Q 34:21). Other contrasts exhibit difference, not contrariety, when doubt is set against both "truth" (*ḥaqq* – Q 10:94) and "knowledge" (*ʿilm* – Q 4:157, 42:14). Doubt is a different kind of mental operation: it may be well- or ill-founded, but as long as the doubter does not act to remove his doubt, he cannot *know* one way or the other. In the Qur'ān, of course, this is precisely the point of the argument: what constitutes the doubters' *kufr* is their refusal to correct their doubt by referring to the only source of truth, which is the message brought by the Prophet. It is curious that "certainty" is not presented as the opposite of "doubt." Only once do the words *shakk* and *yaqīn* even appear in the same context, the verse that denies that Christ Jesus was crucified; but even there the two words are not opposites:

> Those who differ on the matter are in doubt (*shakk*) about it: they have no knowledge (*ʿilm*) of it except pursuit of a conjecture (*illā ittibāʿ al-ẓann*); but certainly they did not kill him (*wa-mā qatalūhu yaqīn*^{an})
>
> (Q 4:157)

The verb of knowing (*ʿ-l-m*) is virtually never contrasted with the usual verb of not knowing or being ignorant (*j-h-l*).[12] Izutsu has demonstrated that it is more pertinent to contrast *ʿilm* with another mental operation altogether. In a diagram perhaps inspired by the logical "square of opposition," he has set the Qur'ānic use of *ʿilm* over against *ẓann* – "mere conjecture."[13] To put it in my own terms, the act of *ẓann* is not to be found on the continuum that extends from absolute knowledge through partial knowledge to absolute ignorance. Rather, it is of a different category: like dreams and "tales of the ancients," it is a fabrication, the contrary of reality. The word *ẓann* can be variously translated as "guess," "conjecture," "speculate," or "think," as in "wishful thinking." Against those who deny the afterlife, the Qur'ān argues, "They have no knowledge of that; they are only guessing" (Q 45:24). It describes those who boast that they have crucified Christ as only pursuing conjecture (*ẓann*) (Q 4:157).

> You thought (*ẓanantum*) that God did not know (*lā yaʿlam*) much about what you were doing. That wishful thinking of yours about your Lord has destroyed you. Now you are one of the lost.
>
> (Q 41:22–23)

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INEQUALITY

A distinctive kind of Qur'ānic contrast is that which argues that two things are not equal, using some variant of the root *s-w-y*. It may appear, in translation, that this topic should be grouped with "arguments from degree" in the previous chapter; but in fact most of the passages are not comparisons but contrasts, often in the form of parables ending in rhetorical questions. "Is the blind equal to the sighted, or is the darkness equal to the light?" (Q 13:16, cf. 6:50, 35:19). "Are they equal – those who know and those who do not?" (Q 39:9). "A man obligated to a number of partners who quarrel among themselves and a man obligated to a single man – are they equal?" (Q 39:29, cf. 16:75).

The formula may in fact be a matter of degree where it is used in a legal argument:

> They are not equal – those believers who sit at home when there is nothing wrong with them and those who devote their wealth and their persons to struggle in the path of God. God has granted those who devote wealth and self to the struggle a degree of preference over those who sit it out. To each God has promised good; but God has preferred with a great reward those who fight over those who just sit.
>
> (Q 4:95)

We have seen such passages among the legal arguments in Chapter 5, while other legal arguments use "inequality" to indicate absolute exclusion, as in the passage previously cited in this chapter which flatly declares that maintenance of the Sacred Mosque is not equal to belief in God and struggle in the path of God (Q 9:19).

Finally, "inequality" is used without parable or figurative language to indicate the ultimate dichotomy. "The bad and the good are not equal, even if the abundance of the bad is pleasing to you . . ." (Q 5:100). "Is the one who believes like the one who sins? They are not equal" (Q 32:18).

"Inequality" seems an ironic understatement when used to describe the final sorting-out:

> Inhabitants of the Fire and inhabitants of the Garden are not equal. It is the inhabitants of the Garden who are the winners.
>
> (Q 59:20)

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> Do those who commit evil acts think that We shall make them like those who believe – equal their lives and equal their deaths? How badly they judge!
>
> (Q 45:21)

OPPOSITION

The array of Qur'ānic arguments from opposition bewilders the one who tries to classify them. Opposites may exclude, include, compare, or contrast, depending upon whether they are applied to Creator or creation. As noted above, the theological concept of "opposition" is more broadly appropriate to Qur'ānic reasoning than is the logical-rhetorical concept of "contrariety," which can allow intermediate positions. Therefore we shall call "opposites" most of what a logician would call "contraries." Nevertheless, there are some legitimate examples of the latter; in those cases, we class "contrariety" as a subset of "opposition" and discuss it at the end of the next section. Still more restrictive is the logical concept of "contradiction," depending as it does on the existence of identical propositions that differ only by the presence in one of the negative. "Reversal" describes the process by which one of a pair of opposites becomes the other. "Antithesis" is an extended contrast, the opposite of "analogy."

The reader who wishes an exhaustive catalogue of definitions, synonyms, and antonyms for the basic Qur'ānic terms indicating belief and disbelief must consult the superb works of Toshihiko Izutsu.[14] In *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Koran*, he mines the text to construct the "semantic field" of a particular concept, notably that of *kufr*, using multiple verses to establish contextual definitions, which include synonymous expressions as well as descriptions of the actions and attitudes of those who exemplify the concept. The use of opposites and contraries (e.g. the opposition of *kufr* to *shukr* and *īmān*, and its equation with *shirk* and *iftirā'*)[15] is integral to his method; my own overlaps his in this area more than any other. His purpose, however, is to define the concepts whether the passages in which the words occur are intended as definitions or not; mine is to analyze the structure of Qur'ānic argument, of which opposites and contraries are only two among many constituents.

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Opposites and contraries

The Qur'ān uses extremes inclusively, enclosing a category, to demonstrate to human beings that that category is entirely within God's power and that what they might consider the "negative" half of it is not to be excluded. "It is He who brings laughter and tears, death and life" (Q 53:43–44). "From a sperm-drop He creates [the human being] and shapes him, then smoothes his path, then causes him to die and entombs him, then resurrects him when He wishes" (Q 80:19–22). Many of the passages that point to the Signs of God in nature do so in a similar manner, by asserting God's control over pairs of opposites: day and night (e.g. Q 17:12), heaven and earth (e.g. Q 2:164), East and West (Q 2:115, 73:9), land and sea (Q 6:59, 10:22).

God himself has many "opposites," things wrongly worshipped which lead the worshipper astray. Idols are obvious: I cite Qur'ānic demonstrations of their ineffectiveness throughout this text. Others are Iblīs (Q 18:50) and one's own desires:

> Have you then seen the one who takes his own passion as his deity? Knowing this, God has led him astray and sealed his ear and his heart; and covered over his sight. And then who after God will guide him? Should you not bear this in mind?
>
> (Q 45:23, cf. 25:43)

Some of the Divine Names have opposites that indicate "not-God":

> That is because God is the Truth (*al-Ḥaqq*); and everything you call upon besides Him is falsehood (*al-bāṭil*). And God is the Exalted, the Great.
>
> (Q 31:30, cf. 22:62)

Some of the Divine Names *are* opposites:

> He is the First and the Last, the Evident and the Hidden (*al-Ẓāhir wa-al-Bāṭin*) ...
>
> (Q 57:3)

The text often depicts the relation between God and humanity as one between opposites. "God is rich (sc. self-sufficient) and you are poor (sc. in need of something beyond yourselves)" (Q 47:38). "Do

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you know better or does God?" (Q 2:140). "They see [the Day of Judgment] far away: We see it near" (Q 70:6–7). "O people! You are in need of God, while God is He Who needs nothing and Who is to be praised" (Q 35:15). "Then God turned to them (in mercy), and then many of them again turned blind and deaf; but God sees very well (*baṣīr*) what they are doing" (Q 5:71).

Here we also class those passages that speak of God as guiding some human beings and leading others astray: "God leads astray (*yuḍill*) whom He will and guides (*yahdī*) whom He will. And He is the Powerful, the Wise" (Q 14:4, cf. 16:93, 74:31, 13:27). Some of the passages show that "leading astray" is a punishment for sin: "He leads none astray except the sinners, who break God's Covenant after it has been confirmed ..." (Q 2:26–27, cf. 9:37, 14:27). At least one (Q 13:27) shows guidance as subsequent to – and a reward for – repentance. Unquestionably the verbs are to be understood as they are translated here: parallel, transitive and in the active voice. The theological difficulties caused by such passages are well known and have been dealt with exhaustively in works on Islamic theology. Suffice it to say here that, in the rhetoric of Qur'ānic argument, it is a false dichotomy to view such pairs of opposites as mutually exclusive, when *in these contexts* it is more productive to view them as coordinated, inclusive, and indicative of God's total power over humanity. Similar pairings contrast those whom God has blessed and those with whom he is angry (Q 1:7), those to whom he turns and those whom he punishes (Q 3:128, 9:106), those whom he saves and those whom he leaves on their knees (Q 19:72).

Some of the clearest pairs of opposites reinforce the contrast between the fates of the saved and those of the damned. Some pairs are directional: the saved receive their Books of Deeds in their right hands, the damned in their left (Q 69:19, 25, cf. 84:7, 10); they hold positions either on the auspicious right (*aṣḥāb al-maymana*) or on the quite literally sinister left (*aṣḥāb al-mash'ama* – Q 90:18–19). The hypocrites are outside the wall, the believers inside (Q 57:13); the arrangement is such that the saved and the damned are able to speak to each other and compare notes (Q 7:44, 50).[16] Contrasts are drawn on virtually every other basis as well. The saved have balances weighted on the side of good, while those of the damned are light (Q 7:8–9). On the Day of Judgment, faces of the former will be bright and beaming, those of the latter covered with dust (Q 80:38–41). The food and drink of Paradise will be pure and delicious (e.g. Q 80:25–28), those of Hell harmful and revolting (e.g. Q 88:5–7).

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It seems superfluous to add that opposite fates are the result of opposite actions, namely, belief and the refusal to believe, though it is worth restating the argument that accepting or rejecting belief equals keeping or breaking the Covenant. In Izutsu's phrase, it is "the grand moral dichotomy."[17] As we have already discussed *islām*, *īmān*, and *kufr* at length in Chapter 5 as performative utterances, we shall mention only a representative sample here. Believers (*mu'minūn*) are contrasted with those who knowingly refuse to believe (*kāfirūn* – Q 74:31, cf. 64:2), with "sinners" (*fāsiqūn* – Q 3:110, cf. 32:18), with "evildoers" (*ẓālimūn* – Q 17:82), with the sick at heart (Q 74:31), with those who turn their backs (Q 24:47), and with followers of Satan (Q 34:20). In what is possibly the earliest use of the word *muslim*, Muslims are contrasted with "criminals" (*mujrimīn* – Q 68:35). They are also contrasted with those who disbelieve (*alladhīna kafarū* – Q 15:2; cf. 3:80), with those who block the Path of God (*wa-ṣaddū 'an sabīl Allāh* – Q 16:88–89); and with those who are unjust (*al- qāsiṭūn* – Q 72:14–15).

> Those who reject belief among the People of the Book and the polytheists are in the fire of Hell – in it forever. They are the worst of humanity. Those who believe and do good works – they are the best of humanity.
>
> (Q 98:6–7)

Contrariety exists within a single individual and within any natural group. By way of balancing the impression that the believers are capable only of good, the Qur'ān notes that they, too, perform both good and evil deeds (*sayyi'āt*) and are in need of forgiveness for the latter. "Those [who do good deeds and turn to God] are the ones from whom We accept the best of what they have done and pass over their evil deeds" (Q 46:16, cf. 39:35). Nor are other groups entirely good or evil. Among the People of the Book are those who are capable of belief as well as *kāfirūn* and those "in whose hearts is a disease" (Q 74:31, 35:32); and there are good and evil *jinn*:

> Among us are Muslims and among us are the unjust (*al-qāsiṭūn*). Those who submit (*aslama*) are the ones who have chosen guidance (*rashad*^{an}); as for the unjust, they are the fuel of Hell.
>
> (Q 72:14–15)

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Other phenomena of daily life harbor contrary aspects. A single substance – wine – and a single class of action – gambling – have both beneficial and sinful effects, but wine and gambling are ultimately harmful because their sinful aspects are greater than their benefits (Q 2:219). Although the sort of conjecture (*ẓann*) that substitutes for knowledge of scripture is a sin, it appears that not all *ẓann* is sin: "O you who believe! Avoid speculating [sc. about your neighbors' lives] to any great extent, because some speculation is sinful (*ba'ḍ al-ẓann ithm*)" (Q 49:12).

One characteristic of contraries is that in some categories they admit intermediate positions between the two extremes, but humans are not free to argue that any given category admits intermediate positions, let alone that they themselves may decide where those positions lie. Thus it is not permitted to obey the Prophet in some things but not others (Q 47:26), or to believe in part of the Book and reject the rest (Q 2:85, 13:36), or to believe in some of the apostles and reject others (Q 4:150). God does not exempt even the Prophet from the possibility that, under pressure from the scoffers, "perhaps you would leave aside part of what We revealed to you" (Q 11:12).

A few passages seem to indicate a position between belief and unbelief. The Beduin include those who have "submitted" but not yet believed.[18] The passage has already been noted in which the hypocrites say, "If we had known how to fight we would have followed you," and God remarks, "On that day they were closer to unbelief than to belief" (Q 3:167).[19] He knows what is in their hearts but threatens no explicit punishment. Compare that with the following passage:

> Among human beings are those who worship God on the edge: if good befalls them, they are content; but if temptation strikes them, they fall on their faces. They lose both this world and the next: *that* is loss made manifest! They pray to things besides God that will neither harm nor benefit them: *that* is going far astray! They call upon something whose harm is closer than its benefit: what an evil patron and what an evil associate!
>
> (Q 22:11–13)

The end of the passage explains the beginning: such people are believers but, as Izutsu says, "very imperfect" ones, who fall all too easily into sin.[20] The last verse seems to imply that the false gods

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can provide some benefits along with the harm they do; but given that this is a Medinan or late Meccan sura; we must interpret this implication as ironic understatement. The idols will certainly bring harm – that is, punishment – to their worshippers, while the benefits are "far away" because in fact they do not exist at all.

Finally, a word must be said about logical contraries and theological ones. Sura *56 al-Wāqi'a* describes a long series of Divine Signs in creation, asking human beings whether it is they or God who creates the sperm, causes the seed to grow in the ground, brings down drinking water from the clouds, and grows the tree that feeds the fire (Q 56:58–72). Only two possible agents are stipulated – God and human beings. A logician would argue that perhaps it is a third force that creates these phenomena, or that a separate force creates each phenomenon, or that "creation" is not how they come into existence at all – in other words, that the choice between divine and human agency does not exhaust the possible alternatives.

The Qur'ān itself uses that technique to get around the false dichotomy posed by People of the Book.

> They say: "Be Jews or Christians and you will be guided!"
> Say: "Rather, the religion (*milla*) of Abraham – a monotheist (*ḥanīf*), not one of the polytheists!"
>
> (Q 2:135)

A passage in Sura 23 *al-Mu'minūn* considers possible explanations for the Meccans' refusal to heed the Prophet. Is the message something new and unheard-of (Q 23:68)? Do they not recognize the Apostle (Q 23:69)? Do they think that he is possessed by *jinn* (Q 23:70)? Is he asking them for money (Q 23:72)? All of these possibilities are dismissed in favor of the only one left: "You are calling them to the Straight Path, and those who do not believe in the Hereafter have turned away from that Path" (Q 23:73–74, cf. 24:50).

This brings us within the realm of the disjunctive syllogism, which we shall take up in Chapter 9.

Contradictories

Because they allow intermediate positions, contraries may not both be true but may both be false, as we demonstrated in the previous section. The genus of "contradictories", however, brings

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us back to the second of the so-called Three Laws of Thought: a thing cannot be both true and false (or *A* and *not-A*) at the same time. We have seen that most of the important Qur'ānic terms have a number of "opposites," each of which negates a single aspect of the meaning, but there are few full antonyms. Rather than impose a false symmetry by attempting to stipulate a single one of many "opposites" as the contradictory of the term in question, here I shall confine the category of "contradictories" to those pairs which use the identical words, distinguished only by the absence or presence of the negative: *A* and *not-A*. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, for propositions: *X* is *A* and *X* is *not-A*.

As I noted in the "Excursus on Performative Utterances" in Chapter 5, most people in the Qur'ān who call themselves *mu'minūn* are contradicted. "Among the people are those who say: 'We believe in God and the Last Day!' but they are not really believers" (Q 2:8). "They say: 'We believe in God and in the Apostle, and we obey!' Then a group of them turn their backs thereafter: they are not believers'" (Q 24:47). Their false assertions are also contradicted. "Those who refuse to believe say: 'We will never be resurrected!' Say: 'O yes, by my Lord, you will indeed be resurrected!'" (Q 64:7, cf. 23:35–37).

> Among [People of the Book] is a group who twist their tongues around the Book so that you will think [what they say] from the Book when it is not from the Book. And they say: 'It is from God!' when it is not from God, knowingly uttering lies against God.
>
> (Q 3:78)

Contradictories, like opposites, are sometimes used to indicate the extent of God's power.

> I swear by what you see and what you do not see that this is the word of a noble (*karīm*) Apostle; it is not the word of a poet.
>
> (Q 69:38–41)

> [On that] Day ... you will see the people as drunk when they are not drunk: rather the punishment of God is extreme.
>
> (Q 22:2)

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Any to whom God does not give light has no light.
(Q 24:40)

Reversal

Despite the emphatic distinctions made by the Qur'ān, its opposites, contraries, and contradictories are not necessarily ossified dualities: under certain circumstances, one of such a pair may be transformed into its opposite, a process which I term "reversal." It is above all the process by which an unbeliever repents and becomes a believer. Ṭabarsī says, "The origin of *tawba* (repentance) is turning back from what went on before (*al-rujū' 'ammā salaf*)."[21]

> [The polytheist, murderer, and fornicator] will have his penalty doubled on Resurrection Day and be abased in it forever, except whoever repents and believes and does good works. For them God will exchange their evil deeds for [or "transform them into"] good ones: God is Forgiving, Merciful.
>
> (Q 25:69–70)

Whatever the transformation, it is a sign of God. It may be an effect of one human's virtuous actions toward another.

> Good and evil are not equal. Pay back [evil] with what is better and see! He between whom and you was enmity will be like your warm friend!
>
> (Q 41:34)

If former enemies "repent, pray, and pay alms, then they are your brothers in Faith" (Q 9:11).

The most dramatic reversals are Signs of the Day of Judgment – "the Day when the earth will be changed into something that is not the earth, as will the heavens ..." (Q 14:48). Natural processes will be reversed: "When the stars disappear, and heaven is split open, and the mountains are scattered like dust in the wind ..." (Q 77:8–10). Some suras, such as 81 *al-Takwīr* ("The Folding Up"), 82 *al-Infiṭār* ("The Cleaving Asunder"), and 84 *al-Inshiqāq* ("The Crack-up"), are named for the long sequences of terrifying *bouleversements* with which they begin. Still more distressing is the reversal of feelings for one's friends and family. "On that Day,

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friends will be enemies, except for the righteous" (Q 43:67). A man will run away from his brother, his parents, his wife, and his children, each one preoccupied with his or her own fate (Q 80:34–37).

And the righteous, at long last, will get back at the sinners:

> Those who sinned used to laugh at those who believed, and wink at each other as they passed by ... But on this Day those who believe will laugh at those who refused to believe, looking out from their seats of honor.
>
> (Q 83:29–30, 34–35)

Antithesis

The definition of "antithesis" which best suits our purpose is that of James William Johnson, who calls it "the reverse of the analogy."[22] If an analogy is an "extended comparison" which establishes "a point-by-point correspondence between two situations or objects,"[23] an antithesis is an extended point-by-point contrast. Johnson sees antithesis as the basis of the disjunctive argument,[24] whereas I have given that role to contrariety and contradiction. Perhaps it is a matter of relative length. The elegant brevity prized by some rhetoricians[25] seems inconsistent with Johnson's stipulation that analogy and antithesis be of a certain length; and while I found numerous brief comparisons offered as examples of antithesis, Johnson's is the only one that views length as a meaningful structural characteristic.

We saw that the best examples of analogy in the Qur'ān are the extended parallel accounts of the prophets prior to the Prophet Muḥammad, which show how his experiences replicated those of his predecessors.[26] The best examples of antithesis are the "extended point-by-point" contrasts of the people in heaven with those in hell – the "Companions of the Garden" and the "Companions of the Fire." Such passages are so often repeated that their broad outlines can be sketched with little reference to particular verses. In Heaven are gardens, shade, rivers, and fruit trees; in Hell, fire, smoke, boiling liquids, and the foul tree of Zaqqūm. In Heaven, beautiful garments of silk and delicious foods and drinks; in Hell, bare skins burnt off and renewed to be burnt again (Q 4:56), bitter food (Q 83:14–16), and drinks either boiling hot or freezing cold (Q 78:24–25). In Heaven, peace, exaltation, joy, and freedom from "any lurking sense of injury" (Q 15:47);[27] in

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Hell, pain, humiliation, despair, and mutual recrimination. In Heaven, eternal life; in Hell, neither life nor death.

Here is a comparatively brief example:

> God has promised the Hypocrites, male and female, and the Unbelievers the fire of Hell, to remain in it forever: that is sufficient for them. And God has cursed them, and they will have a punishment of long duration. (Q 9:68) ... God has promised the Believers, male and female, gardens below which rivers flow, to remain in them forever, and fine dwellings in gardens of Paradise. And acceptance from God is supreme: that is the great victory.
>
> (Q 9:72)

Let us examine a longer example (Q 38:49–64) using Table 7.1 to chart the points of the antithesis.

The parallelism is very tight at first, then takes a more subtle turn in verses 52 and 58, the fourth verse of each sequence, where the pairing off with companions in Paradise (52) is set over against the pairing of punishments in the Pit (58). The security of God's promise (53) is contrasted with the confusion and mutual blame of

Table 7.1 Points of Antithesis

49: The righteous have a beautiful place to return to,	55: The wrongdoers have an evil place to return to:
50: gardens of Paradise whose doors are open to them.	56: Hell! they will fry in it – what an evil resting-place!
51: They shall recline and call for much fruit and drink,	57: So it is; and they will taste boiling drinks and bitterly cold and stinking ones,
52: and with them will be companions whose eyes do not wander.	58: and other things like them – linked in pairs.
53: This is what you were promised on the Day of Accounting.	59–63: No greeting for them ... "Lord! Whoever got us into this – give him a double punishment in the Fire! ... Why don't we see people whom we used to laugh at? ..." (They quarrel over whose fault it all is)
54: This is Our bounty, which can never be exhausted	64: That is a fact: argument among the people of the Fire

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those who used to ridicule the virtuous (59–63). The last pair, while not parallel in construction, show antithesis of a sort: the saved have God's bounty pouring upon them continuously (54), while the damned have only each other in an atmosphere of mutual hostility (64).

Occasionally we discern a reversal of the order of individual elements in a kind of mirrored symmetry:

> Those who reject belief among the People of the Book and the polytheists are in the fire of Hell, remaining in it forever. They are the worst of humanity. Those who believe and do good works – they are the best of humanity. Their reward with God is gardens of Paradise below which rivers flow, remaining in them forever ...
>
> (Q 98:6–8)

Rhetoricians call this sort of arrangement *antimetabole.* The punishment of the damned is described first, followed by their description as "the worst of humanity:" while the saved are first described as "the best of humanity," and then their reward is described.

Further antitheses of Heaven and Hell can be found in Suras 11:106–108, 69:21–37, 75:5–22, 79:35–41, and 88:2–16, among many others. Sura 56, in particular, is more than one-third antithesis (verses 8–9, 27–56, and 88–94), and it is rich in opposites, contraries, and comparisons as well (verses 3, 57–73, and 81–87). Some of the longer antitheses in these suras include subsections which use antimetabole, but space does not permit a full analysis.

Finally, we shall offer an antithesis that does not deal with Heaven and Hell. The beginning of Sura 80, where Muḥammad "frowns and turns away" from the blind man, proves to be unexpectedly complex – an antithesis containing an antimetabole, upon which yet another antithesis is constructed.

The antimetabole comes where verses 5 and 6 reverse the order of topics in verses 1 and 2. Verses 1 and 2 describe first the Prophet and then the one who seeks him; verses 5 and 6 first describe the one whom the Prophet seeks, then the Prophet himself. Verses 3–4 and 7 describe Muḥammad's proper role: each verse follows its initial sequence in the same relative order. The order observed in verses 5 and 6 is also observed in a second reference to the blind man in verses 8–10; thus verses 5–6 and 8–10 form the second

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Table 7.2 Antithesis

1: He frowned and turned away	5: As for the haughty man who needs no one,	8–9: As for the one who came to you making a true effort,
2: when the blind man came to him	6: you pay attention to *him*!	10: you allowed yourself to be distracted from him!
3–4: How do you know? He might become [a] pure [Muslim]! Or he might remember [his relation to God], and that memory would benefit him!	7: It is not your fault if he does not become [a] pure [Muslim]	

antithesis. Verses 5 and 8–9 describe, respectively, the haughty and the earnest interlocutors, verses 6 and 10 the Prophet's inappropriate reactions to both.

The content of Qur'ānic contrast may seem familiar, but, as I have demonstrated, the language used to convey it is full of subtle variations. A small difference in syntax or vocabulary may put virtually identical figures into quite different categories, unnoticed by the hearer or reader who concentrates only on the ethical, legal, or eschatological conclusions of the argument. In the same way, it is possible to miss those arguments in the Qur'ān that must be analyzed using syllogistic logic because they are worded in rhetorically effective ways that may omit one premise or the conclusion. Chapter 8 will analyze Qur'ānic arguments that can be assimilated to the Aristotelian categorical syllogisms. Chapter 9 will revisit the topic of contrast as the basis for the disjunctive syllogisms developed by the Stoics; the chapter will conclude with conditional syllogisms, also Stoic in origin. For purposes of analysis, I shall reword the arguments according to the classical models developed by the Peripatetics and Stoics.

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CATEGORICAL ARGUMENTS

The work that first piqued my interest in Qur'ānic reasoning was *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* by al-Ghazālī[1] when, while researching Ghazālī's role in combating the spread of esoteric (*Bāṭinī*) Shi'ism, I found *Qisṭās* mentioned along with his major anti-Bāṭinī book, *al-Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī fī Faḍā'iḥ al-Bāṭinīya.*[2] In *Qisṭās*, Ghazālī combines anti-Bāṭinī argument with logic, another of his perennial fields of interest; but while *al-Kitāb al-Mustaẓhirī* is a work of dialectical theology (*kalām*) with strong psychological and political elements,[3] *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* is presented as a handbook designed to help the individual believer assess the validity of any argument, including the contention that only the Shi'i Imām holds the secret of Qur'ānic interpretation. Ghazālī says that, by using nothing more than the "just balance" (*al-qisṭās al-mustaqīm* – Q 17:35, 26:182), which he identifies with the patterns of argument found in the Qur'ān itself, a believer will be able to win debates (*jidāl, mujādala)* with any who would challenge his faith. The "just balance" consists of five "scales" (*mawāzīn;* sing. *mīzān*), which are none other than the first, second, and third figures of the Aristotelian syllogism, and the Stoic conditional and disjunctive syllogisms.

The second author whom I cite in the Introduction.[4] the Ḥanbalī jurist Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, begins his *'Alam al-Jadhal fi 'Ilm al-Jadal* with a digest of logic, dialectic, and debating techniques, then seeks their application in the Qur'ān, sura by sura and verse by verse. Though his book is much longer than Ghazālī's, it is in one way less inclusive, as Ṭūfī omits disjunction (*taqsīm*) from the section on inference.[5] He regards disjunction as a dialectical tool, a form of counter-argument (*i'tirāḍ*) that forces one's opponent to accept either-or constructions, which can then be demolished. True inference is either categorical or conditional:

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> We say, and in God is our success, that inference (*al-istidlāl*) absolutely and in every case (*muṭlaq*^{an} *wa-fī ayy ḥukm kān*) does not extend beyond the categorical and conditional (*istithnā'ī*) form, the rules of which are established in logic. Let us use in our examples the first type (*ḍarb*) of the first figure of the categorical syllogism, because it is easier and clearer. As for the conditional syllogism, it has one figure and no more.[6]

He then explains how to use these arguments and how to refute them. Ṭūfī refers twice to Ghazālī, the second time to *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*,[7] but never to *Qisṭās* even though his language and examples are often reminiscent of it, as in his reduction of the two figures of the conditional syllogism to a single one.[8] In this and the next chapter I shall use Ghazālī as my primary source, in part because, unlike Ṭūfī, he classifies his Qur'ānic arguments by type and not by sura. I shall add references to Ṭūfī and my own Qur'ānic examples as needed.

During his first period of teaching, Ghazālī composed at least two books on logic, *Miḥakk al-Naẓar fi al-Manṭiq* and the exhaustive *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, usually subtitled *Mantiq Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (*The Logic of "The Incoherence of the Philosophers"*), which he wrote, in part, to explain the terminology used in *Tahāfut*.[9] *Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*[10] was composed much later, probably before the end of his eleven-year spiritual retreat (1095/488–1105-06/499) and his return to Nishapur.[11] R.J. McCarthy calls *Qisṭās* "a somewhat curious attempt to Islamicize, or 'Quranize,' some of the Aristotelian, and Stoic, logic which he expounded more 'scientifically' in others of his works."[12] One of Ghazālī's techniques for "Islamicizing" logic is to keep the use of technical terms to a minimum, particularly those which might carry negative connotations. Thus for "syllogism" he uses the word *mīzān* where in his earlier works he used *qiyās*, and for "enthymeme" he speaks of a figure with "an understood premise" (*iḍmār aṣl*)[13] rather than of an "incomplete" or "defective syllogism" (*qiyās nāqiṣ*).[14] When he uses the more technical term *muqaddama* for "premise," he puts it into the mouth of his interlocutor;[15] Ghazālī in his own voice uses *aṣl*. While it is true, as Chelhot points out, that he does not even use the word "logic" (*mantiq*),[16] he twice advises the hearer (and, of course, the reader) who wants more detail on the subject to consult his longer books, *Miḥakk al-Naẓar* and *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*[17]. And when he launches into

his analysis of syllogisms, his terminology is quite technical enough for the subject, as will be seen below.

Qisṭās is cast as a dialogue between the author and an unnamed *Bāṭinī*, who asks Ghazālī by what scales he weighs the truth of knowledge. Is it the scale of opinion and "analogy" (*mīzān al-ra'y wa-al-qiyās*) or the scale of authoritative teaching (*al-ta'līm*)? "But in that case you need to follow the infallible Imam, the authoritative teacher, and I don't see that you are trying to find him!"[18] Ghazālī replies:

> As for the scale of ra'y and qiyās, God forbid that I should resort to it, because it is the scale of Satan. And whoever of my colleagues claims that it is the scale of knowledge, I ask Almighty God to protect me from the evil he does to the religion, because he is an ignorant friend of the religion, and that is worse than an intelligent enemy. If God had blessed the doctrine of the esotericists with success, the first thing they would have learned would have been the art of debate (*al-jidāl*) from the Holy Qur'ān, For God Almighty says, "Summon to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good preaching; and argue with them according to what is best" [Q 16:125]. And note that one group is summoned to God by wisdom, another by preaching, and another by argument ...[19]

By what means, the Bāṭinī repeats, does Ghazālī weigh his knowledge? Ghazālī replies that he weighs it by the Just Balance, following God and being taught by the Qur'ān, which says, "Weigh by the Just Balance (*al-qisṭās al-mustaqīm*)" (Q 17:35). What is this "Just Balance?" Ghazālī replies that it is the five scales that God sent down in his Book and instructed his prophets in their use. "And where are these five scales in the Qur'ān? Is this anything more than a lie and a false allegation (*ifk wa-buhtān*)?"[20]

Ghazālī answers the second question first:

> Haven't you heard Almighty God's words in Sura *al-Raḥmān*: "The Merciful taught the Qur'ān, created the human being, taught him intelligent speech. The sun and the moon follow calculated courses, and the stars and the trees bow down. And the heaven – He raised it and set up the Scale (*al-mīzān*), so that you may not go beyond the scale. So establish the weight (*al-wazn*) with justice

(*al-qisṭ*), and do not cause the scale to give short weight (*wa-lā tukhsirū al-mīzāni*) ..." [Q 55:1–9]. And have you not heard His words in Sura *al-Ḥadīd*: "We have sent our Messengers with clear proofs (*al-bayyināt*) and sent down with them the Book and the Scale (*al-mīzān*), so that people may behave justly (*li-yaqūm al-nās bi-l-qisṭ*) ..." [Q 57:25][21]

His Bāṭinī companion shows "certain signs of analytical ability" by explaining to Ghazālī how he would determine whether a scale in the public market was giving true weight, thus demonstrating that necessary knowledge results from premises whose truth is determined by experience and sense data (*al-tajriba wa-l-ḥiss*).[22] Thereupon Ghazālī – hoping to alert him to the true nature of his sect and its secret teaching – agrees to explain to him the five scales revealed in the Qur'ān. Ghazālī distinguishes this divine Scale from the material (*jismānī*) scales that weigh wheat and barley and gold and silver; yet the operations of market scales supply terminology for the extended analogy that shapes the epistle.

Ghazālī does not claim explicitly that the proofs which he extracts from the Qur'ān are evidence of its divine inimitability (*i'jāz*), but they are unquestionably of divine origin.

> Know with certainty that this scale (*mīzān*) is the scale of the knowledge of Almighty God, and the knowledge of His Angels, and His Books, and His Apostles, and His Worlds of the Seen and the Unseen (*mulkihi wa-malakūtihi*), so that you may learn from His Prophets how to weigh by it, as they learned from His Angels. For the First Teacher is God (swt), and the second is Gabriel, and the third is the Prophet (s). And all people learn from the Prophets that which they have no way of knowing except through them.[23]

Ghazālī begins the main body of *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* with a discussion of categorical syllogisms. Although they are the logical figures most immediately recognizable as such, categorical syllogisms arranged in schematic order are not found in the Qur'ān any more than they are found in ordinary human speech or in non-technical prose. Rather, the purpose of schematizing any argument is to restate common thought-processes in order to clarify whether or not a judgment is warranted by the evidence upon which it is based. Most non-technical language omits one or more premises in

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reasoning to a conclusion, usually because the premises are self-evident or universally accepted.

The categorical syllogism is Ghazālī's first scale, which he calls "the scale of equilibrium" (*mīzān al-taʿādul*). It has three forms, the greater (*al-akbar*), the middle (*al-awsaṭ*) and the lesser (*al-aṣghar*), corresponding to the first, second, and third figures. His method is first to give examples from the Qur'ān, then – at his interlocutor's request – examples from everyday life. He defines each *mīzān* and explains the basis of its validity. When his interlocutor asks why the scales are called "greater," "middle," and "lesser," Ghazālī explains:

> The first scale is the widest of the scales, since knowledge can be derived from it by universal (*ʿāmm*) affirmation, particular affirmation, universal negation, and particular negation: thus four types of intelligibles (*al-maʿārif*) can be weighed by it. As for the second, only negatives can be weighed by it, but both the universal and the particular negative may be so measured. As for the third, only the particular may be weighed by it ... Indeed, weighing a universal case by it is one of the scales of Satan.[24]

Toward the end, he sums up the ways in which one ascertains the truth of all the scales: by sense-data, experience, continuous authority (*al-tawātur al-kāmil*), intuition (*bi-awwal al-ʿaql*), or by deduction (*al-istintāj*) from all of these.[25]

In classical formal logic, the four types of proposition enumerated by Ghazālī are abbreviated and arranged as follows:

A (universal affirmative)
E (universal negative)
I (particular affirmative)
O (particular negative)

They are the building-blocks of all syllogisms. The signifying vowels are incorporated into nineteen Latin mnemonic terms, which serve as names for the valid moods. For easy reference, I shall explain and use a number of these as the chapter progresses.

The first figure

Ghazālī begins his explication with the passage in which Abraham argues with Nimrod over the nature of divine power (Q 2:258):

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> Know that the greater scale is the scale of Abraham (a.s.) which he used with Nimrod. From him we learned this scale, but through the medium of the Qur'ān. Now Nimrod had claimed to be divine ...[26]

Abraham's exercise in reasoning with the "mighty hunter" did not begin well. When Abraham said, "My Lord is the one who gives life and death," Nimrod replied, "*I* give life and death." "He meant," says Ghazālī, "that he gave life to the sperm by sexual intercourse, and he gave death by execution."[27] Then Abraham realized that his example was too difficult for Nimrod to understand, so he turned to something clearer:

> Abraham said: "God causes the sun to rise from the East; so *you* make it rise from the West!" Thus he who rejected faith was confounded. God does not guide a people who do wrong.
> (Q 2:258)

That this constitutes a proof Ghazālī knows from another verse: "That was Our proof (*ḥujjatunā*) which We brought to Abraham against his people" (Q 6:78).[28] Now he analyzes how the figure works, as the Bāṭinī analyzed the workings of the scale for weighing gold and silver, and he discovers that it is the result of two premises which combine to produce a result: knowledge. Because the style of the Qur'ān is characterized by "ellipsis and concision" (*al-ḥadhf wa-l-ījāz*), Ghazālī proceeds to set out the proof in conventional form:

> [Whoever has power over the sunrise is God].[29] (A)
> My god is the one who has power over the sunrise. (A)
> Therefore, my god is God ("and not you, Nimrod!")[30] (A)

He concludes by explaining that he knows the truth of the major premise (i.e. that which involves the predicate of the conclusion) by universal stipulation, and that of the minor premise (i.e. that which involves the subject of the conclusion) by sense-data. The Bāṭinī understands the reasoning, but only in this context: "How am I to weigh by it the rest of the intelligibles (*al-ma'ārif*) which are difficult for me?"[31] Ghazālī explains:

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> This is inferred from the fact that a judgment about a predicate is necessarily a judgment about that of which it is predicated (*al-ḥukm ʿalā al-ṣifa ḥukm ʿalā al-mawṣūf bi-l-ḍarūra*) ... Thus "the one who makes the sun rise" is the predicate of the Lord (*al-Rabb*), and we have already stated that whoever is characterized as "the one who makes the sun rise" is [characterized] by divinity.[32]

After two everyday examples in which he proves that a mule with a distended stomach is not pregnant and that a worm is a sentient being, Ghazālī adds a condition to his definition: the predicate must be co-extensive with the thing described (*musāwiya li-l-mawṣūf*) or more general than it (*aʿamm minhu*), so that the statement about it will necessarily include that of which it is predicated.[33] Now he cites a well-known example of the same figure from the field of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*):

> All wine (*nabīdh*) is intoxicating. (A)
> All intoxicants are forbidden. (A)
> Therefore all wine is forbidden. (A)[34]

Aristotle considered the first figure to be "the 'perfect' syllogism," the model for all other forms of argument.[35] Ghazālī's examples are of the first mood of the first figure, which is the basic form of the categorical syllogism in all presentations of logic. Medieval logicians gave this first mood the mnemonic name "Barbara," in which the arrangement of the vowels indicates that it is constructed entirely of universal affirmative or "A" propositions. Validity of the figure depends upon a double rule: "The minor premise must be affirmative; the major premise must be universal."[36] Its characteristic arrangement is that the middle term (i.e. the one that does not appear in the conclusion) is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise.[37] Ghazālī's restatement of his Qur'ānic example follows this pattern, but his legal example reverses the arrangement and puts the minor premise first.[38] Most syllogistic proofs in the Qur'ān appear reducible to the first figure, for the same reason that most of its rhetorical proofs are based on contrast: when the aim is to alert the hearer to One Truth and One Reality, the most fitting method is by this *Dictum de omni et nullo* – the Law of All or None.[39]

Here are two examples used by the Ḥanbalī jurist and theologian Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, schematized and with the

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intervening supporting verses removed. Of the first he concludes, "It is a syllogism (*qiyās*) of the first form, clear in and of itself (*bayyin bi-dhātihi*):"

> Those who disbelieved will be driven to Hell in a crowd until, when they arrive, its gates will be opened and its keepers will say, "Did not Apostles come to you from among yourselves, reciting the signs of God and warning you about meeting this Day of yours?" They will reply, "Oh yes, but the sentence of punishment against the unbelievers has now proven to be true!" To them will be said, "Enter the gates of Hell, to remain there eternally!"
>
> (Q 39:71–72)
>
> You were warned and continued to disbelieve. (A)
> All who were warned and continued to disbelieve will go to Hell. (A)
> Therefore, you will go to Hell. (A)[40]
>
> "When we die and have turned to dust [shall we return to life?] That would be a long way back!" We know what the earth takes away from them, and We have a Book that records all. But they deny the truth [even] when it comes to them, and they are in a state of confusion.
>
> (Q 50:3–5)
>
> Resurrection of bodies is a possibility announced by one who tells the truth. (A)
> Every possibility announced [as a fact] by one who tells the truth is a fact (*wāqi'*). (A)
> [Therefore resurrection of bodies is a fact.] (A)[41]

In the latter example, Ṭūfī equates the statement of the unbelievers with a denial of resurrection and God's reply with its affirmation, and he words the premises accordingly. In both cases, he has put the minor premise first, presumably because he considers that arrangement to be rhetorically more effective.

To Ghazālī's and Ṭūfī's four Qur'ānic syllogisms in Barbara I shall add two more simple ones. Note that the minor premises of both and the conclusion of the second apply to single individuals; but because an individual constitutes a logical class, the premises and conclusions are still considered A propositions.

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Spendthrifts are brothers of the satans (*al-shayāṭīn*), and Satan is ungrateful to his Lord.

(Q 17:27)

Spendthrifts are the brothers of the satans. (A)
Satan is ungrateful to the Lord. (A)
[Therefore, spendthrifts are ungrateful to the Lord.] (A)

We never sent an apostle or a prophet before you but that, when he was reciting,[42] Satan threw [something false] into his recitation. So God abrogates what Satan throws in; then God confirms his Signs. And God is All-Knowing, All-Wise.

(Q 22:52)

All prophets have been interfered with by Satan. (A)
You [, Muḥammad,] are a prophet. (A)
[Therefore, you have been interfered with by Satan.] (A)

The second pattern is also found in Qur'ān 35:4 and other passages in which God consoles Muḥammad, whose own people have rejected him, by recounting similar episodes from the lives of previous prophets.

Although Ghazālī confines himself to the first mood of the first figure, he need not have done so, as all four moods can be found in the Qur'ān. The second mood of the first figure is called "Darii," signaling that it consists of one universal (A) and one particular (I) affirmative, with a conclusion that is also a particular affirmative (I). This mood is used to demonstrate the possibility that not all of the People of the Book are bound for Hell.

But those among [the Jews] who are well-grounded in knowledge and the believers believe in what was sent down to you and what was sent down before you. And (especially) those who pray, and those who give alms and believe in God and the Last Day – We shall grant them a great reward.

(Q 4:162)

All who believe in Revelation, pray, give alms, and believe in God and the Last Day, will have a heavenly reward. (A)
Some Jews believe in Revelation, pray, give alms, and believe in God and the Last Day. (I)
Therefore, some Jews will have a heavenly reward. (I)

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> And when [some Christians] hear what has been sent down to the Apostle, you see their eyes overflowing with tears, for the Truth which they recognize. They say, "Our Lord, we have believed, so record us among the witnesses.[43] Why should we not believe in God and the Truth that has come to us, when we long for our Lord to admit us to the company of the righteous?" For what they have said God has rewarded them with Gardens beneath which rivers flow, dwelling eternally therein. That is the reward for those who do good (*al-muḥsinīn*).
>
> (Q 5:83–85)

All who believe in the truth of Muḥammad's message will go to heaven. (A)
Some Christians believe in the truth of Muḥammad's message. (I)
Therefore, some Christians will go to heaven. (I)

More common than syllogisms in Darii are those in the third mood, "Celarent", which produce a universal negative (E) conclusion on the basis of a universal negative (E) major and a universal affirmative (A) minor premise. The legal and theological uses of universal negative conclusions are clear:

> Those who believe in God and the Last Day do not ask you to exempt them from fighting with their goods and their persons; and God knows well those who fear Him. Only those who do not believe in God and the Last Day, and whose hearts are in doubt, will ask you for exemption. Thus in their doubt they waver.
>
> (Q 9:44–45)

Those who ask to be exempted from fighting do not believe in God. (E)
[X, Y, and Z have asked to be exempted from fighting.] (A)
Therefore, X, Y, and Z do not believe in God. (E)

> They attribute to some of His servants a share with Him [in His godhead]. Humanity is clearly ungrateful [to the point of blasphemy]. What! Has He taken for Himself daughters from out of His creation and bestowed sons upon *you*? When one of them is informed of [the birth of] one of those he has set up as a likeness to the All-Merciful,

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his face darkens and he is filled with silent rage. Is one decked out in ornaments and inarticulate in debate [fit to be associated with God?]

(Q 43:15–18)

One decked out in ornaments and inarticulate is not a fit partner for God (even among the polytheists). (E)
Women are decked out in ornaments and are inarticulate. (A)
[Therefore women are not fit partners for God.] (E)

To complete the four moods of the first-figure syllogism, let us consider the eponymous passage from Sura 26 *al-Shu'arā'*, which can be rendered as a syllogism in "Ferio," which consists of one universal negative (E) and one particular affirmative (I) premise yielding a particular negative (O) conclusion. The combination of negative and particular propositions restricts the form's usefulness, yet the complexities of Qur'ānic diction undoubtedly hide many more.

And the poets – it is those gone astray who follow them. Have you not seen that they wander through every valley, and that they say things that they do not do? Except those who believe, and do good works, and remember God often, and triumph after having been wronged. Those who have wronged them will learn what a disastrous turn they will take!

(Q 26:224–227)

[No believers say things they do not do.] (E)
Some poets are believers. (I)
Therefore some poets do not say things they do not do. (O)

The second figure

As his primary example of the second-figure syllogism, Ghazālī uses another episode from the life of Abraham:

When the night grew dark around him, he saw a star. He said: "That is my Lord." And when it set he said: "I do not love things that set!" And when he saw the moon rising, he said: "That is my Lord." And when it set, he said: "If my Lord does not guide me, I shall certainly be one of those

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who go astray!" And when he saw the sun rising, he said: "That is my Lord: that is the greatest one." And when it set, he said: "O my people! I declare myself free[44] of what you associate with God! I turn my face as a monotheist (*ḥanīf*^{an}) to the One Who created the heavens and the earth, nor am I one of those who associate other deities with God!"

(Q 6:76–79)

The rule of the second-figure syllogism is: "One premise must be negative; the major premise must be universal."[45] Ghazālī's first example is of the first mood of the second figure, which is called "Camestres" to show that its major premise is a universal affirmative (A), its minor premise a universal negative (E), and its conclusion also a universal negative (E). He begins with the bare phrase "I do not love things that set" (*lā uḥibb al-āfilīn*) and renders the syllogism as follows:

> The moon sets (*al-qamar āfil*). (A)
> The Deity does not "set." (E)
> Therefore the moon is not a deity. (E)[46]

Again the Bāṭinī asks that the reasoning be clarified, "For denying divinity to the moon is clear to me." Ghazālī explains:

> [For] every pair of which something that is predicated of one is denied of the other, those two things are unlike ... That of which something is denied that is affirmed of another thing is unlike that other. "Setting" is denied of God; "setting" is affirmed of the moon; and this makes the distinction between the two logically necessary ...[47]

He admits that Abraham's knowledge that God does not "set" is not *a priori* (*lam yakun dhālika al-'ilm awwalīy*^{an} *lahu*) but is derived from two other premises that have produced his existing knowledge that God does not change: (1) everything that changes is contingent (*ḥādith*); (2) "setting" is a type of change.[48]

Ghazālī's next example comes from confrontations with the Christians and Jews:

> The Jews and Christians say, "We are the sons of God, and beloved of Him." Say: "Then why does He punish you for

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> your sins?" No, you are human beings from among those He has created. He forgives whom He will and punishes whom He will ...
>
> (Q 5:18)

Ghazālī's schema for this Qur'ānic rebuttal is in the third mood, "Cesare," of which the major premise and the conclusion are universal negatives (E) and the minor a universal affirmative (A):

> [Sons are not punished.] (E)
> You are punished. (A)
> Therefore, you are not sons. (E)

His third example is in Camestres:

> Say: "O you who are Jews, if you are the friends of God to the exclusion of other people, then hope for death, if you are sincere!" But they will never hope for it, because of what their hands have done before. And God knows all about those who do evil.
>
> (Q 62:6–7, cf. 2:94–95)

> [The friend (*al-walīy*) hopes to meet his Friend (*walīyahu*- sc. God).] (A)
> The Jew does not hope to meet God. (E)
> Therefore, the Jew is not the friend of God. (E)

Ghazālī's everyday example is in Camestres as well:

> A stone is an inanimate object (*jamād*). (A)
> A human is not an inanimate object. (E)
> Therefore, a human being is not a stone. (E)[49]

"Say: 'Do I want anyone other than God as Lord, when He is Lord of all things?'" (Q 6:164). From this verse in Sura 6, to which he compares Q 6:14 and Q 6:114, Ṭūfī extracts the following syllogism:

> Everything except God has a lord (*kull mā siwā Allāh marbūb*).
> Nothing that has a lord *is* a lord (*lā shay' min al-marbūb bi-rabb*).[50]

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Therefore, nothing except God is a lord (*fa-lā shay' mimmā siwā Allāh bi-rabb*).

The syllogism appears at first glance to be made up not of simple but of "covertly multiple premises."[51] However, by taking into account the construction of the Arabic language upon roots and patterns, the terms can in fact be reduced to three, resulting in a syllogism in Camestres.

All that is not-God has a lord. (A)
Nothing that has a lord *is* a lord. (E)
Therefore, nothing that is not-God is a lord. (E)

The conclusion is still not the one desired, however, but as it is a universal negative proposition, it can be converted:

Therefore, there is no lord except God (*fa-idh^{an} lā rabb illā Allāh*).

Still attracted to cases that are more complex than his own analysis indicates, Ṭūfī tackles a long passage in which some of the prophet Ṣāliḥ's people reject his prophethood because he is unable to prevent them from defying divine commands, while others among his people attempt to defend him. "If you wish," says Ṭūfī, "you may arrange it using the categorical (*ḥamlī*) method:"[52]

Every apostle tells the truth. (A)
Everyone who tells the truth brings about what he promises. (A)
You, Ṣāliḥ, cannot bring about what you have promised. (E)
Therefore, you are not an apostle or a truth-teller. (E)
(Q 7:73–77)

Ṭufī ignores the fact that there are too many terms here for a single syllogism; it is actually two, both in Camestres:

Everyone who tells the truth brings about what he promises. (A)
You, Ṣāliḥ, cannot bring about what you have promised. (E)
Therefore, you are not a truth-teller. (E)

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Every apostle tells the truth. (A)
You are not telling the truth. (E)
Therefore, you are not an apostle. (E)

But while the opponents' reasoning is valid, Ṭūfī points out that their premises are irrelevant (*mamnū'atān*). First, the promised punishment will come not immediately but later, to allow the people time to repent, as was the case with Jonah. Thus the recalcitrant people of Thamūd will not be around to profit from arguments based upon their own demise. Second, it is in any case not a prophet who brings on the punishment, but God Himself.

Countless examples of Camestres can be found in the Qur'ān. I shall add only four schemata from well-known *topoi*:

> The Creator of the heavens and the earth – how can He have a son when He has no consort? ...
>
> (Q 6:101)

[All who have sons have consorts.] (A)
God has no consort. (E)
Therefore, God has no son. (E)

> Those [false deities] whom they invoke besides God have not created anything but are themselves created.
>
> (Q 16:20)

God is a creator. (A)
No idols are creators. (E)
[Therefore no idols are God.] (E)

> We know well that they say: "It is a human being who dictates to him!" But the language of the one to whom they incline is foreign, obscure, while this is a clear Arabic tongue.
>
> (Q 16:103)

[Whoever dictates in a language must speak the language.] (A)
X does not speak the language. (E)
Therefore X does not dictate [the Qur'ān to Muḥammad]. (E)[53]

> Or [the unbelievers' state] is like the darkness of a bottomless ocean ... And one to whom God gives no light *has* no light.
>
> (Q 24:40)

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[All who have light have light from God.] (A)
No unbelievers have light from God. (E)
Therefore, no unbelievers have light. (E)

The second mood of the second-figure is called "Baroco," signaling that it consists of one universal affirmative (A) and one particular negative (O), with a conclusion that is also a particular negative (O). The fourth mood is called "Festino:" universal negative (E), particular affirmative (I), and particular negative (O). The passages exemplifying the first-figure syllogisms in Darii (see above) with which Ghazālī demonstrates the possibility that not all of the People of the Book are bound for Hell can, without violence to the text, also be expressed as second-figure syllogisms. We have converted the first to Baroco, the second to Festino.

All who believe in Revelation, pray, give alms, and believe in God and the Last Day, will have a heavenly reward. (A)
Some Jews do not believe in Revelation, pray, give alms, and believe in God and the Last Day. (O)
Therefore, some Jews will not have a heavenly reward. (O)
(Q 4:162)

None who believe in the truth of Muḥammad's message will go to hell. (E)
Some Christians believe in the truth of Muḥammad's message. (I)
Therefore, some Christians will not go to hell. (O)
(Q 5:83–85)

The third and fourth figures

Ghazālī's "lesser" scale is the third figure of the categorical syllogism, "which we have learned from God (swt) where He dictated it (*'allamahu*) to Muḥammad (s) in the Qur'ān."[54] This time it comes from the life of Moses:

They do not give God His due when they say: "God revealed nothing to any human." Say: "Who revealed the Book that Moses brought as a light and a guide to humanity? But you put it on pages which you show and many of which you hide ..."
(Q 6:91)

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Or, in Ghazālī's rendering:

[Moses was a human being.] (A)
God sent a book to Moses. (A)

These premises necessarily produce a particular conclusion (*qaḍīya khāṣṣa*):

Therefore, God sends books to some humans. (I)

Ghazālī notes that the first premise is known through sense-data, the second because it is accepted by the opponents, as proven by the fact that they hide some of what God revealed. This is a rhetorical proof, notes Ghazālī, "and for that it is enough that the two premises be accepted by the opponent ... even if someone else might have some doubt concerning the matter ... And most Qur'ānic proofs proceed in this manner."[55]

Ghazālī's first non-Qur'ānic example is:

A snake is an animal. (A)
A snake walks without legs. (A)
Therefore, some animals walk without legs. (I)

All these are examples of the first mood of the third figure, called "Darapti" for its arrangements of universal and particular propositions. The rule for the third figure is: "The minor premise must be affirmative; the conclusion must be particular. To this should really be added: one of the premises must be universal."[56]

Ghazālī's definition is that:

[For] every two predicates applied to a single thing, some instances of each of the predicates must necessarily apply to the other ... Do you not see that, if it is predicated of the human being both that he is living (*ḥayawān*) and that he is a body, it necessarily follows that some bodies are living; while it does not follow that every body is living; nor should you be misled by the possibility of describing every living thing as being a body. Since applying each predicate to the other is not necessary in every case, the knowledge obtained thereby is not necessary [either].[57]

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In addition to four valid moods of the first-figure syllogism and four of the second, there are six valid moods of the third-figure syllogism (of which the first is Darapti) and five of the fourth figure, for a grand total of nineteen valid moods of the categorical syllogism. Omitting the fourth figure entirely, Ghazālī does not go beyond Darapti, nor shall we. The point is not to exhaust the resources of classical formal logic (or the reader!) but to show how Qur'ānic arguments work both rhetorically and logically. The reader trained in symbolic or mathematical logic may wish to bring these methods to bear as well. But one should remember that the Qur'ān was revealed in natural language, in words. Numbers and non-verbal symbols indeed have meaning, but calling them "language" is ultimately a metaphor. Misplaced concreteness is also a fallacy.

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9

CONDITIONAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS

Ghazālī's fourth and fifth scales were schematized not by the Peripatetics but by logicians of the Stoic school. They posited as axioms five "undemonstrated" arguments, two conditional and three disjunctive, from which they held that all other arguments could be derived.[1] They did not use Aristotelian terminology: where the Peripatetics used "A," "B," and "C" to represent terms (i.e. adjectives or nouns), the Stoics used "first," "second," and "third" to represent entire propositions. Ghazālī treats conditional arguments much less analytically than he does categorical ones; thus I have rearranged his examples considerably in order to illustrate the points at issue. Because he and Ṭūfī do not distinguish between the two types of conditional syllogism in a schematic way, and because Ṭūfī dismisses disjunctive syllogisms as merely a rhetorical device and omits them altogether, I begin with the Stoic schemata, providing Ghazālī's, Ṭūfī's, and my own examples as needed.

CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS

The classic Stoic schema of the type 1 conditional is:

If the first, then the second.
The first.
Therefore the second.

It should be noted that the valid form of type 1 (*modus ponens*) is that which affirms the antecedent. The classical example of it is:

If it is day, then it is light.
It is day.
Therefore it is light.

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The schema of the type 2 conditional is:

If the first, then the second.
Not the second.
Therefore, not the first.

Thus the valid form of type 2 (*modus tollens*) denies the consequent:

If it is day, then it is light.
It is not light.
Therefore, it is not day.[2]

The fallacious forms of conditional argument are so close to the valid ones, and the classical examples so forgettable,[3] that I have chosen other examples more likely to be remembered. The fallacy characteristic of type 1 is that of *affirming the consequent*. Logician Irving Copi's example is part of an old debate:

If Bacon wrote *Hamlet*, then Bacon was a great writer.
Bacon was a great writer.
Therefore Bacon wrote *Hamlet*.[4] [Fallacious]

The fallacy of type 2 is that of *denying the antecedent*. Copi's example, again, is tailored for the academic audience:

If Carl embezzled the college funds, then Carl is guilty of a felony.
Carl did not embezzle the college funds.
Therefore Carl is not guilty of a felony.[5] [Fallacious]

This is a clear fallacy. The felonies of academics are not limited to embezzlement.

The Arabic language is rich in constructions that express the nuances of condition, consequence, implication, and entailment. The three conditional particles *in*, *idhā*, and *law* are usually understood to indicate, respectively, pure hypothesis, time-related possibility ("if-and-when," "whenever"), and condition contrary to fact. Other conditionals are expressed by such words as "whoever" (*man*), "whatever" (*mahmā*), and "wherever" (*aynamā*). All are used in the Qur'ān, but we shall not pursue the lexical differences between them, only establish that the word in

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question actually signals the existence of a conditional relation. Not every conditional construction is introduced by a particle: often the relationship is expressed through syntax and grammar alone: "Keep your covenant and We will keep Ours" (Q 2:40). The converse is also true: not every "if"-word sets up a conditional proposition. It may actually mask a categorical statement: "Do not fear them but fear Me, if you are believers!" (Q 3:175).

The conditional syllogism is Ghazālī's fourth "scale," which he calls *mīzān al-talāzum*, the "scale of mutual implication."[6] He defines it very succinctly, not drawing a clear distinction between the two types of conditional inference and putting the second type first:

> Everything that is consequent to something (*lāzim li-al-shay'*) follows it (*tābi' lahu*) in every case; so that denying the consequent necessarily denies the antecedent (*al-malzūm*). The existence of the antecedent necessitates the existence of the consequent. As for negation of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent, nothing results from these two; rather, they are of the scale of Satan.[7]

At the end of his short chapter, Ghazālī finally sets out consistent illustrations of the valid and the invalid conditionals. As in his definition, he describes both the valid forms and puts the type 2 argument first. I have separated and rearranged them to suit the present context.

The type 1 ("constructive") mode:

> If Zayd's prayer is valid, then he is ritually pure.
> It is known that his prayer is valid.
> Therefore, he is ritually pure.

If the antecedent is denied instead of affirmed, a fallacious form results.

> If Zayd's prayer is valid, then he is ritually pure.
> His prayer is not valid.
> Therefore, he is not ritually pure. [Fallacious]

" ... because the invalidity of his prayer may be because of the failure of some condition other than ritual purity; because this is

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denial of the antecedent, and it does not indicate denial of the consequent."[8]

The type 2 ("destructive") mode:

> If Zayd's prayer is valid, then he is ritually pure.
> It is known that he is not ritually pure.
> Therefore, his prayer is not valid.

If the consequent is affirmed instead of denied, a fallacy is produced, "because his prayer may be invalid for another cause (*'illa*), because this is the existence of the consequent and does not indicate the existence of the antecedent." Ghazālī illustrates the fallacy as follows:

> If Zayd's prayer is valid, then he is ritually pure.
> Zayd is ritually pure.
> Therefore, his prayer is valid.[9] [Fallacious]

Type 1 conditionals ("constructive" mood) in the Qur'ān

One does not find in the Qur'ān a great many full conditional arguments of the first type, that is, those which produce a conclusion by affirming the antecedent. Here is one of the clearest examples:

> The Jews and the Christians will never be happy with you unless you follow their religion. Say: "The guidance of God *is* guidance!" And if you gave in to their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you would find no protector against God, and no supporter.
>
> (Q 2:120)

Here is the argument:

> If you do not follow their religion, the Jews and Christians will never accept you.
> You do not follow their religion.
> Therefore, the Jews and Christians will never accept you.

Far more common are versions in which only the antecedent is stated, leaving the rest to be inferred by the audience. Sometimes in lieu of the consequent there is a rhetorical question:

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> Say: Do you see that if [the Revelation] is from God and you reject it, who is in greater error than one who has split off far away?
>
> (Q 41:52, cf. 46:10)

The argument is, of course, meant to be completed as follows:

> If the Revelation is from God and you reject it, [then you are in error (*ḍalāl*).]
> [The Revelation is from God and you reject it.]
> [Therefore, you are in error.]

The bracketing reflects the fact that not even the whole conditional proposition is stated explicitly, only the antecedent. The listener or reader extrapolates the consequent from the rhetorical question that follows it, then uses it to complete the argument.

The type 1 conditional proceeds by affirmation; and this positive form or "constructive mood" of a conditional is far less effective rhetorically than is the negative or "destructive mood." There are no surprises, and the conclusion can be an anticlimax. It must be noted that the terms "constructive" and "destructive" indicate only that the antecedent is being affirmed or the consequent denied; they do not imply the respective absence or presence of negatives in the argument. The first example given here (Q 2:120 above) is in the constructive mood, even though it contains grammatical negatives; for that very reason it is rhetorically effective and comes to a resounding conclusion.[10] In some of the best-known Qur'ānic passages, conditionals in the constructive mood are strengthened by their twins in the destructive mood, as I shall illustrate below.

Both of Ghazālī's paraphrases of the Qur'ānic arguments and the first part of his definition are of the Stoic type 2, in which the consequent is denied. Obviously, he found type 2 to be more useful in argument than type 1; however, he evidently found type 1 easier to demonstrate, as three of his four everyday examples affirm the antecedent. I paraphrase only the first, because the second and fourth have the same form; the third is of type 2.

> If the sun is up, the stars are hidden.
> The sun is up.
> Therefore the stars are hidden.[11]

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Type 2 conditionals ("destructive" mood) in the Qur'ān

Qur'ānic conditional arguments proceed far more often by denying the consequent (type 2) than by affirming the antecedent (type 1), and they often appear to reflect actual debates. Both the prophets and their opponents use them:

> Those who associate other deities with God will say: "If God had willed, we would not have associated them with Him, nor would our fathers; nor would He have forbidden us anything ..." In this way those before them denied [the Truth], so that they tasted Our punishment. Say: "God's is the decisive argument (*fa-li-Llāh al-ḥujja al-bāligha*): if He had willed, He would indeed have guided you all." Say: "Bring your witnesses to testify that God has forbidden it;" and if they testify, do not testify with them ...
>
> (Q 6:148–150; cf. 10:99–100, 16:35)

The polytheists argue as follows:

> If God had willed, we would not worship many Gods.
> [We do worship many gods.]
> [Therefore God did not will (otherwise).]

The Prophet's rebuttal:

> If God had willed, he would have guided you all.
> [God did not guide you.]
> [Therefore God did not will (otherwise)][12]

Though the Qur'ān can hardly be expected to acknowledge the point, the result of the debate is a logical deadlock, as both parties reason validly in the same conditional schema to prove opposite points. Perhaps for that reason, Muḥammad is instructed, in effect, to begin his efforts again by reciting what God has in fact prohibited: idolatry (*shirk*), disrespect for parents, infanticide, murder, and the like, all of them laws observed by the Abrahamic faiths equally. Not coincidentally, the passage ends with a reference to the Covenant: "Keep the Covenant of God: that is what He has charged you with so that perhaps you will remember" (Q 6:152).[13]

Ṭūfī grants a certain validity to the polytheists' statement by accepting it as "true in itself," since everything that happens indeed

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happens by the will of God, "but they expressed it in a tone of sin and obstinacy (*al-ʿanat wa-l-ʿinād*) . . . and they were reproved for it because their motive was corrupt."[14]

Ghazālī's example of the Qur'ānic conditional syllogism is a type 2 argument. He bases it upon three verses:

> If (*law*) there were gods besides God in them, then both [the heavens and the earth] would have come to ruin.
> (Q 21:22)

> Say: "If (*law*) there were other gods along with Him, as they say, they would have sought a way to get at the Lord of the Throne (*la-btaghaw ilā dhī al-ʿarsh sabil*)" [sc. to kill Him, then contend with each other for godhood][15]
> (Q 17:42)

> If (*law*) these were gods, they would not have gone to Hell; but all of them are there eternally!
> (Q 21:99)

From these three verses he constructs two arguments:

> If there were two gods in the world, it would be ruined.
> It has not been ruined.
> Therefore there are not two gods.[16]

> If there were other gods than the Lord of the Throne, they would have sought a way to get at the Lord of the Throne.
> It is known that they did not seek such a thing.
> Therefore, there are no gods except the Lord of the Throne.[17]

The second argument is based upon the last two verses, as Q 21:99 provides the grounds for denying the consequent: the evidence that the so-called deities found no way to approach God is that they are in Hell forever.

Ghazālī's everyday example comes from *fiqh*:

> If the sale of something absent (*ghā'ib*)[18] were legally valid (*saḥīḥ*), [its legality] would be clearly implied (*fa-yulzamu bi-taṣrīḥ al-ilzām*).
> It is not clearly implied.
> Therefore, [the sale] is not legally valid.[19]

My first example in this section, Qur'ān 6:148–150, illustrated the practical application of the type 2 conditional in debate. A similar passage has an even more confrontational tone in that the consequent is not a proposition but a command:

> Say [to the Jews]: "If the Final Home in God is for you alone and no one else, then wish for death, if you are telling the truth!" But they will never wish for it, because of what they have already done; and God knows all about the wrongdoers.
>
> (Q 2:94–95, cf. 62:6–7)

> "If you (Jews) are assured of heaven, then wish for death."
> They will never wish for death.
> Therefore, they are not assured of heaven.

Conditionals in which the consequent is in the form of a command are classic forms of challenge. Ṭūfī calls Qur'ān 2:23–24 "a conditional inference in the form of an exposure of weakness and a challenge" (*sūrat al-ta'jīz wa-l-taḥaddī*).[20]

> If you are in doubt about what We revealed to Our servant, then produce a sura of the same sort, and call your witnesses – besides God! – if you are telling the truth. And if you do not – and you never will – then beware of the Fire whose fuel is humans and stones, made ready for those who refuse to believe.
>
> (Q 2:23–24)

The construction with a condition followed by an imperative is treated further below, and especially in Chapter 4. Forensic techniques are the subject of the last chapter of this book.

One of the verses used in the classic arguments for the Qur'ān's "miraculous inimitability" (*i'jāz*) is a conditional:

> Do they not pay due attention to the Qur'ān? If it were from anyone other than God, they would have found much discrepancy in it.
>
> (Q 4:82)

The theologians completed the argument validly as follows:

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If the Qur'ān were not from God, they would have found much discrepancy in it.
They found no discrepancy in it.
Therefore, the Qur'ān is from God.

Heretics seized upon the verse as a challenge. Ibn al-Rīwandī's *Kitāb al-Dāmigh* was an attack upon the Qur'ān; two of his examples of alleged contradiction were between Qur'ān 6:59 and Qur'ān 2:143 and 47:31, and between Qur'ān 41:9 and Qur'ān 41:10.[21] But the proposition in Q 4:82 cannot validly be disproven by affirming the consequent:

If the Qur'ān were not from God, they would have found much discrepancy in it.
They did find discrepancy in it.
Therefore, the Qur'ān is not from God. [Fallacious]

The major premise must be reworded if a type 2 syllogism is to be maintained:

If the Qur'ān were from God, they would have found no discrepancy in it.
They did find discrepancy.
Therefore, it is not from God.

Thus the Qur'ānic wording as it stands cannot be used in a type 2 conditional to prove the opposite of what it asserts. A type 1 conditional *can* be built on the verse as it stands:

If the Qur'ān were not from God, they would have found much discrepancy in it.
The Qur'ān is not from God.
Therefore there is discrepancy in it.

This is a formally valid argument, but it does not appear to reproduce Ibn al-Rīwandī's train of thought, since his point was to prove that the Qur'ān was not from God, and the existence of discrepancy was his minor premise, not his conclusion.

Ṭūfī's treatment is extended, analytic, and addresses all objections. The adversaries, he says, have argued against the Qur'ānic conclusion in two ways. The first is to deny the

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inseparability (*mulāzama*) of the two propositions. They do not concede that a human source would be inconsistent, because many humans are capable of avoiding self-contradiction (*tanāqud*), and it is possible that Muḥammad was like that. Their second argument is not to concede denial of the consequent: they claim that in fact the Qur'ān does contain discrepancies. On the first point, Ṭūfī allows that, although few humans could avoid inconsistency without help from God, some might, but not an illiterate person like the Prophet. On the second, he again allows that there are differences in the Qur'ān, but these are due to differences in time, place, and circumstance. No two cases in the Qur'ān are exactly alike, but when different verses address a single case, there are no discrepancies.[22]

Pure, mixed and ambiguous conditionals

All of Ghazālī's conditionals and most of the Qur'ānic ones are not "pure" conditionals but "mixed" ones; that is, the first premise is a conditional but the second premise and the conclusion are categorical statements. Pure conditionals (or "pure hypotheticals") are of the following form:

> If the first, then the second.
> If the second, then the third.
> Therefore, if the first, then the third.[23]

The Qur'ān contains very few "pure" conditionals immediately identifiable as such, though close analysis would undoubtedly uncover more. The most obvious come from Q 76:29–30 and its analogue Q 81:27–29 and have had vast implications for the development of Muslim theology.

> This is a reminder: so whoever wills will take a path to his Lord; and you do not will unless God wills.
> (Q 76:29–30, cf. 81:27–29)

Schematized, the argument is:

> If [and only if] God wills, you will.
> If you will, then you will take a path to your Lord
> Therefore, if God wills, you will take a path to your Lord.

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Thus the type 1 and type 2 conditionals are not "pure" but "mixed" conditionals. Sometimes they are intertwined. Qur'ān 2:23–24, cited in the previous section[24] as an example of challenge, actually contains one argument of each kind. The first is a type 2:

> If you are in doubt about Revelation, then produce a sura like it.
> You cannot produce a sura like it.
> Therefore, fear the Fire prepared for the *kāfirīn*.

The second is a type 1:

> If you cannot produce a sura like it, then fear the Fire.
> You cannot produce a sura like it.
> Therefore, fear the Fire.

An oft-quoted example of Qur'ānic style comes in a consolation to the Muslims after the battle of Uḥud:

> If God supports you, then none can overcome you; and if He abandons you, who is there to help you after that? So upon God let the believers rely.
>
> (Q 3:160)

The first argument is type 2:

> If God supports you, then none can overcome you.
> People have overcome you [today].
> Therefore God was not supporting you [today].

The second is type 1:

> If God withdraws his support, then none can help you.
> God withdrew his support [today].
> Therefore no one could help you.

Sometimes a too-close adherence to the Qur'ānic wording will produce a fallacious argument. For example, let us look at God's answer to Moses when Moses asks God to show himself so that he may look at him:

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"You will never see Me. But look to the mountain: if it stays firm in its place, you will see Me." But when He appeared in glory to the mountain, He made it like a flat plain, and Moses fell down, thunderstruck. When he came to his senses, he said "Glory be to You! I turn to You in repentance (*tubtu ilayka*[25]), and I am the first of the believers."

(Q 7:143)

If we take the wording of the major proposition directly from the text, we produce the following argument:

> If the mountain stays firm in its place, you will see me.
> The mountain does not stay in its place.
> Therefore, you will not see me. [Fallacious]

This argument is invalid because it denies the antecedent, yet its strong conclusion satisfies the hearer's faith. Reversing antecedent and consequent preserves the conclusion:

> If you are able to see me, the mountain will stay in its place.
> The mountain does not stay in its place.
> Therefore, you will not see me.

If we insist on keeping the Qur'ānic language of the major premise, we can construct a valid argument but cannot prove the point at issue, which is that God cannot be seen:

> If the mountain stays firm in its place, you will see me.
> You will not see me.
> Therefore, the mountain will not stay firm in its place.

The twin theological questions of whether God could be seen and whether he spoke to prophets attracted the exegetes' attention to this long verse. As Rāzī says, "In the verse are eminent, lofty questions from the divine sciences."[26] Because the verse "connects" (*'allaqa*) the impossibility of seeing God with the impossibility of the permanent stability of the mountain as evidenced by its collapse, that appears to have satisfied Mu'tazilī-leaning exegetes, who devote more attention to the grammar of the statement, "You will never see Me (*lan tarani*)."[27] Rāzī, however, after enumerating

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(but not schematizing) the permutations of existence, non-existence, and possible existence of both the Beatific Vision and the permanence of the mountain, concludes that both are possible (*mumkin al-wujūd jā'iz al-ḥuṣūl*) and that that is enough upon which to base the conclusion. "*Wa-Llāhu a'lam.*"[28]

Other "if" constructions

Irving Copi has described four different types of implication commonly expressed by "if-then" statements. The first three express three sorts of connection: logic, definition, and causation; but the fourth "reports a decision of the speaker to behave in a certain way under certain circumstances."[29] This exactly describes the sort of declaration found in Q 39:7:

> If you refuse to believe, God is independent of you, but He does not accept rejection from His servants. And if you give thanks, He is pleased to accept it from you ...
>
> (Q 39:7)

Such statements go beyond observing the letter of the Covenant to set for human beings the proper moral tone.

Most if-statements in the Qur'ān prove on analysis to be rules or laws. Logically enough, many of these begin with an if-clause and end with a command; but they do not become actual arguments with consequences until the anticipated situation actually happens and the rule must be applied. "If you find no one at home, do not enter [the house] until you are given permission" (Q 24:28). The requirement to treat wives fairly begins with a conditional and ends with a command:

> If you fear that you will not be fair [to more than one], then [marry] one, or what your right hands possess: that will make you less likely to commit injustice.
>
> (Q 4:3)

It is then up to the prospective husband to reason that if he marries one woman because of her beauty, another because of her wealth, a third because of her father's influence, and a fourth because she is actually the one best suited to be his wife, he is likely to be unfair to one or more of them and should change his plans accordingly.

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If I fear injustice, then I should marry only one.
I fear injustice.
Therefore I shall marry only one.

Qur'ān 4:101 combines a rule with two conditions, but are they alternatives or do they apply simultaneously?

> When you are traveling in the earth, there is no blame on you if you shorten your prayers, if you are afraid that the unbelievers will attack you.
>
> (Q 4:101)

Is it the "traveler's" (shortened) prayer that is to be further shortened or the basic prayer, that is, the one required of those staying at home? What if one is in fear but is not traveling? Interpretation of the conditions – home, travel, fear – has enabled legal scholars to derive three possible alternatives: *ṣalāt al-iqāma,* *ṣalāt al-safar,* and *ṣalāt al-khawf.*[30]

The same conditional constructions found in these laws of limited scope are also found in the sweeping moral principles arising from the Covenant. Let us look at a conditional that does not use a word for "if:"

> Because of [the sin of Cain], We decreed for the children of Israel that whoever kills (*man qatala*) a person, except for murder or corruption in the earth – it is as though he had killed all people. And whoever saves a life – it is as though he had saved all humanity.
>
> (Q 5:32)

This is a general moral principle that requires no particular application to lend it force. Of course, a particular instance has just preceded the rule and in fact is the occasion for its enunciation:

> Whoever kills another person without just cause, it is as though he killed all humanity.
> Cain killed another man without just cause.
> Therefore, it is as though Cain had killed all humanity.

Once the circumstances have been identified and the proper rule applied, many if-constructions prove to be hidden categorical statements or even syllogisms.[31] The burden of countless Qur'ānic

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verses is expressed by the following conditional: "If you believe in and pray to the One God, fast, pay alms, and are good to your parents, you will go to heaven." This means the same as "All who believe in and pray to the One God, fast, pay alms, and are good to their parents will go to heaven." It remains for the believer to complete the argument in the proper way: "I believe in and pray to the One God, fast, pay alms, and am good to my parents. Therefore, I shall go to heaven, if God wills."

DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS

If the Qur'ān may be called in rhetorical terms a single enormous contrast between God and his creation, in logical terms it is a single enormous disjunction between true belief and error. This is not to deny that there are intermediate stages and compatible alternatives in certain subsets of thought and action; but in the end all paths will have one of two ends: the Garden or the Fire.

Disjunction characterizes the third, fourth, and fifth of the Stoic "indemonstrable" arguments, as schematized by the operative formulae "Not both A and B" and "Either A or B (or C or D)."

The Stoic type 3 indemonstrable simply denies that two things can co-exist:

> Not both: it is day and it is night.
> It is day.
> Therefore it is not night

Its form is:

> Not both the first and the second.
> The first.
> Therefore, not the second.[32]

Note that the nature of this disjunction is to deny that it can be both day and night at the same time; but to deny one is not to assert that it *must* be the other – it may be twilight, or early morning before sunrise, or a total eclipse of the sun.

The Qur'ān consistently denies the possibility of co-existence between incompatibles, particularly when exposing discrepancies between what people say and what they do, or between incompatible beliefs held simultaneously.

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> Why did you kill God's prophets in the past if you are believers?
>
> (Q 2:91, cf. 3:183)[33]

This argument may be schematized as follows:

> Not both: you kill God's prophets and you believe in God.
> You kill God's prophets.
> Therefore you do not believe in God.

The allegation is not that all unbelievers are guilty of the murder of prophets, only that such behavior is incompatible with belief. It is true, however, that the Qur'ān in some places, as here, speaks to current members of religious groups as though they are guilty of the sins of their ancestors; while in other places it distinguishes between the actions of individual members of those groups (e.g. Q 2:62).

Another verse demonstrates the unicity of God according to the same pattern:

> How can He have a son when He has no consort (*ṣāḥiba*)?
>
> (Q 6:101)

> Not both: God has no consort and God has a son.
> God has no consort.
> Therefore, God has no son.

The other *logical* possibility is that God has one or more consorts but has no son. It appears that no one was making such a claim, however, as the Qur'ān does not list it as an alternative to be denied.

The Stoics' fourth and fifth types of undemonstrated argument are disjunctions in the either-or mode. The fourth reaches its conclusion by affirmation, the fifth by negation.

> Type 4:
> Either the first or the second.
> The first.
> Therefore, not the second.[34]

> Type 5:
> Either the first or the second.
> Not the first.
> Therefore, the second.[35]

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Because, as Ghazālī says, Qur'ānic language is elliptical and concise,[36] a statement that is the first premise of an understood disjunction can often be validly completed either way:

> Say: "Do you know best or does God?"
> (Q 2:140, cf. 16:74)

This yields both a type 4 and a type 5:

> Type 4:
> Either you or God knows best.
> [God knows best.]
> [Therefore you do not know best.]
>
> Type 5:
> Either you or God knows best.
> [You do not know best.]
> [Therefore God knows best.]

It is clear when one compares the two that type 5 is more effective rhetorically than type 4, which is anticlimactic and redundant here. Having declared that disjunction is a dialectical tool and not true inference, Ṭūfī does not even bother to analyze Q 2:140 as a disjunction but does what so many have done when analyzing Qur'ānic argument – veers off from analysis into a defense of Muḥammad's prophethood against the Jews who deny it.[37]

Type 4 is rhetorically effective only if the conclusion is also a climax:

> Those are the ones whom God has cursed: He has made them deaf and blinded their sight. Do they then not ponder on the Qur'ān, or are there locks on their hearts?
> (Q 47:23–24)
>
> Either they ponder on the Qur'ān or there are locks on their hearts.
> There are locks on their hearts.
> Therefore they do not ponder on the Qur'ān.

> Some people say: "We believe in God," but if they are harmed for God's sake, they treat oppression by human beings as though it were punishment from God. And when victory comes from your Lord, they will say, "We were

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with you [all along]." Does God not know what is in people's hearts?

(Q 29:10)

Either they will avoid human oppression or they will avoid divine punishment.
They will avoid human oppression.
Therefore, they will not avoid divine punishment

Ghazālī calls disjunction *mīzān al-ta'ānud*, the "scale of mutual opposition." His definition of *mīzān al-ta'ānud* covers only figures 4 and 5. His formulation of the syllogism is as idiosyncratic as his nomenclature, in that he has assimilated figure 3 to the other two, and he has restricted the validity of Qur'ānic disjunctions to those having only two disjuncts. His reason for doing so comes not from logic but from dialectic. In fact the Qur'ān contains not only exclusive disjunctions but also inclusive ones, which offer multiple disjuncts of which more than one can be true. Its central topics, of course, are not served by such constructions: no Qur'ānic disjunction allows a conclusion that God is multiple, or that Muḥammad is not the Apostle of God, or that the Covenant may be discarded.

As his only Qur'ānic example Ghazālī takes Q 34:24: "And surely we or you are rightly guided (*'alā hudā*) or in clear error (*fī ḍalāl mubīn*)." The full schema of the argument is as follows:

Either we or you are in clear error.
[It is known that we are not in error.]
[Therefore you are in error.]

Ghazālī has chosen a verse that produces only one schema, though not all Qur'ānic disjunctions are so easy to handle. As with all the arguments in *Qisṭâs*, he gives an illustration from everyday life as well. He compares the argument to the situation of one who enters a two-room house after someone else has entered it: if he does not see the person in the first room, he knows deductively that he is in the other "as certainly as if he had seen him."[38] Ghazālī's schema is of the fifth type, in which one of the disjuncts is negated to yield the positive conclusion. To this we may add further examples:

They say, "The Fire will touch us for only a limited number of days." Say: "Do you have a promise from God

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– for He never breaks His promises – or are you saying something about God that you do not know?"

(Q 2:80)

Either you have a promise from God of limited punishment or you do not know what you are talking about.
[You have no such promise.]
[Therefore, you do not know what you are talking about.][39]

The following verse contains a comparison, but it is the two disjunctions that make it an argument, or rather two arguments, a type 4 and a type 5:

Say: "Among your multiple 'gods' is there one who guides to the Truth?" Say: "God guides to the Truth. So is one who guides to Truth more worthy of being followed, or one who cannot guide unless he himself is guided? What is the matter with you that you judge in that way?"

(Q 10:35)

Either God guides to Truth or your "gods" guide to truth.
God guides to Truth.
Therefore your "gods" do not guide to truth.

Either your "gods" lead or they themselves are led.
Your "gods" cannot lead.
Therefore they themselves are led.

As with the other areas of formal logic, Ghazālī is perfectly familiar with all forms of the disjunctive syllogism, which he has detailed in *Mi'yār al-'Ilm* but called by its more technical name: the "conditional disjunctive syllogism" (*al-qiyās al-sharṭī al-munfaṣil*).[40] In *Qisṭās* he omits most of the eight forms possible for types 4 and 5 as he has omitted type 3 altogether, but he alerts both interlocutor and reader to the danger of positing only two disjuncts when more than two are possible:

As for the definition (*ḥadd*) of this scale, it is that in everything that is reducible to two disjuncts (*kull mā inḥaṣara fī qismayn*), affirmation of one of them entails negation of the other, and negation of one of them entails affirmation of the other; but on the condition that the

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> disjunction (*al-qisma*) is exclusive (*munḥaṣira*) and not inclusive (*muntashira*),[41] as weighing by the inclusive disjunction is Satan's method.[42]

Many Qur'ānic examples are dense and complex, offering multiple possible disjuncts. Qur'ān 5:43 describes three courses of action, which in exclusive disjunction may be distinguished as logical alternatives or combined in inclusive disjunction as indices of human ambivalence:

> How can they ask you to judge between them when they have the Torah in which is the rule of God? Then they turn away after that, and those people are not believers.
>
> (Q 5:43)

> Either they ask you to judge between them, or they have the Torah by which to judge, or they turn away entirely.

Other unmentioned but logical possibilities are that they ask yet another party to judge, or that they do without a judge altogether and settle things by force of arms.

Where multiple disjuncts are offered, multiplicity is usually on the wrong side. In Chapter 7,[43] we cite from Qur'ān 23:68–74 a list of possible reasons for the Meccans' rejection of the Prophet: the message is unheard-of, or they do not recognize Muḥammad, or they think that he is possessed, or they think he will ask them for money. But the actual reasons are that they hate the truth (Q 23:70) and that, not believing in the Hereafter, they have turned away from the Path (Q 23:74). This is an example of what Ghazālī calls "inclusive disjunction" (*qisma muntashira*), because the truth of one of these disjuncts does not entail the falsity of the others: those who reject Muḥammad may think *both* that his message is unheard-of and that he is possessed. A single verse in Sura 24 *al-Nūr* considers why it is that people summoned to the Prophet for judgment between them come only if the right is on their side. It offers three disjuncts, all simultaneously possible, and all inadmissible as excuses:

> Is there a disease in their hearts? Or do they doubt? Or do they fear that God and His Apostle will treat them unfairly? But they are the ones who are doing wrong.
>
> (Q 24:50)

And there are disjunctions within disjunctions. To cite only one example, a long passage from Sura 40 *Ghāfir/al-Mu'min*) is devoted to the words of the secret believer from among Pharaoh's people who defends Moses (Q 40:28–44). It contains a number of arguments, of which the most interesting comes at the beginning:

> If [Moses] is a liar, his lie will be counted against him; and if he is telling the truth, then some of what he is warning you about will happen to you. God does not guide one who goes too far and lies.
>
> (Q 40:28)

Ṭūfī notes that this is a valid disjunction (*taqsīm ṣaḥīḥ*),[44] but his paraphrase of the argument adds nothing significant. We may go a bit farther:

> Either Moses is lying or he is telling the truth.
> If he is lying, either you will follow him or you will not.
> If you follow him, you will not be punished [sc. all blame will lie upon him].
> If you do not follow him, you will not be punished.
>
> If he is telling the truth, either you will follow him or you will not.
> If you follow him, you will not be punished.
> If you do not follow him, you will be punished.

In other words, following Moses – whether he is lying or not[45] – will bring the follower no harm, while ignoring him is as likely as not to bring punishment. Thus if the potential follower accepts the message, he has only a 25 per cent chance of being punished. This is reminiscent of Pascal's "wager."

The long list of divine signs in Qur'ān 56:57–74 is punctuated with such verses as "Is it you who created it, or are We the Creators?" (Q 56:59). Though rhetorically effective, it does not present every theoretically possible source of these signs to hearers whose powers of spiritual discernment are presumed to be at best rudimentary. Because Ghazālī sees the dangers of too broad a range of choices, he calls incomplete disjunction the "scale of Satan." He gives non-Qur'ānic examples of its misuse in the chapter of the same name, notable among them the Bāṭinī disjunction that limits the source of human knowledge to a choice between the unaided

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human intellect (*al-ra'y al-'aqlī al-maḥḍ*) and the teaching of the Hidden Imam.[46]

Finally, Muslims must beware of those who present them with false disjunctions that omit the only true alternative:

> They say: "Be Jews or Christians and you will be guided!"
> Say: "Rather, the religion (*milla*) of Abraham – a monotheist (*ḥanīf*), not one of the polytheists!"
>
> (Q 2:135)

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10

TECHNICAL TERMS AND DEBATING TECHNIQUE

We may gauge from the foregoing chapters the extent to which the Qur'ān treats human beings as endowed with the capacity to assess arguments, weigh proofs, consider implications, and reach proper conclusions. Ideally, humans will see this capacity in each other as well and conduct themselves accordingly.

> Call to the way of your Lord by means of wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them (*jādilhum*) according to what is best. For your Lord knows best who has strayed from His path.
>
> (Q 16:125)

> Do not argue with the People of the Book except according to what is best, except for those of them who have done wrong. And say, "We believe in what was revealed to us and what was revealed to you: our God and your God is[1] One, and to him we submit ourselves."
>
> (Q 29:46)

Muslim scholars long attempted to maintain this high standard when debating each other. Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī treats the etiquette of debate as second only to its legality. In the second chapter of *'Alam al-Jadhal fī 'Ilm al-Jadal* he says, "The first [requirement] of both parties is that each must aim at showing the truth in his argument, not showing off his own superiority, and he must not care whether the argument (*al-ḥujja*) goes for him or against him." He quotes al-Shāfiʿī as having said, "I never debated anyone and then worried about who won the argument. If he won, then I followed him."[2]

But the realities of human nature are only too clear. Ibn al-Ḥanbalī (554/1159–60 – 634/1236–7) notes that of the 29

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occurrences of the word *jadal* and its derivatives in the Qur'ān, all but three (Q 16:125, 29:46, and 58:1) are condemnatory.[3] The best known of the negative references is Q 18:54: "A human being is the most disputatious of all things (*akthara shay' jadal[an]*)." Ṭūfī's treatment of Q 18:54 is rather brief but uses a stunning illustration: the first "disputatious creature" is none other than 'Alī. The Prophet came to 'Alī and Fāṭima one night while they were sleeping and asked, "Are the two of you not praying?"

> So 'Alī said: "Our souls are in the hand of God: He holds them where He will and sends them where He will." The Prophet (S) turned away, striking his hand upon his thigh and saying: "A human being is the most disputatious of creatures!"[4]

Many of the words and roots that later became technical terms in logic, rhetoric, and debate first appear in the Qur'ān as parts of arguments.

> They say: "None will enter Heaven except those who are Jews or Christians." That is what they wish! Say: "Give [us] your proof (*burhānakum*), if you are telling the truth."
> (Q 2:111)

> When it is said to them: "Pay attention to what is in front of you and what is behind you, so that you may receive mercy!", no single sign (*āya*) of their Lord comes to them but they turn away from it. When it is said to them: "Spend of what God has given you!", those who refuse to believe say to those who believe: "Are we supposed to feed those whom God could have fed if He had wished to? You are nothing but wrong!" And they say: "When will this promise (*wa'd*) come true, if you are telling the truth?" They will not have to wait for anything except a single blast, which will take them away in the very act of arguing! (*wa-hum yakhiṣṣimūn*[5])
> (Q 36:45–49)

> Those who argue (*yuḥājjūn*) about God after a positive response to Him – their argument is void (*ḥujjatuhum dāḥiḍa*) with their Lord. There will be anger against them and a painful punishment.
> (Q 42:16)

> They say: "There is only our life here below: we die and we live, and only Time destroys us." They have no knowledge of that – they only conjecture. When Our Clear Signs are read out to them, their only argument (*ḥujjatuhum*) is to say: "Bring back our fathers, if you are telling the truth!"
>
> (Q 45:24–25)

To the nouns already cited – *burhān, jadal,* and *ḥujja,* and the verbs *ḥājja, takhaṣṣama,* and *jādala* – we may add *tahājja* (Q 40:47), *bayyana* (e.g. Q 43:63), *bayyina* (e.g. Q 11:53 and Sura 98 *al-Bayyina*), *khiṣām* (Q 43:18), *istanbaṭa* (Q 4:83), *māra* (Q 18:22), *tamāra* (Q 53:55), *istaftā* (Q 18:22, 37:149), *nāzaʿa* (Q 22:67), *tanāzaʿa* (Q 4:59), and *ikhtalafa* (Q 22:69). I do not maintain that all developments in the field are anticipated in the Qur'ān. For example, although the important root *d-l-l* exists, as well as the noun *dalīl* (Q 25:45), neither occurs as a term of argument; the same is true for the roots *l-z-m, n-t-j, w-ṣ-f, w-j-b,* and many others.[6] But despite the absence of some descriptive technical terms, the Qur'ān combines the techniques, tropes, and syllogisms analyzed in this book to form arguments simple and complex, informal and formal, short and long.

It is in the analysis of extended arguments that *ʿAlam al-Jadhal* proves itself an indispensable tool. With help from Ṭūfī, we shall examine two long passages from the lives of Abraham and Moses and a number of shorter examples based upon incidents in the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, noting the techniques used or recommended and whether the intended audience are pagans or People of the Book.

The first example comes from Sura 21 *al-Anbiyā'*, in which Abraham begins with a verbal argument and ends with a demonstration that his father's idols can neither speak nor act (Q 21:51–67). Ṭūfī scrutinizes the arguments on both sides with great honesty and carefully chosen vocabulary. He observes that the idolaters answer Abraham's unsympathetic (*istifhām nafy wa-inkār*) and disingenuous question "What are these statues to which you are so devoted?" (Q 21:52) with an appeal to the "specious argument of imitating tradition" (*shubhat al-taqlīd*), that is, they argue on the basis of *sunna* and its resulting consensus. We saw in Chapter 2 ("Signs and precedents") the powerful appeal of such arguments, and the care with which the Qur'ān and its exegetes absolve Abraham of any culpability in offending tradition by

disobeying his father on the one hand, and praying that he – an idolater – be forgiven, on the other.[7]

Despite using a few loaded terms, Ṭūfī gives the same logical weight to the idolaters' appeal to consensus (*ittifāq al-jamm al-ghafīr min al-'uqalā'*) as is normally given to the consensus of Muslims: that agreement of large numbers of informed people over a long period of time on something false is usually impossible (*mumtani' 'ādat^an^*).[8] Abraham answers, not by denying the validity of the procedure but by discrediting the conclusion reached: "You and your fathers have clearly been in error" (Q 21:54). Ṭūfī sums up the implications of this exchange:

> Imitating tradition does not conflict with decisive proofs of the unicity of God, and agreement of large numbers of informed people on something false is usually not impossible, but it is unlikely, assuming that it is based upon some proof (*bi-sharṭ istināḍihi ilā ḥujja*). By itself, however, it is neither impossible nor unlikely, otherwise your forefathers would have maintained their rejection of polytheism, in imitation (*iqtidā'^an^*) of Adam and the great majority of monotheists.[9]

But, says Ṭūfī, by granting that they are theoretically correct (*fa-lammā ṣaddaqahum fī maqām al-naẓar*), Abraham has left them uncertain as to whether he has brought them the truth or is making fun of them (Q 21:55). He assures them of his sincerity and argues for the existence of God on the basis of signs, that is, the existence of the heavens and the earth as a basis for induction. As Ṭūfī expresses it,

> These deniers of the divine attributes (*mu'aṭṭila*) knew no deity except their idols, so he demonstrates to them the existence of the True Deity by the existence of the heavens and the earth, using the effect to reason to the cause (*istidlāl^an^ bi-l-athar 'alā al-mu'aththir*).[10]

So ends that day's debate.

Now Abraham carries out his demonstration, breaking all the idols except the biggest one, which he blames for having destroyed the others (Q 21:57–63). "[And if you don't believe me, then] ask them, if they are able to speak" (Q 21:63). The people must then admit that the idols cannot speak (Q 21:65). Ṭūfī notes that

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Abraham has forced his opponents to accept two premises (*wakāna lahu fī dhālika ʿalayhim ilzāmān*): (1) the idea that God, like this idol, refuses to allow any others to be worshipped along with him; (2) their practice – for which he has rebuked them – of worshipping something which cannot speak, or do harm or good, or even defend itself (Q 21:66–67). According to Ṭūfī's reading, the idolaters then hold a brief conference apart, during which some begin to see the error of their ways (Q 21:64), but in the end they return to their stubborn resistance and come out of their meeting blaming Abraham for forcing them to do what cannot be done (*alzamūhu taklīf mā lā yuṭāq*), making them look absurd for trying to get answers from an inanimate object (Q 21:65). Ṭūfī interprets Abraham's reply:

> "*I* did not force you into doing something absurd, rather, I forced you to accept the absurdity [of what you are doing], which is your worship of something impotent and powerless." And when they were cut off from debate, they resorted to force ... Thus we have showed that God (may He be glorified) meets proof with proof and power with power (*al-ḥujja bi-l-ḥujja wa-l-quwwa bi-l-quwwa*) and that He is victorious in both.[11]

Our example from the life of Moses is the long passage from Sura 26 *al-Shuʿarāʾ* that follows the command of the Lord of the Worlds to Moses and Aaron to lead the Children of Israel out of Egypt. Structurally, the passage resembles the previous episode from the life of Abraham in that it progresses from exchanges of words to active demonstrations: it begins with a painful confrontation between Moses and his foster-father Pharaoh (Q 26:18–22), moves on to an embarrassing exchange in which prophecies from Moses are answered with spiteful threats from Pharaoh (Q 26:23–37), and ends with a contest between magicians' tricks and prophetic miracles (Q 26:38–52).

Ṭūfī notes that Pharaoh's attitude in the initial confrontation involves two things: (1) his contempt for Moses, as embodied in the saying: "No one will respect you as an adult who knew you as a child;"[12] (2) his charges that Moses is guilty of ingratitude (*kufr al-niʿma*) to the one who raised him, as evidenced by his killing an Egyptian in the past and now attempting to destroy the Egyptian religion. To the charge that killing the Egyptian put him among the "ungrateful" (*min al-kāfirīn*), Ṭūfī notes that Moses counters with

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an admission of error committed before wisdom had come to him from God: "I did it then, whilë I was among those gone astray (*min al-ḍāllīn*)" (Q 26:20); he has admitted as much, says Ṭūfī, in Qur'ān 28:16. Moses fled, but God granted him the capacity for wise judgment (*ḥukm*) and made him one of the apostles (Q 26:21). He answers Pharaoh's reminder of benefits granted with a comparison: the harm Pharaoh did by enslaving the children of Israel will never be offset by his good deed of raising Moses. "Now the debate on this topic ends (*inqaḍat al-munāẓara*) and returns to the debate on the subject of apostleship."[13]

Moses's words in this second part of the exchange are essentially a definition of God. Pharaoh asks, "And what (*mā*) is the 'Lord of the Worlds'?" (Q 26:23), probably, notes Ṭūfī, because he is asking about what he thinks is an insensible thing (*mā*) like an idol or a planet and not a person or sentient being (*man*).[14] Moses replies, "Lord of the heavens and the earth and all that is between them ..." (Q 26:24); "Your Lord and the Lord of your earliest forefathers" (Q 26:26); "Lord of the East and West ..." (Q 26:28). Pharaoh interjects incredulously: "Do you not hear [what he is saying]?" (Q 26:25). Ṭūfī sums up the meaning of this rhetorical question with what is essentially a syllogism:

> Moses is claiming that the Lord of the Worlds is your Lord and the Lord of your earliest forefathers, that is, because they are part of "the worlds," so that Moses's Lord is his Lord.[15]

Then Pharaoh attempts to deny it by calling Moses insane (Q 26:27) and by claiming himself to be a god (Q 26:29). But as Moses continues, "Pharaoh abandons argument and resorts to force" by threatening to put him in prison.[16] Moses counters the threat by offering a demonstration, which, as Ṭūfī says, Pharaoh accepts for two probable reasons: (1) he does not think Moses capable of producing a proof that will confirm the truth of what he says; (2) he is doing it in the spirit of impartiality (*'alā jihat al-inṣāf*):

> Because any rational person – especially if he is a ruler – concerned with justice, if called upon to consider a rational proof (*ḥujjat al-'aql*), will be compelled by reason[17] to respond to it and prevented by [reason] from refusing it. So when Moses called upon him to give a rational judgment

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> (*ḥukm al-ʿaql*), reason [or "justice"] prevented him from turning away.[18]

Thereupon, "Moses threw down his staff, and behold! It was a serpent plain [to see]; and he drew out his hand and behold! It was white for all to see" (Q 26:32–33). But Ṭūfī does not extend his analysis to the rest of the passage – not Moses's repeat performance before Pharaoh's magicians, or their acceptance of the Lord of the Worlds, or the pursuit of the Children of Israel, who are saved from the waters while Pharaoh's army is drowned. Ṭūfī is interested in argument, not history, and is satisfied with summing up the results of the debate without quite explaining *how* a sign functions as a proof:

> Then there happened between them what was already mentioned in Sura 7 *al-Aʿrāf*, in short, that he advanced his staff as an argument (*iḥtajja bi-ʿaṣāh*), and they opposed him with magic, and he refuted their opposing argument. So his proof remained untouched by any opponent, and his claim was proven.[19]

The Prophet Muḥammad brought the Message both to the pagan Arabs and to People of the Book. The pagan Arabs who deny Muḥammad's message have only two techniques of argument: citation of precedent in support of their idolatry, and demands that the Prophet accomplish things that he has never claimed to be able to do, such as bringing back their fathers (Q 45:24–25).[20] They find his arguments ineffective because he is unable to support his verbal warnings with these sorts of miracles, that is, with signs. Ṭūfī notes the similarity of Qur'ān 45:24–25 to 44:34–36: when the pagans deny the Resurrection, God answers by denying the validity of their assertion of eternal non-existence after death (*ajāba ... bi-man' daʿwāhum al-istimrār baʿd al-mawt ʿalā al-ʿadam*).[21] Though Ṭūfī does not mention the fact, both passages also contain arguments *a fortiori*. In Q 44:37, a question is asked concerning those who challenge the Prophet to bring back their fathers: "Are they better than the people of Tubbaʿ and those before them? We destroyed *them* because they were sinners!" That is, if We destroyed the greater, We can destroy the less. In Q 45:26, the Prophet first points out that it is not he but God who brings back the dead, after having first given them life, then death. In other words, God who creates life to begin with [sc. the greater miracle] is certainly capable of re-creating it.[22]

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The pagans are cynical and dishonest in debate. We have already seen their tendency to argue both ways concerning the identity of Allāh, and to change the subject when they are losing.[23] When Jesus son of Mary is cited as an example to them, they pretend to believe that he is being advanced as a deity, and they try to force Muḥammad into a false choice between Jesus and their own idols:

> They say: "Are our gods better, or is he?" They refer to him only [to start] an argument against you, for they are truly an argumentative lot.
>
> (Q 43:58)

They expose their own inconsistency when they ascribe to God not sons but daughters (Q 43:16), even though any one of them will himself react with anger and grief when a daughter is born to him and not a son (Q 43:17). Interestingly, one sign that a daughter is inferior is that she is alleged to be unable to argue clearly (*fī al-khiṣām ghayr mubīn* – Q 43:18). As Ṭūfī notes, if God took a child, it would have to be one who, "when he fights, fights with heart and, when he speaks, speaks with clarity" (*idhā qātala qātala bi-janān wa-idhā naṭaqa naṭaqa bi-bayān*).[24]

In a sequence of three very long verses, God instructs Muḥammad in another effective way to counter the pagans' inconsistency. First, he is to hold them to their acceptance of Allāh as the High God, the Lord of the heavens and the earth; then he is to use contrast and comparison to demonstrate to them that their acceptance of lesser deities is inconsistent (Q 13:16).

> Say: "Do you take other gods than Him, who cannot benefit or harm [even] themselves?" Say: "Are the blind and the sighted equal? Are the darkness and the light equal?"
>
> (Q 13:16)

The next verse reinforces the demonstration with a sign of divine power – the bringing of rain that fills the wadis – followed by the parable that likens truth to that precious water and to the metal of tools and jewelry, falsehood to the useless scum that is sloughed off of these pure substances (Q 13:17).[25] The final disjunction is inescapable: those who respond positively will have all good things, while those who do not will go to Hell and will be unable to buy their way out (Q 13:18).

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One way of countering the pagans' arguments is to dare them to act, as Moses does Pharaoh's magicians. When they challenge Muḥammad to bring back their fathers, a sign of power such as he has never claimed, he challenges them to produce something on the order of the single Sign that he *has* brought:

> They may say: "He has forged [the Qur'ān]." Say: "Bring ten suras 'forged' like it; and call on anyone you can [to help you], other than God, if you are sincere! Then, if [your false gods] do not respond to you, know that it has only been sent down with God's knowledge, and that there is no deity but He. So are you now *Muslimūn*?"
>
> (Q 11:13–14)

A similar passage (Q 2:23–24) is set very near the beginning of the Qur'ān, a challenge that alerts the hearer to the fact that s/he is being presented with an evidentiary miracle. Other challenges to the pagans are to show just what it is that their deities have created (Q 46:4), or to bring a book previously revealed or some trace of knowledge to show that they are telling the truth (Q 46:4, cf. 31:20, 6:148–50).

Confrontations with People of the Book are of a different order of seriousness. Because all worship the same Deity, the only one whose power is real, a challenge offered and accepted may turn into a trial by ordeal. One such example appeared in the previous chapter,[26] where Muḥammad is to challenge the Jews to "Wish for death" if their claims of righteousness and divine reward are made in good faith (Q 2:94–95, cf. 62:6–7).

Another exchange involves Christians:

> Say to whoever disputes you on the matter [of Jesus] after the knowledge that has come to you: "Come! Let us call our sons and your sons, and our women and your women, and ourselves and yourselves; then let us pray humbly and call down the curse of God on those who are lying."
>
> (Q 3:61)

This may reflect an actual incident in the life of the Prophet. Al-Wahidi (d. 468/1076) gives two versions, one on the authority of the Prophet's grandson al-Ḥasan that involves two Christian monks of Najrān, the other from Jābir b. 'Abd Allāh that involves a two-man delegation (*wafd*) from the same area. When the

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Prophet said to the two monks, "Accept Islam and you will be saved (*aslimā taslamā*)," they replied, "We accepted it before you (*qad aslamnā qablaka*)." He refuted their claim by pointing out that they bowed to the Cross, believed that God had taken a son, and drank wine; they countered by asking, "What do you say about Jesus?" and the Prophet was silent. Thereupon God revealed Qur'ān 3:58–61, part of which asserts that God created Jesus, like Adam, from dust, then brought him to life with the command "Be!" (*kun* – Q 3:59). Muḥammad called the Christians to a meeting in which both would invoke God's curse (*mulā'ana*) and from which only one party would emerge alive. After some deliberation, the monks chose instead to pay tribute.[27] The invocation of curses upon oneself has already been discussed in Chapter One, where it constitutes the final solemnization of the Covenant.[28]

The passage immediately following the challenge of Qur'ān 3:61 contains an invitation to the People of the Book to reconcile with the Muslims on the basis of their shared beliefs: the unicity of God (Q 3:64), the position of Abraham as a monotheist who lived before revelation of the Torah and the Gospel (Q 3:65–68), the Signs of God (Q 3:70), the necessity for honoring a trust (Q 3:75–77), faithfulness to Scripture (Q 3:78–79), the worship of God and not men or angels (Q 3:79–80), belief in the Covenant of the Prophets (Q 3:81–83), and belief in God's Books and Prophets, without making distinctions among the latter (Q 3:84).

This is, however, a Medinan sura, and the calls for agreement are interspersed with warnings to the People of the Book not to assume undue authority. "It is God Who knows, and you do not know!" (Q 3:66). The Qur'ān charges some with wanting to lead the believers astray (Q 3:69), denying the Signs of God which they themselves witness (Q 3:70), concealing the truth (Q 3:71), and distorting Scripture (Q 3:78). All however, will be returned to God (Q 3:83).

There is a striking contrast between the Qur'ān's emphasis on the individual's responsibility for sin (e.g. Q 6:164, 17:15) and its often-repeated charge against the Jews for having killed prophets (e.g. Q 3:183). The Qur'ān uses the second person plural ("Why did you kill them?" – Q 3:183) in effect to assign collective responsibility to the Jewish opponents of Muḥammad for what it accuses their co-religionists of doing centuries before.[29] Similarly, Q 3:183 is followed by a passage (Q 3:187) on the scriptuaries' breaking of the Covenant, also a communal and not an individual

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affair. Conversion to Islam, then, offered the individual a new beginning.

In the end, God's proof is the only one that counts (*li-Llāh al-ḥujja al-bāligha* – Q 6:149). We have already seen that it is the sight of Hell that finally convinces the most stubborn of unbelievers, and by then it is too late (e.g. Q 89:32–26). But those who believe and pray for salvation will be answered by their Lord:

> I will never allow the deed of any one of you, male or female, to be lost. You belong to each other. And those who have emigrated, and been expelled from their homes, and suffered in My Path, and fought and been killed – I shall remit their sins and bring them into gardens beneath which rivers flow, a reward from God. And with God is the best reward.
>
> (Q 3:195)

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11

CONCLUSIONS

Reasoning and argument are so integral to the content of the Qur'ān and so inseparable from its structure that they in many ways shaped the very consciousness of Qur'ānic scholars. Exegetes internalized the idiom, and perhaps for that very reason it did not become a separate genre within the field of *'ulūm al-Qur'ān*. That helps to account for the wide range of approaches to Qur'ānic exegesis and for every exegete's conviction that his approach is justified, indeed dictated, by the sacred text, whether his focus is simple commandments and prohibitions or extended logical analysis of the arguments that underlie the entire text. Thus a figure as controversial as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī could be accused of compiling a *tafsīr* that contained everything except *tafsīr*,[1] while he himself wrote at the end of his life that, after experiencing all branches of *kalām* and philosophy, "I have not found in them either satisfaction or comfort to equal that which I have found in reading the Qur'ān."[2]

Muslims esteem not just every verse of the Qur'ān but every single word as irreplaceably significant. Amidst the wealth of analysis that countless scholars have devoted to its individual words, verses, suras, themes, structures, and tropes; and to its commands, prohibitions, literary and historical content, theology, and parallels with other scriptures, I have attempted to focus my attention and that of my readers upon what I see as the Qur'ān's most basic framework of meaning. After returning to *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* and reapplying Ghazālī's methods to the Qur'ān, I discerned in it a far broader range of arguments than Ghazālī's five, whereupon I set out to classify the reasoned procedures by which the Qur'ān situates its rhetorical, historical, legal, and theological elements on its own spectrum of significance. I have attempted in this book to analyze as many types of Qur'ānic argument as I was

able to recognize, using English terminology common to the humanities, together with certain indispensable terms in Greek, Latin, and Arabic. I have done it this way for two reasons. First, it seemed beside the point, in a book written in English, to reproduce the Arabic techniques of rhetorical and logical analysis, translate the Arabic terms, and then explain how they work using the terminology that I would be using in the first place. Second, many of the traditional techniques of analysis were heavily influenced by Qur'ānic style to begin with; thus using them alone to analyze the text would often yield what were essentially circular arguments.

Herein lies the value of Ghazali's system (and I hope, by extension, of my own): it is largely independent of language structures yet takes full cognizance of meanings to assure that any given argument is appropriately schematized and that all possible schemata have been taken into consideration.

Al-Ghazali epitomizes the scope of Qur'ānic reasoning in the following words:

> Whoever has a scale determines by it the measure of countless substances. The same is true for whoever has *al-qisṭās al-mustaqīm*: he has the Wisdom which brings to whoever has received it a great and endless benefit ... All sciences are not present in the Glorious Qur'ān in an explicit form, but they are present potentially (*bi-l-quwwa*), because of the existence therein of the True Scales (*al-mawāzīn al-qisṭ*) by which are opened the gates of infinite Wisdom.[3]

Using more technical language, al-Suyūṭī says essentially the same thing:

> The 'ulamā' have said that the great Qur'ān contains all types of proofs (*barāhīn*) and evidence (*adilla*): there is no type of proof (*burhān*) or evidence (*dalāla*) or disjunction (*taqsīm*) or warning (*taḥdhīr*) constructed from the entire range of things known by reason or authority which God has not articulated. But He conveyed it according to the customs of the Arabs, without the fine points of the methods of the theologians.[4]

Here follows a summary of the techniques found to be relevant for analysis of Qur'ānic argument, with their methodological applications.

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Chapter 1 established that in the Qur'ān all history is sacred history and began with the cosmic rule that is the Covenant. Arguments based on the Covenant in the first instance refer to the contract made when God created the world and endowed human beings with benefits that they undertook to hold in trust with gratitude and reverence, or mismanage at their peril. Ultimately, all Qur'ānic arguments are based, directly or at some remove, upon the Covenant.

Chapter 2 analyzed two categories of phenomena that provide premises and supporting evidence for arguments based upon the Covenant: (1) the signs (*āyāt, bayyināt*) by which God proves his existence and power; and (2) the precedents (*sunan*) that he has set throughout history by his practice of sending prophets and scriptures to re-establish the Covenant, validate its contractual terms, remind forgetful humans of their responsibilities, and punish violators.

Chapter 3 demonstrated how the Qur'ān assimilates the precedents set by sacred history to the particularly strong Arab social concept of precedent, *sunna*. The result produces arguments based upon precedent that is divine, *sunnat Allāh*, an especially powerful method of addressing the concerns of an audience consisting of both scriptuaries (*ahl al-kitāb*) and pagan Arabs.

Chapter 4 used rule-based reasoning, which is a branch of legal logic, and the logic of commands to analyze the uniformity, predictability, and justification of divine laws, examining how the Qur'ān distinguishes them from the arbitrary and capricious actions ascribed to deities that are, in the end, imaginary and possess no real power. Because of the status of the Covenant as the cosmic rule that in turn generates countless sub-rules, rule-based reasoning is fundamental to the analysis of divine law.

Chapter 5 highlighted the reasoning that supports particular Qur'ānic laws, both those that stipulate proper devotions (*'ibādāt*) and those that govern interactions between human beings (*mu'āmalāt*). Because the Qur'ān is the first source of Islamic law, it would be tautologous to use the methods of Islamic law to analyze the Qur'ān, hence the concentration in this chapter upon fundamental legal notions embodied in the text rather than upon the substance of the laws themselves. In the "Excursus on Performatives," I examined a type of utterance that does not describe a legal status but is itself the very act that creates it. Human acceptance of the Covenant is such an act, as is the *shahāda*.

Chapter 6 explored Qur'ānic applications of arguments based upon comparison, including similarity, analogy, and parable. Analysis of apparent comparisons showed that very often such constructions actually mask quite different forms of reasoning, such as legal arguments, categorical arguments, and disjunction.

Chapter 7 demonstrated that the contrast between God and his creation is more fundamental to Qur'ānic reasoning than is comparison, and its range of argument is broader, including, among others, opposition, contrariety, contradiction, and antithesis. This reverses the order of importance of comparison and contrast as found in works of Western classical rhetoric, and for that reason it more truly dramatizes Islamic ontology.

Chapter 8 recapitulated the first part of Ghazālī's unique short treatise on Qur'ānic logic, *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*, which demonstrates how the first three figures of the categorical syllogism are derived from the Qur'ān. With material from Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī and my own analyses of additional Qur'ānic verses, I was able to identify examples of ten of the nineteen valid moods of the categorical syllogism and leave open the possibility that all nineteen may be found within the sacred text.

In Chapter 9, I considerably amplified Ghazālī's brief presentation of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms in the Qur'ān. Discussion of hypotheticals was again augmented with material from Ṭūfī, but, as he considered disjunction a mere rhetorical technique, his contributions here are limited.

Chapter 10, finally, used several extended examples of debates between prophets and their interlocutors to demonstrate how the Qur'ān combines various forms of argument to support its teachings, illustrate debating technique and etiquette, and demolish the counter-arguments of the opposition. Here the forensically-inclined Ṭūfī is indispensable for the connections that he draws between the two vast fields of Qur'ānic exegesis and formal disputation.

Finally, having summarized my findings as presented in the first ten chapters, I shall use the present chapter to suggest further lines of research using the same methods.

One who chooses to focus upon the Qur'ān itself may wish to discover all instances of a given type of argument, such as argument from precedent or the reasoning that supports divine commands, and expand upon the contents of that argument and its possible variants. It is also a common scholarly procedure to focus upon a single Qur'ānic theme, such as the truth of a prophet's

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message or the importance of prayer, but very often this is done by tracing only textual similarities and variants. Attention to the multiple types of argument that the Qur'ān uses to make the point(s) at issue will add new dimensions to both the analysis of the text and the understanding of the audience's reception.

Clearly, the "audience reception" most accessible to the scholar lies in the massive work of the exegetes. One gauge of the evolution of *tafsīr* is the increasing sophistication with which it engages Qur'ānic argument, and the methods set forth in this book are useful in evaluating the differences between earlier and later works.[5] Some exegeses, such as those of Zamakhsharī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, are known for their "rationalist" tone; and Rāzī in particular has a solid bibliography of works on logic[6] in addition to the content of the extensive methodological preface to *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* that appears in his commentary on the *Fātiḥa*. It is all the more instructive, then, to analyze his treatment of Qur'ānic arguments that fall outside the realm of logic as he understood it.

Legal exegeses of the genre *aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, such as the works of Jaṣṣāṣ and Qurṭubī quoted in earlier chapters, deserve far more scholarly attention than they have so far received.[7] I have found that analyzing Qur'ānic argument is particularly useful in understanding works of this type, in that one can begin to discern in a systematic manner how the legal point of a passage is or is not dependent upon time and place, and the circumstances, status, and mental state of the people involved. Perhaps for the same reasons, I have found these methods unexpectedly useful as an aid to scrutinizing the reasoning of extremist Islamists, particularly their use of the Qur'ān to justify the most violent actions and to exclude other Muslims from consideration as brothers and sisters in faith.[8]

I have attempted in my approach to Qur'ānic argument to combine methodological rigor with an understanding of Qur'ānic priorities. Now when I take up any passage from the Qur'ān, any verse chosen at random, I cannot but be aware that the manner in which it argues its own significance is integral to its meaning. I offer the techniques of analysis presented in this book in the hope that others will find them useful additions to the ones that they and other colleagues in the field have developed over so many years.

Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī concludes his section on *tafsīr* with these remarks:

> Know that ... I have mentioned only what is self-evident and well-known (*ẓāhir*^{an} *mashhūr*^{an}) from among instances

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of debate and cases which involve proof (*al-waqā'i' al-jadalīya wa-l-qaḍāyā al-istidlālīya*); otherwise, when the Qur'ān is contemplated, much more will be found in it than I have mentioned, because it appeared as a miracle in its entirety and in its details. And the nature (*sha'n*) of a miracle is to confound the opponent and prove the opposite of what he alleges, so know this. And perhaps I have failed to [include] something on the topic that is well known, whether through ignorance, or laziness, or being content with something similar to it that has been repeated, or some other similar reason.[9]

In the same spirit of humility, and with the same reservations about having presented only a sample of the whole, I conclude this book.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 See the works of Toshihiko Izutsu, in particular *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002), originally published in 1959 under the title *The Structure of Ethical Terms in the Koran.*

2 Although al-Ghazālī says that the ancient peoples learned them from "the scriptures of Abraham and Moses (*ṣuḥuf Ibrāhīm wa-Mūsā* – Q 87:18–19)." See *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm* (ed. Riyāḍ Muṣṭafā al-'Abd Allāh), Damascus: Dār al-Ḥikma, 1406/1986, p. 82.

3 *I'jāz al-Qur'ān*, p. 47. He says that he has discussed the matter in his book on *Uṣūl.* Editor A. Ṣaqr attributes two books of this title to al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-Uṣūl al-Kabīr fi al-Fiqh* (no. 9, p. 43 of the Introduction) and *Kitab al-Uṣūl al-Ṣaghīr* (no. 26, p. 47). In addition, at least five other works of his have the word *uṣūl* in the title. All appear to be lost, although Ṣaqr saw a single crumbling volume of *Hidāyat al-Mustarshidīn wa-al-Muqni' fi Ma'rifat Uṣūl al-Dīn*, dated 459/1066–67, in the library of al-Azhar.

4 Private interview, June 21, 1996.

5 *Al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qurān, Cairo, 1370/1951 [repr. Beirut, Dar al-Nadwa al-Jadida, n.d.]* §68, ii, p. 135.

6 Now available in a fine edition by Wolfhart Heinrichs from Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1408/1987, 30+283 pp. The work is prefaced by an exhaustive list of biographical sources, and editor Heinrichs refers the reader to his "abbreviated" study in ZDMG Suppl. 3, vol. 1, 1977, pp. 463–673.

7 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfi, *'Alam al-Jadhal fi 'Ilm al-Jadal*, p. 239. I shall use Ṭūfi's work extensively in Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of this book.

8 Burhān al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1415/1994, in four volumes.

9 Suyūṭī's lapse is noted by the editor, Dr. Zāhir al-Alma'i, *Kitāb Istikhrāj al-Jidāl min al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1400/1980, p. 35.

10 Zāhir b. 'Awwad al-Alma'i, *Manāhij al-Jadal fi al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, Riyad, 1399. His entire third chapter is entitled, "There is no connection between Qur'ānic argumentation (*istidlāl*) and Greek

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argumentation." The bulk of his book, however, is devoted to Qur'ānic refutation of "materialists and atheists" and the support of divine unicity, prophecy, resurrection, and a host of other theological positions.

11 Khalīl Aḥmad Khalīl, *Jadalīyat al-Qur'ān*, Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'a, 1977, p. 26.

12 In *Myths, Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature: Towards a New Hermeneutic Approach*, Proceedings of the International Symposium in Beirut, June 25–June 30, 1996; Beirut: Steiner Verlag, 1999, pp. 163–188.

13 See Ibn al-Ḥanbalī, pp. 49–51.

1 THE COVENANT

1 See, for example, W.M. Watt and R. Bell, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān*, Edinburgh, 1970, p. 131; J. Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, Oxford, 1977, *passim*.

2 Abraham Katsh, *Judaism in Islam*, New York University, 1954, pp. xiii–xiv.

3 Cf. Andrew Rippin, "Desiring the Face of God," in Boullata, ed., *Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur'ān*, pp. 119f. "Such are the traps into which many studies of the Qur'ān have fallen."

4 In Merlin Swartz, ed. *Studies on Islam*. Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 86–98.

5 Fück, "Originality," p. 90.

6 Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, Oxford, 1977, p. 100. S.a. pp. 148–52. Auerbach's own term is *Deutungsbedürfnis*. Jane Dammen McAuliffe addresses some of the same points in the context of recent scholarship, particularly "reader-response" theory. See her "Text and Textuality: Q.3:7 as a Point of Intersection" in Boullata, ed., *Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur'ān*, especially her opening and closing sections. In the same *Qur'ān* collection, see Angelika Neuwirth's description of her own method in "Referentiality and Textuality in *Surat al-Hijr*," p. 145.

7 Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, Princeton, 1953, pp. 11–12.

8 Wansbrough, op. cit., p. 100.

9 Bernard Weiss, "Covenant and Law in Islam," in *Religion and Law: Biblical-Judaic and Islamic Perspectives*, Eisenbrauns, 1990, pp. 49–83. The present quotation comes at page 50, n. 2. Weiss's excellent article came to my attention only after this chapter was substantially complete and is in accord with most (but not all) of the conclusions presented here.

10 Cf. Weiss, "Covenant and Law," p. 51, n. 2.

11 Gordon Newby, *The Making of the Last Prophet: A Reconstruction of the Earliest Biography of Muḥammad*, South Carolina, 1989, p. 41.

12 Ṭabarsī, *Majma' al-Bayān fi Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, Sidon: M. al-'Irfān, 1333 [1914–15], repr. Qomm: Mar'ashī 1403 [1982–83], v, p. 476.

13 Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān fi Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* [sic], Beirut: Dar al-Jīl, n.d., xvi, p. 160.

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14 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iv, p. 32.
15 F.E. Peters, *Muḥammad and the Origins of Islam*, SUNY, 1994, p. 260 and n. 16 with its references to Wansbrough and Rippin. S a.Q 6:25, 8:31, 16:24, 23:83, 27:68, 46:17, 68:15, 83:13.
16 Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Koran*, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966, pp. 88–89.
17 Paul Kalluveetil, *Declaration and Covenant: A comprehensive review of covenant formulae from the Old Testament and the ancient Near East*, Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1982, p. 22.
18 Ibid., p. 90, n. 352.
19 Mendenhall and Herion, "Covenant," *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, New York: Doubleday, 1992, i, p. 1181, c. 1.
20 Ibid., p. 1182, c. 2.
21 Ibid., pp. 1180ff.
22 Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, Cambridge, 1977, 19. Cf. B.S. Jackson, *Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law*, Sheffield, 2000, Ch. 9, especially pp. 236–243.
23 Weiss, "Covenant and Law," p. 58.
24 Ibid., p. 55.
25 The phrase is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's, adopted by Weiss ("Covenant and Law," p. 66). For the non-exclusive character of this covenant, see ibid., pp. 55–59 and his conclusions, pp. 81–83.
26 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., pp. 1188ff.
27 Compare these to the four elements in what Bernard Weiss calls the "signs/commandments/promises cluster" – "promise" including both reward and punishment – found in Sura 13:1ff, 24:45–77, and "similar lists found in Sura 23 and 70." "Covenant and Law," p. 53.
28 I am aware that "Recite!" is probably a better translation. I only wish that it had the rhetorical power of the single Anglo-Saxon syllable.
29 See Chapter 4.
30 See the epigraph to this chapter.
31 See Chapter 3.
32 Weiss, "Covenant and Law," pp. 63–64, italics original.
33 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., pp. 1192 c. 2–1193 c. 1.
34 See, e.g. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, n.d., xxv, pp. 119–120.
35 Ṭabarī, op. cit., vi, p. 95.
36 Cf. Weiss, "Covenant and Law", §7, p. 58, where he does not distinguish between the Covenant with the prophets and that with other human beings, and pp. 80–81, with n. 54, where he does. In Q 20:115, God says: "We had already covenanted to Adam, but he forgot, and we found no resolve in him," making ambiguous Adam's status as a prophet.
37 The Arabic root *b-r-'* is not without difficulty in covenantal contexts. A difference of opinion exists over the word *barā'a* in Q 9:1, which Wansbrough (*Quranic Studies*, p. 11) sees as cognate with the Biblical *berit*, "covenant," hence its common translation as "declaration of immunity" (e.g. A. Yusuf Ali's translation of the Qur'ān). Uri Rubin, however, following the Muslim sources, reads it as the *dissolution* of the existing treaty, which dissolution is reiterated in Q 9:3, where the

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word *barī'* means "free from obligation or responsibility" as in Q 8:48, 10:41, 26:216, and the present verse. See Uri Rubin, "*Barā'a*: A Study of Some Qur'ānic Passages," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, V (1984), pp. 13–15. He explains the difference between the meaning of the word in Q 9:1 and its meaning in Q 54:43 as depending upon the associated prepositions.

38 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., p. 1192 c. 2.

39 Ibid., p. 1201 c. 1.

40 See, e.g. al-Fīrūzābādī, *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, iii, p. 321.

41 Both men discuss the point in their exegeses of Q 2:128, in which the word first appears. Moshe Weinfeld notes that sacrifice is absent from the covenant-making Decalogue. See "The Decalogue," in E. Firmage et al., eds, *Religion and Law: Biblical-Judaic and Islamic Perspectives*, Eisenbrauns, 1990, pp. 26ff.

42 Ṭabarī (Beirut ed., ii, p. 172) and Suyūṭī (*al-Durr al-Manthur fī al-Tafsīr bi-al-Ma'thūr*, ed. M.A-F. Ibrāhīm, Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1384/1964, i, pp. 556–558) relate the verse to the custom of gathering to boast about one's forebears after completing the ḥajj in pre-Islamic times. God, then is to be added to or substituted for the tales of glory. Rāzī quotes Mujāhid as equating *manāsik* with "shedding blood" (op. cit. v, p. 184).

43 Ṭabarī, op. cit., viii, p. 82.

44 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, p. 50.

45 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., p. 1182. See §11 and 12 below.

46 F.E. Peters, *Muhammad and the Origins of Islam*, SUNY, 1994, pp. 113, 125–127, 131.

47 Ibid., pp. 119–121.

48 Ibid., pp. 120–121; Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, *Hagarism*. Cambridge, 1977, p. 13.

49 Respectively, i, p. 323, and i, p. 157, both *ad* Q 2:88.

50 Rāzī, op. cit., iii, p. 164.

51 It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss "the punishment of the grave" (*'adhāb al-qabr*): the possibility that some punishment comes before resurrection.

52 Watt and Bell, op. cit., p. 133.

53 But see B.S. Jackson, op. cit., p. 243.

54 See above, §5.

55 See Weiss, "Covenant and Law," p. 80, with the references to Rāzī.

56 To this effect, see Weiss, "Covenant and Law," §2, p. 56.

57 Otto Michel, "*Mimnēskomai, mneia*", *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (ed. G. Kittel; transl. and ed. G. Bromiley), iv, p. 675; cf. Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., p. 1192 c. 1.

58 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., p. 1198. *Z-k-r* meaning "to swear" is found in the Code of Hammurapi; "invoke" is the RSV translation of the word in II Samuel 14:11.

59 Ibid., p. 1198, c. 1.

60 Ibid.; Michel, op. cit., iv, pp. 676, 678. The phrase is Michel's, p. 678.

61 *Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version*. Muslims believe that this passage and others foretell the coming of the Prophet Muḥammad.

62 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., p. 1188, c. 1.

63 See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *al-Tibyān fi Aqsām al-Qur'ān*, (ed. M.H. al-Faqī), Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, n.d., pp. 1, 194, 522.
64 Angelika Neuwirth, "The Makkan sura introductions," in *Approaches to the Qur'ān*, G.R. Hawting and A.A. Shareef (eds). New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 3–36. S.a. Lamya Kandil, "Die Schwüre in den Mekkanischen Suren," in *The Qur'ān as Text*, ed. Stefan Wild, Leiden: Brill, 1996, pp. 41–57.
65 Neuwirth, op. cit., p. 4.
66 Ibid., p. 11.
67 Ibid., p. 16. Also see Soraya Hajjaji-Jarrah's "The enchantment of reading" in *Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur'ān*, ed. I. Boullata, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, pp. 228–251, for a discussion of the sequence in Sura 100 *al-'Ādiyāt*.
68 Neuwirth, op. cit., p. 18.
69 Curiously, Weiss ignores these oaths, stating that "God by definition cannot swear to anything" ("Covenant and Law", p. 72). This is in line with theological resistance to the notion of God being under any sort of obligation, but the statement that "divine covenanting may be distinguished from human covenanting" by the absence of an oath (p. 73) is sufficiently refuted by pointing out the presence of oaths – lots of them.
70 Qur'ān 79:35 and 89:23 speak of humans' "remembering" when confronted with the Day of Judgment, but that comes too late to do any good. It is presented as a lesson to humans that they should not forget; it is not a commandment.
71 Ṭabarī, op. cit., i, pp. 142–144.
72 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., i, pp. 69–70.
73 Rāzī, op. cit., ii, p. 147.
74 *Durr*, i, p. 104.

2 SIGNS AND PRECEDENTS

1 See Chapter 4.
2 To the signs and commands Bernard Weiss ("Covenant and Law," p. 53) adds "promises" for a "cluster" of factors characteristic of expositions of the Covenant. See Chapter 1, n. 24. See Q 13:1–29 for an extended example.
3 This is al-Ghāzalī's first example of the categorical syllogism. See below, Chapter 8, p. 158.
4 Ibn Rushd, *Manāhij al-Adilla fī 'Aqā'id al-Milla* (ed. Maḥmūd Qasim). Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo al-Misriyya, 1964, p. 152. S.a. Ibn al-Ḥanbalī, op. cit., pp. 73–74, n. 3.
5 S.a. Hassan Hanafi, "Method of thematic interpretation of the Qur'ān," in S. Wild (ed.) *The Qur'ān as Text*, pp. 206–207 for a brief exposition.
6 Sometimes identified with an individual, al-Walīd b. al-Mughīra al-Makhzūmī. See al-Fīrūzābādī, *Tanwīr al-Miqbās min Tafsīr Ibn 'Abbās*, Multan: Faruqi Kutubkhaneh, n.d., p. 372.
7 Though the context seems to imply that these "signs" are the previously mentioned bounties, exegetes tend to identify "signs" in a

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conventional way: Ṭabarī (op. cit., xxix, p. 154) says that they are "God's proofs (*ḥujaj*) to His creatures in the form of the Books and the Prophets;" Fīrūzābādī, *Tanwīr al-Miqbās*, p. 372, "Our Book and Our Prophet."

8 Ṭabarī, op. cit., xxx, pp. 161–162. A. Guillaume adds this passage in *The Life of Muhammad*, Oxford, 1980 (1955), p. 107.

9 Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya li-Ibn Hishām*, (ed. T.A-R. Sa'd), Beirut: Dar al-Jil, n.d., I, p. 223. Guillaume, *Life of Muhammad*, p. 107.

10 W.M. Watt and R. Bell, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān*, Edinburgh, 1970, pp. 121–122.

11 See Cartlidge and Dungan, *Documents for the Study of the Gospels*, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980, p. 92, for this incident as found in *The Infancy Gospel of Thomas*.

12 Anderson, Bernhard. *Understanding the Old Testament*, (2nd edn) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 366.

13 See Chapter 1, p. 2ff.

14 See, e.g., Q 7:59–102; 11:25–100; 26:70–191.

15 When such terms are used instead to indicate *approval*, they require contextualization if they are not to be misunderstood. For example, current colloquial American usage attaches positive connotations to hitherto negative words, such as "wild", "outrageous", and especially "baaad" (said with a rising intonation and the vowel greatly elongated). Francophones will find that the *Petit Robert*, in its etymological notes to the word *insolite*, describes the word as "pejorative up until the twentieth century; it is a fashionable word, laudatory rather in our day." *Petit Robert*, Paris, Société du Nouveau Littré, 1970, p. 915.

16 Izutsu, *Structure*, pp. 218–219.

17 This is the Lebanese mountain dialect version.

18 This was the late Professor Noury al-Khaledy, of Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, whose teaching, moral guidance, and sense of humor influenced me profoundly. I shall never be able to describe them in a way that does them justice.

19 Al-Farrā', *Ma'ānī al-Qur'ān*, ii, p. 22.

20 The choice of words is A. Yusuf Ali's, *The Holy Qur'an*, p. 533.

21 Al-Farrā', *Ma'ānī*, ii, p. 22.

22 Al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi' li-Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, ix, p. 43.

23 These may have been his own daughters or all the women of the people to whom he was sent as prophet (e.g. Farrā', ii, p. 23, cf. Q 33:6). Ṭabarī reports virtual consensus that what was offered was marriage with these women, not fornication (xiv, p. 51). Qurṭubī quotes Abū 'Ubayda's view that the intent was not to offer women at all, but to drive away the homosexuals by mentioning something repugnant to them (ix, p. 51).

24 Ṭūsī, *'Alam al-Jadhal*, p. 132.

25 Ṭabarī, op. cit., iii, p. 282.

26 Muqātil b. Sulaymān, *Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān*, (ed. A.M. Shihāta), Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Ḥalabi, 1969, p. 172. Cf. Mark 2:23–28 and 3:1–6.

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3 THE *SUNNA* OF GOD

1 I first presented ideas fundamental to this chapter in my paper "The Neglected *Sunna*: The *sunna* of God" delivered at the 203rd meeting of the American Oriental Society, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 19, 1993. A version of the paper entitled "The neglected *Sunna*: Sunnat Allāh (The *sunna* of God)" was later published as an article in *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (AJISS), vol. 10 (Winter 1993), no. 4, pp. 455–463.
2 This is line 81 of the poem. Labīd, *Sharḥ Dīwan Labīd b. Rabī'a al-'Āmiri* (ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās), Kuwait, Ministry of Guidance and Information, 1961, p. 320.
3 Michael Morony, *Iraq After the Muslim Conquest*, Princeton, University Press, 1984, p. 434.
4 M.M. Bravmann, *The Spiritual Background of Early Islam*, Leiden: Brill, 1972, pp. 123–198.
5 Joseph Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford, 1964; *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950 (repr. 1967).
6 Bravmann, op. cit., p. 148.
7 Ibid., pp. 164ff.
8 Ibid., pp. 139ff., contra Schacht, *Origins*, pp. 62, 70–72; cf. Schacht, *Introduction*, p. 30.
9 Schacht, *Introduction*, p. 17.
10 Schacht, *Origins*, 350, in an addendum to p. 74.
11 These quotations come respectively at p. 135, n. 2 from *Kitāb al-Umm* (Būlāq ed.), ii, 2; p. 121, 8 (*"sunnat allah"*); pp. 143–144 from *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* (Wüstenfeld, ed.), p. 595 (Sura 3:131/7); and p. 144 from Bayḍāwī's *Tafsīr* (Fleisher, ed.), i, 176, 16. Bravmann's own citation of Sura 8:39/38 comes at pp. 147–148.
12 Schacht, *Origins*, 77.
13 Data for the second part of the table and for some textual references were taken from three sources: M.J. Fischer and M. Abedi, *Debating Muslims*, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990, pp. 445–447 and n. 12, pp. 464–465; W.M. Watt and R. Bell, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān*, Edinburgh, EUP, 1970, pp. 206–213; and N.J. Dawood, *The Koran*, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1974, pp. 5–8.
14 Ṭabarsī, from al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742), op. cit., i, p. 508.
15 In Suyūṭi, *Durr*, ii, p. 329.
16 Muqātil, *Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān* (ed. A.M. Shihāta), Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Ḥalabī, 1969, p. 195.
17 Ṭabarī, op. cit., iv, pp. 65f, *ad* Q 3:137.
18 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., i, p. 507, *ad* Q 3:137.
19 Op. cit., p. 233.
20 Ṭabarī, op. cit., v, p. 18.
21 Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, i, p. 521.
22 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, pp. 35–36.
23 Rāzī, op. cit., x, p. 66. For the passage from Jaṣṣāṣ, see above, pp. 92ff.
24 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, p. 35; ii, p. 542, respectively.
25 See n. 13, above.
26 Ṭabarī, op. cit., xxii, p. 96.

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27 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iv, p. 412.
28 The ellipsis indicates the long passage outlining the legal details of the marriage.
29 See Bravmann, *Spiritual Background*, pp. 166f.
30 E.g. Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, p. 188.
31 Or "to be declared an outlaw" (*awwal man kutiba 'alayhi al-shaqā'*).
32 Muqātil, op. cit., i, p. 310.
33 Ibid., i, p. 311.
34 Ibid., i, p. 312.
35 See Chapter 5, pp. 90f, for legal arguments on the basis of equivalence.
36 Ṭabarī, op. cit., vi, p. 125. See Wensinck, *Concordance*, s.vv. *kifl, samna, qatl*. The two halves of the *ḥadīth* sometimes occur separately, and Ṭabarī quotes the second half in a *khabar* from Ibn 'Amr. Suyūṭi quotes numerous versions as well; *Durr*, iii, pp. 61f.
37 Ṭabarī, op. cit., vi, p. 127.
38 See Ṭabarī, op. cit., vi, p. 124 for a statement to that effect attributed to Mujāhid but of which Ṭabarī doubts the authenticity.
39 "His second work *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* ... is another important contribution not only to the science of *tafsīr* but also to the science of the principles of jurisprudence." Saeedullah Qazi, *Principles of Muslim Jurisprudence: Chapters on Qiyās and Ijtihād of ... al-Jaṣṣāṣ*, Lahore: al-Maktabat-el-Ilmiyyah, 1981, p. 39.
40 Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., ii, pp. 401–402.
41 Ibid., ii, p. 404. S.a. Ṭabarī, op. cit., vi, p. 127.
42 Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., ii, p. 405.
43 See Wensinck, *Concordance*, s.v. It is not in Bukhārī or Abū Dāwūd but is in all the other canonical collections, including the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.
44 Ṭabarsī, op. cit,, ii, p. 187.
45 E.g. Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm al-Ẓāhira*, Cairo, 1963–72, iii, p. 189.

4 RULES, COMMANDS, AND REASONS WHY

1 For an example of the first, see the position attributed to 'Abbād b. Sulaymān (d. 250/864) in al-Ash'arī's (d. 324/935) *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn*, H. Ritter, ed., Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1382/1963, pp. 253 and 390. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī includes other Mu'tazili positions, along with those of *ahl al-sunna*, in his exhaustive analysis of the logic of their interpretations of the two halves of Q 21:23 (*al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, xxii, pp. 155–158).
2 Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1968.
3 Georg Henrik von Wright, *Norm and Action: A Logical Inquiry*; New York: Humanities Press, 1963.
4 He excludes purely descriptive "laws," such as the laws of nature.
5 von Wright, op. cit., pp. 12–13. Italics are in the original.
6 Gottlieb, op. cit., pp. 37–38.
7 von Wright, op. cit., pp. 3–16.
8 Gottlieb, op. cit., pp. 17–18.
9 Ibid., p. 20. Italics are original.

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10 Ibid., p. 40.
11 Gottlieb calls this the *character-tag* of a rule (p. 40).
12 Ibid., p. 39.
13 Cf. ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 41.
15 Ibid., p. 39.
16 Toshihiko Izutsu, *Language and Magic*, Tokyo: Keio Institute, 1956, pp. 52–53.
17 Nicholas Rescher, *The Logic of Commands*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, contains a long bibliography arranged chronologically.
18 For a representative exegesis on the multiple uses of the imperative, see Ṭabarsī, op. cit., i, p. 69, *ad* Q 2:27. For a juristic treatment, see Jeannette Wakin, "The Divine Command in Ibn Qudamah," *Islamic Law and Jurisprudence: Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh*, N. Heer, ed., Seattle: University of Washington, 1990, especially pp. 35ff. and the references therein.
19 Rescher, op. cit., p. 2.
20 von Wright, op. cit., pp. 7–8 and *passim*.
21 Cf. von Wright, op. cit., pp. 13–14.
22 Rescher, op. cit., p. 10, with n. 5.
23 Ibid., p. 6, n. 4.
24 Gottlieb, op. cit., pp. 115–116, quoting no. 199 of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953 edn).
25 See n. 21 above.
26 Rescher, op. cit., p. 16.
27 Edwards, Paul. *The Logic of Moral Discourse*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955, p. 127
28 Rescher, op. cit., p. 16.
29 See e.g. Ibn Hishām, *Al-Sīra al-Nabawīya li-Ibn Hishām*, T.A-R. Sa'd, ed., Beirut: Dar al-Jīl, n.d. i, pp. 220–221; *The Life of Muḥammad*, A. Guillaume, ed. and tr., Oxford, 1955 (1980), p. 106.
30 Ibn Hishām op. cit., i, p. 221, text and n. 1; Ṭabarī, op. cit., p. 251; al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, Aḥmad Sa'd 'Alī, ed., Cairo, 1370/1951 (repr. Beirut, Dār al-Nadwa al-Jadīda, n.d.), §7, p. 23.
31 See, for example, al-Qasṭallānī, *Irshād al-Sārī*, vii, pp. 426–429; Guillaume, op. cit., p. 83.
32 Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1400/1980, i, p. 10.
33 Suyūṭī, *Itqān*, §7, pp. 23ff.
34 The *basmalah* is the first verse of Sura 1, whereas in Sura 96 it precedes the first verse.
35 Izutsu, *Language and Magic*, pp. 52ff. See above, p. 67.
36 Suyūṭī, *Itqān*, §7, p. 24. He explains that it may have been called "the first" because it was the first to be revealed in its entirety, unlike Sura 96, or because it was the first to be revealed after the long hiatus following the command to "Read!"
37 This is Abū Bakr M. b. 'Abd Allāh al-Ma'āfirī (d. 543/1148), not to be confused with the great mystic Abu 'Abd Allāh M. b. 'Alī Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn [al-] 'Arabī (d. 638/1240). The passage in question comes in the

entry for Sura 96, iv, p. 1942. Neither Ṭabarī nor the Shī'ī Ṭabarsī mentions 'Alī's purported dating of the passage.

38 See W.M. Watt and Richard Bell, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'ān*, Edinburgh, 1970, pp. 115 and 176.

39 Watt and Bell, *Bell's Introduction*, pp. 112, 174–175, and 212–213. Sir William Muir, *The Life of Mahomet*, London, 1894 (Repr. New Delhi: Voice of India, 1992), pp. 38–46.

40 Muir, op. cit., p. 38.

41 Ibid., p. 40.

42 Ibid., p. 38.

43 See below, p. 81f.

44 Muir, op. cit., p. 47. Italics and capital letters are original.

45 Watt and Bell, *Bell's Introduction*, pp. 112 and 176.

46 A good English account is to be found in Mahmoud Ayoub, *The Qur'ān and Its Interpreters, Volume 1*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1984, pp. 137–138. Also see the notes to A. Yusuf 'Ali's and Muhammad 'Ali's renditions of the Qur'ān, as well as the *Tafsir*s of Mujāhid (d. 104/722), ed. A-R. al-Surati, Islamabad: Majma' al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīya, 1966, p. 85; Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767), ed. A.M. Shihāta, Cairo: Halabi, 1969, i, p. 59; and Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/777), ed. Imtiyaz A. 'Arshi, Rampur, 1385/1965, ad loc.; Ṭabarī, op. cit., Cairo: Halabi, 3rd edn, 1388/1968, i, pp. 469–474.

47 Tāshköprüzādeh, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'āda* , ii, 442. S.a. al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Lahore: al-Maktaba al-'Uthmānīya, n.d., pp. 215f.

48 I have counted some ninety occurrences of this phrase in the Qur'ān.

49 There is a curious divergence in the early exegetical treatment of the two parallel participles *muzzammil* and *muddaththir*. One description of Muhammad's fear following the first revelation has him saying to Khadīja "*daththirūnī, daththirūnī*," and this version of his plea is duly recounted in the exegesis of the word *muddaththir* in Sura 74: see Mujāhid, op. cit., ii, p. 703; Ṭabarī, op. cit., xxix, p. 90; Qasṭallānī, op. cit., vii, p. 403. The same is not true of *muzzammil*: although the more common version of Muḥammad's cry has him saying "*zammilūnī, zammilūnī*", it is not mentioned in the exegesis of Sura 73 *al-Muzzammil* but in that of Sura 96. See Ṭabarī, op. cit., xxx, p. 161; Qasṭallānī, op. cit., vii, p. 427–429. Ṭabarsī conflates the two but the fuller account is under *al-Muddaththir*: op. cit., v, p. 377 and especially p. 384.

50 Mujāhid, *Tafsīr*, ii, p. 766, text and n. 4.

51 Ṭabarī, op. cit., xxx, p. 150. Presumably "Abu Nadrah" was the Baṣrī al-Mundhir b. Mālik al-'Abdi. See Ibn Sa'd, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā*, Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1377/1958, vii, p. 208, and al-Nūrī, *al-Jāmi' fi al-Jarḥ wa-al-Ta'dīl*, Beirut, 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1412/1992, iii, p. 169; no. 4482.

52 Thus Mujāhid, op. cit., ii, p. 794; Fīrūzābādī, *Tanwīr al-Miqbās*, p. 398.

53 Ibn Khālawayh, *I'rāb Thalāthīn Sūra min al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Hilāl, 1985, p. 228. Jeffery notes that the codex of Ubayy also lacked *qul*. See *Materials for the History of the Text of the Qur'ān*, Leiden: Brill, 1937 (repr. AMS Press, 1975), p. 113.

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5 LEGAL ARGUMENTS

1 See Chapter 4, pp. 63ff.
2 Mendenhall and Herion, op. cit., i, p. 1180, col. 1.
3 See Chapter 1, p. 9f.
4 Qurṭubī, op. cit., i, p. 227.
5 In my experience, the recipient usually responds in a way that preserves the triangular relationship, asking God to bless the giver rather than thanking her/him directly.
6 The verb is *i'tadā*, with related participle.
7 The difficulties of translating this word are notorious. Some attempts: "tumult and oppression" (A. Yusuf Ali), "idolatry" (N.J. Dawood), "persecution" (Pickthall and Arberry).
8 Qurṭubī, op. cit., ii, pp. 237–238.
9 See note 7, above, for suggested translations of this word. The translation does not affect the rule under consideration, namely, that there are things worse than killing.
10 See Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., i, pp. 133–158; Qurṭubī, op. cit., i, pp. 164–172.
11 In the summer of 1990 I was sitting with His Eminence the Grand Mufti of Yemen, Aḥmad Muḥammad Muḥammad Yaḥyā Zabāra, when he received a petition from a man who was attempting to use his absence "in a foreign country" (Saudi Arabia!) as a circumstance that would limit his obligation to send financial support to his wife in Yemen. The Mufti found for the wife.
12 Qurṭubī, op. cit., i, p. 225 *ad* Q 2:187.
13 S.a. above, p. 91.
14 Qurṭubī, op. cit., i, p. 170.
15 The word *Allāhu* is in the nominative case.
16 The usual understanding is that this prohibits simultaneous but not sequential marriage to sisters.
17 See, e.g. al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), who ranks it eighth among the great sins: *Kitāb al-Kabā'ir*, Aleppo: Dār al-Wa'y, pp. 41–49. Cf. Q 2:83, 4:36, 6:151, 17:23; and A.J. Wensinck, *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane*, Leiden: Brill, 1936, s.v. *birr*.
18 Bernard Weiss, "Exotericism and objectivity in Islamic jurisprudence," in N. Heer, ed., *Islamic Law and Jurisprudence: Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh*, Seattle, University of Washington, 1990, pp. 65–66.
19 See Chapter 9, "Conditional and Disjunctive Arguments."
20 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iii, p. 388. A Shī'ī, he describes as *taqīya* the mental state of the believer who is forced to reject his faith outwardly.
21 But cf. his position on forced conversion and declaration of divorce, in the "Excursus on Performative Utterances," below.
22 Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., iii, p. 192.
23 George A. Kennedy, *Aristotle: On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, Oxford, 1991, p. 109, n. 247.
24 Edward P.J. Corbett, *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, Oxford, 1971, p. 34.
25 Certain passages may have been revealed following incidents of torture. Q 16:106, for example, is said to have been revealed when the young 'Ammār b. Yāsir verbally renounced his faith after seeing his

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parents tortured to death but remained faithful internally. Such actions were perpetrated on Muslims, not by them. See, e.g. Qurṭubī, op. cit., x, pp. 118ff.

26 Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 110–111.

27 Ibid., p. 113.

28 Ibid.

29 A useful summary can be found in Mustansir Mir's *Dictionary of Qur'ānic Terms and Concepts*, New York: Garland, 1987, s.v. "witness."

30 See Chapter 1, especially pp. 12–13.

31 Three different vowelings for the last phrase have been proposed; see Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iii, p. 299.

32 See the next section, "Contracts."

33 Kennedy, op. cit., p. 114.

34 Ibid., p. 115.

35 Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., i, 487. Also see above, Chapter 4, pp. 80–81.

36 See above, p. 80.

37 Cf. Ṭabarī, iii, p. 116.

38 Legal scholars qualify this as applying only if no others are present who could do the job equally well. It is also questionable whether a fee can be paid for what is in the first instance a religious duty, whereas it is usual to charge a fee for copying a document. See Qurubī, op. cit., iii, p. 248.

39 See Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., i, p. 482. His argument against the occurrence of abrogation in verse 283 runs as follows: if the hypothesis were true, it would mean that the abrogated and abrogating verses were revealed at the same time; but "it is inadmissible that a rule should be abrogated before it goes into effect." There is no evidence that the verses were revealed at different times. Therefore, the "trust" clause renders the locution a recommendation and not a commandment. Jaṣṣāṣ's exegesis of the verse occupies 42 large pages of fine print.

40 Kennedy, op. cit., p. 117.

41 Mir, op. cit., s.v. "Oaths."

42 Op. cit., i, p. 1182, col. 1.

43 Cf. Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., ii, pp. 454, 457.

44 Ibid., ii, pp. 489–494.

45 To wit, in Q 2:133, 3:52, 3:64, 3:84, 5:111, 6:163, 10:90, 27:42, 28:53, 41:33, and 46:15 (declarations); in Q 2:136, 10:72, 27:91, 29:46, and 39:12 (commands); and in Q 2:131, 3:20, and 27:44 (verbs), respectively.

46 This rough and ready definition must suffice, as full treatment is beyond the scope of this book. Performatives occur at the junction of logic, language, and law; they may be pursued in the works of the Oxford logician J.L. Austin and the linguist Jan Andersson (*How to Define Performative*, Uppsala, 1975), *inter alia*. I am indebted to my colleague at the University of Tennessee, the linguist and lawyer Bethany Dumas, both for introducing me to performatives and for recommending to me what she considers the best description of them, "How Performatives Work," by Berkeley philosopher John Searle (*Tennessee Law Review*, vol. 58/1991, pp. 371–392), q.v. with its credits and bibliography.

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47 The difficulties of translating the verb are well known. "Submit" seems closer to the unequal relationship between man and God, yet "commit" also conveys that relation, as one can learn from an etymologically complete dictionary. "Commit" more clearly denotes the element of discrimination pointed out by Muḥammad Abdul Rauf, "Some Notes on the Qur'ānic Use of the Terms *Islam* and *Iman*", MW, vol. 57 (1967), pp. 94–102. He equates *islām* with "monotheism," basing his argument upon the root *s-l-m* as indicating "the absence of something undesired or abhorred, implying at the same time the existence or fulfillment of the desired or required opposite" (p. 94). Also cf. the King James rendering of Psalm 37:5: "Commit thy way unto the Lord; trust also in him; and he shall bring it to pass."
48 Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., i, pp. 452–454.
49 Ibid. iii, p. 193. See above, pp. 97–98.
50 Andersson, op. cit., pp. 5 and 115ff, with the references therein.
51 Ayoub, op. cit., i, p. 5.

6 COMPARISON

1 See the next chapter.
2 See the previous chapter.
3 Edward P.J. Corbett, *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, Oxford, 1971, p. 116.
4 See above, Chapter 5, pp. 84–87 and 90–91, respectively.
5 This is called *antanaclasis*; see Corbett, op. cit., p. 482.
6 See e.g. Ṭabarsī, op. cit., i, p. 288. S.a. Chapter 5 above, p. 85
7 See above, Chapters 1, 2, and 3, and below in the present chapter.
8 See Chapter 5, pp. 86–87.
9 See my article, "Impotence," in the *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ed., Netherlands: Brill, ii, pp. 507–508.
10 Dagobert Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Ames: Littlefield, 1955, p. 11.
11 Ibn Ḥazm, *Mulakhkhaṣ Ibṭāl al-Qiyās wa-al-Ra'y wa-al-Istiḥsān wa-al-Taqlīd wa-al-Ta'līl*, Sa'īd al-Afghānī, ed., Damascus University Press, 1379/1960, p. 70. He and Wensinck ascribe it to the *Sunan* of al-Dārimī, who credits it to Ibn Sīrīn. Wensinck cites it as §22 of al-Dārimi's *Muqaddima*: *Qāsa Iblīs wa-huwa awwal man qāsa* (*Concordance et Indices*, v, p. 503, c. 2).
12 Corbett, op. cit., p. 116.
13 *Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms*, Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1951, p. 40, col. 2., s.v. "allegory."
14 The phrase *Allāhu a'lam* occurs many times in the Qur'ān but not as an absolute, that is, it is always used with an object, e.g. "God knows best what they are hiding" (Q 3:167, 5:61, cf. 60:1). Popular usage of the phrase, of course, implies the superlative.
15 Suyūṭī quotes Qatāda to the effect that these ranks depend upon their deeds in this life. To this he adds a remark by al-Ḍaḥḥāk that precludes the possibility of jealousy in Paradise: "The higher one sees his preference over the one lower than he in rank, while the lower one does not see that there is anyone above him." A *hadīth* from Salmān quotes the Prophet: "There is no one who wants to ascend a rank in

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this world and succeeds but God lowers him in the Hereafter by a greater and longer rank. Then he quoted, 'And the Hereafter is greater in ranks and greater in preference'." (Suyūṭī, *Durr*, v, pp. 256–257.)

16 This wording is borrowed from Pickthall's translation, with minor changes. See *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, Mentor, 1953, p. 428.

17 See Chapter 5, pp. 89–90.

18 *Af'al* is of course the pattern for both the elative adjective and the adjective of color or defect, so another construction must normally be used for making an elative of a defect – "more blind." However, there are precedents for using *af'al* as the elative of an elative: in Chapter 10 of *al-Kitāb*, Sībawayh uses the word *awwal*, "first," in the phrase *awwal minhu*, where it can only mean "prior to" (*al-Kitāb*, ed. H. Derenbourg, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1881 (repr. Hildesheim), i, p. 11). Zamakhsharī says that some have considered the second *a'mā* in this verse as possibly elative and that Abu 'Amr read it in such a way as to distinguish the two (*Kashshāf*, ii, p. 460).

19 See, e.g. Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid*, i, "*Kitāb al-jihād*", §5, p. 283.

20 See my article, "The *a fortiori* argument in *fiqh*, *naḥw*, and *kalām*," *Studies in the History of Arabic Grammar II: Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on the History of Arabic Grammar, Nijmegen, 27 April–1 May, 1987*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1990 (Published as Vol. 56 of the series Studies in the History of the Language Sciences), pp. 165–177.

21 See, e.g. L.S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, New York: Humanities Press, 1933, p. 113; P.F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, London: Methuen, 1952 [repr. University Paperbacks, 1971], pp. 207–210.

22 Ralph Eaton, *General Logic*, New York: Scribner's, 1931, pp. 220–222.

23 Al-Shāfi'ī *al-Risāla*, Muḥammad Kaylānī, ed., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1403/1983, §1482–83 and 1489–90, pp. 223–224.

7 CONTRAST

1 Angeles, op. cit., s.v. "opposites (metaphysics)."

2 Corbett, op. cit., 129.

3 Note that Sura 63 is called *al-Munāfiqūn*, "The Hypocrites."

4 See below, pp. 145–147.

5 The canonical collections quote it in relation to belief, marriage, divorce, freeing slaves, legal fictions (*ḥiyal*), jihād, ritual purity (*ṭahāra*), and asceticism (*zuhd*). See Wensinck, *Concordance et Indices*, vii, p. 55, c. 2.

6 See above, p. 131.

7 E.g. *a-m-n* and *k-f-r*. See the explanation of these two concepts below, p. 143.

8 See Chapter 5 above.

9 *I'jāz al-Qur'ān*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1963, p. 87. In the terms of classical rhetoric, some of these figures are examples of *antimetabole*, others of *chiasmus*; see Corbett, op. cit., pp. 477–478.

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10 This may also be construed as "contrariety," especially if a third state (neither creating nor being created) is admitted, a logical but not a Qur'ānic possibility. See below, pp. 144–145, and Corbett, op. cit., pp. 129f.
11 See Chapter 5, "An excursus on performative utterances," pp. 105–109.
12 In Q 12:89, Joseph uses the two when asking his brothers if they knew what they did to him. In Q 46:22, Hūd tells his people who persist in ignoring his warnings (*tajhalūn*) that only God knows the Day of Judgment. Goldziher and others, of course, have long since expanded the connotation of *Jāhilīya* beyond mere ignorance.
13 Toshihiko Izutsu, *God and Man in the Koran*, Tokyo: Keio Institute, 1964, pp. 59–62; cf. Corbett, op. cit., pp. 56ff.
14 Particularly *God and Man in the Koran* and *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Koran*, a reworking of *The Structure of Ethical Terms in the Koran*. See Bibliography. Also note our remarks *passim*, but especially in Chapter 6.
15 *Ethico-Religious Concepts*, pp. 121–131.
16 See my article "Hell and hellfire," *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, ed., Leiden: Brill, 2001, ii, pp. 414–420.
17 The phrase is the title of Chapter VIII in his *Structure of the Ethical Terms in the Koran*, Tokyo, 1959.
18 See Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts*, p. 107 and above, Chapter 5, p. 105.
19 See above, Chapter 6, p. 123.
20 Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts*, p. 108.
21 Ṭabarsī, op. cit., i, p. 88, *ad* Qur'ān 2:37.
22 *Logic and Rhetoric*, New York: Macmillan, 1962, p. 122.
23 Ibid., p. 120
24 See Chapter 9 below.
25 E.g. Corbett, op. cit., p. 465.
26 See Chapter 6, pp. 115–117.
27 *Ghill*, in A. Yūsuf 'Alī's translation.

8 CATEGORICAL ARGUMENTS

1 See Introduction, p. viii.
2 *The Book on the Scandals of the Esotericists Dedicated to the Caliph al-Mustaẓhir bi-Llāh (r. 487/1094–512/1118)*, A-R Badawi, ed., Cairo: Dār al-Qawmīya lil-Ṭibā'a wal-Nashr, 1383/1964, written at the order of the caliph. Ghazālī composed at least five works on the subject; see Bouyges, *Essai de Chronologie des Oeuvres de Al-Ghazali*, M. Allard, ed., Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959, nos. 22 and 42.
3 *Faḍā'iḥ* exposes the methods allegedly used by agents of the Hidden Imām, whom Ghazālī accuses of entrapping gullible students in heresy by promising them secret teaching (*al-ta'līm*) that in the end is nothing less than abolition of all the rules of religion (*al-sharā'i'* – *Faḍā'iḥ*, p. 12.)
4 See pp. xii–xiii.
5 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī, *'Alam al-Jadhal fi 'Ilm al-Jadal*, Wolfhart Heinrichs, ed., Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1987, p. 60.
6 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 41.

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7 Ibid., at pp. 4 and 53.
8 See below, Chapter 9.
9 Bouyges, op. cit., nos. 19 and 20, p. 25.
10 To my knowledge, there are three treatments of this book in Western languages. The first is by Victor Chelhot, "'Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm' et la Connaissance Rationelle Chez Ġazālī," *BEO* 15 (1955–57), pp. 7–42, which includes a French translation. The second is by Angelika Kleinknecht, "*Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*: eine Ableitung der Logik aus dem Koran," *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, S. Stern et al., eds, South Carolina, 1973, pp. 159–187. The third is Richard McCarthy's translation, published as Appendix III to *Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī's 'al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl' and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī*, Boston: Twayne, 1980, pp. 287–332.
11 Bouyges, op. cit., no. 42.
12 McCarthy, op. cit., p. 287. Chelhot (op. cit., p. 12) calls it "un genre littéraire 'sui generis'," Goldziher "le plus intéressant de ces ouvrages [de polémique] pour la forme et le fond" (*Le Dogme et la Loi de l'Islam*, Paris: Geuthner, 1958, p. 295, n. 156).
13 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, e.g. pp. 42, 43, 78; s.a. n. 55 below.
14 Cf. Ghazālī, *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm*, pp. 177ff.
15 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 28.
16 Chelhot, op. cit., p. 11.
17 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, pp. 93 and 99.
18 Ibid., p. 19.
19 Ibid., pp. 19–20. All translations are my own, but see n. 10 above for full Western language versions.
20 Ibid., pp. 23–24. Cf. Q 24:11–12, and 16.
21 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*., pp. 24–25.
22 Ibid., pp. 27–30.
23 Ibid., p. 26.
24 Ibid., p. 69.
25 Ibid., pp. 101–102.
26 Ibid., p. 41.
27 Ibid., p. 42.
28 This verse actually concludes a passage that contains another type of syllogism, the second-figure syllogism that is Ghazālī's "Middle Scale" (see pp. 162–167).
29 Square brackets indicate the parts of arguments implicit in the Qur'ānic text.
30 Ibid., p. 42
31 Ibid., p. 44. There is a misprint in the edition cited – for *adhin* read *azin* (from *w-z-n*, cf. *mīzān*.)
32 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
33 Ibid., pp. 46–47.
34 Ibid., pp. 47–48.
35 Celestine Bittle, *The Science of Correct Thinking: Logic*, Milwaukee: Bruce, 1935–37, p. 186. The Jesuit Bittle's examples would be of great interest to Muslims, as they are syllogisms that prove that God is One and Eternal.

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36 Bittle, op. cit., p. 189 (italics removed).
37 Bittle, op. cit., p. 185–186.
38 Ghazālī does the same in one of his technical treatises on logic, *Kitāb Miḥakk al-Naẓar fi al-Manṭiq*, M.B.D. al-Na'sānī, ed., Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍa al-Ḥadītha, 1966, pp. 41–44.
39 Bittle, op. cit., p. 166.
40 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 193.
41 Ṭūfī, op. cit, p. 199.
42 My rewording of the verse as a syllogism avoids having to assign a precise meaning to the word *tamannā*, which is notoriously obscure. Without the second half of the verse, one would ordinarily translate it and its cognate noun as "hope" or "aspiration." Yet the verse is cited to prove the integrity of the Qur'ānic text and its freedom from any misreading caused by Satan. One compromise that avoids a circular definition is that it means *ḥaddatha*, "relating ḥadīth" or "conversing," including the Prophet's "conversation with himself." See e.g. al-Qurṭubī, op. cit., xii, pp. 53–57.
43 See Chapter 1 for the importance of the notion of "witness" in the Covenant between God and humankind.
44 See the "Excursus on Performative Utterances" in Chapter 5, pp. 105–109.
45 Bittle, op. cit., p. 192.
46 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, pp. 55–56.
47 Ibid., p. 59.
48 Ibid., p. 58.
49 Ibid., p. 62.
50 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 121.
51 Bittle, op. cit., pp. 117–118, 210.
52 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 127–128.
53 The charge that the source of the Qur'ān was not God but a human being who was not an Arab appears in various versions throughout the literature. According to al-Wāḥidī (*Asbāb al-Nuzūl*, p. 159), it was attributed to two Christian slaves called Yasār and Khayr. Ṣuyūṭī (*Durr*, v, pp. 167–168) gives no fewer than eight alternative versions: a Persian named Bal'ām, 'Abdah b. al-Ḥaḍramī (from four sources, one calling him Abū al-Yusr), a Persian slave named Mqys, Salmān al-Fārisī, and an unnamed secretary.
54 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 65. Ghazālī quotes the verse piecemeal, interspersing it with elements of the argument.
55 Ibid., pp. 66–67. Thus in *Qisṭās* Ghazālī combines two conceptions of the enthymeme: (1) that it is a logical syllogism in which premises and conclusion are necessary but one or more is understood by all parties and hence suppressed for greater overall effectiveness, and (2) that it is a rhetorical figure in which these are only probable, as in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Book I, Chapter 1. S.a. p. 153 above in the present chapter.
56 Bittle, op. cit., pp. 194–195; italics removed.
57 Ghazāli, *Qisṭās*, p. 68.

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9 CONDITIONAL AND DISJUNCTIVE ARGUMENTS

1 Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic*, Berkeley, 1953 (repr. 1961), p. 67.
2 Mates, op. cit., pp. 69–71.
3 Thus Victor Chelhot gets them backwards in his article "'Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm' et la connaissance rationelle chez Ġazālī," *BEO*, xv (1955–57), pp. 7–42. The mistake in question is at p. 13.
4 Irving Copi, *Introduction to Logic* (4th edn), New York: Macmillan, 1972, p. 233.
5 Ibid., p. 234.
6 Chelhot, "règle de concomitance," p. 13. In *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm*, Ghazālī calls it the "conditional conjunctive syllogism" (*al-qiyās al-sharṭī al-muttaṣil*), pp. 151ff.
7 Ghazali, *Qisṭās*, p. 75.
8 Ibid., p. 76. Note that in Riyāḍ Muṣṭafā al-'Abd Allāh's edition there are many misprints and omissions in this passage. I have checked it against that of Muḥammad 'Afīf al-Zuʿbī, Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Zuʿbī, 1392/1973, pp. 33–34.
9 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 76.
10 Celestine Bittle, op. cit., pp. 227–229, contains a complete list of the valid forms of both the "constructive" and "destructive" moods. Qur'ān 2:120 is in the fourth form, 41:52 in the first.
11 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 74.
12 The first section of Ṭabarsī's commentary on the passage fills in the argument in a characteristically useful way. See *Majmaʿ al-Bayān* ii, pp. 379ff. A possible problem in the English wording comes from the fact that the verb *shā'a* in these verses does not have an explicit object. One might therefore render the English as follows: If God had exercised His will, we would not believe in many gods. We do believe in many gods. Therefore, God did not exercise His will.
13 See Chapter 1.
14 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 120.
15 This is the implication as understood by "most exegetes" according to Ṭabarsī, and as understood by R.M. al-'Abd Allāh in his edition of *Qisṭās*; see p. 71, n. 3. Mujāhid and Qatāda, along with the modern A. Yūsuf 'Alī, interpret it as the lesser deities' desire to profit from God's power. Ṭūfī opts for the first interpretation, and it seems likely that Ghazālī does as well, as the other might not have an effect visible on earth. See Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iii, p. 417.
16 "A necessary implication follows, which is the negation of one of the two gods." *Qisṭās*, p. 73. S.a. Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 47.
17 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 73–74.
18 That is, not available for scrutiny or not yet in existence, such as a future crop.
19 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 74.
20 Ṭufi, op. cit., p. 94.
21 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Kitāb al-Muntaẓam*, Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-Maʿārif al-'Uthmānīya, 1357, vi, pp. 102ff. S.a. A.A. al-Aʿsam, *Tārīkh Ibn al-Rīwandi al-Mulḥid*, Beirut: Dar al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1395/1975, pp. 159ff. and other references s.v. *Dāmigh*.

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22 Ṭūfī, op. cit., pp. 108ff.
23 This form is attributed to Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus, not to the Stoics. See Czeslaw Lejewski, "Ancient Logic," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iv, p. 518.
24 See above, p. 177.
25 Note the use of the performative. See the "Excursus on performative utterances" in Chapter 5, pp. 105–109.
26 Rāzī, op. cit., xiv, p. 227.
27 E.g. the Shī'ī Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, p. 475.
28 Rāzī, op. cit., xiv, p. 233–234.
29 Copi, pp. 258–259. Copi's own example is, "If State loses the Homecoming Game, then I'll eat my hat."
30 See, for example, Ṭabarsī, op. cit., ii, pp. 100–101.
31 So the "vanished nations" stories. See Richard Martin, "Structural analysis and the Qur'an," *JAAR* 47, no. 4S, pp. 670–671.
32 Mates, op. cit., p. 71.
33 Ṭūfī notes, "It is as though he expected them to say that 'Every one whom we killed was a liar and his prophethood was not established with us.'" Op. cit., p. 99.
34 Mates, op. cit., p. 72.
35 Ibid., p. 73.
36 *"Mabnāhu 'alā al-ḥadhf wa-l-ījāz," Qisṭās*, p. 42.
37 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 103.
38 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 78.
39 S. a. Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 100.
40 Calling both types "conditional" as is done in both Arabic and English (and, presumably, Latin) seems unnecessarily confusing. Apparently it began with Galen, who equated the meaning of the disjunction "Either it is day or it is night" with that of the conditional "If it is not day then it is night." See Mates, op. cit., pp. 55ff.
41 Or "restricted" and "unrestricted," or "complete" and "incomplete" (McCarthy, op. cit., p. 305); or "proper" and "improper" (Bittle, op. cit., pp. 231ff.)
42 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, p. 79. The entire eighth chapter is entitled *Mīzān al-Shayṭān*.
43 See above, p. 145.
44 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 193.
45 But compare this with the punishment visited upon the weak who have followed the strong into Hell (Q 14:21; see Chapter 6 above, p. 114).
46 Ghazālī, *Qisṭās*, pp. 97ff.

10 TECHNICAL TERMS AND DEBATING TECHNIQUE

1 Here theology and English grammar part company, in that a plural verb sounds correct but implies an unacceptable plurality of subject. I have followed A. Yūsuf 'Alī, M.M. Pickthall, and N.J. Dawood and used the singular. In Arabic, of course, the construction is an equational sentence with no verb.
2 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 13, with n. 1.

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3 *Kitāb Istikhrāj al-Jidāl min al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, pp. 49ff.
4 Ṭūfī, op. cit., pp. 155–156. The word here translated as "the human being" is, of course, *al-insān* – grammatically definite, as is proper Arabic for a generic term. But the presence of the definite article in a Qur'ānic reference often led exegetes, especially early ones, to refer the word to a specific person. Ṭabarsī notes that Ibn 'Abbās held *al-insān* to be al-Naḍr b. al-Ḥārith, al-Kalbī that it was Ubayy b. Khalaf (op. cit., iv, p. 477). Suyūṭī (*Durr*, v, p. 406) cites the story from Bukhārī, Muslim, Ibn al-Mundhir, and Ibn Abī Ḥātim, on the authority of 'Alī himself. Naturally enough, the Shi'i Ṭabarsī leaves it out.
5 There is more than one possible construction of this verb. See Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf*, iii, p. 325.
6 S.a. Robert Brunschvig's article "Simples remarques négatives sur le vocabulaire du Coran," *SI*, v (1956), pp. 19–32. *Dalīl* here is a "sign" of the sun's motion, or a "guide" like those used by travelers. The combination of sun and shadow is a "sign" of God's unicity. See Ṭabarsī, op. cit., iv, p. 173.
7 See above, pp. 36–37; and Ibn al-Ḥanbalī, op. cit., p. 115.
8 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 161.
9 Ibid., p. 162.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 163.
12 *Mā waqqaraka kabīr*^{an} *man 'arafaka ṣaghīr*^{an} (Ṭufi, op. cit., p. 174); cf. Aristotle's inclusion of the "maxim" (*gnōmē*) among his "common modes of persuasion" (*koinai pisteis* – *Rhetoric*, ii, Chapter 21).
13 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 174.
14 Ibn al-Ḥanbalī observes that Moses does not answer the unanswerable question about the nature (*māhīya*) of God or expose its invalidity (*fasād*) but characterizes God by his creation. Op. cit, p. 70.
15 Loc. cit.
16 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 175.
17 *'Aqluhu*. The editor notes (though I see no need for such an emendation) that perhaps this is a mistake for *'adluhu*,"his sense of justice".
18 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 175.
19 Ibid.
20 See above, Chapters 2 and 3.
21 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 197. See Ibn al-Ḥanbalī, op. cit., p. 113, for a brief description of this technique.
22 See Chapter 6, pp. 126–129, for analysis and discussion of *a fortiori* arguments.
23 See Chapter 1, pp. 6–7 and Chapter 2, pp. 30–33.
24 Ṭūfī, op. cit., p. 195.
25 See Chapter 6, p. 118.
26 See Chapter 9, p. 177.
27 *Asbāb al-Nuzūl*, p. 60.
28 See above, pp. 13–14 and 16–17.
29 See A. Katsh, *Judaism in Islam*, NYU, 1954, p. 64, ad Qur'ān 2:58. It is closer in tone to the "Constitution of Medina," with its attention to communal rights and responsibilities and not individual ones. See

M Hamidullah, *The First Written Constitution in the World: An Important Document of the Time of the Holy Prophet*, 2nd rev. edn, Lahore: Sh. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1968, based on Ibn Isḥāq's biography of the Prophet. See A. Guillaume, *The Life of Muḥammad*, Oxford, 1955; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-Nabawīya* (ed. Ṭāhā T.A-R. Sa'īd), Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, n.d., ii, pp. 106–108.

11 CONCLUSIONS

1 This from al-Suyūṭī. See M. Ayoub, op. cit., p. 5.
2 From Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-Anbā'*, ii, p. 27. See G.C. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," EI, vol. xx, pp. 751–755.
3 *Qiṣṭās*, p. 126.
4 *Al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, Cairo, 1370/1951 [repr. Beirut, Dār al-Nadwa al-Jadīda, n.d.] §68, part ii, p. 135. As Jane Dammen McAuliffe points out, here Suyūṭī "both incorporates and expands upon" a chapter from Burhān al-Din al-Zarkashī's *al-Burhān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*. See McAuliffe, "Debate with them in a better way," in *Myths, Historical Archetypes and Symbolic Figures in Arabic Literature*, Beirut: Steiner, 1999, pp. 184f.
5 For a clear and accessible summary of the field of *tafsīr*, see Andrew Rippin's article "*Tafsīr*" in *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, M. Eliade, ed., New York: Macmillan, 1987, xiv, pp. 236–244; reprinted in Andrew Rippin, *The Qur'an and Its Interpretive Tradition*, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2001, x, pp. 1–24.
6 See H. Djavad Falaturi, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's critical logic," in *Yādnāme-ye Īrānī-ye Minorsky*, M. Minovi, ed., Tehran, 1348/1969, pp. 51–79.
7 See Andrew Rippin, "The present status of tafsīr studies," *The Muslim World*, lxxii (1982), reprinted in Rippin, *The Qur'an and Its Interpretive Tradition*, xi, pp. 224–238.
8 See my draft article "Al-Qā'ida and al-Qur'ān: The '*Tafsir*' of Usamah bin Ladin," online at http://web.utk.edu/~religion/faculty.html or at http://web.utk.edu/~warda/bin_ladin_and_quran.htm currently being revised for publication.
9 *Jadal*, p. 209.

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