opposite. Reward is God's bounty, punishment His justice, neither is necessary to Him. Pains and pleasures come from God alone; they are good and there is no need to drag in ideas of desert, compensation, or advantage. Provision (*riẓḳ*) is all that can be of use to man and includes what is forbidden by law. Man has only one appointed time; what God in eternity knew would happen to him will happen to him.

It is incumbent on all Muslims to command what is right.

The miracle of the Koran consists of the union of eloquence with a style foreign to the normal Arab; reports of ancient history, for the prophet had no book learning; and prophecies of the future.

The questions in the grave may be addressed to parts of the heart which God will bring to life for this purpose.

A man becomes a prophet because God chooses him; this is directed against the idea that the office is the reward of good works. Knowledge of God does not make a prophet for all can have it. A prophet can make no mistake about God and cannot do anything that would invalidate his message, cause

[1] The essence of faith does not grow greater or less; its concomitants may. *Musāmara*, 2, 41, 43.

His veracity to be doubted. This is not known by reason. Probably they may commit small sins. They are of different ranks. Miracles confirm the claim to be a prophet. Saints may work miracles but these differ from those of a prophet because they are not accompanied by the claim to be a prophet. Sorcery is not contrary to reason and is real but only evil men practise it.

The imam has to be chosen ; one man in a position of authority can make the choice. There may not be two imams in one small country. The less excellent may be imam if the more excellent is prevented from taking the post. A good imam cannot be deposed ; a bad may be corrected, may abdicate, or be deposed. An imam must be : able to form an independent judgment ; have the good of the Muslims at heart ; a warrior ; wise ; not so tender hearted that he cannot punish ; pious ; upright ; from Ḳuraish ; free ; a Muslim and not a woman. It may be assumed that these are the eleven qualities demanded by al-Bāḳillānī. 'Uthmān and 'Alī are equal in excellence.[1]

[1] *Musāmara*, 279.

CHAPTER IX

THE LAST PHASE

'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī († 415/1024) was famous in his day and so deserves mention though little is recorded of his teaching. The Ṣāḥib 'Abbād was his patron and appointed him kadi of Ray (367/977). When the Ṣāḥib died, 'Abd al-Jabbār declared that he had died without repentance; this was held to be base ingratitude. 'Abd al-Jabbār was at first a follower of Al-Ash'arī but became a Mu'tazilī; he had some reputation among the Shī'a.[1] He was a follower of Abū Hāshim and so agreed in part with the Mu'tazila of Basra. In a discussion with Abū Iṣḥāḳ al-Isfara'īnī he said:

"Exalted is He who is separate from evil."

"Exalted is He in whose realm only what He wills happens."

"Does our Lord wish to be disobeyed?"

"Is our Lord disobeyed against His will?"

"If He withholds guidance from me and decrees perdition for me, has He done good to me or evil?"

"If He withholds from you your own, He has done evil; if He withholds from you His own—he singles out who He will for his mercy."

'Abd al-Jabbār had no answer.[2] This discussion went further than that in which Ghailān was forced to take part.

God.

God is first known as the originator of body. Perceptivity is a function of life both in God and man. The will is an attribute separate from power and knowledge; it is originated and inheres in itself, not in the essence of God.[3] Acts done by God remain

[1] *Risālat al-Ghufrān*, 156. [2] Subkī, 3, 114.

[2] Ījī, 59 f. *Rawḍa bahiya*, 20. It may be noted that some of the ideas, which Horten (*Systeme*) ascribes to 'Abd al-Jabbār, belong to al-Bāḳillānī.

in His power. He cannot inflict pain on children. Guide (*dalīl*) is one of his names.

Reason.

Reason is a modicum of necessary knowledge. Knowledge is defined in two ways ; (*a*) it is an entity which causes the self to rest on the assumption that knowledge apprehends its object as it is : (*b*) it is a state which puts the self at rest. Acquired knowledge need not have a basis in necessary. Outline knowledge has an object ; knowledge of a mode is, of necessity, outline. Knowledge and reasoning may be evil. Opinion and belief are not of the same order ; doubt is not an entity and is wicked if it prevents knowledge from becoming more exact. Inattention is loss (*zawāl*) of knowledge ; sleep is a form of inattention. Pleasure and pain are forms of belief.

Physics.

In the state of not-being, an atom is an atom and an accident an accident, each with an individuality of its own.[1] A single atom is perceived by sight, is not a square (*murabba'*) but like it, and cannot have direction.[2] All will be destroyed together. Entities are not eternal. 'Abd al-Jabbār tried a new classification of accidents ; what can be driven out of its substrate without the aid of a contrary or its equivalent (e.g., sound), does not endure and what cannot be so expelled, endures. A body cannot be seen without colour. An effect cannot happen without its cause. No mode produces a secondary effect though a mode may cause composition (*ta'līf*) if combination (*ijtimā'*) already exists. The earth may be a sphere ; revelation shows that it is at rest, but the cause of this is not known completely by reason.

Man.

Life is individual, it does not need spirit, and there may be two lives in one substrate. Atoms, not accidents, are alive ; that part of a man, which is essential to life, may be renewed

[1] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 34 ;N., 2, 37.

[2] Biram, 48 ; N., 5.

but not life itself. Death is not an entity. Desire and aversion may be where there is no life. The will does not endure. If there are several capacities they can act separately in acts of the heart, but not in acts of the members. Weakness is not an entity contrary to capacity. The satisfaction of hunger or thirst is the removal of desire. Words without meaning may be speech.

Religion.

One report says that faith is obligatory works, another says that all good works are part of faith, which is the doctrine of the Khawārij.[1] There is no certainty of salvation. Reason shows and revelation confirms that recompense is deserved. Reason also shows that some sins are small. A mixture of truth and falsehood and blasphemy by a child are lies. God must give grace; if it might cause equal pleasure or pain, he may prefer that it should cause pain.[2] 'Abd al-Jabbār did not make up his mind on the connection between grace and reward. Heaven and hell are not yet created.[3] 'Alī was the most excellent; his enemies repented but the evidence for this is not a general report.

Abu 'l-Ḥusain Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Baṣrī († 436/1044)[4] belonged to the Mu'tazila; he was a philosopher, tolerant, and criticised the Mu'tazila sharply. He was a pupil of 'Abd al-Jabbār.[5] It is clear that the assimilation to orthodoxy has advanced further than in the time of al-Jubbāī.

God.

The existence of God is His essence (quiddity); He is different from all else and this difference is due to His essence and is not something added to it.[6] This was the teaching of al-Ash'arī. The life of God is His ability to know and have power; it is further defined as the essence which necessitates the denial of the impossibility of knowledge and power being in Him; it is

[1] Ījī, 275; Subkī, 1, 45; D.T.T., 96. [2] al-Ka'bī said the opposite.
[3] Ījī, 254. [4] *Ta'rīkh Baghdād*, 3, 100; b. Khallikān.
[5] Ījī, 290; *Iḥkām*, 221; Rāzī, *I'tiḳādāt*, 45.
[6] Ījī, 9, 12; *Dictionary of Technical Terms*, 1460.

a permanent possibility.[1] Abu 'l-Ḥusain did not accept the doctrine of states, but the attributes, of which he spoke, could not be distinguished from them.[2] He was inclined to reduce all the attributes to power and knowledge or to knowledge alone.[3] The will of God is knowledge of profit in an act; He may will a thing and yet not command it.[4]

His essence causes His knowledge of events when they happen; this knowledge stops when they stop. Knowledge of the past is not the same as knowledge of the future. The Karrāmiya claimed that this was the same as their doctrine of phenomena in God. Abu 'l-Ḥusain defended himself by asserting that God was unchanged, that it was not the knowledge which changed, but the connections of knowingness with God, and these were relative (*iḍāfi*) states of the essence.[5] This was said to be the teaching of Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. In God seeing and hearing mean knowing.[6] Being a knower (*'ālimiya*) is a state caused by the essence.[7]

Reason.

Reason is not an entity. It was left undecided whether acquired must have a basis in necessary knowledge. The knowledge that an act is willed, that an act depends on a motive, that accidents like black and white endure, is necessary and needs no proof.[8] That based on a general report is acquired.

Physics.

The non-existent is not a thing, it is pure negation. Things cannot be known before they come into being.[9] They differ in themselves, by their individual natures, for being is many not one; this idea is said to be due to the rejection of the doctrine of states. The modes of being are not accidents. Two similar accidents cannot inhere in one substrate. Some accidents can endure. Bodies may be renewed, but it is a gathering of

1 Ījī, 56; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 121.
2 Shahrastānī, 59; *Iḳdām*, 177.
3 Shahrastānī, 32, 59; *Iḳdām*, 175.
4 Ījī, 57; *Iḳdām*, 257.
5 Ījī, 25; 53 f; Shahrastānī, 59; *Iḳdām*, 221.
6 Ījī, 62; Taftazānī, 76; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 124.
7 *Muḥaṣṣal*, 55.
8 Ījī, 109; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 80; N., 1.
9 Shahrastānī, 59; *Iḳdām*, 151; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 34.

their scattered parts, not a renewal of what has ceased to be.[1] Abu 'l-Ḥusain could not make up his mind about the theory of atoms.[2]

Man.

Life, power, sight, and hearing are the result of the special constitution of the substrate. God creates in man the will and power to do an act; in such antecedents is something which makes the act inevitable. If motive is present, the act follows by necessity (this was not the usual doctrine of the Mu'tazila); if motive is absent, the act is impossible.[3] A critic calls this determinism.

Religion.

Saints work miracles. Heaven and hell are already created. Both reason and revelation show that an imam is necessary, to be appointed by men.[4] In a bad act is a quality which makes it bad; a good act has not this quality. An act is bad when one, who knows all about it—its origin and consequences—and can do it, will not do it.[5]

'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Māwardī († 450/1058) was a Mu'tazilī[6] and his principles appear in his praise of reason, the root of religion and support of the world, in the first chapter of his *Adab al-dunyā wal-dīn.* Acts of worship fall into two classes:

(1) Those imposed by reason and approved by revelation;

(2) Those imposed by revelation which are not contrary to reason.

Reason is the support of both; by it reality is known and good distinguished from evil. It is twofold:—

(1) Innate, which marks off man from other animals, makes him responsible, and is not subject to increase or decrease. It is an accident and is knowledge of things necessarily perceived. This knowledge is seated in the heart and is twofold:—

[1] Shahrastānī, 59; Ījī, 244.; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 169, says that bodies cannot be renewed.
[2] Pines, *Atomenlehre*, 94: N., 2.
[3] Ījī, 106, 109, 111 f; *Muḥaṣṣal*, 73; N., 2. 141; *Arba'īn*, 227.
[4] Ījī, 243, 254, 297. [5] Ījī, 138.
[6] *Yāḳūt, Biog. Dict.*, 5, 407; Subkī, 3, 304.

(*a*) Knowledge of sense perceptions ;

(*b*) Knowledge of mental processes (e.g., that a thing must either be or not be) ;

(2) Acquired, which is a product of the innate, cannot be separated from it, and is complete knowledge. It grows when used and diminishes when neglected. Growth may be by increase of experience or acuteness of understanding.[1]

Some said that reason cannot be a virtue because it cannot be the mean between extremes. Acquired reason has no limits so increase of reason is a virtue. Al-Māwardī held that the Koran was uncreated and that God does not will the worship of idols.[2]

This doctrine follows al-Jubbāī and al-Ash'arī while the surrender of the creation of the Koran is another sign of the approximation to orthodoxy.

Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Ḥazm († 456/1064) deserves notice because he fought against the prevailing tendencies in theology ; he was defeated and had no successors. He became a convert to the *Ẓāhirī* school of law and applied the principles he learnt in it to religion. All religion is contained in the Koran and tradition ; all that goes beyond these sources is an evil innovation. The prophet did not omit any part of Islam from his preaching. He did not insist on anybody knowing about capacity, whether the Koran was created or not, and whether God will be seen or not. These are theological excrescences, invented by the devil to provoke strife.[3] In arguing with opponents Ibn Ḥazm used theological terms though he did not believe in them ; he is the plain man appealing to the evidence of his senses and the word of God. He is not a belated representative of the Ḥashwiya because he is vehemently opposed to anthropomorphism. It is not surprising that his protest against the application of thought to religion was vain. He has been badly served by the printed edition of his *Book of Religions* ; the manuscript in the British Museum is more concise, less marred by vain repetition. A sample of the argument may

[1] The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā taught the twofold reason ; Cf. 4, 5.
[2] Subkī, 3, 304.
[3] 3, 251. All references in this section are to the *Fiṣal al-milal*.

lead up to the details of his teaching. The 'one' is necessary because it is the foundation of all number. No 'one' exists in the world for every 'one' can be divided and so become a multiple. The 'one' therefore must be outside the world and is God.[1]

God.

God alone is one in reality; in Him essence and existence are one.[2] Four names only can be given Him by reason, the first, the one, truth, and Creator.[3] He is not body for it is known by necessity that what makes body is not body.[4] He is neither moving nor at rest.[5] He is utterly unlike the world so His knowledge and other qualities are not as man's.[6] He acts by His essence; in other words Ibn Ḥazm denied the attributes because the Koran knew them not.[7] 'Attribute' was a bad innovation, introduced by the Mu'tazila, Hishām b. al-Ḥakam and similar leaders of the Shī'a.[8] The only names of God are those sanctioned by the Koran.[9] In God hearing and sight mean knowing[10]; He was always able to create but was not always creating for that would imply the eternity of the world.[11] As he is different from the world, it is right to say that He was always not doing.[12] He created wine, swine, and sickness and can combine contradictories; al-Ash'arī had never heard of anyone who taught that.[13] His knowledge is one, the things He knows are manifold.[14] His spirit and *amr* are created.[15] Falsehood and injustice are imperfections of men so they cannot be in God.[16] He will be seen hereafter by a special power.[17] He invented religious terms; thus he gave 'faith' a special sense and forbade it to be used for simple affirmation.[18]

Reason.

Knowledge is belief in a thing as it is to the exclusion of all doubt. It comes by the senses, by direct reason, or by deduction and is all necessary. If it is not necessary it is only opinion.

[1] 1, 64. [2] 2, 174. [3] 1, 39. [4] 2, 117. [5] 2, 119.
[6] 1, 30. [7] 2, 140. [8] 2, 121. [9] 2, 128. [10] 2, 124.
[11] 2, 190. [12] 5, 56. [13] 3, 36, 66; Ash'arī, *Maḳālāt*, 572.
[14] 2, 143. [15] 2, 169. [16] 2, 192. [17] 3, 2. [18] 3, 196, 205.

The process of deduction, the search for proof is acquisition.[1] Revelation also produces necessary knowledge.[2] Ibn Ḥazm identified a general report with the work of reason, by it a blind man believes in colours; a general report by unbelievers is true unless there is connivance.[3] It is useless to gain knowledge by any other way than that which God has ordained; it is wrong to follow a saint instead of the prophet.[4] Our knowledge of God, gained by direct evidence and reason, is as true as our knowledge of things in this world.[5] On the report of sufficient witnesses we believe in Islam; we do not believe by Islam in the report.[6] Ibn Ḥazm distinguished proofs based on the senses from those based on reason.[7]

God is known by reason but it is only a tool. It is a function of the soul, an accident, created. What it declares to be impossible, God only made impossible after he had created reason. He might have created another reason with other impossibilities.[8] There are four classes of the impossible:

1. Relative; e.g., the growth of a beard on a boy of three.

2. Real; e.g., the change of a mineral into an animal, a stone speaking. These can be imagined; the miracles of the prophets are of this sort.

3. A priori; e.g., a man sits and stands at the same time. These cannot be imagined.

4. Absolute; anything that would involve a change in God.

God can do anything which comes under one of the first three classes, the third class perhaps only in another world.[9]

Men are of two kinds. Those who need proof of their belief; the search for proof is their bounden duty. Most men and women, merchants, slaves, and the imams of tradition who need no proof; the search for it is not incumbent on them.[10]

Physics.

Creation means 'causing to be' so God is always creating the world though this does not mean that He is also always

[1] 5, 108 f. [2] 5, 17. [3] 2, 157; 4, 11. [4] 5, 102.
[5] 3. 76. [6] 4, 11. [7] 1, 92. [8] 1, 82; 2, 282.
[9] 2, 181 f. [10] 4, 37.

destroying it.[1] Creation is the created, but the giving of life is not the living thing.[2] At the moment of creation all is at rest.[3] The world is finite; time and space have no being apart from the world.[4] Atoms do not exist.[5] Some accidents are essential to the being of the substrate and some are not.[6] Qualities are of varying intensity; in other words, one accident can inhere in another.[7] Endurance is not an entity; it is only continued existence.[8] Nature is the quality in a thing by which it acts though God creates the acts. It is an accident without understanding; to ascribe will to it is folly.[9] Change of nature is impossible except by a miracle.[10] God has given names to things according to their qualities so, if the nature changes, the name must change too, which is impossible; so a sorcerer cannot change a man into a donkey.[11] Secondary acts are created by God and ascribed to the objects in which they are created.[12] As light is quicker than sound, it is clear that it does not rest in intermediate places, though all else does.[13] Heaven and earth are not flat.[14]

Man.

The soul is the spirit; souls were created at the same time as Adam.[15] The soul is not composed of the four elements; it is a body, occupying space, rational, controlling the body.[16] It is a body because it makes individuals.[17] Body limits the soul which has a clearer vision after death as it had before it joined the body.[18] Sensation is a function of the soul.[19] It has two powers, reason and passion. If God helps, reason prevails; if He does not, passion is supreme.[20] Two agents may unite in one act.[21] Capacity is twofold; soundness of body, which is before the act, and power from God with the act.[22] Man makes movement, rest, knowledge, thought, and will; what is beyond these is the act of God in which man shares.[23] Ibn Ḥazm uses will for desire; he speaks of a man willing to sleep but rising up to pray.[24]

[1] 5, 55. [2] 5, 40. [3] 5, 57. [4] 4, 81; 1, 28 [5] 5, 92.
[6] 1, 72. [7] 3, 89. [8] 5, 42. [9] 3, 59. [10] 1, 60.
[11] 5, 3. [12] 5, 59. [13] 5, 64. [14] 5, 130. [15] 3, 131.
[16] 5, 74, 88. [17] 5, 89. [18] 5, 75, 87 f. [19] 2, 107. [20] 3, 50.
[21] 3, 76. [22] 3, 30. [23] 5, 41. [24] 3, 131.

Religion.

Faith is belief, word, and act. That faith is only belief is absurd, for no one says continuously the opposite of what he believes. When a man grows in goodness he grows in faith for good deeds are part of faith, the absence of them lack of it.[1] Ibn Ḥazm points out the difficulty of reconciling man's knowledge of God, which is necessary, with faith which merits reward.[2] He was tender to the ignorant; if a man had some excuse for his ignorance, it did not matter if he did not know whether Muḥammad was alive or dead.[3] A man may be a Muslim though he cannot bring forward proofs for his faith.[4] He, who resists truth in his speech or in his heart, is an idolater.[5] Intentional omission of prayer is unbelief.[6] All children will go to paradise.[7]

Only angels and prophets are sinless though prophets may forget and be careless.[8] Prophets were created before *djinn* and the rest of men.[9] They are needed also as teachers for only through them could medicine and astronomy have been known.[10] The mothers of Isaac, Moses, and Jesus were prophets.[11] The Koran is the word (*kalām*) of God and His knowledge; it is not other than he.[12] Written or read it is still the word of God, but the paper and the voice are created.[13] The miraculous nature of the Koran endures till the end of the world.[14] The speech (*ḳawl*) of God is not his word and is created.[15]

Repentance blots out sin; if a man returns to his sin, it does not annul the effect of his previous repentance.[16] A man is not punished for errors of judgment; he gets one reward for trying and a second for being right.[17] Prayer has no meaning for those who say that God has done the best he can for men.[18] Prayer is commanded by God, not to upset his providence and not to cause something that would not otherwise have happened. God fore-ordained the prayer, which he foreknew would be answered, that it might be the occasion of what he foreknew would happen.[19] None can thank God as he ought.[20]

[1] 3, 189-215. [2] 3, 180. [3] 3, 249. [4] 5, 110. [5] 3, 259.
[6] 3, 229. [7] 3, 130; 4, 72. [8] 3, 245; 4, 13. [9] 4, 112. [10] 1, 72.
[11] 4, 121. [12] 3, 8. [13] 3, 7. [14] 3, 16. [15] 1, 63; 3, 11.
[16] 4, 61. [17] 4, 3. [18] 3, 181. [19] 2, 134. [20] 3, 187.

The dead do not live in the grave, the punishment there affects the soul only.[1] Souls are with God, the body is nothing; both rise again at the last day.[2] Reward is after death, apparently never in this world.[3] Animals share in the resurrection.[4]

The imam must be from Ḳuraish, an adult male, a Muslim, knowing his religion, and not doing evil openly. Blindness and such defects are no disqualification.[5] If a competent man of Ḳuraish puts himself forward at the death of an imam, who has not appointed a successor, and one or more do him homage, he is imam.[6]

Ibn Ḥazm believed in amulets and charms.[7]

There is no need to follow the story further in detail for development ceases, the old ingredients may be combined in new ways, but there is no growth. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī († 505/1111), the Proof of Islam, left his mark on religion, his philosophy and mysticism affected his statement of theological questions, but did not unite with his theology to form something new. His formulation of the creed, the *risāla ḳudsiya* which is incorporated in the *iḥyā' 'ulūmi 'l-dīn*, is on traditional lines. Distrust of reason shows itself in the words of the preface, "are protected from the postulates of reason by the strong rope" of faith, though a line or two below it is assumed that reason does not contradict revelation while elsewhere it is stated that only by revelation can the acts and qualities of God be apprehended. The chief proof of the being of God is religious, the evidence of the Koran. The following details show that he was both old-fashioned and an innovator though the new is often incompatible with the old.

God.

Man cannot know the real nature of God,[8]; only if he knows certain qualities in himself can he recognise them in God.[9] Earlier orthodoxy had declared that there was no likeness between man and God and had then proceeded to argue from man to God. Al-Ghazālī was the first to allow this argument

[1] 4, 67 f. [2] 2, 207; 4, 68. [3] 1, 91. [4] 1, 87. [5] 4, 166.
[6] 4, 102. [7] 5, 4. [8] *Muḥaṣṣal*, 136. [9] *Maḍnūn*, 8.

to orthodoxy. Existence is essential in God, in man it is contingent, coming from outside himself.[1]

Reason.

Reason perceives the truth,[2] but measured by the divine majesty it is weak.[3] Contrary to al-Ash'arī, the failure of proof does not involve the absence of the thing to be proved; al-Ghazālī wrote the *tahāfut* to show that philosophy cannot prove God.

Physics.

God's bounty gives being to what can receive it,[4] a decided limitation of His power.

Man.

Man has two spirits; one dies with the body, the other is an atom and a substance but not corporeal, breathed into him by God, which is the bearer of the knowledge of God and endures after the death of the body.[5] The kernel of man's being is his knowledge of God and what is beyond the senses.[6] By one desire man seeks what is allowed and what is forbidden, a parallel to what al-Naẓẓām taught that faith and unbelief are products of the same faculty.[7] Bliss is believing firmly in a thing as it is.[8]

Ibn Tumart († 524/1130) adopted some ideas from al-Ghazālī and combined an Ash'arī theology with denial of the attributes and a Shī'ī doctrine of the imam. As a thinker he is ridiculous. "Reason provides only possibility or allowability and so can have nothing to do with the certainty of revelation" yet he can speak of the necessities of reason.[9] What is known by revelation before the coming of the mahdī, will be known after his coming by the necessity of direct vision.[10]

Later writers have a high opinion of reason and do not admit

1 *Maḍnūn ṣaghīr*, 9.
2 *Streitschrift gegen die Batinije*, 7 and oft.
3 *Maḍnūn*, 45.
4 *Maḍnūn ṣaghīr*, 4.
5 *Maḍnūn ṣaghīr*, 6; *Musāmara*, 222.
6 *Maḍnūn*, 20.
7 *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, 2, 64.
8 *Iljām*, 60.
9 *Le Livre de Muhammad ibn Toumert*, 163.
10 *Le livre de Muhammad ibn Toumert*, 257.

any conflict with revelation. A typical statement is: In no religion does revelation contradict the dictates of reason; for reason is the root of revelation in the sense that it bears witness to the truth of prophecy (the office and function of prophets) and the world's need of it. If revelation contradicts reason, it denies the principle that bears witness to its reality.[1]

Ibn Taimiya, Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm († 728/1328) regarded orthodoxy as the golden mean; from one point of view its doctrine of faith was the mean between that of the Khawārij and that of the Mu'tazila, from another between that of the Murji'a and that of the followers of Jahm. He took a rosy view of Muslim history when he made the orthodox attitude to the Companions a mean between that of the Khawārij and that of the Shī'a. He was not a clear thinker. Some doctrines are more sharply defined or show additions. Thus the Koran is revealed not created; it came from God and returns to Him. What this last phrase means is uncertain; it suggests Christian influence, the idea that creation will pass away and God will be all in all. Parallel to the punishment in the grave, which lasts till the resurrection, is the bliss of the righteous (cf. p. 136). Faith is the speech of the heart and tongue and the action of the heart, tongue, and members.

The concept of mental speech, speech without words, is accepted without reservation. The companions are not without sin but offences are forgiven them which will not be forgiven to others. Those, who fought at Badr, are privileged for God said to them, "Do what you like; I will forgive you."[2]

It has been said that most modern theologians are neo-Mu'tazila.

Muḥammad 'Abduh can write a creed which is strictly orthodox yet he draws near to the positions of the Mu'tazila when he writes freely. He says that religion demands independence of will and thought. To him reason is more than a tool for working on the material supplied by revelation. Reason and religion have become brothers. When reason conflicts with tradition, reason must decide. All sound reasoning leads to belief in God;

[1] *Disputatio pro religione Mohammedanorum adversus Christianorum*, ed. van den Ham, 4. [2] *'Aḳīda wāsiṭiya*; *majmū'at rasā'il*, 1, 387.

belief in some religious ideas demands a basis in reason. Yet reason does not bring salvation to men unless there is a divine guide. The tool idea comes out in the statement that the love of religion is in the heart but reason cannot employ it as did the prophets.

In the sphere of morals also the orthodox position is abandoned. Right and wrong are not created by God's will for reason can distinguish good from evil without waiting for revelation and voluntary acts are good or bad in themselves or by their effects.

There is also a return to the Mu'tazila in the idea that God acts for the advantage of His creatures.

APPENDIX

1. GENEALOGICAL TABLE
2. SHĪ'A SECTS
3. SOME SECTS OF THE KHAW-ĀRIJ



APPENDIX

SHĪ'A SECTS

This list is taken from Nawbakhti ; *A* indicates a reference to the *Maḳālāt* of al-Ash'arī.

1. Sabaiya. 'Alī 1 is imam ; he is not dead but will return.
2. Kaisāniya. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiya 4 is imam. (*A*. Kaisāniya 1).
3. Ḥasan 2 is imam.
4. Ḥusain 3 is imam after the death of Ḥasan 2.
5. Ḥusain 3 was imam and then Muḥammad b. al-Hanafiya 4. (*A*. Kaisāniya 2).
6. Muḥammad 4 is imam : Ḥasan 2 and Ḥusain 3 acted under his orders. Kaisāniya or Mukhtāriya.
7. After the death of Muḥammad 4 the Karbiya[1] said that he was still living. (*A*. Kaisāniya 3 with a difference) Ḥamza was his deputy, then Ṣāid, then Bayān.
8. Muḥammad 4 is living on Mt. Riḍwa.
9. Muḥammad 4 is dead ; Abū Hāshim 'Abdullah 7 is imam. Hāshimiya ; (*A*. Kaisāniya 5).
10. Abū Hāshim 7 is alive and not dead and is imam.

After the death of Abū Hāshim 7 :

11. The true Kaisāniya ; 'Alī 8 another son of Muḥammad 4 was imam, then his descendants Ḥasan 10, 'Alī 12, and Ḥasan 14.
12. Ḥasan 14 is dead and Muḥammad 4 will return.
    (*A*. makes Nos. 11 and 12 into Kaisāniya 7.)
13. Ḥārithiya. Abū Hāshim 7 appointed Mu'āwiya b. 'Abdullah 5 imam. (*A*. Kaisāniya 9 with a difference).
14. Abū Hāshim 7 appointed Muḥammad 28, the great grandson of al-'Abbās (*A*. Kaisāniya 8).
15. Bayāniya. Abū Hāshim 7 is the mahdī. (*A*. Kaisāniya 10.)
16. Abū Hāshim 7 appointed 'Alī Zain al-'Ābidīn 6.
    (*A*. Kaisāniya 11. Shahrastānī, p. 113 says that Abū Hāshim 7 appointed Muḥammad al-Bāḳir 9 the son of 'Alī 6.)

After the death of 'Abdullah b. Mu'āwiya 5 :

17. Ḥārithiya say that he is alive in the mountains of Ispahan.
    (*A*. Kaisāniya 10.)
18. 'Abdullah b. Mu'āwiya 5 is the mahdī, he will return, give the power to an 'Alid and die.
19. 'Abdullah 5 is dead and there is no imam after him.
20. Kaisāniya, except the 'Abbasid party, have no imam.
21. Manṣūriya. Muḥammad al-Bāḳir 9 appointed Abū Manṣūr as imam.
22. The Khaṭṭābiya form four sects :
    (*a*) Ja'far al-Ṣādiḳ 13 is god and Abu l-Khaṭṭāb a prophet.
    (*b*) Bazīgh is a prophet.
    (*c*) Al-Sarrī is a prophet ; they went on pilgrimage to Ja'far 13.
    (*d*) Ja'far 13 is god and Ma'mar god of the earth.
23. The Rawandiya form four sects :
    (*a*) Abumuslimiya or Khurramdiniya.
    (*b*) Rizāmiya.
    (*c*) Hurairiya.
24. 'Alī 1 was imam, then Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiya 4, who appointed Muhammad 28.
25. 'Isā b. Mūsā 29 the 'Abbasid was imam.
26. The only imams were 'Alī 1 and his sons Ḥasan 2 and Ḥusain 3.
27. Mughīriya. Muḥammad the Pure Soul 11 is imam. 'Umar b. Rayāḥ tested Muḥammad al-Bāḳir 9 and found him wanting.
28. Muḥammad al-Bāḳir 9 is imam.
29. Ja'far al-Ṣādiḳ 11 is imam.

[1] *E.I.*, Kuraibiya.

30. Muḥammad, the Pure Soul 11 is imam. (They disowned the Mughīriya.)
31. Nāusiya. Ja'far 13 is imam and is not dead.
32. Ismā'īliya. Ismā'īl 15 is imam.
33. Muhārika. Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl 19 is imam.
34. Sumaiṭiya. Muḥammad al-Dibāj 18 is imam.
35. Faṭḥiya. 'Abdullah al-Afṭaḥ 16 is imam, and then Mūsā 17.
36. Mūsā al-Kāẓim 17 is imam but 'Abdullah 16 was not.
37. 'Alī al-Riḍā 20 is imam.
38. Mūsā al-Kāẓim 17 is imam and is not dead.
39. Mūsā 17 is dead and there will be no imam till he returns.
40. Mūsā 17 is not dead; 'Alī al-Riḍā 20 is only his deputy. Mamṭūra.
41. Mūsā 17 may be dead or alive.
42. Basharīya. Mūsā 17 is not dead; Muḥammad b. Bashīr is his deputy.
43. Muḥammad al-Jawwad 22 (Taḳī) is imam.
44. Aḥmad 21 son of Mūsā 17 is imam.
45. Muḥammad 20 was imam and died; it was uncertain if Mūsā 17 was dead.
46. 'Alī al-Hādī is imam. Muḥammad b. Nuṣair al-Namīri was a prophet.[1]
47. Muḥammad 24 son of 'Alī 23 is imam.
48. Ḥasan al-'Askari 25 is imam.
49. Ḥasan 25 did not die.
50. Ḥasan 25 died and came to life again.
51. Ḥasan 25 died and Ja'far 26 his brother is imam.
52. Ja'far 26 received the imamate from his father 'Alī 23.
53. Muḥammad 24 is imam but not Ḥasan 25 and Ja'far 26.
54. Muḥammad al-Mahdī 27 is imam; he was born before his father's death.
55. Muḥammad 27 is imam; he was born after his father's death.
56. Muḥammad 27 is imam.
57. There will be no imam after Muḥammad 27; the Mahdī is expected.
58. Muḥammad 24 was imam; he made Nafīs trustee for Ja'far 26. Ḥasan 25 was not imam.
59. Ḥasan 25 is imam. These expressed no opinion on Muḥammad 27.
60. Imāmiya. Muḥammad 27 is imam.
61. Ḥasan 25 was imam and died. Ja'far 26 became imam.

[1] *Farḳ*, 239. Cf. 242.

SECTS OF THE KHAWĀRIJ

Baihasiya. (The founder was put to death by al-Ḥajjāj.)

It is required of a Muslim that he knows God, his apostle, and what he has revealed; that he be friends with the friends of God and oppose his enemies; that he know the laws with the interpretation of them.

Some things he need not know till there is a demand for them, but then he must not use his own judgment. Faith is what distinguishes truth from falsehood; it is knowledge and confession; it is in the heart, separate from words and works. Most of the sect held that knowledge, confession, and work were all part of faith; most denied the freedom of the will.

Muslim lands were the abode of unbelief. Those who opposed the sect might be killed and their goods spoiled. Prayer might be omitted if the leader were a stranger. The attitude to crimes was that of the Ṣufriya. Drunkenness, caused by drinks which were not forbidden, and its consequences were not unbelief.

'Ajārida. The founder, 'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Ajrad, came out in the reign of the last Umayyad caliph.

Those who believed but did not come out in active rebellion were not believers. It was not lawful to seize the property of unbelievers as long as the owners were alive. The children of believers were excommunicate; when they grew up they became believers by a formal acceptance of Islam. The children of absolute unbelievers are in hell

Certain marriages, forbidden by the Koran, were allowed. They rejected the story of Joseph from the Koran.

The *'Ajarida* split into many sects.

Ṣaltiya. Some of this sect held that children were neutral; they were neither friends of God nor his enemies.

Khalafiya.

The children of unbelievers are in hell but they have done no evil works and are not absolute unbelievers. When they had no man fit to be their imam, they said that there could be no fighting except under an imam.[1] They did not hold the freedom of the will.

Maimūniya.

The children of unbelievers go to heaven. It was a duty to fight the government and its supporters, also those who opposed the Khāriji faith, but no others. They accepted free will and "capacity before the act"; said that God wills good and not evil, and does not will the acts of men.

Ḥamziya. The founder Ḥamza was alive in 185/801.[2]

They differed from the Maimūniya by thinking that the children of unbelievers go to hell. Unbelievers might be killed but only during war. They admitted the possibility of two imams at the same time.

Shu'aibiya.

They held the sunni views on the freedom of the will and 'acquisition.'

Aṭrāfiya.

They held sunni views on the freedom of the will. Reason is a guide to truth, so those on the outskirts (*aṭrāf*) of the world, who have an imperfect knowledge of revealed truth, may correct their ignorance by reason.

Khāzimiya or *Ḥāzimiya.*

They were like the Shu'aibiya. They would not express a definite opinion about 'Alī. They held the doctrine of '*muwāfāt*'; that God thinks of a man as he will be at the judgment, not as he is at any moment of his life.

These sects were counted as 'Ajārida.

Tha'labiya.

Children are to be treated according to the faith of their parents. Some held that they were neutral (cf. Ṣaltiya). At first they took taxes from rich slaves and gave the religious alms to poor ones. Later they gave up this practice.

Akhnasiya; a branch of the Tha'labiya.

They reserved judgment on Muslims in general, except on those whom they knew to be good or bad. They forbad acts of war in time of peace. There must be no fighting till the enemy had been invited to accept the true faith. They allowed their women to marry any Muslim.

Ma'badiya.

They kept the earlier practice of the Tha'labiya in taxation, opposed the practice of the Akhnasiya in marriage, but did not excommunicate the other parties.

[1] *Mukhtasar*, 82. [2] Came out in 179/795; *Mukh.*, 84.

Rushaidiya.

The tithe on land which did not need irrigation was one twentieth.

When shown that they were wrong, they kept their own custom, but did not excommunicate others.

Mukramiya.

They held the doctrine of '*muwāfāt*' and that the omission of prayer was a sin only because it revealed ignorance of God.

Ma'lūmiya.

To be a believer man must know all God's names and attributes. They are said to have held Mu'tazili views on human freedom but to have taught that only that happens which God wills.

Majhūliya.

It is enough for a believer to know some of God's names and attributes. They held sunni views on human freedom.

Yazīdiya.[1]

They excommunicated all except the early Khawārij (those before the Azāriḳa) and the Ibāḍis. They admitted as 'friends' those *dhimmis* who recognised Muḥammad as a prophet without becoming Muslims. They expected a prophet from the Gentiles to whom a Koran would be sent down as a whole. Every sin is absolute unbelief.

Ḥafṣiya.

Knowledge of God makes the difference between faith and absolute unbelief. One who knows God but does not believe in a prophet, paradise, or hell, or does what is forbidden, is an unbeliever but not an absolute unbeliever.

ATTRIBUTES

John of Damacus gives a list of the divine attributes and, with one or two exceptions, they have Muslim equivalents. The following list might have been taken from John or from Muslim divines:—Uncreated, immortal, eternal, without beginning, boundless, immaterial, creator, not liable to feeling, not confined by space, without bounds, without limits, unseen, incomprehensible, self-sufficient, lord, supreme, infinite in power, generous, endless, changeless, preceding phenomena, simple, uncompounded, without body, giver of life, all powerful.

Migne, 94, 792.

[1] Adherents of Zaid b. abī Anīsa. b. Ḥazm, 4, 188.

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