

ENGLNAD, RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

(A STUDY IN DIPLOMACY)

1857-1878

By

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of Russian Influence in the
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VICE-CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR

No. 781/VC-Testm.

Dated 17th May, 1963.

I have carefully gone through this manuscript. I must congratulate Dr. M. Anwar Khan, Senior Lecturer in History for writing out an extremely interesting account about the expansionist activities of Russia in Central Asia and the vacillating policy pursued by the British Government during the latter half of the 19th century. Very little was known about the moves and counter-moves of the above mentioned two countries. The author has put in a lot of labour and industry in studying numerous documents and journals of history with the result that this book keeps the readers interest alive right upto the last page.

I hope this book will throw some light on the hitherto unknown political activities which prompted the Russian Government to subjugate the whole of the Central Asia.

MOHAMMAD ALI
Vice-Chancellor,
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PREFACE

The present work is offered as a contribution to our knowledge and understanding of British policy and reaction to Russian expansion in Central Asia,¹ during 1857 to 1878. In preparation for the thesis, personal reference has been made to the large body of official documents, preserved in various archives in England. In addition, every effort has been made to examine other relevant materials. Often it is in the private correspondence of the policy makers, rather than in state papers, that the researcher is able to discern the actual underlying current of thoughts, and motivations, behind government action.

To date, little has been done to acquaint the public, both lay and scholarly, with Britain's interest in Central Asia during the Nineteenth century. Although Britain was highly alarmed at the rise of Russian power and influence in this area, she did not have any will to stop or to oppose it ; neither by annexation herself, nor by direct military or financial aid to the nations concerned. Central Asia, whether Afghanistan or beyond its

1. The term Central Asia is rather a vague geographical designation. It refers here to that region of Asia which intervened between the Russian Empire in the north and the British Empire in the south : it also includes the Chinese province of Turkistan in the east. The terms Central Asia and Turkistan are used synonymously in this study.

northern borders, was not in Britain's schemes of annexation.

Russian expansion in Central Asia has been attributed to several factors. British historians of the Nineteenth century impute it to the traditional policy of Russia going back to the days of Peter the Great, for the conquest of India. Modern research work suggests underlying economic factors. Some of these may be mentioned briefly ; the growth of Russian textile industry in the later half of the Nineteenth century : unsuccessful competition of Russian product in Western markets against superior European goods ; dependence upon American export of raw cotton, which was interrupted firstly due to hostility with Britain during the Crimean War, and again this export was totally stopped during the Civil War in America. Emancipation of the serfs in 1861 is also to be accounted for, in the growth of industry in Russia.² The Russian historians and diplomats of the Nineteenth century, attributed this expansion, along with Russia's civilising mission in the East, partly to Russia's strategic planning against Britain. The closer to India, they believed would be Russia, the less opposition it would meet from that power in her doings in Europe.

The influence of the military class in Russia played no less an important role in Russian penetration southward. The ruling Czar derived his

2. As interesting piece of research work had been done at the London University in 1952, by Lunger, A. *The Economic Background of the Russian Conquest of Central Asia in the second half of the 19th Century*. Ph.D. unpublished thesis.

authority from this class, and was quite powerless in rejecting the wishes of the military Junta.³

Acknowledgments.

I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to my director of research, Doctor W. Standford Reid, without whose interest, appreciation, and moral and intellectual support, this work would not have been finalised. I should also like to thank my various friends at McGill who have helped me with the draft—typing, proof reading, and the preparation of the final draft of this thesis. They are Miss Ilona Shilov, Miss Dorothy Crossland, Miss Carol Comm- ing, Mr. Alan Richardson, Mr. Anthony Cooper, Mr. Michel Maxwell, Mr. Danial Dorotich, and Dr. J. N. Westwood.

I should like to express my gratitude to the Canada Council for their scholarship award, which enabled me to come from Peshawar to pursue higher studies in history in Canada. I appreciate the financial assistance provided to me by McGill University during my third year's stay in Canada.

Finally, I should like to thank the authorities of the India Office Library, the British Museum and the Public Record Office, all in London (England). I am indebted to the courtesies of the Librarians of the Cambridge University, and of the Christ Church College, Oxford, for allowing me access to the Mayo and the Salisbury Papers respectively. I sincerely appreciate the courtesy and hospitality extended to

3. Loftus, Lord A. *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, London, 1894, vol. II (second series) p.47 : Schuyler, E. *Turkistan*, New York 1876, vol. II pp.262-63.

me by His Grace, the present Duke of Argyll, in allowing me to consult the private papers of his great grandfather, the eighth Duke of Argyll. The National Trust Museum, Hughendon Manor, deserve my thanks for permitting me to consult Beaconsfield private correspondence. I am grateful to the members of the Reference Section, Redpath Library for procuring necessary material for me from various parts of North America.

April 5, 1962.

M. A. K.

SECOND PREFACE

To the authorities of the Bodleian Library Oxford, my thanks are due for allowing me to consult, during the summer of 1962, the Clarendon collection. Much more than formal acknowledgement is due to Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, the Vice Chancellor, for having blessed this work with his valuable suggestions which are incorporated in the text now.

At the end I am grateful to Maulana Fazale Manan for helping me to make this study available to the public.

Sept. 5, 1963.

M. A. K.

CHAPTER I

Herat. England's First Bastion Against Russia

Political division in Afghanistan always created a serious problem of the north-western frontiers of British India. In the division and weakness of Afghanistan lay India's instability. A unified Afghanistan, under firm British influence, believed Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, would serve as a forceful barrier against the expansion of Russia in Central Asia.¹ And Herat, the most north-western province of Afghanistan was the bulwark of this barrier.

From the dawn of its history, India had been invaded from its north-western borders. Herat,² was a halting station for the armies of all the great conquerors of India from Alexander, Changez Khan Mahmud to Temur, Babur and Ahmad Shah Abdali. It was the nearest and the most vulnerable point at which an invader could concentrate and prepare for an invasion of India. The fertility of its valley, its strategic position commanding all the important roads

1. *Parliamentary Papers Readex Microprint Edition*, New York LVI 1878-79 no. I Cannings minute on the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1857. (Hereafter cited par. pap).

2. Herat is located at 34° 20' 30" north and 62° 11' 0" east : 2500 feet above sea level. It is situated in the Hari Rud valley. Its name comes from the Sanskrit word Arya (Husbandman) which after many variations like Aria, Heri, Hiriva finally settled on the present form.

to India, its admirable climate and the prestige it enjoyed through Central Asia as a great commercial centre, made it a cornerstone in the outlying defences of India. "The real invasion" wrote Sir J. Sheil.¹ "if it ever takes place, must be by Herat".²

Hence to some of the British strategists of the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the British possession of Herat was imperative. "Herat is the key to India", ran a popular saying. John Jacob, a seasoned Anglo-Indian administrator on the Sindh frontiers had urged the government in 1856 to make Herat an English fortress garrisoning it with twenty thousand troops ;³ his views on the north western defences of India, were highly admired by some of his distinguished colleagues, like Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir B. Frere, Sir H. Green, Sir L. Pelly, Sir G. Birdwood and Sir W. Mereweather. This group of politico-military thinkers, sometimes called "the Bombay School", anticipated the Russian advance upon India and advocated the occupation of such outlying posts as Quetta, Qandhar and Herat, to checkmate future threats to the defences of India.⁴ Major Robert Taylor who led

1. Sir Justin Sheil (1803—71) went to Persia 1833 : Secretary to Legation 1836. Envoy in Persia (1844—54.)

2. Sheil, Lady. *Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia*. London, 1856. p. 372.

3. *Par. pap. op. cit.* no. 1/3. Also in Pelly, L. *Views and opinions of John Jacob*, London, 1858. p. 377.

4. Smith, R.B. *The life of Lord Lawrence*. New York 1833 vol. 2 p. 496.

the British mission to Herat in 1858¹ was convinced that Herat "must be.....English".² An astute Secretary of State for India, Sir Charles Wood³ had been hatching an idea for Herat occupation by Britain.³ Writers like Vambery,⁴ Malleson⁵ and Marvin⁶ as well as many other travellers and pamphleteers, had done much to reveal the great potentiality of Herat in the complex history of Central Asia ; the political events surrounding it were invariably recorded in the '*Times of London*'.

The second decade of the Nineteenth Century had brought a political division in Afghanistan⁷. The Barakzis (Mohammadzis) held Kabul and the popalzis (Sadozis) established themselves at Herat. Weak as they were, the popalzis longed for external assistance to maintain them against their powerful

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1. *Enclosure to secret letters from India 1859/172*. Taylor to Edmonstone no. 4. January 1, 58. Taylor Memorandum on Herat. ('Hereafter cited as E.S.L.I.)
 2. Sir Charles Wood, later First Viscount of Halifax (1800—85) was the president of the board of Control 1852—55. Secretary of state for India 1859—1866.
 3. *Secret Home Correspondence 1865/69*. I.O. to F.O. Aug. 11, 65 see for details of this preceding p. 60. (Hereafter cited as S.H.C.)
 4. Vambery, A. *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*. London, 1847 p. 214.
 5. Malleson, G.B. *Herat the Granery] and Garden of Central Asia*. London, 1880.
 6. Marvin, C. *Russians at the Gates of Herat*, New York, 1885.
 7. In 1818 the Barakzis expelled the ruling house of Sadozis from Kabul. Mahmud, the last Sadozi ruler of Kabul, sought refuge in Herat (1818—29). He was followed by his son Kamran (1829—42). He was murdered by his Vazier, Yar Mohammad in 1842. At the death of Yar Mohammad in 1851, his son Syed Mohammad came to the throne of Herat.

eastern cousins. This invited both Persian and Russian intrigues against Afghan soil. Herat was not adjoined to India, Afghanistan separated them, nor was the Russian dominion contiguous to Herat, Persia lay between them. But Afghanistan had fallen under the British sphere of influence, especially after the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1853; and Persia was under that of Russia. Both Afghanistan and Persia laid claim to Herat, each one was supported in its claim by its western ally.

Increasing Russian influence in Persia presents another interesting study in Anglo-Russian diplomacy in the East. Persia was attracted to Britain by her hopes, but was driven towards Russia by her fears. Since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the Persian territory had been subjected to Russian encroachment. Within thirty years she lost almost all the important cities on her western fringe of the border,¹ though she looked for English support under the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814, she received none.² For her losses of the west, Persia hoped to compensate eastward. She had an historical claim to Herat since 1509.³ It also served

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1. Russia seized Georgia in 1801, Mingrela in 1803 and Imeretia 1804. Baku and Shirvan went to Russia by the Treaty of Gulistan 1813. The Treaty of Turkomanchi gave Erivan to Russia and by that of Adrianople 1829, Poti was ceded.
 2. By the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814, England had promised help to Persia against external invasion. This Treaty had been formulated for fear of Napoleon's invading India, but once that fear was over Britain dropped all interest in Persia.
 3. Herat was seized by Ismail Safavi in 1509 and remained under Persian influence over a period of two centuries. It was in 1715 that the Abdalis of Herat defied the Persian authority there.

her strategic purposes, being a bulwark against the regular inroads of the Turkomans of Merv.¹ The waning influence of the British at Teheran since the Napoleonic Wars and the late diplomatic mishandling of A.C. Murray,² the British Envoy, made Russia's work easy in that country, and she successfully persuaded Persia to interfere in Afghanistan. Persia had made more than one unsuccessful attempt to Seize Herat. Twice (1838 and 1853) Britain actively interfered to thwart her attempts and in 1853 forced her to sign a written acknowledgement guaranteeing the independent existence of Herat.³ However, the political turmoil of 1855-56 in Herat, helped Persia to occupy it again.⁴ Persia then

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1. Eastwick, B. *Journal of a Deplomat's Three Years Residence in Persia*. London 1864 vol. 2 pp. 251—53.
 2. Since 1828 British influence at Teheran was low. The appointment of A.C. Murray (later Sir Charles) in 1855 further strained the relations. Murry's undue favour to Hashim Khan, a Persian state convict, by appointing him his agent at Shiraz against the stipulations of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1841, annoyed the Persian authorities. Murray again demaded the release of Hashim's wife then shut in her brother's house. Furthermore he expected the Persian court to apologize for the their maltreatment of Hashim Khan and his family. Failing to dictate his terms to the Shah, Murray broke off diplomatic relations and left the Capital.
 3. 1837—38 Persia besieged Herat for nine months. The British Minister Mc Neil's pressure at Teheran, E. Pottinger's defence at Herat and the Indian Government's invasion of Kharak, relieved the siege. In 1853 Pesia took over Herat with the consent of its ruler Syed Mohammad and only evacuated it at the British threat. By the Treaty of 1853 Persia renounced its claim to Herat
 4. In Sept. 1855, a Sadozi exile in Persia, Prince M. Yussuf took over Herat after murdering Syed Mohammad. The same year Kohindil Khan of Qandhar died and his brother, Dost Mohammad invaded his dominion. Persia declared that Kabul intended to invade Herat as

(Continued on page 6)

threatened Qandhar.¹ Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, reported that Russia was backing this project.² London viewed with severe displeasure the whole proceeding, because the "machination" of the Russian agents at Herat make for considerable "trouble and anxiety" on the north western frontiers of India.³

The home authorities had authorized Lord Canning, the Governor-General of India, during the early days of the Persian siege of Herat to keep Persia out of that city by providing assistance "to any power strong enough to co-operate with you".⁴ Canning despatched two lakhs of ruppees to those besieged in Herat, but it did not arrive in time.⁵ Meanwhile Herat fell to Persia in October 1856. Britain deemed it necessary to declare war against

(Continued from page 5)

well. Prince Yussuf shared the Persian apprehension and invited them to his assistance. But Yussaf soon changed his mind and refused entry into Herat of the Persian army. Persia laid siege to Herat in April 1856. In the meantime there was a local rising against Yussuf in which he was deposed and Isa Khan a local chief came to power. The city surrendered to Persia on October 24, 56.

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1857/149 Edwardes to James Dec. 20, 56.
2. *Ibid.* Nov. 25, 56.
3. *Board Drafts* 1857/22 Board of Control to F.O. Oct. 15, 57. (Hereafter cited as B.D.).
4. *B.D.* 1856/21 Board of Control to G. G. July 10, 56.
5. This amount was sent by the hands of Mir Mubarik Shah, a native agent of the British Government. Mubarik left Peshawar on November 7, 1856. There was considerable delay in sanctioning this amount. See *Epitome of Correspondence Regarding our Relations with Afghanistan and Herat.* (Hereafter cited as Epitome) Lahore 1863 p. 61.

Persia to oust that power from Herat.¹

The co-operation of Kabul was necessary for an effective action against Persia for her seizure of Herat. Amir Dost Mohammad himself was much alarmed by this invasion. He had sent an agent to Kurram to consult the British authorities on the subject.² During the early days of 1857, he himself came down to Peshawar on a British invitation and signed a treaty with the Government of India. This treaty provided him with one lakh of rupees a month to raise an army of eighteen thousand men and to receive a supervisory British mission under Major H.B. Lumsden at Qandhar.³ The Amir also received a native British Vakeel, Foujdar Khan, at his court and appointed his Vakeel to Peshawar.

War was declared against Persia in November, 1856, and the Persian Gulf was selected for military operations. No action was taken from the Kabul side either against Herat or against Persia. There was a school of thought in the British political circle which urged Dost Mohammad's participation in the war, but Sir John Lawrence, the then chief Commissioner of Punjab, opposed this project,

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1. *B.D.* 1856/21. The Board had been instructed by F.O. on July 19, to get things ready for military actions against Persia. Then the Board instructed the Government of India to prepare an expedition from Bombay for invasion of Kharak and Bushire on July 22, 56.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1857/149 Edwardes to James Nov. 25, 56.
 3. The other members of the mission were (i) Lt. Lumsden, (ii) Dr. Bellew, (iii) Ghulam Sarwar Kagwani.

doubting Dost Mohammad's sincerity and strength.¹

This British fleet reached the Persian Gulf earlier than the news. It took the Persians by surprise,² and Bushire, the maritime capital of Persia fell to the invaders on December 10, 1856.³

The war was short lived. Persian losses were heavy compared with England's. The Persian Government had approached Russia for help,⁴ and the Russian forces were observed assembling on the

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1. (i) Dost showed his readiness at Peshawar to undertake invasion of Herat. Edwardes favoured his move. See *Epitome* p. 74.
 (ii) Even Canning was at this stage harbouring the idea of waging war on the Afghan-Herat border. See Shand, A.L. *General John Jacob*, London 1900 Canning to Jacob July 13, 56, pp 248-49.
 (iii) There is an indication in the *Granville Papers* that Clarendon favoured the Afghan participation in the war. *Granville Papers* P.R.O. 30/29/21. Canning to Granville, Feb. 21, 57.
 (iv) J.P. Grant, a member of the Governor-General's executive Council differed with his other colleagues on the decision of confining the operation of war only to the Persian Gulf. See *par. pap.* LVI 1878-79 pp. 753-54.
 (v) "*The Times*" recommended direct action through Afghanistan on Herat without the support of Dost Mohammad. *The Times* of London, April 10, 57. P. 4. C. 5. (Hereafter cited as *Times*).
 2. *Blackwood Magazine*. "The Persian war of 1856-57".. XC 1861, P. 34. (Hereafter cited as B.M.) Also see the *Quarterly Review*, "Persia". CI. 1857. p. 537. Captain Jones the British political agent at Bushire avoided giving any news of the invasion to the Persian authorities. (Hereafter cited as *Q.R.*) There is also an account of Persia and Herat in the *Westminster Review* XI. 1857.
 3. General E. Stalker was commanding the British forces at this time. On January 27, 57 he was relieved of his charge by Gen. Outram, who was his junior and who had been raised to seniority by a special Brevet. Stalker committed suicide at Bushire. See *S.H.C.* (P) 1857/43. Murray to Clarendon (copy), April, 11, 57.
 4. F.O. 65/492. Wodehouse to Clarendon no. 4., Jan. 1, 57. Also see *S.H.C.* (P) 1857-43. Wodehouse to Clarendon (copy), Feb. 19, 57.

Caspian,¹ but no direct assistance arrived from Russia. There were actually three clashes, and Persia lost Khushab, Mohammarrah and Ahwaz². Negotiations in the meantime had been opened and the treaty of Paris was signed on March 4, 1857. Persia engaged to evacuate its forces from Herat and promised not to make any claim on the sovereignty of Herat in the future, nor to meddle in the internal affairs of the state of Afghanistan. Under the treaty stipulation a British mission led by Major Robert Taylor was deputed to visit Herat to supervise the Persian withdrawal from that city.³

The treaty of Persia⁴ as the subsequent events showed, gave Britain nothing. Britain won the war but lost the peace.⁵ The peace proved to be a great victory for Persia. From the very outset of negotiations, Persia insisted on quashing Kabul's right over Herat; a solution much against the British interest and policy. Britain approved this plea of Persia in principle and it was just by accident that this arrangement escaped forming part of the written agreement. Lord Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris and signatory of the treaty, on the

1. F.O. 65/492 Wodehouse to Clarendon No. 31., Jan 10, 57.

2. At Bushire on December, 29, 56 : Khushab, Feb. 7, 57 : Mohammarrah on March 28.

3. The other members of the mission were Lt. Hardy of the Bombay Artillery and Lt. Clerk of the Madras Cavalry.

4. For text of the treaty see Rawlinson. H. *England and Russia in the EAST* London, 1857. Appendix 4. (Hereafter cited as Rawlinson.)

5. Bushev, P.P. *Gerat i Anglo-Iranskaya Boina 1856-57* Moscow, 1959 p. 169.

authority of Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Minister, assured his counterpart Farrukh Khan, the persian envoy, that the *status quo* would be maintained in Herat, and Britain did not wish to bring any change in the existing political division of Afghanistan. Farrukh Khan was promised a written guarantee on the subject, but his note arrived almost a fortnight after the signing of the treaty.¹ Taylor's mission in the same spirit had been instructed to recognise any state of Government which it found existing in Herat.²

The whole war looked at from its results, was an extravagant waste. Britain spent more than a quarter of a million pounds,³ besides the blood involved, but gained nothing. Lumsden was highly disappointed to learn of this situation, and called it "England's greatest failure in central Asian politics",⁴ and the Duke of Argyll termed the whole project as a "Murray plus Pam" show.⁵ The Parliament, though in complete ignorance of the procedure of the war and its result, did sense the situation, and deplored that the main object of the

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1. S. H. C. (P) 1857/42 Cowley to Clarendon (copy) no. 438. March 18, 57.
 2. F.O. 60/216 Clarendon to Murray No. 54 ; May 29, 57.
 3. Dost Mohammad only received an aggregate of twenty one lakh of rupees. The subsidy was started on Jan. 57 and lasted upto September 58. This subsidy decidedly helped in saving India from Afghan invasion during the catastrophe of 1857.
 4. E. S. L. I. 1859/172 Lumsden's Report on the Qandhar Mission p. 235-6.
 5. Granville Papers P.R.O. 30/29/51 Argyll to Granville (Private) June 30, 57.

war had been "abandoned".¹

This pattern of policy on the British part gave Persia liberty to shape affairs as she pleased in Herat. She had Isa Khan, the new ruler of Herat murdered,² and at her withdrawal, nominated to the throne of Herat, Sultan Ahmad Khan, son of Azim Khan of Qandhar. He was Dost Mohammad's nephew and son-in-law, and had acquired a certain reputation for his animosity to the English having fought against them in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839—42) and the Second Sikh War (1848-49). The new ruler possessed all the qualifications the Persians looked for. He gave a written guarantee at the time of his appointment to the Persian Sadre Azam (Prime Minister) that he would be contented under the vassalage of Persia. This he carried out completely by keeping both the Khutba (swearing fealty at congregational prayer) and the coin in Shah Nasirud Din's name.³

This was an open violation of the Treaty of Paris. Both Murray⁴ and Taylor⁹ protested against it to the British Foreign Office.

But Whitehall clamed its offended lieutenants by advising them that "H.M. Government was indifferent whether Herat was virtually or actually subservient to Persia". The latter state at least was

1. *Hansard*. Commons, CL 1857 col. 1850.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/192. Taylor to Edmonstone, Nov. 2. 57. Taylor says he was murdered on the direct orders of the Shah.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. Taylor to Murray no. 13 (copy) Oct. 22, 57.

4. F.O. 60/219. Murray to Clarendon, Sept. 17, 57.

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. Taylor to Murray no. 13. *op. cit.*

acknowledgement of the independence of Herat in "words".¹

But in spite of indifference of London to Herat and the animosity of Teheran to Britain, the British Mission under Taylor was received well by Sultan Ahmad Khan. The mission found the ruler of Herat altogether a changed man, full of admiration and intimacy for the British. He complained both to Taylor² and Mohammad Naqi,³ the Indian agent, about the insincerity of Persia, and looked forward anxiously for British support in restoring prosperity to his dominion, which Taylor found, after the ravages of the war, as "one map of ruins". In the meantime Sultan Ahmad wrote "several letters" to Edwardes,⁴ as the "door of enmity is shut and that of friendship thrown open".⁵ Taylor personally was much impressed by the frank and friendly disposition of Sultan Ahmad towards England and recommended speedy assistance for the ruler of Herat.⁶

1. F.O. 60/216. Clarendon to Murray no. 137, Oct. 28, 57.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. Taylor to Murray no. 19 (copy), March 5, 58, and Taylor to Edmonstone no. 4., Jan. 1, 58.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/169. Deposition of M. Naqi. pp. 675—80. Naqi was Edward's secret agent in Herat. He brought a letter from Sultan Ahmad addressed to Edwardes in Dec. 57.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1859/172 Sultan Ahmad to Nazir Khairullah Khan Sept. 10, 58. Khairullah was an Afghan pensionery of the Government of India at Peshawar.

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/171 Sultan Ahmad to Edwardes Nov. 3, 57.

6. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/171 Taylor to Edwardes Oct. 26, 57.

E. S. L. I. 1859/172 Taylor to Edmonstone Nov. 2, 57 and no. 4. January 1, 58. *E.S.L.I.* 1858/169 Taylor to Edwardes Dec. 10, 57.

But neither the overtures of Sultan Ahmad nor the recommendations of Taylor affected, even slightly, the attitude of the British Government. The immediate indifference to Herat presents a strange phenomenon in the British policy towards that state. Britain had a vital strategic interest in Herat. She had been struggling continually for its independence. What did now make Britain so indifferent to Herat ?

This tepidity to Herat must be viewed in a broader context. Firstly, the growing importance of Persia in the defences of India against expanding Russia in Central Asia was giving way to a conciliatory attitude towards the former state. Persia was the major state bordering on Turkistan, the latter then in schemes of Russian conquest. Britain favoured Persian conquest to that of Russia in Central Asia, and Russell in 1860 approved Persian expansion up to the Mery oasis and taking over the Turkomans.¹ The growing influence of Rawlinson² over the Indian administration in London further augmented the Persian cause in Britain. Herat, Rawlinson believed, must form part of a strong friendly state. Rawlinson favoured Teheran to Kabul, and, also, he preferred a stronger Persia

1. F.O. 60/246 Russell to Alison No. 57 July 25, 60.

2. Sir Henry Creswick Rawlinson (1810—95) Bombay Service, 1827 ; instructor Persian Army 1833—39 ; Political Assistant Kabul 1839-40 ; Political agent Turkish Arabia 1843 ; Consul-General Baghdad 1844 ; exploration Babylonia 1846—55 ; Director East India Company 1856 ; Member India Council 1858-59 and 1868—95.

than Afghanistan.¹ Besides, Persia was more civilised state than Afghanistan, and was well represented at the western courts ; it had greater influence in Whitehall than had Kabul, which was only known through Peshawar. Farrukh Khan, the Persian envoy to Britain, by his successful negotiation of the treaty, friendly manners and affable disposition towards Britain, had won the hearts both at home and in Britain.² Later the death of Sadre Azam Aghan Nuri and the appointment of Farrukh to his post promoted further understanding in Anglo-Persian relations.³

Secondly, the outbreak of the mutiny in India, directed British attention from the borders of India to its heart. All the available funds and energy were directed towards the suppression of the rising.⁴ So obsessed was the *Times* with the latter that there was hardly any mention of Herat's politics in its columns between the years 1858 and 1860. Nor did the contemporary journals and periodicals show any interest in Herat's affairs. The Mutiny obsessed the press, the Parliament, the public, and the political leaders. This contingency also halted communication among the policy makers. From Clarendon, at the top to Taylor at the bottom, each was pressing his immediate senior, or junior, as to the

1. Rawlinson. *op. cit.* p. 85.

2. Eastwick II *op. cit.* p. 133-34.

3. Agha Nuri died in 1860.

4. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Taylor to Edmonstone Feb. 22, 58 : refers to the Board's reply in response to his request for aid to Herat.

policy to be pursued regarding Herat¹. This was followed by an extraordinary amount of ignorance in the British political service on Central Asia. Public leaders longed for information, and political workers, wanting in instructions, became inactive and dull. Taylor found his stay in Herat useless, and full of harm.²

Thirdly, British political opinion was divided on the subject of Herat. Lumsden from Qandhar recommended handing over Herat to Ghulam Haider, the heir-apparent of Dost Mohammad and Son-in-law of the late Yar Mohammad of Herat.³ Taylor found in Sultan Ahmad a genuine authority to preside over Herat. Murray, who had assumed a somewhat conciliatory attitude towards Persia, after a personal quarrel with that state, took a less sanguine view of the unity in the Afghan state.⁴

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1. (i) *S. H. C. (P)* 1858/50. F.O. to India Board, Jan. 28, 58., asks for G.G's views on Herat.
 - (ii) *Ibid.* I.B. to F.O., Feb. 1, 58., shows ignorance of Government of India policy on the subject.
 - (iii) *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. G.G. to Dost Mohammad Sept. 10, 58. Canning expressed his ignorance of the Herat settlement.
 - (iv) F.O. 60/219. Murray to Canning asks as to the policy regarding Herat.
 - (v) *E. S. L. I.* 1858/171. Government of Punjab to India no. 839, Dec. 17, 57, asks the supreme Government to instruct on the policy and reply to be made to the ruler of Herat.
 - (vi) *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169. Taylor to Edwardes, Dec. 10, 57., asks as to Government of India's views on Herat.
 - (vii) *Ibid.* Lumsden *Diary* no. 11. 19—25 March, 58 on the same subject.
2. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. Taylor to Edmonstone, Feb. 22, 58.
 3. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169. Lumsden *Diary* no. 7. April 27, 57.
 4. F-O. 60/220 Murray to Clarendon no. 8. Dec. 15, 57.

Edwardes was all in favour of Dost Mohammad,¹ and Lawrence's "wisest policy" was back to Indus, that is, to deliver up the Peshawar valley to Dost Mohammad and to let Central Asia solve its problems by itself.²

Hence, the changing pattern of thought towards Persia, the great political upheaval inside India, and the disunity of approach to the Herat question, hindered the making of a sensible policy.

On the other hand, the traditional rivalry between Herat and Kabul was urging the former to look for a dependable ally. Sultan Ahmad, as the contemporary accounts agree, was an ambitious ruler full of vigour and drive. The Persian Government he suspected, and to Britain he made friendly overtures, but he received no encouragement. On the contrary, Taylor's mission was withdrawn,³ and, to the great chagrin of the ruler of Herat, during the middle of 1858, a plot was hatched in the British Embassy at Teheran to depose Sultan Ahmad and to install Prince Mohammad Raza, the younger brother of Prince Yussuf.⁴ This was a turning point

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169 Edwardes to Temple no. 662 June 16, 57.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1159/172 Government of Punjab to India no. 332 Oct. 21, 58.

3. Taylor left Herat on March, 1, 1858.

4. Sultan Ahmad arrested two British agents involved in the plot. They were Mirza Ahmad Ali and Mirza Zainul Abideen. Both were secret agents of Edwardes in Herat. Ahmad was a news writer, while Zain a somewhat smart man, was a go-between of the British and the ruling parties at Herat. He helped in paying the way for Taylor's mission and the latter spoke highly of him.

in Sultan Ahmad's attitude towards the English. From then onward, he abandoned hopes of goodwill from Britain, and looked elsewhere for an ally. Sultan Ahmad fell back on Persia, receiving ten thousand toomans in cash, besides guns and powder.¹ Persia, in return required him to close his dominion to the British influence, which he promptly did. Sadre Azam Aghan Nuri furnished him with a list of persons to be intimidated and vigilantly guarded against. The suspects were those who had favoured greater intimacy with England. A Period of arrest and torture was ushered at Herat for the pro-English element there.²

But the Persian treasury could not stand the

(Continued from page 16)

On their release from Herat under diplomatic immunity, both confessed that they were working against Sultan Ahmad at the instigation of the British Embassy. Ahmad gave the story of his personal part in the plot to Lawrence at Peshawar. See *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Temple to Edmonstone no. 335 Nov. 15, 58 and the enclosure in it of Ahmad's desposition of Oct. 28, 58.

Zain gave full details of his shares in the plot to Rawlinson at Teheran. See F.O. 60/274 no. 7. Both Taylor and Murray expressed absolute ignorance of the plot and called it a machination of the native staff. See for Taylor's defence of himself in *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Taylor to Edmonstone Jan. 22, 58. p. 783—790 and also *E. S. L. I.* 1861—65/176 Taylor to Aitchison Jan. 5, 1861.

For Murray's implication in the plot. See F.O. 60/220 No. 9, F.O. 60/231 Nos. 11 and 13 and F. O. 60/232 No, 94. See Murray's defence of himself *S.H.C.* 1860/54 Murray to Russell (copy) May 4, 1860. Rawlinson himself was convinced that "the plot was either originated by the British agents or at any rate they were deeply implicated in it", F.O. 60/247 no. 7. Feb. 26, 60.

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Taylor to Edmostone Feb. 22, 58.
2. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Taylor to Murray (copy) no. 15. and 16. Feb. 18, 1858 p, 895—7.

heavy demands of the greedy vassal. A moneyed bidder was required. And Russia stepped in. N.V. Khanikov, the acting consul-general at Tebrez, and a talented orientalist, visited Herat in the Autumn of 1858. He was given a rousing reception, and held secret meetings with Sultan Ahmad.¹ Khanikov expressed willingness to advance a Russian loan to Herat,² and persuaded its ruler to negotiate a treaty with Russia.³

The treaty, as its draft showed, aimed at the promotion of Russian trade and commerce in Herat: it authorised Russia to appoint a permanent agent at Herat, in addition to making the dominion of Herat amenable to Russian trade. The treaty was to be approved and guaranteed by the Persian Government during the Sultan Ahmad's visit to Teheran. Sultan Ahmad was requested to open correspondence on the subject with the Russian Legation at Herat, who would help to obtain the Shah's consent. Count Anitchkov, the Russian Minister at Teheran, did not fail to keep Sultan Ahmad in good humour by consignments of presents and sweet compliments. His arrival was anxiously awaited at Teheran to ratify the treaty. Khanikov's

1. F.O. 60/233 Doria to Stanley No. 5 Dec. 30, 58.

2. Khanikov had also been accredited on a mission to Kabul, but Dost Mohammad, on the British advice, refused to receive him. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. G.G. to C.C. Telegram, Nov. 10, 58.

3. F.O. 60/248. Rawlinson to Russell no. 13, April, 25, 60. In 1860 the draft of this treaty was sent for Rawlinson's study and advice. Rawlinson discouraged Persia's approval of it. Also F.O. 60/267. No. 57.

tact and audacity also averted, the plot engineered by Murray to depose Sultan Ahmad.¹

Khanikov's proceedings at Herat set up a wave of apprehension in the British political circles. Edwardes blamed Murray for his diplomatic failure against Russia in Herat.² Murray, in his turn, blamed London.³ Lumsden called Khanikov's reception at Herat a great diplomatic victory for Russia in Central Asian politics.⁴ A contemporary penman derived the same conclusion while writing on the politics of Herat.⁵

These expostulations of the British representatives in Central Asia and India received a proper hearing at this time. The Tories under Lord Derby had come into power for a short while,⁶ and the control of Persian affairs transferred from the Foreign Office to the India Office, in November 1858.⁷ The Tories were much more sensitive over the Central

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1. F.O. 60/232 No. 118 and F.O. 60/233 No. 1
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Edwardes Memorandum Sept. 11, 58.
 3. *E. S. L. I.* 1878/19 *Secret Memorandum on Afghanistan* p. 23, refers to Murray's opinion. Murray had already protested against the Government policy regarding Herat in early 1858. See F.O. 60/229 no. 4.
 4. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172 Lumsden report *op. cit.* p. 234.
 5. *B.M.* xcv *op. cit.* pp. 470-71.
 6. Palmerston Ministry was defeated towards the end of Feb. 1858 on the French conspiracy question.
 7. Palmerston gives two reasons for this transfer. (i) the charge for the consolidated fund was exhausted without providing for the Persian legation. (ii) Malmesbury called the whole of Foreign Office business a "damned bore". He wrote to the envoys abroad not to send lengthy despatches. *Palmerston Papers* M.ss 48581/61 Palmerston to Russell (private) Oct. 25, 59.

Asian question and were deeply interested in the safety of Herat for the defence of India. A secret committee, consisting of G. Clark, F. Currie, H. Rawlinson and J. Kay as secretary, was appointed to advise the Government on the policy and means to be adopted, regarding Kabul and Herat.¹ The committee made many sound and concrete recommendations regarding Central Asian affairs ; it urged the restoration of British influence in Central Asia and it asked for the location of a permanent British resident at Herat.²

The new ministry approved the committee's recommendations. The Government of India was instructed to appoint either Major Lumsden who had previously led the Qandhar Mission, or Major Green of the Sindh Irregular Horse, or someone else equally conversant with frontier problems to represent the British interest in Herat, to keep an eye on the designs of Russia in Central Asia and to counteract "the restless activities" of that nation.³ The ministerial instructions to the Government of India deplored the lack of interest in Afghan affairs. The instructions aimed at a rapid change in the policy to be pursued regarding Central Asia.⁴

Another important step was the appointment of

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1878/19 Secret memo *op. cit.* p. 23-4.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Letters to India etc.* 1859/69/I. Secretary of State to G. G. no. 2, and 3, Feb. 3 and 10, 1859 respectively, and April 1859, pp. 29. 39. The last named letter was not despatched to India. It was very forceful in language on the subject of Russian activities in Central Asia.

4. *Ibid.* The G. G. was also asked to station a British agent at Qandhar.

Rawlinson to the court of Persia. Rawlinson's oriental interest and Russophobia¹ were not unknown at this time. He was Derby's personal selection.² Rawlinson's instructions, both from Stanley and from Wood, his immediate superiors at the India Office, laid much emphasis on counter-acting the Russian activities in Central Asia.³

Rawlinson, on his way to Persia, met Khanikov at Tiflis, and sensed from his talk the amount of influence Russia enjoyed at Herat,⁴ and he was even more convinced of this after meeting Sultan Ahmad, during the Russian arranged visit of the Herati ruler to Teheran. During the various interviews that Rawlinson had with Sultan Ahmad, the former thoroughly convinced him of the friendly intentions of Britain towards his state. Sultan Ahmad became a great admirer of the new British Minister at Teheran and could not hide from Lewis Pelly, the Secretary of the British legation, the fact he thought Rawlinson's "simple shake of the hand carries more conviction of friendship to my mind

1. Since 1837, during his residence in Persia, Rawlinson was convinced of the aggressive attitude of Russia in Central Asia, which grew stronger as Russia expanded in that region. See Rawlinson's article in "*Calcutta Review* XII 1849 and also his book *England and Russia in the East op. cit.* p. 1.

2. Rawlinson, G. *Memoires of Maj. Gen. Sir H. C. Rawlinson*, London 1898, p. 206.

3. Since Stanley was leaving the office after the defeat of the ministry, his instructions were not despatched. *S. H. C.* 1859/53A., pp. 483-59.

For Wood's instructions see F. O. 60/237. Wood to Rawlinson No. 2., Aug. 24, 59.

4. F. O. 60/240. Rawlinson to Wood No. 4., Nov. 10, 59.

than all the words of the other men".¹ To M. Graff of the Russian Legation, whom Sultan Ahmad met for the formulation of Russo-Herat treaty, he "decided to give a categorical refusal".²

Sultan Ahmad also promised to stop the reading of the Khutba and minting of money in the Shah's name as soon as he was able to stand on his own feet.³ Acquiescing in Sultan Ahmad's request, Rawlinson promised to send a British officer to Herat and Lewis Pelly, was selected for the purpose. Pelly visited Herat for three weeks in October 1860, and was much impressed by Sultan Ahmad's friendly gestures and his administrative skills.⁴

Rawlinson himself developed much liking for the Sultan and exhorted Britain to make a formal treaty with him.⁵ These friendly diplomatic overtures created an encouraging impression on Sultan Ahmad's mind, which he did not fail to communicate.⁶ He addressed the Governor-General of India, showing his perfect readiness to act on the British Government's advice.⁷

While Sultan Ahmad was honeymooning with the fresh English friendly overtures and Rawlinson was jubilant about his diplomatic victory over

1. F. O. 60/249. Pelly to Rusell No. 85. May 22, 60.

2. F. O. 60/249 Rawlinson to Russel No. 83 May 17, 60.

3. F. O. 60/250 Pelly to Alison Oct. 11, 60.

4. F. O. 60/251 Alison to Russell No. 58. Nov. 19, 60.

5. F. O. 60/249 no. 83. *op. cit.*

6. F. O. 60/256 Sultan Ahmad to Alison Dec. 1860 in Alison to Russell Jan. 5, 61.

7. F. O. 60/251 Sultan Ahmad to G. G. (no date).

Anitchkov, new developments occurred at London greatly affecting the destiny of Herat. The new Liberal Ministry¹ which had come into power was far from satisfied with the solution of Herat. Persian affairs were again transferred in January 1860, to the Foreign Office,² and the Herat question was given careful study in the light of the late political perspectives. Sir Charles Wood the veteran Indian secretary, was the major ministerial power in the field of Central Asian diplomacy. Palmerston, growing old, had lost all interest in it. His "great game" of 1839-42 in Central Asia, had not been encouraging.³ Lord John Russell and Sir Charles Wood were batting at the wickets and the score of the latter was high. Wood doubted the advisability of the policy pursued towards Herat.⁴ To Wood, the division of Afghanistan presented the crux of the whole problem of the north western defence of India. He was convinced now of what the Government of India had pleaded in 1857, that Herat must be

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1. Derby Ministry was defeated on Hartington Motion in June 1859.
 2. Control over the Persian affairs remained throughout the later course of the Nineteenth Century a subject of controversy between the India and Foreign Offices. India used to contribute a fixed sum of £12,000 annually for the establishment in Persia. India Office made repeated claims on the control of the British Legation at Teheran. The committee of the House of Commons on Diplomatic and consular services in 1870 also favoured India's claim. Salisbury in 1876-77 exerted his influence for this right but nothing came of it.
 3. Palmerston Papers preserved in the British Museum contain nothing on this phase of Central Asian politics. There is only one letter in his collection relevant to this time. It was on the transfer of the Persian mission to F. O. I regret to note that I was not given access to Palmerston collection at Broadland.
 4. F. O. 60/237 no. 2. *op. cit.*

“under strong Afghan kingdom”.¹

This idea was not new, but it had new life now. It appealed because of Russia's direct dealing with Herat. It appealed to Russell more than anybody else, resulting in one of his blunt expressions “why Herat may not belong to Dost Muhammad without disquieting Persia”.² Rawlinson sensed this development of thought at Whitehall. To uncloud the new approach on Herat, he invited the instructions of the Foreign Office on one of his three suggestions : either to guarantee Herat's independence, or to deliver it to Persia or to open it to Dost's invasion.³ The Foreign Office preferred the implementation of the last mentioned policy.⁴

Hence the Government of India was instructed not to send an agent to Herat, as suggested by the Conservative Government ; but the agent, if already despatched, was to be recalled.⁵

Affairs of the Herat-Afghan borders were always critical. Since September 1857, Dost Mohammad had been encroaching on Herat territory.⁶ He had

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1. *Russel Papers*. P. R. O. 30/22/78 Wood to Russel (private) Feb. 6, 60.
 2. *S. H. C.* 1860/54 F. O. to I. O. Russell's draft of instruction to Rawlinson in Feb. 1860, submitted to I. O. for its comments. The latter advised to couch the language in diplomatic terms instead of making it open. See I. O. to F. O. March 10, 60.
 3. F. O. 60/247 Rawlinson to Russell No. 1 Jan. 2, 60.
 4. *S. H. C.* 1860/54 F. O. to I. O. Feb. 16, 60 refers to Rawlinson's letter and the policy approved.
 5. *Letters to India etc.* 1859/69/1 Secretary of State to viceroy Aug. 26, 59.
 6. *E. S. L. I.* 1859/169 Lumsden's *Diary* no. 23, p. 248 and No. 25. p. 258, reports Kabul's aggression on the fort of Jerani. Also Edwards to Brandreth no. 917 Sept. 24, 57 reports Foujdar's intelligence of Kabul's hostile designs against Herat.
E. S. L. I. 1858/161 Taylor to Murray (copy) Sept. 26, 57 reports Afghan invasion of Ghore.

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undertaken the Anglo-Afghan alliance of 1857 with a great hope of bringing Herat back under Kabul's control. Sultan Ahmad's nomination to that principality had greatly annoyed him.¹

But English diplomacy did not approve of Dost's aggressive intentions towards Herat, and he had been warned against such proceedings.² Four years later, Dost Mohammad found an opportunity. He sensed a change in British policy, and quickly found a genuine cause for action when the ruler of Herat seized the Kabul-held district of Farrah. History has it that the Governor of Ghore, a principality of Herat, instigated a murder in Farrah. The governor of Farrah raided and reduced Ghore to submission. Sultan Ahmad retaliated by taking over Farrah,³ once a principality of Herat, and lost to it since 1856 when Dost Mohammad occupied it. The Kabul forces were set in motion against Herat on June 16, 1862. Farrah was taken back after a short siege on the 29th and Dost Mohammad set out

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1. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169 Edwards to Brandreth No. 917 *op. cit.* Lumsden's *Diary No.* 13, 5-11 June, 57. Also Taylor to Murray (copy) Sept. 26, 57.
 2. (i) *B. D.* 1857/22 Murray drew F. O.'s attention to Dost's aggression on Oct. 20, 57. F. O. requested India House on Nov. 30 to advise Dost against this action. The Board instructed the G. G. on Dec. 10, 57 on the subject.
(ii) *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169 Government of India to Punjab No. 49 Jan. 27, 58 on the same subject. Government of Punjab to Commissioner Peshawar No. 42. Jan. 27, 58. in anticipation of the instruction to tell Lumsden to warn the Amir against aggression on Herat.
 3. Sultan Ahmad always laid claim to Farrah and had been threatening to use force for its restoration. Allahdad the Kabul envoy to Herat was plainly told about it. See *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169 Kabul Diary March, 17, 58.

towards Herat in early July and besieged the city on July 28.¹

The fall of Herat to Kabul was not unexpected. Persia felt as alarmed as Sultan Ahmad who had sent his Vazier, Hassan Ali, to Khurassan to negotiate for Persian help.² The Shah's Government approached Charles Alison, the British Minister at Teheran requesting either individual or united efforts to stop the war over Herat, since it was endangering both Persian prestige and borders. Alison's message direct from Teheran and the telegrams via Constantinople almost flooded the Foreign Office.³ Persia also warned him to use her force in defence of Herat.⁴ Mahmud Khan, the Persian envoy in London met Russell on February 12, to protest against Kabul's aggression on Herat, and two days later submitted a memorandum on the Persian stand and honour involved in the struggle.⁵

But no encouragement was shown to the Persian entreaties in London. On the contrary, the frontier authorities of the Government of India approved Dost Mohammad's conduct in the war,⁶ though

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1. Epitome *op. cit.* pp. 116-22. Also Eastwick II *op. cit.* p. 127-8. Eastwick's chronology differs from Epitome. I have preferred the latter's authority.
 2. Eastwick, II. *op. cit.* p. 241.
 3. F. O. 60/267 nos. 81, 84, 86, 92-96 and F. O. 60/268 nos. 99, 109-114 and F.O. 60/269 nos. 148, 154, 156. S. H. C. 1862/56 Bulwark to Russell July 7, 62. Aug. 6, 62. and S. H. C. 1863/57 Erskine to Russell Nov. 4, 62.
 4. S. H. C. 1862/56. Alison's Telegram of Aug. 5, 62 (copy).
 5. S. H. C. 1862/75 (copy) pp. 357-378.
 6. E. S. L. I. 1861-65/176 Government of Punjab to India no. 515/766 Sep. 23, 62.

Ghulam Hussain, the British Vakeel who had accompanied the Amir's camp to Herat, was instructed to retreat to Qandhar. This measure was deemed necessary to allay strong Persian suspicion of the British instigation to Amir for his action against Herat.¹ The Foreign Office at first termed the Persian protests as an "exaggeration",² and, later, at the India Office's advice, adopted a harsh tone towards Persia.³ Teheran was told that the British Government would strictly adhere to the treaty stipulation of 1857, which had made no promise to maintain the present ruler in power, and the British Government would not be justified under the terms of that treaty, in interfering in the struggle, so long as Kabul's operations were confined to the Afghan territory.⁴ Palmerston assured Parliament that England would not hesitate to take steps if the security of India was threatened by any outside aggression on the territory of Afghanistan.⁵

"May the Amir live long" exclaimed the anxious correspondent of the *Times*.⁶ The Amir with his

1. *Ibid.* Commissioner Peshawar to Vakeel. Aug. 7, 62. See also Government of India to Punjab no. 931 Oct. 11, 62. The Government of India regretted Dost Mohammad's action against Herat without prior consultation with India. Also *Elgin Papers* 3/2 Elgin to Wood July, 16, 62.

2. F. O. 60/265 Russell to Alison no. 44, July, 9, 62.

3. *S. H. C.* 1862/56 I. O. to F. O. Aug. 18, 62, Sept. 24, 62 and Oct. 24, 62.

4. F. O. 60/265 Russell to Alison no. 60 Sept. 24, 62. and F. O. 60/273 Russell to Thomson no. 15 March 20, 63.

5. *Hansard.* Commons CLXVII 1862 c. 89.

6. *Times.* Oct. 28, 62. p. 10 c. 2.

sixteen thousand men and thirty two guns was conducting the siege victoriously.¹ Sultan Ahmad deprived of Persian support, short of war material, and harrassed by internal strifes, made repeated overtures for negotiations to the invader through his wife, the Amir's daughter, and through Persia ;² but nothing came of them. In the early days of the siege, Sultan Ahmad's wife died and on April 6, 1863, the Sultan himself died. His son, Shahnawaz Khan, held out gallantly, but, on March 27, a vigorous attack by the Kabulis, accompanied by the teachery of the Herati garrison, brought about the fall of Herat.³

The fall of Herat brought great relief to the British diplomats. Lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, expressed his satisfaction to the Amir at the capture of Herat.⁴ The Foreign Office exerted its influence to bring about a conciliation between Afghanistan and Persia.⁵ Both were advised and warned not to interfere with each other's dominion⁶ This advice

1. Eastwick II, *op. cit.* p. 218.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1861-65/176. *K. D.* 22-29 July, 62. Persia sent an envoy to the Amir's camp advising peace but the Amir turned down this request.

3. *Ibid.* June 5, 63. The ravages of the war were heavy. Vambery who visited Herat in 1863 found it ruined and desolated. See Vambery, A. *Travels in Central Asia*, London, 1864 p. 280. Terentyef estimates the mortality rate as twenty five hundred men. Terentyef, M. A. *Russia and England in Central Asia*. (Translated by F. C. Daukes) Calcutta 1876, Vol. I. p. 333.

4. *E. S. L. I.* 1861-65/176 Government of India to Punjab no. 398 July, 3, 63. to instruct the vakeel on the subject.

5. F. O. 60/273. no. 25. July 10, 63.

6. *Letters to India etc.* 1859-69/I Secretary of State to Viceroy no. 8. Aug. 31, 63. Wood approved the Government of India's advice already sent by the Viceroy in his no. 398 *op. cit.* and requested to impress upon the Amir its importance further.

worked, and Vambery, during his visit to Central Asia, witnessed, in the Fall of 1862, the visit of a friendly Persian envoy to the Amir's court.¹

The annexation of Herat to Afghanistan was decidedly a great victory for British diplomacy in Central Asia. Herat would have survived as an independent entity but for Khanikov's mission. The Russian infiltration into Herat brought to an end the chapter of its independence in the history of the Central Asian states. Russia's infiltration into the Afghan dominion was ill-timed. There still lay a vast belt of territory between the Russian frontier and that of Afghanistan. The regions of the Sar Daria and the Amu were to be subjugated prior to the Russian approach to the Hindukush region. In the following pages the story of Russia's struggle for supremacy over the Sar Daria is recounted.

1. Vambery. *Central Asia and Anglo-Russian Frontier Question op. cit.*
p. 204.

CHAPTER II

Russian "Masterly Activity" in Khokand, 1857-65

"The Russians clearly are making progress in Central Asia. I don't see that we can stop them, or that we can do any good".¹

Sir Charles Wood, in 1865.

Russian activities in Central Asia, after the Crimean War, present an interesting contrast to those of the British in that region. Between the years 1857 and 1859, three Russian missions were despatched to four Oriental courts. N. V. Khanikov visited Herat in 1858-1859. Captain Ch. Valikhanov was sent to Kashghar, and N. P. Ignatiev² was ordered to proceed to Khiva and Bokhara. Ignatiev's mission was entirely devoted to the study of British political and commercial activities in Central Asia, and he was requested to recommend measures to be

1. *Lawrence Papers*. no. 2 Wood to Lawrence (private), Sept. 16, 65.

2. Count Nicholas Pavlovitch Ignatiev (1832-1908) had served as military attache in London in 1857. His report on England's military power was much appreciated by his government, and the Czar personally invited him for an interview to Warsaw. At the conclusion of his mission to Khiva and Bokhara, Ignatiev was sent to China, where he signed the important Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1860, acquiring for Russia the province of Ussuri. As Director of the Asiatic Dept. in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1861-64) he strongly supported the unification of the Orenburg and Siberian lines of communication. In 1864, he was appointed Minister at Constantinople, where his legation was raised subsequently to an embassy. He represented Russia for thirty-four years at the Ottoman Court.

adopted to counteract the British hegemony in that region. He was also urged to get first-hand knowledge of the geography, resources and history of this area, and to study the routes to India from both the principalities of Bokhara and Khiva.¹

During the Anglo-Persian war over Herat in 1857, A. I. Baryatinsky, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, in a letter, warned the Russian ministry of war about the growing power of Britain in Central Asia. Baryatinsky feared the British entry into Caucasia through Herat.² Ignatiev in his note to Prince A. M. Gortchakov, the foreign minister, in September 1857, was emphatic on the point that Britain was only assailable in Central Asia in the event of a war with Britain in Europe: he laid no less stress on the point that Central Asia was the only outlet for Russian trade in the face of her difficulty of competing in Europe with the superior products of Britain, France, Belgium and America.³

Russia by the year 1848 had traversed the deserts bordering Siberia which stretched down both sides of the Sea of Aral : she had subjugated the Steppe "the key and gate to all the countries of Central Asia" as Peter the Great had said in 1722.⁴ and she had established the forts of Orenburg, Uralsk, Raismk and Karabutak. Advancing into Sar Daria, Russia

1. Khalifin, H. I. *Tri Russki Missi*, Tashkand 1956. pp. 43-45.

2. *Ibid.* p. 20.

3. *Ibid.* p. 41, quoted from Ignatiev's *Missive Va Khiva I Bokhara Va* 1858. St. Petersburg 1897, pp. 2-3.

4. Michell, John and Robert. *The Russian Central Asia* (Translated from Russian Accounts of Travels and Journals). London 1865., p. 315.

got involved in a quarrel with the states of Khiva and Khokand. This quarrel was confined at first to Khokand, which had taken over the Kirghiz (Kazak)¹ of the Steppe, as a result of occupying the town of Turkistan (Hazrat Sultan). To have a firm hold over its Kirghiz subjects, khokand had erected strong points on the Lower Sar Daria at Jang Kurgan, Julek, Ak Masjid, Kamaish Kurgan, Chin Kurgan, Kaish Kurgan, etc. Ak Masjid, built in 1817, was the administrative centre of the steppe region of Khokand. The Kazaks had been the subject of dispute between Khokand and Russia since 1850. Russia's predominant influence in the Sar Daria, required her to extend still further south. In 1852,

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1. The Kirghiz living on the Western Steppes, south of Orenburg, are not Kirghiz by origin, but were called so by the Russians. The Russians called them Kara Kirghiz (Black Kirghiz) or Dikokamenny (wild mountain Kirghiz). The Kirghiz called themselves Kazaks (which means robbers, a name given to them by their neighbours). The Kazaks in the Steppes are descendents of several Turkish tribes, who settled during the political turmoils of the 15th century in the neighbourhood of Lake Balkash. During the early 18th century they were powerful and ruled over Tashkand and its vicinity. During this period they were divided into three camps or Orda (a Turkish word commonly translated as Horde): Ulus Juz (Great Horde), Urta Juz (Middle Horde) and Kitchie Juz (Lesser Horde). In 1723 the Khan of Zungaria occupied the town of Turkistan. The Middle and Lesser Hordes moved westwards and occupied the Steppe between the Aral Sea, the Caspian, and the Ural River. In 1734, their ruler Abul Khair entered into an agreement with Russia and became its subject. (Schuyler, E. Turkistan, New York, 1876 v. I pp. 30. 33). The Kirghiz inhabited the neighbourhood of the Issykkul, the valley of Tian Shen the Almai mountains and the Pameer to the south of Khokand. The origin of the word Kirghiz is legendary: Kysk-Kys (Forty maiden). It is said that they were the sons of forty maidens, who, having lost their men, were impregnated either by a red dog or by the foam of Lake Issyk-Kul. (Schuyler, *op. cit.* II pp. 135-8).

the Orenburg forces under the orders of General V. A. Perovski, took over the Khokandi forts of Kumaish Kurgan, Chin Kurgan and Kaish Kurgan. In 1853 Ak Masjid (previously Fort Perovski and now Kizil Orda), was occupied by Russia as well. Three Russian forts were erected on the Sar : one at the source of Kazala (Fort No. 1) another at Karmakchi (Fort No. 2) and the last at Kamaish Kurgan (Fort No. 3). The lands south of the River Ili were occupied and in 1854 Almati (now Alma Ata) was taken and a fort founded there known as Fort Vernoe. Then came the interval of the Crimean War during which there was no further Russian territorial expansion in Central Asia till 1857.

Relations between Khokand¹ and Russia in 1857 were of a critical nature. The government of Punjab, learned through its Central Asian sources that Khokand was awaiting the inevitable Russian penetration into its dominion.² Lord Wodehouse, the British ambassador, reported from St. Petersburg that Russo-Khokandi relations were of an "unfriendly nature".³

The period between 1857 and 1876, during

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1. Khokand is derived from the word Khoob Kand, the "beautiful place" or "village". It was bounded on the east by Chinese territory, on the west by Bokhara and the Sar Daria, to the north by the great hordes of nomads and on the south by Badakhshan and Karatagin. Its area was situated between latitude 42° 45' north and longitude 65° 73' east in the valley of the Sar Daria. In its territorial extension it was larger than either Bokhara or Khiva. Its population was a round three million, consisting of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazak, Kirghiz and Kiptchak.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1857/149 Government of Punjab to India No. 81. January 30, 57.
 3. F. O. 65/498. no. 467.

which Khokand lost her independence, is considered a dark period in her history. Internal strife and wars with Bokhara were two major factors which paved the way for Russia's victorious entry of the Lower Sar. During this period Khokand changed its rulers nine times. The country's civil wars crippled resources, disaffection among the population was rife and a general pessimism pervaded various segments of the population. The commercial class, along with the Tajiks, became Russia's fifth column in Khokand.¹ Rivalry between Khokand and Bokhara for political hegemony in the Sar Daria Valley was the worst that Central Asia had ever seen. Blind to the common threat of encroachment by Russia, both states kept alive their traditional feuding. When Russia was knocking at the northern door of Khokand, Bokhara was breaking through the western door. Sandwiched by the hostilities of its neighbour and torn by internal chaos, Khokand fell an easy prey to Russia's long tentacles.

Khudayar Khan of the Min Dynasty, ruled over Khokand from 1845 on, and representing the degenerated Nineteenth Century Muslim Central Asia, his reign witnessed an age of complete anarchy, coupled with persecutions and defections.² The fall of Mussalman Quli, a Kiptchak adviser to the Khan and a pillar of his strength, was followed by the Sarts or Tajiks rule under Mirza Ahmad's leader-

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1. Vambery, A. *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*. p. 14.
 2. Schuyler, *op. cit.* I p. 350. Schuyler mentions a general massacre of the Kiptchaks in which twenty thousand were killed.

ship. His was an oppressive administration leading to further deterioration in the country's morale¹

It was an opportune hour for Russian advance. The need for the unification of the Orenburg and Siberian lines of communication and fortification, persuaded Russian strategists to push their frontiers forward. In 1857 the town of Suzak, situated ninety-six miles to the southeast of Ak Masjid was taken.³ The same year Sukti Beg, a Kazak chief of Pishpak tendered his allegiance to Russia.³

The tyranny of Khudayar Khan and his repeated losses against Russia in the north made him unpopular.⁴ The Kirghiz together with the offended Kiptchak, entered into a plot with Mula Khan (also mentioned as Malle or Mali Khan), a step-brother of Khudayar Khan, and proclaimed the former as their chief. Khudayar Khan, defeated at Sammanchi, fled to Bokhara, and sought shelter at Jizakh.⁵ This was in 1859.⁶ Mula Khan ruled for three years.⁷ He was assisted in his administration by a distinguished Uzbek chief, Mula Ali Quli (also mentioned as Alim Kul) who played a prominent role in Khokand politics in the later years.

1. *Ibid.* p. 350.

2. Singh, S. H. *A History of Khokand*. Lahore, 1878. p. 5. Singh's work is a corrected version of Manphul's account. Pandit Manphul had been sent by the Government of India to collect information on the political events of the day. The account of his visit is given on page 56. For Manphul's report on Khokand see *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2.

3. *Ibid.* p. 5.

4. Schuyler I p. 351. *op. cit.*

5. *Ibid.* p. 351.

6. Singh p. 4. *op. cit.*

7. *Ibid.* p. 5. Schuyler says he ruled for two years p. 351.

It was during 1859 that A. A. Katenin, the governor-general of Orenburg, drew up a "Memoir on the policy of Russia in Central Asia in the Orenburg Region," "requesting the Imperial Government to occupy the Khokandi fortress of Julek, a strategic station about seventy miles from Ak Masjid.¹ Katenin's death, stopped the execution of the project and it was undertaken by his successor, Lt. Gen. A. P. Bezak.² During the rule of Mula Khan the Russian advance was pushed forward from two directions : Almati in the west and Ak Masjid in the east. On the western side the Russians took the town of Ashang, thirty-six miles from Almati.³ Mula Khan sent a force to oppose the invaders. The armies met about four miles out-side the city. In the fight that ensued the Russians retreated to Ashang. The Khokandis considered it a victory, felt contented, and returned to Khokand.⁴ The Russians then demolished two forts in the vicinity of Marki and Takmak and erected the fort of Pishpak.⁵ Advancing from the eastern side, in 1861, the Russian's attacked the fort of Yani Kurgan, situated twenty miles to the south of AkMasjid. The Khokandis under their Commander Bateer Beg, resisted the invaders successfully and repulsed their attack with a loss of thirty-two men and two guns. But the departure of the

1. Michell. *op. cit.* p. 389.

2. *Ibid.* p. 389.

3. Singh *op. cit.* p. 5.

4. *Ibid.* p. 5.

5. *Ibid.* p. 5. Also in F. O. 65/1860 no. 14.

Khokandi army to their capital left Yani Kurgan defenceless.¹

There was then an interval of about three years (1861-64) in the Russo-Khokandi war. The Polish insurrection, the Trans-Caspian rising and the fear of war with western Europe, distracted Russian attention from Central Asia.² The Russian strategists in Central Asia found time to give proper thought to their future plans of conquest, while Khokand reverted once again to its internal civil war.

Russia's two extreme outposts in Turkistan in 1861, were Julek in the Province of Orenburg, and Almati in Siberia. There was still a gap of some three hundred miles between these two stations. The area in between them, contained that northern portion of Khokand, which was famed for its fine climate, richness of soil and prosperity of commerce. In 1861 General Bezak expounded his plan for uniting the two outposts. He sent his report on the subject to the Ministry of war, urging the possession of Tashkand, which would serve multifarious purposes : it would bring total subjugation of the Kazak territory between Khokand and the Steppe ; it would supply fuel and coal to the ill-equipped Aral flotilla and it would serve as a great emporium between Russia and the rest of Central Asia besides Tashkand,

1. Ibid. pp. 5-6.

2. There was a rising in the Province of Kazan in 1863 under Yuri Samarin and Charkowski. Poland was always a nuisance to the Russians. The Polish insurrection of 1863 conducted by the secret committee known as Azad (Government) shook the Russian administration to the foundations.

he contented would provide a natural boundary protecting Russian rule in Turkistan. Bezak recommended an immediate occupation of Tashkand, before it was too late, for Khokand had been equipped with British arms. He pointed out that the possession of Tashkand would cover all the expenses so far incurred in the military build up in the Sar Daria region.¹ The ministry of war supported Bezak's plan and proposed to put the newly acquired area under a governor-general stationed at Tashkand.² The proposal was studied by a special committee in the presence of the Czar on March 9, 1862. The committee then referred the project to General Dhummel, the governor-general of Western Siberia, to know his views on the matter.³ Dhummel in a memoir dated May 26, 1862, supported the scheme and suggested the sending of a flying column to seize Aulia-Ata in the coming Spring and to erect a fort there, or close by, to accommodate a large garrison. He also suggested making a separate Khanate of the province of Tashkand to be run by the native under the supervision of Russian officers.⁴ The project came up once again for discussion before the Central Committee on February 23, 1863. The committee realized the importance of uniting the two provinces, but because of financial difficulties, it could not give immediate sanction to the scheme.⁵ However it did

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1. Spalding, H. *Khiva and Turkistan*. (Translated from Russian). London, 1874. pp. 29-32.
 2. *Ibid.* p. 33.
 3. *Ibid.* p. 33.
 4. *Ibid.* pp. 33-34.
 5. *Ibid.* p. 34.

authorise the governor-generals of Orenburg and Siberia to exert in their influence their dominions to attain this common object.¹ The Central Committee approved Gen. Dhummel's proposal to despatch a reconnaissance party from the Orenburg region up the Sar Daria during the following Spring.²

Khokand during this time witnessed the worst kind of internal strife in its history. Mula Khan's excessive dependence on Ali Quli, made him unpopular with other chiefs who had taken part in the insurrection and helped him to power.

The discontented element took advantage of Ali Quli's absence when he went to Andijan as its governor. They murdered Mula Khan in 1862, and raised to the throne Shah Murad Khan, a fifteen year old son of Sarmat Khan, the elder brother of Khudayar.³ Ali Quli at Andijan, upholding the cause of Mula Khan, got hold of the deceased Khan's thirteen year old son Syed Sultan Khan.⁴ The conspirators were alarmed at this move: the most notable among them, Shadiman Khawaja the Beg of Tashkand and Qinayat Shah, the Beg of Turkistan, fearing revenge, recalled from Jizakh Khudayar Khan, a powerful claimant to the throne for competition against this teenaged nephews.⁴ The

1. *Ibid.* p. 34.

2. *Ibid.* p. 33.

3. *Schuyler op. cit.* I. pp. 351-2.

4. *Ibid.* Singh *op. cit.* calls him Said Mohd Khan. p. 6.

5. Singh *op. cit.* p. 6. says that Khudayar came to power with the help of Bokhara but Schuyler *op. cit.* p. 351. points out that Khudayar lived in very humiliating conditions in Jizakh and made an escape from that place with great difficulty.

principality of Khokand was divided into three slices. Khokand under Shah Murad, Tashkand under Khudayar, and Andijan and its surroundings under Syed Sultan. Then followed civil war between the competitors. The Khokandi army under Shah Murad besieged Khudayar at Tashkand, but failed to take it after a siege of thirty-one-days.¹ During their homeward march the Khokandis were surprised by Ali Quli, who easily over-powered them. He punished the perpetrators of Mula Khan's murder in the presence of Shah Murad, but surprisingly did not touch the latter's position and he was allowed to remain on the throne, with Ali Quli as his regent.²

This change was followed by Khudayar's offensive against Khokand. Ali Quli, seeing general treachery seething around him, retired to the mountains, which made the invader's work easy. Khudayar having taken over Khokand murdered Shah Murad.³ But Ali Quli did not give up the struggle. He was supported by the Uzbeks, while the Sarts and the townspeople weary of the struggle, supported Khudayar. The Amir of Bokhara also sided with Khudayar.⁴ Finally the sustained energies of Ali Quli prevailed over feeble minded Khudayar and once again the latter

1. Schuyler *op. cit.* p. 352.

2. *Ibid.* p. 352.

3. *Ibid.* p. 352. But Singh *op. cit.* p. 6. say that Shah Murad was not murdered and once again ascended the throne in 1863 and was murdered the same year by Ali Quli.

4. Schuyler *op. cit.* p. 353 says that this war lasted for three years but his chronology does not support this statement.

sought refuge in Bokhara. Ali Quli as usual became regent to the new ruler, Syed Sultan, in 1863.¹

While Khokand was torn by internal strife, the Russian commanders received orders to implement the new plan. The year 1863 did not bring any important acquisition to Russia except the seizure of Yani Kurgan, which had been deserted by the Khokandis in 1861. The new year, however, brought rapid conquests. The Siberian troops under Colonel M.G. Charnaiev from Almati, fell upon Talas in May and subjugating it they moved upon Aulia Ata in June 1864.² The town fell after a siege of four days in which sixteen hundred Khokandis and five hundred Russians died.³ The Orenburg troops under the command of Colonel N.A. Verevkin attacked the town of Hazrat Sultan from Ak Masjid in June 1864. Sixteen thousand Khokandis under their Beg, Mirza Daulat, opposed the invaders outside the city, but were defeated. It was not only a defeat by force of arms, for as Vambery says, vodka and roubles played their roles as well.⁵ The inhabitants of Hazrat Sultan, had been bribed by a local chief, Tajik Tura,⁵ and they shut their gates to the fugitive army, then later welcomed the Russian forces.

Facing aggression from the north, Khokand

1. *Ibid.* p. 353.

2. Named after a Kirghiz mystic meaning "holy father" a descendent of Ahmad Yasavi, a celebrated Muslim saint. Schuyler *op. cit.* II. p. 121.

3. Spalding *op. cit.* pp. 34-5 and Singh *op. cit.* p. 7.

4. Vambery. *Central Asia op. cit.* p. 38.

5. Singh. *op. cit.* p. 7.

looked towards the south for protection. The British dominion in India was looked upon by the Uzbek chief as the only hope against expanding Russia. Since the fall of Ak Masjid, the appeals to India for protection and aid had been incessant. Khudayar Khan had sent an envoy, Shahzada Sultan Mohammad, in 1855, to Peshawar. The envoy met Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar and solicited the protection of the British Government against the atrocities of Russia. Shahzada made a formal request on behalf of the Khokandi ruler to the effect that British officers be sent to Khokand to drill the native army.¹ But no encouragement was shown to the Khokandi envoy except for the exchange of presents.² Shahzada was, however, able to secure privately the services of three Muslim soldiers who accompanied him to Khokand.³ They were Nabi Bakhsh, Khair Mohammad and Samad Khan.

This was followed by another envoy from Khokand. The new envoy was Peer Mohammad, bearing a letter from the Khan of Khokand containing a similar demand for arms and instructors.⁴ Edwardes, aware of the Indian Government's policy on the subject, did not forwards the application to

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1957/149 Edwardes to James no. 149 June 30, 57.

2. *Ibid.* Edwardes sent his agent Mohammad Ali to accompany the Khokandi envoy and to collect first hand information on the subject. Ali's account is not available in full in the India Office Reports.

3. Singh *op. cit.* p. 4.

4. *E. S. L. I.* 1857/149 no. 149. *op. cit.*

the higher authorities,¹ but this did not discourage Khokand from approaching the Government of India again for protection and help.²

The fall of Aulia Ata and Hazrat Sultan, the two most important cities of Khokand, led to another cry for help against Russia. The regent Ali Quli sent an envoy, Khawaja Beg, to the Government of India³. He arrived reported in India in the early Fall of 1864 and met the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.⁴ Khawaja Beg bore a letter to "the East India Company" containing a protest against the Russian violation of their promises and a complaint against their aggression on the territory of Khokand. The letter appealed to the "Sovereign of London" to help the people of Khokand since "friend are ready to avenge the distress of their friends."⁵ The envoy then met the Viceroy Sir John Lawrence at Lahore in October. Khawaja Beg told the Viceroy of the miserable plight of Khokand at Russia's hands. But the appeal did not touch Lawrence, and in his reply to the Khan of Khokand he informed him that, as the Viceroy of the Queen of England he could do nothing for

1. *Ibid.*

2. Both Singh *op. cit.* p. 6. and Rawlinson, H. *England and Russia in the East*, London, 1875 p. 194, mention the arrival of a Khokandi envoy Khudai Nazar in 1860. This point needs confirmation.

3. Khawaja Beg was accompanied by two other envoys, Nazar Dadkhah and Mungli Beg, for the Sultan of Turkey and the Amir of Kabul respectively.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1861-65/176. Government of Punjab to India no. 483-577. Sept. 4, 1864.

5. *Ibid* p. 763A to 763B.

Khokand, and advised the Khan that "Your Highness must therefore look to your own people, your own means and resources for maintaining your power."¹ The envoy left India in the Summer of 1865.²

In Central Asia after the conquest of Hazrat Sultan and Aulia Ata, both the columns of Orenburg and Siberia were united under Colonel Charnaiev, and they advanced on Chamkand in June, 1864. Ali Quli threatened by aggression, rushed towards Chamkand to defend it and met the enemy at Susik, six miles north west of Chamkand. The Russians were defeated,³ and they proposed an armistice on the understanding that they might be allowed to retain the conquest they had made : but Ali Quli rejected this offer.⁴ The Russians re-inforced from Aulia Ata, then made another attempt on Chamkand with twelve thousand men and thirteen guns on July 27. Ali Quli put up stubborn resistance with his thirty five thousand men and thirty five guns, resulting in the second retreat of the Russians.⁵ Leaving Chamkand in the charge of Mirza Ahmad with a garrison of six thousand and the fort in good repair, Ali Quli returned to Khokand. It was a good opportunity for Charnaiev, who made his third

1. *Ibid.* Viceroy to the Khan of Khokand, Dec. 5, 1864. p. 781C.

2. During the conversation with Lawrence, the envoy was given the impression that as to a final reply on the subject of help to Khokand, he should wait for the permission from the home government. This statement was confirmed by the interpreter. See Government of Punjab to India no. 225-436. In *E.S.L.I.* 1861-65/176.

3. Singh *op. cit.* p. 8.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

5. *Ibid.* p. 8,

attempt on Chamkand. He took over Sairam, a town twenty one miles outside Chamkand.¹ Mirza Ahmad attempting to oppose the Russian advances, was routed. The invaders then stormed Chamkand, which fell to them in October 1864.² Mirza was forced to flee to Tashkand.

The Russian invasion of Chamkand forced Ali Quli to send another envoy, Tash Khawaja Sadoor, to India with valuable presents and two letters, one for the British Queen and another for the Viceroy of India. The letter to the Queen was complimentary but that to the Viceroy was a request for a supply of arms and instructors;³ it referred to the earlier request made through Khawaja Beg, and alluded to the Russian onslaughts on Chamkand and its heroic defence by the Khokandis. Ali Quli once again solicited British friendship and requested them to despatch, along with the envoy, "as many experienced artillerymen and instructors as possible."⁴ Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, promptly acknowledged this letter by referring to the former letter sent to the Khan of Khokand. He added that the letter for the Queen would be forwarded to London. The Viceroy, sympathised with the ruler of Khokand for losses sustained in the "aggressive movements", and concluded by saying that the Government of India could not afford

1. F. 065/867 no. 92.

2. F.O. 65/867 no, 259 also Singh *op. cit.* p. 8.

3. E. S. L. I. 1861-65/176 Commissioner Peshawar to Secretary of Punjab no, 18, January 26, 1865.

4. E. S. L. I. 1861-65/176 Ali Quli to Viceroy pp. 973-4.

to help the ruler of Khokand.¹

Russian doings in Central Asia had become the centre of great attention in Europe. Western Europe had both a commercial and political interest in Central Asia. France, had a long-standing interest in the East and Paris had been serving as one of the major sources of information for the *Times* news reports on this area. Italy was a major buyer of Central Asian silkworm eggs, and in 1863-1864 a three man delegation from Italy visited Bokhara, to expand commercial contacts with Turkistan.² Both Austria and Prussia were interested in current political developments in this part of the world. Though somewhat late, the Austrian newspaper, the "*Wanderer*" under its editor, Herr Carl Von Vincenti published regular accounts of Central Asian politics.³ Two Persian papers, the "*Allegemene Zeitung*" and "*Kolnische Zeitung*" took a deep interest in Russian activities.⁴ Vambery, "*the Hungarian Darvaish*", in his *Travels* in Central Asia, had introduced this area to the common man in Europe.⁵ His profound contempt for Russian aggression had produced a frantic effect on the English mind.⁶

1. *Ibid.* Viceroy to the Chief of Khokand, Feb. 21, 1865. p. 797.

2. This delegation was suspected of political activities and was detained in Bokhara for thirteen months.

3. Helwald F, Von. *The Russian in Central Asia*. (Translated by Wirgman), London 1874. Introduction p. xv.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Vambery, A. *Travels in Central Asia*, London 1863. (The book was translated into French by E.D. forgus/Paris 1865.).

6. Vambery wrote many letters and articles, besides works on this subject. His letter appeared often in the *Times*.

The British Government was both deeply interested and alarmed by the Russian conquest in Central Asia. Rawlinson, the British Minister at Tehran was the first person to notice a potential threat in Russia's march eastward. He contended that if unhindered, her further extension in Central Asia, would constitute a serious danger to the safety of India. He urged the home ministry to remedy the situation before it was too late.¹ Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, read this report with alarm and forwarded it to the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, adding that the report on the Russian encroachment in Central Asia "indicated an uneasy feeling in countries to which it relates."² He instructed Jame Crampton, the British Minister to Russia that, on the subject of Russian proceedings in Central Asia, "you need not disguise from them that the attention of H.M. Government is directed to that quarter and that we should see with regret any change there". Russell told Crampton to convey to the Russian authorities that Britain did not wish to enter into a struggle with Russia for political influence in Central Asia, but the British Government would like to see that "Russia shall not take advantage of means of pressure on the states of Central Asia" which "should remain in the possession of native rulers and be

1. F. O. 65/867 Rawlinson to Wood no. 3. Jan. 4, 1860. Rawlinson had made this assumption on the report of an agent sent to Khiva by the British Legation at Teheran in 1859. The agent's report disclosed that Russia was preparing for an offensive.

2. F. O. 65/549 Russell to Crampton no. 66. March 31, 1860.

undisturbed by foreign intrigues.”¹

Whatever interest the foreign powers took in Russian proceedings, nothing concrete was in fact known of Russian policy. Russia had been concealing her conquests in Turkistan. Crampton, urged by Russell in reference to Rawlinson's queries on the subject of Russian activity in Central Asia and the Caspian, could not discover the actual state of affairs in those regions.² S.I. Lumley, the Secretary at the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, laboured hard to collect intelligence on actual Russian acquisitions in Central Asia, but it was all “vague and scanty.”³ He learnt from the Italian mission, which was returning from St. Petersburg, that all Russian doings in Central Asia were kept secret from the public. They told him that a Junior Russian officer once wrote account of a Russo Khokandi war in a private letter to a friend. The letter was censored and returned to the writer with a warning against conveying such an information.⁴ M. Gianotti, the Italian Charge d'Affaires, during his conversation with Gortchakov praised the success of Russian arms in Central Asia, but the latter dismissing the discussion of this topic “turned the conversation in such a way as to preclude any further mention.”⁵ However, Lumely procured a map of the country between the Russian frontier and Bokhara from the Italian

1. *Ibid.*

2. F.O. 65/867. no. 90.

3. F.O. 65/867. Lumely to Russel no. 46. Sept. 13, 1864.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

mission. It greatly interested Whitehall.¹

But the fall of Chamkand to Russia was not without repercussions in the west. The *Times* produced a telegram from a Paris paper, telling its readers of the fall of Khokand to Russia.² The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* opined that Russia had found the "key" to India for which she had been toiling since the days of Peter.⁴

This "attention in foreign countries" to Russian movements in Central Asia, led Gortchakov, in November 1864, to send a memorandum on the aim and object of Russian policy in Central Asia, to the Russian legations abroad for distribution to their accredited courts. The circular pointed out that the security of the frontier, and the commercial needs of Russia forced her to exercise ascendancy over her turbulent and nomadic neighbours, whose plunder and depredation of Russian trade, had compelled the Imperial Government to send punitive expeditions against them many times and that retreat was always considered a sign of weakness. Russia's work did not differ, said the circular, from that of the United State in America, France in Algeria, England in India, and Holland in Indonesia. Gortchakov expounded the view that the occupation of Chamkand was necessary to achieve the said Russian objectives by establishing a frontier line between Lake Issyk-Kul and the Sar Daria. The

1. *S. H. C.* 1864/58. F. O. to I.O. Oct. 1, 1864.

2. *Times*, Dec. 6, 1864. p. 12, c. 1.

3. *Ibid.* Kuly 14, 1864. p. 5, c. 1.

circular concluded that Russia disliked further schemes of territorial extension and was only motivated by carrying on "a mission to civilise neighbouring countries on the continent of Asia."¹

This circular was not sent to the court of St. James, nor was the British Embassy in Russia made aware of it. Russell was surprised at this treatment. He told Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at the Czar's court to acquire a copy of this circular from Gortchakov. Russell considered it "highly desirable" that the British Government should be made aware of the intentions of Russia in Central Asia.² But, Gortchakov, did not entertain this request, and he doubted the legality of whether "H.M. Government were justified in requiring information on the subject."³ However he did read out to Buchanan the text of circular "as a personal and confidential communication." He told Buchanan that Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador to England, had been authorised to furnish the contents of the circular to Russell, only if the latter would receive it "as a spontaneous and friendly communication."⁴ This irksome explanation so exasperated Russell that he instructed Buchanan in a return despatch to inquire if the subject matter was so much secretive, why it had been sent to Vienna, Berlin, Paris etc.⁵

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1. F.O. 65/867-868. The Foreign Office received the document through its embassies abroad.
 2. F.O. 65/867 no. 2. January 10, 65.
 3. F.O. 65/867 no, 24, Jan. 18, 65.
 4. F.O. 65/867 Buchanan to Russell no. 25, Jan. 18, 65.
 5. F.O. 65/867 no. 18, Jan. 28, 65.

Hardly had the ink dried on the Gortchakov circular when Russia again took the offensive in the territory of Khokand. Making Chamkand her base of operation, she commenced activities against Tashkand. At the close of 1864, Colonel Charnaiev had made an attempt and had been repulsed by Ali Quli.¹ The Russians made another attempt on Tashkand in December 1864, from Hazrat Sultan, and again Ali Quli stopped their advance.²

By the Spring of 1865, Charnaiev had made suitable arrangements for decisive action against Tashkand, and on May 9, 1865 a Russian force consisting of ten thousand Russians and five thousand Cossaks with twelve guns, arrived at Mingyorsk in the vicinity of the city of Tashkand.³ Here the troops were divided into three columns. The first column surrounded all the major gate of the city ; the second marched on Niazbek, a fortified town twelve miles north-east of Tashkand and seized it on May 16 ; they then proceeded to divert the course of the Jagnab Canal, a branch of the Charchik River, and so cut off the water supply of Tashkand ; the third column encamped at Toitipa, a village sixteen miles south east of Tashkand cutting off the besieged city from the outside.⁴

Charnaiev was expecting an easy fall of Tashkand. Russian roubles were once again active, and a section of the people had been bought over : it

1. Singh *op. cit.* p. 8.

2. *Ibid.* p. 9.

3. *Ibid.* p. 9.

4. *Ibid.* p. 9. and Schuyler *op. cit.* I p. 113.

had been planned that the disloyal party inside the city would attack the defending garrisons from inside and would open the gates of the city on June 1.¹ But on the same day, the regent Ali Quli reached Tashkand with a powerful army.² Next day he met the Russian at Shortipa, an open field in the vicinity of Niazbek.³ A desperate combat ensued, lasting till afternoon. The Khokandis fought to a man until Ali Quli was hit in the left rib by a masket ball, making him totally unfit to command. The loss of leadership disheartened the Khokandis and they dispersed. Ali Quli died from the wound the same evening.

The death of Ali Quli was a turning point in Khokand history. The young Khan, Syed Sultan, retreated to Tashkand while his chiefs made their way to Khokand, there making Khudai Kul their Khan.⁴ The Russians immediately attacked the city and besieged it.⁵ Syed Sultan on the advice of the Aksakals (elders) of the city, sent an appeal to Bokhara for help. Amir Muzaffaruddin of Bokhara, responded promptly and sent one of his generals, Sikandar Khan Yuzbashi, to organise the defence of Tashkand ; he reached the city on June 8.³

1. Schuyler *op. cit.* I. p. 113.

2. *Ibid.* Schuyler describes Ali Quli's army as six thousand men and forty guns.

3. F.O. 65/868 no. 4. Schuyler *op. cit.* I, p. 113. Singh. *op. cit.* p. 9. says May 23.

4. Singh *op. cit.* p. 10.

5. *Ibid.* p. 10.

6. *Ibid.* p. 10. Singh says Syed Sultan was arrested by Sikandar and sent to Bokhara, while Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 114., says that he fled the city.

The garrison inside the city resisted stoutly and the siege failed. The Russians, meanwhile, had approached Syed Azim and Mohammad Saleh, two wealthy merchants of the city, who induced a section of the inhabitants to open the Kamalan gate to Captain Abramov.¹ Captain De La Croix made his way by the Khokandi gate.² The whole day was spent in quarrelling.³ The following day was also spent in street fighting. The evening brought peace when the chiefs of the city agreed to surrender, and petitioned for a restoration of order. A proclamation was issued on July 14, 1865, by which Tashkand was made subject to Russian government.

The fall of Tashkand was a significant event in Central Asian politics. Russian advances in that area roused a wave of alarm throughout Persia, India and Britain. The Persian Government urged the British Foreign Office to take into consideration the rapid movements of Russia in that quarter. The Shah's Government suggested that Britain should open some system of communication with Central Asia with a view to ascertaining the extent of Russian penetration.⁴ The Government of India obtained through native sources a much exaggerated account of the Russian activities in Turkistan. One of the reports said that the Russian army had even reached

1. *Ibid.* p. 10. Schuyler I. p. 114, says that the gate was forced by a Russian assault on July 9, while Singh says that it was opened by the inhabitants on June 23.

2. Schuyler, *op. cit.* I. pp. 114-15.

3. *Ibid.* pp. 115-16.

4. *S.H.C.* 1865/59 F.O. to I. O. Feb. 20, 65. referring to Alison's despatch no. 127 of Dec. 6, 64. in F.O. 65/867.

Yarkand ;¹ another referred to an agreement between Bokhara and Russia over the territory of Khokand which was to be partitioned between the two of them.²

To procure correct information on the state of the swiftly changing events in Central Asia, the Government of India established machinery for the purpose. In the middle of 1865, the Government of India, instructed the Punjab authorities to send trustworthy native agent to such parts of Central Asia where from accurate intelligence could be procured.³ Pandit Manphul, an Extra-Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab secretariat volunteered his services for the task. He was assisted by three young men, equally suitable for the work. Foremost among them was Munshi Faiz Bakhsh, a Pathan from Peshawar, who had been working in the political department of the Government of Punjab, and had been of great service in collecting intelligence on the north western frontiers of India. Second in the trio was Mohammad Hussain, (later on known Shumsul Ulama, Maulvi Mohammad Hussain Azad) an intelligent educated Lahori, and known for his proficiency in the oriental languages. He belonged to the Education Department of the Government of Punjab, and was the secretary of a literary society of Lahore. The last was Karam Chand, a gold-smith of Punjab, known to the merchants of Central Asia.⁴

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1861-65/176 Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 75. June 16, 665.

2. *S.H.C.* 1865/59 I.O. to F.O. July 18, 65.

3. *E. S.L.I.* 1867/2 Secretary of Punjab to Secretary of India nos. 221—44, June 8, 67. refers to the Government of India instructions.

4. *Ibid.*

Manphul's instructions required him to make a factual study of Russian extension, the nature and size of their army, and their fortifications and strength in Turkistan. He was asked to find out the political state of affairs in Khokand, its ruler, his administration and his potentiality for resistance against Russia. The instructions also requested information on the views and opinions of the inhabitants of Central Asia in general, and those of the Yarkand in particular concerning the Russo-Khokandi war and the rise of Russian influence in their neighbourhood.¹

Manphul's party left Murree in August 1865, disguised and under assumed names. Pandit assumed the name of Bahi Divan Singh, travelling as a Hindu Mahajan with Karam Chand as his servant. Faiz Bakhsh posed as a trader under the name of Ghulam Rabani, and Mohammad Hussain named as Baha-ud-Din, and professing to be a scholar in pursuit of scriptural knowledge.² The party reached Kabul on September 13, and dispersed for their assigned destinations on November 12. Manphul with his servant appeared in Badakhshan on November 25,³ where he met the ruler and exchanged presents.⁴ Faiz proceeded via Bokhara and Samarqand to Khokand. He then continued on to Tashkand and met Charnaiev.⁵ Hussain also visited the above mentioned places but independently and penetrated as far as Chamkand.⁶ Karam Chand visited Khokand to collect reports

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2 Instructions to Manphul pp. 500-501.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2, no. 221—444 *op. cit.*

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2 Manphul Report pp-502—504.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2 Itinary of Ghulam Rabani pp. 849—866.

6. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2 nos. 221—444 *op. cit.*

from his colleagues.¹

The party returned to India in November 1866, after an absence of more than a year. Manphul during this visit made permanent arrangements for periodically securing intelligence on the affairs of Central Asia. He appointed secret agents, both in Khokand and Bokhara, to collect important news of the day through a number of mercantile firms.²

Manphul on his return submitted a detailed report of the observations to the Government of India. The report was divided into four parts. The first dealt with the states of Khokand and Bokhara. It traced the history of Khokand from the earliest days to the end of its wars with Russia. The second was the story of Eastern Turkistan, its history, resources and geography. The third was the history of the state of Badakhshan and the last a description of Kunduz and Yaghistan.

In England, the British public was no less alarmed than the Government of India over Russia's proximity to India. The editorial column of the *Times*, informed them that Russia had become most formidable power in Central Asia, with every opportunity to threaten India. It warned the British Government that the barrier provided by nature against "the insurrection of the northern soldiery" in Central Asia was broken and the time

1. *Ibid.*

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Secretary of Punjab to Secretary of India nos. 336—709 Sept, 16, 67. The following agents were appointed: A. Qadir and A. Paracha in Bokhara. Jalal Khan and G.M. Parachi in Khokand.

had come for serious consideration of the matter.¹ Then came Vambéry's warning through the pages of the same paper that "the approach of Russia to Bokhara and Afghanistan is to be much sooner effected than the English politicians believe". He argued that by next year, England would feel the brunt of it.² "Geographicus" noticed with regret the approaching fall of the Uzbek principalities to Russia and considered it "a matter of serious moment to England, and requires to be watched with the closest attention."³

Equally alarmed was Lumley, the British Embassy's secretary at St. Petersburg, who had held numerous talks with Gortchakov on Central Asian Issues.⁴ Lumley found perfect justification for the Uzbek states becoming a "troublesome neighbour" against Russian encroachment into their dominions.⁵ Lumley's observations on Central Asia led him to believe that Herat was to become very soon "a subject of grave consideration for Her Majesty's Government in India".⁶

But quite a different approach was taken by Sir Roderick I. Murchison, the president of Royal Geographical Society of London. Murchison in one of his monthly addresses to the society on May 22, 1865, while speaking on "Russia and her

1. *Times*. Dec, 27/64. p.5. c. 5.

2. *Ibid*. June 17, 65. p. 12. c. 6.

3. *Ibid*. June 15, 65. p. 11. c. 6.

4. F.O. 65/868 Lumley to Russell no. 54. August 15, 65.

5. *Ibid*.

6. F. O. 65/867 Lumley to Russell no, 48. Sept. 13, 64.

boundaries", approved the proceedings of Russia against Khokand, and expounded that "the alarm taken by a few of our countrymen.....is entirely groundless."¹ Sir Roderick pointed out that Russia historically had more valid claims on the eastern trade than England.² The president of the Geographical Society concluded his speech with the remarks that undue apprehension in regard to the Czar's conquest of India is an "absurd idea."³

Marchison's views were hailed in Russia. The "Journal de Ste. Petersbourg" of 19 June/1 July published a translation of Murchison's address, in an article that had emanated from Gortchakov's office.⁴ The article hoped that such authoritative expressions as that of Murchison, would dispel fear from English minds. Lord John Russell who was anxiously looking for some reason to open correspondence with the stubborn Gortchakov, took the Russian reaction to Murchison's address, as a fitting opportunity. He immediately envisaged a plan for arriving at some understanding with Russia. Russell proposed a draft to be sent to Lumley, establishing a basis for an agreement between the two powers.⁵

Russell in his proposed draft shared the sentiments of Murchison, but still admitted some

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1. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* vol. viii May 1865 p. 228.
 2. *Ibid.* p. 239.
 3. *Ibid.* p. 239.
 4. F.O. 65/868 Lumley to Russell no. 3. July 3, 1865. Also in par. pap. 1878 p. 621.
 5. S. H. C. 1865/59 1. o. to F. O. July 11, 65.

circumstances which might give rise to anxiety. To remove such anxiety, he intended to instruct Lumley, to suggest to Gortchakov, that both Governments should make a declaration that they would not extend their boundaries in Central Asia, except in case of "deplorable necessity", in which case the active partner would make a "full and frank exposition" to the other ; on the extent to which an extension was contemplated. Both parties were to respect the presently established boundaries of Central Asia along with those of Persia.¹

This proposed draft was forwarded to the India Office for comments. But Sir Charles Wood, the Indian Secretary, was not disposed to such an understanding. He was altogether against the formation of a "convention" and advised the Foreign Office to "abstain at present from contracting any definite engagement" respecting British and Russian extension in Central Asia.² But Russell did not feel satisfied with this and tried to emphasize on the Indian Secretary that he was not endeavouring for a "formal convention", but was proposing only on exchange of notes between the two governments. Keeping up pressure on Indian Office, the foreign Office asserted in its communication that the Foreign Secretary had sounded out Baron Brunow on the subject, and Lord Russell hoped to get a satisfactory explanation from Gortchakov on Russian actions in Turkistan.³ The Foreign office amending its original

1. *Ibid.* Russell proposed draft July 65. pp. 696—700.

2. *Ibid.* l.o. to F. O. July 29, 65.

3. *S.H.C.* 1865/59. F.O. to l.o. July 29, 65.

draft, added that the British Government was "determined to respect the present state of possession in Central Asia." It expected the Czar's Government to make "an analogous declaration to settle the minds of the inhabitants of Central Asia."¹

But the India Office still did not agree to it. The Government of India at this time was invading Bhootan a small mountainous principality on the southern slopes of Himalaya, and this action must have had bearing on the response of the India Office to Russell.² The India Office's strong objection was on the meaning attached to the phrase "present state of possession," since such a binding on the part of England "would affect the complications which may be expected to arise from questions connected with the province of Herat."³ Also, Sir Charles Wood strongly doubted Russia's willingness to co-operate in such a scheme. He did not suppose "they would ever agree to anything or keep their agreement if they made it."⁴

But the Foreign Office was in a hurry. Instructions to Lumley had been sent on July 31. While the India Office was remonstrating against the plan, Lumley was talking to Gortchakov on the subject.⁵ Lumley was no less energetic than

1. *Ibid.* Russell's second draft July 65. pp. 715—19.

2. *Ibid.* See I.O.'s comments with pencil on Russel's first draft of proposal. The comments say "it would prevent us from annexing Bhootan" and "how will this work in regard to Herat."

3. *Ibid.* I.O. to F.O. Aug. 11, 65.

4. *Lawrence Papers.* no. 2/1 Wood to Lawrence (private) Aug. 12, 65.

5. *S. H. C.* 1865/59 F. O. to L.O. Aug. 23, 65. See instructions to Lumley F. O. 65/868 no. 23. Also in *Par. pap.* 1878 L. no. 3.

his foreign minister. Gortchakov was away in Peterhoff. Lumley telegraphed him and sought for an interview on August 10. Gortchakov read the proposal, and observed calmly that "as a practical man he did not see any gain" in interchanging such declarations. He added that Russia was not land hungry, but had been endeavouring "to open a safe road to Kashghar". Gortchakov further remarked that the unauthorised occupation of Khokand, by the Amir of Bokhara, had made it difficult for Russia to enter into such declarations. As regards Persia, Gortchakov did not see its any connection with issues of Central Asia.¹ To make Russia's objection to such a declaration somewhat more clear, Gortchakov told the British Foreign Office, through Baron Brunnow, that Russia "shall labour with perseverance to attain" a safe frontier and commercial privileges in Central Asia.²

But Russell was still not satisfied and he went on urging through the British envoy at St. Petersburg, to obtain a Russian declaration of aims similar to those expressed by the Queen's government.³ Buchanan had audience with both the Czar and Gortchakov. But while the Czar kept silent,⁴ Gortchakov was a master of diplomacy. Lord

1. F. O. 65/868 Lumley to Russell nou. 44. Ag. 10, 65. Also in *par. pap.* 1878 L. no. 6.

2. F. O. 65/868 Gortchakov to Brunnow Aug. 5/17 1865. Also in *par. pap.* 1878 no. 7.

3. F. O. 65/868 Russell to Lumley no. 102. Sept. 16, 65. Also in *par. pap.* 1878 L. no. 8.

4. F. O. 65/868 nos. 267, 276, 304.

Brougham had made a fair sketch of him in 1855. He had said Gortchakov "will accept any affront and return to the charge as though nothing had occurred. His particular line of pleasing is openness. A cordial frankness that will amount to telling the truth if it can help him to deceive and there is a bland sincerity about him when he chooses that would allay the doubts of the most suspicious men. He has (or thinks he has) a great knowledge of England and has cheerfully cherished that assumption."¹ Gortchakov successfully tackled Buchanan, and finally told him that the Imperial declaration had been sent to Brunnow, to be forwarded to Whitehall.² Buchanan was jubilant at his diplomatic victory, because the declaration as he gleaned from Gortchakov's talk, though not as formal as required, was a confirmation of Russian activities and commercial pursuits in Central Asia. It respected the independence of Afghanistan and supported the stability of the Persian monarchy.³ Gortchakov also assured Buchanan that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Tashkand was being considered by the Imperial Government, and Russian had refused to accept sovereignty over that city.⁴

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1. Gortchakov in 1855 was Russian ambassador to Vienna. Palmerston asked Brougham who knew him to give an impression of Gortchakov. Lord John Russell was going to meet him at Vienna on the Eastern Question. See P. R. O. 30/22 Box 12. Also in *The Slavonic and Eastern European Review*, v. 16, pp. 45—67.
 2. F.O. 65/868 no. 304, *op. cit.*
 3. *Ibid.*
 4. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Clarendon no. 388, Dec. 10. 65.

But to the chagrin of London, no such declaration as promised by Gortchakov, was ever received at Whitehall.¹

Meantime the Russian authorities in Central Asia had been consolidating their work in the newly acquired area. Henceforth the Kazaks of the Steppe were administered by the Orenburg, and Siberian authorities. The western part of the Steppe was under the administration of Orenburg while the eastern part was under Siberia. In early 1865 the whole of the Steppe region in addition to the recently conquered area between the Aral Sea and the lake Issyk-kul, was formed into the Oblast (province) of Turkistan.² Charnaiev was made its first military governor, and was put under direct supervision of the Governor-General of Orenburg. Russian expansion in Central Asia presents an interesting contrast to British policy in that region. A brief survey of the British "inactivity" beyond the north western frontiers of India is made in the following chapter.

1. F.O. 65/868 no. 304 *op. cit.* see the footnotes on the letter.

2. F.O. 65/868 no. 78. Buchanan to Russell March 1, 65.

CHAPTER III

British "Masterly Inactivity" in Afghanistan, 1863—1868

"The crucial period of our relations with Sher Ali was from 1863—1868. During that period he was treated with discourtesy, with indignity, with what I consider to be actual injustice by Lord Lawrence's Government. The rights he inherited from his father were ignored, his advances were discouraged, his interest sacrificed, nay, his whole future was imperilled"

Sir Henry Rawlinson.

The Russian expansion in Central Asia, throughout the later half of the Nineteenth Century, created the chief problem of India's external policy. The problem of Afghanistan in this context was Britain's own creation. Britain had a vital strategic interest in Afghanistan as a buffer state for India, but to maintain this buffer necessitated direct and active influence in Afghan affairs; this influence was not forthcoming and instead she adopted the policy of "Masterly Inactivity". This² term was coined by John Wyllie³ an ardent admirer of Lawrence's policy

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1878/19 Rawlinson's minute. Oct. 26, 1878. p. 579.

2. *Fortnightly Review*, 1869 No. VI. "Masterly Inactivity" by Wyllie. (hereafter cited as F. R.).

3. John William Shah Wyllie (1835—70) joined Kathiawar as political agent 1856—60; served in Calcutta and Lucknow 1861—2; undersecretary external affairs 1862—68.

and his undersecretary for external affairs in the Government of India. Wyllie's prolific pen and ingenious brain helped Lawrence to popularise his political gospels on Central Asia among the British public.¹ The policy of "Matersly Inactivity" aimed at letting affairs alone beyond the north western frontiers of India. It was a policy which Lawrence had maintained since his early contact with the north western borders ; for he was convinced that events north of the Indus were not worth the attentions of Britain and at best should be stabilized by some other power with a more direct interest.

Dost Mohammad died at Herat on June 9, 1863, leaving behind eighteen sons.² The major aspirants to the throne were Afzal Khan, Azam Khan and Sher Ali. Each one of the trio was well qualified to succeed his father. Afzal Khan had made a name for himself in the conquest of Afghan-Turkistan, and had been ruling that area for sometime during his father's reign. He was manly, bold, resolute and a good administrator.³ Mohammad Azam was a

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1. See Wyllie's article in *The Edinburgh Review*, 1867 No. CXXV "Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence". Wyllie also wrote a couple of letters on this subject both in the *Daily News* and in *The Times*. Wyllie's articles on India and Central Asia are edited by W. W. Hunter. "*Essays on the External Policy of Indian*" London, 1875.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169 Lumsden's *Diary* no. 27 pp. 275—77. List of Amir's sons : Afzal Khan 52, Azam Khan 45, Sher Ali 40, Amin Khan 34, Wali Mohammad 33, Sharif Khan 30, Ahmad Khan 30, Mohammad Aslam 27, Faiz Mohammad 25, Hassan Khan 25, Zaman Khan 25, Hussain Khan 23. The ages of Mohammad Qusim, Faizullah Khan, Yussuf Khan and Osman Khan are not known. The names of two minor sons and the daughters are also unknown.
 3. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/172 Edwardes to Temple no. 82. pp. 56—9.

skilled administrator also, having served in the eastern districts of Kurram and Khost. He was considered the ablest politician in Dost's family.¹ Sher Ali, the darling of his father, was a mediocrity compared with his elder brothers. He was short tempered and superficial,² but Dost Mohammad had proclaimed him successor to the throne on the death of the heir-apparent, Ghulam Haider in July 1858. During the following years Sher Ali was recognised in Afghanistan as the rightful successor to his father, and the Government of India had also formally accepted him in 1858.³

On June 12, 1863, Sher Ali informed the Government of India of his father's death, with the implication that it should recognise his succession to the throne of Kabul.⁴ The Earl of Elgin, the Viceroy of India (1862--1863), doubted Sher Ali's hold over Afghanistan and deemed it necessary "to wait for further information before taking a formal step in acknowledging" Sher Ali to the Ameerate.⁵ Sher Ali's letter was acknowledged, and the British vakeel at his court was directed to tell the Amir that a reply to his communication would follow in due course.⁶

This "contemptuous negligence or the miserable waiting game" policy, as one contemporary critic

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1. *The Edinburgh Review* CXXV *op. cit.* p. 18. (Hereafter cited as E. R.)
 2. *Ibid.* p. 18.
 3. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/170 Government of India to Punjab no. 2226 Sept. 14, 1858. Also in *Epitome* pp. 98-99.
 4. *E. S. L. I.* 1861--65/176 p. 490.
 5. Wood Papers 2/56 Elgin to Wood July 30, 63 : *par. pap.* LVI 1878--9 No. 3/1.
 6. *E. S. L. I.* 1861--65/176 Government of India to Punjab July 22, 63.

called it,¹ had a disastrous effect on the internal politics of Afghanistan. The commissioner of Peshawar warned the Supreme Government of the consequences of non-recognition to the *de facto* ruler, which he correctly pointed out, would encourage the discontented elements within Afghanistan; they would infer from the British tardiness its dissatisfaction with the nomination of the ruling Amir.² Sher Ali himself was surprised at the cold attitude of the British and anxiously awaited Calcutta's reply to his letter of June.

Discord started as soon as the princes, Amin, Sharif and Azam left Herat after the funeral ceremonies for their father, for their respective fortresses in Qandhar, Girishk and Kurram. Sher Ali on his way to Kabul halted at Ghazni to ascertain Azam's allegiance, and invited Azam to come there so that he might satisfy himself of his fealty.³ Sher Ali reached Kabul on September 9, but still the British communication recognizing his status had not arrived. The Amir's rivals throve on British inaction and Azam, the most active among them, opened correspondence with the commissioner of Peshawar, condemning the new ruler's attitude towards his brothers and asking for advice on intended

1. *Daily News*, Evan Bell's letter January, 1, 1870 p. 2. c. 3.

2. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* No. 4/6.

3. Rahman A. *The life of Amir Abdur Rehman*. London, 1900 vol. I p. 43 (Hereafter cited as Rahman). But both the accounts by Wyllie in *E. S. L. I.* 1866/I No. 126. July 16, pp. 497-539 and in the *Edinburg Review op. cit.* P. 19 report that Sher Ali marched on Kurram and forced Azam to submission.

retaliation.¹ Afzal the strongest of the candidates, holding power in Turkistan was a great moral and physical support for the younger more ambitious princes. Azam had approached the English in his name and Aslam, the eighth prince in line had fled from Bamian and sought refuge with him. Prince Amin, the fourth in line and prince Sharif, the sixth son of Dost Mohammad, were actively engaged in forming a coalition against the new Amir in their dominions.

The advent of snowy winter in Afghanistan halted the intended revolts. In December 1863, the Government of India recognised Sher Ali as successor to his father's throne, in what Rawlinson called "coldest terms of official formalism."² Sher Ali took it as an auspicious omen and immediately despatched his trusted general Mohammad Rafique to Peshawar to negotiate for assistance from the Government of India, but Sir John Lawrence, who had assumed the viceroyalty, held out against giving any.⁴

Rafique on his return found Afghanistan in political turmoil. The two brothers Afzal at Balkh and Azam at Kurram, assisted by the former's talented son Abdul Rahman, had drawn up a plan of action.⁴ The Spring of 1864, commenced with civil war in Afghanistan. Sher Ali ever suspicious of Azam's activities, had sent a force to take over the fort of

1. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 4/2.

2. *Nineteenth Century Review*. "The Afghan Crisis" vol. IV 1878 p. 970.

3. *Collection of Political Despatches from India 1864/73*, 59/12 (Hereafter cited as C. P. D. I.)

4. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 44. Rahman says he did not take part in such plans.

Gardez, recently quitted by Azam who lacked a sufficient army to garrison it. This caused Azam to defy his brother's authority in Kurram. Sher Ali then sent General Rafique against Azam and he himself marched against Balkh. Azam deserted by his soldiery, abandoned Kurram and fled to Rawalpindi in India, in May 1864, where he stayed for the next ten months. Sher, advanced on Turkistan, and met Afzal's force at Bajgah near Bamian on June 3, where a short skirmish took place. Meanwhile Rafique rejoined Sher Ali. Both sides had convincing arguments, Afzal demonstrated his superior claim to the throne and Sher Ali his strong army, but each fearing the other. At length negotiations were opened¹ and peace was concluded on June 29, with solemn pledges on the Book. Afzal's status was defined and he was restored to his dominion in Turkistan.

But the truce was short live. Abdul Rahman did not approve of his father's stand and even advised him to arrest Sher Ali if possible.⁷ Sher Ali himself was highly suspicious of Abdul Rahman the governor of Tukhtapul.³ This mistrust was enhanced by the mischief of the Kabuli courtiers who advised the Amir to remove Afzal from Turkistan. Afzal learning of this, called it a breach of the sworn pledge so recently taken, but he was arrested.⁴ Rahman decided to fight for the release of his father, but the

1. *Ibid.* p. 46. Rahman says that the initiative was taken by Sher Ali.

2. *Ibid.* p. 47.

3. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 20.

4. *E. S. L. I.* 1861-65/176 *K. D.* 22-24 July 1864.

latter knowing the weakness of his son's arms, advised him to proceed to Bokhara and return when competent to fight.¹

Sher Ali then turned towards the second coalition led by Amin, the Governor of Qandhar, assisted by the wealthy Sharif, ruler of Farrah and Girishk, the two southernmost districts of Afghanistan. They were joined by their nephew Jalalud Din, the son of the late Akbar Khan, the hero of the First Anglo-Afghan war. Jalal-ud-Din attempted early in 1865 to capture Kelate-e-Ghilzai, but failed and fell back on Judulk, where he was reinforced by his uncles. They then planned to storm Kilate-e-Ghilzai a second time. Sher Ali, learning of their intentions took up a defensive position at the latter place on June 3, 1865. Three days later he met them at Kujbhaz, two miles outside Kilat. A desperate battle ensued : the Qandharies were winning until the sudden death of prince Amin turned the tide ; the Qandharies were defeated and with their demoralised commanders, Sharif and Jalal, they retreated to Qandhar, where they surrendered to Sher Ali on June 14. Sher's major loss in this battle was the death of his son Ali Khan, which he himself said "clouded all the joy of victory."

Azam failed to gain any support in India for his clique, and, disappointed, returned to² Kurram

1. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 48.

2. Azam in India was given very humitiating treatment, Lawrence was getting annoyed with his presence in India and urged Montgomery to get rid of him. Azam's allowance in India was Rs. 1500 a month. See. *Lawrence Papers* no. 29 Feb : 11, July 27 and Aug. 4, 1864.

in March 1865. After raising another abortive revolt, he again retreated to the Waziri hills. The middle of 1865 saw Sher Ali paramount in Afghanistan. Afzal was under arrest; Amin was dead, Azam and Rahman were refugees, and Sharif and Jalal were suing for pardon.

All the English accounts agree that Abdul Rahman was given a rousing reception in Bokhara. Sher Ali's betrayal and arrest of his brother was condemned and the native college of divines pronounced a "*Fatwa of Kuffar*" against Sher Ali. The Amir of Bokhara expressed his willingness to assist Abdul Rahman's crusade against his uncle.¹

Abdul Rahman gathered two thousand five hundred men at Bokhara and leaving that city on June 22, he entered Afghanistan during the middle of the following month. His arrival was welcomed by Faiz Mohammad, the governor of Akcha, who was having a hard time with Sher Ali on the subject of revenue returns to Kabul.² Rahman took over Akcha without firing a shot. Then he advanced on Balkh, which Fateh Mohammad, another son of the late Akbar Khan, was holding in favour of Sher Ali. To the chagrin of Fateh, his army refused to fight against the son of their old master. Fateh Mohammad facing hostility on all sides, made his way to Kabul alone, abandoning Balkh and

1. *E. R.* pp. 21-2. But Abdur Rahman on the contrary reports that he received neither help nor money from Bokhara. Rather he was kept as a state prisoner and was insulted on many occasions. He was not allowed to take back even his own men. Rahman I *op. cit.* pp. 55-61.

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* pp. 64-5.

Tashkurgan to Rahman. Appointing Faiz to the administration of the conquered area, Rahman left for Bamian where he was joined by his uncle Azam Khan on November, 30, 1865.

Sher Ali, good fortune was running out. He had not recovered from the shock of his son's death, and had shut himself up with his harem in Qandhar. He delegated the defence of Kabul to his son Ibrahim by displacing Wali Mohammad, a man of doubtful loyalty and of the same ilk as his brother Faiz. The Balkh party mastering the situation, set out for Kabul and in December, arrived within ten miles of the city. Their star was in the ascendent. Both Sharif and Rafique, sent by the Amir to assist Ibrahim in Kabul, picked quarrels with the new governor and joined the invaders. They were followed by Wali Mohammad who had legitimate grounds for discontent.

The Balkh army reaching Kabul, received an offer of armistice from Ibrahim-wary of intrigues and conscious of his defenceless position. He requested the invaders to postpone the conflict for forty days, that is up to February 19, by which date, Afzal and his co-prisoners would be released and the former restored to his estate. The proposals were accepted by the invaders, who needed rest and shelter after their long march through snow and frost.¹ Ibrahim during this period pressed his father hard either to liberate the prisoners, or to come to his rescue, but Sher Ali throughout this time, as

1. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 71. Also B. R. *op. cit.* p. 26.

Abdul Rahman says was "like a lunatic" unaware of the events around him.¹ And when the deadline arrived the conditions remained unfulfilled. The Balkhis then fell upon Kabul, which already depressed, was giving ground to the invaders. On February 22, the main body of the Kabul army abandoned their camps and two days later Azam entered Kabul.² Ibrahim supported by a handful of faithfuls, held out at Bala Hissar, but this too surrendered to Rahman after a siege of nine days on the promise of personal safety and freedom to the defenders.³

The fall of Kabul brought Sher Ali to his senses.⁴ Conscription from Herat, Qandhar and Farrah raised his army to about forty thousand men.⁵ The whole month of March he spent in collecting provisions. He was warmly supported by Fateh Mohammad, and both Faiz and Sharif once again joined his camp. Jealousy between Azam and Rahman further augured well for Sher Ali's success in the coming struggle.⁶ In April he moved towards Ghazni, then besieged by Abdur Rahman. Rahman seeing a mighty army advancing, raised the siege and withdrew to the narrow pass of Saidabad.⁷ Sher Ali leaving the royal prisoner Afzal at Ghazni, set out

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 63.

2. *E. R.* p. 27. Rahman's chronology of the events is very poor. His account says that the war started in March and occupation took place in February. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 72.

3. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 27. Also Rahman *op. cit.* p. 72.

4. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 27.

5. Rahman I. *op. cit.* p. 73.

5. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 28.

7. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 73:

for Saidabad on May 9.⁸ Here Rahman assisted by Rafique occupied a strong position. Azam stayed at Kabul "preferring to watch the progress of the battle from afar."⁵

A cannonade on the 9th was followed by a desperate battle the next day. Sher Ali himself led his twenty five thousand men and fifty guns, against Rahman's seven thousand. Both sides fought bravely, but the desertion of the Qandharis to Rahman's side turned the scale against Sher. He fled with a few hundred men, while the rest of his army surrendered to Rahman. The residents of Ghazni, on learning of Sher's defeat, shut their gates to the fugitive ruler and welcomed the new monarch by liberating the royal prisoners,² chief among them, Afzal Khan, who became the new Amir on May 21, 1866 amidst popular celebrations that evening.

The latter half of the year 1866 saw Afghanistan split up into three parts, each ruled by an independent chief. Central Afghanistan comprising Kabul and Ghazni was under Afzal Khan, who wearied by his long captivity and growing age had delegated his authority to his younger brother Azam.⁷ The south and west, including the districts of Kelat-e-Ghilzai, Qandhar, Girishk, Farrah and Herat were held by Sher Ali. His son Yaqub was holding Herat, and had accumulated a powerful contingent. Most of the Kabul chiefs still looked upon Sher Ali as their

1. *E. R. op. cit.* pp. 28-9.

2. Rahman I p. 76.

3. *Ibid.* Also *E. R. op. cit.* p. 29.

4. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 101. *E. R. op. cit.* pp. 250-252.

Amir.¹ Northern Afghanistan, that is Afghan Turkistan, was ruled by Faiz Mohammad, who was appointed the governor of Balkh by Rahman on his conquest of that region, but had defied the Kabul authority and had assumed independence.² By his tactful dealings with his subjects, Faiz had earned much esteem and all the Uzbek chiefs had recognised him as their master. Faiz having offended the central party was leaning towards Sher Ali, and the latter welcomed his overtures. Thus within three years of the death of Dost Mohammad, Afghanistan had fallen prey to chaos and anarchy. To the political observers of the time, it was a tussel for power between Azam and Sher.³

Both Azam and Sher Ali made claims to the support of the British Government during their struggle for survival. Azam during his ten month's sojourn in India, had received a "cold treatment" there.⁴ He had been a great adherent of the English alliance for Afghanistan, had served as an intermediary for formulating the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1857, and had successfully persuaded his father not to invade India during the Mutiny, contrary to the popular demand in Afghanistan during that time.⁵

1. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 30.

2. It is said Azam was against Faiz's appointment and wanted to remove him ; Faiz learning this declared his independence.

3. *F. R. op. cit.* p. 588.

4. Rahman *op. cit.* p. 69.

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/171 Edwardes to Temple no. 82. *op. cit.* pp. 58-9. Also in Bellew, H. W. *Afghanistan and the Afghans*, London 1879. p. 87.

He had been on friendly terms with the British mission during their residence at Qandhar, and both Lumsden and Bellew spoke highly of him.¹ Azam did expect some rewards for his long standing friendly attitude towards India, and made his visit there with this hope.² Azam was not wrong when he summoned to his presence the British Munshi,³ Mohammad Bakhtiar, in March, 1866, after the conquest of Kabul and denounced his masters as "inhospitable and ungrateful."⁴

To the British Government of Sir John Lawrence both Azam and his brother Afzal were usurpers. Lawrence was annoyed at the liberty which the British Munshi took to congratulate Azam on his victorious entry into Kabul.⁵ He issued immediate orders to recall the Munshi, when the latter extended friendly overtures on behalf of the British Government to stop a rumoured Russo-Afghan alliance in 1866.⁶ But the commissioner of Peshawar, and the Lt. Governor of Punjab, intervened to cancel this decision as they deemed Munshi's stay necessary at Kabul.⁷ Azam appealed to the Government of

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1. *E. S. L. I.* 1858/169. Lumsden's Diary no. 27. Also in *E. S. L. I.* 1859/172. Lumsden's Report *op. cit.* pp. 201-2.
 2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 70.
 3. Foujdar Khan served between 1857 and 1860. He was followed by Ghulam Hussain who stayed at Kabul till January 1864, and left behind a Munshi, to represent the British Government.
 4. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 31.
 5. *E. S. L. I.* 1866/I Government of India to Punjab March 14, 1866, p. 143.
 6. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 32.
 7. *E. S. L. I.* 1866/I Government of India to Punjab no. 355. April 17, 66 and No. 86. May 17, 66. Also in *Par. Pap.* 1878-9 LVI p. 383.

India firstly through the Munshi and then wrote directly on behalf of Afzal to Lawrence, for Afzal's recognition and British help. But Lawrence paid no heed to such requests and in reply told them "plainly and openly" that the British Government would not "break off" with Sher Ali, and would only recognise Afzal if he became supreme throughout Afghanistan, because the relations of the British Government were with the actual ruler of that state.¹ Lawrence addressed Afzal Khan not as an Amir but as a mere Sardar.

Once again, in November 1866, when the Russian advance in Central Asia and Bokhara's ineffectiveness against it was constituting a threat to the Afghan dominion,² Afzal and Azam invited Lawrence to interest himself in Afghanistan affairs. Lawrence brushed aside the apprehensions of the Afghans and told them that the Government of India could see no danger to their dominion.³

Lawrence's attitude towards Sher Ali, his "original ally" makes for another sad story. Sher Ali had written three successive letters by the middle of 1866, to the British Munshi at Kabul, requesting him to forward to higher authorities, his demand for six thousand muskets and money in cash. Of these letters only two reached India.⁴ Both the letters in Punjab were considered forgeries, a machination of the Afzal party in league with the Munshi to test

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1866/I Lawrence to Afzal Khan July 11, 1866. *E. R. op. cit.* p. 33. *Lawrence Papers* no. 29. Lawrence to Mcleod June 2, 1866.

2. *Ibid. op. cit.* Azam to Kabul Munshi pp. 433-4.

3. *F. R. op. cit.* p. 603-4.

4. *Ibid.* p. 590.

the real intentions of the British.¹ No reply was made to Sher Ali. Then in September 1866, the latter wrote directly to the commissioner of Peshawar appealing that kings had been always assisted by kings during their troubles, and Sher Ali, the rightful successor to his father's throne, who had been on treaty terms with the British, deserved their help in an hour of need.² The Government of Punjab forwarding the letter to the Central Government also informed Sher Ali that it was not certain whether the British Government would interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.¹ The Government of India considered this reply sufficient and directed the border authorities not to communicate further on the subject.²

Thus once again a wave of strife was released in Afghanistan, known as the Afghan civil war. Shrewd political observers had always held the dictum that a weak Afghanistan in Central Asia, would invite troubles for British India. Britain did not at any stage of the civil war, attempt to exercise its influence directly or indirectly to restore peace in Afghanistan. Credit goes to H. T. Prinsep, a shrewd Anglo-Indian administrator and later a member of the Secretary of State's Council, and to the Government of the Punjab for recommending that the Government of India send a British mission to Afghanistan to patch up differences between the

1. *Ibid.*

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1866/I Sept. 10, 66. p. 834.

3. *Ibid.* Secretary Punjab to Commssioner Peshawar no. 24. Oct. 6, 1866. p. 835.

4. *Ibid.* Government of India to Punjab no. 1075. Oct. 20, 66. p. 837.

contending parties, but Sir John Lawrence was deaf to such suggestions.¹

The year of 1867, was ushered in by further and mounting turmoil in Afghanistan. Sher and Faiz descended upon Kabul separately. Sher Ali had moved towards Ghazni in October 1866, with a force of about twenty-seven thousand men. Azam and Rahman came out with their fifteen thousand and halted at Dewarak.² Sher Ali reaching Kelat-e-Ghilzai despatched an advance party which made a surprise attack upon the enemy on December 30, but nothing was gained. Then followed inaction for a fortnight. On January 12, Sher Ali came out of Kelat.³ Four days later Rahman advanced on him at Kujbaz. A cannonade lasted the whole day long, with a break at sunset: it was resumed next morning.⁴ In the afternoon Kabul assumed an aggressive role by making a general advance. The Qandhari section of Sher's army gave way. Sher Ali noticing his trenches empty withdrew, and by the evening Rahman was master of the field.⁵ Sher Ali fled towards Qandhar and from there to Herat. Azam and Rahman took over Qandhar on January, 26.⁶

1. S. H. C. 1868/62. Princep memo. on Central Asia. January 3, 1868 : *Lawrence Papers* no. 28 Mcleod to Lawrence (private) Feb. 29, 68 and no. 30 Lawrence to Mcleod (private) March 6 and Aug. 17, 1858.

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 80.

3. *F. R. op. cit.* p. 601.

4. *The Edinburgh Review* CXXVIII 1873. "The recent events in Afghanistan" p. 253. (Hereafter cited as *E. R.* 1873).

5. *Ibid.*

6. *F. R. op. cit.* p. 601. but Afzal's letter to Lawrence mentions the occupation of Qandhar on January 19. See *Par. Pap.* 1878-9. LVI.

While the Kabul army was arrayed at Kelat-e-Ghilzai, Faiz Mohammad advanced on Kabul. Azam despatched his son Sarwar, but Sarwar was no match for his powerful uncle. Sarwar was defeated in January 1867 at Abikali and Bajgah, and Faiz's passage lay open to Kabul. Afzal got hysterical and sent for Rahman to arrest this advance.¹ But Faiz hearing of Sher Ali's defeat, fortunately gave up his further plan of action.

The new year dawned with brighter prospects for the central party. Afzal's major rivals were defeated. Faiz disheartened by Sher Ali's collapse, had returned from Bamian without taking any advantage of his victories. Afzal's hold extended over Kelat-e-Ghilzai and Qandhar, both of them important centres. The Kabul party once again turned towards the British Government to ascertain whether the laurels of war had brought co-operation any nearer. A letter with Afzal's signature on it, was despatched to Lawrence announcing his victory over Sher Ali. The Government of Punjab in forwarding this letter, recommended to the Central Government that Afzal's claim and status in his dominion be recognized, since it was not impossible that he might someday rule the whole of Afghanistan. The recommendations urged the Central Government to address Afzal as Amir and not Sardar as on the former occasion.² This counsel took effect, and Lawrence in his letter to Afzal, addressed him as

1. Rahman I p. 85.

2. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* No. 7/2 : *Lawrence Papers* no. 28 Mcleod to Lawrence (private) Feb. 12, 67.

Amir, but only of Kabul and Qandhar.¹ The letter reminded Afzal Khan that the relations of the British Government existed with only the actual ruler of Afghanistan and to attain that actuality he must exert himself. Lawrence also informed the ruler of Kabul that a native Vakeel would be deputed to his court to represent the British Government.²

This was not a very encouraging message for the Kabul party. Though in their letter, Kabul reciprocated the formalities contained in Lawrence's letter, yet they were convinced by now that the British would never come to their help. Afzal Khan therefore turned towards Russia. A copy of the letter from the Government of India, along with a communication from Afzal Khan, was sent to the Russian Governor of Tashkand, by the hand of a Khokandi trader named Qamr-ud-Din. The note said that they had no confidence in "Lord Sahib's" fine profession of goodwill and they were disgusted with the English for their usual ingratitude and selfishness, and they looked upon Russia as their only well-wisher, and were very anxious to open commercial contacts with her.³ The letter reached Tashkand on June 5.

Sher Ali after his defeat at Kelat-e-Ghilzai once again had recourse to English support. He sent

1. *Lawrence Papers*. no. 8. Lawrence to Cranborne (private) Feb. 9, 67.

2. *E. S. L. I.* 1867/2 Viceroy to Afzak Khan Feb. 25, 67. Also *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 7/2.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1876/2 G. Paracha to Manphul July 5, 67. Also in *F. R. op. cit.* p. 605.

from Herat to Sindh a namesake of his own.¹ The messenger on his master's advice put the new request in the form of an ultimatum, that is, failing to procure British co-operation, Sher Ali would ask for extraneous help.² The Commissioner of Sindh, a chief executive authority on the border, having no power to promise anything,³ listened to the talk with patience, and at the end handed over to the dejected envoy a copy of the latest letter of the Government of India addressed to Afzal Khan, which advocated the rigid neutral policy of British India.⁴ True to his policy, in July, Sher Ali approached Persia, sending his son Yaqub, the Governor of Herat, to meet the Shah of Persia who was on a pilgrimage to the Shrine of his spiritual director, Imam Raza, in Mashhad on the borders of Herat.⁵

The visit of Yaqub, the ruler of Herat to Mashhad was not without interest. Persia was deeply concerned with Herat, and a rumour spread on the borders that Sher Ali was making over Herat to Persia in lieu of military aid from that power against his rivals in Afghanistan.⁶ Herat once again

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1. *E.S.L.I.* Commissioner Sindh Telegram Feb. 26, 67. p. 339.
 2. *Lawrence Papers.* no. 8. Lawrence to Northcote (private) March 28, 67.
 3. *E.S.L.I.* Government of India to Commissioner Sindh Telegram Feb. 28, 67. p. 341.
 4. *Ibid.* Commissioner Sindh to Government of India Telegram April 4, 67. p. 429.
 5. F. O. 60/305 Alison to Stanley no. 63 July 23, 1867.
 6. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2. Viceroy to secretary of State no. 3. Sept. 3, 67. and No. 161. Oct. 15, 67. The first letter also in *Par. pap. op. cit.* no. 10.

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became a burning question in Afghan politics.¹

Lawrence grew nervous as he heard of the day-to-day developments on the Perso-Afghan border. It was a challenge to his policy of "Masterly Inactivity". He wrote to his immediate chief at the India Office, that he would assist Afzal and his party against Persian-supported Sher Ali invasion of Afghanistan. He requested that the home government exert its authority at Tehran and stop the Persian-led interference in Afghanistan. Also he wrote to Alison, the British Minister at Tehran, suggesting he might use his influence to discourage the possibility of this new alliance.² Lawrence also warned Sher Ali of the consequences of the step that he was contemplating.

Alison wisely deputed, Ronald Thomson, the Secretary of the British Legation, to be in attendance on the Shah during the latter's visit to Mashhad.³ Alison was assured by the Persian Foreign Office at Tehran, that Persia would prefer neutrality in the internal problems of Afghanistan. The Shah himself sent a communique to Alison, informing him that Persia had no intention of compromising itself in the

1. Simultaneous with Yaqub's visit, Shahnawaz Khan, son of the late Sultan Amnad Khan also appeared at Mashhad. Shahnawaz was a co-prisoner with Afzal in Ghazni, but was released by Afzal Khan on the defeat of Sher Ali. He was sent by the Afzal party to counteract the activities of Yaqub in Persia and if possible to eject Sher Ali from Herat with Persian aid. Shahnawaz was well received by the Shah and was a source of trouble for a long time to Yaqub. F. O. 60/305 no. 82 and its (enclosures), also F. O. 60/306 no. 93 and its enclosure.

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 3. *op. cit.*

3. *Ibid.*

Afghan civil war.¹

Yaqub met the Shah and although he was given a favourable reception at Mashhad, the Shah excused himself from rendering any active help.²

Both Afzal and Sher Ali failing in their endeavours to win foreign assistance for their internal feuds, turned once again to their own resources. The latter half of the year 1867, saw them again in the battlefield. This time Sher Ali received effective help from Faiz, who had beaten the Kabul army first in 1866, and then again in April 1867. The Kabul Commander Sarwar Khan, frightened at his defeat at Bajgah, left the direction to his subordinates and returned to Kabul. Faiz Mohammad cleared Bamian of the enemy and then retreated to Balkh, leaving further activities for joint action in co-operation with Sher Ali. The latter seeing the sincerity of purpose of the young warrior, joined Faiz at Takhtapul in May 1867. The combined forces numbered sixteen thousand men and sixteen guns. It was a strong and spirited army. Prospects looked brighter for Sher Ali.³ Kabul was defenceless for both Rahman and Azam with their forces were away at Qandhar. Afzal's weak but harsh administration had alienated the common sympathies, and worst of all, a cholera epidemic had broken out in Kabul in July, paralysing the daily

1. F. O. 60/305 no. 63 *op. cit.* F. O. 60/306 Alison to Stanley no. 73 Aug. 11, 67 and its enclosure.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *F. R. op. cit.* p. 606.

life of the city.¹ But Sher Ali failed to take advantage of his opportunities and spent the whole summer at Takhtapul, making visionary schemes.²

After much hesitation, the combined armies of Sher and Faiz started moving on August 23. Abdul Rahman in the meantime had organised his defences in the Hindu Kush Pass.³ The invaders numbering twenty thousand marched in two columns, separated by a considerable distance : Sher Ali was heading towards Panjshehr Pass, while Faiz entered Slanlang Pass. Here Rahman fell upon Faiz. This is known as the battle of Qila Allahbad, after an old fort in the vicinity. Faiz was hit by a cannonball in the encounter, and died : his army surrendered to Rahman on September 17. Faiz's defeat and death frightened Sher, and he hurried to retreat to Takhtapul.⁴ Azam watching the military events from Qandhar, came down to Kabul on September 21, 1867 when the difficulties at the capital were over. He found the ruling Amir Afzal Khan, on his death bed. Afzal from the start was inclined to bequeath his throne to Azam, much against Abdul Rahman's will. The latter had struggled hard to influence his father, but the old man preferred family interest to his own. Afzal died on October 7, appointing Azam his successor, and duly acknowledged by Rahman three days latter.⁵ Bakhtiar, the British Munshi at Kabul,

1. *Ibid.* pp. 608-9. Also Rahman I *op. cit.* pp. 85-6.

2. *Ibid.* p. 606.

3. Rahman I *op. cit.* pp. 86-7.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2. Pollock to Thorton Oct. 16, 67.

5. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 88.

reported that Azam expected a formal British expression of condolence on his brother's death, and also hoped that his title would be given recognition without reservation.¹

Lawrence was reluctant to recognise Azam's accession to the throne of Kabul.² But it was risky to deny a *de facto* ruler his due recognition. Azam was holding a major portion of Afghanistan, had repeatedly defeated Sher Ali, and was universally acknowledged as Amir in the dominion under him. On November 13, Lawrence issued a letter to Azam, addressing him as Amir of Kabul and Qandhar, offering condolence on the old Amir's death, and welcoming Azam's arrival to the Ameerate.³ Ata Mohammad Khan was appointed the new British Vakeel to the court of Azam : he reached Kabul on January 18, and was well received by the new Amir.⁴

The new Amir had many problems to face. Sher Ali was again accumulating munitions and men at Herat. And Turkistan, after the death of Faiz, was lying masterless : the Kabul party had the strongest claim on this region since it was an appanage of Afzal Khan, and it had been conquered by Abdul Rahman and made over to Faiz. Again Abdul Rahman was a nuisance to Azam ; the former's presence at Kabul was eclipsing the latter's influence. Azam used a single stone to kill two birds ; he assigned to Abdul Rahman the affairs of

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 *Kabul Diary* Oct. 13, 67.

2. *F.R. op. cit.* p. 611.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2. Lawrence to Azam Nov. 13, 67.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3. Commissioner Peshawar to Sec. Punjab no. 9 Jan. 31, 68.

Turkistan, this the adventurous nephew accepted though with some hesitation.¹ Also Azam attached to Rahman, Ismail, the son of Amin Khan, to watch and report the activities in the distant north.

On his arrival in Turkistan in January 1860, Rahman found that Sher Ali had made a pecuniary trip to that region, taking away all that was removable. Not content with this, he had sold all the Uzbek principalities to their chiefs, and had installed them as independent rulers.² Rahman found Turkistan in ferment against him. The new chiefs were not likely to give up the independence they had purchased. They formed a confederacy against him at Maimana, a strongly fortified principality in the Hindu Kush range. Abdul Rahman stormed Nimlek, and took over alongwith it Akaba, Malika and Shiberghan. The conquest of Maimana proved to be a difficult task. The enemy had taken up strong defensive position and the surrounding hill range provided formidable shelter for them. Abdul Rahman failed in his first attempt, but the Meers surrendered when he launched his second attempt in May 1868.³ By the middle of 1868, Abdul Rahman had regained his father's dominion in Turkistan. But affairs in Central Afghanistan had taken a new shape during his absence.

Seeing Kabul's energy divided, and Abdul Rahman,

1. Rahman I. *op. cit.* pp. 89-90.

2. *Ibid.* p. 91.

3. *E.R.* 1873 *op. cit.* pp. 261-2. It says Rahman failed in his various attempts to take over Maimana and retired to Bokhara, took it with fresh reinforcements.

the great pillar of Kabul's strength, involved in the difficult conquest of the Uzbeks, Sher Ali deemed it opportune to move on Qandhar, which groaned under the tyrannies of Aziz and Sarwar, the two sons of Azam. Towards the end of March 1868, Sher Ali sent a strong force under his son Yaqub, to test the latter's budding skill. It was a great success. Yaqub defeated Aziz at Girishk, and taking him prisoner marched on Qandhar, which was quickly abandoned by Sarwar to the invader. Sher Ali in the meantime joined his son and the combined army moved towards Ghazni on July 26.¹

The fall of Qandhar had disastrous effects on the Kabul administration. Risings broke out throughout Azam's dominion. Since 1866 his oppression had increased resulting in execution orders of many a talented men including Rafique, the great soldier of the Afghan civil war. The Ghilzais and Shinwaris in the vicinity of Ghazni were discontented, and only awaited a signal to rise. Azam's army was ill-paid, ill-equipped and disgruntled with his greedy administration. Azam saw misfortune surrounding him. He sent for Rahman to come to his rescue, but Rahman had exhausted his energy and resources on the Uzbeks. His only response to his frightened uncle was to advise him to hold on to Kabul for at least a month when he would be able to rescue him.² The desertion of Ismail who left Turkistan on Azam's order but

1. *Ibid*, p. 263.

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 97.

joined Sher Ali, further weakened Azam's cause.¹

Azam came out of Kabul towards the end of July, to defend Ghazni. Ismail, who had joined Sher Ali's cause, entered Kabul, and forced the garrison to surrender on August 18, declaring Sher Ali an Amir at Kabul.² Azam entering Ghazni, was facing Sher Ali's forces, but the latter hearing of Ismail's action at Kabul, decided to join him. Azam followed. Ghazni was left defenceless on the departure of Azam, and surrendered to Sher Ali's adherents, who then attacked Azam from the rear, while Sher Ali launched a frontal attack.³ Thus surrounded and harrassed, Azam attempted to attack Sher Ali on the night of August 26, but found his army arrayed against himself. He fled with some of his followers towards Khost, whence he reached Turkistan during the second week of September.⁴

Azam met Abdul Rahman at Ghor, and persuaded him to take immediate action against Sher Ali.⁵ Since the fall of Kabul, Rahman's authority in Turkistan had been challenged. His soldiery was deserting him and the people in general were grumbling against the taxation, so necessary for the projected war. Both nephew and uncle set out towards Ghazni in October. They sent Sarwar to the Ghilzai area to foment a rising there against Sher Ali. The latter hearing of the activities of

1. *Ibid.* p. 96.

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 98.

3. *E.R.* 1873 *op. cit.* p. 264.

4. *Ibid.* p. 264.

5. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 99.

Azam sent an army against Sarwar, which crushed the Ghilzai rising while Sher himself set out towards Ghazni and encamped near Zanakhan. Azam reaching Ghazni was refused entry into the city by the commander.¹ No action took place during the closing days of the year 1868. Weak and resourceless, Rahman opposed any action during the winter of 1868-1869, but Azam was in a hurry and forced his nephew to open an offensive against Sher Ali.² On January 3, Abdul Rahman moved towards Zanakhan, making a bid to cut off the outlying detachments of Sher Ali. The attempt failed. Abdul Rahman was overpowered and he fled to safety, closely followed by Azam,³ who as usual watched events from a distance at Roza.

The crownless wanderers flew from Ghazni to Zurmat and from there to Waziristan, Bilauchistan, Siestan and in July 1869, they appeared at Mashad.⁴ Here they bade good-bye to each other for ever. Azam proceeding towards Teheran died at Shahrood. Rahman entered Bokhara and from there proceeded to Tashkand, becoming a pensioner of the Russian Government, while awaiting the role which Russia made him play in the years to come.

Sher Ali on his conquest of Kabul in August 1868, informed both Ata Mohammad and Bakhtiar, of his victorious entry to that place.⁵ Receiving no

1. *E.R.* 1873 *op. cit.* p. 269.

2. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 102.

3. *Ibid.* p. 103. Also *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4 Sher Ali to Viceroy Jan. 17, 69.

4. *E.R.* 1873 *op. cit.* p. 270.

5. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3. *K.D.* 23—29, Aug., 68, pp. 323—5.

official response and recognition of his achievements, he addressed a letter to Lawrence announcing his success over his rivals.¹ After ten days, he complained to Ata Mohammad, that he had not received any congratulatory message from the Government of India on the recovery of his dominion. He enumerated to the British Vakeel, the many times that he had deserted the side of his son-in-law Saadat Khan, during the latter's war against the English on the eve of the Ambala campaign.² Sher Ali was emphatic on the point, that although he had given no offence to the British, he never had received any encouragement from the British during the greatest trial of his life.³ He expressed a wish to meet Lawrence himself in India, to explain to him the Kabul position.⁴

But Lawrence was still hesitant. He doubted whether Sher Ali would be able to maintain himself on the throne of Afghanistan.⁵ While recognising the value of "his undaunted courage, constancy, and energy", Lawrence reported to his immediate superior at Whitehall that "no reliance can be placed on him",⁶ and advised him to wait and watch further events.⁷

Having discussed the civil war in Afghanistan

1. *Ibid.* Sher Ali to Viceroy, Sep. 14, 68. pp. 869.

2. A rising of the Wahabis in 1863 on the Anglo-Afghan border.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3. *K.D.* September 25, 68. pp. 976-7.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3 G.G. to Northcote no. 142. Sep. 2, 68. p. 677.

6. *Ibid.* p. 678.

7. *Ibid.* p. 679.

it now becomes necessary to make an analysis of the author of the policy of "Masterly Inactivity".

Lawrence, as is generally known, had risen from a very humble position of writership in the East India Company's service, to a rank which equalled those of the great rulers of his time. He himself had said once that the "Governor generalship is too good a post for a fellow like me",¹ But when he attained it, he failed to appreciate the significance of its position. He ruled as "our American cousins run a store" estimated Herbert Edwardes, one of Lawrence's closest associates on the north western borders of India.² Lawrence failed to realise how great an improvement his open, moral if not material, backing could make in the affairs of Central Asia.

Lawrence belonged to that generation of Englishmen in India, who had experienced the grim consequences of the first Anglo-Afghan War, and this had tended to make them entirely indifferent to the whole problem of Central Asia. The tragic retreat of the British Columns in early 1842 from Afghanistan, and the appalling treatment meted out to two English officials, Stoddart and Conolly in Bokhara, had profoundly affected the thought of the contemporary British policy makers in regards to Central Asia. Lawrence, from the start of his border career in 1846, as a commissioner in the Sikh dominion to his death in 1879, was suspicious of

1. Quoted in : Mercy, V. *The Viceroy of India*, London 1849, p. 83.

2. Edwards, H. *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major Sir H. B. Edwardes, compiled by his wife* : London, 1886 p. 290.

Central Asian rulers.

The Afghans to him were unreliable allies and ruthless plunderers. It was his conviction that Afghanistan would never join the English bloc in Central Asia against Russia. Their love of plunder and their childish eagerness to recover the valleys of Peshawar and Kashmir, coupled with their bigotry, would drive them into the Russian camp. It was wasting both money and energy to try and deal with them, so reasoned Lawrence.¹ He was personally against any treaty with the Afghans.² It was Dalhousie, Canning, or Edwardes³ who made the treaties of 1855 and 1857, with Dost Mohammad.

To the political events on the banks of the Amu and Sar Daria, Lawrence applied another theory. He preferred the growth of Russia in that region to the decayed institutions of the Uzbeks. Lawrence was convinced that this would be for the Uzbeks, an admonition inflicted by the nature for their depredatory spirit, and also that it was a curse for Russia to have undertaken the insurmountable project of conquest and consolidation in Central Asia, which would undoubtedly exhaust her energies and resources. He always harboured the belief that the Russian occupation of Central Asia would be temporary, for these were barren lands inhabited by highly fanatical races. Russia was bound to face a

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1. *Lawrence Papers* no. 7. Lawrence to De Grey (private) May 17, 66, and to Cranborne (private) July 17, 66.
 2. *Par. pap.* LVI 1878-9 Lawrence minutes Nov. 25, 68, no. 14/4.
 3. Edwardes, *Memorials*, *op. cit.* p. 266.

tremendous opposition "like our fate in Kabul".¹ Hence he declined to listen to repeated appeals made by the rulers of Khotan, Khokand, and Bokhara for English support. He was against establishing any commercial links with Yarkand.² He opposed sending accredited English agents to the courts of Central Asia, when suggestions to this effect were made by the Government of Panjab in 1866.³

No less an important effect upon Lawrence's mind was the blind faith attached to his opinion by his superiors in London. His views were accepted as gospel truth by both the Liberal and the Conservative Secretaries of State for India. Sir Charles Wood endorsed his ideas.⁴ The Earl of Cranborne, later Marquis of Salisbury, to whom Lawrence in the seventies was the "Shadow of a great name under which a motley assemblage of wild follies and respectable truisms are trustfully lying down together",⁵ in the sixties was of the view that Lawrence's policy was "consistent with English interest at present".⁶ To Sir Stafford Northcote, Lawrence's was the last word on Central Asian

1. *Lawrence Papers*. no. 6. Lawrence to Wood (private) May 26, 65. Also in his various minutes on the subject of Central Asia he expressed this view.

2. *Par. pap.* XLVI 1868-9 Government of India to Punjab Oct. 28, 68, pp. 535-7.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/1 Government of India to Punjab no. 672 June 27, 66.

4. *Lawrence Papers*. no. 1. Wood to Lawrence (private) June 16, July 4, Oct. 15, 1864 and Letters to India 1859-69/I no. 2, *op. cit.*

5. *Lytton Papers* 516/2 Salisbury to Lytton no. 40 (private), Oct. 4, 77.

6. *Lawrence Papers*, no. 5. Cranborne to Lawrence (private) Aug. 27, 66.

issues.¹ The same tone was adopted by Earl de Grey and Ripon, when he was heading the India Office.²

This omnipotence credited to a person with such obvious flaws in his make-up, naturally did not bring benefits to the British interest on the north western frontiers of India. To the Afghans who looked upon British India as their Argus, it was a sad injustice. Sher Ali always remained a complainant concerning British attitude towards him during the civil war. He held the English responsible for lighting the "fire" in his country.³ To Azam Khan "England was a selfish nation" and he hoped to join the Russian camp, as soon as he was well established in Afghanistan.⁴ Abdul Rahman had "never seen the benefit of English friendship" and preferred to stay in Russia rather than in India.⁵

Thus we can get a glimpse of how Lawrence's policy in India, had created a gulf between the Afghan and the English. Russia having subjugated Bokhara during this period, found it more easy to approach the Afghan mind. Here lay the crux of the problem.

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1. *Lawrence Paper*, no. 4. Northcote to Lawrence (private) April 10, Oct. 1, 1867, and *Letters to India* 1859—69/I Dec. 26, 67. The last letter also in *Par. pap.* LVI 1878-9 no. 15.
 2. *Lawrence Papers*, no. 3. De Grey to Lawrence (private) May 3 and June 30, 66.
 3. *Nine teenth Century Review* IV, 1878 "The Afghan Crisis" Rawlinson p. 971.
 4. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I K.D. March 3, 66, pp. 239-40, and *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3 Commissioner Peshawar to Secretary Punjab no. 33, April 15, 68, p. 291.
 5. Rahman I *op. cit.* p. 111.

CHAPTER IV

Russian "Masterly Activity" continued—Bokhara 1865—1869

Relations between Russia and Bokhara during the first half of the Nineteenth century were of a peaceful nature. There had been a regular exchange of envoys between the two courts.¹ Bokhara did not border Russian territory either at this time or later when Russia occupied the Lower Sar-Daria, for the Kizilkum desert still separated them from each other.² Colonel N.P. Ignatiev who visited Bokhara in September 1858 was "cheerful and contented, he obtained all he wanted from the Amir and perhaps more than he expected" wrote one of the members of Ignatiev's mission.³ Ignatiev, during his conversation with Lord Napier, the British envoy to the Czar's court, spoke well of the treatment he received in Bokhara. He was impressed with the public order, the administration and the army of

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1. Russian envoys sent to Bokhara in the 19th Century included Lt. Poverdovski (1802) who did not reach Bokhara : Subhaunkuloff (1809) : Negri (1820) : Tsiolkovski (1824), failed to reach Bokhara : Damaison (1834) : E. Vukovitch (1835) : Capt. Kovaleski (1839) : Capt. Butnef (1840).
 2. On the frontier of Bokhara to the east was Khokand and the mountains of Badakhshan, on the south the Amu, and on the north and west was the great desert.
 3. Edwardes, H.S. *Russian projects against India*. London 1885, quoted, p. 209.

Bokhara.¹

Ignatiev's mission, carefully studied the object and nature of the British interest in Afghanistan, and in the territories beyond its north western border, and at the end submitted its proposals to Amir Nassarullah of Bokhara.² The mission requested the Amir (1) to lower by half, customs duties on Russian merchandise; (2) to provide protection to Russian merchants; (3) to allow the establishment of temporary Russian commercial agencies in Bokhara; (4) to allot permanent carvansarais for Russian merchants; (5) to permit freedom of navigation on the Amu Daria;³ and (6) to liberate Russian subjects then in captivity in Bokhara.

Amir Nassarullah acceded to the Russian proposals, promising in addition not to receive British emissaries in his dominion, and that he would ask the ruler of Afghanistan not to let them through that country.⁴ British intelligence confirmed these proceedings. Kabul sources reported that thirty-two Russians, who were married to native girls, were turned over to the mission, and that a carvansarai known as Bala Sarai had been allotted to Russian merchants.⁵ The British embassy at St. Petersburg learnt from a newspaper report that, a

1. F.O. 65/867 Napier to Russell no. 272, Aug. 26, 61.

2. Khalfin *op. cit.* pp. 57-8.

3. Also known Vakhshu (Sanskrit), Oxus (Greek) and Jehun (Arabic). The word Amu is derived from the town of Amul, located in the present day at Char Joui.

4. Khalfin p. 59.

5. *E.S.L.I.* 1859/173 *K.D.* 9-15 April 59, pp. 457-8.

decision had been made to establish consulates in Bokhara and in the other states of Central Asia.¹ Lord Wodehouse, the British envoy, was somewhat annoyed at these developments, but he was assured that Britain "need not be alarmed as no demonstration was intended in that part" of Central Asia.²

Ignatiev's visit was returned by Khwaja Najam-ud-Din, the Bokharan envoy, who met both the Czar and Gortchakov. The envoy was assured of the peaceful intentions of Russia in Central Asia.³ The British Foreign office intelligence indicated that a commercial treaty was under consideration by the two governments, and that these negotiations had political implications.⁴

The civilities were shortlived. Increasing Russian pressure in the Sar Daria, produced a sense of insecurity throughout the nations of Central Asia, and particularly on Muzzafar-ud-Din, the new Amir of Bokhara.⁵ The Russian occupation of Tashkand was the last straw, and Amir Muzzafar took immediate action.

Political ascendancy in Turkistan had been the key policy of the Amirs of Bokhara in the Nineteenth century. Bokhara was the most influential and the major political power among the

1. F.O. 65/867, no. 259.

2. F.O. 65/867. Wodehouse to Clarendon, March 25, 58.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1859/1873 *K.D. op. cit.* and also in F.O. 65/534, no. 59.

4. F.O. 65/535 Crampton to Malmesbury no. 87, March 16, 1859.

5. Nassarullah died in 1860 and was succeeded by his son.

states of Central Asia ; in the hour of crisis the neighbouring states looked to it for guidance and support. The cry from Tashkand and Khokand for deliverance could not remain unmet by the "defender of the faith". It was not only Amir Muzzaffar's political sagacity, but also religious obligations that brought him to the rescue of his co-religionists.

The fall of Tashkand made action imperative and on June 25, 1865, Amir Muzzafar despatched his envoy Khwaja Najam-ud-Din Parsa to St. Petersburg.¹ The envoy took with him two elephants as presents for the Czar, and a letter containing both a protest against the Russian occupation of Tashkand and a request for its restoration to Bokhara.² In the meantime the Amir moved on to Khokand, and occupied it for the next two months from July 14 to September 13, before restoring Khudayar Khan to the throne under the vassalage of Bokhara.³ The Amir also annexed the south-western area of Khokand extending as far as Kani Badam, and including Uratippa and Khokand.⁴

Russian diplomatic circle did not approve of Amir Muzzafar's actions. To them he was an intruder in Russo-Khokandi affairs, and an encroacher on Khokandi territory. Hence they set out to take stringent measures against Bokhara. A Bokharan caravan was detained at Orenburg,⁵

1. Singh *op. cit.* p. 13.

2. F.O. 65/868. Buchanan to Russel no. 325, Oct. 25, 65.

3. Singh *op. cit.* p, 14.

4. *Ibid.*

5. E.R. CXXV 1867 *op. cit.* p. 37.

restrictions were imposed on the commerce of that state,¹ Khwaja Najam-ud-Din was not allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg, and Bokhara was asked to withdraw from the recently conquered Khokandi territory.² In July the Amir sent another envoy, Khwaja Ahsan, to Charnaiev, requesting the release of Najam-ud-Din, so that he might resume his journey to the Russian capital, and repeating his demand for a Russian withdrawal from Tashkand.³ Charnaiev rejected both demands. Muzzafar-ud-Din retaliated by closing his dominion to Russian trade and traders.⁴

Four months passed without any important event. Najam-ud-Din was still imprisoned in Fort Kazala. The Amir started necessary preparations for a "Jehad against Rooss".⁵ Then came an immediate change in Russian attitude. In early November 1865, Najam-ud-Din was permitted to proceed to St. Petersburg, and a Russian mission from Tashkand, under M. de Struv was sent to Bokhara.⁶ Struv demanded that the Amir withdraw from Khokandi territory and open up that state to Russian trade.⁷ The Bokhara mission in St. Petersburg was refused an audience with the Czar, and was advised to refer its grievances to the

1. F.O. 65/868. Buchanan to Russel no. 27, Sept. 12, 65.

2. *Ibid.* also in no. 325.

3. Singh *op. cit.* p. 13.

4. *E.R. op. cit.* p. 37.

5. Singh *op. cit.* p. 14.

6. Other members of the mission were Lt. Col. Tatarinof, and Capt. Ghukhofski.

7. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I Ghulam Rabbani account p. 192

Orenburg administration.¹ The Amir, in a fury, detained the Russian mission conditional upon the safe-return of his own mission.²

Charnaiev made this a *casus belli*, declaring it a machination of the secret British agents, intent on exciting war against Russia.³ Gortchakov had already indicated to Buchanan that Struv's detention in Bokhara might result in war.⁴ It was a forgone conclusion. The Russian mission could not expect to have better treatment than that given to Najam's.

Charnaiev moved his forces against Bokhara on January 30, 1866. They crossed the Sar Daria with fourteen companies of infantry, six squadrons of Cossacks and sixteen guns, and reached Jizakh,⁵ the first fortified Bokharan town, on February 16.⁶ Charnraiev there found himself opposed by a formidable force, and prudence advised an immediate withdrawal.⁷

Charnaiev's retreat from Jizakh was not well received at St. Petersburg-retreat as Gortchakov had said in his circular of 1864, is taken as sign of weakness by Asians. The same month Charnaiev was recalled, and he was succeeded by General D.I. Romanovski. While Gortchakov bluffed Buchanan,

1. F.O. 85/868 Buchanan to Russel no. 377 Dec. 6, 65.

2. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Clarendon No. 111, March 14, 66.

3. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Russel no. 223, May 9, 66.

4. F.O. 65/868 no. 111, *op. cit.*

5. Jizakh means hot. The place is known for its high temperature ; it is situated in the deep valley near the Aktau range.

6. Vambery, A. *History of Bokhara*, London, 1873 p. 402.

7. *Ibid.* pp. 402-3. But *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I Ghulam Rabbani account of Feb. 22, 66, states that the Russians were defeated at Jizakh.

that the "independent and insubordinate proceedings" of Charnaiev had led to the latter's recall. Buchanan learnt from other sources the actual story of the general's recall.¹ On the contrary Charnaiev's salary had been raised, honours were bestowed upon him and his policy in Central Asia was kept very much alive.²

Charnaiev's advance on Jizakh alarmed the Government of India, which had received an account of it through an agent.³ The agent reported that there were 20,000 Russian soldiers ready for action against Bokhara, while the latter's irregular and ill-equipped forces would never be able to resist the Russian advance. The Government of India, relying on this report, strongly doubted "the good faith and pacific and commercial intentions" of Russia as expressed in the despatch of her Chancellor in 1864; it concluded that the present quarrel between Bokhara and Russia had been conducted under "the direct order of the Russian Government". The Russian action, the Government of India pointed out, was "unauthorised" and the war with Bokhara was one of its projects of expansion.⁴

Lord Clarendon, acting on the information of the India Office, directed Cortchakov that "H.M. Government recognizes that under international law and practice, Russia is justified in having recourse to

1. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Clarendon no. 71, Feb. 28, 66.

2. Terentev, M.A. *Istoria Zavovania Sredni Asii*, St. Petersburg 1906. Vol. I, p. 335, given in Pierce, R.A. *Russian Central Asia 1867, 1917*, California 1960, p. 24.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I Ghulam Rabbani account pp. 190/2.

4. *S.H.C.* 1866/I.O. to F.O. June 21, 66.

measures of coercion to procure the release of her envoy", but that, the Russian aim as understood from the circular of 1864, was to form a safe boundary line without disturbing the integrity of the Central Asian states. Subsequent events in that part of the world showed that "Russia seems to have made a steady advance in this direction, taking permanent possession of territory not required solely for making a good frontier".¹

Buchanan made some inquiries in St. Petersburg. His intelligence was that the Russian army in Central Asia was not as large as reported by the Indian agent.² He learned that there were eleven battalions each consisting of about 500 men.³ He then obtained an audience with Gortchakov and read out to him, a significant portion of Clarendon's despatch on the subject. Gortchakov listened calmly and in reply informed the British envoy, that Tashkand had indeed been annexed to the Russian dominion in Central Asia, but as regards further extension in that region, "the Russian military authorities were the only competent judges as to what district might be required to give a satisfactory frontier to the Russian possessions in Central Asia".⁴ This explanation, it looks, did not satisfy Buchanan who asked

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1. F.O. 65/868 Clarendon to Buchanan no. 201, June 27, 66.
 2. There were 15,000 Russian soldiers in Turkistan. See Romanovsky pamphlet translated in the *London Times*, March 26, 1869, p. 8, c. 3. Romanovski, own account says that there were 13,000 men in Turkistan. Romanovski, D.I. *Notes on Central Asian question* (Translated by Government of India), Calcutta 1870 p. 18.
 3. F.O. 65/869 Buchanan to Russel no. 311, July 2, 66.
 4. *Ibid.*

Gortchakov where Russia intended to halt her conquest. To this query Gortchakov gave "no very definite answer".¹

The new Russian commander in Central Asia, General Romanovski, was an educated Slav, with a sense of ethnic superiority, who advocated Russian conquest mainly for moral ends.² Buchanan learned that he was a man of peaceful means.³ His instructions emphasized the territorial extension of Russia in Turkistan only in cases of urgency, keeping in mind that Asians respect the force of arms above negotiations.⁴ Romanovski was also to negotiate with Bokhara for the release of the Russian mission and to open that state to Russian commerce.⁵

But peace in Central Asia was an unattainable goal. The greed of the Russian mercantile class, the pressure for promotions among the military group, and the hostility of the Russian press towards Britain,⁶ led to new tensions with Bokhara. The spring of 1866, brought an open clash of arms between Russia and Bokhara. Amir Muzzafar showed his willingness to suspend hostilities and to liberate the Russian mission,⁷ but failing to receive a favourable response to his offer, he collected 45,000

1. *Ibid.*

2. Romanovski *op. cit.* p. 17.

3. F.O. 65/868 no. 6, Sept. 21, 66.

4. Romanovski *op. cit.* pp. 15-16.

5. *Ibid.*

6. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Clarendon no. 53, Feb. 21, 66.

7. F.O. 65/868 Buchanan to Clarendon no. 157, April 3, 66, refers to a telegram published in "Invalid" 23 March, 4 April, 66.

men and twenty one guns at Chinaz, a fortress on the left bank of the Sar-Daria, to liberate Tashkand.¹ Romanovski advanced with 4,000 men to meet the enemy, and a fierce battle was fought on May 20 at Irjar, to the east of the Sar.² The Russian artillery won the day, spreading terror in the Bokharan flanks ; the latter left the battlefield in confusion and the Amir made good his escape to Jizakh.³

The defeat at Irjar, Vambery says, was the "Cannae" of Turkistan.⁴ It humbled Bokhara, the mighty defender of the faith in Central Asia. On May 28, Nau was taken and then on June 1, the invaders moved on Khojand, an impregnable fortress protected on both sides by the Sar. The garrison held out stoutly but heavy Russian artillery bombardment forced it to surrender within a week, and the city fell on June 7.⁵

Khojand was annexed to the Russian dominion in a proclamation of June 9.⁶ Khudayar sent his greetings to the invaders on their victory against Bokhara : and presents were exchanged between the two states.⁷ He renounced all connections with Bokhara, extended friendly overtures towards Russia,⁸ opened his country to Russia trade, and

1. Vambery, Bokhara *op. cit.* p. 403.

2. Romanovski *op. cit.* p. 30.

3. Vambery, Bokhara *op. cit.* p. 404.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Singh *op. cit.* p. 22, F.O. 65/868. Buchanan's telegram of June 25, 66, mentions the fall of the city on June 5.

6. Singh *op. cit.* p. 23.

7. *Ibid.* pp. 24-5.

8. *Ibid.* p. 14.

equalised custom duties in his dominion.

With the submission of Khudayar Khan, and the occupation of Nau and Khojand, both of which belonged to Khokand, an important chapter in the history of the Russian conquest of Central Asia, was closed. With Khokand subdued, only Bokhara remained. Bokhara was a country with a population of about 3,000,000 ; renowned for the fertility of its soil, and variety of climates, suitable both for staple articles, like corn, cotton, silk, mudder, tobacco and also for sugar cane, opium and indigo.¹ Both sides of the Amu were rich in silver, lead, copper and iron.² The dominion of Bukhara was reckoned among the great gardens of Asia, and had been the fountain of some of the mightiest empires in the Middle Ages. Bokhara had prided herself in the past as a great centre of culture, and even during the days of its decline it boasted numerous colleges. Vambery in 1863 found eighty colleges existing there.³

To the Russian strategists the subjugation of Bokhara was a necessity : it would safeguard Russia's trade route ; leave open the resources of the Zarfashan Valley and would be a logical frontier. Amu Daria, and not Sar Daria, was declared to be the natural boundary line in the south, against any future incursions by Britain in that region. Plans and schemes were once again submitted to the Government for action. Lt. Col. Glukhovsky, an

1. Rawlinson, H. *op. cit.* London 1875 p. 198.

2. *Ibid.* p. 199.

3. Vambery, *Travels op. cit.* p. 365.

officer on the general staff of Turkistan presented a memorandum to Romanovski in July 1866, strongly recommending the taking over of the Central Asian Khanates, or at the minimum limiting their independence.¹ The proposal was welcomed by General N.A. Krujanovski, the Governor-General of Orenburg, and he arrived in Turkistan in August 1866, to conduct the campaign against Bokhara in person.²

The fall of Khojand and the growing Russian threat, led Amir Muzzafar to search for additional help. He was aware of two powers hostile to Russia—the Ottoman ruler, and the British Government. The former was his co-religionist, himself fighting against Russia and supported by Britain. The latter were his southward neighbours, who were interested in the integrity of Afghanistan to off-set Russian danger to India. Bokhara was about 100 miles north of Afghanistan, and the Russians could only approach the latter through the dominion of Bokhara. Deeper reasoning convinced Amir Muzzafar to seek the advice of the British Government on the subject.

Efforts to establish contacts with the British Government had started in 1857. They were indirect. Amir Nasarullah of Bokhara, had been endeavouring since 1857, to ally himself with Afghanistan against any future emergency in the north. Dost

1. *Khristomatia po. Istorie S.S.S.R. III*, Moscow 1952 pp. 316-17.

2. Romanovski *op. cit.* pp. 46-48. Krujanovski was dis-satisfied with Romanovski's easy dealings in Central Asia. The former was an imperialist to the core.

Mohammad, on the eve of the Peshawar Conference, made explicit inquiries, whether the British would like him to join an alliance with Bokhara ; but Sir John Lawrence showed no interest in the matter.¹ Incessant efforts continued to be made by Bokhara ; she despatched her envoys to Kabul, but nothing came of it during the days of Dost Mohammad.² During the ascendancy of Afzal Khan and his party, this alliance was given more serious thought at Kabul. The Kabul rulers did suggest a British alliance with Bokhara,³ and also volunteered Afghan help against Russia,⁴ but the Government of India discouraged both the proceedings.⁵

In November 1866, Amir Muzzafar approached the Viceroy of India directly. An envoy Khwaja Mohammad Parsa, the Chief Mufti of Bokhara, assisted by twenty followers and bringing horses and many valuable specimens of native handicraft as presents for the Indian dignitaries, reached Peshawar,⁶ on November 11, 1866. He had letters for the Lt. Governor of the Punjab, the Viceroy of India, the Queen of England and the Sultan of Turkey. The letter to the Lt. Governor was a formal

1. *Epitome op. cit.* p. 71.

2. These envoys are chronicled during this time as (i) in May, 1857, (ii) Mirza Abid in Dec. 57, (iii) Najam-ud-Din in Sept. 1860.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. Azam Khan to Kabul Munshi pp. 433-4.

4. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-9, no. 8/3.

5. *Ibid.* no. 8/1.

6. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Government of Punjab to Government of India, January 1, 67. p. 87. *Lawrence Papers* no. 7. Lawrence to Cranborne (Private) Dec. 20, 66. Lawrence writes that Manphul induced the Amir of Bokhara to send an envoy to India.

request to assist the envoy in his journey. That to the Viceroy contained a wish for friendship with the Government of India, and a request to relieve the Muslims of Central Asia from "the oppression exercised upon them by the Russians."¹ The letter to the Queen was a protest against the "fraud and deceit" of Russia. The Amir spoke of the Russian violation of international law by seizing the lands of Turkistan and arresting his envoy at Orenburg. He expressed his determination to resist the enemy, but deemed it necessary to consult with others and take their advice first. And he said he would lend his co-operation to every efforts of the British, aimed at expelling the Russians—"the evil men" from Central Asia.²

By a curious coincidence in Peshawar, Khwaja Parsa met the Khokandi envoy back on his way to Khokand from Constantinople. From him, he learned that "nothing but discouragement was to be expected from either power".³ Hence Khwaja withheld any direct verbal request for British help during his meeting with Sir John Lawrence in Calcutta on January 9, 1867.⁴ He "conversed in vague generalities", and when asked whether his chief needed British officers to train his army or British commercial agents in his dominion, the envoy answered that he had no explicit instructions on the

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2, p. 93.

2. *Ibid.* p. 91.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Government of India to Punjab no. 94. January 24, 67.

4. *Ibid.*

subject.¹

Lawrence, in his reply to the Amir of Bokhara "refused to have anything to do with the alleged grievances of Bokhara against that power".² He told the ruler of Bokhara that geographical barriers and ignorance of the actual political state of affairs in Central Asia, did not enable him "to render any effective aid either by advice or in any other form".³ Amir Muzzafar Din was expecting a favourable reply to his correspondence with the British Government. He and his prime minister, called upon the Indian merchants residing in Bokhara, on every alternate day to know whether the British Government was well-disposed towards Bokhara, and whether these merchants would help in promoting friendship between the two states.⁴ In fact the authorities in Bokhara, became very friendly to all Indian subjects, and two Englishmen who were known to be living there under assumed native names, were ordered to be treated politely if traced out.⁵

Amir Muzzafar's letter to the Queen became a great subject of confusion in India. Lawrence promised Khwaja Parsa, that the Queen's reply to the Amir's letter would be communicated to him in Constantinople, through the British Ambassador

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1. *Lawrence Papers* no. 8. Lawrence to Cranborne (private) January 22, 67.
 2. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 19, January 24, 67.
 3. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2 Viceroy to Amir, January 24, 67.
 4. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2. A. Paracha, July 27 and Sept. 11, 67, and A. Qadir, June 7, 67.
 5. *Ibid.* A. Paracha, Sept. 11. 67.

there.¹ In Constantinople, Parsa approached Sir Henry Elliot, the British envoy to the Porte, and requested the delivery of the Queen's reply.² Elliot sought out the home instructions on the subject.³ The Foreign office consulted the India office.⁴ The latter expressed complete ignorance of both the letters and presents to the Queen, saying, they had only received a printed translation of the letter.⁵ The Indian office then telegraphed the Viceroy on the subject on December 19. He replied on December 24, both by a telegram and a letter. Lawrence sent the letter in original along with its box, but the presents had been sold in India.⁶ The British Embassy at Constantinople, then informed Khwaja Parsa, that suitable presents and a letter in reply from the Queen had been forwarded to India to be sent onward to Bokhara. Khwaja Parsa on his homeward journey through India, requested to see the Queen's communication,⁷ but the Government of India had no record of it whatsoever.⁸ It was later on learned, that the Duke of Argyll, who had come to the India office, in the new Liberal ministry, had muted the demands of the Foreign office. The India office had told the Foreign office, that a "suitable reply" had already been made

1. *S.H.C.* 1867/61. Khwaja Parsa to the British Ambassador (copy), Nov. 24, 67.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.* Elliot to Stanley no. 55 (copy) Dec. 4, 67.

4. *Ibid.* F.O. to I.O. Dec. 16, 67.

5. *Ibid.* I.O. to F.O. Dec. 19, 67.

6. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3 Viceroy to Secretary of State, no. 1, January 8, 68.

7. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3 Parsa to Viceroy, Feb. 12, 69.

8. *Ibid.* Viceroy to Secretary of State, no. 162, May 27, 69.

to the Amir by the Viceroy with necessary return presents for that ruler. The Duke opined, that it was not necessary, that in the presence of the Viceroy as the Queen's representative in the East, she should herself address "the petty potentates of Central Asia."¹

Amir Muzzafar isolated and weighed down by misfortune, implored help from all sides, from the rulers of Kabul, from the Sultan of Turkey, and from the British Government—but none came to his rescue. He once again turned to appease his powerful invader. He released M. de Struv and his party, and sued for peace in the middle of June, 1866.² An envoy, Khwaja Ismatullah was sent in the company of the liberated Russian mission to Tashkand, to negotiate peace,³ but the peace proposals were not encouraging. Bokhara was asked to recognise the sovereignty of Russia over all the conquered territories, to reduce duties on Russian merchandise, and to pay an indemnity of £ 50,000 for the expenses of the late war.⁴ The Amir's envoy objected to the last mentioned condition. Russia, however, released 150 Bokharan prisoners along with Khwaja Najam-ud-Din. General Krujanovski gave him ten days notice to pay the amount proposed.⁵

1. S.H.C. 1868/3 I.O. to F.O., Dec. 31, 68.

2. Singh, *op. cit.* p. 27.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Quarterly Review*. "Russian Advances in Central Asia" CXXVI, 1874. p. 412. Singh gives 365,000 roubles as indemnity, p. 27.

5. *Quarterly Review op. cit.* p. 412.

The Amir rejected the proposal and turned towards defensive measures.¹ The Russian forces moved upon Uratippa and laid seige to it.² The city was gallantly defended by its Beg, the hereditary ruler, Abdul Ghaffar. The seige lasted for eight days, before heavy artillery fire finally reduced it to submission on October 26.³ The Russian forces under the command of General Krujanovski, then advanced upon Jizakh, which had been powerfully manned and strongly fortified. It had a triple wall twenty-four feet high and twenty-seven feet thick, surrounded by a triple ditch, nearly twenty-five feet deep in some places.⁴ The garrison consisted of 10,000 men with 53 guns, commanded by its bragging leader Allah Yar. The Russians opened fire on the city on November 9, and two days later the main assault was launched ; the garrison fought to a man and of the eighteen Beks in the city, sixteen died in hand to hand fighting ; of 10,000 men, 6,000 were killed, and the city fell the same day.⁵ It was followed by the occupation of Dara Elanti, controlling the entrance to the Zarfashan Valley.⁶ Winter came and hostilities were suspended. Krujanovski having accomplished the desired objective, left for Orenburg, a fortnight after the capture of Jizakh. The winter of 1866-1867 brought

1. F.O. 65/868. Buchanan to Stanley, no. 396, Nov. 16, 66.

2. Singh *op. cit.* p. 32.

3. F.O. 65/868, no. 396. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 312. Singh says the city fell on September 26, p. 35.

4. Schuyler I, *op. cit.* p. 229.

5. *Ibid.* p. 230 : F.O. 65/868 Buchanan Tel, Nov. 28, 66.

6. Singh, p. 33.

a lull. In the meantime major administrative changes took place in Russian-held Turkistan. In 1865, "The Steppe Commission" was set up to recommend administrative reforms in the conquered areas of Central Asia. It was headed by a state counsellor, F. K. Giers, assisted by three other members.¹ The commission studied carefully the social, political, economic and ethnic composition of the new area over a period of two years, and the report was submitted to the Czar in early 1867. The project was then discussed at a ministerial level, presided over by the minister of war.² On April 11, the latter reported the findings largely based on those of "The Steppe Commission" i.e. to making Turkistan an independent province, adding to it a part of the Siberian province of Semipalatinsk, and to be placed under a governor-general attached to the ministry of war, and directly responsible to the Czar.³ The governor-generalship of the new region would control the two provinces of Sar-Daria and Semiretchie, and be vested with absolute civil and military authority.⁴ The recommendations were approved in July 1867, and General K. P. Von Kaufmann was appointed as the first Governor-general, with General G. A. Kolpakovski and General N. M. Golovachev as the military governors of the Semiretchi and the Sar Daria "oblasts"

1. Other members were Col. Dandeville, Col. Geins and Col. Protsankov.

2. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 203.

3. *Ibid.* p. 204.

4. *Ibid.* pp. 204-5.

respectively.

During this interim, negotiations for a settlement between Bokhara and the governor-general of Orenburg were in progress.¹ Amir Muzzafar was in a great dilemma. Both inside and outside his dominion, hostility was mounting against his authority. On the outside, the Russians had recently occupied the city of Yani Kurgan in June 1867 ; and inside a formidable opposition was slowly organizing itself since the fall of Tashkand, he had lost much popular support, and the fall of Khojand and Jizakh, further diminished his prestige. The popular demand in Bokhara was for an open fight to oust the unbelievers from the land. To meet this demand, the Amir raised the taxation. The new taxes, he collected as usual in the form of tankas and subsequently re-issued them at double the value raising the value from 66 to 132 chekas, which in the absence of silver went upto 200 chekas.² There was immediate deflation and poverty became widespread, especially among the farmers. Suspension of trade with Russia further damaged the economy. The Amir in desperation laid hand on the property of the priestly class. This was a hornet's nest. The forcible collections from the colleges and mosques, brought decrees of "Kuffur" against him.³ The discontented political figures stirred up the fire. Two powerful parties arose to challenge the Amir's authority ; one was led by his disgruntled eldest son,

1. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 42.

2. Terentyef p. 51 ; Vambery, *Anglo-Russian Frontier op. cit.* p. 76.

3. Vambery, *Anglo-Russian Frontier op. cit.* p. 77.

Kata Tora (Crown Prince) Abdul Malik Mirza, and the other by Jora Beg, the governor of Shahresabz, who wanted to place Syed Khan, the Amir's nephew on the throne of Bokhara.¹

This widespread discontent confused the Amir. War against the infidels became a popular slogan. The Amir himself did not intend war against a rival, where his failure was inevitable.² In a state of mental strain, he set out to seek the benedictions of his spiritual guides—Khwaja Baha-ud-Din and Khwaja Abdul Khaliq.³ It was rumoured that the Amir was fleeing the country. The mob surrounded him at the tomb of Khwaja Khaliq and made a violent plea for war against Russia,⁴ and the Amir was left with no choice.

The negotiations with Russia were not moving smoothly. General Kaufmann, when consulted on the ten clause treaty proposed by Krujanovski with the Czar's approval, added two more to it.⁵ It was signed by Khrujanovski on September 26, and handed over to the Bokharan envoy for a reply by the end of October.⁶ Kaufmann reported to Tashkand on November 19, when an answer still had not come from Bokhara.⁷ There was a technical

1. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 241. Singh names the nephew as Safdar Khwaja and says that he was raised to the throne at Shahresabz in Nov. 66.

2. Vambery, *Anglo-Russian Frontier op. cit.* p. 79.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 79. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 53.

4. Vambery, *Anglo-Russian Frontier, op. cit.* p. 79.

5. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 42.

6. *Ibid.* pp. 42-43.

7. *Ibid.* p. 45.

error in the treaty, the Russians unaware of the geographical location of the begship of Naurata, had put it in the range of mountains dividing the boundary line between Bokhara and Turkistan.¹ This was not understandable to the Amir, but the Russians took his delay as an intended refusal to enter into the agreement.

In early December 1867, Amir Muzzafar sent his envoy, Musa Beg, to explain this situation to Kaufmann.² But Kaufmann did not appreciate this technical explanation, and asked for submission of the ratified treaty. In the meantime a band of Bokharans had arrested a Russian Officer, Lt. Sluzenkov with three soldiers. This further exasperated the new governor-general, who wrote a letter on December 31, asking for the immediate release of Sluzenkov and his party, and transmission of the ratified treaty.³ On March 14, 1868 Bokhara replied to this letter announcing the release of Sluzenkov, but giving no definite answer on the ratification.⁴ Kaufman sent another letter, warning the Amir of the consequences of delay.⁵

The rival groups in Bokhara took advantage of the tense situation and Jora Beg's men, attacked a Russian camp near Jizakh.⁶ Kaufmann, who was about to leave for St. Petersburg, took this as

1. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 241.

2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 45.

3. *Ibid.* p. 45.

4. *Ibid.* p. 46. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 303.

5. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 47.

6. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 241.

aggression on the Amir's part, cancelled his trip to the Russian capital, and rushed via Jizakh to attack Samarqand.¹ The Amir sent repeated embassies to the general requesting him to grant some more time, in which he would ratify the treaty, and also would explain the misunderstanding regarding it.² On May 13, when hostilities were about to commence, a fresh envoy arrived, bringing the treaty complete with the Amir's signature, but it varied from the Russian draft.³ The Amir then made a final request to stop hostilities for two days, and Kaufmann, granted him two hours.⁴ Then the Russian general ordered an advance, and the Bokharans rapidly dispersed before the invaders, whilst the inhabitants of Samarqand closed their gates to the fugitive army running from the banks of the Zarfashan.⁵ Next day (May 14), a deputation of the Aksakals of Samarqand invited the Russians to take over the city, and to provide asylum to its citizens.⁶ Its occupation was followed by the subjugation of Urgut, Chilek and Katta Kurgan.

The fall of Samarqand roused the whole of Bokhara.⁷ The Amir appeared with a formidable

1. *Ibid.* F.O. 65/869 no. 972, June 3, 68.

2. *Ibid.* Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 54.

3. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 54.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.* p. 55.

6. The account given by the Government of India's news writers is very confusing. The chronology is defective. It says that the Russian campaign started in August and five gates of the city were besieged. See *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3, R. Kuli account Sept. 2, 68.

7. *Ibid.*

army near Katta Kurgan, and General Golovachev then in command, seeing the superiority of the enemy's numbers urged Kaufmann's help.¹ Kaufmann rushed to his general's rescue, leaving Samarqand with 762 men and the remainder, 450 in number, confined to hospital.² Samarqand was then beseiged by Jora Beg, with a huge army from Shahresabz. Fortune favoured none ; the Amir was defeated by Kaufmann at Zarabulak on June 26, and Jora Beg, hearing of the Amir's defeat and Kaufmann's rumoured advance on Shahresabz, raised his siege begun on June 26, and repaired toward the defence of his own city. Samarqand remained under siege conducted by a remnant of the Bokharans till early July, when Kaufmann dispersed them.³

Repeated reversals at Russia's hands, humbled Amir Muzzafar and he offered an unconditional surrender.⁴ He was even willing to abdicate his throne in favour of the Czar, but Kaufmann cajoled him that it was never the intention of the Russian Government to destroy his dominion.⁵ A treaty was signed on July 5, 1868, under which Amir Muzzafar was allowed to retain possession of Bokhara west of Katta-Kurgan : all to the east including the Valley of Zarfashan was annexed to Russia ; the Amir also promised in a secret clause to pay one million

1. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 243.

2. *Ibid.* p. 244. Vambery, *Anglo-Russian Frontier op. cit.* pp. 82—86.

3. Schuyler I *op. cit.* pp. 245-6.

4. *Ibid.* II p. 304. Terentyef *op. cit.* p. 62.

5. *Ibid.*

roubles as an indemnity,¹ and to open Bokhara to Russian commerce and trade. Kaufmann and his staff received suitable honours and awards for their successful proceedings against Bokhara.²

The fall of Samarqand like that of Chamkand once again alarmed the British authorities, for the intelligence sources in Central Asia, Persia, India and St. Petersburg had given full reports of the proceedings to Whitehall.³ Lord Stanley, the Foreign Minister of the Conservative government, instructed Buchanan to "remind" Gortchakov of various Russian assurances advanced through Buchanan and Brunnow, to set aside further Russian expansion in Central Asia.⁴ Buchanan had already approached Gortchakov, and was snubbed by the latter, as "the Russian Government do not consider themselves called upon to offer explanations to other governments as to their proceedings and policy in Central Asia."⁵ Two days later, Buchanan again met Gortchakov, and read out to him Stanley's communication on the subject. Gortchakov remarked that circumstances had forced Russia to adopt stringent measures against Bokhara. He told the British envoy, that the late war with Bokhara

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1. F.O. 65/870 no. 122. Schuyler II *op. cit.* P. 305, says the amount of 125,000 tillas was payable only in one year : but Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 64, mentions that it was payable in five years.
 2. F.O. 65/869. Buchanan to Stanley no. 124, June 20, 68.
 3. *E.S.L.I.* 1867/2, K.D. August 23, 67. Government of Bombay to India Telegram, May 28, 67. Alison to Viceroy. May 27, 67 : besides many telegrams of Buchanan on this subject as expressed above.
 4. F.O. 65/869 no. 250, June 13, 68.
 5. F.O. 65/869 Buchanan to Stanley no. 158, July 28, 68.

was the latter's own creation. However, Gortchakov gave renewed assurances of Russia's peaceful intentions in Turkistan.¹

Such assurances encouraged Buchanan to ascertain Russia's stand on Samarqand. He expressed fear to Gortchakov that Kaufmann in a letter to the Chancellor, had proudly mentioned the tomb of Tamerlane opposite his residence's window. This the ambassador feared, might not tempt the general for "including so interesting a monument" within the Czar's Empire. Gortchakov brushed aside such apprehensions and expressed his explicit confidence in the conduct of his general.² Almost a month later, Gortchakov reassured the British envoy that Bokhara had accepted a peace treaty, and Russian troops had been ordered to evacuate Samarqand.³ In the fall of 1869, Gortchakov met Clarendon at Heidelberg,⁴ and assured him of the restoration of Samarqand to Bokhara.

Numerous such assurances again allayed British apprehensions, but the Russian political robots could not disengage themselves from the spoils of war. Kaufmann, during his visit to St. Petersburg in Autumn 1868, was able to convince the Czar to retain the newly acquired area in Turkistan.⁵ The British Embassy learned from sources close to the

1. F.O. 65/869 Buchanan to Stanley no. 134 and 137, June 30, 68.

2. F.O. 65/869 o. 137.

3. The treaty concluded with Bokhara was not shown to Buchanan. See F.O. 65/869, Buchanan to Clarendon no. 190, Sep. 9, 68.

4. F.O. 65/871 No. 220, *op. cit.*

5. F.O. 65/870 Rumbold to Clarendon no. 25, April 21, 69.

Emperor and the Russian Foreign office, that the assurances on Samarqand were outdated.¹

Amir Muzzafar was under a strong impression that Samarqand would be restored to him. Early in 1869, he deputed two envoys, Khwaja Sadoor and Musa Beg, to proceed to St. Petersburg for negotiations on Samarqand. Neither proceeded to St. Petersburg, because Kaufmann did not approve of their journey to the capital.² In Autumn 1869, the Amir sent a delegation to St. Petersburg, headed by his fourth son, Syed Abdullah Fateh Khan, nicknamed Tura jan, and assisted by the Dadkhwah of Bokhara.³ The delegation proceeded to the Russian capital much against Kaufmann's will. It was vested with power to appeal to the Czar for the return of Samarqand.⁴ It met the Czar on November 3. Bokhara at this time still had not fully paid off its war indemnity, hence the prince was told that until this was done, the Amir should not expect any negotiation on the subject of Samarqand's delivery to Bokhara.⁵ The prince was also informed that in future no direct appeal to the centre would be acceptable, unless it was forwarded through the administration of Turkistan.⁶ Tura jan on his return

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1. F.O. 65/870 no. 54. Rumbold had a talk with Col. de Schweinitz, the Prussian military attache in St. Petersburg and held in great favour by the Czar. The Colonel doubted whether Samarqand would be restored to Bokhara.
 2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 75.
 3. F.O. 55/871 no. 192.
 4. Schuyler II *op. cit.* pp. 306-7.
 5. F.O. 65/872 no. 203.
 6. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 78-9.

to Tashkand, lodged an appeal to Kaufmann on the subject of Samarqand, on March 14, 1870, but it came to no good.¹

By the end of 1870, Amir Muzzafar had remitted the war indemnity.² M. Stremoukov, the Director of the Asiatic Department, confirmed this in his conversation with Buchanan. But the Director added that Samarqand would be retained by Russia as an assurance against the peaceful conduct of the Amir. Buchanan was surprised at this explanation.³ General Milyutin, the Minister of War, produced another interpretation. He opposed withdrawal from Samarqand, because it would be taken by the people of Turkistan as a sign of Russia's incompetency to hold that place.⁴ Whatever the true reason, Samarqand was not given back to Bokhara, though the British Government still entertained a hope for its restoration. Lord Augustus Loftus, the new British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, once again broached the subject of Samarqand during a conversation with Gortchakov. The latter replied that the occupation of the province over the last four years and the advantages gained by both Russia and the inhabitants of that province, had persuaded the Imperial Government to abandon the idea of making

1. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 307.

2. *Ibid.* p. 306. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 72-3 says that the Amir borrowed the amount involved from the Moscow merchants.

3. F.O. 65/872 no. 248.

4. F.O. 65/872 no. 77. Gortchakov himself was in favour of restoring Samarqand to Bokhara. He made a powerful speech in the Council on this subject, see F.O. 65/871 no. 33.

over Samarqand to Bokhara.¹

Beaten and robbed of his dominion, Amir Muzzafar made another request to the Government of India, with personal instructions to the envoy Khwaja Abbas, "to use every eadeavour to obtain assistance from the British Government against Russia, in whatever form the British Government might consider best".² In November 1871, two envoys from Bokhara descended on the plains of India : Khwaja Abbas with letters for the Viceroy of India and the Queen of England ; and Khwaja Abdul Hye, as an envoy to the Sultan of Turkey.

In his letter to the Queen, Amir Muzzafar once again remonstrated against the Russian encroachment on Transoxianan territory, which, he wrote "had been from ancient times the possession of our ancestors". He admitted the incompetency of the ill-equipped and disorganised masses of Central Asia, against their powerful rival, and appealed to the Queen in the name of brotherhood, to respond to the needs of the Bokharans.³ During an audience with the Lt. Governor of Punjab, Khwaja Abbas commenced his story that in the not too distant past, Bokhara had been a powerful state, indifferent to having allies of any sort, but now she was humbled by a formidable state situated only 82 "kos" from the very city of Bokhara itself. Russia, the envoy said, was both a deadly enemy and an unreliable

1. F.O. 65/876. Loftus to Granville no. 72, Feb. 19, 73.

2. E.S.L.I. 1872/11. Viceroy to the Secretary of State no. 9, January 24, 72.

3. *Ibid.* Amir to the Queen pp. 355-6.

friend, having gone back on its promises over Khokand, Tashkand and Samarqand. Khwaja Abbas hoped that the Queen of England would either take over Bokhara, or equip its people with arms to fight against Russia.¹ During his interview on December 22 with Lord Mayo, the Viceroy of India, the envoy repeated the miserable plight of the people and the ruler of his country. The envoy repented for "the unfortunate occurrences in former years", and looked forward to a friendly future through the goodwill of the Viceroy. As to the nature and form of help, the envoy said that he was instructed by his ruler to leave this to the discretion of the British authorities. During his conversation with the foreign secretary of the Government of India, on December 23, Khwaja Abbas suggested the usefulness of sending experts to train the Amir's army and to manufacture arms, adding that all such officers stationed in Bokhara could be kept in disguise.²

Lord Mayo suggested to the home government the possibility of having the Queen herself address the Amir, but he also expressed complete inability of the Government of India to help the ruler of Bokhara either directly with troops and arms, or indirectly with money. This was a procedure, the Viceroy pointed out, to which he could "give no encouragement whatsoever".³

Lord Napier of Merchistoun,⁴ the acting

1. *Ibid.* pp. 349—351.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 356—361.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/11, no. 9, *op. cit.*

4. Mayo died in the Andaman Islands in February 1872.

Viceroy, in his reply to Amir of Bokhara informed him that "the energies of the British Government are principally directed towards the improvement of the internal administration and it is contrary to policy to take part in the concern of other nations". Also the existing cordial relations between England and Russia, did not permit the former to entertain a request as contained in the letter of the Amir.¹ The Queen in her letter to the ruler of Bokhara said that she could "only pray that the result may be permanent peace".² She also sent a copy of the "Queen's Highland Journal" as a personal gift to the Amir.³

Neither was Khwaja Abdul Hye inactive at Constantinople in approaching both the Turkish and the British Government, the latter through its ambassador Sir H. Elliot. The envoy requested the Government of the Porte to lend him officers for raising a regular army in Bokhara.⁴ Then he met Elliot, and appealed for the stationing of British agents in Bokhara, to watch Russo-Bokharan relations since Russia was quite likely to make "an unfounded accusation of the ill-treatment of the Russian merchants a pretext for an attack on the independence of the Khan".⁵

Khwaja Hye was advised by the Turkish authorities that his ruler should develop greater

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/11. Acting Viceroy to Amir, April 3, 72.

2. *Letters to India* 1872/4. Queen to Amir, Aug. 31, 72.

3. *Ibid.* Secretary of State to Amir, Aug. 31, 72.

4. *S.H.C.* 1872/70. Elliot to Granville no. 41 (copy), June 4, 72.

5. *Ibid.* no. 85 (copy), July 6, 72.

contact with the British, should put his administration in their hands, and they would draw up a constitution, establish a council of state and appoint a consulate to the state of Bokhara.¹ The envoy on his return journey, met the officials of the Government of India, and made a formal request for deputing an officer to Bokhara.² He requested that Douglas Forsyth an enterprising officer in the Government of Punjab should accompany him on his return home journey.³

But the Government of India turned down this request. It was a proposal, the Viceroy thought, to which no encouragement could be given, as "the direct interest of the British subjects at Bokhara are not of sufficient importance to render it necessary" to appoint an agent in that city.⁴

Humbled by such treatment, receiving disappointment and setbacks from all quarters, Amir Muzzafar, in the final analysis resolved to put himself at the mercy of the invader. His attitude towards Russia, had undergone a change. Kaufmann helped him to subdue risings of his son Katta Tora, and the Beg of Shahresabz. The Amir sent his sons for education to Russia, and during the Russian invasion of Khiva, he actively supported them.

By the end of 1870 Russia was paramount in the Sar Daria region. Within a period of fifteen years, she had subjugated two of the richest states in

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1873/15. Abbas interview in India pp. 448/50.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Douglas Forsyth was heading a mission at this time to Yarkand.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 67, Sept. 16, 72.

Central Asia. Khudayar Khan signed a treaty in the early part of 1868, under which an equalising customs duty was introduced on Russian merchandise ; Khokand was opened to Russian traders with the privilege of establishing carvan sarais and depots at suitable places.¹ A treaty of similar type, mention of which is made earlier, was imposed upon Bokhara also.

Russian ascendancy in the Sar Daria and northern part of the Amu Daria, created a potential threat to the out-lying frontier posts of India. Both the British public and the government realised the risk involved in the policy of "Masterly Inactivity". Serious consideration was given to the problem of Central Asia and suitable measures were adopted, the description of which is given in the following pages.

I. Schuyler II op. cit. pp. 274/6. The treaty was signed by the Khan in February and approved by the Czar in November, 1868.

CHAPTER V

Restoration of British Influence, 1869—1873

“ I am not much afraid of the Russians, but I think their neighbourhood may disquiet the countries on our northern border and give them a notion that there is a power behind them who might protect them if stirred ”.¹

Sir Charles Wood in 1865.

Charnaiev, by the occupation of Tashkand, laid the foundation of a Russian dominion in Central Asia which extended now to all the hilly districts of Bokhara directly adjacent to the Afghan districts of Darwaz and Wakhhan. This acquisition was accomplished within a decade in spite of repeated assurances of non-extension by the Russian leaders. Russia, becoming paramount in the two Uzbek states set out to cripple British Commercial influence in Turkistan. Restrictive measures were adopted to stop the entry of English and Indian merchandise into Bokhara by way of Persia and Afghanistan. The Turkistani merchants were warned by the Russian authorities not to continue their trade in English and Indian goods : only indigo and English muslin were exempted from general prohibition, but the duty on these commodities was raised to 25%, as compared to 2½%

1. *Lawrence Papers*, no. 6. Wood to Lawrence (private) Feb. 27, 65.

generally leveled on Russian goods.¹

Britain had great commercial interest in Central Asia. The report of Government of India compiled in 1862, indicated that there was a yearly trade of Rupees 1, 030, 372 between India and Central Asia,². The loss of markets in Central Asia was deeply felt by the mercantile class, who wielded a strong influence on the Government. The British Government itself was embarrassed to learn of these Russian prohibitions against English commerce. Enquiries were made to verify them : the answer was in the affirmative. This was inevitable. The political writers on the subject of Russian Conquest in Central Asia had been warning the government of the consequences of Russian expansion in that region. Vambéry in his "Travels", had expressed his fear in 1864, over the British indifference to Central Asian question⁴. Four years later Vambéry referred to England as "a child which after having once burnt itself at a fire, will not for a long time venture to draw near its warmth"⁵. Giffon Robert, another writer of this period, sadly noticed that two-thirds of Central Asia had gone to Russia⁶. *Blackwood's Magazine*, informed its readers that the Russian

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4. R. Kul to Manphul Nov. 24, 68. Also in S.H.C. 1869/64. Buchanan Telegram Nov. 10, 69.

2. Davies, R.H. *Report on the Trade and Resources of the Countries on the N.W. Boundary of British India*. Lahore, 1862, p. 1.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4 pp. 1387—92 : also a questionnaire was sent to the merchants of Peshawar : see pp. 1401—3.

4. Vambéry, A. *Travels in Central Asia*, London 1864. pp. 439—43.

5. Vambéry, A. *Sketches of Central Asia*, London, 1868. p. 425.

6. *Fortnightly Review* IV 1868. "The Question of Central Asia" p.5.

occupation of Bokhara had "reduced the distance between the British and Russian outposts to less than seven hundred miles"¹. Even wyllie, a great Russophil of Lawrence's school of thought, could not conceal his sense of insecurity when he pointed out that only Afghanistan separated the Cossacks from the Sepoys².

But the greatest alarmist of this part of the century in England was Sir Henry Rawlinson. Speaking before the *British Association for the Advancement of Science* on the "Russian Frontiers in Central Asia", Rawlinson opined that the Russian extension of frontier, if advantageous to the cause of science and learning, was highly disadvantageous politically. He told the society that the Russian "frotier" in Central Asia was unstationery, and would be nearing India every day³. This speech followed Rawlinson's two articles in the *Quarterly Review* on the geo-political history of Central Asia⁴. He warned the English Russophils that Russia's proximity to India would bring chronic conflagration into India⁵. Rawlinson advised his countrymen "to set our house in order as to meet the crisis" because the Russian agents and embassies were about to appear in Kabul, Herat and Qandhar⁶.

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1. *Blackwood's Edinburg Magazine* CV 1869. "Sir John Lawrence" p. 711.
 2. *Fortnightly Review* VI 1869, "Masterly Inactivity" p. 586.
 3. *British Association for the Advancement of Science Reports and Transactions* 1865, p. 128.
 4. *Quartely Review* no. 118, 1865, and no. 120, 1866. Both of these were reproduced in his book *England and Russia in the East*, London, 1875.
 5. *Ibid.* no. 118. p. 534.
 6. *Ibid.* no. 120. p.502.

Letters also appeared in the *Times* deploring general ignorance of the public over the Central Asian affairs¹. "Hotar" called it a policy of "shortsightedness" to over-estimate the distance between India and the Russian possessions in Turkistan. This pattern of thought, he pointed out, had "encouraged" Russia in eastward movement. He suggested that it was still not too late to force Russia to respect the independence of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva².

A notable feature of this period (1865—1869) was the publication of five books concerning the general situation of the Central Asian Question³. Though these writers arrived at varying conclusions, their works were valuable in furnishing information to the public on that distant part of the world. Two of the authors, Trench and Bell, were Russophobes, while the others took a lenient view of the situation.

Equally disturbed at the Russian conquests in Central Asia, were some of the government officials both in India and Britain. Henry Green, the political superintendent on the Sindh frontiers, wrote a memorandum in August 1866, recommending the occupation of Queta—a strategic post in northern

1. *Times*. Dec. 15, 68, p.6.c.6.

2. *Ibid.* Feb. 13, 69. p.5. c.2.

3. (i) Trench, F. *The Russo Indian Question*, London 1869.

(ii) Bell, Evan. *The Oxus and the Indus*, London, 1869.

(iii) British Subject, A. *Russian Central Asia and British India*, London, 1865.

(iv) Cotton, S. *Nine Years on the North-Western Frontiers of India*, London, 1868.

(v) William & Northgate. *The Central Asian Question*. London, 1869.

Bilauchistan commanding the Bolan pass. Green endorsed John Jacob's views of 1856, that the possession of Quetta was necessary for the northern defences of India. Green believed that there would be little resistance shown to this occupation by the Khan of Kalat and the tribes of Bilauchistan.¹ Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor of Bombay, considered this scheme "essentially sound" and urged the Central Government to sanction this project.² Green's proposal on the occupation of Quetta led to expressions of opinion by the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence; the members of his council and some of the politico-military experts on the subject of Central Asia³. Although all of them opposed British occupation of Quetta, an apprehension was felt over the uninterrupted advance of Russia towards the frontiers of India and Afghanistan. S.U. Yule and H.M. Durand, both members of the Viceroy's council, urged a change of policy towards Afghanistan⁴. Lawrence, after collecting their opinions, arrived at the conclusion that an Anglo-Russian understanding regarding Central Asia was a necessity⁵. And he forwarded the views of his experts to the India Office.

But Lawrence's proposal for establishing an understanding with Russia did not receive a willing ear at the India office. J. R. Melville, the Assistant

1. *Par. Pap.* LXXVII 1878-79, no. 1/2.

2. *Ibid.* no. 1/5.

3. See for the views of these persons *Ibid* no. 3. with its enclosures.

4. *Ibid.* no. 4/4 or 5.

5. *E.S.L.I.* Viceroy to Secretary of State, no. 3. Sept. 3, 67.

Secretary in the secret and political department of the India office, differed with Lawrence in his memorandum which he wrote on the subject of British policy in Central Asia¹. Melville called Lawrence's suggested understanding with Russia, a "worthless" measure. He was of the opinion that such an understanding would not bind Russia, but would certainly "hamper us". The memorandum suggested that the Russian advance in Central Asia had been, up to then, on "tiptoe", fearing the jealousy of the British Government. But once assured of the latter's neutrality and indifference to her advance to a certain line, Russia would reach that line in just "one-bound", and then would rekindle intrigues and dissensions.

The communication of the Government of India, along with Melville's memorandum were forwarded to Lord Derby, the Prime Minister. Derby suggested that the papers on the subject should be circulated among the Cabinet to elicit their opinions. As to arriving at some understanding with Russia regarding Central Asia, Derby was sure that "no understanding or engagement with the Russian Government will bind the latter if they see their advantage in breaking it"².

Then came the significant memorandum of Sir Henry Rawlinson on the policy of Britain in Central Asia. Rawlinson in his paper, made a general survey

1. S.H.C. 1868/62. Melville memorandum Dec. 2, 67. pp. 7—15.

2. S.H.C. 1868/62. Stanley comments on the paper, Dec. 8, 67 pp. 63-4 : see also War office memo on the Russian conquest in Central Asia in F.O 65/868. W.O. to F.O. no. 461/715. June 12, 66.

of the Russian conquest in Turkistan, and proved that Russia would soon be a paramount power on the Sar-Daria lands¹. This paramountcy would place Afghanistan at Russia's mercy. Rawlinson did not harbour any fear of Russian invasion of India, but he was emphatic that the presence of Russia on the frontiers of India would stir up "every chief throughout Northern India who either has or fancies he has a grievance",² against Britain. Putting strategic light on his thesis, Rawlinson believed that Russia, once established in Herat, would not be easily expelled. He agreed with Auckland's doctrine of "establishing a strong friendly power on our North-West Frontier". To achieve this end he pleaded for an effective support to Sher Ali whose "fortunes are again in assendent"³. Rawlinson appraised the possibility of establishing a British mission at Kabul. He advised furnishing Afghanistan with arms, officers and money⁴. Sir Henry appealed in the name of peace and moral and material improvement, "that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty and that any moderate outlay or responsibility that we may incur in establishing order at Kabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy"⁵.

1. Rawlinson prepared this paper for a speech in the Parliament. Failing to get a turn, he forwarded it to the India Office. The memorandum was also published in his book "England and Russia in the East" *op. cit.* pp. 271—300.

2. *Ibid.* p. 287.

3. *Ibid.* p. 292.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.* 293.

The gist of Rawlinson's paper was to take effective steps to check Russian expansion in Central Asia. He recommended a liberal subsidy to Sher Ali; to establish friendlier relations with Persia; to connect the Afghan frontier with a railway line, and to occupy Quetta. In fact, Rawlinson was asking for the reversal of Lawrence's policy of "Masterly Inactivity".

Most of the Anglo-Indian statesmen agreed with Rawlinson's views especially those concerning Afghanistan, and the threat involving her by Russian expansion.¹ Brigadier-General Lumsden of the Guides; Sir D. F. Mcleod, the Lt. Governor of Punjab, Col. Taylor, the Commissioner of Ambala; Sir Richard Temple, the Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and the Commander-in-Chief Sir W. R. Mansfield, approved Rawlinson's idea of establishing greater contacts with Afghanistan.

These remonstrances from various quarters from within and without India, compelled the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence to change his former attitude on many of the pertinent issues. His policy of "Masterly Inactivity" had become a subject of controversy both in India and in Britain. It was commonly believed that it was an outdated policy. Lawrence, therefore, wrote to Northcote in August, 1868, that he would be prepared to help Sher Ali as was demanded in England, provided Sher Ali succeeded in regaining his power.² In the following

1. *Par. Pap.* LVI, 1878—99, No. 14/1, 2, 3, 5, 8.

2. Lawrence Papers no. 9. Lawrence to Northcote (private) Aug. 17, 68.

month Sher Ali came to power in Afghanistan.

The arrival of the Liberal Ministry into power in December, 1868, further improved the situation. The Liberals, as compared to the Conservatives, believed in peaceful co-existence with Russia in Central Asia. To the Liberals of Gladstone's age, imperialism was synonymous to immorality. As discussed in Chapter Two, they had made an attempt during the days of Palmerston, to come to some sort of understanding with Russia in Central Asia. It did not however, materialise. Another attempt was made now. It did succeed. Improved relations with Afghanistan were a major factor in bringing about such an understanding with Russia. British help to Afghanistan in the forms of arms and money alarmed Russia that Britain was manufacturing a plot to overthrow Russian dominance in Central Asia. This apprehension forced Russia to listen to the British appeal.

For the sake of analysis, the events discussed below are divided into three sections :—

- (i) the restoration of British influence in Afghanistan.
- (ii) the division of Central Asia into spheres of influences.
- (iii) the British commercial venture into the Chinese Turkistan.

Sher Ali's rise to power in 1868 was well timed. Public and officials pressure on the government had paved the way for his support. During the course of November, Sher Ali requested the Government of India for help. Lawrence immediately sanctioned

two lakhs of rupees for his assistance. This sum was raised in late December to six lakh in cash, with 3500 stands of arms and necessary ammunition.¹ Before departing from India, Lawrence sanctioned another grant of six lakh of rupees for the Amir.² This was a big step in improving the relations with Afghanistan. The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* hailed this "changed policy towards lawful ruler."³

Sher Ali in September, 1868, had expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India, and Lawrence had acceded to it. But Sher Ali's pre-occupation in his newly won dominion prevented him from seeing Lawrence before the latter's departure and replacement by the Earl of Mayo in January, 1869. Mayo's early days in India were also busy. In February Sher Ali made fresh overtures to meet the Viceroy.⁴ Mayo invited him to meet at Ambala—a military cantonment in northern India. It was felt that if the Amir's journey took him near to the centre of India, he would have to pass a considerable part of British territory and thus learn something about "the wonders of the western civilisation."⁵

Sher Ali left Kabul on February 16, and reached Peshawar on March 3. He was accompanied by

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1. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3. Government of India to Punjab. Telegram Dec. 21, 68. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 14 A/1 and *Edinburg Review* CXXXVIII, "Recent Events in Afghanistan" p. 267.
 2. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4. Viceroy to Amir, Jan. 9, 69. Also in *Par. Pap. op. cit.* No. 14 A/1.
 3. *Times*, March 10, 69, p. 4, c. 3.
 4. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* Ata Mohammad to Pollock, Feb. 7, 69, no. 15/3.
 5. *Blackwood's Magazine* CVII 1870. "Lord Mayo and the Ambala Darbar" p. 64.

his son, prince Abdulla Jan, and three senior councillors. During his five days stay at Peshawar, the Amir visited the army barracks, a photographic studio and the submarine cable plant.¹ The Amir reached Lahore on March 14, where he spent his next six days. He was received in a public Darbar by the Lt. Governor, and visited the troops, railway factory and telegraph office.² Sher Ali reached Ambala on March 24, where a splendid reception awaited him.³ Three days later Mayo arrived in Ambala. The same day in the evening the Viceroy received the Afghan chief in a public Darbar, attended by all the dignitaries of the native states and the government officials. The Amir and his troupe were presented with gifts by the Viceroy.⁴ On March 29, Mayo visited Sher Ali's camp and received the Afghan gifts brought for the Viceroy. The highlights of the Amir's next two days stay at Ambala were entertainments like horse races, elephant combat and military manoeuvres. The Queen sent a telegram welcoming the Amir to India and congratulated the Viceroy on his successful management of the Amir's visit.⁵

While the Amir was in Ambala, he and the Viceroy discussed Anglo-Afghan relations. Two

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1. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* Pallock's Diary no. 16/1 and 2.
 2. *Blackwood's Magazine* "Ambala Darbar" *op. cit.* p. 66.
 3. *Argyll Papers* no. 1. Mayo to Argyll (private) April 4, 69 : also see the description of the camps and the reception of the Amir in *Blackwood's Magazine*. "Ambala Darbar" *op. cit.* pp. 67-8.
 4. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 17, and its enclosures.
 5. *Mayo Papers*. Additional Manuscripts 7490/4. Queen's Telegram, April 23, 69.

similar discussions took place between the Foreign Secretary, Seton-Karr, and the Amir's Senior Minister, Syed Noor Mohammad Shah. In addition, there were numerous unofficial meetings between Captain H. Grey, the interpreter and secret agent of Lord Mayo, and Syed Noor.¹ Due to the recently restored friendship, Sher Ali had come to Ambala with high hope of assistance, but Mayo with his typical charming Irish manners and successful diplomatic handling, kept the issue of assistance out of the talk. Central Asia and Russia, did not appear at all in the interviews "because it is desirable not to show to the Amir that we have apprehension from the North".² However the Amir did receive written assurances of the good intentions of the British Government towards his personal rule. Mayo, besides assuring him moral and material assistance in an emergency, assured him that the British Government "will view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as a ruler of Kabul".³

Sher Ali left Ambala for Kabul on April 3. His departure from India was followed by remittance of six lakh of rupees promised by Lawrence, plus 6,500 more stands of arms, four eighteen pounder siege guns, two eight inch howitzers, one mountain battery of artillery, besides proportionate quantity of

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1. *Argyll Papers op. cit.* no. 3. Mayo to Argyll (private) Oct. 17. 69. Also *Par. Pap. ap. cit.* no. 16/2.
 2. *Argyll Papers, op. cit.* Mayo to Argyll (private) April 18, 69.
 3. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4. Viceroy to the Amir, March 31, 69. Also *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 17/3.

ammunition.¹ Sher Ali was definitely satisfied with his visit to India. There is even evidence to show that he was willing to receive British agents in his state.²

1. *Mayo Papers op. cit.* no. 7490/3/1. Burne to McLeod April 27, 69. Lt. Col. Burne was Mayo's private secretary. Also *E.S.L.I.* 1869/4. Memorandum to Military Department no. 452. April 8, 69, p. 1021.
2. (i) This subject became most controversial during the years 1878-79. Seton-Karr, the ex-foreign secretary of the Government of India at the request of Lord Lawrence sent a statement to the Parliament to the effect that Sher Ali was opposed to receiving any British agent in Afghanistan in 1869. This statement was censured by Stanhope the Under Secretary of State for India on Dec. 9, 78 in the House of Commons (Hansard, Commons no. 243, 1878-9 cc. 320 and 358). Seton-Karr was inflamed by this treatment and wrote a letter to the minister, a copy of which was forwarded for publication to the *Daily News* (Dec. 12, 78, p. 5, c. 7). Karr claimed that he was distinctly empowered by Mayo to ask the Amir on the subject of receiving an English resident in Afghanistan. The Amir considered it objectionable to his people. Mayo therefore dropped this subject altogether from future discussions.
- (ii) Karr's letter brought to light another statement by an equally authoritative hand. It was H. Grey, now (1878-9) Major, and Commissioner of Bahawalpur. Grey's letter appeared in the *Times* (Feb. 24, 1879, p. 6, c. 5). Grey claimed that he had seven interviews with the Afghan authorities, the reports of which he sent in his three notes. In his report of March 29, 1869, Grey stated that the Amir would like to erect forts on his northern frontiers, and would like to admit European garrisons if ever desired. As to the location of a British resident, the Amir had no objection except to his presence at Kabul, where the people were hostile. Grey said that in his report of April 4, 1869, he mentioned also the Amir's willingness to the presence of an English agent.
- (iii) The Government of India started an inquiry into this subject during 1875 and 1877. Grey's report, which he claimed to have been submitted on March 29, is dated here on March 31. (See *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-9, pp. 547 and 669): X.Y. or F.B. report also confirms Grey's statement. F.B. learnt of it from the Amir's Mir-Munshi, and Syed M. Ishaq, Prince Abdullah's tutor. (See *E.S.L.I.* 1875/4 p. 29, and *Par. Pap. op. cit.* No. 32/11).
- (iv) Grey's and F.B.'s statements were also supported by Col. O. T. Burne, then Private Secretary of Lord Mayo. See *Times*, (Feb. 26, 1879, p. 11, c. 2).

Sher Ali left India touched by the friendly intentions of the Government of India and impressed by the might of the British power in India. On his return to Kabul he made some earnest attempts, during the course of the next three years to introduce the new system of administration which he observed in the host country. His reforms touched all the fields of administration. He established a council of advisors, enunciated a system of watch and ward, introduced a regular postal system, and advised native manufacturers to produce articles like those of the West.¹ In his military reforms he abolished the semi-feudal organisation of the army, and instituted in its stead a regularly paid one on British pattern.² An attempt was made to integrate the treasury and the administration of his five provinces, and a budget system was introduced. However this drive for reforms did not live long. Modernisation needs planners and these Afghanistan badly lacked.

Anglo-Afghan relations between the years 1869 and 1872, were of the most cordial type. Mutual confidence developed on both sides.³ An interesting

1. *Edinburgh Review*. "Afghanistan" *op. cit.* p. 272., and *Blackwood's Magazine*: "Ambala Darbar" *op. cit.* p. 73.

2. *Blackwood's Magazine* "Ambala Darbar" *op. cit.* p. 73.

3. Sher Ali before his visit to Ambala had deported his four brothers to India.

They were Ahmed Khan, Omar Khan, Zaman Khan, and Rahmat ullah. His visit to Ambala was followed by deportation of Ismail Khan, Zulfiquar Khan and Mohd Saleh. In 1872 Sharif Khan was deported to India.

Government of India in 1869 conditioned Abdul Rahman and Azam Khan assylum in India to their abstention from political activities. In 1871, Ishaq Khan, the son of the late Azam Khan, appealed for assylum in India. It was refused because the Amir did not approve of it.

proof of the improved relations was the Amir's willingness to act on Lord Mayo's advice during the rebellion of his son, prince Yaqub. To this prince more than anybody else, Sher Ali owed his victory over his brothers during the civil war. Sher Ali's leaning towards his younger son Abdullah Jan, irritated the elder prince who revolted on September 2, 1870.¹ Prince Yaqub set out to take over Herat, the province he had been ruling since 1863. Sher Ali sent forces against him. Yaqub was beaten and fled to Siestan.² Lord Mayo deemed it necessary at this time to interfere and settled the dispute of the "savage lot".³ On September 24, Mayo addressed a letter to the Amir counselling him to reconcile himself with his son and to remove, if possible, the causes of irrigation.⁴ This was followed by another letter from the Viceroy in reply to the Amir's letter on the misconduct of his son, Yaqub. Mayo again counselled him to use moderation rather than the firmness usually exhibited in such circumstances.⁵ Mayo's influence prevailed over Sher Ali and the latter addressed a conciliatory communication to his rebel son now residing in Siestan. Negotiation failed in face of ill-natured intriguers.⁶ Another attempt at reconcilliation came from Mir Afzal Khan, the

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1. *E.S.L.I.* 1870/7. Kabul Diary (hereafter cited as K. D.) Sept. 4, 70.
 2. *Edinburgh Review* "Afghanistan" *op. cit.* p. 290.
 3. *Argyll Papers.* *op. cit.* no. 2. Mayo to Argyll (private) Nov. 16, 1870.
 4. *E.S.L.I.* 1870/7. Viceroy to the Amir, Sept. 24, 70.
 5. *Ibid.* Nov. 16, 79.
 6. *Edinburgh Review.* "Afghanistan" *op. cit.* p. 291.

Governor of Farrah, and the grand-father of Prince Abdullah. This effort also met the same fate.¹

Prince Yaqub's plans for the conquest of Herat, met with the approval of the Persian authorities. Mayo informed the British Legation in Persia to make sure that no hostile attempt against the authority of Sher Ali was encouraged by Persia. Mayo was assured by Charles Alison, the British Minister at Teheran, that Yaqub would not receive any aid from the Shah's Government against his father.²

By the close of March 1871, Yaqub appeared before Herat and on May 6, he invested the city.³ After taking Herat, Yaqub thought of making peace with his father. He sent a deputation to his father, expressing his willingness to visit him and to apologise for his misdeeds. The Amir was not in a mood for reconcilliation, he was furious with his son and was planning to subdue him by force. And at this point Mayo's third letter arrived, in which he repeated his views on the necessity for amicable relations between father and son. Mayo referring to Yaqub's proposal of submission, denied any desire on his part to defend the rebel son's conduct, but he declared that, "our desire to support you is as strong as ever, but our power to do so is weakened by your quarrel with your son Accept my advice. Disregard the recommendations of interested

1. *Ibid.*

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1871/8. Mayo's telegram to Alison, Dec. 27, 70. p. 53, Alison's reply Dec. 29, 70. p. 50. and January 2, 71. p. 691. Also see *S. H. C.* 1871/76. Granville's telegram to Alison on June 13, 71. and Alison's reply June 15, 71.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1871/7. K.D. June 1, 71.

counsellors: be reconciled to your son and thus restores peace to your country".¹ This council prevailed upon the Amir. Sher Ali invited Yaqub to visit him assuring him that he need not have fear of treachery.²

Yaqub arrived at Kabul on July 5, 1871. It took the Amir some time to heal his injured pride, and in the middle of September, the repentent son was appointed to the governor-ship of Herat.

The rise of Russia in Central Asia was a most difficult question which dominated the thoughts of both the Liberal and the Conservative administrations of England. Both parties envisaged a solution, but each a different one. To the Conservatives, if Russia was capable of expansion in Central Asia, so was Britain. The Conservatives in their two short-lived administrations of 1858-1859, and 1866—1868, neither had time nor an opportunity to accomplish something concrete in Central Asian diplomacy. Lawrence's presence in India and his hold over the north-western frontier's affairs constituted a major impediment to the Whitehall policy-makers. The Viceroy on the spot wielded greater influence than a minister-in-charge of India at London. And Whitehall had not yet learnt how to dictate to Calcutta. Lawrence, since 1865, had been proposing to the home-government to enter into some agreement with Russia regarding unsettled affairs of Central Asia.³ The

1. *Mayo Papers* 7490/3/1. Viceroy to the Amir, June 6, 71. Also in *E.S.L.I.* 1871/8.

2. *Edinburgh Review*. "Afghanistan" *op. cit.* p. 295.

3. *Lawrence Papers*. no. 6. Lawrence to Wood (private) April 4, 65.

Conservatives during their reign doubted the wisdom of this policy.

The Liberals both under Palmerston and Gladston, were opposed to the idea of territorial acquisition beyond the north-western frontiers of India, but they shared Lawrence's view that certain parts of Central Asia should be assigned to Russia, where she could expand with the consent of the British Government.¹ Keeping in mind this object, Lord Clarendon had held a "confidential interview" with Gortchakov in 1868, and had discussed the possibility of establishing a neutral zone between the two countries.² Clarendon, after this interview, had spoken to Baron Brunnow "more than once" appraising the likelihood of drawing a boundary line in Central Asia, which in no circumstances should be crossed.³ Gortchakov hailed Clarendon's views. Hence the Russian Chancellor was of the opinion that the territories of the Central Asia up to the borders of Afghanistan should be assigned to Russia.⁴

But the Russian proposition was not acceptable to the Government of India. The new Viceroy, Lord Mayo, was altogether a different person from his predecessor. Mayo had been rewarded by the Conservatives for his distinguished services to the

1. See Lord John Russell's view on it in Chapter II.

2. F.O. 65/870. Gortchakov to Brunnow, March 7, 69. Also in *Par. Pap.* LXXV 1873 no. 1/1.

3. F. O. 65/870. Clarendon to Buchanan no. 88. March 27. 69. *Par. Pap.* *op. cit.* no. 1.

4. F. O. 65/870. Gortchakov to Brunnow, March. 7, *op. cit.*

party. He was Disraeli's personal selection.¹ Mayo, trained in the Conservative traditions, was keen to assert himself in the Central Asian politics. Mayo believed that Russia should consent to place herself in the same position as regards Khiva, the unconquered part of Bokhara and the Turkomans of that region, as Britain was willing to do as regards Kelat, Afghanistan and the newly emerged state of Kashgharia (Chinese Turkistan). Both the powers he thought, should have authority to punish any misbehaviour of their satellites but that after punishment had been administered they should be obliged to retreat.² Clarendon, adopting the views of the Indian Government, replied to Gortchakov that Afghanistan was not the state which could fulfill the requirements of a buffer zone.³ He argued that only the upper Amu Daria in the south of Bokhara would meet the conditions necessary for such a zone. This area included the Merv Oasis and the territory of Khiva.⁴ But Russia had strong objection to this division of Turkistan. Both Khiva and Merv were in the plan of Russian conquest. The idea of neutral zone was dropped, and M. de Westman, the Russian Foreign Minister, attributed the failure of the scheme to the envy held by the Government of India for the

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1. Monypenny, W. F. and Buckle, G. E. *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, New York, 1929. vol. 2. p. 415. The Conservative Ministry was defeated before Mayo reached India. But Gladstone consented to his appointment.
 2. Mayo to Rawlinson, June 10, 69 in Rawlinson's *England and Russia* *op. cit.* P. 309.
 3. F. O. 65/870. no. 88. *op. cit.*
 4. F. O. 65/870, Clarendon to Rumbold no. 25. April 17, 69. also *Par. Pap.* *op. cit.* po. 3.

Russian position in Central Asia.¹

The idea of the neutral zone was all at once revived. The initiative, this time, came from Russia. The improved relations between India and Afghanistan and the military assistance provided to the latter, alarmed Russia. It was believed in Russia that Britain was forming a confederacy of the Central Asian states led by Afghanistan to expell Russian from Turkistan. Brunnow expressed this fear personally to an Anglo-Indian official Douglas Forsyth.² Amir Sher Ali had actually sent an envoy to Bokhara proposing the alliance of the two states and waging a holy war against Russia.³ Discontinuation of Lawrence's policy of "Masterly Inactivity"—much deplored in Russia, and Mayo's keen interest in Central Asian affairs further alarmed the Russian authorities. "Russia should pursue an honest course and if it does not she would lay upon itself trouble and danger" wrote the redoubtable Viceroy to Buchanan. It was a great warning for Gortchakov who "looked rather caught" when Buchanan read out the Viceroy's letter to him.⁴

Coinciding with this policy was the hostile attitude of Sher Ali upon his northern borders. At Ambala, Sher Ali had been assured of British support to consolidate his authority in the north against his internal rivals. But he went a step further.

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1. F. O. 55/870. Rumbold to Clarendon no. 42, May 10, 69.
 2. *Mayo Papers* no. 7490/9/6. Forsyth to Mayo (Private) June 25, 69.
 2. *Argyll Paper* no. I. Mayo to Argyll (private) July 29, 70.
 4. *Mayo Papers*. no. 7490/6. Buchanan to Mayo (private) June 26, 70.

Sher Ali invited to his dominion Abdul Malik Tura, the rebel son of Amir Muzzafar of Bokhara. He married his daughter to the Bokharan prince, and promised him help against his father, the latter now in alliance with Russia.¹ He gave shelter to the governor of Kulab, who had rebelled against Bokhara.² Sher Ali also sympathised with Jora Beg, the rebel chief of Shahresabz.³ And he started subsidising the Tekke Turkomans against any future exegency. Hence Terentyeff, the contemporary Russian historian, attributed Sher Ali's hostility against his neighbours to the Ambala conference, where a pact was signed between India and Afghanistan to counterbalance Russian power in Central Asia.⁴

Hostile movements of Sher Ali alerted the Imperial Government. Czar Alexander II, personally expressed his fears to Buchanan on Sher Ali's openly agressive activities, which the Czar thought had been encouraged by the Government of India.⁵ Westmann even went to the extent of directly blaming the Queen's government for Sher Ali's militancy on his northern borders.⁶

It was against this background that Gortchakov invited Clarendon to Heidelberg in the early Fall of

1. Vambery, A. *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*, London 1874. p. 245.

2. *Edinburgh Review*. "Afghanistan", *op. cit.* p. 278.

3. *Ibid.* p. 280.

4. Terentyef, II *op. cit.* p. 346.

5. F. O. 65/870. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 112. July 25, 69 : also *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no 8.

6. *Ibid.* no. 116. July 28, 69 : also *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 9.

1869. During their three-and-a-half hours talk, Gortchakov complained about the British assistance to Afghanistan, and the hostile attitude adopted by that state against its neighbours—an apprehension which took Clarendon some time to allay. Clarendon reiterated the British plan of making the upper Amu, a neutral zone between the two powers in Central Asia.¹ But Gortchakov “the crafty man only practising upon my youth and innocence” requested Clarendon not to press for the Amu line, but to agree to making Afghanistan, a neutral zone between the two states.²

Luckily for Russia, Thomas Douglas Forsyth, the Commissioner of Jallandhar division, was intending to visit Russia at this time. The Russian diplomatists decided to take advantage of his visit. Forsyth had served for a long time on the north-western frontiers of India, and was deeply interested in establishing commercial links between India and Turkistan. He had been endeavouring since 1867, to attract the attention of Central Asian merchants by organising trade fairs at Palampur. But he did not receive any encouragement from the government of Sir John Lawrence.³ Mayo welcomed his endeavours. Early in 1869 Forsyth applied for leave to the government, expressing his desire to visit Russia

1. F. O. 65/870. Clarendon to Buchanan no. 122. Sept. 3. 69 : also *Par. Pap. op. cit.* No. 11.

2. Maxwell, Sir H. *The Life and Letter of Fourth Earl of Clarendon*, New York 1913 vol. 2. p. 361.

3. Forsyth, Sir Douglas. *Autobiography and Reminiscences*, London, 1887. p. 44 : *Lawrence Papers* no. 29 Lawrence to Mcleod June 3, 67.

via Europe, and to return to India via Central Asia. The object of his visit was to ascertain the truth of the prohibitions imposed by Russia on English imports in Bokhara : to discover the prospects for British trade in that region, and to study the object of Russian activities in the direction of Kashgharia.¹ Mayo, after having interviewed the applicant, forwarded his case to the India office. The latter considered the whole proceeding a "difficult question." It doubted the fitness of the agent whose visit would be confused with his official capacity.² The Duke of Argyll personally did not take any interest in the business.³ It was Mayo's letter to the Duke on the subject of Forsyth's visit "a golden key to unlock an impassable door" that moved the India office.⁴ The application was forwarded to the Foreign office, which, in turn, forwarded it to Brunnow for the necessary action. In the meantime Forsyth met Sir Roderick Merchison "a friend in need" who introduced him to Brunnow.⁵

Brunnow hit upon a plan. The question of the boundary line had been dropped out from negotiations, and Forsyth's visit to Russia could be utilised towards that end. Brunnow suggested to Clarendon that Forsyth should proceed to Baden Baden to meet Gortchakov, who would arrange Forsyth's visit to Russia. Clarendon agreed because Forsyth's knowledge of India and Central

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1. *S. H. C.* 1169/4. Forsyth to the Government of Punjab April 14, 69.
 2. *Ibid.* See J. W. Kay's remark on the application of Forsyth.
 3. Forsyth's *Autobiography op. cit.* p. 47.
 4. *Mayo Papers.* Add 7490/9/6. Forsyth to Mayo (private) April 27, 69.
 5. *Ibid.* June 35, 69.

Asia would help to solve many misunderstandings between the two powers, especially those concerning the commercial relations in which Forsyth was deeply interested. Brunnow handed over a letter of introduction to Forsyth containing five points of mutual interest to the two governments. They were :—

- (i) entents cordial.
- (ii) understanding on tariff.
- (iii) exchange of officers.
- (iv) to show to the Central Asian states that perfect understanding existed between the two states.
- (v) confidence in success of negotiations conducted through the officials of the two states.¹

Forsyth met Gortchakov during the last week of July, 1869. Gortchakov refused to discuss commerce because "he could not allow" questions of tariff to enter into diplomacy.² However, he assured the British officer that commerce and tariff would be discussed during his visit to St. Petersburg. Gortchakov was much pleased to learn from Forsyth that Lord Mayo was anxious to continue Lawrence's policy on the frontiers of India.³ Clarendon approved Forsyth's proceedings at Baden, and sanctioned his journey to the Czar's capital.⁴

1. *Ibid.* July 22, 69.

2. *Ibid.* July 27, 69. Also in *S. H. C.* 1869/64. Forsyth to Clarendon, July 30, 69.

3. *Ibid.* Also in *S. H. C.* 1869/64. Forsyth to Secretary of State for India, Aug. 3, 69.

4. *Mayo Paper.* Add 7490/9/6. Forsyth to Mayo (private) August, 11, 69.

Clarendon also attached "some kind of official term" to Forsyth's conversation at St. Petersburg.

Forsyth had planned to visit St. Petersburg in a private capacity. Contrary to his expectations, he noticed that the nature of his visit had suddenly changed. For the proposed negotiations at St. Petersburg he had no instructions either on political or commercial subjects. The India office was not at all encouraging. Clarendon was ignorant of the sandy deserts and rocky mountains of Central Asia. Forsyth was at a loss. However he requested the Government of India to furnish him with instructions on the subject of Central Asia.¹ Lord Mayo sent him a letter addressed to Gortchakov, and also some instructions on the political state of affairs in Central Asia.²

Forsyth visited St. Petersburg in the Fall of 1869. There the discussion was only confined to the issue of the neutral zone, i.e. Afghanistan. By Afghanistan, the Russians meant Afghanistan proper only. They did not include in it Afghan-Turkistan. Forsyth had a hard time to explain to them that Afghan-Turkistan was an integral part of Afghanistan. However, it was concluded that the Uzbek states of Balkh, Kunduz and Badakhshan, should form the proposed boundary line marking the limits of Afghanistan³. The St. Petersburg authorities agreed to recognise only that area as the state of Afghanistan

1. *Ibid.* Forsyth to Burne, July 17, 69.

2. F. O. 65/871. Forsyth to Buchanan no. 222, Nov. 2, 59. Also *Par. Pap.* op. cit. No. 15/1.

3. F.O. 65/871. Forsyth to Buchanan in no. 222, *op. cit.*

which was then held by Sher Ali¹. It was also agreed upon that both England and Russia should exert their influence on Afganistan and Bokhara respectively, to avoid troubles on the borders.

Both Buchanan and Clarendon appreciated "the ability and judgement displayed" by Forsyth during his mission to St. Petersburg². Forsyth, however, was not allowed to visit Central Asia. The arrangement concluded between Forsyth and Stremoukov, was forwarded by the Russian Asiatic Department to Kaufmann, for his study and comments.

It appears from the negotiations conducted at St. Petersburg and the correspondence that followed this negotiation, that the Liberal Ministry of England felt satisfied or was made to believe by Russia that the area beyond the northern limits of Afghanistan should be left over to Russia. Forsyth himself says that Mayo's major object in sanctioning his visit to St. Petersburg was to define Sher Ali's possessions in Central Asia³. Mayo himself, since the middle of 1869, had been collecting data on the actual boundaries of Afghanistan. He also consulted Rawlinson on the subject⁴. However, whether consciously or unconsciously, the British policy

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1. *Ibid.* Also Mayo Papers Add. 7490/9/6. Forsyth to Mayo (private), Nov. 5, 69.
 2. *S.H.C.* 1869/64. F.O. to I.O., Nov. 30, 69 : and *Cambridge papers* Add. 7490/6/2. Buchanan to Mayo, Nov. 6, 69. *Mayo*
 3. Forsyth. *Autobiography op. cit.* p. 49 : See also *Inveraray Papers op. cit.* no. 2. Mayo to Argyll (private), Aug. 12, 69. *Argyll*
 4. *S.H.C.* 1869/64. Rawlinson Memorandum on Afghanistan June, 15, 69.

makers handed over, Central Asia, beyond the northern border of Afghanistan, to Russia.

It was soon realised, both in India and at the India office that Forsyth's statements on the Afghan boundary line were not well-based. Both Rawlinson's and Mayo's findings pointed out that the Amu Daria constituted the northern limits of Afghanistan. Forsyth had not mentioned the Amu at all in his conversation with Stremoukov. Another point of equal importance was that the present Afghanistan was not to comprise what was possessed by Sher Ali, but that which was possessed by his father. The Government of India cleared this point by stating that an arrangement had been worked out between Dost Mohammad of Afghanistan and Amir Nasarullah of Bokhara in 1859, to the effect that Afghanistan would not interfere with the Turkomans on the north of Amu, while Bokhara on her part promised not to lay any claim to Badakhshan, Maimanah and their dependencies on the south of Amu like Shibergan, Akcha and Saripul. Hence, the Government of India's despatch on the subject of the Afghan boundary line in Central Asia, pointed out that the Amu, served as the northern limit of Afghanistan from the district of Balkh on the west of Badakhshan at the most easterly point. The western boundary was Badakhshan with the whole area between the Amu and the Hindu Kush¹.

The Government of India's viewpoint was forwarded to the Russian Government. The Asian

1. *Par. Pap. op. cit* no. 60/1. Viceroy to the Secretary of State, May 20, 1870.

Department at St. Petersburg sent it to Kaufmann at Tashkand for his observations.

Sixteen months passed and nothing was heard from St. Petersburg or Tashkand. Buchanan pressed for a reply at the Russian capital. In November, 1871, the Russian Foreign office communicated to London its reaction to the Government of India's statement on the boundaries of Afghanistan. Gortchakov made strong objection to making Sher Ali possessor of the dominion owned by his father¹. Stremoukov once again raised the question of Badakhshan and Maimanah, which he thought should not belong to Afghanistan, but should be considered an independent area along with a cordon of small states between Herat and Badakhshan. In reply to Buchanan's strong defence of Afghanistan's claims, Stremoukov withdrew his objections to the inclusion of all other principalities in Afghanistan with the exception of Badakhshan, which the Director of the Asiatic Department believed, should not in any case, become part of Afghanistan². But the India office, at the persuasion of the Government of India and Rawlinson, pressed its point that only the Amu should form the boundary line of Afghanistan³. Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, sent another communication to

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1. F.O. 65/873. Gortchakov to Brunnow Nov. 12, 1871 : also in *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 79.
 2. F.O. 65/873. Buchanan to Granville no. 254. Oct. 24, 71.
 3. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. April 5, 72 : and *Granville Papers* P.R.O. 30/29/51. Argyll to Granville January 4, 72 ; Argyll says that both Rawlinson and Lawrence assume that Afghanistan reaches to the Amu.

St. Petersburg in reply to that of Gortchakov's of November 1871. This was quite a comprehensive statement on the geographical features of the Afghan borders. The communication informed the Russian Government that the British Government had waited long for Kaufmann's reply on the subject, but, having received no answer from that authority, had in the meantime arrived at the conclusion that all the territories up to Khoja Saleh on the Amu belonged to Sher Ali, who had been advised to defend them and that the Government of India would be willing to assist him in that project. This area, Granville declared, comprised Badakhshan and Wakhan from the Lake Sarikol on the east, to the River Kokcha on the north, running all along the Amu Daria to Khoja Saleh, and containing in it the district of Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh. The north-western bounday of Afghanistan would contain the districts of Akcha, Saripul, Maimanah, Shibergan and Andkhoi. The western Afghan frontier would run from the dependencies of Herat to the Persian province of Khurassan¹.

Granville's communication had been couched in formal, courteous, diplomatic phrases. Lord Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sensed that if a definite decision was to be reached, the communication must bear a tone strong enough to stop further Russian objections to it. The Foreign office agreed to his suggestion, and the communication was delivered to Gortchakov

1. F.O. 65/874. Granville to Loftus no. 197. Oct. 17, 72. Also in *Par. Pap.* *op. cit.* no 1.

in a revised and firmer form¹.

The new communication alarmed the Russian authorities. Brunnow asked Granville confidentially whether the despatch in question should be considered as an ultimatum². Gortchakov also took it as an ultimatum³. Stremoukov was reported to have said that "the English were very violent on the subject and threaten us with war⁴."

In the meantime, General Kaufmann had compiled his findings after a study of two years. His observations were that the possession of Badakhshan and Wakhan, would make Afghanistan a paramount power among the Central Asian states. From its base at Badakhshan, Kabul would be able at any time, to threaten Bokhara, Khokand and Kashgharia. Kaufmann's enquiries led him to believe that Sher Ali had no hold over Badakhshan or Wakhan⁵. The Russian authorities also raised objections to Sher Ali's authority over Akcha, Saripul Maimana, etc⁶.

But Whitehall had taken a strong stand now. The India office had a great share in it⁷. Granville, in his reply to Gortchakov stated clearly that the creation of Badakhshan and Wakhan as an indepen-

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1. F.O. 65/874. Loftus to Granville Telegram, Oct. 28, 72 : and Granville reply by telegram Nov. 2, 72.
 2. F.O. 65/875. Granville to Loftus no. 221. Dec. 14, 72.
 3. F.O. 65/875. Loftus to Granville no. 370. Dec. 25, 72.
 4. F.O. 65/877. Loftus to Granville no. March 27, 73.
 5. F.O. 65/875. Kaufmann to Gortchakov Nov. 29, 72 : also in Par. pap. op. cit. no. 2/1.
 6. F.O. 65/875. Gortchakov to Brunnow, Dec. 19, 72.
 7. Mayo Papers. *Register of Despatches Drafted* : see I.O. to F.O. January 25, 73.

dent state in Central Asia was fraught with danger. Sher Ali would never give up his right to these principalities. His authority had been recognised in both the principalities and both the chiefs of those principalities owed allegiance to him.¹

This energetic attitude of the British weakened the opposition of the Czar's Government. Russia at this time was planning an expedition against Khiva, besides the financial exigencies of the empire, and growing differences with Germany made it inadvisable for Russia to offend England openly.² The Czar sent his confidential envoy, Count Schouvalov, to London to assure Britain of the friendly attention of Russia towards her. This mission was followed by Gortchakov's despatch of January 31, agreeing to the boundary line laid down by England.³

Strategy and trade were two major impulses attracting Kashgharia⁴ to Britain in the latter half of

1. F.O. 65/875. Granville to Loftus no. 22. January 24, 73 : also in *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 4.

2. F.O. 65/875. Granville to Loftus no. 6. January 1, 73.

3. F.O. 65/875. Gortchakov to Brunnow, Jan. 31, 73 : also in *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 5.

4. (i) Kashgharia assumed different names at different periods of its history. Early Arab historians called it Turan or Turkistan. The later historians in their attempt to distinguish it from Turkistan proper, named it "Bilad-e-Sharq" (the eastern cities). The historian Rashid-ud-Din in his *Tarikh-e-Rashidi* called it "Mashrik Turkistan" (Eastern Turkistan).

(ii) Some of the Persian writers called it "Kichak Bokhara" (Little Bokhara), a name that was later on popular with most of the early European geographers.

(Continued on page 160)

the Nineteenth century. Early in 1858, on the order of the House of Commons, a select Committee was appointed to investigate the possibility of colonising India, and also to explore means suitable for extension of trade with the states of Central Asia.¹ The Committee consisted of sixteen members headed by William Ewart (1798-1869).² The Committee interviewed the Schlagintweit brothers on July 6, 1858. These three German brothers, Herman, Robert and Adolphe toured India and Central Asia between 1854 and 1857. Herman and Robert returned to Europe while Adolphe was killed in Kashgharia during his second trip to Central Asia. Talking about Kashgharia, both the brothers affirmed that it was rich with mineral resources and carried on an extensive trade with all the parts of Central Asia. Tea, they asserted, was in great demand in Kashgharia.³

(Continued from page 159)

- (iii) During the period of the Mongol occupation, Kashgharia was known as "Mongolistan". Under later Chughtai Khan, the name of their capital, i.e. Kashghar, was applied to the whole of the region of Kashgharia. While the name Mongolistan was applied to the home of the Mongol nomads in the northern valley.
- (iv) The Chinese held this region up to the western province of Ili and hence called it "Tianshan Nan Lu" (the way south of Tian Shen).
- (v) The western neighbours of Kashghar, i.e. Khokand, Bokhara, etc. called it "Alty Shahr" (six cities) or "Jaty Shahr" (seven cities).
- (vi) Most of the European travellers of the Nineteenth century called it Chinese Turkistan.
- (vii) China after its conquest in 1877-8, named it "Sinking" (the new province). This term had been in vogue even prior to their conquest in 1877-78: but the name became better known after this period.

1. *Par. Pap.* VII 1857-58, part 2. p. II.

2. *Hansard. Commons* CXLIX March 16, 58. CC. 269—293.

3. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* pp. 1—10.

Two years later, Ewart put a question in Parliament as to whether any measures had been adopted by the Government to open up Kashgharia to British trade. Sir Charles Wood, replied that the Government of India had been approaching the Chinese authorities on this subject¹. The Government of India in the meantime had been active in collecting necessary information on trade routes and resources of Central Asia, and a detailed report on the subject was compiled in 1862 by R.H. Davies, the Secretary of the Government of Punjab². This report was primarily concerned with the commercial potential of the countries between the British frontiers in the northwest to those of Russia in Central Asia. The report contained a unique account of the trade routes, geography and climate of Central Asia at this time. It pointed out that British products could easily displace those of Russia in Central Asia³. A good part of the report was devoted to prospects of trade with Kashgharia. The latter state stood in need of skin, cotton fabric, opium, spices, saffaron and tea. The report deplored the heavy duties imposed by the Maharaja of Kashmir on the Indo-Kashghar trade. Davie's report recommended the holding of commercial fairs in India to attract Central Asian merchants, and urged the government to improve roads towards Kashgharia, and to approach the Chinese authorities for co-operation in these projects.

1. *Hansard* ; Debates ; *Cammons* CLVII March 16, 1860, C. 734-5.

2. Davies, R.H. *Trade and Resources of the Countries on N.W of India.*
op. cit.

3. *Ibid.* p. 46.

Davie's report was much appreciated at home and was published in 1864 for the study of the Parliament. Henceafter no proper steps had been taken to establish commercial links with Kashgharia. Russian hostility and Chinese caution stood in the way of Britain's endeavours in that direction. The end of the Chinese rule in Kashgharia ushered in brighter prospects for linking Kashgharia commercially with India.

The Chinese occupied Kashgharia three times. First in 94 A-D. during the Han dynasty (202 B.C.—220 A.D.); again in 650 A.D. under the Tang rulers (618—907 A.D.), and for the last time in 1759 under the Manchus (1644—1911). The Chinese rule throughout the course of this period had been unpopular. There had been repeated risings against them resulting in the retreat or slaughter of the Chinese soldiery, and emergence of one or more autonomous states. The inhabitants of Kashgharia, the Uighur¹ (Taranchis) and Dungans,² had been

1. The origin of the Uighur is not exactly known. Kuropatkin calls them the descendents of the Huns. See A.N. Kuropatkin. *Kashgharia* (translated by W. E. Gowan) Calcutta 1882, p. 92.

2. Many theories are advanced as to the origin of the Dungans. They are sometimes claimed to be of common stock with the Uighurs, also they are called original Chinese. But both the theories are considered wrong. Another version advanced by some of the English sources of the 19th Century, is attached to the meaning of their name Tungan (a Turkish word meaning "remnant"). It is said that they were the remnants of those Turghai tribes who came in the tenth century A.D. from Transoxiana. But modern Russian accounts repudiate this theory. It is believed that the word Dungan is a combination of the two Chinese words, Dun (East) and Gan (Kansu). The Muslim settlers inhabiting the eastern region of Kansu got this denomination from their Chinese neighbours and rulers. See Terentyef *op. cit.* pp. 225—27, and *The Central Asian Review* vol. IX 1961 pp. 202-3.

converted to Islam during the tenth century A.D. At the close of the Seventeenth century a priestly class known as Khwajas,¹ became both spiritual and political leaders of the state of Kashgharia. In 1759, the Chinese took over Kashgharia for the third time. The descendents of the Khwajas migrated to Khokand, and from there made repeated crusades to regain their lost dominion.² The decline of the Chinese power in Kashgharia for the third time is attributed to Dungan risings. The sanctity attached in Kashgharia to the Khwaja house, played a considerable role in overthrowing the Manchu yoke. The watchword in Kashgharia had been "when Buzurg Khan mounts his steed, Altishehr shall be free".³ Buzurg was Jehangir's son. Jehangir had been executed by the Chinese in 1828.

Many factors contributed to the fall of the Chinese rule in Kashgharia. A wave of religious resurgence in Kashgharia coming out of Chinese oppression, and Russian expansion in Turkistan, were

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1. The Khwajas were the descedents of Khwaja Ahrar, a celebrated saint of the fifteenth century Central Asia. In Kashgharia he held a considerable influence and one of the Khans of that region bestowed upon him an estate. His two sons Khwaja Kalian and Khwaja Ishaq Vali were the founders of two politico-religious groups of Ishkias and Ishaqias respectively, who later on were known as Mount Albanians (White Mountaineers) and Montenegrins (Black Mountaineers).
 2. Since the beginning of the 19th century the Khawajas had been making attempts at the conquest of Kashgharia. In 1825 Jehangir, in 1830 Yussuf, in 1846 Seven Khwaja brothers and in 1857 Vali Khan, invaded Kashghar, but none of them succeeded to establish himself permanently.
 3. Wyllie, J.W.S. *Essays on the external policy of India* Ed. W. W. Hunter, London. 1875. p. 214. This is an article reproduced from *The Edinburgh Review*. "Western China" CXXVII 1868.

the major causes of the Dungan rebellion in Kashgharia.¹ The general decay of the Chinese Empire in the Nineteenth century also made the insurgents work easier in Kashgharia. Especially after the Taiping Rebellion (1850—64), the Nien Rebellion (1853—68), the Opium War (1839—42), the Anglo-French occupation of Canton (1858) and the fall of Peking (1860), the hold of the Central Government over its distantly located provinces, vanished.²

It was in 1862, that the Dungans of Salar or Hochow, in the province of Kansu, defied the Chinese authority. From Kansu the spark spread throughout Kashgharia. The Dungans of Kansu, having declared their independence, sent their emissaries into Shensi and Zungaria. Risings started at Hamil, Urumchi, Turfan and Manas, and all the provinces successfully over-threw the Chinese authority, and established their independent governments. The wave of insurgence came to Yarkand in 1863, wherefrom it spread to Yangi Hissar, Kashghar, Aksu, Khutan and Kucha. Everywhere the rising was successful. The Manchu soldiery in most of the forts either was put to the sword, died in defence, or committed suicide. Yangishehr was the only place left in 1865 in the Chinese hands.

The close of the Manchu reign in Kashgharia was followed by almost a dozen independent principalities. Rivalries and schisms now erupted

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1. Forsyth, Sir T.D. Douglas. *Report of the Mission to Yarkand in 1873*, Calcutta 1875. p. 201.
 2. Hummel, A.W. *Eminent Chinese of the Ching Period*: article on Tso Tsung. Tang by Tu Lien-che; Washington, 1944. p. 765.

among the victors. The city of Kashghar became a subject of dispute between the two parties. One group invited Sadiq Beg, a Kirghiz chief to rule.¹ The latter invited Buzurg Khan from Khokand, and Buzurg was accompanied by Yuqub Beg, the latter being a veteran soldier and a talented administrator.

Buzurg and his party of sixty-eight persons left Khokand in early 1865. The residents of Kashghar welcomed his arrival and raised him to the throne. The subjugation of the whole of Kashgharia was under the plan of the new Khwaja ruler, but he had neither will nor power to undertake it : hence it fell to the lot of Yaqub Beg.

Yabub Beg, born in 1820 at Pishbek near Tashkand, was the son of a Qazi and connected with the influential group at Khokand. He had suffered many trials during his life before entering the political arena in Kashgharia. In 1853 he was in command of the Ak-Masjid fort when it was lost to Russia. In Khokand, he never hesitated to change to the winning side during the political contest between Khudayar and his various rivals from 1858 to 1865.² During various wars that Yaqub had fought against the Russians, he had received five

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1. Tsing Yuan, "*Yakub Beg and the Muslim Rebellion in Chinese Turkistan*". *Central Asian Journal* : The Hague and Wiesbaden vol. June 1961. See also an article in *The Edinburgh Review* "*Eastern Turkistan*", CXXXIX 1874. The account given in the latter article is not very accurate.
 2. Forsyth. *op. cit.* pp. 98-99. See also Boulger, C.D. *The Life of Yaqoob Beg*, London 1878. Boulger's account is misleading and confused. His chronology is also poor. There is also an article in *The Westminster Review* "*The Late Yaqub Beg of Kashghar*", LIV. 1878. This is also not a systematic account.

wounds on his body.

In the middle of 1865, Yaqub Beg set out to put an end to petty potentates of Kashgharia. The first one he conquered was Yangishahr, then he fought the Dungans of Aksu, Kucha and Turgan, defeating them all at Yangi Hissar. This victory was followed by the surrender of Yarkand to Yaqub. Then followed a rupture between Buzurg Khan and Yaqub. The former envied the growing influence of his lieutenant, while the latter hated the authority of a puppet ruler. In a battle that was fought at Yangi Hissar, Buzurg was defeated and arrested. The defeated chief was banished to Tibet, from whence he went to Mecca via India and then returned to Khokand.¹

Yaqub Beg was now a ruler over the western part of Kashgharia. Within a year he carved out a state for himself. He held Kashghar, Yangi Hissar and Yarkand. Both the rulers of Sirikol and Khotan in the south acknowledged his authority.²

The break up of the Chinese rule in Central Asia opened better prospects for Britain to establish political and commercial links with Kashgharia. Among the government officials, Lumley was the first to turn the attention of the home government to this "extensive scale" movements on the borders of India, which he thought, would not be without interest for the Government of India.³ But the government of Sir John Lawrence in India did not

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/5. *Ladakh Diary*. Oct. 12, 69.

2. Boulger *op. cit.* p. 118.

3. F. O. 65/867. Lumley to Russell no. 55. Sept. 14, 64.

show much awareness of the situation. Efforts in India were made to familiarise the government and people of India, with the new rulers of Kashgharia, but all such efforts were made on private and non-governmental level. In August 1863, Captain T. G. Montgomerie, the astronomical assistant in the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India, sent a native agent Mohammad Hamid, to Yarkand. Hamid reached there on September 30, and spent six months in Yarkand.¹ The next attempt to explore Kashgharia emanated from the same department. W.H. Johnson a civil assistant, undertook a journey to Khotan at his own risk in the middle of 1865.² Johnson visited Khotan on an invitation from Khan Badshah Mufti Habibullah, the ruler of Khotan.³ Johnson's journey had a double purpose ; to learn about the actual Russian position in Central Asia, and to know the geographical location of Khotan.⁴ Johnson reached Khotan during the last week of September, 1865. He was well received by Khan Badshah, a man of eighty years of age whom he described as, "stout, well-built and of a very fair complexion." The Khan has visited India in 1861, on his way to Mecca, and on his return had waged a successful rising against the Chinese, resulting in his accession to the throne.

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1. *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.* "On the Geographical position of Yarkand and some other places in Central Asia", vol. XXXVI 1866.
 2. *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.* *Report of Johnson's Journey to Khotan.* vol. XXXVII 1867.
 3. *Ibid.* p. 3.
 4. *Ibid.*

Khan Badshah was in great fear of Russia and earnestly looked for some assistance from outside. He wanted to detain Johnson as a hostage until he received some assistance from the Government of India.¹ Johnson found the land of Khotan fertile, and the mountain rich in minerals including gold and coal. He was much impressed with the native hospitality. He also found that the ruler of Khotan was keen to open trade relations with India.²

Khan Badshah's position in Khotan was shaky. He was surrounded by powerful enemies, *i.e.* Russia, China and Yaqub Beg. Early in 1865, he had approached the Government of India, through the ruler of Kashmir, for help, but the overture did not meet with approval from the Government of India.³ Johnson's visit to Khotan and the assurances he advanced of British assistance, encouraged the ruler of Khotan, who forwarded two letters to the Government of India, one through Johnson and the other through his envoy, Juma Khan.

Johnson, on his return to India, forwarded the Khotan letter to his government, recommending that the ruler of Khotan should be assisted with a supply of small arms.⁴ The envoy Juma Khan, met the Lt.-Governor of Punjab at Hattian. The letter that the envoy bore was an open request for supply of artisan and arms.⁵ The envoy then proceeded

1. *Ibid.* p. 4.

2. *Ibid.* p. 6.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. Memorandum on Khotan pp. 99-100.

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. Government of Punjab to India no. 59—80. Feb. 5, 66.

5. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. Ruler of Khotan to Viceroy, p. 110.

to Calcutta and met the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence. The envoy in a written statement expressed the wishes of his ruler to enter into a treaty with the Government of India and repeated his request for help in the form of experts and equipment.¹ Lawrence, in his reply to the ruler of Khotan, expressed the inability to comply with the requests of the ruler of Khotan.²

In the meantime political events in Kashgharia, were rapidly changing. The new ruler of Kashghar, Yaqub Beg, was a man of undaunted energy and skill. In 1867, he took Khotan by a strategem. During the next three years, Yaqub subjugated the Dungans to the north and east.³ The surrender of Kohna Turfan in 1870, and the submission of Manas the same year extended his hold to the north-west. By the end of the year 1870, Yaqub Beg was an acknowledged master of the Muslim population in Kashgharia.

In Britain, Johnson's visit to Khotan was highly commended. The president of the Royal Geographical Society called him "a true, bold and scientific manager of expedition."⁴ Rawlinson, in his paper on Johnson's trip to Khotan, described his adventure as a work of great distinction.⁵ Johnson's name appeared for many days in the columns of the London newspapers.

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. *Memo. op. cit.* p. 107.

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1866/I. Viceroy to Ruler of Khotan, Feb. 17, 66.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1871/8. *Ladakh Diary.* January 23, 71.

4. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society* no. XI, 1866-67. November 12, 66. p. 11.

5. *Ibid.* pp. 6-11.

Another enthusiast and adventurer like Johnson, was Douglas Forsyth, who has been mentioned previously. Forsyth had visited Russia in 1864, and was present at a commercial fair at Nijni Novogorod. His on-the-spot observations convinced him that Britain stood a good chance of competing with the Russian products in Central Asia¹. As commissioner of Jallandhur division, his jurisdiction extended over the outlying provinces of Kulu, Lahole and Spiti, all of them bordering on the states of Tibet and Ladakh. While on his regular visits to the border stations, he assessed the trade situation. He became convinced that the traditional trade between India and Kashgharia could be increased by offering positive encouragements to the merchants of the area². Forsyth also expressed a wish to visit Khotan; however, although Sir Stafford Northcote approved³, Lawrence opposed it.

During the course of 1865-1866, the Government of the Punjab appointed a native agent at Ladakh to collect news on the swiftly changing political events in Kashgharia. The agent was also instructed to inspect the observance of the Indo-Kashmir agreement of 1864, under which the Kashmir authorities had to levy reduced duties on English imports⁴.

1. *Par. Pap.* XLVI 1869. p. 487.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 487-9: also in Forsyth, *Autobiography op. cit.* pp. 43-4.

3. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* Secretary of State to Viceroy, March 7, 67. pp. 491-2.

4. *Par. Pap.* L. 1867-68. Government of Punjab to Government of India, Dec. 13, 66. pp. 707-8.

Next year, on the recommendation of the Government of the Punjab, the Central Government approved the appointment of Doctor Cayley as Assistant Commissioner of Ladakh.¹ Also the ruler of Kashmir was instructed to lower the tariff duty to 5% on imports of English goods into Kashmir².

Cayley's reports from Ladakh showed that Yaqub Beg of Kashgharia had been taking keen interest in the promotion of trade in his state. He imposed only a 2½% duty on imports, while export was free of any charge³. During the summer of 1868, Forsyth visited Ladakh and met both Kashghari traders and an official Kashghari representative, Mohammad Nazar, then visiting Kashmir. Forsyth learnt from the Kashghari representative that Yaqub Beg was eager to develop commercial ties with India. Forsyth immediately reported the matter to the Government. In his report he recommended the appointment of an Indian agent at Kashghar and the establishment of commercial fairs in India⁴. Whitehall showed considerable interest in Forsyth's proceedings, and it showed willingness to sanction a "moderate grant" for improving the trade routes between India and Central Asia. But the Viceroy, Lawrence, took less sanguine a view of the opportunity. He thought that the roads to Kashgharia were

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1. *Ibid.* Government of India to Punjab. January 22, 67. pp. 709-10 : and Government of Punjab to India, Sept. 26, 67. p. 716.
 2. *Ibid.* p. 717.
 3. *Ibid.* *Ladakh Diary.* Sept. 24, 67. p. 723.
 4. *Par. Pap.* XLVI 1868-69. Government of Punjab to India Sep. 23, 68 : also in Forsyth, *Autobiography op. cit.* pp. 44—5.

hazardous, trade insignificant, the land distant and the problems of labour and transport insoluble¹.

During the course of 1868-1869, three adventurers entered Kashgharia in purely private capacities. First among them was Robert Barkley Shaw (1839—1878), a tea planter in the Kangra Valley. Shaw reached Kashghar at the end of the year 1868. He was warmly received by Yaqub Beg, who showed considerable interest in promoting trade with India. During three interviews that Shaw had with Yaqub, the latter showed his hearty desire to live on friendly terms with the British Government. "Your queen is like a sun", said the ruler of Kashgharia, "which warms everything it shines upon. I am in cold and desire that some of its rays should fall upon me. I am very small (showing the tip of his finger), a man of yesterday. In these few years God has given me this great country. I am very glad that you have come"². Shaw described Kashgharia as a prospering state and a potential market for tea and calico.

Simultaneously with Shaw's journey, another traveller, G.W. Hayward, entered Kashghar in March 1869. Yaqub met Hayward on the second day of his visit to the Kashgharian capital. Yaqub was glad to see him and expressed a hope that "the English in future would visit his country"³. Hayward's

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1. *Par. Pap.* XLVI 1868-69. Government of India to Punjab Oct. 28, 1868.
 2. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society.* "A visit to Yarkand and Kashghar" by Shaw. XIV 1869-70. pp. 132-133: also in Shaw, R. B. *Visit to High Tartary*, London 1871. p. 356.
 3. *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.* "Hayward's journey from Leh to Yarkand and Kashghar". XL 1870. p. 100.

account of Kashgharia, besides being of scientific value, provides much contemporary information on the political and commercial state of the territory. He pointed out that Kashgharia constituted a considerable market for tea. This market, he continued had been monopolised by Russia, under the Russo-Chinese treaty of 1861. Russia lost the monopoly with the rise of the new Kashgharian government, and she was struggling hard to regain it by even intimidating Yaqub¹. Hayward noticed that Kashgharia provided a market for spices, tea, calico, leather and utensils, while it produced wool, gold, silver, cotton silk, etc.²

The third visitor to Kashgharia during this period was Captain Montgomerie's native agent, Mirza Shuja, who reached Kashghar in February 1869, and stayed there for more than four months. Mirza had audience with Yaqub Beg. He also received the impression that the ruler of Kashgharia looked forward anxiously to establish commercial ties with India.³

Equally active in India was Forsyth, who saw in Kashgharia not only a potential market, but a strategic post as well. He believed that Russian penetration into Kashgharia would threaten India more than their presence on the Amu. The latter was separated from India by barren lands, while Kashgharia provided all the wherewithal to the

1. *Ibid.* p. 98.

2. *Ibid.* p. 134.

3. *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.* "Report on Mirza's exploration of Kashghar". XLI 1871. p. 145.

invader.¹ The Himalayas were no longer impassable, Forsyth told a distinguished gathering in London. He even thought of linking Yarkand by a rail-road with India².

These individual enterprises and initiatives received appreciation in Calcutta. Lawrence had been replaced by Mayo. To the latter, leaving affair alone on the north-west of India was a policy, which was "neither English nor commercial"³. Mayo, from an interview with Shaw, learnt that a "new country containing..... 3 or 4 million tea drinking people" had been discovered⁴. Mayo, after having learnt of the possibilities of the success of the project under consideration, set out to seek the co-operation of the ruler of Kashmir, to secure a safe trade route to Kashgharia. A treaty was signed on May 2, 1870 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, with the sole object of improving trade relations with Kashgharia. Under the new treaty, Kashmir promised to levy no duty on goods in transit; and a trade route was to be selected which would remain "a free highway in perpetuity"⁵.

While negotiations for a treaty with Kashmir

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1. *E.S.L.I.* 1868/3. Forsyth Memorandum on E. Turkistan Oct. 7, 1868.
 2. *Report and Transaction of British Society for Advancement of Sciences.* "Trade Routes between Central Asia and Northern India" by Forsyth, 1869 p. 162.
 3. *Argyll Papers.* 1870/1. *op. cit.* Mayo to Argyll (private). June 2, 70.
 4. *Argyll Papers* 1869/1. *op. cit.* Mayo to Argyll (private). July 2, 70.
 5. *E.S.L.I.* 1870/6. Anglo-Kashmir Treaty. pp. 412—14.

were in progress, an envoy from Yaqub Beg, Mirza Shadi, came to India. The envoy met Lord Mayo on March 28, 1870. The object of the mission was to open friendly relations between the two governments to promote trade, to buy arms in India, to persuade artisans to go to Kashghar, to invite an English officer to visit Kashgharia, and to seek advice as to Kashghar's dealings with its neighbour in general and Russia in particular¹.

Lord Mayo's friendly gesture encouraged the envoy. The Viceroy informed him that he was at perfect liberty to buy arms in India and induce artisans to go to Kashgharia. Concerning Kashghar's neighbours, Mayo advised Yaqub Beg to confine himself to maintaining internal order and stability and to avoid getting embroiled with other nations. This was the advice Mayo added, he had tendered to Afghanistan, which was now free from Russian violation of her borders. Mayo reciprocated Yaqub's idea of promoting trade between the two countries, and at the end intimated that the Government of India was considering the possibility of appointing an English officer to accompany the envoy to Kashghar².

Mayo sent a letter to Yaqub to be delivered by the envoy on his return. He advised the Kashghar ruler to have "watchful and vigorous internal government by strengthening the defence of your frontier" and to abstain from the conflicts beyond his borders³.

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1870/6. Interview. pp. 343—46.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1870/6. Viceroy to Ruler of Kashghar, April, 4, 70.

It was finally decided to send a British officer to lead a mission to the Kashghar Court, and Douglas Forsyth was appointed to the post. His instructions emphasised avoiding discussion on political affairs, but to concentrate on commercial objectives. Forsyth was requested to study the prospect of trade in that part of the world, and to recommend measures necessary for its promotion¹.

Forsyth set out for Kashghar in the summer of 1870. His mission consisted of seventeen men including Robert Shaw. The party reached Yarkand on August 28. Unluckily, Yaqub Beg had to go to the eastern frontiers to suppress a Dungan rising in the cities of Turfan and Urumchi. Forsyth waited for a fortnight, and realising Yaqub's engagement was indefinite, left Yarkand on September 5, 1870².

Yaqub Beg learnt with regret of the departure of Forsyth from Yarkand³. As no further word reached him from India, he despatched another envoy, Syed Ahrar Khan Tura, to India in the Fall of 1871. At Calcutta, Syed Tura met the Viceroy, and both the commercial and political objects of his visit were discussed. The envoy expressed a fear that his ruler was harbouring a fear of Russia. He went on to point out that Russian occupation of Kulja constituted a great threat to Kashgharia⁴. On

1. *Ibid.* Government of India to Punjab. no. 5A. April 14, 1870.

2. *Par. Pap.* LI. 1871. Forsyth Report of the Mission to Yarkand. pp. 619—54 : also in Forsyth *Autobiography op. cit.* p. 64.

3. *Proceedings of the Government of Punjab* 1871/14I. Governor of Ladakh to Ruler of Kashmir, Aug. 71. p. 891. (Hereafter cited as *P. G. P.*).

4. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/11. Interview. Dec. 25, 71. pp. 381—85.

his way homeward at Lahore, the envoy requested a return visit of an English officer¹. The Government of Punjab requested the Central Government to utilize this opportunity by sending a fresh envoy to Kashghar. But Mayo's successor at Fort William, did not look favourably on the idea and postponed the proposal for a more opportune time².

Russo-Kashghar affairs at this time present a very interesting contrast to those of Anglo-Kashghar relations. The Russians looked upon Yaqub Beg as a rebel and usurper of the Chinese dominion in Central Asia, while Yaqub considered them also as usurpers and aggressors in Central Asia. In addition, he was afraid of them. For this reason he banned Russian merchants into his territory.³ General Von Kaufmann, on his part, was also getting worried about Yaqub's friendly overtures to England. As a safety measure against Anglo-Kashghar hostility, Kaufmann fortified in 1868, the Valley of Narain on the Russo-Kashghar border⁴. This further increased fear in Kashgharia of the ill-intentions of the northern neighbour. The same year, Yaqub sent his envoy, Mirza Shadi, to Tashkand. Kaufmann had left for St. Petersburg and Mirza Shadi

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Government of Punjab to India no. 471. April 13, 72.

2. *Ibid.* Government of India to Punjab no. 992. p. April 23, 72.

3. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 317.

4. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 263. By the treaty of Peking, the Valley of Narain had been assigned to Russia.

followed him there¹.

At St. Petersburg, Mirza Shadi was given the draft of a commercial treaty to take to Kashghar, and to be ratified by his ruler. But Yaqub refused to enter into any treaty engagement until the boundary line was demarcated between the two states. Yaqub had an eye on the Valley of Narain, which had been a part of Kashgharia.

Forsyth's visit to Yarkand in 1870, and Yaqub's occupation of Turfan the same year, alarmed Kaufmann, who deemed it necessary to occupy Kulja (Ili) — the only link of Russian trade and influence between Alma Ata and Urumchi, Hamil and Peking. The occupation of Kulja by Yaqub, the Russian strategists thought, would extend British influence to the whole of Zungaria and would open, not only Russian Turkistan, but even Siberia to British hostile penetration. General G.A. Kolpakovski occupied Kulja in August 1871.

This was one of the major reasons for despatching Syed Ahrar Khan Tura to India. In the meantime, Kaufmann devised another move. The Russians attempted to induce Khudayar Khan of Khokand, to use his sovereign rights over Yaqub Beg, and to invade Kashgharia, annexing it to the dominion of Khokand². It was a great temptation.

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1. F. O. 65/869. Buchanan to Stanley no. 279. Dec. 2, 68. Captain Reinthal in the meantime was sent to Kashghar. Reinthal was much impressed by Yaqub's administration. It was at the receipt of Reinthal report that Mirza Shadi was invited to St. Petersburg. See Reinthal *Report in Letters to India* 1870/12.
 2. *E.S.L.I.* 1869/5. *Ladakh Diary* Aug. 24, 69. Cayley learnt this intelligence in 1869 from Mirza Shuja: also see Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 320.

But it would not have been popular among the subjects of Khudayar. The latter advised Kaufmann conciliation and presented his services for mediation, and sent an envoy to the Kashghar Court counselling Yaqub Beg to appease Russia¹. But Yaqub refused to be bullied. He dismissed the idea of mediation, and requested Kaufmann to approach him directly if the latter wished to settle the points in dispute.

A Russian mission under Baron Kaulbars was sent to Kashghar. The object of the mission was to sign a commercial treaty with Yaqub. Russian forces in the meantime were deployed on the Kashgharian border, to be used if the mission failed in its object². Yaqub welcomed the mission to his Court, but refused to negotiate a treaty under the threat of war³. Russian troops were withdrawn from the border. The Russo-Kashghar treaty was signed on June 22, 1872. The treaty lowered the duties on Russian goods to a uniform rate of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ and it also served its main object, that is, to open the state of Kashgharia to Russian trade and merchants.

The Russo-Kashghar treaty created great anxiety in England. Since the visits of Shaw, Hayward and Forsyth to Kashgharia, it had become a centre of scientific and cultural discussion in London. Books, articles and lectures many of which have been mentioned in this chapter appeared on the inhabitants and the state of Kashgharia. To satisfy the interest of the curious English public, the Crystal Palace

1. Schuyler II. *op. cit* p. 320.

2. *Ibid.* p. 321. Terentyef I *op. cit.* p. 282.

3. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 321.

arranged a "Yarkand Court" from the collections of the various visitors to Kashgharia¹. Half of the annual medals of the Royal Geographical Society during this period went to the explorers of this area of Central Asia¹.

Kashgharia was considered as the future market for English commerce. This market was lost when Russia imposed its terms on the ruler of that state. Britain had failed to avail herself of any opportunity when it arose, was the opinion of Robert Shaw, as expressed in the columns of the *Times*.³ The government was approached to safe-guard the mercantile interest of the country. The Derby, Bedford and Manchester Chambers of Commerce, sent their memoranda to the Foreign Office and to the India Office, requesting their government not to miss opportunities any more for opening regular trade with Kashgharia⁴. The Society for the Encouragement of Art, Manufacturers and Commerce sent on April, 25, 1873, its twenty-three men deputation, led by its Chairman, Major-General, Erdley Wilmot, to the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India. The deputation presented an eleven-clause memorandum to the Duke, emphasising the importance of trade with Central Asia in general and Kashgharia in particular. It requested the government to sign a

1. Forsyth. *Autobiography op. cit.* p. 77.

2. See for the prizes and medals the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, 1866—73.

3. *Times*. January 25, 73. p. 6. c. 2.

4. F. O. 65/876—879. Derby [Chamber of Commerce Memorandum on March 24, 73.

commercial treaty with Kashgharia on the basis of most-favoured nation¹.

The government of India itself was keen to promote both commercial and political relations with the ruler of Kashgharia. Lord Mayo wanted to see Kashgharia as a strong buffer state on the north of India between Russia and England in Central Asia. In 1871, he took Robert Shaw into the government service and appointed him joint commissioner at Ladakh. Shaw wielded considerable influence in Kashgharia and was deeply interested in the establishment of greater intimacy between England and Kashgharia. The government of India had been urging the home government to make it known to St. Petersburg that Kashgharia was beyond Russia's sphere of influence²: it even requested Whitehall to get the boundaries of Kashgharia defined in collaboration with St. Petersburg³. Forsyth, during his conversation with the Russian authorities in 1869, had given them an impression that Britain would not be indifferent to Russian aggression on Kashgharia⁴. Both Lumley and Buchanan had been assured of the peaceful intentions of Russia towards Kashgharia⁵.

It was in the beginning of 1873, that Syed Yaqub

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1. *Journal Society of Arts and Institution in Union*, XXI 1873.
 2. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 54, July 18, 72: and *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 22. Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 30, 73.
 3. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 10/1. Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 30, 73.
 4. F. O. 65/871. Forsyth to Buchanan in no. 222. Nov. 2, 69.
 5. F. O. 65/868 nos. 19 and 27: F. O. 65/781 no. 273.

Khan Tura, a nephew of the ruler of Kashgharia and a statesman of great ability, reached India. He was proceeding on a mission to Constantinople. He was met both by the Viceroy Lord Northbrook and his foreign secretary, Charles Aitchison. The envoy was asked whether he had authority to conclude a formal treaty engagement with the Government of India. The envoy regretted that he was unable to do this, but suggested that the matter be referred to his ruler, though he showed his personal willingness to enter into preliminary negotiations.¹ It is hard to say from which side the initiative came².

But one point is clear the Government of India was willing to enter into a commercial treaty with Kashgharia³. The Queen herself, in her letter sent by Forsyth in 1873, expressed the view that "the prosecution of commercial intercourse with all parts of the world.....is one of the most cherished objects of the British people"⁴. It was, however, arranged that Syed Yaqub on his return from Constantinople, would be accompanied by a British mission to conclude the treaty.

Syed Yaqub's proceedings in Constantinople delayed him for a while. The Viceroy sent "several pressing telegrams" to Elliot requesting him to expedite Yaqub's departure from Turkey. In the meantime,

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1873/14. Interview. Feb. 27 and March 28, 73. pp. 553—58.

2. *Ibid.* p. 554.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1873/14. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 30. March 14, 73.

4. *Letters to India*, 1873/5. Queen to ruler of Kashghar July 18, 73.

the British mission to the Court of Kashghar, again headed by Forsyth, was staffed and equipped properly. The mission consisted altogether of three hundred men and four hundred mules.¹ The mission left India during the early Fall of 1873. At Shahidula it was joined by Syed Yaqub. It reached Kashghar on December 4. On Feb. 2, 1874 the Anglo-Kashghar Treaty of Commerce was signed.² The treaty allowed the British subjects to enter, reside and trade in Kashgharia. Import duties in Kashghar, were fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}\%$. A house for the British embassy was provided in Kashghar and Forsyth requested his government to send an envoy to take charge of his diplomatic assignments.³ The mission left the capital after staying there for four months.

The treaty of 1874 was landmark in Anglo-Kashghar relations. More than anything else it led to a considerable increase of trade between the two countries. In 1873 the import-export between the two countries was estimated to be at Rupees 17,76,729 : next year it increased to Rupees 20,10,932 and during the year 1875 this trade stood at Rupees 21,60,789.⁴ A Central Asian Trading Company was formed by some of the civil servants and wealthy natives in 1874, with exclusive object of monopolising Kashgharian trade.⁵

1. Forsyth. Report. *op. cit.* pp. 1—3.

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1874/17. Anglo-Kashghar Treaty. pp. 768—771.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1874/17. Forsyth Report from Kashghar. Feb. 2, 74.

4. *P. G. P.* 1874/144. *Ladakh Diary*, April 13, 74 : *P. G. P.* 1876/859. *Ladakh Diary*, April, 26, 76.

5. The manager of the Company was T. Russel and his assistant was Dalgleish.

CHAPTER VI

Russian Conquest of Khiva, 1873

Khiva or Khwarizm¹ was the first object of Russian conquest in Central Asia, but all their attempts to occupy that state, prior to 1873, ended in fiasco. Diplomatic relations between the two states are traced back to the Fourteenth century, but actual intercourse started in 1557 when an envoy from Khiva attended Ivan's Court.² A native report that the sand of the Amu contained gold in it, led Czar Peter the Great, to send the tragic expedition of Prince Bekovich Charkoski in 1716-1717.³ Doctor Blankengal, a Russian physician who visited Khiva in 1793, gave another exaggerated account of Khiva's "rich and in-exhaustible gold and silver mines".⁴ Hence Russia made another attempt in 1839, again resulting in failure. However in 1842 a

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1. Khwarizm in old Persian means "eastward". Khwarizm once formed a mighty empire in the middle ages. Its ruler Ala-ud-Din (1200—1220) seized Kashgharia, Samarqand, Bokhara, Balkh, Khorassan and Mazandaran. Changez Khan valued the friendship of the Khwarizmshahi rulers. In the later years it became an appanage of the house of Juji (son of Changez). Khiva did not form properly the Khanate of Transoxiana. It was Temur who attached it to his dominion. At the collapse of Temur's Empire an independent Uzbek Khanate was established at Khiva in about 1515.
 2. Michell *op. cit.* p. 536.
 3. *Ibid.* pp. 538-39.
 4. Spalding *op. cit.* p. 125.

commercial treaty was signed between Russia and Khiva, but it came to nothing, though the exchange of envoys between the two Courts was regularly maintained.¹

Russian entrenchment in the Sar Daria around the middle of the Nineteenth century, created anxiety in Khiva. The latter state had established its settlements on the southern banks of the Sar Daria in 1825, had subjugated the Kazaks of the region, and had erected several forts around the year 1830.² To the west of the Russian fort Perovski and to the south east of Fort No. 2. (Karmakchi), was situated the Khivan Fort of Khwaja Niaz (known after its first governor). It occupied a strategic position, controlling the trade route between Bokhara and Orenburg. The Russians occupied it in 1856.³

During the Nineteenth century, the dynasty of Inak Iltizar was ruling over Khiva. To the Russians the rulers of this dynasty were "usurpers"⁴ who had

1. Khivan envoys to Russia came in 1557, 1563, 1566, 1583, 1700, 1703, 1714, 1837 and 1857. Russia sent Prince Bekovich (1717), Lt. Col. Herzenberg (1731), Gladishov, Mouraviv and Nazerof (1741), Dr. Blankengal (1793), Capt. Mouravief (1819), Gen. Perovski (1839), Cap. Nikiphorof (1841), Lt. Col. Deniski (1842). Of these envoys and expeditions, Col. Herzenberg was not allowed to enter Khiva, General Perovski's expedition failed to reach Khiva, and Prince Bekovich's party was massacred in Khiva.

2. Michell *op. cit.* pp. 318-19.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Board Drafts* 1857/22. Wodehouse to Clarendon (copy) Oct. 2, 57. General Kovalesky, the Director of the Asiatic Department called them "usurpers" in an interview with Wodehouse.

dethroned the legitimate rulers of Khiva.¹ However, Syed Mohammad Khan, the ruler of Khiva (1856—1864), deputed an ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1857, announcing his accession to the throne and to congratulate Czar Alexander II on his accession.² Ignatiev's mission to Khiva initially found the Khan co-operative to Russian proposals to enter into a commercial alliance. These proposals were upset firstly by the arrival of a third steamship to the two already stationed in the Amu, then by the "manoeuvring" of the steamer *Perovski* in the river, and finally by the protection provided to a Persian slave on the deck of that ship.³ Ignatiev was highly annoyed at the failure of his mission. He called Khiva a "den of robbers",⁴ and wrote to Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg, saying that to expect any consideration or respect from Khiva for an international agreement was a farce.⁵

Of the three Uzbek states of Turkistan, Britain, somehow, was more interested in Khiva than Khokand or Bokhara. Fully aware of the three main Russian expansionist attempts, namely the Cossack expedition in the Seventeenth century, Bekovich's in

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1. Since the year 1700 when Shahniaz Khan the ruler of Khiva (1687—1702) had sent his envoy to Peter, Khiva was held to have acknowledged Russian overlordship. Shahniaz was succeeded on the throne by Arab Mohd. II in 1702, Abdul Khair in 1741, Noor Ali and Habib Khan in 1770. They were all Kirghiz subjects of Russia ruling over Khiva.
 2. Michell *op. cit.* p. 552.
 3. Edwardes. Russian projects. *op. cit.* p. 202 : Khalfin *op. cit.* pp. 45—49.
 4. F. O. 65/867. Napier to Russell no. 272. Aug. 26, 61.
 5. Khalfin *op. cit.* p. 55.

the Eighteenth century, and Perovski's in the Nineteenth century, Britain feared that Khiva would be the first victim to succumb in Central Asia. Hence in 1840 two British officers, Captain James Abbot and Richmond Shakespears were sent to Khiva to advise the Khan on the policy to be pursued in regard to his powerful enemy. Again in 1859, a native agent, Rajab Ali was sent to Khiva by the British Legation in Persia, with the object of learning the actual state of political affairs in Central Asia.¹ Rajab Ali stayed for two years in Khiva, and on his return submitted a detailed report on the Russian doings in Central Asia with respect to Khiva; he also brought a letter from the Khan addressed to the British Minister at Teheran, in which the Khan had expressed his great uneasiness at the Russian expansion in Turkistan.²

The Adaeef Kazaks inhabiting the southern banks of the Sar Daria were the subject of dispute between Russia and Khiva. The Adaeef had acknowledged the authority of both Khiva and Russia. The latter had subjected them to a nominal tribute since 1850, but they had always defied this authority and occasionally plundered the Russian territory and carried off Russian subjects as prisoners. Khiva was also a potential market for Adaeef goods. This situation itself was embarrassing for the Khan of Khiva. To overcome a future

1. F. O. 60/237. Stanley to Doria no. 28 and 32. May 5 and June 2, 59. respectively.

2. F. O. 60/237, Alison to Russell no. 14. January 30, 61, and its enclosure. Raja Ali's account, as pointed out by Alison, exaggerated the Russian conquest.

misunderstanding, the Khivan authorities had suggested to Ignatiev in 1858, that the boundary line between the two states be defined. This proposition was not acceptable to the Russian authorities, and Ignatiev dismissed the Khan's request, calling the demarcation of the boundaries an impossible project.¹

It is interesting to note that Khiva on her part never sent any expedition against Russian territory, nor directly encouraged the capture of Russian subjects, on the contrary Russian prisoners sold in Khiva had been well looked after in that state.² Also during the Russo-Bokharan war, Khiva is reported to have remained peaceful and abstained from interference in the struggle even when requested for help by Bokhara.³

After the subjugation of Khokand and Bokhara, Russia turned towards Khiva. But the latter state was not easily approachable. It was distantly situated and separated by vast deserts, from Tashkand six hundred miles away, and from Orenburg nine hundred and thirty miles away.⁴ The closest base for any operation against Khiva was the Caspian, and since 1837, Russia had been endeavouring to establish itself in this area. During 1837-1838, the island of Ashurda was captured.⁵ In 1864 a fort

1. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 170.

2. Schuyler I *op. cit.* pp. 49-50.

3. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 155.

4. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 335.

5. Rawlinson. *England and Russia op. cit.* p. 140.

was erected at the mouth of the Attrek.¹ The following year it was decided to erect a fort on the eastern coast of the Caspian in the Bay of Krasnovodsk,² which naturally would shorten the distance to Khiva to five hundred miles.

A fortification at Krasnovodsk was very popular with the Russian mercantile class.³ In the beginning of 1869 the "Society for Promotion of Russian Trade and Industry" collected an expert opinion on this "shortest land track" to Central Asia, and submitted it in the form of a memorandum to the government.⁴ The memorandum requested the government to occupy the Bay of Krasnovodsk, for this would guarantee a firmer hold on Central Asia and the Caspian. Buchanan's intelligence indicated that the St. Petersburg authorities approved the scheme.⁵ The British ambassador then approached Gortchakov for the verification of the report, which the latter confirmed and added that the establishment at Krasnovodsk would be confined to a small factory. To another query, the Russian Chancellor replied that the Turkomans of the Caspian region were neither subject to Persia nor Khiva, but were independent tribes.⁶ Gortchakov positively denied any intention of using the Krasnovodsk Bay as a

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1. F. O. 65/867. Alison to Russell no. 123 (copy) Nov. 30, 64.
 2. F. O. 65/867. Buchanan to Russel no. 85. March 3. 65.
 3. Another idea popular at this time was to restore the Amu to its ancient bed. It is said that the Amu used to flow into the Caspian sea.
 4. *Letters to India* 1870/2. Michell's Report on Krasnovodsk Bay. March 25, 70 : F. O. 65/871 no. 73.
 5. F. O. 65/871. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 215. Nov. 1, 69.
 6. *Ibid.*

base of hostile operation against Khiva.¹

At the end of 1869, Colonel N. G. Stolietov landed his forces at Krasnovodsk and occupied it without any resistance.²

The Russian authorities throughout the year of 1869, denied having any intentions of opening hostilities against Khiva. The Michell Brothers intelligence indicated that a formidable army was being equipped for "serious military action" against Khiva in the Spring of 1870. Robert Michell attached to the India office, and translator of many Russian accounts on the subject of Central Asia, visited Russia in 1869 and went up to Orenburg. His findings showed that serious consideration was being given to despatching an expedition against Khiva.³ His brother Thomas Michell, the British consul at St. Petersburg, and the renowned author of numerous works on Central Asia, in the meantime made the acquaintance of General Heymenn, the proposed commander of the expedition of twenty-five thousand troops to Khiva. Thomas learnt that General Heymenn would launch his expedition against Khiva in February 1870, from Krasnovodsk Bay.⁴ Gortchakov was somewhat embarrassed to know that the scheme had leaked out.⁵ He renewed once again his assurances of peaceful intent, and both he and Stremoukov, added that the restoration of the Amu to its old bed had been under the

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1. F. O. 65/871. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 261. Dec. 1, 69.
 2. F. O. 65/871. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 92. Dec. 14, 69.
 3. F. O. 65/871. Buchanan to Clarendon, no. 251. Nov. 18, 69.
 4. *Ibid.* Same to same, no. 295. (enclosure) Dec. 29, 69.
 5. *Ibid.* Same to same, no. 295. Dec. 29, 69.

consideration of the Russian Government for some time now.¹

Since his arrival in Tashkand, General Kaufmann had been in correspondence with Syed Mohammad Rahim the new Khan (1864—1890) of Khiva. Kaufmann in his first letter to the Khan on December 1, 1867, advised the latter to punish border robberies and incursions.² Khiva replied to this letter in February 1868, promising to do so if the offenders were caught and requesting the general to do the same on his frontiers.³ But to attain peace in the Steppe region was a *chimera*. Since 1824, the Kazaks had been grumbling against the Russian administrative reforms. During that year, the Khanate held by the house of Abul Khair was abolished, and the Steppe was divided into three districts, each under the authority of a Sultan Regent.⁴ This division had destroyed the Kazaks tribal distinctions, their right of land-holding, and the aristocratic structure of their society. The Kazaks had showed their resentment to the new system in their risings under Syrem, Kenisar and Izat Kutebar.⁵ The Russian reforms of 1869 in the Steppe region, further excited the Kazaks. Under the new reforms the land of the Lesser Hordes was put under the control of Russian military governors;⁶ an election system was introduced, and taxes were

1. *Ibid.*

2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 157.

3. *Ibid* p. 158.

4. Schuyler I *op. cit.* pp. 31—32.

5. *Ibid.* p. 32.

6. *Ibid.* p. 33.

raised on each tent.¹ The influential section of the populace—the Khans and the Mullas, whose position had been most affected by the new system—stirred up a rising early in 1870.² General Kaufmann blamed the Khan of Khiva for instigating the Kazaks to rise, but contemporary chroniclers completely absolve Khiva.³

Kaufmann wrote two letters to the Khan of Khiva on August 24 and October 2, 1869, warning him of the consequences of instigating the Kazaks against Russia.⁴ In his third letter written on January 30, 1870, Kaufmann adopted “more decided terms” and sent the Khan an ultimatum of amity or enmity, with no middle position. The proposal for amity was couched in terms of a request to the Khan to open his state to Russian merchants.⁵ The Khan replied to the first two letters in March 1870, expressing his amiable intentions, with an explanation that Khiva had never committed any aggression on foreign territory. The Russian prisoners then held in Khiva, the letters explained, had been brought by the nomad Kazaks to that city, and that the prisoners would be released soon. The Khan also requested that an end be put to the infiltration

1. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 168-69.

2. Schuyler I *op. cit.* p. 33.

3. Schuyler reproduces a letter of Gen. Charnaiev published in *Ruski Mir* of Feb. 2 (14) 1875, showing that Khiva had no hand in the rising of the Steppe. (Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 331). Neither is Terentyef definite on this point (Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 199).

4. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 176-77.

5. *Ibid.* p. 189 : F. O. 65/872. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 104. March 22, 70.

of Russian troops into Khiva territory.¹

Kaufmann replied to these letters on April 6, 1870. He claimed that all the territory on the Yani Daria (a branch of the Sar) as far as Akchakul belonged to Russia, while the area of the Bukan Mountains, and the whole road from Kizil Kum to Irkabai, belonged to Bokhara, the latter now being subject to Russia. Hence Kaufmann asserted his claim to the area immediately south of the Sar. In addition he asked for the immediate release of the Russian prisoners.²

On April 26, the Khan replied to Kaufmann's letter of January 30, and complained against the Russian occupation of Krasnovodsk. The Khan trusted that Czar Alexander II, would be as peaceful as his ancestors, and hoped that the paramountcy of his position would not lead him to encroach upon his neighbours; the great sovereigns, the Khan said "are not aggressors", that if the Czar wanted to make war, let it be known to him that battles were decided by God, and Russia might be mistaken in her confidence of victory.³

In the meantime the rising in the Steppe had been suppressed, and Kaufmann realized that Khiva's turn for subjugation had come. The Tashkand authorities believed that Khiva, whom Kaufmann termed as '*mineur*', should be reduced

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1. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 190-91.
 2. *Ibid.* p. 193.
 3. F.O. 65/872. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 219. June 15, 70: Terentyef as given in Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 421.

to submission by force.¹ General Milyutin, the Minister of War, in his letter of March 25, 1870, approved the Tashkand proposal,² and Kaufmann closed all further correspondence with Khiva.³

At St. Petersburg a considerable re-orientation in the type of explanations given to Britain began to occur. Grumbling against Khiva was started along the lines that Khiva had instigated the Kazaks, that the Khan had addressed Kaufmann insolently; that the Khan had refused to reply to Kaufmann's letters, and that the Khan's proceedings were injurious to promotion of trade.⁴ Buchanan was told that the Khan deserved punishment, and an expedition against Khiva would be despatched from Turkistan and Krasnovodsk.⁵ Stremoukov substituted the word "reconnaissance" for "expedition" against Khiva.⁶ These explanations convinced Buchanan that "the prospect of his (the Khan's) retaining his independence does not however appear to be very satisfactory."⁷

Impending Russian hostility against the Khanate of Khiva was looked upon with great apprehension by the British. K. E. Abbot, the British Consul-General at Odessa, opined that the Russian occupation

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1. F.O. 65/872. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 125. April 6, 70: Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 194.
 2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 194-95.
 3. *Ibid.* p. 201.
 4. F.O. 65/872. Buchanan to Clarendon no. 85. March 8, 70, no. 122. April 5, 70, and no. 213 June 14, 70.
 5. F.O. 65/872. Buchanan to Granville no. 584. Dec. 28, 70.
 6. F.O. 64/873. Buchanan to Granville no. 104. May, 27, 71.
 7. F.O. 65/872. no. 122 *op. cit.*

of Khiva would ultimately disturb "our quiet possession of India." Abbot believed that Khiva's integrity was a "matter of vital importance" for the British position in the East.¹ I. S. Lumley, the British Minister at Brussels, learnt of the Russian expedition from an Austrian officer who was leaving to join the expedition against Khiva. His estimate was that the Russian occupation of Khiva would "increase to an enormous extent the aggressive power of Russia for action against Persia, Afghanistan and even British India".² Anxiety was also felt in Parliament over the Russian concentration of troops against the state of Khiva.³ Equally alarmed was the Government of India. The Viceroy sent a telegram on May 25, 1871, followed by a despatch the next day, stating the apprehension felt in Afghanistan and on the frontiers of India over the hostile proceedings of Russia. The Government of India hoped that "H. M. Government will lose no opportunity of stating in the most unmistakable terms their clear disapproval of such a course as inimical to British interest and calculated seriously to imperil the peace of the East".⁴ The India office even suggested the sending of a confidential agent from Teheran, to Khiva with presents for the

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1. *S.H.C.* 1871/67. Abbot to Granville no. 13 (copy) March 14, 71.
 2. *Ibid.* Lumley to Granville no. 114 (copy) April 16, 71.
 3. *Hansard*, Commons. CCV 1871. April 18, 71. C. 1241.
 4. *E.S.L.I.* 1871/8. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 28. May 26, 71. The I.O. forwarded the Viceroy's telegram to F.O. on May 26, requesting to get Russian assurances of abstention in the affairs of Afghanistan. F.O. directed Buchanan on the subject (F.O. 658/73. no. 79. May 29, 71).

Khan, to know the actual state of affairs.¹

The proposed Russian expedition to Khiva in 1871, was not undertaken that year. The British intelligence reported that Kaufmann would have ordered a march on Khiva, but for the financial liabilities of the Turkistan administration.² Buchanan learnt from confidential sources that the impending expedition against Khiva had become a subject of "controversy" between the ministries of war and finance. It was said that the finance department of Turkistan had promised to supply the necessary funds for the general's plans, but that the Ministry of Finance had over-ruled the decision of its subordinate department. This treatment infuriated Kaufmann and he memorialised the throne on the subject. Each of the ministries rose to the defence of their subordinates. The Ministry of Finance argued that the financial agents in the provinces were independent of the military authorities, and that by their recent action they had averted an unnecessary war. The Minister of War held that the Governor-General in an hour of need, possessed the authority to declare war without even referring it to St. Petersburg. The issues were again debated in the Council of Ministers at a later date, but none of the parties had modified their stands.³

The St. Petersburg authorities in their conversation again began to deny any idea of commencing

1. S.H.C. 1871/3. I.O. to F.O. July 1, 71. But the proposal was disapproved by the Government of India. Therefore no agent was sent.

2. F.O. 65/873. Buchanan to Granville no. 190. Aug. 23, 71.

3. F.O. 65/873. Buchanan to Granville no. 220. Sept. 18, 71.

hostilities against the state of Khiva.¹

Kaufmann failing to coerce Khiva, turned once again to negotiations with that state. This time he opened correspondence through Bokhara. He proposed that Khiva should liberate all Russian personnel, should refuse protection to the Kazak robbers, and that the Khan should enter into an alliance with Russia. These proposals were taken to Khiva by a Bokharan envoy ; Syed Rahim took this mediation from Bokhara as an affront. The envoy was told that if Kaufmann desired to maintain peace, he should himself write a "polite" letter to the Khan, promising therein not to transgress the Khan's dominion, in return for which the Khan would liberate the prisoners, and would punish the plunderers of Russian territory.² The Khan despatched with his reply to the Amir of Bokhara, a Khivan envoy, who denied that there were any just grounds for the existing Russian hostility to Khiva. The Amir of Bokhara directed the Khivan envoy to meet Kaufmann, but the latter refused to receive him.³

In his endeavours to remove misunderstanding as to his conduct towards Russia, Syed Rahim deputed two envoys during the early part of 1872, to meet higher Russian authorities. One envoy was to

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1. *Ibid.* Same to same no. 129. June 12, 71 and no. 127. June 13, 71.
 2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 201-0. The numbers of the Russian prisoners in Khiva varies in different accounts. In this letter the Khan numbered them as eleven, Amin Bai, the Khivan envoy to India in 1872, said that there were twenty-four, and a memorandum prepared by the British War office said thirty-nine. Schuyler says that they were twenty-one in number. He saw them at Kazala after their release from Khiva.
 3. Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 203-4.

proceed to the court of the Grand Duke Michael, the Governor-General of Caucasia, and the other to that of Krujanovsky, the Governor-General of Orenburg. Both the envoys were then to proceed to St. Petersburg, and there to lay their case before the Czar.¹ In his letter to the Grand Duke, the Khan complained against Russian encroachment on the coast of Khwarizm (Krasnovodsk), and the territory of Min Bulak in Turkistan. The Khan suggested that if Russia's intentions were honest, he was ready to sign a treaty with her, under which both should respect the other's dominion.²

Neither of the Khivan envoys were allowed to their destinations, one was stopped at Alexanderoff and the other at Orenburg.³ They were informed that no request for negotiation would be entertained until Kaufmann received an apology from the Khan, the prisoners were released and a treaty of commerce was concluded with Russia.⁴

This affront shown to his mission exasperated the Khan, who is reported to have said "I am not a smaller man than the others".⁵ A state Council (Divan) was then convened and it was decided not to release the captives.⁶ Meanwhile an envoy was despatched to the Government of India, to make them aware of the existing tension between Russia

1. F.O. 65/874. Loftus to Granville no. 65. April 3, 72.

2. Terentyef II pp. 205-6.

3. F.O. 65/87. no. 65. *op. cit.*

4. *Letters to India*. 1872/4. June 12, 72. *Moscow Gazette* (translation), no date.

5. *Ibid.* Sept. 26, 72. *Moscow Gazette* (translation) no date.

6. *Ibid.*

and Khiva. The envoy, Amin ud Din Bai, was the bearer of a letter for "the Queen of India". He reached India at the close of July 1872. On September 5, Amin Bai had an audience with Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy of India.

During the interview with the Viceroy, the envoy exonerated Khiva of any complicity in arresting the Russian subjects. Amin Bai, though unaware of the subject of the Khan's communication with Kaufmann, asserted strongly that Khiva would never have declined to send courteous replies to Kaufmann's letters. The envoy stressed the point that if the prisoner's release paved the path to peace, the Khan would certainly have not missed this opportunity.¹

Northbrook was impressed by the "emphatic manner" of the envoy's presentation, which showed "the earnest and sincere desire of the Khan" for peaceful co-existence with Russia.² The main object of Amin Bai's visit to India was to use the good-offices of the British Government to help adjust the relations of Khiva with Russia. He proposed to Northbrook that either the British Government communicate with the St. Petersburg authorities to obtain an amiable understanding between Khiva and Russia or that it should appoint a British officer to the Russo-Khivan border to adjust matters on the spot with the local authorities.³ Northbrook expressed his inability to co-operate on either of these proposals. However, he requested the home

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Interview. Sept. 5, 72.

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/13. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 69. Sept. 26, 72.

3. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/12. Interview. *op. cit.*

government to appraise the possibility of obtaining an understanding between the two parties.¹

In his reply to the Khan of Khiva, Northbrook advised the former to liberate the Russian prisoners without any further delay and to approach the Russian authorities in Turkistan with friendly overtures.²

The Khivan communication with India probably alarmed Kaufmann, for Loftus noted that in St. Petersburg, the "most exaggerated reports" were being circulated about British interference in the Russo-Khivan dispute.³ Kaufmann then visited St. Petersburg in the Fall of 1872, and spent a "great portion of winter there".⁴ By his "winning manners and social popularity", he succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Czar for his long cherished idea of subjugating Khiva⁵—the graveyard of three earlier Russian attempts.

In the meantime Russian strategists familiarized themselves with the nature of the desert area separating the oasis of Khiva from the Russian base in Turkistan. During the summer of 1871 and 1872, the Kizil Kum desert to the north of Bokhara and stretching towards Khiva was surveyed. Using Kazalinsk as a base, the region in the direction of Min Bulak and the Bukan Tau Mountain was explored, and from Orenburg, the country south of the Emba River. In the Autumn of 1882, Colonel

1. *E.S.L.I.*, 1872/13. no. 69. *op. cit.*

2. *E.S.L.I.* 1872/13. Viceroy to Khan of Khiva. Sept. 10, 72.

3. F.O. 65/875. Loftus to Granville no. 364. Dec. 24, 72.

4. F.O. 65/875. Loftus to Granville no. 261. Sept. 16, 72.

5. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 334.

Markozov set out with an expedition to try and take Khiva by a *coup de main*; he got as far as Igdy, and then was forced to retreat in the face of a vigorous attack by the Turkomans.¹

Kaufmann assured of support at St. Petersburg, set out to make preparations on an extensive scale against Khiva. Heavy siege guns were purchased from Germany.² Foreign military experts were invited to participate in the campaign.³ And the Spring of 1873 was fixed for the march on Khiva.

The Government of India foresaw that the Russian demonstration in Central Asia would disturb the balance of peace in that area: and the home government was once again approached on the subject.⁴ At home the *London Times* reported without fail everything that went on in Central Asia, and considerable agitation and alarm began to brew in political circles over the blatantly apparent designs of Russia on Khiva. Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, tried to appease Granville. The latter replied that "peace at any price is not the special tradition of the Government of India".⁵ Brunnow then telegraphed St. Petersburg, making the Czar's government aware of the situation in London.⁶

1. *Ibid.* pp. 332—35.

2. *S.H.C.* 1871/67. Steven (Consul a Nicolaiev) to Granville no. 12. May 2, 71.

3. Lt. H. Stumm, a German officer, accompanied the campaign.

4. *Par. Pap.* LXXXV 1873 nos. 94 and 95.

5. *Gladstone Papers* Add. Mss 44169/148 Granville to Gladstone (private) Oct. 20, 72. F.O. 65/874. Granville to Loftus no. 205. Oct. 31, 72: also in Ram, A. *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville*, London 1952. vol. 2. no. 772.

6. *Letters to India* 1873/5. Michell intelligence Dec. 11, 73.

The Czar immediately sent, his personal envoy Count Pierre Schouvalov, to London, to first assure the British government of the peaceful intention of the Emperor in Central Asia, and secondly to forward a personal concern of the Czar.

Schouvalov's mission for a long time remained something of a mystery, for it was known that he was the Director General of the Russian Secret Police and a confidential counsellor of the Emperor.¹ In January 1873, he set out to visit the western courts. At St. Petersburg it was rumoured that he was visiting the continental courts and London to discuss the organization of an "International Society".² Both Gortchakov and Westmann, expressed ignorance of the actual object of his visit abroad.³ Nor did Brunnow know much about the whole nature of his visit to London.⁴ He could only assure Granville that the latter could not meet a "more satisfactory" person than Schouvalov to talk on Anglo-Russian affairs.⁵ In London it was known that Schouvalov had come to discuss the outstanding Anglo-Russian questions with the British Government, particularly Khiva and the Afghan boundary line.⁶

But the real nature of Schouvalov's visit, as it was known on his arrival in London, was neither

1. F.O. 65/875. Loftus to Granville no. 8. January 8, 73.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Granville Papers*. P.R.O. 30/29/114. Granville to Loftus (private) January 1, 73.

5. *Gladstone Papers*. Add Mss 44169/101 *op. cit.*

6. F.O. 65/875. Granville to Loftus, January 8, 73.

political nor international but merely social. He had arrived to undertake the preliminary arrangements for the marriage between the Duke of Edinburgh and the Grand Duchess Maria of Russia. Schouvalov had instructions to sound out the Duke as to whether the latter would agree to the Czar's proposal meeting his only daughter in short sojourns in Germany and Russia after the marriage.¹ To prevent confusion it had been decided that all the preliminaries for this matrimonial alliance between the two royal houses, should be confined to only two persons-Granville and Schouvalov. Loftus was directed to keep silent on the subject.²

Hence Central Asia served as a cloak for Schouvalov's "confidential and private" mission in London.³ Schouvalov during his fifteen days stay dilated on Central Asia as well. He told Granville that Khiva would be invaded by a force consisting of four and a half battalions during the following spring. But neither its annexation nor a prolonged occupation was under consideration.⁴ The essence of Schouvalov's talk on Khiva was that the Czar "promises" wrote Granville to his political chief, "not to take possession of Khiva, or even to occupy it and that we may say so to Parlt".⁵ Hence it

1. *Granville Papers*. P.R.O. 30/29/114. *op. cit.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. Loftus, Lord A. *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, second series, vol. 2. London, 1894, p. 49.

4. F.O. 65/875. no. 8. *op. cit.*

5. *Gladstone Papers*. Add Mss. 44169/148. Granville to Gladstone (private) January 8, 73 : also in Ram *op. cit.* no. 810.

was decided in London not to remonstrate against the Russian march on Khiva.¹

In the meantime plans for the conquest of Khiva had been completed at St. Petersburg. Kaufmann suggested an advance on Khiva from Turkistan and Krasnovdsk, but on Krujanovosky's insistence, Orenburg's participation in the operation was also approved. The plan came before the Central Committee presided over by the Emperor in December, 1872. The vote in the Council stood thirty-eight in favour of capturing Khiva and nine against it. Even Gortchakov supported the majority.²

The Imperial mandate for the full conquest of Khiva was issued on December 24, 1872.³ The Russian forces divided into five columns set out in March 1873. The entire expedition consisted of fifty-three companies of infantry, twenty-five sotnias (a company consisting of one hundred) of Cossacks, fifty-four guns, six mortars, two mitrailleuses, five rocket divisions, nineteen thousand two hundred camels, with a compliment of about fourteen thousand men.⁴ With Kaufmann who was the supreme commander of the whole operation, went two dukes, the Grand Duke Nicholas Constantinovich and the Duke Eugene of Lutchenburg.

1. F.O. 65/875. no. 8. *op cit.*

2. F.O. 65/875. Loftus to Granville no. 68. Dec. 24, 72. But Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 336, says that the vote was 35 to 9 and Gortchakov opposed occupation of Khiva: *The Times*, January 14, 73, p. 9, c. 6, also supports Schuyler's statement.

3. Stumm, H. *Russia's advance Eastward*: Official Report of Lt. Stumm (translated by C.E.H. Vincent) London 1874 p. 48.

4. Stumm, H. *Russia in Central Asia* (translated by Ozanne and Saches) London 1885 pp. 42-43.

All the columns, with the exception of that of Orenburg (under General Verevkin) and that of Alexandrofsk (under Colonel Lomakin), suffered privation and numerous disasters during their march towards Khiva. The Krasnovodsk column (under Colonel Markozov), faced a terrible ordeal in the valley of the Amu's ancient bed. The cloumn had to return to Krasnovodsk at the end of May. The Turkistan column narrowly escaped total disaster in the desert.¹

General Kaufmann having occupied the city of Shura Khana on May 28, and the town of Hazarasp (forty-five miles to the north of Khiva) on June 4, received a letter from Syed Rahim, informing him that the Russian prisoners had been released, and the general should refrain from hostilities, for the Khan would consent to undertake a treaty with Russia. This was followed by another letter from the Khan on June 7, repeating his previous requests. Kaufmann replied that negotiations for peace would be conducted when he reached Khiva and he advised the Khan to surrender without any resistance.²

General Verevkin occupied Kungrad on May 20, and reached Chanakchik (three miles from Khiva) on June 7. The Khan also approached him sueing for peace on June 5, but Verevkin having no power in the absence of Kaufmann, turned down the request. Verevkin after waiting for two days, opened

1. MacGahan, J.A. *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, London 1874 pp. 163—72 : Schuyler II *op. cit.* pp. 336—47.

2. Schuyler II *op. cit.* pp. 342-43 : Terentyef II *op. cit.* pp. 212-13.

fire on the city on June 9. The same evening a Khivan deputation arrived to discuss the Russian conditions for peace and were advised to wait for Kaufmann's arrival. In the meantime the Khan fled the city, leaving affairs in the hands of his uncle Syed Amir ul Umar. On June 10, General Skobelov captured the northern gate of the city. The same day Kaufmann reached Khiva.¹

On June 10, Kaufmann received the city's submission from Syed Umar: the gates were opened to the invader and the city was taken over.² Syed Rahim was invited back to Khiva. A special Divan consisting of four Russians and three Khivans was appointed to assist the Khan in the administration of the state.

Khiva fell to Russia. The British statesmen were wondering whether she would withdraw. Granville was getting suspicious of Schouvalov's assurances.³ With the approaching success of the operation against Khiva, the tone of the St. Petersburg authorities changed. In May, Gortchakov informed Loftus that no importance should be attached to Schouvalov's discussion with Granville, since it was in the nature of a personal conversation. He added that Schouvalov did not admit any legal basis on the part of Britain for intervention in the affairs of Khiva.⁴ Gortchakov's language astonished the

1. *Ibid.* pp. 348—50.

2. *Ibid.* MacGahan *op. cit.* pp. 226-27.

3. F. O. 65/875. Granville to Loftus no. 26, Jan. 31, 73. and a telegram of the same day.

4. F. O. 65/877. Loftus Telegram May 2, 73.

British Foreign Office ; the latter telegraphed Loftus for further details on the subject,¹ and he replied next day that "Gortchakov is endeavouring to convert the formal assurances given by Count Schouvalov in regard to Khiva to mere intentions of the Emperor ; which intentions as we have had experience of in the case of the Poles, may be altered by circumstances".²

The Russian Government and the public were very sensitive on the subject of a withdrawal from Khiva, for they believed that the recent Khivan campaign had no parallel in the history of military campaigns. The difficulties encountered by the British in Abyssinia, and Alexander the Great in Central Asia, were "light" in comparison to the Russian march across the deserts towards Khiva.³ The Russian press started a campaign for Khiva's retention ; the *Exchange Gazette* called the conquest of Khiva a historical necessity ;⁴ the *Moscow Gazette* challenged England's right to question Russia's actions against Khiva ;⁵ the *Golos* advised the government not to listen to the tales of others, but to see its own best interests in Central Asia.⁶ Loftus observed a fierce battle raging in St. Petersburg, about the assurances advanced to Britain on Khiva, and his conclusion was that to show fairness to these

1. F. O. 65/877. Granville Telegram, May 22, 73

2. F. O. 65/877. Loftus Telegram, May 23, 73.

3. *Letters to India* 1873/5. Michell's Report, July 10, 73.

4. *Letters to India* 1872/4. Michell's Report, Dec. 13, 72.

5. F. O. 65/877. Loftus to Granville no. 116. March 27, 73.

6. *Ibid.* Same to same no. 119. March 28, 73.

assurances, the town of Khiva would be either burnt or razed to the ground-it would neither continue to exist nor would the "assurances" last.¹

Khiva was not burnt. It was not razed to the ground. On August 12, 1873, the Russo-Khivan Treaty was signed, under which the Khan of Khiva became subject to the Czar, and all Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu was ceded to Russia; the Russians also received the right of residence and tax free trade in the Khanate and the Khan was subjected to an indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles, payable over a period of twenty years.²

The *Time of London* published the Russo-Khivan Treaty.³ The English press was highly excited by the terms of the treaty, calling them inconsistent with the spirit of the declaration which the Czar had "spontaneously" ordered his envoy, Schouvalov, to make.⁴

Schouvalov was the only soul, personally embarrassed by the affairs with Khiva. He had been charged with instructions to tell the British Government that "*pas un pouce de terrain ne serait pris par la Russie*".⁵ Thus he requested the Czar, either to disavow the promises made to England, or to repudiate the course adopted by Kaufmann in annexing Khiva to Russia.⁶ But the Emperor appeased him by pointing

1. F. O. 65/878. Loftus to Granville no. 211. May 27, 73.

2. F. O. 65/879. Doria to Granville no. 428. Dec. 20, 73.

3. *Times*, Nov. 23 and 24, 1873. p. 4 and 5. col. 1 and 2. respectively.

4. *Granville Papers*. P. R. O. 30/29/114. Granville to Loftus (private) Nov. 27, 73.

5. Quoted in Loftus. *Diplomatic Reminiscences op. cit.* p. 106.

6. *Letters to India 1873/5*. Michell's *Intellegence*. Dec. 19, 73.

out that Gortchakov believed that the assurances given to England referred only to the town of Khiva, and not to the whole of the Khanate.¹

The history outlined in this chapter and in the one preceding it form part of the Liberal Party's diplomacy in Central Asia. The Liberals knowing full well the Russian intentions with regard to Central Asia, deceived both themselves and the British public. The rise of the Conservatives to power in 1874, changed the whole concept of British diplomacy in Central Asia. The keypoint of their policy was to be that Russia must be stopped at all costs. The following chapter will give a picture of the Conservatives's attempt not only to checkmate Russia in Central Asia, but to expel her from that part of the world.

1. Loftus. *Diplomatic Reminiscences* *op. cit.* p. 106.

CHAPTER VII

England's Plan for the Liberation of Central Asia, 1874—1877

By the end of 1873, Russia had taken over three major states of Turkistan-Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva. At the end of the Khivan campaign, Kaufmann deputed his political advisor on Turkistan affairs, M. de Struv, to persuade the Amir of Bokhara for signing a new treaty with Russia. The Russo-Bokhara Treaty of 1868, made public in 1872, was replaced by a new treaty signed on October 10, 1873. Under the new treaty, the Amu Daria was made accessible to Russian navigation. Russia obtained the right to erect piers and storehouses on the Amu. The state of Bokhara was opened to the Russian traders, with an equalising duty of $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ on Russian goods. The Russian subjects were entitled to hold land and property in Bokhara, subject to local land tax.¹

A part of the territory (from Kukestli to Meshekli) detached from Khiva on the right bank of the Amu was given to Bokhara, and the rest of the territory was formed into a military district of the Amu Daria and placed under Colonel N.A. Ivanov as its governor

1. For full text of the Treaty see Rawlinson, H. *England and Russia op. sit.* Appendix 7: *Times*, December 31, 73. p. 3. c.l.

with the capital at Petro Alexandrovosko (now Turtkul), situated at a distance of twenty miles from the city of Khiva. The Yamud tribes in the vicinity of Khiva were reduced to submission, suffering heavy losses of life and property.

Another important step towards consolidating Russian position in Central Asia was the formation of the Transcaspian Province in 1874. The new province comprised the territories of Mangishlak and Krasnovodsk. General N.P. Lomevkin was appointed its first military governor.¹

The risings of 1874 and 1875 in Khokand, helped Russia to annex Khokand to the Russian Empire. Khudayar Khan, as is known, was unpopular in his country for his tyrannies and his excessive dependence on Russia. Many plots against his authority had been hatched and several revolts had erupted since Khudayar's third accession to the Khanate in 1865. The Kirghiz and Kiptchak had revolted in 1871 and 1873. Many claimants to the throne had shown up during the last ten years. Foremost among them were Karim Khan, the Khan's nephew; Faulad Khan, the son of the late Sultan Murad; and the two sons of Khudayar, Mohammad Amin and Nazarud Din.

The rising of July 1875, led by Abdur Rahman Aftabchi, the son of the late Mussalman Quli, was the biggest of all, Khudayar was expelled and he sought refuge at Tashkand. His son Nasarud Din was made the Khan. War was declared against Russia. But it was shortlived. On Nasarud Din's request a treaty of friendship was signed with Russia. It was

1. Schuyler II *op. cit.* p. 378.

followed by another rising in the Fall of 1875, led by Aftabchi in the name of Faulad Khan. Kaufmann crushed this rising easily. On the recommendations of Kaufmann, an Imperial *Ukase* was issued on February 19, 1876 incorporating Khiva into Russian territory: the new oblast was restored to its ancient name Farghana and Colonel M.D. Skobelov was made its first governor.¹

The conquest of Khiva completed the process of Russian expansion up to the northern banks of the Amu: it also brought Russia, both into contiguity with the state of Afghanistan and into hostility with Persia. The Russian conquest of Khiva also opened the Oasis of Merv to Russia. Since 1870 Russia had kept an eye on Merv, and Stremoukov had hinted Buchanan during that year that Merv was significant for Russian commerce.²

The area on the south of the Caspian across the desert of Korakum to the Amu, and along the Persian frontiers to the east up to Herat on the Afghanistan border was held by the nomad Turkomans.³ The

1. Schuyler I *op. cit.* pp. 354—358, II pp. 281—301: Singh *op. cit.* pp. 38—55: F. O. 65/929 nos. 259, 262, 272, 282, 289, 290: F. O. 65/930 nos. 310, 328: F. O. 65/957 no. 101: *Par. pap.* LXXVII 1878-79 no. 1/4. Karim Beg's Report.

2. F. O. 65/872. Buchanan to Granville no. 363. Sept. 21, 70.

3. These Turkomans says Rawlinson, belonged to the family of the Uzbeks. Their chief tribes were:

- (i) the Chadur, 12,000 tents, between the Caspian and the Aral.
- (ii) the Ersari, 50,000 tents along the Amu.
- (iii) the Salov and Saruk, 20,000 tents on the Murghab and the Tejend.
- (iv) the Tekkeh, 60,000 tents on the skirts of the hills from Merv to the Caspian.
- (v) the Yamud and Goklans, 50,000 tents along the Persian borders on the shore of the Caspian (Rawlinson *op. cit.* p. 333).

Turkomans of this region numbered around 200,000 camps. Out of this vast horde Russia was concerned greatly with four tribes. They were the Chaduras, the Yamuds, the Goklan and the Tekkeh.¹

Both the Chaduras and the Yamud had acknowledged the Russian hegemony by this time. But the Tekkeh proved most restless of all in the defence of their homeland. Between 1871 and 1873, three Russian expeditions were sent to chastise them. The Tekkeh placed between the Attrek and Merv, approached both Persia and Afghanistan for help.² General Lomakin, since his appointment to the Transcaspian administration, had been both threatening and inducing the Tekkeh and the Goklan to surrender to him.

It is against this setting in Central Asia that the British attitude regarding that part of the world, is to be studied. The new attitude on Central Asia was no more based upon delusion and ignorance. For the first time in British history, the British public became aware of the true geography, history and the culture of the Central Asians. Some of the unique works on the subject of Turkistan were published during the early seventies of the Nineteenth century. They were.³ Rawlinson's *England and Russia in the East* (1875); Vambéry's *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question* (1874); and, *Bokhara* (1873); Willie's *Essays on the External Policy of India*

1. Rawlinson *op. cit.* pp. 332-33.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 333—38.

3. The books mentioned here are only those which were published between 1870 and 1875. For full details of these books see the bibliography at the end of the work.

(1875) ; Bary's *Russia in 1860* (1871) ; Bell's *The Oxus and the Indus* (1874) ; Bellew's *Kashmir and Kashghar* (1875) ; Hutton's *Central Asia* (1875) ; Green's *The Defence of the North Western Frontiers of India* (1873) ; Cotton's *The Central Asian question* (1872) ; Shaw's *Visit to High Tartary* (1871) ; and MacGahan's *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva* (1874)¹, Halliday's, *The Retention of India* (1872).

Another important feature of this period was the translation of some foreign publications on the subject of Central Asia. Romanovski's pamphlet, *Notes on the Central Asia Question* was translated in 1870. Hugo Stumm's *Russia's Advance Eastward*, and Spalding's *Khiva*, got their English versions in London 1874. One of the most laudable works of the Royal Geographical Society was, to have assigned the pages of its journals to explanations of the most intricate and unknown denominations of Central Asia.² Other contemporary journals and periodicals, also published most thought provoking material on the politics of Turkistan.³

Hence Russian movements in Central Asia during the early course of the seventies were not

1. MacGahan, J. A. was an American journalist. He was the correspondent of *New York Herald*, who visited Central Asia during the early seventies. He accompanied the Turkistan column to Khiva. His book was published in London.

2. See the *Journals* of the Society XXXVII—XLVIII : also its proceedings XVI—XVIII.

3. See for example *Quarterly Review* CXXXIV and CXXXVI : *The Macmillan Magazine* XXII, XXVII and XXX : *The Fortnightly Review* XV and XVIII : *The Edinburgh Review* CXXXIX and CXII.

without outbursts of excitement in London. "Man talked wisely and learned in the Clubs of the Amoo Darya, the Sar Darya and the Attrek".¹ The Russian expedition to Khiva raised a considerable agitation both in the press and the Parliament. Many letters appeared in the *Times* deploring British inactivity in the Central Asian question.² Questions were repeatedly raised in Parliament on the Russian proceedings against Khiva. Eastwick a member of Parliament and a former officer of the British Political service in Persia, in his long drawn speech, challenged Russia's justification of her conquest in Turkistan. He warned the British Government of the grim consequences of Russia's expansion in the direction of India.³ Rawlinson in his "*Notes on Khiva*" a paper read before the Geographical Society in the London University lecture theatre, predicted Russia's betrayal over the assurance she has given to England regarding Khiva.⁴ The Prince of Wales and the Duke of Cambridge—"two men of iron" insisted upon Granville to be "firm" with Russia on Central Asian issues.⁵ Even pacific man like Northbrook, the Viceroy of India, doubted the fitness of British policy with regard to Central Asia, "our silence is drifting us into a war" wrote the Viceroy privately to the Duke of Argyll.⁶ Loftus at St. Petersburg

1. Baker, V. *Clouds in the East*, London 1876. p. 1.

2. *Times*, Oct. 29, 72., p. 8. c. 4. and Nov. 2, 72, p. 6. c. 5.

3. *Hansard*. Commons CCXV 1873. April 2, 73. cc. 818—48.

4. *Times*, March 25, 73. p. 7., c. 4 : Rawlinson *op. cit.* p. 400.

5. *Gladstone Papers*; Ad. Mss. 44170/11. Granville to Gladstone (no date), also in Ram II *op. cit.* no. 963.

6. *Argyll Papers*. Northbrook to Argyll, Sept. 26, 72.

was getting sick of Russian "assurances". He urged the home ministry that "Russia must be timely warned" of the consequences of her further extension into Turkistan.¹

In February 1874, the Conservatives under Disraeli came to power. The new Cabinet consisting of twelve members, was decidedly "one of the strongest of the Century".² It contained some of the most talented men of that part of the century. Cairns, Derby, Salisbury, Northcote, Gathorne Hardy, Carnarvon are worth mentioning among them. Central Asia from the very outset attracted the attention of the Conservative chief. On March 7, 1874, Disraeli requested Salisbury, the Indian Secretary, to lay before him even the private correspondence of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, which should be "treated as a private letter from an Ambassador to For. Secretary of State always forwarded to the P. Minister".³

Disraeli though seventy and "power" had come "late" to him, was still spirited, and was a firm believer in an imperial policy for his "imperial country". The East, over Disraeli's mind like that of Burke, exercised a considerable fascination. The only difference between the two statesmen was that Burke wanted to learn from the East, Disraeli wanted to teach her—law and order. It was a lust for

1. F. O. 65/901. Loftus Memorandum on Central Asia (private) May 1874.

2. Seton-Watson, R. W. *Britain in Europe*, Cambridge 1955, p. 506.

3. Monypenny, W. P. and Buckle, G. E. *The Life of Disraeli*, New York 1929. pp. 750-51. (Hereafter cited as Buckle Disraeli).

power, surpassing the magnificence of the great empires of India, and that of its rulers that haunted Disraeli's dreams.¹ He acquired the Suez Canal in 1875, the same year he sent the Prince of Wales to India, and next year he proclaimed Victoria as the Empress of India.

Disraeli like most of the Conservatives of his time, was highly suspicious of Russian conduct. "I have no great faith in a real understanding with Russia as to our Eastern possession" he wrote during the early days of his ministry.² And he warned Salisbury that "it is quite on the cards that in the course of next year, something may occur in Central Asia which may make us rather a laughing stock, if we give this decoration, but to be laughed at is no better lot if we are anxious that we have not been gulled, and on the whole, I am in favour of conferring grand X as solicited."³

This warning set Salisbury in motion. On June 12, 1874, when the Russian forces in Turkistan were celebrating the decennial anniversary of their conquest of Asia, Salisbury was indoctrinating his Viceroy with his seductive suggestions. Russian in the West, Salisbury wrote, was hardly pregnable. England must change its tactics. "It is of no use" Salisbury continued, "to rely on diplomatic remonstrances here. It cannot be followed by any *European* action, and that Russia knows perfectly well. All diplomatic remonstrances and threats must

1. Noyce, F. *England, India and Afghanistan*, London 1902, p. 62.
 2. *Salisbury Papers*. Disraeli to Salisbury (private) June 2, 74.
 3. *Ibid.*

have a background of force. What I desire to press is that background must be Asiatic I presume your governments are familiar with the question of a march to Herat from the Indus I should be very glad to hear from you as fully as you have time to write to me on this vital question.”¹

For any hostile action against Russia in Central Asia, Britain required a considerable organization and planning beforehand. The intelligence system on the frontiers of India must be perfect. India, to Salisbury’s mind, was very defective in procuring accurate information on the political state of affairs in Central Asia. Salisbury advised Northbrook to establish an intelligence department at Lahore, placed under some highly qualified man to furnish the home government with the information desired by her.² But Northbrook did not see any advantage in Salisbury’s proposal. His contention was that the proposed intelligence department would not improve upon the already established system.³ Salisbury was not satisfied with this explanation, and he sent a reminder to his reluctant Viceroy telling that the sources of information from India were inadequate and he must work towards improving them.⁴

Nor was Northbrook in favour of putting any physical pressure on Russia in Central Asia. He was an ardent adherent of Lawrence’s preachings. Free

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1. *Northbrook Papers* no. 11. Salisbury to Northbrook (private) no. 16., June 12, 74.
 2. *Ibid.* no. 12. Same to same (private) no. 12., May 22, 74.
 3. *Ibid.* Northbrook to Salisbury (private) no. 20. June 16, 74.
 4. *Ibid.* Salisbury to Northbrook no. 39. Dec. 3, 74.

and frank talk with Russia, Northbrook believed, would solve many of the misunderstandings existing between the two powers.¹ Salisbury was getting annoyed. He asked what would happen if Russia invaded Merv? Northbrook replied, "come to understanding with Russia".²

When this controversy over Central Asian issues, though privately, was going on between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State; Sir Bartle Frere,³ then a member of the Secretary of State Council, sent to the India office his views, in a letter form, on the subject of British policy in Central Asia. This letter is considered to have made a considerable impression on the Conservative administration.⁴ Frere penned⁵ down his views that Russia in Central Asia could only be stopped either by a mountain barrier or by a civilised power. Russian policy, Frere said, had been positive, active, and aggressive, while that of England in Central Asia was purely defensive, stationary, and even negative. This policy of "standstill and do nothing" had purchased for Britain suspicion and misunderstanding on the part of the Orientals. Sir Bartle Frere concluded his papers by saying that Britain should (i) establish

1. *Northbrook Papers*, no. 11. Northbrook to Salisbury (private) no. 30. Aug. 20, 74 : also the same in *Salisbury Papers*.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Sir B. Frere (1815—84) Chief Commissioner Sindh 1850—59 ; Member Viceroy's executive council 1859—62 : Governor of Bombay 1862—67 : Member India Council 1867—77.

4. Martineau, J. *Life and Correspondence of Sr B. Frere*, London, 1895. vol. I. p. 491.

5. *Ibid.* pp. 491—98 : also a selected portion of this letter appeared in the *Times*, Oct. 17, 1878. p. 10. cc. 1—5.

political agencies in Afghanistan (ii) should occupy Quetta and garrison it with strong military force (iii) should place immediately at Herat a British mission.

Salisbury personally approved many of Frere's views on Central Asia. He forwarded a copy of this memorandum to Northbrook.¹ The latter kept quiet upon the subject.²

In the meantime John Lawrence (now Lord) wrote a counter memorandum on that of Frere's.³ Lawrence strongly supported his own policy of "Masterly Inactivity" and vigorously pleaded its continuation. Northbrook in India immediately voted for Lawrence's policy because Lawrence seemed "to have sounder judgement than Frere." Northbrook also opposed schemes of taking over Quetta or Herat.⁴

In London, Frere-Lawrence controversy led to Frere's second memorandum in which he strongly reiterated his earlier stand.⁵ Frere argued that Britain was not land hungry, but it certainly would not "suit us that our weaker neighbours should be swallowed up by the strong military power." He recommended treating Afghanistan like Holland or Belgium, whose defence against aggression was more important to

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1. *Northbrook Papers* no. 11. Salisbury to Northbrook (private) no. 35. Nov. 5, 74.
 2. *Ibid.* Northbrook to Salisbury (private) no. 46. Dec. 14, 74.
 3. F. O. 65/904. Lawrence Memorandum. Nov. 4, 74.
 4. *Northbrook Papers*, no. 11. Northbrook to Salisbury no. 50. Dec. 18, 74.
 5. F. O. 65/926. Frere Memorandum. January 11, 75.

Britain than her occupation. Frere strongly doubted the competency and honesty of the British native agent stationed at Kabul. He was of the view that the Amir of Afghanistan would prefer the presence of an English to a native as the British representative.

Frere's polemics encouraged Salisbury to a considerable extent in his views and policy regarding Afghanistan, the Amir of which state was drifting slowly out of Britain's hand. The Amir "does absolutely nothing" he wrote to Northbrook, "in return" for the money and protection that Britain had provided him.¹ On January 2, 1875, Salisbury sounded Disraeli that he intended to instruct Northbrook frankly to take measures for placing a British resident either at Herat or Qandhar². Disraeli responded promptly (January 6, 1875) "I have been strongly in favour of our Government being represented in Afghanistan, thou not unaware of the difficulties and dangers. The necessity, however, outweighs everything. It is a question whether we should not have an agent both at Kandhar and Herat."³

Two weeks later Salisbury addressed a despatch to Northbrook on the subject of appointing an accredited British agent in Afghanistan⁴. Salisbury

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1. *Northbrook Papers* no. 11. Salisbury to Northbrook (private) no. 35. Nov. 5, 74.
 2. *Disraeli Papers* Box 93 B/XX/Ce/268. Salisbury to Disraeli (private) Jan. 2, 75.
 3. Buckle. *Disraeli II op. cit.* p. 767.
 4. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 31. Secretary of State to Viceroy. January 22, 75.

instructed Northbrook to take Sher Ali's assent for establishing a British agent first at Herat and later at Qandhar. He added that Sher Ali had already expressed his willingness to receive agents in his dominion. Salisbury noticed no immediate Russian threat to Afghanistan, but the aspects of the affairs were sufficiently grave and they required timely precaution.¹ The Indian Secretary doubted the conduct of the British Vakeel stationed at Kabul. He was of the view that the political activities inside Afghanistan and on its borders, required the presence of "only a European" agent in that state, who could furnish many details of knowledge necessary for the military authorities to possess.²

Northbrook telegraphed the India office on February 18, 1875 that the Government of India's records did not support Salisbury's contention that the Amir had shown his readiness to receive an European agent in his state.³ Salisbury replied by a telegram on February 23, that the Amir had expressed his willingness at Ambala to receive European agent in Afghanistan, and this intelligence had been based on the reports of Pollock, Thorton and Girdlestone—all of the Punjab Civil Service.⁴ Northbrook consulted the Anglo-Indian officers named by Salisbury, on the subject, but none corroborated this statement. Northbrook sent this report

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 32. Viceroy to Secretary of State, June 7, 75 : refers to the telegrams despatched on the subject.

4. *Ibid.*

to Salisbury on Mach 24.¹

In the meantime the Government of India issued a questionnaire to all the officers particularly attached to the Amir during his visit to India in 1869, and also to all those officers who had been familiar with the Afghan politics in general. The questionnaire asked them (i) whether the Amir ever expressed his willingness to receive European agents in Afghanistan; (ii) whether the appointment of such agents would be advantageous, and (iii) whether the reports of the native agent (Vakeel), were reliable, sufficient and satisfactory.²

The general conclusion of all the officers including that of the two former Vakeels, Foujdar Khan and Ghulam Hussain, was adverse to the proposal of sending agents to Afghanistan. They also denied the general willingness of the Amir to receive such agents³. The only exception among these officers were Captain H. Grey and F. B. (I suppose Faiz Bakhsh). Both believed that the Amir was willing to receive the European officers in his state.⁴

Differences had come between the Viceroy and the Indian Secretary: both were justified in their viewpoints. Northbrook as late as the Fall of 1873, had turned down the request of the Amir for entering into an offensive-defensive alliance with Britain.⁵ Since then

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 32/1. Government of India to Punjab, March 27, 75.

3. *Ibid.* no. 32/4—13.

4. This point had been discussed in Chapter V. P. 141.

5. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79. no. 34.

the Amir was showing a veiled hostility to the British Government.¹ The time was most inopportune to put forth such a tedious request, which would necessarily be turned down by the Amir. Salisbury on his part believed that the time was highly advantageous, the fiscal worries of the Amir, the chaotic condition of his country, and the growing intrigues of Russia on the frontiers of Afghanistan would force Sher Ali to pay willing ear to the English request. Northbrook did not share these views. He found the Amir much away from embarrassment and apprehension. Northbrook looked forward to Russia's seizure of Merv. This would frighten the Amir. And then would come the time to dictate British terms to the Amir.² To Salisbury this was a useless scheme to wait for, and an unfortunate hour for proposals. He argued that then by that time England would have lost its influence at the Kabul Court.³

Differences were getting stronger between the Viceroy and the Indian Secretary. Disraeli sensed the situation, and in the middle of 1875, he wrote to Salisbury "my impression is that somehow or other Northbrook reign will soon terminate and you and I must look for the right man."⁴ Northbrook also on his part realised that he could go no more with his dictating superior, and in September (12), he requested Salisbury to relieve him of his duties in

1. *Northbrook Papers*, no. 11. Northbrook to Salisbury (private) no. 32. Sept. 8, 74.

2. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79. no. 32.

3. *Ibid.* no. 33. Secretary of State to Viceroy, Nov. 19, 75.

4. *Salisbury Papers*. Disraeli to Salisbury (private), June 8, 75.

India.¹ In the search for "the right man" Lord Powis, the great grandson of Lord Clive, and Lord John Manners were consulted. Both declined the offer. Finally, Lytton was found, who came forward with a dictum, "I know not whether I can save the ship, but I would rather do so or die with the rudder in my right hand."² Lytton had been selected only for, as Disraeli wrote to him, to cope successfully with the "critical state of affairs in Central Asia."³

Coming back to Central Asia, we notice that after the conquest of Khiva, Russia had been manoeuvring for the occupation of Merv. Both the British public and the Government were sensitive at this point. To allay their apprehension, Gortchakov had assured Granville that any demonstration against the Turkomans of Merv would be merely punitive.⁴

But the Conservatives took a different view of the situation. Russia must understand that in the event of a Russian advance upon Merv, the British troops would also advance into Afghanistan. Derby, made it clear to Schouvalov, the new Russian Ambassador in London, that England would not be the first to take steps in Central Asia, but certainly would not be late to miss a chance if ever created by Russian movements on the other side.⁵ This warning had a salutary effect upon the St. Petersburg

1. Mallet. B. Thomas, George. *Earl of Northbrook*, London 1908, p. 114.

2. *Disraeli Papers*. Box 105, no. B/XX/LX/20. Lytton to Disraeli (private), Nov. 30, 75.

3. Balfour, Lady Betty. *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, London 1899, p. 2.

4. F. O. 65/901, Gortchakov to Brunnow, Feb. 2, 74.

5. F. O. 65/926. Derby to Loftus no. 64, March 19, 75.

authorities. In a meeting of the Cabinet, presided by the Czar, and attended by Schouvalov, who was visiting the capital for a briefing, the idea of further advance in the direction of Merv, as urged by the military party, was discouraged.¹ But Russia, nevertheless claimed complete liberty of action over the territories situated between the Russian frontiers in Turkistan and those of the Afghanistan. This was the understanding, Russia asserted, established between England and Russia under the negotiations of 1873. Merv, Gortchakov pointed out in his memorandum, drawn up for the study of Schouvalov, fell under the Russian sphere of influence. He called Afghanistan an intermediary zone, whose independence was respectable both to England and Russia.²

This explanation exasperated the Conservatives. The Indian sources called Gortchakov's memorandum inaccurate and misleading.³ The Foreign office with the consent of the India office, told the Czar's Government that the idea of the neutral zone had been abandoned the minute Clarendon's suggestion of neutralizing the upper Amu to the south of Bokhara was rejected by Russia. It added that Forsyth's mission to St. Petersburg was not conditioned to "re-open the question of neutral zone." It was the delimitation of the Afghan boundary and making Afghanistan external to Russian influence

1. F. O. 65/927 Loftus to Derby no. 134. April 27, 75.

2. F. O. 65/927. Gortchakov to Schouvalov, April 17, 75.

3. F. O. 65/928. I. O. to F. O. June 21, 75 : Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 37. Aug. 23, 75.

that constituted the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1873.¹ Disraeli in the Parliament, called the idea of the neutral zone a mere "speculation in a diplomatic despatch, and nothing else."² Hence the Russian Government was warned in explicit terms that any further Russian advance southward, might result in serious consequences.³

This brought an end to the idea of the neutral zone put forward by the Liberal Ministry of England. Both the Russian press and politicians hailed it. Gortchakov sent his approval to London.⁴ Baron Jomini, the acting Russian Foreign minister, called the neutral zone system an "impossibility in barbaric lands."⁵ *Journal de St. Petersburg*, in an article on July 18, 1875, advised both Russia and England to help each other in subjugating the Mohammadans of Central Asia. It asserted that Russia, as next door neighbour to India, would be a source of assistance to Britain in controlling its two hundred million unruly subjects.⁶ Schouvalov used the same language to Lytton during the latter's interview with the Russian envoy in London. Schouvalov persuaded both Derby and Lytton to pave way for direct correspondence between the Viceroy of India and that of the Russian Turkistan. Schouvalov also proposed to Lytton to partition

1. F. O. 65/930. Derby to Doria no. 318. Oct. 25, 75.

2. *Hansard*. Commons. CCXXIX 1876. c. 135.

3. F. O. 65/930. Derby to Doria no. 318. *op. cit.*

4. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 62. Gortchakov to Schouvalov, Feb. 15, 76.

5. F. O. 65/928. Doria to Derby no. 215, July 13, 75.

6. F. O. 65/928. Doria to Derby no. 217. July 19, 75.

Afghanistan and to establish a common frontier between the two empires in the East.¹

Armed with instructions both from Disraeli and Salisbury, Lytton set out for India in March 1876. Lytton was sent on a mission to India. The mission concerned Central Asia only. His first and foremost duty was "to ascertain and remove if possible the causes of Sher Ali's undisguised alienation and to spare no effort to place its relations with him on a more cordial and substantial footing."² Lytton from the very outset of his administration in India, concentrated on the north-western frontiers. He wanted to form a new province beyond the Indus. The new frontier province should comprise of six frontier districts (Hazara, Kohat, Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan). It would be placed under a Chief Commissioner located at Peshawar, to be under the direct control of the Viceroy.³ Lytton's next pre-occupation was with Amir Sher Ali. He had to convince the Amir, of Britain's friendly intentions towards him. But before convincing the Amir, he had to convince his council also of the friendly intentions of Britain regarding Afghanistan. Lytton wanted to send an envoy to the Amir to confer with him on matters of common interest. To deal with Northbrook's

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1. *Lytton Papers*. no. 3/1. Lytton to Salisbury (private) Feb. 26, 76 : F. O. 65/956. Derby to Loftus no. 108. March 2, 76 : *Lytton Papers* no. 518/3. Lytton to Cranbrook (private) July 1, 78.
 2. Lytton Robert. *Personal and Literary Letters* : edited by Lady Betty Balfour, London 1906, vol. 2. p. 3 : *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79. no. 35. Instructions to Lytton.
 3. *Lytton Papers*. no. 8. *The organization of N. W. F. Province.*

trained council "a very stupid council" as Lytton called it, was a hard job.¹ General H. W. Norman and Sir William Muir, were holding a strong opposition to the Viceroy's policy regarding Afghanistan.² It was after considerable amount of canvassing that the council agreed on the general policy laid down by the new Viceroy.³ Lytton also started a tour of frontier districts to have first hand knowledge of the affairs on the borders. He was planning to make a military demonstration on the borders against Afghanistan, if the latter state did not consent to the new English proposals.⁴ Luckily the Amir did not reject the British proposals and expressed his willingness to send his own envoy to India. Both Salisbury and Disraeli were "impressed very favourably" with Lytton's proceedings in India.⁵

Central Asia, as we learn today from the private correspondence of the Conservative statesmen, was destined to play an important role in European politics. The crumbling structure of the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth century, here, needs some attention. Turkey during this century was faced

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1. *Disraeli Papers*. Box 105, no. B/XX/LY/230. Lytton to Disraeli (private) April 21, 76 : *Carnarvon Papers*. P. R. O. 30/6/15. Lytton to Carnarvon (private) Nov. 29, 76.
 2. *Lytton Papers*, no. 7. Norman and Muir minutes on June 19, 76.
 3. Lytton. *Letters op. cit.* Lytton to Salisbury, April 20, 79.
 4. *Lytton Papers* 516/1. Salisbury to Lytton no. 30, June 23, 76, refers to Lytton's views. Salisbury opposed this measure.
 5. *Disraeli Papers* Box 92, no. B/XX/Ce/75. Salisbury to Disraeli (private), May 13, 76 : *Lytton Papers* 516/1. Disraeli to Salisbury (private), Sept. 3, 76.

with more than one problem. Its rulers were incompetent : its finances were in a shattered position, having acquired nine foreign loans between 1845 and 1875 : its non-Muslim minorities of the Balkan peninsula were dissatisfied with its administration. Thus the wide combination of internal chaos and external pressure, had brought Turkey, at the point of disintegration. Britain believed in the integration of this empire : the latter controlled the sea-route to India. This route must not fall into a hostile hand. On the other hand Russia thrived at the Ottoman trouble. She was kindling fire in the Balkan. In the summer of 1875, Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted against the Porte. This movement received considerable support from Serbia and other Slav lands. This brought the Russians as well into action. Czar Alexander II, was visiting Ems at this time. He invited Germany and Austria for negotiations. In May 1876, the Berlin memorandum was drawn up. The memorandum proposed an armistice of two months, and Turkey was warned to arrive at an agreement with its belligerents, failing at which the power would intervene to maintain peace. Italy and France accepted the proposal. London disagreed : on May 24, the British fleet was sent to Basika Bay for the defence of Turkey. It brought an immediate end to the Czar's plan of action.

But next week brought in problems more complicated to the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdul Aziz was murdered on May 30, followed by the death of his two ministers. The same month a revolt broke out in Southern Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro

declared war on Turkey on the last day of June 1876. Czar Alexander concluded his trip by entering into a secret convention with Austria on July 8 at Reischstadt, for the partitioning of Turkey.¹

Russia sent its volunteers to Serbia under the command of its Central Asian warrior, General Charnaiev. But the Turks knew the art of warfare. They pushed the Serbian at flight. The latter's defeat at Aleksinac opened Belgrade to the Turks. Russia sent an ultimatum on October 31, 1876, to the new Sultan Murad V, insisting upon a cessation of hostilities within forty-eight hours. She limited the duration of the armistice to one month or six weeks, under which Turkey had to conclude peace terms. The Porte requested for more time. Russia refused. Britain supported Turkish demand.² The Czar in Moscow announced that if Europe failed to come to the rescue of the Christian subjects of the Porte, Russia would "act alone".³

This was a critical situation. Constantinople would necessarily fall to Russia, in case of the latter's war against Turkey. Many in England thought that Britain should occupy Egypt, so as to secure Britain's highway to India. "Constantinople" said Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield) in his interview to Lord Barrington on October 23, 1876, "is the key of India and not Egypt and the Suez Canal".⁴

1. Seton-Watson *op. cit.* p. 517.

2. Buckle. *Disraeli II op. cit.* pp. 955—57.

3. Cecil, Lady Gwendolen. *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury*, London 1921, vol. II p. 89.

4. Buckle, *Disraeli II op. cit.* p. 956.

Next day, that is on October 24, Lytton received a telegram of inquiry from Salisbury : Beaconsfield wanted to know of the possibility of striking a rapid blow on Russia in Central Asia.¹ Lytton was thrilled, and immensely excited to hear the prospects of a war with Russia in Central Asia. He boasted superiority of his arms in India. "If war is declared" wrote Lytton the next day, "I would propose that the Government of India should at once take the offensive in Central Asia, where Russia is really very weak, and where I believe that without any great expenditure of force, we could easily raise the Khanates against her, and put a sea of fire between us. I think it would be a mistake to wait attack from her".² However, Lytton required some grace of time-one month at least, when he could mobilise his army on the borders and could enter into necessary negotiations with Kalat and Kabul.³

Next day Lytton addressed Salisbury another letter, informing that he was consulting his two military experts General Sir Henry Norman, the military member of the Viceroy's Council, and General Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief of the army in India, on the possibility of striking a "telling blow" on Russia in Central Asia. Lytton feared that winter had started, and all the

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1. *Disraeli Papers*. Box 93. no. B/XX/ce/273. Salisbury to Disraeli (private) Oct. 29, 76 : refers to Disraeli's inquiry.
 2. *Lytton Papers*, no. 3/1. Lytton to Salisbury (private) Oct. 25, 76 : also same in *Salisbury Papers*.
 3. *Ibid.* Same to same (private) Oct. 27 : *Disraeli Papers*. Box 93 no. B/XX/ce/273 a-b. Lytton to Salisbury (private) Oct. 27, 76.

passes of Central Asia would soon be covered with snow. He pointed out that presently he could easily strike a blow on Russia, in the direction of the Caspian, but not actually in Turkistan. He suggested that the spring would be the most opportune time for an advance on Central Asia. Lytton, therefore, hoped that war in Europe would be postponed till then.¹ Two days later Lytton telegraphed Salisbury that the British regiment under orders to embark for England, would be detained in India : he requested the sending of more officers to train the newly raised native troops : he also requested the supply of rifles and guns for the equipment of native soldiery.²

Henceforth Lytton's dreams were haunted by the British conquest of Central Asia. His dramatic skill, his poetic prosework, his devotion to his duty, and his administrative potentialities, influenced the men and events around him. He called the war with Russia a game in which "prestige, sentiment, and political influence perhaps be even more important than military operation—dash, boldness and rapidity must be the main elements and conditions of success".³ Both Norman and Haines came out with their plans, for the impending British campaign in Central Asia. Norman thought that the successful proceedings of the campaign would require a whole hearted co-operation of Afghanistan, Kashgharia and Turkistan. Without

1. *Salisbury Papers*. Lytton to Salisbury (private), Oct. 28/76.

2. *Disraeli Papers*. Box 93. no. B/XX/ce/274 a. Lytton to Salisbury (private) Oct. 30, 76.

3. *Lytton Papers*. no. 3/1. Lytton to Norman (private), Dec. 6, 76 : Lytton to Haines (private), Dec. 10, 76.

obtaining the co-operation of the Mohammadans of Central Asia, any injury to Russia from India " would be a great enterprise ; I venture to say beyond our means".¹ Norman planned to send, in the first instance about 150 British officers, in small groups to selected places in Afghanistan, where they should start offensive operations. This should follow by despatching three British columns composing in all of 40,000 men to Herat, Kabul and Qandhar, for full scale war against Russia.²

Haines in his memorandum,³ on the subject of the British conquest of Central Asia, took less sanguine view of Sher Ali's co-operation for the success of the operation. He advised the government to crush Amir's hostile attitude and " making our immediate appearance at Cabul ", on the other hand if the Amir was co-operating, then Haines suggested that twenty British officers, assisted by three hundred native officers and soldiers, should be immediately sent to Afghanistan and Kashgharia. Their duties would be to drill the native forces, to approach the chiefs and tribes of the Turkomans of Central Asia, to procure intelligence on the routes, and to collect supplies for the impending expedition. This should be followed by an advance of 5,000 men of all arms to Kurram and Jalalabad. A fort should be erected at

1. *Carnarvon Papers*. P. R. O. 30/6/115. Norman's Memorandum on war with Russia in Central Asia. Dec. 2, 1876 : *Lytton Papers* no. 3/1. Norman's Memorandum. Nov. 2, 76.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Carnarvon Papers*. P. R. O. 30/6/115. Haines's Memorandum on the Conquest of Central Asia. Nov. 27, 1876.

Bamian, and Herat's fortification should be strengthened. Bolan Pass and Qandhar should serve the route for advance on Turkistan. Engineers should be sent to Afghanistan to inspect the defences. The Amir should be encouraged to instigate, the Turko-mans and other tribes inhabiting the area between the Pamir to the Caspian, in rebellion to dislodge Russia at Charjoui. The campaign, the Commander-in-Chief recommended, should commence in May or June next. The whole expedition should be composed of three columns (i) Kurram Column, 6,320 men and 22 guns ; (ii) Multan Column, 3180 men and 34 guns ; (iii) Sindh Column, 4,430 men and 4 guns. At the departure of this expedition, a reserve force of about 16,000 men and 43 guns should be kept ready at Multan, Peshawar and Sindh, to reinforce the first expedition. A detailed list of fray and forage, plus equipment for this hazardous journey of the army was attached to the memorandum.¹

Lytton himself considered that the march from the Bolan alone would not be expedient : and that the Khyber route via Balkh would directly put the British attack on Tashkand—"the heart of Russian power in Central Asia". He also considered that Sher Ali's acquiescence was necessary for an aggressive campaign against Russia : failing to achieve the Amir's agreement, Britain should fall back to her defensive position.² Lytton was sure that Sher Ali would co-operate with the English : so would do the

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Lytton Papers* no. 3/1. Lytton to Haines (private), Dec. 10, 76.

Mohammadan of Central Asia who were frantic at this moment at Russia's aggression on the Porte.¹

In the meantime Lytton signed a treaty with the Khan of Kalat (December 8, 1876), under which the long-coveted strategic post of Quetta was occupied. Relations with Kashmir were improved, and its ruler was urged to extend his hold over the border states of Chitral, Yasin and Mastuj, and to control the Baroghil and Iskoman Passes, both of them leading to Kashgharia. In early January 1877, Lytton learnt that Sher Ali was sending his envoy to negotiate a treaty with the Government of India.² By this time roads on the Kohat Pass had been improved. By the end of the year 1876, the following forces had been concentrated on the border :-

- (i) *Artillery.* G. Battery, 8th Brigade and No. 6., 13th Brigade at Rawalpindi. Hazara Mountain Battery at Kohat.
- (ii) *Cavalry.* 4th Hussar at Rawalpindi : 8th Guide at Mardan, and 12th Bengal at Jehlum.
- (iii) *Infantry.* 2nd Battalion 9th Foot, and 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade at Rawalpindi : Guides at Mardan : 20th Punjab infantry at Peshawar : 32nd Pioneer at Jehlum : and 5th Gorkha at Abbottabad.
- (iv) *Sappers and Miners.* One Company at Rawalpindi and one Company at Roorki.³

1. *Ibid.* Lytton to Salisbury (private), Nov. 8, 76.

2. *Disraeli Papers* Box 105, no. B/XX/LY/246. Lytton's Telegram. January 5, 77.

3. *Military Proceedings of the Government of India*, 1877/961. Roberts to Burne no. 380c. Dec. 21, 76.

Provisions and equipment of an army of around 40,000 men, scheduled for a journey of 500 miles proved to be a Herculean job. Individual soldier's wherewithal-food, arms and ammunitions, heavy clothing and carriage, proved to be a lengthy work. Transportation provided another difficulty. However necessary stores were established at Kohat to meet the demands of the army.

But the shortage of boots was a serious problem. Inquiries at the army stores revealed that shoes were not sufficient even for one regiment.¹ The boots were neither popular with the native soldiery, nor were they in vogue on the hot plains of India. It was a European import. Orders were placed to the Cawnpur manufacturer in the Fall of 1876, but their supply did not come up to expectation.² Urgent demands were addressed to England, but they failed to meet immediate response. It took them three to four months to supply India.³

However, by the Spring of 1877, Lytton was well-equipped for an expeditionary force to mobilise at "a moment's notice". He was hoping to conclude his negotiations with Sher Ali successfully.⁴ "I should desire nothing better" wrote Lytton to Rawalinson, "than an early war with Russia, whose diplomacy I dread more than her arms."⁵ But the

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1. *Lytton Papers*. no. 3/2. Lytton to Carnarvon (private) January 21, 77.
 2. *Military Proceedings of the Government of India 1877/961*. Commander 32nd Pioneer to Adjutant General Delhi, Dec. 26, 76.
 3. *Ibid.* Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 33, Feb. 9, 77.
 4. *Carnarvon Papers*. P. R. O. 30/6/15. Lytton to Carnarvon (private), January 11, 77 : also same in *Lytton Papers* no. 3/2.
 5. *Lytton Papers*. no. 3/2. Lytton to Rawlinson (private), January 11, 77.

home-government was cool now on the issue of war with Russia. This was quite irritating to Lytton. In Europe the Balkan question was calming down. The Porte accepted the Russian-proposed armistice. On November 2, 1876, the British Government proposed a European conference on the Eastern Question. Salisbury was selected to represent the British interest at the Constantinople Conference in December 1873. The Conference failed to reach any conclusion. And Lytton was jubilant to hear about it¹. This was a great chance to "annihilate" the Russian supremacy in Central Asia. But he received no orders for action. In May 1877, General Lomakin took over Kizil Arvat on the Attrek. Lytton considered an opportunity fit enough for opening hostilities against Russia. He immediately telegraphed Salisbury, that any further action of Lomakin in the direction of Merv should be considered a "*Casus Belli*" against Russia.² Also he requested authorisation for organising and encouraging the Turko-mans of Merv for war against Russia.

The attitude of the home-government towards Russia had changed. The idea of war with Russia had originated with Beaconsfield. But the cabinet led by "the three Lords"—Derby, Salisbury and Carnarvon, did not approve of it. The India office was totally indifferent to the scheme of war with Russia in Central Asia. Sir Louis Mallet, and Lord

1. *Ibid.* Lytton to Carnarvon (private), January 21, 77 : also same in *Carnarvon Papers*.

2. *Disraeli Papers*. Box 93, no. A/XX/ce/280a. Lytton to Salisbury, May 30, 77. F. O. 65/992. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 21, July 2, 77.

George Hamilton, both of them Salisbury's assistant at the India office, termed it an insane idea.¹ The India Council was getting "wilder and wilder" on Lytton's proceedings on the north-western frontiers of India. They believed that the doctrines adopted by Lytton's government were not of the "Indian origin."² Sir Horace Walpole, permanent private Secretary at the India office, was horrified to read Lytton's private correspondence addressed to Salisbury on the subject of war with Russia.³

In Parliament, in the press, and in the cabinet there was alarm prevailing over Lytton's bellicose attitude. An impression was growing both in the India office, and in the cabinet, that Lytton was going to war with Russia without the approval of the home government. Even "sober" papers like *Economist* and the *Saturday Review* had an allusion to this.⁴ The public opinion was against such a policy. The London press—*Times*, *Daily News* and *London Society* were anti-Russian, while the country press was unanimously the other way.⁵

And worst of all, Salisbury was absolutely a changed man after the Constantinople Conference. He returned home convinced that Turkey was

1. *Lytton Papers*. 517/2. Hamilton to Lytton (private) Nov. 16, 76 : Mallet to Lytton (private), Dec. 29, 76.

2. *Lytton Papers*. 516/2. Salisbury to Lytton (private) no. 26, July 13, 77, and no. 33, Aug. 14, 77.

3. *Carnarvon Papers*. P. R. O. 30/6/15. Walpole to Carnarvon (private), Dec. 25, 76.

4. *Lytton Papers*. 516/2. Salisbury to Lytton (private) no. 26 *op. cit.* and no. 33. *op. cit.*

5. *Lytton Papers*. 517/2. Mallet to Lytton (private), Dec. 29, 76.

doomed beyond hope, and its only solution was not integration but disintegration. This idea, there are evidence to show, was impressed upon Salisbury by Ignatiev, the shrewd Russian soldier-statesman. Beaconsfield himself was surprised at this change and remarked that Salisbury had become more Russian than Ignatiev. "Sal. seems most prejudiced," wrote Beaconsfield on December 28, 1876, to Derby, "not to be aware that his principal object, in being sent to Const. is to keep Russians out of Turkey, not to create an ideal existance for Turkish Xtians."¹

Salisbury's change of mind was most shocking to Lytton. "Instead of relying on his support," wrote Lytton to Layard, the new British Ambassador in Turkey, "I have to struggle against his indirect but powerful opposition." In another letter to the same person, Lytton remarks that Salisbury "adheres to his new gospel with all the exaggerated fervour of a convert, and I fear he carries with him Carnarvon, Northcote, Cross and the majority of the Cabinet. I feel equally ashamed of my party. It really seems as though the English Empire were doomed, and all our present statesmen stricken with political blindness."² Lytton was grieved both by Beaconsfield and Salisbury, who had gone back on their promises, after he had gone so far on their

1. Buckle. *Disraeli II op. cit.* p. 983. The rise of Bismark's Germany was one of the foremost factors that was changing Britain's attitude towards Russia. This idea was emphasised upon Salisbury's mind by Ignatiev as well. See Lytton's correspondence on this subject in *Lytton Papers* no. 3/2.

2. *Lytton Papers.* no. 3/2. Lytton to Layard, July 2 and 3, 1877.

“private” advices.¹

In his private correspondence on the subject of the cabinet's conduct and betrayal, Lytton's literary skill and his injured pride, coupled together produce most embellished products of his pen. But Salisbury, “a man of big words and timid acts” as Burne called him,² was altogether changed. He saw no advantage in a war with Russia, whether conducted officially or unofficially. Salisbury believed that Britain in Central Asia would not be able to occupy any fortified place, because the Russians, like the Turks, fought well behind the wall.³ Nor did he feel that it would be honourable to incite the Turkoman attack on Russia.⁴ However, Salisbury appeased Lytton by telling him that in case of Russian occupation of Merv, the Cabinet had decided to take over Herat. But to achieve that end, the Afghan co-operation would be necessary. He advised Lytton to use his every endeavour to compromise with the Amir.⁵

But Afghanistan proved to be a stumbling block in Lytton's programme. By the end of 1877, Britain lost its influence, not only in Afghanistan, but in Kashgharia as well. The latter state was virtually lost to Britain. The following pages give the story of the loss of the British allies in Central Asia.

1. *Ibid.* Lytton to Hamilton, Sept. 3, 77.

2. *Lytton Papers*. 517/6. Burne to Lytton (private), Oct. 11, 78.

3. *Lytton Papers* 516/2. Salisbury to Lytton (private) no. 26, July 13, 77.

4. *Ibid.* Same to same (private) no. 20, June 1, 77.

5. *Ibid.* Same to same (private) no. 33. August 14, 77.

CHAPTER VIII

The loss of Allies—Afghanistan and Khasgharia, 1877-1878.

The loss of British influence in Afghanistan can be attributed to the rise of the Liberals under Gladstone (1869—1874). Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, and Northbrook form a trio, responsible for straining the relation between Afghanistan and Britain. To the Gladstonian Liberals, imperialism was synonymous with immorality. England, Gladstone believed had become limitless¹. It had taken administrative responsibilities unassumed in the history of mankind. The Roman Empire itself, despite its vast territorial possessions, had never taken on such responsibilities that now rested on the British Parliament and cabinet².

The new Liberal slogan was that England must remain stationary. War and squabbles were not in Gladstone's programme. In 1868, soon after his assumption of power, he preached the limitations of armaments in Europe³. In one breath his deep religious convictions urged him to condemn the oppressive Turks in the Near East, he condoned

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1. *Nineteenth Century Review* IV 1878, "England's Mission" by Gladstone, p. 584.
 2. *Nineteenth Century Review* II 1877, "Aggression in Egypt and Freedom in the East" by Gladstone, pp. 151-52.
 3. Knaplund, P. *Gladstone's Foreign Policy*, New York 1935, p. 11.

the oppressiveness of Russia in Central Asia. Russia to Gladstone's mind, was the introducer of Western traditions, civilization and morality into the wilds of Central Asia. The Government of the Czar, emphasised Gladstone, "exhibits a career of marked moderation and prudence and a rather reluctant submission to the inexorable causes which drove them forward in an anxious, costly and uninvited career."¹ No wonder Gladstone's portrait decorated a Russian office in St. Petersburg. "I admire him much" said one Russian general².

To the Liberals of the Gladstone era, Central Asia beyond the northwest of Afghanistan, belonged to Russia. Both in private and in public, they gave vent to this thought. In Parliament they applauded Lawrence's "Masterly Inactivity". Called Russia's a civilizing mission in Turkistan: and underated the importance of Afghanistan in the North-Western defences of India. "Nature" said Grant Duff, the Under-Secretary of State for India, "is the greatest bulwark against Russia". Hence they discouraged subsidies to Sher Ali, and considered Russia's expansion inevitable³.

As early as 1868, the Duke of Argyll opined that Afghanistan would soon be the "only one" state existing between India and Russia.⁴ "About Central Asia", wrote the Duke to Granville, "I am

1. *Contemporary Review* XXVIII 1876. "Russian Policy and Deeds in Turkistan", p. 875.

2. Marvin, C. *Russian Advance Towards India*, London 1882. p. 229.

3. *Hansard*. Commons. CXC VII 1868-69. cc. 1567 and 1561—65 : CCXV 1873. cc. 848—63.

4. *Argyll Papers*. Duke of Argyll Memorandum, 1868.

so bored by it that it is all I can do to give it any attention".¹ Granville once asked the Duke whether the latter could tell "why" the Russians were "pushing on" in Central Asia. The Duke replied that it was only the "philosopher's worry" to run after "whys".² An interesting letter is preserved in the *Granville Papers*, written by the Duke of Argyll to Granville. The letter, though obviously not written in a serious mood, gives an idea of the type of view held by some influential Liberals. The Duke wrote.³

"You will be delighted to hear that I have determined to give up India. I find we get nothing from it. It even costs us a good deal. It imposes custom duties on our goods—5 pct. on cotton and 10 pct. on other goods. It obliges us to keep a large army and a great part of the expense falls on the poor British tax payer. The whole thing is an antiquated delusion. I have desired Mayo to reinstate the Moguls and I have suggested that a great part of the country may be put under Nana Sahib, if indeed he be alive and unhangd.

Will you before Parlt. meets circulate a little memo: explaining yr. proceedings? I shall have one ready—as like yours as I can make it".

It was during the days of the Liberals that

1. *Granville Papers*. P. R. O. 30/29/51. Argyll to Granville (private), Jan. 9, 72.

2. *Ibid.* January 9 and 11, 1872.

3. *Ibid.* Argyll to Granville (private), Dec. 1, 1869.

Russia opened correspondence with Amir Sher Ali. Seventeen letters were exchanged between the Russian authorities and the ruler of Kabul, during 1870 and 1874.¹ Sher Ali was frightened after receiving the early communications of Kaufmann. The Amir suspected the Russian motives in opening correspondence with him. The Liberals allayed his apprehensions, encouraged him to communicate with Kaufmann, and assured him of the good intentions of the Czar's government regarding Afghanistan.²

Sher Ali received very cold treatment from the Liberals even after the restoration of his power. In 1869 Sher Ali visited Ambala with high hopes of receiving pecuniary assistance from the Government of India. He did not conceal his displeasure with the past activities of the Government of India. He looked forward to such concessions as an offensive-defensive alliance, an annual subsidy and active support against his enemies. But as discussed earlier, Lord Mayo handled the situation without committing Britain in any way. Sher Ali obtained neither treaty, fixed subsidy, active help, nor dynastic pledges.³ The Amir was returning totally "empty handed". Mayo sensed that the Amir was disappointed; to appease any possible wounded feelings, he expressed "severe displeasure" of the British Government at the seditious activities of his rivals.⁴ The Liberals did not appreciate the liberty

1. *Par. Pap.* XCVIII 1881, no. 1/1—17.

2. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878, no. 1/7. Viceroy to ruler of Kabul June 24, 70.

3. *Argyll Papers.* 1869/1. Mayo to Argyll (private), April 18, 69 : *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 19, Viceroy to Secretary of State, July 1, 69.

4. *Ibid.*

taken by the Viceroy in making "certain expressions" the meaning of which might be misconstrued by the Amir. The home ministry asked the Viceroy to disavow his language to the Amir.¹ Mayo was at great pains to explain the intricacy of the situation. He writes privately to the Duke that had the latter been on the spot, even he "would have agreed with us".² Mayo impressed upon the Duke's mind that Britain had gained everything, but lost nothing.

The end to Mayo's rule in India, was indeed a great loss to British diplomacy in Central Asia. His successor, Lord Northbrook, was "a stupid fellow who did not appreciate the real condition of affairs but still would have done something had he not been over-ruled by a cowardly administration".³ It was during Northbrook's rule (1872—76) that the Amir was irritated. Northbrook tried to step into Mayo's shoes, regarding Afghanistan, but he lacked the essential ingredient of Mayo's policy-tact.

Three problems cropped up during Northbrook's administration which strained his relations with the Amir. They were (i) British arbitration in Siestan; (ii) Northbrook's interference on behalf of Prince Yaqub, and (iii) the Amir's apprehension at Russian proximity to his state.

1. *Par. Pap.* 1878-79 no. 18. Secretary of State to Viceroy May 4, 69.

2. *Argyll Papers.* 1869/1. Mayo to Argyll (private), July 1, 70.

3. *Gladstone Papers.* Add Mss. 44266/49. Northbrook to Gladstone (private), Nov. 25, 78 : refers to the comments made about him by the Conservative party.

Siestan is situated on the banks of Helmand, with an area of about 500 square miles. It was inhabited by people of Afghan, Persian and Bilauchi descent. It is bounded on the north and north-west by Khurassan, on the west by Persia, and its south and south-east is separated from Makran by a desert. It belonged to Persia in the ancient days. Persia had a classical attachment to this province. It was in Siestan that Rustam was born, Afrasiyab fought, Bahman scored victories and Naushervan ruled. It was lost for a while to Persia during the incursion of the Mongols, but was recovered under the Safavids. Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of modern Afghanistan (1747—1773) incorporated Siestan into his dominion. Following the turmoil of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Persia occupied Siestan in 1853.¹ The conquest of Siestan was in Dost Mohammad's plan in 1862-1863. The Persian Government was alive to this threat and in the Fall of 1862, it urged the British Government to warn Dost Mohammad of the consequences of attack on the Persian province of Siestan.² The British Foreign office declined to recognise Persian sovereignty over Siestan, hence, the Foreign office excused itself of the execution of the Article Seven of the Treaty of Paris 1857, under which Britain had promised to arbitrate in Perso-Afghan border disputes.³ But this explanation did not satisfy Persia, and the

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1868/3. Memorandum on Seistan. Dec. 20, 67. p. 82.

2. *S. H. C.* 1862/56. F. O. to I. O. Oct. 22, 62 : sends Erskine's telegram from Constantinople containing Persian protest.

3. F. O. 60/273. Russell to Alison, no. 80. Oct. 30, 62.

latter state persistantly approached the British Government to prohibit Kabul's aggressive designs upon Siestan. Hard pressed on the subject, Lord Russell informed the Persian Government in November, 1863 that the British Government had decided not to interfere in the Perso-Afghan dispute over Siestan, and he added, that Britain would "leave it to both parties to make good their possessions by force of arms".¹

Henceforth Persia steadily made efforts to establish itself in Siestan. Force, conciliation and intrigues, were the common methods employed by Persia to win both Persian and non-Persian element in Siestan. In 1867 Persia deposed its ruler, Taj Mohammad, and took over the administration directly by appointing a governor.²

During this period (1863—1867), when Persia was consolidating its hold over Siestan, Afghanistan was torn up by the civil war. The issue was taken by Sher Ali in 1870, who requested British mediation in 1870. Lord Mayo agreed.³ General F. J. Goldsmid, assisted by two Anglo-Indian officers, was appointed to settle the dispute between Afghanistan and Persia, each represented by a commissioner.

In Autumn, 1872, Goldsmid declared his award. He divided Siestan into two parts, (i) Siestan proper, and (ii) Outer Siestan.

Siestan proper was defined as the region, bounded on the north-west by the Hamun, dividing

1. F. O. 60/273. Russell to Mohd. Khan, Nov. 5, 63.

2. E. S. L. I. 1868/3. Memo on Siestan *op. cit.* p. 88.

3. E. S. L. I. 1870/7. Viceroy to Amir, Sept. 8, 70.

it from Lash Jowain and Neh Benden districts; on the south by the Hamun and Dashte-Sangbar and the barren tracts south of Sakuha and Burje Alam Khan; on the east by the main branch of the Helmand. Outer Siestan was composed of the country on the right bank of the Helmand extending 120 miles in length on the north to Rudbar in the south. Siestan proper was assigned to Persia, while outer Siestan went to Afghanistan.¹

It was decidedly a thankless job. Both Persia and Afghanistan were annoyed at this partition. Persia got all the productive lands of Siestan, much coveted by Afghanistan while the former lost all the strategic posts recently built on the eastern side of Helmand.

Amir Sher Ali was expecting some undue favour from Goldsmid, and failing to get it, he got irritated. "The atmosphere at the Court" wrote the Kabul Vakeel, "is changed. None of them is contented with arbitration".² The Amir himself in his letter to the Viceroy, termed the partition as "imaginary" and based upon "shortsighted" views.³

Yaqub-Sher Ali relations have been discussed in the preceding pages, it will be remembered that Mayo had been successful in patching up the differences between the father and the son. Yaqub had been appointed to the governship of Herat, but was carefully watched through his three deputies—Mirakhor

1. Goldsmid, F. J. *Eastern Persia*, London 1876. p. 407.

2. *Political Proceedings of the Government of Punjab*, 1873/14 Vakeel to Commissioner, January 20, 73.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1873/14. Amir to Viceroy, January 20, 73.

Ahmad Khan, who held the control of the finances, Abdullah Khan Nasiri, commanding the irregular levies, and Hafizullah Khan, the Commander of the regular forces.¹ But Yaqub gradually overpowered them and took control of the total administration in the province.² Mirakhor came to Kabul in August 1872, and complained against Yaqub's mishandling of the administration and finances of Herat. He was reluctant to serve any more under the annoying prince, but the Amir insisted upon his presence in Herat.³ After a year, Mirakhor again visited Kabul and opened a tirade against Yaqub's misdoings in Herat.⁴ In October, 1873, Sher Ali fell ill, and Yaqub sought to advance on Kabul and seize powers, but he was disappointed to learn of his father's quick recovery.⁵ In early 1874, Sher Ali appointed his younger son, Abdullah Jan, his heir-apparent. This led Yaqub to retaliatory measures. He exhibited seditious intentions against the Kabul authority, refused to celebrate the new heir-apparent's appointment, approached the Persian authorities for help, and made a demand upon the Amir to assign him permanently the administration of Herat.⁶

The Amir thought to reconcile his offended son, and sent his two trusted officers Mirakhor and

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1. *Political Proceedings of the Government of Punjab* 1872/142. K. D. 2—5 Feb. 72.
 2. *Ibid.* K. D. June 18—20, 72.
 3. *Ibid.* K. D. Aug. 27—29, 72.
 4. *Ibid.* K. D. September, 72.
 5. *Political Proceedings of the Government of Punjab* 1873/143. K. D. Nov. 11—15, 73.
 6. *Political Proceedings of the Government of Punjab* 1874/144. K. D. Dec. 30, 73. to March 26/74.

Sherdil, to invite him to Kabul. Yaqub refused to listen to their advice, and sent his own agent Tahir Khan, to clarify his position to the Amir.¹ Mirakhor reported from Herat that the prince could only be overpowered by deceit, and he advised the Amir that the latter should take Tahir Khan into confidence and to induce Yaqub to come to Kabul "for success of the subject".² The plan was approved at Kabul and a delegation was sent in the company of Tahir Khan to Herat. The delegation carried written promises of safety of life, dignity and property, as had been demanded by Yaqub through his agent. Yaqub arrived in Kabul in early November. Three days later he was arrested.³

Northbrook, following the footsteps of Mayo, interefered in the matter.⁴ The Kabul Vakeel was directed to convey to the Amir the Viceroy's regret over the breach of the conditions under which Yaqub came to Kabul.⁵

The Kabul court was annoyed at Northbrook's direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The courtiers called it a meddling in the Amir's "family" affairs, and the Amir himself sneered, "I wonder what the English consider by

1. *Ibid.*, K. D. July 17—20, 74.

2. *Ibid.*, K. D. Aug. 7—10, 74.

3. *Ibid.*, K. D. Dec. 16, 74.

4. Argyll had urged Northbrook in November, 1873 to induce Sher Ali to recognise Yaqub as his successor. Northbrook considered that Yaqub's claim to the throne should be supported on the death of his father. This was an alarming suggestion to the Duke (*Northbrook Papers* no. 9. Argyll to Northbrook no. 58, Nov. 19, 73).

5. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 30/5. Government of India to Commissioner Peshawar, Nov. 17, 74.

making enquiries about Yaqub ”.¹ In his reply to Northbrook, Sher Ali justified his action in arresting his son, and considered Yaqub’s release detrimental to his authority.²

The rise of Russia in Central Asia had disquietened the mind of Sher Ali like most other Central Asians. Russia’s next move was on Merv, and the Amir was aware of it. Kaufmann had opened correspondence with him, and Sher Ali had been alerted by it. The Russians were at his “elbow” said Sher Ali once, after drawing a map by his own hands of the Russian conquest in Turkistan.³ More than once, the Amir told the British Vakeel, of his fears of the approach of Russia. Everytime the British Government lulled his fears and consoled him with the assurance which the British Government had herself received from St. Petersburg. “It is impossible” said Sher Ali, “for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations.”⁴ Sher Ali wanted a guarantee and security against Russian invasion of Afghanistan. He proposed to the Government of India in May, 1873, to fortify his northern frontiers, and also to train and equip his forces.⁵ And for this object his trusted counsellor Syed Noor Mohammad Shah reached India in July, 1873, to wait upon the Viceroy. The envoy was explicit on the point of Russian aggression against Afghanistan, and he requested that an aggressor on the Afghan state should be

1. *Ibid.* no. 30/1. Vakeel to Commissioner Peshawar, Dec. 14, 74.

2. *Ibid.* no. 30/2.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1871/8. Vakeel to Commissioner, May 11, 71.

4. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79, no. 26/2. Vakeel to Commissioner, May 5, 73.

5. *Ibid.*

considered an "enemy" of England as well. He asked for an explicit written assurance against Russian invasion of Afghanistan.¹

Northbrook had sought home government instructions by the despatch of a telegram on June 27, followed by a letter three days after. Northbrook asked for authorisation to assure the Amir that in a contingency of aggression on Afghanistan, the British Government would assist the Amir.² The Duke of Argyll in his return telegram on July 1, disapproved Northbrook's proposal.³ Northbrook sent another telegram on July 24, that Sher Ali was getting dubious of British assurances, and he was keen to know how much he should depend on British support in case of an unprovoked violation of his borders. Northbrook proposed assisting the Amir under such circumstances.⁴ Two days later, the Duke replied that the Cabinet did not share Sher Ali's apprehension of Russia, and added that the British Government would prefer to pursue its former policy regarding Afghanistan.⁵

Hence, Northbrook during his interview with Syed Noor, used guarded language on the subject of Russian threat to Afghanistan. In his letter to the Amir, once again, the Viceroy assured him of friendly intentions of Russia regarding Afghanistan, and the Viceroy advised the Amir not to incur any

1. *Ibid.* no. 26/4. Interview between Syed Noor and Northbrook, July 12, 73.

2. *Ibid.* no. 21 and 22.

3. *Ibid.* no. 23.

4. *Ibid.* no. 24.

5. *Ibid.* no. 25.

large sum on the unnecessary northern defence of Afghanistan.¹

Syed Noor's visit to India was a turning point in Anglo-Afghan relation. Sher Ali was somewhat rude in his reply to the Viceroy. His letter contained sarcastic remarks and peculiar taunts.² "I am pretty well sure", wrote Northbrook to Argyll privately, "that the mission had done more harm than good."³ Sher Ali, after this event, was entirely changed man. He refused to allow English officers to enter his dominion. He also refused to accept Northbrook's present of 5,000 Enfield rifles, though he was desperately in need of them and had been contacting a London firm for the purchase of such arms.⁴

The Liberals lost Sher Ali, the Conservatives opened their reign with a determination to regain him. The attempt was ill-timed. Lytton came to India with instructions to appease the Amir at all cost. On May 5, 1876, he sent a letter bearing the signature of Colonel Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawar, but drafted by himself, to Sher Ali via the hands of the Viceroy's personal Aid-De-Camp.⁵ The letter contained a plain request to the Amir to receive a British mission. This mission was to visit Afghanistan to announce the Viceroy's arrival, and

1. *Ibid.* no. 26/7. Viceroy to Amir, Sept. 6, 73.

2. *Ibid.* no. 28/1, Amir to Viceroy, Nov. 13, 73 : *Northbrook Papers* no. 9, Northbrook to Argyll (private) Dec. 26, 73.

3. *Northbrook Papers* no. 9. Northbrook to Argyll (private) Feb. 5, 73.

4. *Political Proceedings of Government of Punjab* 1873/143. K. D. January 4-6, 73.

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1877/14. Instructions to Pollock, April 24, 76.

the impending proclamation announcing the Queen's assumption of the title "Empress of India". In addition, it was to discuss matters of common interest to the two governments.¹ Sher Ali declined to receive the mission for any further negotiations on Anglo-Afghan relations, however he did not preclude sending his own envoy to India, if the negotiations were of vital interest.²

Lytton retaliated by refusing to receive the Kabul envoy. The British Vakeel was instructed to warn the Amir that by employing dubious methods, he was alienating British sympathies. This alerted the Amir, and he proposed that the British Vakeel should visit India to learn the views of his government, and also to explain the Amir's viewpoint.³

Ata Mohammad Khan, the British Vakeel at Kabul, visited Simla in October 1876. He was interrogated by Lytton and his officials both on his personal performance in the diplomatic service of the Government of India, and upon the indifferent attitude of the Amir of Kabul. Ata Mohammad after defending the integrity of his judgement and work, explained the misunderstandings created by some of the events that had happened during the previous administration. The gist of the Vakeel's talk was, that the Amir had given up any hope of concrete gain from Britain, and he was highly suspicious of

1. *Ibid.* Commissioner to Amir, May 5, 76.

2. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79, no. 3/67. Amir to Commissioner May 22, 76.

3. *Ibid.* 36/8-10.

the recent sudden overtures of friendship.¹

Lytton told the Vakeel to impress upon the Amir's mind that in the recent British overtures lay an opportunity of becoming "the strongest sovereign" that Kabul had ever seen. His rejection might lead to "wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether". The Viceroy expressed an earnest desire of the British Government to enter into an offensive-defensive alliance with the Amir, guaranteeing him personal and dynastic safety both against internal and external threat, plus a yearly subsidy; recognition of his new heir-apparent, and the fortification of his northern frontiers. The Amir in return should receive British agents at Herat and elsewhere; he had to act on the Indian Government's advice in his external affairs; to discontinue communication with Russia; and should open his dominion to the Englishmen visiting with political objectives.²

Lytton authorised Ata Mohammad to conduct negotiations on the line suggested, and an "aide memoir" was furnished to the Vakeel for his guidance. It was emphasised upon the Vakeel to make it clear to the Amir that he should send his envoy for negotiation only if he was willing to accept the British "conditions".³

Serious consideration was given to the British proposals at Kabul. Ata Mohammad met the Amir on November 22, December 4th, 9th, 18th and December 20th, 1876. Also, the Vakeel conversed

1. *Ibid.* no. 36/18-19. Ata Mohammad interviews, Oct. 7 and 10, 76.
 2. *Ibid.* no. 36/19.
 3. *Ibid.* no. 36/20-21.

with most of his ministers. Ata Mohammad's impression was that the Kabul's court was much against yielding to the extraordinary British conditions.¹ However on Decemher 21, Ata Mohammad reported that the Amir was seding a deputation to India, and the Kabul court was willing, though hestitantly, to receive the British agents in Afghanistan.²

Syed Noor, accompanied by Mirakhor Ahmad Khan and Munshi Mohammad Baqir, reached Peshawar in January 1877. Lytton had appointed Sir Lewis Pelly, his agent for the negotiation of the Anglo-Afghan treaty.³ Pelly waited for the Afghan deputation at Peshawar. He had in his possession a twenty clause Anglo-Afghan draft treaty. The treaty guaranteed internal and external security to Sher Ali and his dynasty in Afghanistan. It provided a grant of twenty lakh of rupees to the Amir at the ratification of the treaty, besides twelve lakh as an annual grant. The treaty asked for British agents at Herat and elsewhere, while Kabul was to be represented by a native agent. Afghanistan would be represented by an envoy at the Viceroy's court.⁴

The conference was opened at Peshawar on January 30th, 1877, and lasted almost till the end of March, 1877. There were nine official meetings of the Anglo-Afghan representatives, besides numerous

1. *Ibid.* no. 36/26—31.

2. *Ibid.* no. 36/32.

3. Pelly had accompanied Lytton from England as special advisor to the Viceroy on Afghanistan. Pelly had served in the political service of the Government of India, both inside and outside India. Sir George Campbell called Pelly an adherent of "forward policy".

4. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79. no. 36/24 and 25.

parleys of a private and personal nature. The Afghan delegate, Syed Noor, opened the negotiations with a tirade of grievances against the British attitude during the course of the last eight years. The envoy pressed the point that the Amir harboured no fear from Russia. He said, the assurance advanced by Mayo, Northbrook, Kaufmann, Gortchakov and Granville, had removed all the anxiety from the Amir's mind.¹ As regards the presence of an English agent in Afghanistan, "we mistrust you", said the Syed privately to Dr. Bellew, "and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us, and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands".² Syed Noor also informed Pelly privately that the British demands were unacceptable. He said none in Afghanistan would be happy over the British presence. The Afghan leader concluded his talk, that he had no definite instructions as to whether to agree to the British proposals or not.³

Pelly vainly tried to emphasise upon the Afghan's mind the benefits of the treaty for Afghanistan, but Syed Noor responded only by referring bitterly to the past. On March 15, 1877, Pelly on the instruction of Lytton, asked for a definite reply whether Kabul desired an alliance or not. Obtaining no encouraging response, Lytton withdrew his offers.⁴ Syed Noor died in Peshawar, suffering from a chronic

1. *Ibid.* no. 36/45.

2. *Ibid.* no. 36/40.

3. *E. S. L. I.* 1877/14. Pelly to Viceroy, Feb. 1, 77.

4. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79, no. 39/46.

stricture of the urethra. Lytton ordered that the conference be closed on March 30. This was the end of direct negotiations with Kabul. The Afghan friendship had been lost.¹

If the Liberals lost Afghanistan, the Conservatives lost Kashgharia. The latter state represented a major piece in the diplomatic chess game now played between England and Russia in Central Asia. Both the powers had entered commercial treaties with Kashgharia. But Yaqub Beg was more inclined towards Britain. The conclusion of Anglo-Kashgharia Commerce Treaty of 1874, put an end to the advantages gained by Russia in her commercial treaty. Yaqub Beg once again imposed restrictions on Russian goods. Their merchants were subjected to compulsory sale and seizure in Kashgharia.² Colonel Reinthal, the Russian envoy who visited Kashghar in 1875, gave an alarmist view of the situation in Kashgharia. Reinthal reported that the Kashgharia army was drilled and controlled by the British and the Turks. He found a fantastic build up of armaments in Kashgharia.³ The Russian authorities eyed with displeasure Yaqub Beg's activities. Stremoukov called him "an usurper, a cruel, and despotic tyrant".⁴ General Ignatiev was sending warnings from Constantiople, that Kashghar and Merv were "the rallying points of enemies of Russia in Central Asia, and of the Anglo-Turkish

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1. An attempt was also made to use the Porte's influence in restoring relations with Afghanistan. But Sher Ali paid no heed to it.
 2. Terentyef II *op. cit.* p. 287.
 3. Kuropatkin *op. cit.* pp. 193-94.
 4. F. O. 55/904. Loftus to Derby no. 406, Nov. 10, 74.

intrigues".¹ To Kaufmann, Kashgharia was a mere "creation de Monsieur Forsyth".²

In June 1874, Stremoukov raised with Loftus the question of a close alliance between Britain and Kashgharia, under which arms had been supplied to that state.³ Almost a year after Schouvalov complained to Derby against the British build up in Kashghar. Derby tried to set the ambassador's mind at rest, but the latter was still harping on the same string even a year later.⁴ Derby then wrote privately to Schouvalov, that no arms had been sent to Kashgharia except a few 'arms de luxe', as presents for the personal use of its chief.⁵

Both Loftus and Forsyth who were fully aware of Russian intentions in Central Asia, expected an ultimate occupation of Kashgharia by Russia. Forsyth in his confidential report on his last mission to Kashghar, and in his two letters from that capital, indicated that Russia was looking for a pretext to invade Kashghar. He advised Yaqub Beg to revert to defensive measures, and suggested to him to abandon Urumchi and Manas, the two outlying provinces in the eastern valley which had exposed his defences. Yaqub Beg willingly agreed.⁶

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1. *Ibid.* Same to same no. 469, Dec. 23, 74.
 2. F. O. 55/926. Willsly to Loftus no. 2, January 6, 75.
 3. F. O. 65/902, no. 197.
 4. F. O. 65/956. Derby to Loftus no. 12, Feb. 29, 76.
 5. F. O. 65/956. Derby to Schouvalov, Feb. 29, 76: Salisbury was personally against supply of arms to Kashgharia. See *Lytton Papers* 516/I. Salisbury to Lytton (private) no. 8. March 10, 76.
 6. *E. S. L. I.* 1874/17-18. Forsyth to Government of India no. 147. March 4, 74, and no. 163. May 16, 74: *E. S. L. I.* 1875/4. Forsyth Report on the Mission, pp. 307-323.

Loftus, like Forsyth, was a firm believer in the integrity of Kashgharia. He even recommended to the home-government to confer "The Star of India" on Yaqub Beg.¹ Robert Shaw, who visited Kashghar in the Fall, 1874, as the British Ambassador to the court of Kashghar, found Yaqub proud of the British alliance and ready to work on their advice.²

In fact, the invasion of Kashgharia did not come from the north, but from east. The British Legation at Peking had been warning both the Governments of India and the home government since 1870 that China would never agree to the idea of abdicating its claim to the territory of Kashgharia.³ Sir Thomas Wade, the new British Minister at Peking, sounded out the views of Prince Kung, the Chinese Prime Minister, on the touchy question of Kashgharian independence. The Chinese Government "has to sharpen its arms and ration its horses for their extermination" replied the angered Chancellor.⁴ Wade also sent a rejoinder in 1873, on the subject of the pending Anglo-Kashghar treaty of Commerce,

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1. F. O. 65/877. Loftus to Granville, Telegram, April 21, 73.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1876/8. Shaw's Memorandum on Eastern Turkistan, April 11, 76.—Shaw had been instructed not to stay as permanent envoy at Kashghar, nor to give any impression of his permanency of deputation to Yaqub. The Government of India favoured making this embassy permanent but Salisbury opposed it. (*Letters to India* 1874/6. Secretary of State to Viceroy, July 24, 74.
 3. *E. S. L. I.* 1870/6. Wade to Viceroy, March 30, 70 : Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British Minister in China had met Mayo at Calcutta, during the former's visit to India. Alcock gave his general observation on the subject. See *Argyll Papers* 1870/1. Mayo to Argyll (private) Feb. 8, 70.
 4. F. O. 17/548 Kung to Wade, April 11, 70., Wade to Clarendon, April 12, 70.

informing the British Government that China would highly deprecate this alliance.¹

China, since 1866, had been meditating on the possibility of reconquering Kashgharia. Actual credit for recovery of Kashgharia goes to Tso-Tsung-tang (1812—1885), a born general and a man of indomitable energy. Since his appointment to the governor-generalship of Shensi and Kansu in September, 1866, Tso had been planning to regain the lost north-western territories of China. His unsuccessful preoccupation with the Nien-fei rising during that period deviated his attention for a while.² Tso had pledged in honour to complete the conquest of Kashgharia. In 1868 he launched his offensive against the north-west. In Spring, 1869, Shansi was pacified and by November, 1873 the province of Kansu was reduced to submission.³ Tso was rewarded for his services : and in Autumn, 1874, he was promoted to the rank of grand secretary, and in the following year was assigned the charge of military affairs in Sinkiang.⁴

The Government of India up till this time was unaware of the Chinese proceedings against Kashgharia. Captain Biddulph, a member of Forsyth's second mission to Kashgharia, was the first to learn about it. "A new complication has arisen", wrote Biddulph from Yarkand in January, 1874. His intelligence was that the Chinese had reached up to

1. F. O. 17/654 Wade to Granville. Telegram, June 27, 73.

2. Hummel, A. W. *Eminent Chinese of the Ching Period* ; article on Tso by Tue Lien Che : Washington, 1944, vol. II pp. 764.

3. *Ibid.* p. 765.

4. *Ibid.*

the Barakol district. Britain should not "allow this man to be kicked out".¹ Next came Loftus' intelligence in June, 1874. He learnt from Stremoukov that China had invaded Kansu.² It was followed by Robert Michell's report deduced from Russian and Chinese sources, that 17,000 Chinese troops had been mobilised for the recovery of Kashgharia.³ And lastly, Shaw reported in December from Kashghar that the terrorised Dungs of Urumchi and Manas, had approached Yaqub Beg for help against Chinese aggression.⁴ By the beginning of the new year, reports on the Chinese proceedings against Kashgharia were pouring into Whitehall from Peking and St. Petersburg.

Incessant reports on the Chinese invasion of Kashgharia alarmed the Government of India. In October, 1874, the Viceroy approached the India office on the possibility of preventing the Chinese attack on Kashgharia. The Viceroy suggested that since Kashghar had been recognised as a sovereign state both by Russia and Britain, a joint or independent British diplomatic action at Peking would be advisable to end the growing quarrel between China and Kashgharia. Northbrook pointed out that the independence of Kashghar was of material gain for the British interest in the East.⁵ The India office

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1. *Letters to India* 1874/6. Letter from Biddulph, January 27, 74 (The addressee of the letter is not known. The India office possesses an extract of his letter).
 2. F. O. 65/902. Loftus to Derby no. 203, June 22, 74.
 3. *S. H. C.* 1874/76. July 24 and Aug. 8, 74.
 4. *E. S. L. I.* 1175/2. Shaw to Government of India no. 31. Dec. 14, 74.
 5. *E. S. L. I.* 1874/19. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 61. Oct. 2. 74.

moved the Foreign office on the subject.¹

Sir Thomas Wade, the British Minister at Peking from the very outset was as much against Tso's campaign as he was against Forsyth's treaty. Wade believed that this campaign was disastrous both politically and commercially for China. He thought that China was playing Russia's game in Central Asia by conquering Kashgharia. He had been persuading since November, 1874, Li Hung Chang, the Grand Secretary and the Viceroy of Chihli, to abandon the idea of the north-western conquest. Li gave a willing ear to this advice and tried to convince the Tsungli Yaman (the Foreign Affairs Board established in 1861). But this persuasion brought to Li an "angry denunciation as an unpatriotic Chinese".²

In early 1876, Sir Douglas Forsyth on furlough for England, visited China "as a private gentleman". Li expressed a wish to meet Forsyth; and Wade immediately arranged an interview between the two at Tientsin. Forsyth himself, well-trained in Central Asian diplomacy, was further primed by Wade on the intricacies of the Chinese politics for Li's interview. Forsyth met Li on April 8, Li insisted that Yaqub Beg should submit to China on conditions similiar to those of the King of Korea. Forsyth, as coached by Wade, replied that Yaqub Beg should not be treated as a rebel, but one who had chastised the rebels against China. Yaqub would never

1. *S. H. C.* 1874/81. I. O. to F. O. Nov. 17, 74.

2. F. O. 17/825. Wade to Forsyth (private), April 6, 76 : F. O. 17/677. Wade to Derby no. 234. Dec. 3, 74 : F. O. 17/825. Wade to Derby no. 136 ; July 8, 76.

surrender, said Forsyth. "What he had won by the sword, and as he himself says by God's will, that he will defend by the sword so long as God gives him life".¹ Forsyth appealed to the grand secretary to help and not to destroy the wise government of Yaqub. Li "really agreed" to Forsyth's views about Kashgharia, and again requested him to write to Yaqub to take an initiative in extending overtures of friendship and submission.²

Wade, however, kept the issue alive, and on September 15, 1876, he broached the subject of Kashghar at Cheffo during his talk with Li. He persuaded the latter once again to write to Prince Kung, and to move him to communicate with Tso, suggesting the possibility of receiving Yaqub's emissary. Wade then approached the prince himself. The prince agreed and it was learnt that Tso assured the central government that an envoy from Yaqub would be well-received. Li then suggested that Yaqub better hurriedly send an envoy.³

In the meantime, Wade had left for England, and Hugh Fraser, the British charge 'd affaires did not have any instructions on the subject. Neither was there any direct communication between Peking and Calcutta for approaching Kashghar.

Luckily an opportunity was opened by the arrival of a Kashgharian envoy to India, in the Summer of 1876, Syed Yaqub Khan Tura, the roving ambassador of Kashghar, arrived in India.

1. F. O. 17/825. Forsyth to Wade (private), April 9, 76.

2. *Ibid.*

3. F. O. 17/825. Fraser to Derby no. 219. Dec. 10, 76.

He was on a mission to procure a permanent British resident for Kashghar.¹ The envoy stated that Kashgharia was threatened by China. He said Russia had offered her good offices to negotiate peace between China and Kashghar, but the envoy pointed out that the ruler of Kashghar would prefer British representation and negotiation.²

This was a great opportunity to send an envoy to Kashghar and advise its ruler to send an agent for negotiation to China. Lytton asked authorisation from Salisbury for Shaw's permanent appointment at Kashghar.³ Salisbury replied, "that advantage is not worth the risk". However he favoured to consult his council as well on the subject.⁴

The question of locating permanent agent at Kashghar was debated by the India Council. The political committee of the India office favoured despatching a resident to Kashghar. The India Council also voted in its favour. Only Salisbury and Sir Henry Maine dissented.⁵ Salisbury in his letter to the Viceroy regretted over having entered into alliance with Kashghar, and expressed his sorrow for having made the resident clause in the treaty so firm. He advised Lytton to defer the departure of the mission "till towards the close of

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1. Robert Shaw, who had gone to Kashghar in 1874 as British resident, returned next year. The Government of India, as discussed earlier, was not keen now to appoint a resident.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1876/10. Memorandum of conversation with Syed Tura, Sep. 30, 76.
 3. *Ibid.* Telegram, Aug. 12, 76.
 4. *Ibid.* Telegram, Aug. 17, 76.
 5. *Political and Secret Despatches to India 1877/3.* The Minutes of the Council.

ensuing travelling season." By that time Salisbury was hopeful that "circumstances" in Kashgharia would have developed in such a way that Britain would not have to send an agent.¹

Tso-Tsang-tang, at this time (1875) was facing two major problems—food and funds. Tso's army was short of food, also it had not been paid for many months.² Food was a necessity. Tso employed his soldiers in their spare time on the cultivation of lands, but it did not solve the problem. He had a large army of 89,000 men divided into 178 battalions.³ It was in early 1875 that a Russian mission under Colonel Sosnowsky visited China. Tso entertained the Russian mission well at Lanchu in June, 1875.⁴ On Tso's request, the mission readily agreed to supply three million chins (Chinese weight one chin equivalent to $1\frac{1}{3}$ lbs) of Siberian grain at the price of $7\frac{1}{2}$ taels (Chinese currency one tael equivalent to about two rupees) per hundred chin.⁵ By April next, Tso had stored his food supply.

In Spring, 1875, Tso had memorialised the throne for 2,000,000 taels.⁶ The Chinese economy at this time was passing through a critical stage.

1. *Ibid.* Secretary of State to Viceroy no, 31. April 5. 77.

2. Wade wrote to Forsyth on April 6, 1876 that there was an annual arrear in the pay of Tso's army of about £ 5,000,000.

3. Bales, W. L. *Tso Tsung-tang*. Shanghai 1937. p. 325 : Fraser numbered Tso's army as 50,000 men while Loftus report showed that the army consisted of 40,000 men.

4. F. O. 17/825. Mayers (British Secretary in the Peking Legation) learnt this account from Li.

5. Bales, *op. cit.* p. 336.

6. F. O. 17/705. Robertson to Tenterden no. 33. July 23, 75.

The state income since 1865 had declined. There were £ 9,000,000 in arrears from the provincial subsidies.¹ The Alcock convention of 1869 further hit the economy; under this convention the custom duties imposed upon foreign trade had been abolished. The war indemnity payable to France and Britain had further damaged the economic structure of the empire.

Tso's demand for funds embarrassed the central authorities. In his second application, Tso raised his demand to ten million taels. This amount he requested to be borrowed from the foreign banks. This proposal provoked opposition from some of the Chinese officials who considered the coastal defences and the establishment of a navy more significant than the subjugation of a distant province.² But Tso emphasised the importance of Kashgharia, and considered it vital for the retention of Mongolia, the latter place in itself necessary for the safety of Peking.³ Tso even threatened to resign if his application was turned down.

Tso's pertinacity won the day. The government decided to provide him with funds, half of which were to be raised by foreign loans. During 1876-1877 a foreign loan of £1,600,000, the first of its kind, was raised from the British Bank of Hong Kong and Shinghai.⁴ Obtaining the funds, Tso

1. F. O. 17/825. Wade to Forsyth. April 6, 76.

2. Hummel *op. cit.* p. 765 : F. O. 17/721. Wade to Derby no. 83. March 24, 76.

3. *Ibid.*

4. F. O. 17/825, Fraser to Derby no. 180, Oct. 8, 67 : November 16 (Telegram), and no. 211, Nov. 16, 77.

moved his headquarters to Kansu. By the middle of 1876, Tso was all equipped for an advance on Kashgharia.

There are indications in the British Foreign office records that Tso was planning to employ foreigners for speedy execution of his expedition against Kashgharia. Wade confirms that besides provisions, Russian arms were also supplied to the Chinese for the conquest of Kashgharia.¹ Fraser also sent intelligence that Tso preferred employment of Russian mercenaries, as they were familiar with warfare in Central Asia.² However, one point is definite. German arms and experts were used extensively.³

Tso occupied Urumchi on August 17, and Manas on November 6, 1876. Only the Tian Shan range separated Yaqub from Tso. Yaqub Beg in the meantime had concentrated his forces at Turfan, Takhtasun and Divanchi, the three advance posts in the east. Yaqub himself had advanced to Korala, appointing Hakim Khan Tura to Turfan, and Haq Quli Beg (Yaqub's younger son) to Takhtasun.⁴ Loftus learnt at St. Petersburg that Yaqub had collected 50,000 men, and he stood equal chances of

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1. F. O. 17/825. Wade Memorandum, March 26, 77.
 2. F. O. 17/825. Fraser to Derby no. 45 and 46. March 5, 77.
 3. Von Brandt, the German minister at Peking wielded considerable influence at the Chinese court, and had been a great instrument in encouraging the Chinese idea of conquering Kashgharia. A certain Herr Schnell, a German drill-master was training the Chinese forces. Krupp field guns and mortar pieces were successfully handled by Tso's men.
 4. Kuropatkin *op. cit.* p. 246.

repulsing the invader.¹ The winter of 1876-1877, stopped collision between the two forces.

Wade learnt in London that his advice to Tsungli Yaman had paved the way for conciliation. On January 24, 1877, Wade sent a memorandum to the Foreign office recommending British mediation in the Sino-Kashghar dispute.² This idea was not accepted by the British political observers. The India office also gave it a cold shoulder. Salisbury personally was against it. His contention was that the struggle between China and Kashghar "does not directly effect Indian interest, but is in reality a Chinese question". However he did not over-rule the assistance of the Government of India in the mediation, if requested by the Foreign office.³ Loftus warned from St. Petersburg that single mediation of England between China and Kashghar would create jealousy on the part of Russia, which might produce serious "embarrassment" in the East. He suggested that a proposal for joint mediation should be made to Russia "in the interest of humanity and civilisation".⁴

Wade disagreed with Loftus and proposed to "abstain altogether, rather than attempt in concert with Russia".⁵ Salisbury immediately endorsed Wade's views. He warned the Foreign office that

1. F. O. 65/989. Loftus to Derby no. 130, March 27, 77.

2. I could not get this memorandum in the F. O. records. References to this memorandum are made in Wade's other letters and in F. O. and I. O. correspondence on this subject.

3. F. O. 17/825. I. O. to F. O. Feb. 23, 77.

4. F. O. 65/989. Loftus to Derby no. 97. March 2, 77.

5. F. O. 17/825. Wade Memorandum. March 5, 77.

India was not interested in the affairs of mediation, and if the Foreign office was keen, "the responsibility which such mediation might involve must fall wholly on the Imperial, and in no degree upon the Indian Government".¹ This warning alerted the Foreign office. The idea of British mediation was immediately dropped.²

The idea of mediation was subsequently revived all at once. Syed Yaqub Khan Tura, the roaming ambassador of Kashgharia appeared in London in early 1877. On March 5, Wade reported that the Khan desired British intervention as mediator.³ In April the Tsungli Yaman debated the question of Kashgharia at Peking, and Prince Kung supported termination of hostilities with Yaqub Beg.⁴ From Canton, the British Consul, Sir B. Robertson, reported on the authority of the Viceroy of Kwang, that China was anxious to maintain Kashgharia as a neutral state between Russia and China in Central Asia.⁵

Wade found an opportunity to revive the idea of British mediation. But the India office, a major actor in the drama, was inactive. This annoyed Wade. He suggested to the Foreign office that it should send "a word of warning" to Salisbury's office, to which the Khan's visit was as much related as to the Foreign office.⁶ In the meantime Wade

1. F. O. 17/825. I. O. to F. O. March 21, 77.

2. *Ibid.* F. O. to I. O. April 16, 77.

3. F. O. 65/869. Wade Memorandum in no. 45. March 5, 77.

4. F. O. 17/825. Fraser Telegram. May 8, 77.

5. *E. S. L. I.* 1877/4. Charge d'affairs to Viceroy, May 23, 77 : refers to Robertson's report of May 8, vide Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 24, July 16, 77.

6. *Tenterden Papers.* F. O. 363/4. Wade to Tenterden (private), May 19, 77.

met Yaqub Khan at the Alexandra Hotel, in the company of Forsyth who had arranged this meeting.¹ The Khan suggested that the British mediation was well-timed: the Chinese so far had been fighting against the Dungans; and daggers had not yet been drawn between Peking and Kashghar.²

Kuo-ta-jen, the first of Chinese resident ministers abroad, had only assumed his duties in London in January, 1877. He was getting nervous on learning of the Khan's and Wade's movements. On May 25, 1877, Wade met him. Kuo stated plainly that he would not take the initiative in any direction either to address his government on the subject of Kashgharia, or to open negotiations with the Khan. It must come first from either of the other parties.³ Kuo dreaded lest he would be penalised by Peking for undermining their position by taking an initiative. Wade invited both Syed Yaqub and Kuo to the dinner of the Asiatic Society on May 28. This, he thought, would at least bring them together.⁴

On June 4, "the Kashghar man" met Salisbury, and persuaded the latter to use his influence for saving Kashgharia from the horrors of war.⁵ Salisbury agreed. He also took him for an audience with the Queen.⁶ The India office requested the Foreign office to take early steps in ascertaining the

1. F. O. 17/825. Wade to Derby. May 24, 77.

2. *Ibid.*

3. F. O. 17/825, Wade to Derby, May 26, 77.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Lytton papers* 516/2. Salisbury to Lytton no. 21. (private), June 8, 77.

6. *Ibid.* no. 25. (private) July 28, 77.

views of the Chinese Government on the subject of Kashgharia, and establishing the basis for a possible *modus vivendi*.¹ Wade sensed from Kuo's conversation at the "dinner table" that the latter was quite willing to meet Yaqub Khan, though "informally".²

Everything being in favour, Wade came forth with his scheme of negotiation. This scheme involved several suggestions, first that the Chinese and the Kashgharian envoys should be brought together in London, secondly, that each should be "educated" before-hand to avoid confusion, thirdly that the matter should be treated in top secrecy, and finally that after the terms had been arranged, the Khan should leave for Kashghar, and Kuo should report to his government, and Fraser should pursue the matter at Peking.³ The India office approved the plan, and the Foreign office authorised Wade to go ahead with it.⁴

Wade met Kuo on June 22. Kuo had gone back on all he had said or indicated. He saw no advantage in meeting the Khan and found no sense in approaching his government on the subject of Kashgharia. However, he proposed that the Khan should make the first overture in the form of written proposals for recognising Chinese overlordship and ceding some of the towns to China necessary for its north-western defences.⁵ Wade requested Forsyth to sound the Khan, and if agreeable, to submit his

1. F. O. 17/825. I. O. to F. O. June, 8, 77.

2. F. O. 17/825. Wade to Tenterden, June 4, 77.

3. *Ibid.* Wade Memorandum, June 12, 77.

4. *Ibid.* I. O. to F. O. June 14, 77 : Derby to Wade, June 19, 77.

5. F. O. 17/825. Wade to Derby, June 25, 77.

proposals for negotiations. Forsyth had already talked over this with the Khan, and had prepared a memorandum in which he made the ruler of Kashgharia equal to the King of Burma, in relations to China, and proposed demarcation of the boundaries between the two states, and assistance to Kashgharia against external and internal troubles.¹ The Foreign office sent Forsyth's proposals for the India office's approval. The latter insisted on omitting both the references to "the king of Burma"² and the internal and external enemies.³

The Foreign office then addressed a note to Kuo, extending the good offices of the British Government to restore peace between Kashgharia and China, and forwarded the Khan's proposals, which the Foreign office pointed out resembled those discussed between Kuo and Wade. Under the proposals, the ruler of Kashgharia recognised the sovereignty of China and promised to send embassies periodically to Peking, carrying presents or tribute. The proposals included an assertion of complete control of his territory by the ruler of Kashghar. Finally it suggested a demarcation of the boundaries between the two, and an agreement to assist each other in case of need.⁴

Tuo did not like the mentioning of his name in the Foreign office note, which indicated an initiative taken by him. He requested that it should be

1. *Ibid.* Forsyth to Wade, June 23, 77.

2. Upper Burma was under schemes of annexation. Ten years later it was annexed to British India.

3. F. O. 17/825. I. O. to F. O., July 7, 77.

4. *Ibid.* Derby to Kuo, July 7, 77.

deleted from the communication.¹ Kuo was also somewhat upset at the intervention of a Mohammanan convert English baron, Lord Stanley of Alderley,² who was getting annoyed at the slow proceedings of the Sino-Kashghar negotiations.³ Wade was also using a somewhat tough attitude towards the Chinese diplomat.⁴ The Foreign office note further embarrassed him. This made Kuo feel "down-cast and sullen".⁵ On July 12, Kuo informed the Foreign office that he had neither authority nor geographical knowledge to open the question of Kashgharia. He reiterated the suggestion that Yaqub Beg should cede some cities to China, and asked for a guarantee from the British Government for the good conduct of Yaqub.⁶ The Foreign office declined to take on this responsibility.⁷

However, the long-coveted meeting between Kuo and Khan took place on July 16, at Wade's house. Kuo was calm and unconcerned. He did

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1. F. O. 17/825. Kuo's interview with Tenterden on July 8, 77 : Kuo to Derby, July 12 : *Tenterden Papers*, F. O. 363/4 Wade to Tenterden (private), July 8, 77.
 2. Lord Stanley of Alderly (1827—1903) entered the foreign service in 1847 : attached to Constantinople embassy 1851 : Counsellor Vienna 1853 : Secretary Athen Legation 1854 : Secretary Danubian Commission 1856—58 : resigned 1859 : Learnt Arabic, Persian Turkish, and Chinese languages. 1869 succeeded to Peerage. Greatly interested in Indian questions, and was warmly supported of the Indian National Congress (D. N. B. Rev. F. Saunders pp. 383-84). Also see *Carnarvon Papers* P. R. O. 30/6/2 for Stanley's correspondence on the Eastern and Far Eastern Questions.
 3. *Tenterden Papers* F. O. 363/4. Wade to Tenterden (private) June 29, 77 and July 10, 77.
 4. *Ibid.*
 5. *Ibid.* Same to same July 8, 77.
 6. F. O. 17/825. Kuo to Derby, July 12, 77.
 7. *Ibid.* Derby to Kuo, July 23, 77.

not make any comments on the subject of the talk.¹ Nevertheless, Derby forwarded on the correspondence on the subject to Fraser, instructing him to ascertain whether the Chinese Government was prepared to agree in principle to a settlement on the basis of the terms proposed, and whether that government would like to receive an envoy from Kashghar.² Fraser, after meeting Prince Kung on the subject, telegraphed that the negotiations for peace could only be conducted by Tso.³ This was in September, 1877.

But the affairs in Central Asia had taken now a new turn. Tso's army was making successful marches. On April 18, 1877 Divanchi fell to the Chinese.⁴ On May 16, Turfan was taken.⁵ On May 29, Yaqub Beg died at Kurala.⁶ His death was a turning point in Kashgharian politics. Dissension and desertion spread throughout Kashgharia. Haq Quli, appointing Hakim Khan Tura as governor of Kurala, set out on June 6 to take his father's body to Kashghar.⁷ Haq Quli was murdered by an assassin hired by his elder brother Beg Quli, near Aksu. Beg Quli proclaimed himself as ruler of

1. *Ibid.* Wade to Derby. July 25. 77.

2. *Ibid.* Derby to Fraser no. 9. Aug. 3, 77.

3. *Ibid.* Fraser to Derby, Sept. 23, 1877.

4. Kuropatkin *op. cit.* p. 247.

5. *Ibid.* Hummel *op. cit.* p. 765 : F. O. 17/863. Fraser Telegram no. 132, June 28, 77.

6. Many stories were spread about Yaqub's death. One was that he was poisoned by the Russian envoy, seconded that he died in an embroil while quarreling with his officer. It is also said that he was poisoned by Hakim Khan Tura.

7. *Par. Pap.* LXXVIII 1880 no. 15/5. Yussuf Affandi account. Yussuf was a soldier from Turkey, employed in Kashghar cavalry.

Karashahr. Niaz Beg, the governor of Khotan, defied the central authority and made himself ruler of that province.¹

A civil war started in Kashgharia. Beg Quli first marched against Hakim Khan who had occupied Aksu as well. In a bloody combat near Shur Kudak, Hakim was defeated and he made his way to the Russian territory. On August 13, Beg Quli took over Aksu. Then he turned towards Khotan. The Khotani army was defeated on October 20. Niaz Beg, unable to resist any longer, joined Tso's army.²

It was against this background that the British offer for mediation reached Peking. Fraser noticed an astonishingly changed attitude of Prince Kung, when he met the latter on September 23, 1877. The Prince was eager to impress upon Fraser the ideas of Tso's victories, the soundness of Chinese claim on Kashgharia, Kuo's irresponsibility and Tso's responsibility. Prince Kung was sarcastic on the British mediation.³ Tso in the meanwhile, had memorialised the throne on the subject of Sino-Kashghar dispute. He called it a pure domestic affair of China, and called Britain an intruder.⁴

The civil war in Kashgharia facilitated the Chinese advance. The invaders took over Karashahr on October 7, Kurala on October 9, and Kucha on October 18, 1877.⁵ It was followed by the Chinese

1. Ibid. Kuropatkin *op. cit.* pp. 250-51.

2. Kuropatkin *op. cit.* pp. 251-52.

3. F. O. 17/825. Fraser to Derby no. 172, Sept. 24, 77.

4. Hummel *op. cit.* p. 766.

5. F. O. 65/992. Vide Fraser to Derby no. 232, Dec. 5, 77.

occupation of Aksu and Ush.¹

Beg Quli, having defeated his rivals, turned to settle the dispute with Tso. He approached the Government of India to use their good offices, in bringing out a reconcillation between the two, but received no response.² Then he approached Dalgleish, the Assistant Manager of the Central Asian Company, who had been stationed at Yarkand for the last three years. Beg Quli intended to appoint him as his envoy to Tso's court, for negotiation of peace. This attempt also failed. Dalgleish, who reached India in December, 1877, reported that the new ruler needed not only physical but moral support also from India.³

The successful Chinese forces were pushing towards Kashghar. Beg Quli's forces were getting disheartened. In the middle of December, the Chinese appeared before Kashghar. Beg Quli's troops fled the city. On December 16, Kashghar fell to China.⁴ By the beginning of next Spring China was holding the whole of Kashgharia. The *Peking Gazette* of March 16, 1878, announced complete conquest of Kashgharia.⁵ Beg Quli and his followers fled to Russia, and delivered themselves up to Kaufmann.⁶

It is against this setting that we have to study

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1. *Ibid.* Fraser Telegram, Dec. 29, 77.
 2. *E. S. L. I.* 1878/17. Ladakh Diary no. 15/17, 77. Report by Haji Qurban the Kashghar Vakeel.
 4. *Ibid.* Ladakh Diary, Dec. 12, 77.
 3. Kuropatkin *op, cit.* p. 253.
 5. F. O. 17/826. Fraser to Derby no. 50. March 16, 78.
 6. *Ibid.* no. 41. March 7, 78.

the last chapter of this study. Afghanistan and Kashgharia were two allies of Britain in Central Asia. Kashgharia was lost, Afghanistan was about to be lost. The latter had opened correspondence with the Russia, and had refused to listen to English advice or guidance. The fall of Afghanistan to Russia was intolerable.

CHAPTER IX

The British War Against Afghanistan 1878

“ What am I to do in the face of an alliance between the Ameer and the Russian Government ? What am I to do in the event of the death of the Ameer, and a bold bid for the throne of Afghanistan by Abdul Rahman with the support of Russia ”.

Lytton in 1878.

Kashgharia was taken over by China. Afghanistan was drifting into the Russian camp. Sher Ali's refusal to receive the British mission was considered by Lytton, a clear sign of his hostility towards Britain, and his inclination towards Russia. “ Small bodies gravitate to great ones ”, wrote Lytton in his minutes on Afghanistan. “ If Afghanistan does not gravitate towards the British, it must gravitate towards the Russian Empire. And between bodies of equivalent gravity, the attraction force of one that is in movement will always exceed that of the one which is motionless ”.² Russia was in motion and Afghanistan was gravitating towards her. An attempt is made here to show the course of Afghanistan's gravitation towards Russia.

General Kaufmann immediately after the

1. *Lytton Papers* 511/3. Lytton to Granbrook (private), Aug. 3. 78.

2. *Lytton Papers* no. 7. July 5, 76.

conquest of Bokhara, had opened correspondence with Sher Ali. His first letter to Sher Ali on February 28, 1870,¹ was complimentary, and this was followed by twelve more letters over the next six years.² The nature of this correspondence was essentially friendly, though occasionally political issues were raised like Abdul Rahman's arrival in Tashkand, Russia's disapproval of Prince Yaqub's hostility to his father, and the Russian conquest of Khiva, alongwith their annexation of Khokand. Sher Ali used to forward these letters regularly to the Government of India, requesting the type of reply to be made in each case. The Kabul court always considered Russian correspondence objectionable, and pregnant with evil consequences. But the Government of India normally consoled the Amir that the correspondence was prompted by the friendly attitude of Russia towards Afghanistan in consonance with the promises and obligations entered into between England and Russia.³ All this correspondence was forwarded by the Government of India to London. Never was any apprehension felt in Whitehall over the consequences of this correspondence. The Russian letters in the subsequent years were communicated and exchanged by native Russian envoys who were courteously received at Kabul.

The Government of Lord Lytton did not

1. Buchanan dated this letter as March 30, 1870. Vide F. O. 65/872: no. 229.

2. *Par. Pap.* XCVIII 1881 no. 1/1—22.

3. *Pap. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 3/7. no. 4/5, and no. 8/5.

approve of the Russian correspondence with Sher Ali. Lytton feared that Britain at any moment would be forced into open hostilities with Russia, not only in Europe, but in Asia as well, and the Russian machinations, in Afghanistan would constitute an inordinate threat to India. In the middle of September, 1876, Lytton took up the matter of Kaufmann's correspondence with Sher Ali. Lytton informed Salisbury that Kaufmann's regular correspondence, and the presence of his agents at Kabul, had created a web of intrigues which would seriously impair the British relations with Sher Ali. He forwarded the letter of Kaufmann written in February 1876, which had references to both the internal and foreign affairs of Afghanistan, as an example.¹ Lytton complained that the Amir had discontinued his usual consultations with the Government of India as to the reply to be made to the Russian authorities, and he had habituated himself to acknowledge this correspondence "in cordial terms". The Viceroy, to make his point clear, added that the Russian agents hold "secret nightly meetings" with the Amir, from which he concluded that the time had now arrived when Kaufmann's correspondence with Sher Ali should be stopped, and the Czar's government be requested to abide by its earlier assurances, and that Afghanistan be permitted to remain neutral.² It was about this time that a rumour spread in India that Sher Ali

1. *E. S. L. I.* 1876/10. Viceroy to Secretary of State no. 41. Sept, 18, 76 : also a telegram on Sept. 16, 76.

2. *Ibid.*

had been induced by the Russian agents to sign a treaty with Russia.¹

The India office forwarded the Viceroy's comments to the Foreign office, with the request that a remonstrance against Kaufmann's correspondence should be sent to the Russian Government. Salisbury privately wrote to Derby that nothing less than "a written disclaimer" by Russia of their intentions to negotiate a treaty with Afghanistan, would satisfy Lytton.² Derby instructed Loftus to obtain from St. Petersburg a disclaimer as requested by the Government of India.³ Schouvalov when contacted by Derby on the subject of a Russo-Afghan treaty, expressed his ignorance and promised to consult his government.⁴ Schouvalov was authorised by Gortchakov in a telegraph to deny categorically any action by Kaufmann at Kabul, either through agents or through any other means⁵. At St. Petersburg, M. de Giers, the Head of the Russian Asiatic Department, denied this report, basing his denial on the War office records which indicated neither the despatch of a letter, or the sending of agents by Kaufmann.⁶

This prompt denial by the Russian authorities led the British Government to forward to St. Petersburg a copy of Kaufmann's letter of

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1. *Political Despatches to India* 1876/2. I. O. to F. O., Oct. 24, 76. This report was published in a local newspaper. The India office called it "unreliable".
 2. F. O. 65/957. Salisbury to Derby (private), Sept. 28, 76.
 3. F. O. 65/958. Derby to Loftus no. 480. Oct. 2, 76.
 4. *Ibid.* Same to same no. 501, Oct. 10, 76.
 5. *Ibid.* Same to same no. 505, Oct. 12, 76.
 6. *Ibid.* Loftus to Derby no. 495, Oct. 19, 76.

February 1876 to Sher Ali, as a specimen of the general's activities in the East.¹ This counter-action brought a change in the tone of the Russian authorities. Both Gortchakov and Giers then acknowledged Kaufmann's correspondence with Sher Ali, but denied once again the presence of any Russian agent in Afghanistan, or the continuation of any negotiation for a Russo-Afghan treaty. Kaufmann's correspondence, the Russian authorities termed as complimentary and courteous.²

None of the Russian explanations really satisfied the British Government. Producing further evidence of complicity, it forwarded to St. Petersburg the *Kabul Diaries* of October and November, 1876, which reported the arrival in Kabul of two Russian agents, Mirza Yussuf Marvi and Mula Saifullah.³

Giers exonerated Kaufmann of having any connection with the agents, and suspected that the persons concerned had assumed the characters of Russian envoys of their own volition. However, he informed Loftus that the relevant parts of the diaries in question, had been despatched to Kaufmann with a warning that the assumed character of the envoys was liable to cause misconceptions and should be guarded against in the future.⁴ The British Foreign office considered this explanation sufficient,⁵ but the India office was not

1. F. O. 65/958. Derby to Loftus no. 535, Oct. 24, 76 : also a copy of it was delivered to Schouvalov.

2. *Ibid.* nos. 536, 543 and 585.

3. F. O. 65/989. Derby to Loftus no. 12, January 19, 77.

4. F. O. 65/989, Loftus to Derby no. 65, February 14, 77.

5. *Ibid.* F. O. to I. O., Feb. 23, 77.

at all satisfied. Salisbury considered Gier's instructions to Kaufmann as "vague", and pointed out that the instructions had not prohibited the general from corresponding with Sher Ali, but rather had enjoined him to take more precaution against English detection.¹ The India office requested the Foreign office to urge upon the Czar's government, the necessity for a complete discontinuation of Kaufmann's correspondence with Afghanistan.² The Foreign office instructed Loftus accordingly.³

In India, at this time, Lytton had closed the Peshawar Conference. He had broken off diplomatic relations with Sher Ali. The British agent on his orders was withdrawn from the Kabul court,⁴ and he left Sher alone "to stew in his own gravy".

The Russian authorities in Central Asia sensed the situation. British intelligence from Peshawar reported that Russian couriers were bringing letters for the Amir almost every week,⁵ and the Amir was holding secret interviews with them, and intended to send an agent to Tashkand.⁶ Captain Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, reported on May 8, that a Russo-Afghan treaty was under the consideration of the Kabul court at that very moment.⁷

1. F. O. 65/989. I. O. to F. O., March 9, 77.

2. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 97. I. O. to F. O., January 27, 77.

3. F.O. 65/989. Derby to Loftus no. 28, Feb. 7, 77.

4. Ata Mohammad was not sent back to Kabul.

5. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 36/48. Qazi Ahmad Khan Diary, March 2, 77.

6. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 143/3. News from Peshawar, April 30, 77.

7. *Ibid.* no. 161/5.

It is not out of place here to delve for a moment into the Balkan situation, because in the event of a war with Russia in Europe, "the Empress of India would order her armies to clear Central Asia of the Muscovites, and drive them into the Caspian".¹ The Constantinople Conference had ended in failure (January 20, 1877). It was followed by Ignatiev's mission to London in March, resulting in the signing of a protocol by six European powers, advising the Porte to stop the coercion of its non-Muslim subjects, and to introduce reforms, a failure to meet this demand would be followed by joint action by the powers. The Porte rejected this protocol on April 7, and Russia declared war against Turkey seventeen days later.

Beaconsfield was becoming restless and uneasy at Russia's aggression and so was the Queen. Both pleaded for a spirited policy, and a bold stand against Russia in the Near East. "It is not the question of upholding Turkey", the Queen wrote to the Cabinet on April 19, 1877, "it is the question of Russian or British supremacy in the world".² In her private note attached to this message for the cabinet, the Queen even preferred to abdicate rather than "to kiss Russia's feet".³ She was also annoyed at Lord Derby's negative attitude, who called any war with Russia unnecessary.⁴ "Such a Foreign Minister"

1. Buckle. Disraeli II *op. cit.* entry, July 22, 77. p. 1027.

2. *Ibid.* p. 1005.

3. *Ibid.* p. 1004.

4. Victoria, Queen of Great Britain. *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. Edited by G. E. Buckle, Toronto 1926. vol. II (second series). Derby to Queen, June 11, 77, pp. 541-52.

she complained to Beaconsfield on June 25, 1877, "the Queen really never remembers".¹

Beaconsfield single-handed, was leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to convince the cabinet of the necessity for taking firm steps against Russia. But the cabinet was both nervous and hostile, and not to be intimidated or cajoled. As early as April 21, 1877, Beaconsfield proposed the occupation of the Dardanelles, against the Russian seizure of Constantinople,² but the cabinet opposed it. It took him two months to prevail and convince them of the importance of preparing for war with Russia in case the latter did take over Constantinople.³ On October 5, seeing Turkish resistance collapsing, Beaconsfield again proposed British intervention in the war, but again the cabinet was indisposed.⁴ And in November, the ruling British Cabinet of twelve persons was divided into seven "parties or policies". The seventh party composed of the Queen and her prime minister, agreed upon that Russia be made to give a written agreement that under no circumstances would she occupy either Constantinople or the Dardanelles.⁵ On November 11, Russia captured Kars and then marched upon Plevna. On December 4, Beaconsfield proposed to the cabinet that any further threat to Constantinople to be taken as a *casus belli*, but Derby as usual demurred. On December 17, Beaconsfield threatened to resign in protest against

1. Buckle, Disraeli II *op. cit.* p. 1019.

2. Victoria. Letters II *op. cit.* p. 530.

3. Buckle. Disraeli II *op. cit.* To queen, July 21, 77. p. 1026.

4. *Ibid.* p. 1055.

5. *Ibid.* pp. 1066-67.

the complete passivity of his colleagues ; however his protest was less than whole-hearted for he sensed that the "three lords" would resign, though he was not sure about Salisbury.¹ On January 9, 1878 the Shipka Pass was taken by Russia, but the cabinet was still preoccupied. Next day Victoria wrote to Beaconsfield "oh if the Queen were a man, she would like to go and give those Russians, whose words one cannot believe, such a beating".² The Queen's taunt led to a stormy session of the cabinet on January 12. Derby opposed everything and proposed nothing. Beaconsfield requested that the dissenters should have resigned.³

On January 17, the cabinet met again. Russia was still advancing southward towards the Ottoman capital. Six days later Beaconsfield won the support of the majority of the cabinet, to send the fleet to the defence of Constantinople. Derby and Carnarvon immediately resigned and the Queen expressed "her immense satisfaction and relief" at their resignation.⁴ But neither the fleet nor Derby could depart, for in one case the Porte feared that Russia would retaliate by seizing Constantinople, and in the other that it would have a disintegrating effect upon the party. However Carnarvon left.

On January 29, Russia occupied Adrianople, and on February 1, an armistice was signed between Russia and Turkey. Beaconsfield considered the

1. *Ibid.* p. 1076.

2. *Ibid.* p. 1089.

3. *Ibid.* p. 1091.

4. *Ibid.* Queen to Beaconsfield, January 24, 78. p. 1101.

whole affair of the armistice "a comedy" and suspected that Russia would continue to advance along other lines. His position in the cabinet was strong now.¹ There was little in the Foreign office that was left in the control of Derby. It was run by a secret committee composing of Beaconsfield, Salisbury and Cairns.

On March 3, Russia forced Turkey to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. The treaty gave independence to Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania. Russia acquired all the eastern portion of Armenia, besides Bassarabia. Most striking was the creation of "Big Bulgaria" extending from the Danube to the Aegean, and from the Black Sea to Albania.

This treaty was a great diplomatic triumph for Russia. It avenged the humiliation of the Crimean War and guaranteed Russian predominance in the Balkans.

In Britain the reaction was not so triumphant. Beaconsfield proposed to the cabinet on March 27, 1878 that the "reserves" should be called out and Cyprus and Alexandretta should be occupied. Derby resigned at once, and Salisbury succeeded him at the Foreign office. On April 1, 1878, Britain published a circular proposing that the treaty be submitted to the consideration of the Powers. This circular received a favourable response at the continental courts; though naturally was not acceptable to Russia. Soon after this Parliament endorsed the calling out of the "reserves", and in

1. *Ibid.* p. 1155.

April, 7,000 Indian troops left for Malta. Schouvalov the Russian ambassador in London, was exceedingly alarmed by England's preparations for war, and this was not alleviated by the fact that on his departure for St. Petersburg in the second week of May, 1878, Beaconsfield had told him quite distinctly "that we could not, in the slightest degree, cease from our plans of preparation."¹

It is against this background that Lytton's policy in Central Asia should be studied. No action against Russia in Central Asia could be taken because of the lack of co-operation from Sher Ali.

Russia in the meantime was not inactive. To her, India was Britain's Achilles heel. It was only in Central Asia that Russia could fight England on equal terms. Loftus sent home an article from the *Golos* of December 3, 1877, written by Major Wessel, which argued that in the event of war in Europe, Russia should mass a force of 30,000 men on the borders of India to intimidate Britain.² Loftus's next intelligence was a report that the Czar had an audience with his two generals, Charnaiev and Stolietov on March 24, 1878, after which both left for Central Asia on some important mission. Stolietov, it was learnt at Whitehall, had been placed on Kaufmann's general staff³. At the end of April, Taylor Thomson, the British Minister at Tehran,

1. Buckle, *Disraeli II op. cit.* pp. 1155—1165.

2. F. O. 65/992. Loftus to Derby no. 672, Dec. 5, 77: also during this time Skobelov had submitted a plan for Indian conquest. See *Political Despatches to India*, 1877/3, no. 77.

3. F. O. 65/1029, Loftus to Salisbury no- 415, April 12, 78. and no. 442, April 19, 78.

procured a secret document from the Russian Legation in Persia. The document contained the minutes of a secret cabinet meeting held at St. Petersburg, in which General Milyutin, the Minister of War, presented his plan for the invasion of India. The plan proposed that Russia should mass her forces on the borders of India, and this would force Britain to weaken and withdraw her forces from the European front. This strategy, the Minister believed, would relieve British pressure on Russia in Europe; further it might excite the discontented Indians to rise against Britain in India. The scheme was approved and the Minister in charge was authorised to implement it.¹ Then came Loftus' report of May, that the Russian forces in Central Asia had been ordered to move towards the frontiers of Bokhara.² During the course of the next three months, the British Embassy at St. Petersburg collected information from numerous newspapers and journals indicating that some 30,000 men had been mobilised in Turkistan for the proposed action against India. The reports said that three columns had already been equipped.³ The main body under Kaufmann was to march from Samarqand *via* Kabul and the Khyber Pass. The left wing column under General Abramov was stationed at Farghana, and

1. F. O. 65/1030. Thomson to Salisbury no. 16 (copy), April 29, 78.

2. F. O. 65/1030. Loftus to Salisbury no. 491, May 6, 78.

3. F. O. 65/1030. Loftus to Salisbury nos. 639, 651, 676, 715, 722 : F. O. 65/1031 nos. 744, 759 : for Russian preparations at Vladivostok in the sea of Japan, see Admiral Ryder's Report in F. O. 65/991, Aug. 2, 77 : also Rawlinson's article in *Nineteenth Century Review* IV 1878 on Russian preparations for war in Central Asia.

was to proceed *via* the Alai mountains to Chitral and Kashmir. The right wing under Colonel Grotengelm at Petro-Alexandrovsk, was to move *via* Khiva, Charjoui and Merv to Herat. The main body of the force reached Sarikol and Jam on July 8, 1878.

The news of the Russian concentration of troops on the Amu created a sensation in Afghanistan. The Governor of Afghan-Turkistan, Sher Dil Khan, reported to Amir Sher Ali that England and Russia were on the brink of war all over the world; and that the Russians were inducing Abdul Rahman to assert his claim to the throne of Afghanistan, counting that an ally on the Afghan throne would help them invade India.¹ The next report said that roads were being built with great speed between Khiva and Charjoui. It also said that eighty thousand Russian soldiers had been stationed at the Amu². These reports had a very frightening effect on Sher Ali.

The absence of the British Vakeel at Kabul's court was one of the most unfortunate mistakes that Lytton had made. It not only left Sher Ali accessible to the Russians, but British intelligence in Afghanistan became a mere collection of bazaar gossips. Cavagnari at Peshawar was collecting a most exaggerated account of Russo-Afghan politics and at great cost.³

1. *Par. Pap.* 1878 no. 143/4. Peshawar newsletter, May 13, 78.

2. *Ibid.* no. 144/3 and 6. Cavagnari reports, June 13 and 16, 78.

3. *Lytton Papers* 519/7. Cavagnari to Lytton (private), April 18, 78: for example the Russian envoy was first named Charnaiev, then Kaufmann, then R. M. Abramov. It was the Foreign office that corrected it.

In June, 1878, Sher Ali was informed by Kaufmann that a Russian envoy of high rank would be visiting his capital.¹ Sher Ali made evasive excuses not to receive him; but he was informed in reply that the envoy had already left and his safety and an honourable reception would be the Amir's duty.²

The Russian mission was headed by Major-General Stolietov, and assisted by three Russian officers, Colonel N. O. Rosgonov, N. V. Benderski, and Doctor Yavorski, accompanied by three Persian and Turkish translators, one English translator and twenty-three Cossacks. Leaving Tashkand in May, they reached Sherabad on the Afghan-Bokharan frontier on June 27. Sher Dil Khan, the Afghan governor, had no authority to allow the mission to cross the border, but Stolietov made his way into the Afghan territory at his own risk. He informed the governor that the mission considered it an insult to wait on the borders, and that if the Amir was unwilling to receive the mission, it would return home. On July 5, the mission entered Mazar-Sharif, the capital of Afghan-Turkistan, where it was received by the state officials. It left there on July 17, and on August 9, it entered the vicinity of Kabul, where it was received by the heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan. During the next march the mission

1. The question of sending an envoy to Kabul was thrice debated during the month of May in the cabinet meetings at St. Petersburg. See F. O. 65/1032. Plunket to Salisbury nos. 807 and 808, Sept. 25, 78.

2. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 144/2. and 4 : Lytton, *Letters op. cit.* p. 110.

was received by the Afghan Foreign Minister, Shah Mohammad.¹

In the meantime events in Europe had taken a peaceful turn. Russia had agreed to enter into negotiations for the settlement of the Balkan issue. The Berlin Congress had opened on June 13, 1878 and after a tedious sitting of exactly one month, had settled the fate of the Balkans. Beaconsfield had returned home with "peace" and "honour". At this time the Stolietov mission had not entered Kabul. Kaufmann's instructions reached him on August 9, 1878, to the effect that the Berlin Congress had settled the differences, and Stolietov during his negotiations with Sher Ali should "abstain from decided measure, promises etc., and generally not to go so far as he would have done in the opposite case"² Next day the mission entered the capital and met the Amir. Stolietov delivered to the Amir a letter from Kaufmann, suggesting that Anglo-Russian relations needed "deep consideration" and that the government of the Amir would benefit much by its alliance and friendship with Russia.³

Stolietov then met the Amir on the 13th and 14th of August, and a Russo-Afghan offensive-

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1. The account of the mission is taken mostly from the Russian sources. Major among them is Yavorski, I. L. *Journey of a Russian Embassy through Afghanistan and Bokhara in 1878-79*. Abridged and translated by E. R. Ellis and W. E. Gowan, Calcutta 1885. vol. I., pp. 11—167. A part of it is taken from Loftus' reports derived from Russian press, see *Par. Pap.* LXXVII 1878-79, nos. 6/2, 8/2, 15/1, and 11/1.
 2. Yavorski *op. cit.* p. 167.
 3. *Par. Pap.* XCVIII no. 1/30. Kaufmann to Sher Ali, June 1878.

defensive treaty was signed.¹

Lytton was becoming embarrassed by reports of a Russian envoy's journey towards the Afghan capital. On June 7, he telegraphed the Indian office on the subject and Whitehall approached Loftus for verification. The latter was assured by Giers that no envoy either from Tashkand or St. Petersburg, had been sent to Kabul.² Lytton, having received additional information now sent another telegram to the India office on July 30, reporting that the envoy had set out and had reached Afghanistan. He solicited instructions whether the question as it stood then, should be treated as an imperial or local one. If the latter, the Viceroy declared then he was of the opinion that the Amir should be persuaded to receive a British mission.³

Incharge of the India office at this time was Gathorne Hardy, first Viscount Cranbrook. The new Indian Secretary was not at home with the delicate problem of Indian foreign policy. Cranbrook advised the Viceroy by telegram on August 1, 1878, to ascertain the actual state of affairs regarding the Russian envoy's journey to Kabul, before taking any step.⁴ Next day Lytton sent an express telegraph

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1. The British Government could not get hold of the actual text of the treaty either before or even after the conquest of Kabul. At General Robert's request, Mirza Nabi and Mirza Mohammad Hassan, the two Afghan translators of the treaty, wrote down the contents of it from memory. Yavorski also mentions the signing of this treaty. *Par. Pap.* XCVIII 1881, no. 1/32 ; Yavorski *op. cit.* p. 180.
 2. F. O. 65/1030. Loftus to Salisbury no. 263, July 3, 78.
 3. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 40.
 4. *Ibid.* no. 43.

that any further delay would be injurious to Britain's prestige in India. He requested that the question of Afghanistan should be left to the Government of India, which would handle it successfully and without recourse to war. Lytton was expecting that the Amir would not resist a British mission, and would be eager to play one power against the other for his own benefit. The mission, Lytton wrote, would induce the Amir to enter into a treaty alliance with the Government of India.¹

Cranbrook did not want to make the question of Afghanistan only an Indian one, but rather a part of the imperial policy ; and with this end in view he had been persuading Salisbury privately since last July to make a protest at St. Petersburg over Stolietov's mission. But Salisbury was hesitant, a protest he thought would make little impression at St. Petersburg, nor did he wish to confuse the Turkish and Balkan questions with that of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of Russian troops from Bulgaria and Asiatic Turkey, was more important to him than Stolietov in Kabul.² Disappointed in his endeavours to convince Salisbury, Cranbrook with the approval of the cabinet, agreed to Lytton's idea of sending a British mission to Afghanistan.³ This was on August 3.

It was a daring step that Cranbrook took. The

1. *Ibid.* no. 45.

2. Cowling, M, "Lytton the Cabinet and the Russian" in *English Historical Review*, London, January 1961 pp. 65—67.

3. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* no. 46 : Hardy-Gathorne, A. *Gathorne Hardy First Earl of Cranbrook*. A memoir, vol. II, London 1910, p. 83.

consequences of this action might be serious. The India office did not like to take full responsibility for the action, for the refusal to receive the British mission on the part of the Amir, or the expulsion of that of Russia on the insinuations of the British, might result in a war of either of the powers with Afghanistan. Burne, the political secretary at the India office was annoyed to learn of the Foreign office's lack of participation in the affairs of Afghanistan.¹ He persuaded Cranbrook to make a move, and on August 8, the India office requested the Foreign office that a complaint against the Russian Ambassador's forcible entry into Afghanistan, be made at St. Petersburg.² Eleven days later, Salisbury issued his instructions to the British Embassy at St. Petersburg.³ The India office was informed of this action on August 12.⁴

In the meantime Lytton having received an authorisation from Cranbrook, appointed Ghulam Hussain, a former British agent in Afghanistan, to visit Kabul and deliver to the Amir a personal message and letter from the Viceroy requesting the reception of a British mission in Afghanistan.⁵ On August 21, it was learnt in India that Abdullah Jan, the heir-apparent to the Afghan throne had died. This delayed Ghulam Hussain's visit for a while, and he was given an additional letter containing the

1. Cowling, *op. cit.* p. 65.

2. *Par. Pap.* LXXX 1878 no. 148.

3. F. O. 65/1031. Salisbury to Plunket no. 440, Aug. 19, 78.

4. *Cranbrook Papers.* T 501/56 Walpole to Cranbrook (private) Sept. 18, 78.

5. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 49. Viceroy to Amir, August 14, 78.

Viceroy's condolence on the death of the prince. Ghulam Hussain left Peshawar on August 30.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, an officer of outstanding frontier service, was the man selected to head the British mission to Afghanistan. His mission included persons of exceptional knowledge of Afghanistan like Doctor H. W. Bellew and Major Cavagnari, besides two Indian dignitaries, Maharaja Partab Singh of Jodhpur and Sardar Obaidullah Khan of Tonk. The mission in all consisted of ten members. It had been ordered to proceed to Kabul in early September, but owing to the death of the heir-apparent it was scheduled to leave on September 16. The mission was instructed not to make its way by force, but if any resistance was shown from the Afghan side, it should report back. It was authorised to inform the Amir, that the presence of the Russian mission in Afghanistan had been taken as an "affront" by the British Government, and it demanded its instant dismissal. Chamberlain was vested with the authority to conclude a treaty with the Amir.¹

At this point there came a misunderstanding between Calcutta and London, the responsibility for which falls on the shoulders of Cranbrook. Both Salisbury and Beaconsfield thought that the British mission would be delayed till the receipt of the Russian reply to Britain's earlier complaint. The India office was aware of this remonstrance at St. Petersburg, but Cranbrook failed to instruct Lytton on these lines.

1. *E.S.L.I.* 1878/19. Instructions to Chamberlain no. 192, Sept. 7, 1878.

Lytton's instructions to Chamberlain reached the India office on September 9. Cranbrook was holidaying at Braemore in the north of Scotland. Horace Walpole, private secretary at the India office, sent copies of Lytton's instructions to Beaconsfield, Salisbury and Cranbrook. Both Salisbury and Cranbrook were alarmed to learn of Lytton's proceedings. Lytton "has committed a great error" wrote Beaconsfield to Cranbrook on September 12.¹ Next day in a very terse manner he again wrote, "is he (Lytton) acquainted with the negotiations now going on with Russia".² The same day David Plunket, the British Charge d'affairs at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that Giers had informed him that Stolietov's mission to Kabul was "a provisional and purely courteous" one.³ Cranbrook was in a dilemma. He sent a telegram from Braemore to the India office to instruct Lytton not to send Chamberlain's mission until he received further orders from home.⁴ On September 13, the India office sent the telegram to Lytton. The next day the message was in his hand.

It was a hard test for the Viceroy's prestige in India. Chamberlain having reached Peshawar, had contacted Faiz Mohammad, the Afghan Commandant of Ali Masjid Fort, and the latter had communicated

1. Buckle. Disraeli II *op. cit.* p. 1253.

2. *Ibid.* Same in *Cranbrook Papers* T 501/266.

3. F. O. 65/1031. Plunket to Salisbury no. 783, Sept. 13, 78 : also F. O. 65/1032 no. 825, Gortchakov also called it a provisional and a courtesy mission.

4. *Lytton Papers.* 516/3. Cranbrook to Lytton, Sept. 15, 78 : refers to the telegram.

his reply that he had no orders from Kabul to allow passage to the British mission.¹ Ghulam Hussain had reached Kabul with a formal request from the Viceroy himself to receive the mission. The wide publicity given to the proceedings of the mission in the native press, had turned every Indian's eyes on Jamrud and Peshawar. However Lytton postponed Chamberlain's departure for five day's more.

The mission was scheduled to leave on September 21. Chamberlain moved on to Jamrud on September 20. Next morning Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins, accompanied by a small escort of the Khyber Maliks entered the Jamrud Pass, and requested Faiz Mohammad to allow them passage. They were refused entry because the commandant still had no instructions from Kabul.² The commandant warned them that he would have to use force if the mission proceeded without the permission of the Amir. Chamberlain reported the failure to Lytton and the latter dissolved the mission.³

Lytton in the meantime had decided upon a war with Afghanistan. The border tribes had been detached from Sher Ali ; forces had been ordered to assemble on the frontiers ; the Amir's letter to that of the Viceroy's of August last was considered disrespectful and devoid of any agreement ; and the Amir was held responsible for the insult to the

1. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79, no. 59/3 and 5.

2. *Lytton Papers* 516/3. Lytton to Cranbrook (private) no. 52, Sept. 22, 78 : and no. 63, Nov. 3. 78.

3. *Ibid.*

Government of India. Hence, Lytton's council decided to take over Qurrum and Qandhar. These proposals were sent to the home government in two telegrams on October 13 and 19.¹

Lytton was sure of the success of his "mutiny" against the home government. The cabinet was scattered all over the country at this time. It met on October 5. It censured the Viceroy for disobeying the authority of the home government, and it opposed any advance beyond the Khyber Pass. It warned the Viceroy not to cross the frontiers without direct orders from home. However, it requested the Viceroy to furnish further information on the plan for his conquest of Afghanistan.²

In the fortnight that followed the meeting of the cabinet, Lytton impressed upon it that affairs had gone too far to retreat. Even the Queen thought that "want of firmness or delay might be fatal to us".³ Cranbrook in the meantime had changed his opposition to Lytton and had become one of his firm supporters. Beaconsfield was also leaning towards Lytton's views.

The cabinet met again on October 25. Cranbrook asked for the support of the Viceroy, but the cabinet did not see any reason to support him. The bitterest comments on the conduct of Lytton came from Salisbury, who thought that the Viceroy was "forcing the hand of the Government". Beaconsfield

1. *Par. Pap. op. cit.* nos. 60, 61, 63, 64.

2. F. O. 65/1033. Cranbrook to Lytton, Oct. 5, 78. Telegram.

3. Victoria. Letters. *op. cit.* II. Queen to Beaconsfield, Oct. 23, 78. Telegram p. 642.

acted as moderator between Cranbrook and Salisbury. The former considered war with Afghanistan "inevitable sooner or later". It was then, however, decided that before taking any strong action against the Amir, the latter should be given another chance, a message should be sent to him duly approved by the Cabinet.¹

On October 25, Lytton telegraphed to the India office the draft of his message for the Amir. The cabinet modified it and omitted much that concerned the Russian mission in Afghanistan. However the message or ultimatum, whatever it may be called, complained against the reception of the Russian mission, and the Amir's rejection of the British mission. Sher Ali was asked to submit a written apology for insulting the British Government by refusing to receive the mission: the Amir was also asked to accommodate a permanent British mission in Afghanistan. Sher Ali was warned to send his acceptance by November 20, 1878. If he failed to comply with this demand, his country would be invaded by the British troops. The ultimatum² was sent to Kabul on November 2.

Sher Ali during these months had been acting on Stolietov's advice. He counselled the Amir not to receive Chamberlain's mission.³ Stolietov left Kabul on August 23, accompanied by Afghan

1. Buckle. Disraeli II *op. cit.* pp. 1258—60: *Par. Pap.* *op. cit.* no. 65: *Lytton Papers.* 516/3. Cranbrook to Lytton (private) no. 61, Oct. 28, 78. *Cranbrook Papers* T 501/266 Beaconsfield to Cranbrook (private) Sept. 22, 78.

2. *Par. Pap.* nos. 66, 68, 69 and 70.

3. Yavorski I *op. cit.* p. 180.

officials for Tashkand.¹ Rosgonov was left in charge of the mission. The Russian mission was made permanent by an imperial order of the Czar, issued in September. Stolietov on his departure, told the Amir that he would return with 30,000 men.² On September 21, Stolietov sent a message from Tashkand that he was sure of his success in helping the Amir.³

Sher Ali accepted the Russian assurances, and his correspondence with the Russian authorities indicates that he never dreamed of being left alone.⁴ It was on November 19, that Sher Ali received a letter from Kaufmann advising him to come to terms with the British.⁵ The same day, he wrote to the Viceroy of India that he would receive a temporary, small and friendly British mission.⁶ This letter took ten days to reach the British at Dekka.⁷ By this time war had been declared against Afghanistan.⁸

On November 21, the British armies advanced on Afghanistan by the three passes. Sir Samuel Brown penetrated the Khyber, and capturing Ali Masjid advanced on Jalalabad. Major-General Roberts marched up the Kurram Valley and headed

1. *Ibid.* pp. 185-86.

2. *Ibid.* II pp. 1—29 : *Par. Pap.* XCVIII 1881 no. 1/43.

3. *Par. Pap.* XCVIII 1881, no. 1/33.

4. *Ibid.* no. 1/35 and 37 : Yavorski II *op. cit.* pp. 41—45. Yavorski has taken most of this correspondence from the *British Parliamentary Papers*.

5. *Ibid.* no. 1/39 : Yavorski II *op. cit.* p. 47.

6. *Par. Pap.* LVI 1878-79 no. 2/1.

7. *Ibid.* no. 2.

8. *Ibid.* no. 10. Viceroy's Proclamation of War, Nov. 21 78.

towards Piewar Pass. General Steward marched from Quetta through the Bolan upon Qandhar.

Sher Ali failing to receive the promised Russian help for the defence of his Kingdom, left Kabul on December 13. He was accompanied by the Russian mission. He intended to visit St. Petersburg.¹ Hence, he released his son Yaqub from prison and appointed him Amir, advising him to make the best terms he could with the British.

During the course of the next two years, i.e. 1879-80, numerous events occurred in Anglo-Afghan politics. Sher Ali died at Mazar-Sharif on February 20, 1879 ; the British occupied the Valley of Kabul, and the Treaty of Gandamak was signed in May, 1879 ; in July Cavagnari was appointed British agent at Kabul ; in September, there was a rising in Kabul, in which Cavagnari and his staff died ; then took place the second British invasion of Afghanistan ; and Yaqub abdicated. In early 1880, Abdul Rahman appeared upon the scene to contest his ancestral throne : Lytton welcomed his arrival. At home the Conservatives were defeated in the general election of April, 1880. The Liberals came to power.

For almost two years, the fate of a major portion of Afghanistan remained uncertain ; twice it was occupied by Britain only to be set independent again shortly thereafter. Britain had several choices. Afghanistan as a whole, or a part of it could be

1. For Anglo-Russian correspondence on the subject of the independence of Afghanistan during the British invasion of 1878. See F. O. 65/1034. Schouvalov to Salisbury, Dec. 17, 87, and Salisbury's reply on Dec. 19, 87 : also F. O. 65/1034, no. 651. Dec. 14, 78.

annexed to India.¹ This was not done. Britain's only interest in Afghanistan was to make it a healthy buffer state between the British and the Russian possessions in Central Asia. This policy was faithfully maintained from the days of Auckland to those of Mountbatten. Britain did not expand in Central Asia, because this expansion would not give her any political or commercial advantages. For Russia, on the other hand, Central Asia served both these objectives. Thus Britain's indifference to Central Asia helped Russian growth in that area of the world.

1. Only Kurram Valley, Pishin and Sibbi were annexed to India.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have discussed how Russian influence grew while British influence waned in the region of Central Asia. The year 1857 is significant in the history of Central Asia because Russia, beaten in the Balkans, turned towards the conquest of Turkistan. It is also important that in 1857-1858, the British Crown took direct responsibility of the Government of India. By the year 1878 Russia was a power paramount in the whole of Central Asia.

During the course of this time, the problem that confronted the British policy maker was, should Russian expansion be stopped, and if so, how. The only possibility of arresting the Russian encroachment was either by British expansion in Central Asia, or by forming a confederacy of the Central Asian States against Russia, helped and supported by Britain. Neither was practicable to the British mind. Territorial extension beyond the north western frontiers of India was out of question. The Liberals hated the very idea. Only in case of an emergency did the Conservatives plan to occupy Herat or Qandhar, and only then with the approval of the Amir of Afghanistan. Central Asia, beyond the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, was not of great value to the British. Nor was the formation

of a confederacy of the Uzbek states feasible to the Anglo-Indian officials. An attempt to this effect had been made during the period of the first British occupation of Afghanistan (1839 – 1842) when British agents were sent to the courts of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva. The Amir of Bokhara opposed this attempt by arresting and murdering the British agents. This had a discouraging effect on the subsequent British policy regarding Central Asia.

Hence, though the British, both the public and the government felt at times greatly alarmed at Russia's expansion southward, they devised no means to counteract this movement. Britain contented herself by merely lodging periodic diplomatic remonstrances against Russian territorial acquisition in Turkistan.

The Russian policy makers fully understood the British policy and objectives in Central Asia. The region of Turkistan was destined to be absorbed by either of the major powers in the East, Russia or England. The latter was passive so Russia became active. She did not miss a single chance to achieve her objective. She readily gave assurances to Britain of her peaceful intentions regarding Central Asia, and repeatedly broke them whenever necessary. Britain was quite powerless to make her observe her promises.

Britain's policy regarding Central Asia on the other hand, aimed at making Afghanistan a buffer state between the Russian and the British possessions in the East with permanent British influence

in Afghanistan. This policy was kept alive at all costs. Two major wars were fought with the Afghans during the course of the Nineteenth Century to prevent Afghanistan from falling under Russian influence. Both the Afghans and the Russians were given to understand that Britain would not tolerate Russian predominance in Afghanistan. This policy worked out very well throughout the British rule in India, but it also meant that Russia was permitted to do much as she pleased north of the Hindu Kush.

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(ii) *Clarendon Papers.* George William Frederick Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon (1800—1870). F. O. 60/36. This correspondence is demi-official type. Of particular interest is Clarendon's correspondence with Buchanan between 1868 and 1870.

(iii) *Granville Papers.* George Leveson-Gower, second Earl of Granville (1815—1891), P. R. O. 30/29. The correspondence of Granville when he was

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1870—1874, contain's quite an interesting portion of relevent material. Most significant portion is his correspondence with the Duke of Argyll. Besides there is correspondence of Lord Canning, Gladstone and Loftus, which put some light on the British foreign policy.

(iv) *Russell Papers*. John, first Earl of Russell (1792—1878). P. R. O. 30/22. It is a demi-official correspondence between Russell and the British Minister at Teheran and the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

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(ii) *Lytton Papers*. Edward Robert Bulwar, first Earl of Lytton (1831—1891). Mss. Eur. E218. (printed and manuscript). Lord Lytton's correspondence as Viceroy of India 1876—1880, with Salisbury, Carnarvon, Disraeli, Cranbrook, Rawlinson and many other Indian officials, besides numerous political figures at home, is full of excitement. No study on British diplomacy in Central Asia during this period would be complete without consulting Lytton's private correspondence.

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
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


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
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
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